“China, as a responsible country, …”

Xinhualogical (English), Sept 26, 2023:

China, as a responsible country, is never absent at multilateral forums in which it takes part, said Wang at a press conference on a newly-released white paper, titled “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions.”

–
Sputnik (Chinese), Sept 26, 2023:

Wang Yi: APEC should not be a wrestling ring of provocation and confrontation
王毅：APEC峰会不应该是挑起对抗的角斗场
America will hold the 30th APEC leaders’ informal meeting. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said at a press conference held at the State Council news buro of a white book titled “Working together to build a community of human destiny: China’s advocacy and action” that APEC is the highest-level, most widely-ranging and most influential mechanism for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and should be a great stage for the promotion of cooperation, not a wrestling ring for provocation and confrontation.
美国将于11月举办亚太经合组织第十三次领导人非正式会议，中国外交部部长王毅在国务院新闻办公室举办的关于《携手构建人类命运共同体：中国的倡议与行动》白皮书新闻发布会上表示，亚太经合组织是亚太地区层级最高、领域最广、最具影响力的经济合作机制，应成为促进合作的大舞台，而不应是挑起对抗的角斗场。
Answering reporters’ questions^*) about whether Chairman Xi Jinping would attend the meeting, Wang Yi said:
“China is a responsible country, and we have never been absent from important multilateral forums where China participates. Concerning participation arrangements for APEC, we are maintaining communications with all parties and will officially publish information at the appropriate time.”
“中国是一个负责任的国家，我们从不缺席中方参与的重要多边论坛。关于出席亚太经合组织的安排，我们正在与各方保持沟通，会适时正式发布消息。”
Wang Yi pointed out that multilateral diplomacy is an important pillar of China’s participation and global governance and for the promotion of a community of human destiny. Obviously, it is also an important platform for the development of diplomacy between heads of state. Chairman Xi Jinping attaches great importance to multilateral diplomacy, and China’s role in global governance has become ever greater.
王毅指出，多边外交是中国参与全球治理、推进人类命运共同体的重要依托，当然也是开展元首外交的重要平台。习近平主席高度重视多边外交，中国在全球治理中发挥的作用越来越大。
[…..]

Wang’s warnings against “provocation” or “confrontation” can refer to lots of things, of course (the only thing being sure that they are targeting the U.S. as the host), but one of the issues on his mind is probably the attendance of Hong Kong’s chief executive. According to a report by Singapore’s “Lianhe Zaobao”, John Lee Ka-chiu may be locked out by the U.S. as the host country to the meeting. Washington had imposed sanctions on Lee at the time when he was Hong Kong’s security secretary, and played a role in implementing China’s “national security law” in Hong Kong.
It appears as if China makes his attendance at the informal summit a bargaining chip. It didn’t work on India, if Beijing tried it in the run-up to the G20 summit, too.
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Note

Sputnik’s article doesn’t make it clear if it was one reporter / one question, or several of either, but according to “Lianhe Zaobao”, the question was asked by a Bloomberg reporter.
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Related

John Lee: “Terrorism, iron fact”, June 3, 2020
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Wu Renhua’s “Day-by-Day Chronicle of the 1989 Tian An Men Incident”

我爱北京天安门 (I love Beijing Tian An Men) is a children’s song.
It is mostly about Mao Zedong, but still popular – see that video.

The following is an overview of some old translations – Tweets by Professor Wu Renhua (吴仁华), posted from April 15 to June 9, 2011, commemorating the Tian An Massacre, and remembering the months of hopes and ambitions before that. In fact, the emphasis is on how the Democracy Movement started and how it went – it’s the people’s history, not so much the “People’s Liberation Army’s” or its role in killing the people and their hopes.

My translation of it (which may include mistakes) starts with Wu’s April 15 post and ends with the April 25 post. The links within my translations are no longer valid, but there’s a re-post of Professor Wu’s work on “Wenxue City”.

The Weeks before June 4, 1989	Intro
The Weeks before June 4: Wu Renhua’s Introduction	Professor Wu
The Weeks before June 4 – a Desire to do Better than in 1987	April 15, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Towards the Sun	April 17, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – a Trip to North Korea	April 19 – 20, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Asserting Authority	April 21, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Hu Yaobang’s Funeral	April 22, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Role Allocations	April 23, 1989
Struggling for the Ideological Switch Stands	April 24, 1989
Deng Xiaoping’s remarks and the April-26 Editorial	April 25, 1989

If you do a translation yourself, please let me know, and I’ll link there.

