Posts tagged ‘negotiations’

Wednesday, January 11, 2023

China is wary of new China Strategies – of course

German-Chinese relations are under review by Germany’s federal government – Beijing is worried

I actually wanted to ignore the visit to Taiwan by “Free Democrat” (FDP) members of Germany’s federal parliament. The FDP  would drop Taiwan like a hot potato if Xi Jinping put China’s state-owned enterprises up for international privatization. It is understandable that Taiwan welcomes foreign visits, this one included, but forget that talk about “friendship”.

That said, China’s ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, makes sure that the German visit to Taiwan can’t be ignored – he’s making another fuss of it, in Germany’s business-friendly “Handelsblatt”, warning German politics “not to play with fire and not to test China’s red lines”. He is also worried that the German “traffic-light coalition”, consisting of Social Democrats, Greens, and the FDP (whose trademark color is yellow) would entirely follow America’s China policy.

The government's colors

The government’s colors

Nils Schmid, the Social Democrat parliament group’s spokesman on foreign affairs, says that he is “somewhat surprised” by Wu’s criticism. “The SPD parliamentary group demanded an adjustment of China policy, and the coalition agreement contains unambigious statements.”

The Chinese embassy has certainly laid its hands on one or several drafts of Berlin’s strategy papers. However, Schmid suggests that it must be a version that is several months old, and says that there is no final version yet. He adds that “contrary to China, where the state-controlled media certainly wouldn’t publish a similar criticism by foreign ambassadors, the Chinese ambassador has the opportunity to do so without being censored, around here.” This showed that there was systemic competition between China and democratic states after all.

Gyde Jensen, deputy chair of the FDP’s parliament group, says that Wu Ken’s answers show how fundamentally differently China interprets guiding liberal principles (“liberale Leitprinzipien”) and “bereaves them of their core concept, such as free markets, entrepreneurial freedom, human rights and multilateralism”. That alone was enough to explain why Germany needed a comprehensive China strategy, “for the record for everyone, China not least, to show how we see these principles and concepts and which action or rules we derive from them.” This included Germany’s interpretation of the “One-China policy”, concerning Taiwan.

China’s ambassador to Germany probably chose the “Handelsblatt” as an interlocutor not least because of its business-friendly position. However, by far not all German business is as involved in business with China as he appears to believe.

If it was up to Beijing, the Communist Party of China would determine China’s policy on Western countries, and business would continue to determine the West’s China policies. That was, of course, an extremely profitable arrangement for China, and it’s not really surprising that Beijing would like to keep it in place.

But every relationship, economically and politically, has to be in its stakeholders’ mutual interest (to borrow a Chinese slogan). Germany’s China policy will still be partly business-driven: if German business had got the “access” to Chinese markets it has long dreamed of, a tougher German policy on China would be almost inconceivable.

In that light, there is no reason to sing the praise of either Germany’s, America’s or any country’s government and their sudden attention for human rights et al. But there is reason to welcome their “tougher” policies. Depending on the “last versions” and their implementation, they may be in the national interest of our countries – at last.
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Related

“The Ukraine crisis it has triggered”, “China Daily”, Jan 10, 2023
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Monday, December 12, 2022

China-GCC Summit: “Let’s be Partners in our Civilizational Rise”


“The Chinese people see the Arab people as good friends”, then Chief State Councillor Wen Jiabao told his hosts during a visit to the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, thirteen years ago. A few months earlier, then Chinese special representative to the Middle East, Wu Sike, had told a press conference in Beijing that Islamic countries from government to the people, all understand and support the measures the Chinese government took to maintain stability.

20221209_xwlb_20221210_sino_gcc_summit_02

To prove that, Xi Jinping held a summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (in the following: GCC) country leaders in Riyadh on Friday last week. Judging by the faces around the table, only God knows for sure how understanding and supportive the GCC leaders really are, but business is business, and maybe Arab heads of state and govenment never look happy during official appointments anyway. At any rate,

Mohammad Altowaim, a member of the Saudi Chinese Business Council, told the Global Times that he read Xi’s article carefully twice, and the second time he read it to his friends, he read it loud

China’s propaganda usually limits its posts on Twitter to trite feelgood quotes from their great helmsman, but Xi Jinping’s actual “keynote speech” was ambitious. How connective the interfaces of both sides, coined “highly complementary” by Xi, will turn out to be, remains to be seen.  But China’s reference point and litmus test – America – is showing promising signs: Washington is not happy, says CNN.

The following is my translation of Xi Jinping’s keynote speech, given at the China-GCC summit on Friday afternoon local time in Saudi Arabia. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Esteemed Colleagues, Secretary General Nayef, Hello Everyone!
尊敬的各位同事,
纳伊夫秘书长:
大家好!

