Chinese-Philippines Ties: “Brimming with Expectations”

The following is my translation of a press release by the Chinese foreign ministry (FMPRC), published on Wednesday morning (GMT) this week.

Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

一百聞不如一見：
maritime disputes (click map for source)

Main Link: 

Wang Yi meets Philippine national security advisor Carlos

王毅会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯

On July 6 local time, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Philippine National Security Advisor Ms Carlos¹⁾ in Manila.

当地时间2022年7月6日，国务委员兼外长王毅在马尼拉会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯女士。

Wang Yi said that Sino-Philippine have a thousand-year history of friendly relations. During the past six years, with the joint efforts of both sides, Sino-Philippine relations had achieved a change for the better and advanced quality. The election of President Marcos had opened a new page in Sino-Philippine relations, and the two countries’ peoples were brimming with expectations for the development of bilateral relations. This visit represents the Chinese side’s focus on Sino-Philippine relations and its support for the new government, the continuity and stability in China’s friendly policies toward the Philippines. China would like to cooperate with the Philippine side to implement the important consensus between the two heads of state, to deepen pragmatic cooperation and to initiate another “golden age” in Sino-Philippines relations.

王毅表示，中菲有着千年友好交往历史。过去6年来，在双方共同努力下，中菲关系实现转圜改善、提质升级。马科斯总统当选为中菲关系翻开了新的一页，两国人民对双边关系发展充满期待。此访旨在体现中方对中菲关系的重视和对菲新一届政府的支持，体现中国对菲友好政策的连续性和稳定性。中方愿同菲方落实好两国元首重要共识，深化各领域务实合作，开创中菲关系下一个“黄金时代”。

Carlos said that the two peoples of the Philippines and China were were deeply attached and culturally connected to each other. China was a friendly major power. Chairman Xi Jinping had emphasized that he wanted to create a prosperous and beautiful future together with the Ascia-Pacific countries. The Philippine side is fully in favor of this and would like to broaden exchange and cooperation with the Chinese side, handle disagreements properly, promote mutual trust, improve confidence, gather goodwill and strengthen friendship.

卡洛斯说，菲中两国人民相亲、文化相通。中国是友善的大国。习近平主席强调要同亚太国家共创共享和平繁荣的美好未来，菲方完全赞同，愿同中方扩大交流合作，妥善处理分歧，促进互信、增强信心、积累善意，巩固友好。

Wang Yi said that China had never followed the traditional great powers’ road of colonialism and lootings and that it would maintain its own peaceful development, maintain cooperation and win-win, maintain shared development of opportunities with neighboring countries, join hands to build the community of human destiny²⁾ together and take good care the global village inhabited by all of us together.

王毅说，中国从不走传统大国殖民掠夺的老路，将坚持自身和平发展，坚持合作共赢，坚持与邻国分享发展机遇，携手共建人类命运共同体，呵护好我们共同居住的地球村。

Wang Yi emphasized that China and the Philippines were neighbors neither of which could be moved away, and our choice was friendship, friendship, and friendship again. The healthy continuation and the stable development of Sino-Philippine relatoins was in accordance with the two countries’ and the two peoples’ fundamental and long-term interests. Given the current international and regional situation full of uncertainty and instability, the two sides must continue and enhance their traditional friendship, and let Sino-Philippines relations become more stable and durable, so as to keep them moving forward on the right track.

王毅强调，中菲是搬不走的邻居，我们唯一的选择就是友好、友好、再友好。中菲关系健康持续稳定发展符合两国和两国人民的根本和长远利益。面对当前充满不确定不稳定性的国际地区形势，双方要传承弘扬传统友好，使中菲关系更加稳固坚韧，始终沿着正确轨道向前发展。

Both sides believed unanimously that people-to-people exchange should be strengthened and that the two countries’ friendly public opinion and the societal foundations of the two countries’ friendship be solidified.

双方一致认为应加强人文交流，夯实两国友好的民意和社会基础。

The two sides unanimously believed that the valuable experience of the two countries should be summed up, the overall situation of Sino-Philippine friendship should be actively protected, bilateral relations should not be defined by disputes, and definite differences not be allowed to be in the way of the two countries’ cooperation.