Xi-Zelensky Phonecall: “China didn’t create the Ukraine Crisis”

The following is my translation of a CCTV / CPBS account of the telephone conversation between Chinese party and state leader Xi Jinping and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky on Wednesday. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

CCTV Xinwen Lianbo, April 26, 2023

The phone conversation ranked second in Central People’s Broadcasting Station’s “News and Press Review” (新闻和报纸摘要) on Thursday morning, and also second in CCTV’s evening news (新闻联播) on Wednesday evening. That doesn’t necessarily mean that the news itself was of greate importance in China, but Xi-related news always comes at the top of China’s news broadcasts.

Main Link: Xi Jinping has phone call with Ukrainian President Zelensky (习近平同乌克兰总统泽连斯基通电话)

Xi Jinping has phone call with Ukrainian President Zelensky
April 26, 2023, 19:35:09
Source: CCTV newsreader
习近平同乌克兰总统泽连斯基通电话
2023-04-26 19:35:09
来源：央视新闻客户端

On the afternoon of April 26, State Chairman Xi Jinping had a telephone conversation with Ukrainian President Zelensky on the latter’s invitation. The two sides exchanged views about Chinese-Ukrainian relations and the Ukraine crisis.
4月26日下午，国家主席习近平应约同乌克兰总统泽连斯基通电话。双方就中乌关系和乌克兰危机交换了意见。

Xi Jinping pointed out that Chinese-Ukrainian relations have passed the milestone of 31 years and reached the level of strategic partnership, which had been helpful in the development and revitalization of both countries. I appreciate President Zelensky’s repeated statements that he attaches importance to Chinese-Ukrainian relations and to cooperation with China, and I thank Ukraine for its great support in the evacuation of Chinese citizens last year. Mutual support for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is the political foundation for Chinese-Ukrainian relations. The two sides should have their focus on the future, be persistent in regarding and mapping¹ the two countries’ relations from a long-term perspective, with lasting mutual respect, in the tradition of treating each other sincerely, and promote the further development of the Chinese-Ukrainian strategic partnership. China’s wish to develop Chinese-Ukrainian relations is consistent and clear. No matter what changes there may be in the unstable international situation, China wants to carry the mutually beneficial cooperation with Ukraine forward.
习近平指出，中乌关系走过31年发展历程，达到战略伙伴关系水平，为两国各自发展振兴提供了助力。我赞赏泽连斯基总统多次表示重视发展中乌关系和对华合作，感谢乌方去年为中国公民撤离提供大力协助。相互尊重主权和领土完整是中乌关系的政治基础。双方要着眼未来，坚持从长远角度看待和谋划两国关系，延续双方相互尊重、真诚相待的传统，推动中乌战略伙伴关系向前发展。中方发展中乌关系的意愿是一贯的、明确的。无论国际风云如何变幻，中方愿同乌方一道，把两国互利合作向前推进。

Xi Jinping pointed out that the complex development of the Ukraine crisis had a major impact on the international situation. Concerning the problem of the Ukraine crisis, China had always stood on the side of peace, with the core position being to urge peace and to promote talks. I put forward a series of “four shoulds”², “four common denominators”³, and “three reflections”⁴. Also on this basis, China issued the document “China’s Position concerning the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. China didn’t create the Ukraine crisis, and isn’t a party involved in it. Being a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a responsible major power, we will neither [passively] watch the fires burning across the river, nor will we add fuel to it – let alone exploit the situation. China’s conduct and deeds are honorable and aboveboard. Dialogue and talks are the only feasible way out. There are no winners in a nuclear war. In dealing with the nuclear issue, all parties involved should maintain cool heads and restraint, focus on the real prospects and destiny of themselves and mankind, and manage the crisis well together. As the thoughts and voices of reason are gaining ground among all parties, we should seize the opportunity to gather conditions that are favorable for a political solution to the crisis. We hope that all parties will reflect deeply on the Ukraine crisis, and jointly seek a path to lasting peace in Europe. China will persist in encouraging peace and promoting talks, to resume individual efforts for peace to reach a ceasefire as soon as possible. The Chinese government will send its special Euro-Asian affairs representative to Ukraine and other countries to communicate thoroughly with all parties for a political solution to the Ukraine crisis. China has sent several humanitarian consignments to Ukraine before and is willing to provide all help that is in its power.
习近平指出，乌克兰危机复杂演变，对国际形势产生重大影响。在乌克兰危机问题上，中方始终站在和平一边，核心立场就是劝和促谈。我相继提出了“四个应该”、“四个共同”和“三点思考”。中方还在此基础上发布了《关于政治解决乌克兰危机的中国立场》文件。中国不是乌克兰危机的制造者，也不是当事方。作为联合国安理会常任理事国和负责任大国，我们既不会隔岸观火，也不会拱火浇油，更不干趁机牟利的事。中方所作所为光明正大。对话谈判是唯一可行的出路。核战争没有赢家。对待核问题，有关各方都应该保持冷静克制，真正从自身和全人类的前途命运着眼，共同管控好危机。现在各方理性的思考和声音在增加，应该抓住契机，为危机的政治解决积累有利条件。希望各方从乌克兰危机中深刻反思，通过对话，共同寻求欧洲长治久安之道。中方将坚持劝和促谈，为尽快止战停火、恢复和平作出自己的努力。中方将派中国政府欧亚事务特别代表赴乌克兰等国访问，就政治解决乌克兰危机同各方进行深入沟通。中方已向乌方提供了多批人道主义援助，愿继续提供力所能及的帮助。