First of all, let me sincerely express my heartfelt gratitude to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its efforts in holding the first Chinese-Gulf-Cooperation Council countries’ summit. I’m very glad that we are getting together all at once, to discuss the development of Sino-GCC relations together.
首先,我谨对沙特阿拉伯王国为举办首届中国-海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会峰会作出的努力表示衷心感谢。很高兴同大家齐聚一堂,共商中海关系发展大计。

China and the GCC countries share a history of nearly two-thousand years of friendly contacts. China and the GCC countries have maintained and valued peace, harmony, and sought the real knowledge of “Eastern wisdom”, along the ancient Silk Road. Ever since the GCC was established in 1981, China and the GCC have, for more than fourty years, written a brilliant work of unity and mutual help and win-win cooperation.
中国同海合会国家有近两千年友好交往历史。双方人民秉持重和平、尚和谐、求真知的“东方智慧”,沿着古丝绸之路往来不绝。1981年海合会一成立,中国即同海合会建立联系。40余年来,双方谱写了团结互助、合作共赢的灿烂篇章。

China and the GCC countries relations have, after all, achieved rapid development rooted in deep mutual trust. China and the GCC countries have always supported each others’ sovereignty and independence, respected each others’ paths of development, equality of big and small countries without exception, and firmly maintained multilateralism. Rooted in highly complementary [economies], with China’s vast consumer market and its perfect industrial system and with the GCC’s rich energy resources and increasingly diversified development, the two sides are natural cooperation partners. Rooted in popular sentiment, China and the GCC both belong to the Eastern civilization, with similar civilizational values and its peoples knowing each other well. Rooted in trials and tribulations lived through together, facing the challenges of international and regional instabilities and the financial crisis, the COVID-19 epidemic situation, and major natural disasters, the two sides have been in the same boat, keeping watch over each other.
中海关系之所以实现跨越式发展,归根于深厚互信,中国和海合会国家始终相互支持彼此主权独立,尊重各自发展道路,坚持大小国家一律平等,坚定维护多边主义。归根于高度互补,中国拥有广阔消费市场,工业体系完备;海方能源资源丰富,经济多元化发展方兴未艾,双方是天然合作伙伴。归根于民心相通,中海同属东方文明,文化价值相近,人民相知相亲。归根于患难与共,面对国际和地区风云变幻以及金融危机、新冠肺炎疫情、重大自然灾害等挑战,双方同舟共济,守望相助。

Colleagues!
各位同事!

Facing a century of turbulent changes, the GCC countries have united in their strife for self-improvement, have overcome the negative epidemic impact and achieved economic growth, actively promoted political solutions for regional hotspots and problems, promoted the GCC to become the Middle Eastern Gulf’s most vital regional organization, which is highly appreciated by China. At a historical crossroads, let’s contintue the good tradition of China-GCC strategic partnership, and substantiate the content of China’s and the GCC’s strategic relationship.
面对百年变局,海合会国家团结自强,克服疫情影响实现经济增长,积极推动地区热点难点问题政治解决,推动海合会成为中东海湾最具活力的地区组织,中方对此高度赞赏。站在历史的十字路口,我们要赓续中海友好传统,以建立中海战略伙伴关系为契机,充实中海关系战略内涵。

Let’s be partners in unity and continuously solidify mutual political trust, let’s firmly support each others’ core interests. Let’s jointly uphold the principle of non-interference, join hands for a genuine practice of multilateralism, and protect the numerous developing countries’ common interests.
——做共促团结的伙伴。我们要不断夯实政治互信,坚定支持彼此核心利益。共同维护不干涉内政原则,携手践行真正的多边主义,维护广大发展中国家共同利益。

Let’s be jointly-planning1 partners. Let’s strengthen strategic development interfaces, bring complementary advantages into play, and train the kinetic energy of development. China looks forward to cooperating with all parties to promote and implement global development initiatives, to implement the United Nations’ agenda for sustainable development, and to promote regional development and prosperity.
——做共谋发展的伙伴。我们要加强发展战略对接,发挥互补优势,培育发展动能。中方期待同各方一道推进落实全球发展倡议,落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程,促进地区发展繁荣。

Let’s be partners in building security together. China will continue its firm support for GCC countries’ protection of their security, its support for the region’s countries in solving disagreement through dialogue and consultations, and in building a Gulf security framework. GCC countries are welcome to participate in global security initiatives and in upholding regional peace and stability together.
——做共筑安全的伙伴。中国将继续坚定支持海合会国家维护自身安全,支持地区国家通过对话协商化解分歧,构建海湾集体安全架构。欢迎海合会国家参与全球安全倡议,共同维护地区和平稳定。

Let’s be partners in our civilizational rise. We should enhance communication between our peoples, enrich cultural exchanges, learn from each others’ outstanding civilizational products, promote the eastern civilizations’ profound marrows, and make positive contributions to humankind’s civilizational development and progress.
——做共兴文明的伙伴。我们要增进民心相通,丰富人文交流,借鉴彼此优秀文化成果,弘扬东方文明深厚精髓,为人类文明发展进步作出积极贡献。
Colleagues!
各位同事!