双方一致认为应总结两国交往宝贵经验，努力维护中菲友好大局，不以争议定义双边关系，不让具体分歧阻碍两国合作。

____________

Notes

¹⁾ Clarita Reyes Carlos, aka Clarita Carlos
²⁾ frequently, but not precisely, translated as a community with a shared future
____________

Raising Taiwan’s Profile: RTI’s French Programs return to Shortwave

Radio Taiwan International (RTI) has – at least partly – reversed a decision announced early in 2018, which had cut the French department’s shortwave programs. To prepare the French programs’ return to the airwaves, test transmissions will be carried out on several days this month, and on March 1 – details there.

Radio Taiwan International QSL, 2018

The transmitter site used by RTI will be Kostinbrod, Bulgaria, which already airs RTI programs in German and in Russian. The transmissions in French will target both western Europe and northern Africa, according to the French service’s mailbag program of February 15. They quote the new management of RTI as stating that the station needs to use all means of communications available to raise Taiwan’s profile. Spanish was also mentioned as a candidate to return to shortwave, but I couldn’t make out if this referred to a firm decision (my French isn’t very good).

As far as the new management is concerned, RTI published some information in 2019, and so did other Taiwanese media.

According to Focus Taiwan (CNA English), the new director-general^*) is Chang Cheng (張正), a media worker and broadcasting host, and founder of “4-way news”, an online and once-a-month paper publication with a focus on Taiwan’s migrant communities. He was voted in for RTI during the first half of 2019, after “a public selection process,” conducted by the external broadcaster”for the first time.” According to them, they sort of called for bids:

Radio Taiwan International’s previous director-general Shao Li-chung left office on January 31 [2019], and RTI carried out a public bidding and formed an assessment and selection team, including former government information office chief Su Cheng-ping, professor Hu Yuan-hui and Lo Shi-hung of National Chung Cheng University, assistant professor Wang Yae-wei of Chengchi University’s College of Communication, Upstream-Downstream webpage founder Feng Hsiao-fei, Taiwan Alliance for Advancement of Youth Rights and Welfare secretary-general Yeh Ta-hua, RTI board of directors’ chairman, as well as seven experts who were members of the board of directors.

中央廣播電台前總台長邵立中於今年1月31日卸任總台長，央廣第一次採取公開徵選，並組成總台長審薦小組，成員組成包括：前新聞局長蘇正平、中正大學傳播學系教授胡元輝與羅世宏、政大廣電系助理教授王亞維、上下游網站創辦人馮小非、台少盟秘書長葉大華，以及央廣董事長路平等7位具備央廣董事身分的專家學者組成。

RTI made the decision public on June 11, but at the time, the decision was still awaiting approval from the board of directors and the Executive Yuan (i. e. Taiwan’s government).

I find it confusing that there would still be a director-general at all, plus a board of directors, because about a year and a half ago, plans for RTI (plus CNA and Public TV) seemed to point into a different direction.

But what matters most to listeners like me is the opportunity to switch on the radio and to listen.

____________

Notes

^*) Also referred to as “president” in English

____________

Huanqiu: South China Sea “a testing point for China’s strategic-opportunity development”

The following is a translation of an editorial, published by Huanqiu Shibao on May 31.

Original headline / main link: America’s increased Patrolling of the South China Sea is doomed to be transitional (美国巡航南海再多，也注定是过客)

A similarly-worded, but less detailed, editorial was also published by the English-language “Global Times”. Neither version was signed.

Links within blockquotes added during translation, not part of the Chinese article. Translations and links may not always reflect the accurate judicial terms – this is a newspaper reader‘s translation, not a lawyer’s — JR

Under the American machinations, the South China Sea issue has heated up somewhat. American defense secretary Mattis said on May 29 that America would continue to unfold “freedom of navigation activities”, and that the American navy would also take other action.

在美国的策动下，南海问题近来有所升温。美国防长马蒂斯29日表示，美国将继续在南海具有争议的岛屿附近开展“航行自由行动”，此外美军还会采取其他行动。

Just as Mattis said the words above two days ago, two American navy vessels entered China Paracel islands’ [Xisha] and reefs’ territorial waters. Australian senator Jim Molan was an even more ear-piercing voice, asserting that only all-out war would expel China from the Spratlys.