Zelensky congratulated Chairman Xi on his re-election, praised China’s extraordinary accomplishments, expressed his belief that under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping, China would successfully answer to all challenges, and develop further. China upheld the United Nation’s guidance and principles in international affairs and was hugely influential in the international arena. Ukraine scrupulously abided by the one-China policy, hoped to unfold comprehensive cooperation with China, to open a new chapter in Ukrainian-Chinese relations, and jointly make efforts for the protection of global peace and stability. Zelensky presented his views on the Ukraine crisis, thanked China for the humanitarian aid it had provided, and welcomed its important impact in restoring peace and crisis-solving by diplomatic means.
泽连斯基祝贺习近平主席再次当选，赞赏中国取得的非凡成就，相信在习近平主席领导下，中国将成功应对各种挑战，持续向前发展。中方在国际事务中秉持联合国宪章宗旨和原则，在国际舞台上发挥着巨大影响力。乌方恪守一个中国政策，希望同中方开展全面合作，开启乌中关系的新篇章，共同致力于维护世界和平与稳定。泽连斯基介绍了对当前乌克兰危机的看法，感谢中方为乌克兰提供的人道主义援助，欢迎中方为恢复和平、通过外交手段解决危机发挥重要作用。

________________

Notes

1)	“Scheming”, actually, but that’s probably not the intended meaning.
2)	This refers to a “video conference” between Macron (France), Scholz (Germany) and Xi (China) on March 8, 2022. In a referral to that conference more than a month later, the China Institute of International Studies wrote that Xi Jinping pointed out in a video summit with the French and German leaders that all countries’ sovereignty, that territorial integrity should be respected, that the United Nations Charter’s guidance and principles should be complied with, that the legitimate security concerns of all countries should be taken seriously, and that all efforts that were beneficial for a peaceful solution of the crisis should get support.
3)	According to “Qiushi”: Four common denominators (四个共同), i. e. (1) jointly maintaining global peace and stability, (2) jointly advance global sustainable development, (3) jointly achieve mutually beneficial cooperation, and (4) jointly expand openness and harmonization.
4)	No idea what they are about.

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Related

“Now there is an Opportunity”, Zelensky video address, April 26, 2023
“We did not start this war”, President Zelensky, April 26
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China’s Position: Ukraine still hopes for the Best

On February 27, Ukraine issued a rejection of sorts of China’s February 24 position paper “on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. Advisor to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Mykhailo Podolyak, told “Freedom TV”  that the only effective measure the position paper called for was “immediate cessation of fire.”

“This means that Russia will remain in the occupied territories, we will have a new dividing line, and we will have a slow absorption of Ukraine. That is, the slow death of Ukraine,” the TV station quoted Pdolyak.

The rejection from Zelensky’s office, but only in an unofficial interview, suggests that Kiev doesn’t want to anger Beijing and possibly provoke Chinese lethal-arms supplies to Russia that wouldn’t happen otherwise.