During the coming three to five years, China would like to make efforts with the GCC countries in the following major fields of cooperation:
未来3到5年,中国愿同海合会国家在以下重点合作领域作出努力:

Firstly, let’s build a new pattern of three-dimensional energy cooperation. China will continue to import great quanitities of crude oil from GCC countries, broaden its imports of liquified natural gas, strengthen upstream oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and cooperation in engineering services and refining logistics. Full use should be made of Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, and the settlement of accounts in RMB should be developed. Hydrogen power, energy storage systems, wind and solar energy, intelligent electrical networks and other cooperation on clean and low-carbon energy technology as well as localization of new energy source equipment should be developed. A Sino-GCC forum for the peaceful use of nuclear technology as well as a Sino-GCC demonstration center for nuclear safety should be established, and 300 technical talents from GCC countries be educated in the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
第一,构建能源立体合作新格局。中国将继续从海合会国家持续大量进口原油,扩大进口液化天然气,加强油气上游开发、工程服务、储运炼化合作。充分利用上海石油天然气交易中心平台,开展油气贸易人民币结算。加强氢能、储能、风电光伏、智能电网等清洁低碳能源技术合作和新能源设备本地化生产合作。设立中海和平利用核技术论坛,共建中海核安保示范中心,为海合会国家培养300名和平利用核能与核技术人才。

Secondly, let’s make headway in financial and investment cooperation. China would like to cooperate with GCC countries to develop financial-supervision cooperation, facilitate GCC countries’ access to the Chinese capital market. establish sovereign wealth funds with GCC countries, and launch cooperation in numerous ways. Let’s explore and hold Sino-GCC industrial and investment cooperation forums. Let’s strengthen cooperation in the fields of investment in the digitized economy and in green development, and establish bilateral mechanisms for investment and economic cooperation. Let’s work on the interchangeability of our own currencies, deepen digitized currency cooperation, and promote the multiple central bank digital currency bridge project.
第二,推动金融投资合作新进展。中国愿同海合会国家开展金融监管合作,便利海合会国家企业进入中国资本市场。同海方成立共同投资联合会,支持双方主权财富基金以多种方式开展合作。研究举办中海产业和投资合作论坛。加强数字经济和绿色发展等领域投资合作,建立双边投资和经济合作工作机制。开展本币互换合作,深化数字货币合作,推进多边央行数字货币桥项目。

Thirdly, let’s expand new fields of cooperation on innovative technology. China would like to establish a big-data and cloud-computing center with GCC countries, strengthen 5G and 6G technological cooperation, jointly establish a number of innovation and startup incubators, and ten projects around cross-border e-commerce and communications infrastructure. Let’s establish a cooperation mechanism for meteorological cooperation between China and the GCC and hold research Sino-GCC research forums on climate change.
第三,拓展创新科技合作新领域。中国愿同海合会国家共建大数据和云计算中心,加强5G和6G技术合作,共建一批创新创业孵化器,围绕跨境电商合作和通信网络建设等领域实施10个数字经济项目。建立中海气象科技合作机制,举办中海应对气候变化研讨会。

Fourthly, let’s achieve new breakthroughs in space cooperation. China would like to carry out a series of cooperation projects concerning remote-sensing and communications satellites, space applications, and space infrastructure. Let’s select the best astronauts2 for training. China welcomes GCC austronauts to the Chinese space station, to carry out scientific experiments on flights together with Chinese austronauts. GCC austronauts are welcome to participate in China’s Chang’E, Tianwen, etc. transport cooperation. and in the establishment of a Sino-GCC moon-probing and space-probing center.
第四,实现航天太空合作新突破。中国愿同海合会国家在遥感和通信卫星、空间应用、航天基础设施等领域开展一系列合作项目。开展航天员选拔训练合作,欢迎海合会国家航天员进入中国空间站,同中国航天员联合飞行并进行空间科学实验。欢迎海方参与中国嫦娥和天问等航天任务的搭载合作,研究成立中海联合月球和深空探测中心。