就在马蒂斯发表上述谈话的两天前，美国两艘军舰进入了中国西沙群岛的领海。澳大利亚参议员莫兰发出更加刺耳的声音，宣称只有一场全面战争，才能将中国逐出南沙岛屿。

Also, some Philippine media and Western media have hyped Philippine foreign minister Cayatano’s talk to days ago. That foreign minister said that Philippine president Duterte had defined a red line concerning the South China Sea, and to prepare to “fight for the South China Sea”. However, when you read Cayetano’s complete talk carefully, you find that his and Duterte’s attitude are not that extreme.

此外，一些菲律宾媒体和西方媒体炒作菲律宾外长卡耶塔诺的一次讲话，这位外长说菲律宾总统杜特尔特已经为南海问题划设了红线，并且准备好“为南海而战”。然而仔细阅读卡耶塔诺的讲话全文，可以发现他和杜特尔特的态度远非那么激进。

Seen from the perspective of the countries within the South China Sea zone, the situation here remains stable, the differences receive control. But the exercise of American strength in the South China Sea begins to show an increasing frequency. This shows in America’s revoking the invitation of China to the RIMPAC exercises under the pretext of opposing China’s “militarization” of the South China Sea, and by two US Navy vessels dashing into the Paracel Islands’ twelve-nautical-miles zone and similar declarations that seem to foretell more active American provocations.

从南海域内国家的关系角度看，这里的局势继续保持平稳，分歧得到管控。但是美国在南海问题上的发力开始呈现增加之势，标志是美以反对中国在南海搞“军事化”为名取消对中国参加环太平洋军演的邀请，美海军两艘军舰一起闯西沙岛屿12海里以及相关表态似乎在预示美更活跃的挑衅。

The South China Sea’s serving as America’s strategic game point can’t be cooled down in the short term. In the future, its continuous heating up will probably occur with a rising frequency. China needs to prepare well psychologically and make tactical arrangements, with the goal of dealing with America in an orderly and methodical way in the South China Sea.

南海作为中美的战略博弈点很难在短时间内冷却下来，它在今后进一步升温看来是高概率趋势。中国必须对此做好充分的心理准备和策略安排，与美在南海有条不紊地长期周旋。

China needs, first of all, to stabilize relations with the claimant countries, especially Vietnam and the Philippines and so on, it needs to continue control of divisions with these countries, avoid the eruption of sharp conflict with any of these countries, [unable to read]. In this way, America’s and its overseas allies excuses for meddling can be greatly reduced, and it will help to let them understand that giving cause to quarrels and manufacturing tense situations are not welcomed.

中国首先需要稳定好与南海声索国，尤其是与越南、菲律宾等的关系，继续管控好同这些国家的分歧，争取不出现同某一个声索国的尖锐冲突，维系发展作为这一地区主题的局面。这样可以大幅减少美国及其南海域外盟友在这里开展干预行动的借口，也会让它们在南海通过搬弄是非制造紧张局势不受欢迎。

Secondly, China must maintain a bottomline concept, strengthen its ability to serve powerful responses, should extreme US intervention in the South China Sea occur. Apart from the deployment of defensive weaponry on the Spratly islands and reefs, China also needs to build a powerful deensive system that includess naval mobile forces and land-based ans air-borne forces, making sure that, if by any chance, the situation in the South China Sea heatens, we are able to meet the situation head-on and fight back at any level of challenge, and any deck of cards.

第二，中国必须保持底线思维，加强对美国一旦在南海采取极端干预进行强有力反制行动的实力建设。除了在南沙岛礁上部署防御性武器，中国还需构建包括海军移动力量和陆基、空基力量组成的强大威慑系统，确保在万一南海局势升级时我方能够迎头回击任何级别的挑战及摊牌。

Thirdly, with ample strength serving as a backup, China will confidently deal with routine military provocations from America, with the principle of each to their own. American declarations of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea don’t touch China; it goes without saying that navigation is free in South China Sea regular territorial waters, and the psychological pressure America can create with this method is decreasing, and its significance diluted. Time in the South China Sea is measured in Chinese and local time, not in American time.