^{中共中央外事工作委员会办公室主任王毅会见乌克兰外长库列巴，慕尼黑，Febr 18, 2023}

In an article published on March 3, “Freedom TV” quotes interviewees as saying that “it is too early to say that China is openly opposing Ukraine”. China’s “global ambitions”, its long common border with Russia, and its dependence on Russian energy supplies as well as the two countries’ traditional alliance are quoted as factors supporting the bilateral relationship, but “Beijing will not sacrifice its own well-being because of Russia, experts are sure”.

Part of China’s “well-beings” is the arable land it owns in Ukraine. It shouldn’t be too difficult to replace, given that Beijing’s investment companies are scouting all continents for farmable land to buy or rent, but it wouldn’t be fun to see the goose being killed by Russia – even if it isn’t quite the “golden” goose.

Besides, at least one of “Voice of America’s” interlocutors, Taiwan International Strategic Study Society director Ching-Sheng Lo (羅慶生), took a rather critical view of China’s food security, a year ago.

Lo Ching-Sheng says: “Having bought that much grain, with storage for a year and a half, there’s nothing to care about – no problem in the short run. If this should turn into an Afghanistan kind of war of twenty years, China’s problems will be very big.”
罗庆生说：“因为中国买了太多粮食的关系，它储存了一年半的粮食，所以一年半之内它不会有事情，所以短期的话没问题。长期的话，如果说变成阿富汗战争那个样子打个20年，那中国的问题就很大了。”

But the Russian hinterland will count more than Ukraine – be it for China’s “global ambitions”, be it for its food security. Beijing took a speaking decision in early February, 2022, a few weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine started. Answer to the unfolding crisis: more grain imports from Russia.

Ukraine’s hopes on China are unreasonably high. As Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a fellow for international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote,

The party can survive setbacks in the chip war, but the stakes are much higher in the fight for food security. Failure on the food security front will threaten the survival of the regime.

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Related

Kuleba addresses Asia, March 22, 2022

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China is wary of new China Strategies – of course

German-Chinese relations are under review by Germany’s federal government – Beijing is worried

I actually wanted to ignore the visit to Taiwan by “Free Democrat” (FDP) members of Germany’s federal parliament. The FDP  would drop Taiwan like a hot potato if Xi Jinping put China’s state-owned enterprises up for international privatization. It is understandable that Taiwan welcomes foreign visits, this one included, but forget that talk about “friendship”.

That said, China’s ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, makes sure that the German visit to Taiwan can’t be ignored – he’s making another fuss of it, in Germany’s business-friendly “Handelsblatt”, warning German politics “not to play with fire and not to test China’s red lines”. He is also worried that the German “traffic-light coalition”, consisting of Social Democrats, Greens, and the FDP (whose trademark color is yellow) would entirely follow America’s China policy.

The government’s colors

Nils Schmid, the Social Democrat parliament group’s spokesman on foreign affairs, says that he is “somewhat surprised” by Wu’s criticism. “The SPD parliamentary group demanded an adjustment of China policy, and the coalition agreement contains unambigious statements.”

The Chinese embassy has certainly laid its hands on one or several drafts of Berlin’s strategy papers. However, Schmid suggests that it must be a version that is several months old, and says that there is no final version yet. He adds that “contrary to China, where the state-controlled media certainly wouldn’t publish a similar criticism by foreign ambassadors, the Chinese ambassador has the opportunity to do so without being censored, around here.” This showed that there was systemic competition between China and democratic states after all.

Gyde Jensen, deputy chair of the FDP’s parliament group, says that Wu Ken’s answers show how fundamentally differently China interprets guiding liberal principles (“liberale Leitprinzipien”) and “bereaves them of their core concept, such as free markets, entrepreneurial freedom, human rights and multilateralism”. That alone was enough to explain why Germany needed a comprehensive China strategy, “for the record for everyone, China not least, to show how we see these principles and concepts and which action or rules we derive from them.” This included Germany’s interpretation of the “One-China policy”, concerning Taiwan.

China’s ambassador to Germany probably chose the “Handelsblatt” as an interlocutor not least because of its business-friendly position. However, by far not all German business is as involved in business with China as he appears to believe.

If it was up to Beijing, the Communist Party of China would determine China’s policy on Western countries, and business would continue to determine the West’s China policies. That was, of course, an extremely profitable arrangement for China, and it’s not really surprising that Beijing would like to keep it in place.