Fifthly, let’s build cooperation highlights in language and cultural cooperation. China is going to cooperate with 300 GCC universities, middle- and elementary schools for Chinese-language education to establish 300 Chinese-language classrooms, to provide 3000 “Chinese Bridge” summer (or winter) camps, establish Chinese Learning and Testing Centers and online Chinese classrooms. Let’s hold Sino-GCC language and cultural forums, build humanities exchange and mutual-learning and bilingual data bases.
第五,打造语言文化合作新亮点。中国将同300所海合会国家大中小学合作开展中文教育,同海合会国家合作设立300个中文智慧教室,提供3000个“汉语桥”夏(冬)令营名额,建立中文学习测试中心和网络中文课堂。举办中海语言文化论坛,共建中海人文交流和互鉴双语文库。

Colleagues!
各位同事!

China and the GCC countries all shoulder their own responsibilities in the mission of rejuvenated national development. The Sino-GCC relations are both old and young. Let’s connect the past and the future, advance hand in hand, and jointly initiate the beautiful future of Sino-GCC relations!
中国和海合会国家各自肩负民族发展振兴的光荣使命,中海关系既古老又年轻。让我们继往开来,携手奋进,共同开创中海关系美好未来!

Thank you all!
谢谢大家!

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Notes

1 共谋 (gòngmóu) is actually a rather negative verb – to scheme, to conspire, etc.. “Jointly plan” is also a possible translation, but by far the nicest one among a rather nasty lot.
2 Chinese-English nomenclature: taikonaut

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How to speak to Pakistan, April 22, 2015

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Thursday, September 8, 2022

The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

taiwanren_are_also_chinese

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China” (Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.” (We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.” (Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.” (Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”. If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle. This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it.
Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

table_one_mainland_china

or the other way round,

Table 2

table_two_orc
Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

table_three_orc

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be
table_must_not_exist
because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

table_four_taiwan
That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

____________

Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Friday, July 8, 2022

Chinese-Philippines Ties: “Brimming with Expectations”

The following is my translation of a press release by the Chinese foreign ministry (FMPRC), published on Wednesday morning (GMT) this week.

Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

Lines of disputes in the South China Sea (map)

一百聞不如一見:
maritime disputes (click map for source)

Main Link: 

Wang Yi meets Philippine national security advisor Carlos

王毅会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯

On July 6 local time, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Philippine National Security Advisor Ms Carlos1) in Manila.

当地时间2022年7月6日,国务委员兼外长王毅在马尼拉会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯女士。

Wang Yi said that Sino-Philippine have a thousand-year history of friendly relations. During the past six years, with the joint efforts of both sides, Sino-Philippine relations had achieved a change for the better and advanced quality. The election of President Marcos had opened a new page in Sino-Philippine relations, and the two countries’ peoples were brimming with expectations for the development of bilateral relations. This visit represents the Chinese side’s focus on Sino-Philippine relations and its support for the new government, the continuity and stability in China’s friendly policies toward the Philippines. China would like to cooperate with the Philippine side to implement the important consensus between the two heads of state, to deepen pragmatic cooperation and to initiate another “golden age” in Sino-Philippines relations.

王毅表示,中菲有着千年友好交往历史。过去6年来,在双方共同努力下,中菲关系实现转圜改善、提质升级。马科斯总统当选为中菲关系翻开了新的一页,两国人民对双边关系发展充满期待。此访旨在体现中方对中菲关系的重视和对菲新一届政府的支持,体现中国对菲友好政策的连续性和稳定性。中方愿同菲方落实好两国元首重要共识,深化各领域务实合作,开创中菲关系下一个“黄金时代”。

Carlos said that the two peoples of the Philippines and China were were deeply attached and culturally connected to each other. China was a friendly major power. Chairman Xi Jinping had emphasized that he wanted to create a prosperous and beautiful future together with the Ascia-Pacific countries. The Philippine side is fully in favor of this and would like to broaden exchange and cooperation with the Chinese side, handle disagreements properly, promote mutual trust, improve confidence, gather goodwill and strengthen friendship.

卡洛斯说,菲中两国人民相亲、文化相通。中国是友善的大国。习近平主席强调要同亚太国家共创共享和平繁荣的美好未来,菲方完全赞同,愿同中方扩大交流合作,妥善处理分歧,促进互信、增强信心、积累善意,巩固友好。

Wang Yi said that China had never followed the traditional great powers’ road of colonialism and lootings and that it would maintain its own peaceful development, maintain cooperation and win-win, maintain shared development of opportunities with neighboring countries, join hands to build the community of human destiny2) together and take good care the global village inhabited by all of us together.