第三，有充足的实力做后盾，中国要自信地与美国一般性军事挑衅耐心周旋，原则应当是它搞它的，我搞我的。美国在南海宣示航行自由奈何不了中国，南海正常水域的航行本来就是自由的，美方这样做所能施加的心理压力一直在递减，其意义不断被冲淡。南海上记录这个时代的钟表使用的一定是中国和当地时间，而决不会是美国时间。

Sovereignty issues concerning the islands and reefs in the South China sea, and maritime rights and interests, are also a testing point for China’s strategic-opportunity development. China must balance these two issues well, and maintain China’s territorial position, and also, it must avoid taking military measures to achieve this position.

南海存在岛礁主权和海洋权益之争，这里同时是中国发展战略机遇期的一个考验点。中国一定要做好这两个问题的平衡，即坚持中国的领土主张，也决不为实现这一主张采取军事手段。

To solve disputes through talks has long been our stable approach. China must strenghten communication with the claimant countries on the South China Sea sovereignty issue, shape mutual understanding, make all sides feel at ease, make regional countries’ development cooperation build on foundations of emerging and solidifying strategic mutual trust. To this end, it is important to implement the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”, to build consensus on standards of negotiations.

通过谈判解决纷争早已是我们的稳定态度，中国要就此与南海主权声索国家加强沟通，形成默契，让各方都安心，使得域内国家的发展合作建立在不断形成并且巩固的战略互信基础之上，为此落实《南海各方行为宣言》，就南海行为准则谈判构建共识都非常重要。

Obviously, navigation in the South China Sea is free, but the South China Sea isn’t a place for countries outside the area to wave about and issue orders, and to show off their military strength. The South China Sea is an important international thoroughfare, but also China’s gate. This means that to China, it needs to be all the more unimpeded. China won’t allow any outisde power to build hostile screenwalls against it here, we have sufficient strength and resolve to persevere until they abandon their harmful attempts against us.

显而易见，南海航行是自由的，但南海不是域外国家指手画脚、耀武扬威的地方。南海是国际大通道，但它同时是中国的家门口，这意味着它对中国来说更必须是畅通的。中国不会允许任何域外力量在这里构建针对中国的敌对性屏障，我们有足够的实力和坚定的意志与任何那样的企图坚决博弈下去，直到它们放弃针对我们的不良企图。

Notebook: Tsai’s recent Speeches

Focus Taiwan (CNA newsagency’s English-language website) has President Tsai Ing-wen‘s full  Double-Ten address, (the original script can be found on the presidential website), and on October, she gave a speech in English, to the Yushan Forum, an “Asia Innovation and Progress Dialogue”, including remarks about the “New Southbound Policy”.

Yushan Forum, Oct 2017 – please click picture for video

Tsai Ing-wen’s approval ratings have recently seen a modest surge – or a significant one, when looking at where they have come from, since summer this year.

In July, an L. A. Times correspondent reported the nasty numbers of that month – an approval rating of 33 per cent -, but added that this didn’t necessarily mean that her supporters were abandoning her.

Indeed, it has become a Taiwanese tradition to keep presidents under the opinion-poll waterline most of the time – when Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai’s predecessor, was re-elected early in 2012, four years of submergence lied behind him, with another four years waiting.

German FM Vietnam Visit: Counter-Balancing China?

“Vietnam is Germany’s important strategic partner”, Nhan Dan‘s Chinese edition quoted German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, in one of its headlines on October 29. Nhan Dan is the organ of Vietnam’s Communist Party central committee.

German foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier left Berlin on October 29 to begin a trip intended to strengthen the two countries’ strategic partnership.

德国外交部长弗兰克-瓦尔特·施泰因迈尔10月29离开柏林，开始启程对越南进行访问，旨在加强两国战略伙伴关系。

German foreign minister Steinmeier is leading a delegation with members in charge of economic and cultural affairs.