But every relationship, economically and politically, has to be in its stakeholders’ mutual interest (to borrow a Chinese slogan). Germany’s China policy will still be partly business-driven: if German business had got the “access” to Chinese markets it has long dreamed of, a tougher German policy on China would be almost inconceivable.

In that light, there is no reason to sing the praise of either Germany’s, America’s or any country’s government and their sudden attention for human rights et al. But there is reason to welcome their “tougher” policies. Depending on the “last versions” and their implementation, they may be in the national interest of our countries – at last.
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Related

“The Ukraine crisis it has triggered”, “China Daily”, Jan 10, 2023
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China-GCC Summit: “Let’s be Partners in our Civilizational Rise”

–
“The Chinese people see the Arab people as good friends”, then Chief State Councillor Wen Jiabao told his hosts during a visit to the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, thirteen years ago. A few months earlier, then Chinese special representative to the Middle East, Wu Sike, had told a press conference in Beijing that Islamic countries from government to the people, all understand and support the measures the Chinese government took to maintain stability.

To prove that, Xi Jinping held a summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (in the following: GCC) country leaders in Riyadh on Friday last week. Judging by the faces around the table, only God knows for sure how understanding and supportive the GCC leaders really are, but business is business, and maybe Arab heads of state and govenment never look happy during official appointments anyway. At any rate,

Mohammad Altowaim, a member of the Saudi Chinese Business Council, told the Global Times that he read Xi’s article carefully twice, and the second time he read it to his friends, he read it loud

China’s propaganda usually limits its posts on Twitter to trite feelgood quotes from their great helmsman, but Xi Jinping’s actual “keynote speech” was ambitious. How connective the interfaces of both sides, coined “highly complementary” by Xi, will turn out to be, remains to be seen.  But China’s reference point and litmus test – America – is showing promising signs: Washington is not happy, says CNN.

The following is my translation of Xi Jinping’s keynote speech, given at the China-GCC summit on Friday afternoon local time in Saudi Arabia. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Esteemed Colleagues, Secretary General Nayef, Hello Everyone!
尊敬的各位同事，
纳伊夫秘书长：
大家好！

First of all, let me sincerely express my heartfelt gratitude to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its efforts in holding the first Chinese-Gulf-Cooperation Council countries’ summit. I’m very glad that we are getting together all at once, to discuss the development of Sino-GCC relations together.
首先，我谨对沙特阿拉伯王国为举办首届中国－海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会峰会作出的努力表示衷心感谢。很高兴同大家齐聚一堂，共商中海关系发展大计。

China and the GCC countries share a history of nearly two-thousand years of friendly contacts. China and the GCC countries have maintained and valued peace, harmony, and sought the real knowledge of “Eastern wisdom”, along the ancient Silk Road. Ever since the GCC was established in 1981, China and the GCC have, for more than fourty years, written a brilliant work of unity and mutual help and win-win cooperation.
中国同海合会国家有近两千年友好交往历史。双方人民秉持重和平、尚和谐、求真知的“东方智慧”，沿着古丝绸之路往来不绝。1981年海合会一成立，中国即同海合会建立联系。40余年来，双方谱写了团结互助、合作共赢的灿烂篇章。

China and the GCC countries relations have, after all, achieved rapid development rooted in deep mutual trust. China and the GCC countries have always supported each others’ sovereignty and independence, respected each others’ paths of development, equality of big and small countries without exception, and firmly maintained multilateralism. Rooted in highly complementary [economies], with China’s vast consumer market and its perfect industrial system and with the GCC’s rich energy resources and increasingly diversified development, the two sides are natural cooperation partners. Rooted in popular sentiment, China and the GCC both belong to the Eastern civilization, with similar civilizational values and its peoples knowing each other well. Rooted in trials and tribulations lived through together, facing the challenges of international and regional instabilities and the financial crisis, the COVID-19 epidemic situation, and major natural disasters, the two sides have been in the same boat, keeping watch over each other.
中海关系之所以实现跨越式发展，归根于深厚互信，中国和海合会国家始终相互支持彼此主权独立，尊重各自发展道路，坚持大小国家一律平等，坚定维护多边主义。归根于高度互补，中国拥有广阔消费市场，工业体系完备；海方能源资源丰富，经济多元化发展方兴未艾，双方是天然合作伙伴。归根于民心相通，中海同属东方文明，文化价值相近，人民相知相亲。归根于患难与共，面对国际和地区风云变幻以及金融危机、新冠肺炎疫情、重大自然灾害等挑战，双方同舟共济，守望相助。