王毅说,中国从不走传统大国殖民掠夺的老路,将坚持自身和平发展,坚持合作共赢,坚持与邻国分享发展机遇,携手共建人类命运共同体,呵护好我们共同居住的地球村。

Wang Yi emphasized that China and the Philippines were neighbors neither of which could be moved away, and our choice was friendship, friendship, and friendship again. The healthy continuation and the stable development of Sino-Philippine relatoins was in accordance with the two countries’ and the two peoples’ fundamental and long-term interests. Given the current international and regional situation full of uncertainty and instability, the two sides must continue and enhance their traditional friendship, and let Sino-Philippines relations become more stable and durable, so as to keep them moving forward on the right track.

王毅强调,中菲是搬不走的邻居,我们唯一的选择就是友好、友好、再友好。中菲关系健康持续稳定发展符合两国和两国人民的根本和长远利益。面对当前充满不确定不稳定性的国际地区形势,双方要传承弘扬传统友好,使中菲关系更加稳固坚韧,始终沿着正确轨道向前发展。

Both sides believed unanimously that people-to-people exchange should be strengthened and that the two countries’ friendly public opinion and the societal foundations of the two countries’ friendship be solidified.

双方一致认为应加强人文交流,夯实两国友好的民意和社会基础。

The two sides unanimously believed that the valuable experience of the two countries should be summed up, the overall situation of Sino-Philippine friendship should be actively protected, bilateral relations should not be defined by disputes, and definite differences not be allowed to be in the way of the two countries’ cooperation.

双方一致认为应总结两国交往宝贵经验,努力维护中菲友好大局,不以争议定义双边关系,不让具体分歧阻碍两国合作。

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Notes

1) Clarita Reyes Carlos, aka Clarita Carlos
2) frequently, but not precisely, translated as a community with a shared future
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Wednesday, March 23, 2022

Biden-Xi Videolink last Friday: “Some People haven’t put the positive statements of Mr. President into practice”

When one guy knows what the other one thinks while saying something completely different, that’s probably called successful diplomacy – at least when relations are rotten. That’s also true for the video meeting of the American and Chinese heads of state last Friday (March 18).
What strikes the reader of the communiqués are the shares of the two participants in each others’ readouts.

Xinhua communiqué of Biden-Xi videolink on March 18, 2022

Characters count: Biden 224 / 1187 Xi (Xinhua)

The White House’s readout contains only 164 words, none of which can be attributed to the Chinese interlcoutor alone – and it mentions implications and consequences if China provides material support to Russia. Xinhua, on the other hand, doesn’t even mention President Biden’s threat.
Let’s focus on the Xinhua communiqué.

The first cross-purposes talk is about the legendary “One-China policy”. This term, probably garaged in every joint statement ever issued by China and a new diplomatic counterpart, can mean very different things from one country to another. The US, for example, “acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position.” There’s no position taken by the United States here.

So when Biden declares that “that U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed”, Xi Jinping knows that this is no recognition of China’s claims concerning Taiwan. Still, as if they mean the same thing, Xi expresses tells Biden how much he values his statement.

Following that, Xinhua’s account moves on to Chinese accusations made by Xi. Sino-US relations hadn’t recovered from the difficulties created “by the previous administration” (i. e. the Trump admin, but without naming it). Rather, even more challenges to these relations were emerging. Xi continues:

In particular, some people in America send wrong signals to the forces [in Taiwan] supporting “Taiwanese independence”. If the Taiwan issue isn’t handled well, this can have a subverting effect on [Sino-US] relations. We hope that America attaches sufficient attention to this. The immediate cause for the situation in Sino-American relations is that some people on the American side don’t implement the significant consensus the two of us [Biden and Xi] have achieved, and that they haven’t put the positive statements of Mr. President into practice either. America’s strategic intentions towards China have created misinterpretations and wrong assessments.
特别是美国一些人向“台独”势力发出错误信号,这是十分危险的。台湾问题如果处理不好,将会对两国关系造成颠覆性影响。希望美方予以足够重视。中美关系之所以出现目前的局面,直接原因是,美方一些人没有落实我们两人达成的重要共识,也没有把总统先生的积极表态落到实处。美方对中方的战略意图作出了误读误判。

Xi ostensibly gives Biden “credit” by condemning the Trump administration. This follows an opportunistic pattern in China by which it also judges its own past dynasties. Every misery and every defect is blamed on (now powerless) sinister guys from the pre-“communist” past, and the CPC is the mother of all progress. That’s how those in power today can talk with each other and be at ease – albeit at the cost of historical accuracy, at least in public.

Also, Xi applies a similar ambiguity to opponents in America, as Biden America applies to the status of Taiwan. Who are those “some people on the American side”? They could refer to quarters within the Biden administration, but also to opposition politicians like Trumps former secretary of state Michael Pompeo – considered a spawn of hell by Beijing, for reasons like these.