德国外长施泰因迈尔率领负责经济和文化事务代表团对越南进行为期三天的访问。

The German foreign minister sees Vietnam as Germany’s important economic, political, cultural and strategic partner. The head of Germany’s federal parliament, Norbert Lammert, visited Vietnam in March 2015, and Vietnam [then] state chairman Trưong Tan Sang’s visit to Germany in November 2015 strengthened the two countries’ relations further.

德国外交部将越南是为德国重要的经济、政治、文化战略伙伴。德国联邦议院议长诺贝特·拉默特2015年3月对越南进行访问和越南国家主席张晋创2015年11月对德国进行访问为两国关系增添了新动力。

In the framework of the two countries’ strategic-partnership action plan, Germany’s and Vietnam’s cooperation activities are developing further, in a variety of fields, with new projects being added every year. One of these important projects is the “German House”, under construction in Ho Chi Minh City, which is going to be a headquarter for German organizations and companies in Ho Chi Minh City.

在两国战略伙伴行动计划框架内，德国与越南合作活动在各领域上继续向前发展，每年都有新的合作项目。两国重要合作项目之一是在胡志明市兴建 “德国屋”，这里将成为在胡志明市德国组织和企业的总部。

Bilateral trade between Vietnam and Germany amounted to 10.3 billion USD in 2015, with German imports from Vietnam at eight bn, and exports to Vietnam at 2.3 bn USD. Major export products from Vietnam are footwear, textiles, farming and seafood products, electronic components, wooden furniture, etc.. Major import products from Germany are machinery, transport, vehicles, chemical products, and measurement instruments, etc..

越德两国2015年双边贸易金额达103亿美元，德国自越南进口80亿美元、对越南出口23亿美元。越南对德国主要出口产品是鞋类、纺织品、农海产品、电子零件和木家具等；越南自德国进口主要产品是机械、运输车辆、化学物品和化学仪器等。

On Sunday, Nhan Dan reported a visit by Steinmeier to a German company’s investment site in Haiphong. According to the newsarticle, the gypsum production site, built by German gypsum producer Knauf, is one of the biggest investment projects in Haiphong.

Vietnam’s foreign broadcaster Voice of Vietnam‘s (VoV) German service adds a short description of the Phu Lac wind farm.

Betram Lang, a MERICS researcher, wrote earlier this month that

[i]n times of rising diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea, the European Union (EU) tries to bolster the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a counterweight to China in the region. To this end, the EU has offered generous financial support to foster the regional integration process and sponsor the still politically toothless ASEAN secretariat. It almost tripled previous financial commitments to 196 million EUR between 2014 and 2020.

That however was proving difficult: While Cambodia has been positioning itself as China’s closest ally in South East Asia since at least 2001, other ASEAN countries have recently sought their own kind of ‘privileged relationship’ with the PRC as well.

China’s online media apparently don’t report Steinmeier’s Vietnam visit – most of the Chinese-language coverage appears to be from Vietnamese sources.

Before heading for Vietnam, Steinmeier reportedly called on Vietnam’s leadership for political reforms in Vietnam, an issue that Vietnam’s state-controlled media didn’t cover (not in Chinese, anyway).

In a speech at the opening ceremony for a German and European Law program of study at Hanoi Law University, Steinmeier came back to the topic of political reforms. Successful modernization required the rule of law, and a strong civil society, he said.

Steinmeier also addressed the South China Sea conflict – in a diplomatic way -, plus ASEAN:

For us, but for Vietnam with its important and further growing role in ASEAN and the United Nations, one thing is clear: Peace can only be secured when international law and politics work together. International law aims at guide power within tracks, and the powerful in politics must accept these tracks. The latest decision, based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, was an important legal step. What matters now is that the groundbreaking elements of the decision will gradually be turned into practice of international law.

Für uns, aber auch für Vietnam mit seiner wichtigen und weiter wachsenden Rolle in ASEAN und in den Vereinten Nationen ist jedenfalls eines klar: Frieden wird nur gesichert, wenn Völkerrecht und Politik zusammenspielen. Das Völkerrecht zielt darauf ab, Macht in Bahnen zu lenken, und die Mächtigen in der Politik müssen diese Bahnen akzeptieren. Der jüngste Schiedsspruch, basierend auf der Seerechtskonvention der Vereinten Nationen, war ein wichtiger rechtlicher Schritt. Jetzt kommt es darauf an, dass die wegweisenden Elemente des Schiedsspruches Schritt für Schritt auch völkerrechtliche Praxis werden.