Colleagues!
各位同事！

Facing a century of turbulent changes, the GCC countries have united in their strife for self-improvement, have overcome the negative epidemic impact and achieved economic growth, actively promoted political solutions for regional hotspots and problems, promoted the GCC to become the Middle Eastern Gulf’s most vital regional organization, which is highly appreciated by China. At a historical crossroads, let’s contintue the good tradition of China-GCC strategic partnership, and substantiate the content of China’s and the GCC’s strategic relationship.
面对百年变局，海合会国家团结自强，克服疫情影响实现经济增长，积极推动地区热点难点问题政治解决，推动海合会成为中东海湾最具活力的地区组织，中方对此高度赞赏。站在历史的十字路口，我们要赓续中海友好传统，以建立中海战略伙伴关系为契机，充实中海关系战略内涵。

Let’s be partners in unity and continuously solidify mutual political trust, let’s firmly support each others’ core interests. Let’s jointly uphold the principle of non-interference, join hands for a genuine practice of multilateralism, and protect the numerous developing countries’ common interests.
——做共促团结的伙伴。我们要不断夯实政治互信，坚定支持彼此核心利益。共同维护不干涉内政原则，携手践行真正的多边主义，维护广大发展中国家共同利益。

Let’s be jointly-planning¹ partners. Let’s strengthen strategic development interfaces, bring complementary advantages into play, and train the kinetic energy of development. China looks forward to cooperating with all parties to promote and implement global development initiatives, to implement the United Nations’ agenda for sustainable development, and to promote regional development and prosperity.
——做共谋发展的伙伴。我们要加强发展战略对接，发挥互补优势，培育发展动能。中方期待同各方一道推进落实全球发展倡议，落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程，促进地区发展繁荣。

Let’s be partners in building security together. China will continue its firm support for GCC countries’ protection of their security, its support for the region’s countries in solving disagreement through dialogue and consultations, and in building a Gulf security framework. GCC countries are welcome to participate in global security initiatives and in upholding regional peace and stability together.
——做共筑安全的伙伴。中国将继续坚定支持海合会国家维护自身安全，支持地区国家通过对话协商化解分歧，构建海湾集体安全架构。欢迎海合会国家参与全球安全倡议，共同维护地区和平稳定。

Let’s be partners in our civilizational rise. We should enhance communication between our peoples, enrich cultural exchanges, learn from each others’ outstanding civilizational products, promote the eastern civilizations’ profound marrows, and make positive contributions to humankind’s civilizational development and progress.
——做共兴文明的伙伴。我们要增进民心相通，丰富人文交流，借鉴彼此优秀文化成果，弘扬东方文明深厚精髓，为人类文明发展进步作出积极贡献。
Colleagues!
各位同事！

During the coming three to five years, China would like to make efforts with the GCC countries in the following major fields of cooperation:
未来3到5年，中国愿同海合会国家在以下重点合作领域作出努力：

Firstly, let’s build a new pattern of three-dimensional energy cooperation. China will continue to import great quanitities of crude oil from GCC countries, broaden its imports of liquified natural gas, strengthen upstream oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and cooperation in engineering services and refining logistics. Full use should be made of Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, and the settlement of accounts in RMB should be developed. Hydrogen power, energy storage systems, wind and solar energy, intelligent electrical networks and other cooperation on clean and low-carbon energy technology as well as localization of new energy source equipment should be developed. A Sino-GCC forum for the peaceful use of nuclear technology as well as a Sino-GCC demonstration center for nuclear safety should be established, and 300 technical talents from GCC countries be educated in the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
第一，构建能源立体合作新格局。中国将继续从海合会国家持续大量进口原油，扩大进口液化天然气，加强油气上游开发、工程服务、储运炼化合作。充分利用上海石油天然气交易中心平台，开展油气贸易人民币结算。加强氢能、储能、风电光伏、智能电网等清洁低碳能源技术合作和新能源设备本地化生产合作。设立中海和平利用核技术论坛，共建中海核安保示范中心，为海合会国家培养300名和平利用核能与核技术人才。