As China doesn’t understand the concept of an opposition, those portrayed by Xi as saboteurs may just be some American newspaper columnist who happened to catch his eye.

Then the conversation – according to Xinhua – turns to Ukraine. Xi uses the same keywords as usual – avoiding escalation, paying attention to the tasks of the moment, overcoming “cold-war mentality”, etc.. Both heads of state agree, finally, to make efforts respectively to a) get their countries’ relations back on track and b) to find an appropriate solution for the “Ukraine crisis”.

Main Chinese concerns, apart from more stable Sino-US relations, appear to be economic issues. The situation “it had come to in Ukraine” wasn’t what China wanted to see, Xinhua quotes Xi. He criticizes “comprehensive and indiscriminate sanctions that caused “suffering among the common people, and points to a double challenge – Covid-SARS and economic development, both influenced by the two most recent crises.

There may be one deviation from the usual talk however: “only the one who attached the bell to the tiger  can remove it again”.

If Biden followed up and asked if this referred to him or to Putin (or Zelensky, or everyone) is not passed down on us, but one might guess that Xi didn’t mainly refer to Moscow.

Ding Xuexiang, Liu He and Wang Yi as well as other persons attended on Xi’s side of the meeting.

Thursday, March 10, 2022

Flames of War, deeply felt and lamented by China

The following is my translation of a Xinhua report, republished by the Chinese government (State Council). There’s also a translation by “China Daily”, on their “English-Language Solutions” website. Blend them together as you see fit.

It might be worth mentioning that one of the participants on Xi’s side was Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), the Communist Party’s general office director, although Xi probably took part in the “video summit” in his capacity as China’s head of state.

March 8 Xi-Macron-Scholz "video summit"

Chinese pyramid: That’s the way Xi likes it


Main Link: Xi Jinping holds video summit with French and German leaders
习近平同法国德国领导人举行视频峰会

March 8, 2022, 19:53, Xinhua
2022-03-08 19:53 来源: 新华社

In the afternoon of March 8, Chinese state chairman Xi Jinping held a video summit with French president Macron and German chancellor Scholz.
新华社北京3月8日电 国家主席习近平3月8日下午在北京同法国总统马克龙、德国总理朔尔茨举行视频峰会。

Xi Jinping pointed out that in the current world, once-in-a-hundred-years changes and the centennial pandemic situation go hand in hand. They bring global challenges that require global cooperation. China and Europe speak numerous common languages in terms of seeking peace, seeking development, and promoting cooperation. We must shoulder responsibilities to bring more stability and certainty to a turbulently changing world. The two sides must take a continuous and far-sighted approach to strengthen dialogue, maintain cooperation, and promote Chinese-European relations. China’s development will bring more space for Chinese-European cooperation. Based on the principle of mutual benefit and double-win, the two sides must maintain and deepen green and digital partnership relations and pragmatic cooperation in all fieds. The two sides should continue and maintain multilateralism, and advance major global agendas.
习近平指出,当今世界,百年变局和世纪疫情交织,带来很多全球性挑战,需要全球性合作。中欧在谋和平、求发展、促合作方面有很多共同语言。我们要拿出担当,为动荡变化的世界注入更多稳定性和确定性。双方要加强对话,坚持合作,推动中欧关系行稳致远。中国的发展将为中欧合作带来更大空间。双方要继续本着互利共赢原则,持续深化绿色、数字伙伴关系和各领域务实合作。双方要继续坚持多边主义,推进重大全球性议程。

Macron and Scholz expressed congratulations regarding the successful holding of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games. The world is facing many challenges, and fighting alone will only worsen the situation. The European side attaches importance to China’s important and positive role in global affairs and wants to work closeley with China to make common efforts to solve climate change, public health and other important global challenges. The European side wants to work together with theChinese side to  successfully hold a European-Chinese leaders’ meeting, to promote a continuous forward development of French-Chinese and German-Chinese as well as European-Chinese relations.
马克龙、朔尔茨表示,祝贺中方成功举办北京冬奥会。当今世界面临诸多挑战,单打独斗,只会使形势恶化。欧方重视中国在世界事务中发挥的重要和积极作用,愿同中方紧密合作,共同努力解决气候变化、公共卫生等重大全球性挑战。欧方愿同中方一道,办好欧中领导人会晤,推动法中、德中以及欧中关系不断向前发展。

The two sides exchanged views on the current situation in Ukraine.
双方重点就当前乌克兰局势交换意见。