Vietnam’s opposition to China’s naval strategy in the South China Sea has been stronger than that of other ASEAN nations. But geostrategic considerations are only one aspect of Germany’s Vietnam policy. Vietnam’s economy keeps growing fast, and East Germany and Vietnam in particular share a history of economic cooperation.

Deutsche Welle, once Germany’s foreign radio station, in a March 2015 report, commemorating fourty years of German-Vietnamese ties:

When that country [East Germany] collapsed, almost all its Vietnamese workers suddenly lost their jobs. They did not want to return to Vietnam because the employment prospects in their home country were very poor. The Vietnamese economic boom was yet to come.

Even so, the majority of these Vietnamese were still repatriated because they did not have a residence permit.

The conflict over contract workers and the regulation of old debts strained the German-Vietnamese ties for several years, according to Gerhard Will. “Only during the course of negotiations, it became clear to both countries what they could offer a lot to each other,” writes Will, who has been a Vietnam expert and worked at the German Institute of International and Security Affairs in Berlin.

[…]

In 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung signed the “Hanoi Declaration” to establish a “strategic partnership” between the two countries. The two leaders expressed the desire to continue economic partnership and cooperate in the areas of development policy, environment, education and science. The German-Vietnamese University in the city of Ho Chi Minh, founded in 2008, is considered a model project in terms of bilateral cooperation.

There is also a West German-Vietnamese history. 33,000 immigrants may not sound like a big number these days, but it did in the 1970s and 1980s.

Huanqiu Editorial on Hague ruling: “The Chinese People will inevitably support the Government”

The following is a translation from an editorial published online by Huanqiu Shibao. It refers to today’s (Tuesday’s) decision by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

The terms used in this translation may not be accurate legal language, be it because of my limited translation skills, be it because of the nature of the article which may be more about purposeful agitation and reassurance, than about legal issues.

Links within the blockquote were added during translation.

The arbitration court’s result on the South China Sea arbitration case, announced in the afternoon Beijing time, is even more extreme, more shameless, than predicted by many, and may be rated as “the worst version” people could imagine, and we believe that Chinese people in their entirety will resent this illegal ruling, and the peace-loving global public will also be absolutely astonished about the arbitration court’s seriously partial approach which will very likely add to regional tensions.

南海仲裁案仲裁庭北京时间12日下午公布了仲裁结果，它比之前很多人预测的更加极端、无耻，堪称是人们可以想象的“最坏版本”，相信全体中国人都会为这一非法裁定感到愤慨，世界爱好和平的公众也会对仲裁庭这一严重偏袒一方，并且很可能加剧地区局势紧张的做法而十分诧异。

According to an unofficial translation, this arbitration result, by denying the nine-dotted line, acts drastically against China’s sovereignty within [this line], and also denies its historical foundation. It denies that there were any exclusive economic zone around any of the Spratly Islands which amounts to denying the Taiping Island its due status. It also openly claims that the [artificial] extension of the islands were without legal legitimacy, denouncing China for obstructing the Philippines’ economic activities within the nine-dotted line, and denouncing China’s interception of Philippine vessels can only exacerbate maritime tensions.

根据一个非官方的中文翻译版本，这一仲裁结果借助否决南海九段线内中国主张权益来对其做了釜底抽薪，而且否定它的历史依据。它否定南沙群岛中任何一岛有专属经济区，这等于否定了太平岛的应有地位。它还公然宣称中国在南沙扩建岛礁不具有合法性，指责中国拦阻菲律宾在九段线内开展经济活动，指中国拦截菲律宾船只加剧了海上紧张。

If one goes by this ruling, the maximum that would remain for China in the Spratly Islands would be a few isolated spots, no exclusive economic zones, and even some territorial waters linking the islands and reefs could be denied. In large part, the Spratlys would be covered by Philippine and Vietnamese exclusive economic zones.