Secondly, let’s make headway in financial and investment cooperation. China would like to cooperate with GCC countries to develop financial-supervision cooperation, facilitate GCC countries’ access to the Chinese capital market. establish sovereign wealth funds with GCC countries, and launch cooperation in numerous ways. Let’s explore and hold Sino-GCC industrial and investment cooperation forums. Let’s strengthen cooperation in the fields of investment in the digitized economy and in green development, and establish bilateral mechanisms for investment and economic cooperation. Let’s work on the interchangeability of our own currencies, deepen digitized currency cooperation, and promote the multiple central bank digital currency bridge project.
第二，推动金融投资合作新进展。中国愿同海合会国家开展金融监管合作，便利海合会国家企业进入中国资本市场。同海方成立共同投资联合会，支持双方主权财富基金以多种方式开展合作。研究举办中海产业和投资合作论坛。加强数字经济和绿色发展等领域投资合作，建立双边投资和经济合作工作机制。开展本币互换合作，深化数字货币合作，推进多边央行数字货币桥项目。

Thirdly, let’s expand new fields of cooperation on innovative technology. China would like to establish a big-data and cloud-computing center with GCC countries, strengthen 5G and 6G technological cooperation, jointly establish a number of innovation and startup incubators, and ten projects around cross-border e-commerce and communications infrastructure. Let’s establish a cooperation mechanism for meteorological cooperation between China and the GCC and hold research Sino-GCC research forums on climate change.
第三，拓展创新科技合作新领域。中国愿同海合会国家共建大数据和云计算中心，加强5G和6G技术合作，共建一批创新创业孵化器，围绕跨境电商合作和通信网络建设等领域实施10个数字经济项目。建立中海气象科技合作机制，举办中海应对气候变化研讨会。

Fourthly, let’s achieve new breakthroughs in space cooperation. China would like to carry out a series of cooperation projects concerning remote-sensing and communications satellites, space applications, and space infrastructure. Let’s select the best astronauts² for training. China welcomes GCC austronauts to the Chinese space station, to carry out scientific experiments on flights together with Chinese austronauts. GCC austronauts are welcome to participate in China’s Chang’E, Tianwen, etc. transport cooperation. and in the establishment of a Sino-GCC moon-probing and space-probing center.
第四，实现航天太空合作新突破。中国愿同海合会国家在遥感和通信卫星、空间应用、航天基础设施等领域开展一系列合作项目。开展航天员选拔训练合作，欢迎海合会国家航天员进入中国空间站，同中国航天员联合飞行并进行空间科学实验。欢迎海方参与中国嫦娥和天问等航天任务的搭载合作，研究成立中海联合月球和深空探测中心。

Fifthly, let’s build cooperation highlights in language and cultural cooperation. China is going to cooperate with 300 GCC universities, middle- and elementary schools for Chinese-language education to establish 300 Chinese-language classrooms, to provide 3000 “Chinese Bridge” summer (or winter) camps, establish Chinese Learning and Testing Centers and online Chinese classrooms. Let’s hold Sino-GCC language and cultural forums, build humanities exchange and mutual-learning and bilingual data bases.
第五，打造语言文化合作新亮点。中国将同300所海合会国家大中小学合作开展中文教育，同海合会国家合作设立300个中文智慧教室，提供3000个“汉语桥”夏（冬）令营名额，建立中文学习测试中心和网络中文课堂。举办中海语言文化论坛，共建中海人文交流和互鉴双语文库。

Colleagues!
各位同事！

China and the GCC countries all shoulder their own responsibilities in the mission of rejuvenated national development. The Sino-GCC relations are both old and young. Let’s connect the past and the future, advance hand in hand, and jointly initiate the beautiful future of Sino-GCC relations!
中国和海合会国家各自肩负民族发展振兴的光荣使命，中海关系既古老又年轻。让我们继往开来，携手奋进，共同开创中海关系美好未来！

Thank you all!
谢谢大家！

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Notes

1	共谋 (gòngmóu) is actually a rather negative verb – to scheme, to conspire, etc.. “Jointly plan” is also a possible translation, but by far the nicest one among a rather nasty lot.
2	Chinese-English nomenclature: taikonaut

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Related

How to speak to Pakistan, April 22, 2015

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The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China”	(Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.”	(We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.”	(Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.”	(Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”.	If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle.	This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it. Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

or the other way round,

Table 2

Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be

because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Updates

Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestags, undatiert, acc April 13, 2023

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Chinese-Philippines Ties: “Brimming with Expectations”

The following is my translation of a press release by the Chinese foreign ministry (FMPRC), published on Wednesday morning (GMT) this week.

Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

一百聞不如一見：
maritime disputes (click map for source)

Main Link: 

Wang Yi meets Philippine national security advisor Carlos

王毅会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯

On July 6 local time, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Philippine National Security Advisor Ms Carlos¹⁾ in Manila.

当地时间2022年7月6日，国务委员兼外长王毅在马尼拉会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯女士。

Wang Yi said that Sino-Philippine have a thousand-year history of friendly relations. During the past six years, with the joint efforts of both sides, Sino-Philippine relations had achieved a change for the better and advanced quality. The election of President Marcos had opened a new page in Sino-Philippine relations, and the two countries’ peoples were brimming with expectations for the development of bilateral relations. This visit represents the Chinese side’s focus on Sino-Philippine relations and its support for the new government, the continuity and stability in China’s friendly policies toward the Philippines. China would like to cooperate with the Philippine side to implement the important consensus between the two heads of state, to deepen pragmatic cooperation and to initiate another “golden age” in Sino-Philippines relations.

王毅表示，中菲有着千年友好交往历史。过去6年来，在双方共同努力下，中菲关系实现转圜改善、提质升级。马科斯总统当选为中菲关系翻开了新的一页，两国人民对双边关系发展充满期待。此访旨在体现中方对中菲关系的重视和对菲新一届政府的支持，体现中国对菲友好政策的连续性和稳定性。中方愿同菲方落实好两国元首重要共识，深化各领域务实合作，开创中菲关系下一个“黄金时代”。

Carlos said that the two peoples of the Philippines and China were were deeply attached and culturally connected to each other. China was a friendly major power. Chairman Xi Jinping had emphasized that he wanted to create a prosperous and beautiful future together with the Ascia-Pacific countries. The Philippine side is fully in favor of this and would like to broaden exchange and cooperation with the Chinese side, handle disagreements properly, promote mutual trust, improve confidence, gather goodwill and strengthen friendship.

卡洛斯说，菲中两国人民相亲、文化相通。中国是友善的大国。习近平主席强调要同亚太国家共创共享和平繁荣的美好未来，菲方完全赞同，愿同中方扩大交流合作，妥善处理分歧，促进互信、增强信心、积累善意，巩固友好。

Wang Yi said that China had never followed the traditional great powers’ road of colonialism and lootings and that it would maintain its own peaceful development, maintain cooperation and win-win, maintain shared development of opportunities with neighboring countries, join hands to build the community of human destiny²⁾ together and take good care the global village inhabited by all of us together.

王毅说，中国从不走传统大国殖民掠夺的老路，将坚持自身和平发展，坚持合作共赢，坚持与邻国分享发展机遇，携手共建人类命运共同体，呵护好我们共同居住的地球村。

Wang Yi emphasized that China and the Philippines were neighbors neither of which could be moved away, and our choice was friendship, friendship, and friendship again. The healthy continuation and the stable development of Sino-Philippine relatoins was in accordance with the two countries’ and the two peoples’ fundamental and long-term interests. Given the current international and regional situation full of uncertainty and instability, the two sides must continue and enhance their traditional friendship, and let Sino-Philippines relations become more stable and durable, so as to keep them moving forward on the right track.

王毅强调，中菲是搬不走的邻居，我们唯一的选择就是友好、友好、再友好。中菲关系健康持续稳定发展符合两国和两国人民的根本和长远利益。面对当前充满不确定不稳定性的国际地区形势，双方要传承弘扬传统友好，使中菲关系更加稳固坚韧，始终沿着正确轨道向前发展。

Both sides believed unanimously that people-to-people exchange should be strengthened and that the two countries’ friendly public opinion and the societal foundations of the two countries’ friendship be solidified.

双方一致认为应加强人文交流，夯实两国友好的民意和社会基础。

The two sides unanimously believed that the valuable experience of the two countries should be summed up, the overall situation of Sino-Philippine friendship should be actively protected, bilateral relations should not be defined by disputes, and definite differences not be allowed to be in the way of the two countries’ cooperation.

双方一致认为应总结两国交往宝贵经验，努力维护中菲友好大局，不以争议定义双边关系，不让具体分歧阻碍两国合作。

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Notes

¹⁾ Clarita Reyes Carlos, aka Clarita Carlos
²⁾ frequently, but not precisely, translated as a community with a shared future
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