Macron and Scholz explained their opinions and positions concerning the current situation in Ukraine, saying that Europe is facing the most serious crisis since World War 2, and that France and Germany support a negotiated solution of the problem, to give peace a chance. They thanked the Chinese side for advocating humanitarian proposals. They want to strengthen communication and coordination with the Chinese side, mediate peace and promote talks to avoid further escalation of the situation which would create an even more serious humanitarian crisis.
马克龙、朔尔茨介绍了对当前乌克兰局势的看法和立场,表示欧洲正面临二战以来最严重危机,法德支持通过谈判解决问题,给和平一个机会。感谢中方提出人道主义局势倡议,愿同中方加强沟通协调,劝和促谈,避免局势进一步升级,产生更严重人道主义危机。

Xi Jinping emphasized that the current situation in Ukraine is worrying. The re-ignition of the flames of war on the European continent is deeply felt and lamented by China. The Chinese side advocates that all countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected, that the United Nations’ charter’s objectives and principles should be complied with, that all countries’ reasonable concerns should be attached importance to, and all efforts directed at the peaceful solution of the crisis should be supported. The top priority job now is to avoid further escalation, let alone loss of control, in the tense situation. The Chinese side appreciates the French and the German efforts to mediate in the Ukrainian situation and wants to maintain communication and coordination with the French, German and European side to play a positive role together with the international community in accordance with any side’s requirements in this matter.
习近平强调,当前,乌克兰局势令人担忧,中方对欧洲大陆重燃战火深感痛惜。中方主张,各国主权、领土完整都应该得到尊重,联合国宪章宗旨和原则都应该得到遵守,各国合理安全关切都应该得到重视,一切有利于和平解决危机的努力都应该得到支持。当务之急是避免紧张局势升级,甚至失控。中方赞赏法德为斡旋乌克兰局势所作努力,愿同法方、德方和欧方保持沟通和协调,根据当事各方需要,同国际社会一道发挥积极作用。

Xi Jinping emphasized that we must jointly support Russian-Ukrainian peace talks, maintain momentum in the two sides’ negotiations, overcome difficulties to keep the talks going, and to arrive at results and peace. We would like to call for the greatest degree of limits and restraint to avoid a large-scale humanitarian crisis. China has put forward a six-point initiative concerning the humanitarian situation in Ukraine and would like to provide Ukraine with further humanitarian material aid. We want to work together to reduce the negative impact of the crisis. The relevant sanctions are creating shocks for the stability of global finance, energy, transportation and supply chains, create burdens for the global economy already under the negative impact of the pandemic, and are disadvantageous for all sides. We must actively advocate common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concepts. The Chinese side supports France and Germany setting out from Europe’s own interests, giving thought to lasting security in Europe, maintaining strategic independence and promoting the building of an equal, effective and sustainable European security framework. The Chinese side also views an equal dialogue between Europe, Russia, America and NATO with optimism.
习近平强调,我们要共同支持俄乌和谈,推动双方维护谈判势头,克服困难谈下去,谈出结果、谈出和平。我们要呼吁保持最大限度克制,防止出现大规模人道主义危机。中方提出了关于乌克兰人道主义局势的六点倡议,愿向乌克兰进一步提供人道主义物资援助。我们要一起努力减少危机造成的负面影响。有关制裁对全球金融、能源、交通、供应链稳定都会造成冲击,拖累疫情下负重前行的世界经济,对各方都不利。我们要积极倡导共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观。中方支持法德两国从欧洲自身利益出发,为欧洲持久安全着想,坚持战略自主,推动构建均衡、有效、可持续的欧洲安全框架。中方也乐见欧俄美及北约开展平等对话。

The two sides also exchanged views about the Iran nuclear issue.
双方还就伊朗核问题交换了意见。

Ding Xuexiang, Yang Jiechi, Wang Yi, He Lifeng and others took part in the meeting.
丁薛祥、杨洁篪、王毅、何立峰等参加会议。

Thursday, March 3, 2022

Forgetful Fury

There’s a lot of talk about China feeling uneasy about Russia these days – which may be so.

But don’t expect China to support any measures that could topple Russia’s regime. For one, they need Russia on their side if they try to invade Taiwan: politically for sure, and militarily (in terms of arms supplies or other kinds of technical support), probably. Also, it is generally useful to have a permanent backer at the UN Security Council (if the Chinese ambassador there forgets his smelling salts, for example, and passes out at a critical moment for feeling uneasy, next to Russia).

If you know China’s North Korea policy, you’ll know it’s Russia policy even better. North Korea is a disaster zone with missiles, and Russia is a gas station with missiles, working warheads, and veto power. And with tanks, obviously, but that doesn’t matter to China.

If China did anything that toppled Russia’s regime, it would be inadvertently.