如果按照这一裁决，中国在南沙群岛最多只剩下一些孤立的点，既无专属经济区，甚至可能连岛礁周围的一些领海都将被剥夺。而南沙海域大部分将被菲律宾和越南的专属经济区覆盖。

It would also mean that Chinese construction on these islands and reefs could not be continued, and if the Philippines and Vietnam had sufficient power, they could carry out “demolitions” of already existing Chinese construction. From here on, all maritime resources would be the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s; China’s economic activities and all other activities would have to withdraw from that area.

它还意味着，中国的岛礁建设无法持续，如果菲越有足够的力量，甚至可以对中国已建的岛礁搞“强拆”。今后那片海域的资源将归菲越所有，中国的经济活动和其他活动都要退出那个区域。

This is a brazen denial of China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea doesn’t apply for the standards and adjustments of territorial sovereignty – this should be one of the main principles of international conventions and treaties. Now, by this contentious redefinition [my understanding of the line – may be wrong – JR], this comes full circle by delimiting the dispute with this forcible ruling, this is shameless overstepping of authority and abuse of authority, and cruel trampling on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and for the entire international law system.

这是对中国领土主权和海洋权益的悍然否定。联合国海洋法公约不适用于领土主权的调整和规范，这是该公约缔约时的首要原则之一。现在仲裁庭通过对这些争端的再定义，兜了个圈子对中菲领土和海洋划界争端强行裁决，这是无耻的越权和滥权，是对海洋法公约以及整个国际法体系的粗暴践踏。

Not only China’s government, but the entire Chinese society will never accept this “arbitration result”. We will show an unwavering attitude of non-participation and non-acceptance, and nobody should think that anything would shake us.

不仅中国政府，整个中国社会都决不可能接受这一“仲裁结果”，我们对仲裁“不接受、不参与”的态度坚定不移，谁都休想撼动我们。

The so-called “arbitration result” is wasted paper, but if America, Japan and other countries will use it to exert actual military and political pressure on China, the Chinese people will inevitably support the government as it fights back. We firmly believe that when China’s law enforcement is embattled, China’s military force will not remain silent when their appearance is needed.

所谓“仲裁结果”就是废纸一张，但美日等国如果利用它向中国施加现实军事政治压力，中国人民必将支持政府予以针锋相对的回击。相信中国的执法力量严阵以待，中国的军事力量同样不会在需要他们站出来时沉默。

We hope that China’s reasonable activities of all kinds will not be affected in any way, and we also hope that Chinese society, in the face of all storms and waves, including geopolitical provocations, will maintain their determination, and let the daily affairs of this country continue as normal. We believe that the government is able to meet these challenges and to make us believe in this country’s strength will guarantee the unmoved continuation of our correct path.

我们希望看到，中国在南沙地区的各种正当活动不受任何影响，也希望看到中国社会在各种包括地缘政治挑衅在内的各种风浪面前保持定力，让这个国家的运行节奏一如往常。相信我们的政府有能力应对这些挑战，也让我们相信这个国家的实力能够确保我们岿然不动。

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Related/Updates

» Beijing engineers coverage, BBC, July 12, 2016
» Why we cover our Ears, BBC, July 10, 2016

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China’s One-Belt-one-Road Initiative: Your Sea is our Sea but My Sea is my Sea

Visiting Xuanzang’s library in Xi’an – Xinwen Lianbo, click picture for video

Former Chinese consul general to Kolkata, Mao Siwei (毛四维 毛四维) was optimistic about China-India relations in a India Today Global Roundtable event in Beijing in May 2015, suggesting that there was an expectation in China that Modi would usher in a new model of relations: “India-China 2.0”, according to the Daily Mail. While conceding that border issues, including China’s claim on Arunachal Pradesh, and Chinese investment in the Kashmiri regions controlled by Pakistan “challenged” the relationship, he expressed hope that during Indian prime minister Narendra Modi‘s visit to China would usher in the second stage where the focus will be on Chinese investment and making in India, thus succeeding the “first stage model” of 1988, which had been about “not letting the border issue getting in the way of overall relations”.