But there’s another reason for China’s reservations, too. China’s regime is much worse than Russia’s. It’s fascinating how easily the hell named Xinjiang has been forgotten on the international scene. Do those who ask China to condemn the invasion of Ukraine really know who they are talking to? Do they want to prove the obvious, because they know the answer? Or do they hope for a moderating effect of Beijing’s unease, on Moscow’s killing spree?

The last point would be the likeliest. But it doesn’t look like a gamechanger either.

Be mad at Moscow, if you have to, but don’t be forgetful.
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Related

We cannot even die for a cause like them, Uyghur Times, March 2, 2022
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Saturday, February 19, 2022

Wang Yi: Minsk II “the only way”

Xinhua MSC coverage, Febr 19

Xinhua MSC coverage, Febr 19

Main link: FMPRC press release, Febr 19

On February 19 in the evening, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on invitation, took part in the 58th Munich Security Conference, gave a keynote speech by video link from Beijing. He answered the conference host’s questions concerning China’s approach and position concerning NATO eastward expansion, European security and the situation in Ukraine.

2022年2月19日晚,国务委员兼外长王毅在北京应邀以视频方式出席第58届慕尼黑安全会议中国专场并发表主旨讲话。王毅现场回答了主持人有关中方对于北约东扩、欧洲安全和乌克兰局势态度立场的问题。

Wang Yi said that the Cold War has long ended. Being a result of the Cold War years, NATO should judge the hour and size up the situation and make necessary adjustments. If NATO blindly expanded eastward, will that be conducive for maintaining long-term peace and stability in Europe? This is a question our European friends should seriously reflect on.

王毅表示,冷战早已结束,北约作为当年冷战的产物,应该审时度势,作出必要调整。如果北约一味东扩,是否有利于维护欧洲的和平稳定,是否有利于实现欧洲长治久安?这是一个值得欧洲朋友认真思考的问题。

Wang Yi emphasized that all countries’sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity ought to be respected and protected as this was a fundamental standard in international relations, reflecting the United Nations Charter’s objectives. It was also a principled position that had always been upheld by China, and Ukraine was no exception. If anyone doubted China’s position on this issue, that was just a hype with ulterior motives, and a distortion of China’s position.

王毅强调,各国的主权、独立和领土完整都应当得到尊重和维护,因为这是国际关系的基本准则,体现的是联合国宪章的宗旨,也是中方一贯秉持的原则立场,对乌克兰也不例外。如果有人在此问题上质疑中方的态度,那就是别有用心的炒作,也是对中方立场的歪曲。

Wang Yi said that as a permanent Security Council member, China had always decided on its position based on the merit of the issue itself, thus handling international matters. China believed that concerning the Ukraine issue, one should get back to the Minsk II starting point. As this agreement was binding,  agreed upon by all parties after negotiations, and obtained the Security Council’s approval, it was the only way to solve the Ukraine issue. According to our understanding, both Russia and the European Union support Minsk II, and when I had a phone conversation with US Secretary of State Blinken recently, America also expressed support. As that’s the case, why can’t the parties sit down together for a full discussion, produce a roadmap and a timetable towards a workable protocol? What every party needs to do now is to earnestly assume responsibility, make efforts for peace, rather than blindly pushing up raising tensions, creating panic and make war.

王毅表示,中国作为安理会常任理事国,一贯按照事情本身的是非曲直决定自身立场,处理国际事务。中方认为,在乌克兰问题上,现在应该尽快回到新明斯克协议这一原点。因为这一协议是当事方通过谈判达成的具有约束力的协议,得到了联合国安理会的核可,是解决乌克兰问题的唯一出路。据我了解,俄罗斯、欧盟方面都支持新明斯克协议,前不久我同美国国务卿布林肯通电话时,美方也表示支持。既然如此,为什么各方不能坐在一起进行充分讨论,制定出落实协议的路线图和时间表。当前各方需要做的是,切实负起责任,为和平而努力,而不是一味推高紧张,制造恐慌,甚至渲染战争。

As for the prospects of solving the Ukraine issue, Wang Yi said that Ukraine should become a bridge, connecting East and West, rather than a frontline state in the confrontation of powers. As for European security, all sides could raise their own concerns, with Russia’s reasonable security concerns being respected and taken seriously. China expected that all sides should find a solution through dialog and consultation.

至于乌克兰问题解决前景,王毅表示,乌克兰应当成为东西方沟通的桥梁,而不应该成为大国对抗的前沿。对于欧洲安全,各方都可以提出自己的关切,其中俄方的合理安全关切应该得到尊重和重视。中方期待各方通过对话协商,找到真正有利于维护欧洲安全的解决方案。

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