While the Roundtable apparently kept things nice, not everyone in Beijing agreed with Mao.

China’s state paper and website “Global Times” wrote on May 11 that

Modi has been busy strengthening India’s ties with neighboring countries to compete with China, while trying to take advantage of the tremendous opportunities for economic development created by China, as Beijing is actively carrying forward the “One Belt and One Road” initiative.

And:

Due to the Indian elites’ blind arrogance and confidence in their democracy, and the inferiority of its ordinary people, very few Indians are able to treat Sino-Indian relations accurately, objectively and rationally. Worse, some Indian media have been irresponsibly exaggerating the conflicts between the two sides, adding fuel to the hostility among the public.

Modi visited contested areas under Indian control to boost his prestige at home, the “Global Times” wrote, and Delhi was reluctant to admit that a widening trade deficit with China – its biggest trading partner – was its own fault.

The paper’s advice:

The Indian government should loosen up on the limits of cross-border trade with China, reduce the trade deficit, improve the efficiency of government administrations, and relax the visa restrictions, in order to attract more Chinese companies to invest in India.

On June 17, on his personal blog, Mao Siwei wrote about China’s One Belt, One Road initiative. India’s geographical position was a motivation for the initiative and needes a response from India, Mao wrote, and tried to answer the question why India was not taking part in the initiative.

Mao looked at what he sees as at least four views among India’s elites, concerning One Belt, One Road, and he cites four Indian commentators as examples for these views. However, he does not link to their articles in question, even though they are all available online, and of course, he leaves out much of the more controversial content there.

While Mao cites Sino-Indian relations expert Raja Mohan as showing the most constructive opinions of all  (quoting an Indian Express article of May 10 this year to prove this point), he writes that there are  also a very negative positions, as taken by Brahma Chellaney (in the context of Chellaney, Mao mentions a China-US Focus article of May 11, 2015).

Indeed, Mohan had warned in March that [as] Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares for his China visit in May, New Delhi can no longer delay the articulation of a coherent strategy to restore the subcontinent’s historic connectivity,

and rejected Indian anxieties as stemming from the error of viewing China’s Silk Road initiative through the narrow prism of geopolitics.

Mohans conclusions:

That India needs greater connectivity with its neighbours is not in doubt. All recent governments in Delhi have identified it as a major national objective. If China has economic compulsions of its own in putting money in regional connectivity, it makes eminent sense for Delhi to work with Beijing.

There was no either-or when it came to working with Beijing or – or rather and – with Tokyo and Washington.

Chellaney on the other hand sees colonialism looming from the North:

One example of how China has sought to “purchase” friendships was the major contracts it signed with Sri Lanka’s now-ousted president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, to turn that strategically located Indian Ocean country into a major stop on China’s nautical “road.” The new president, Maithripala Sirisena, said on the election-campaign trail that the Chinese projects were ensnaring Sri Lanka in a “debt trap.”

In his election manifesto, without naming China, Sirisena warned: “The land that the White Man took over by means of military strength is now being obtained by foreigners by paying ransom to a handful of persons. This robbery is taking place before everybody in broad daylight… If this trend continues for another six years, our country would become a colony and we would become slaves.”

Besides, Chellaney accuses Beijing of operating a double standard:

China is also seeking to tap the Indian Ocean’s rich mineral wealth, and is inviting India to join hands with it in deep seabed mining there. Yet it opposes any Indian-Vietnamese collaboration in the South China Sea. “Your sea is our sea but my sea is my sea” seems to be the new Chinese saying.

 

Shyam Saran, a former foreign secretary, is cited by Mao Siwei as an example for a moderately positive stance. While Saran sees China and India as competitors in a very complex relationship, and one where China’s navy has not-so-friendly ideas (and ones that correspond with the “One-Belt-One-Road” initiative), Chinese surplus capital was still good for India’s infrastructure, Saran argues. The initiative could also help India to offset the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. At the same time, India should strengthen its security links with America, Japan, ASEAN and Australia, without signing on to a containment strategy against China.

Another rather critical commentator cited by Mao is Jabin T. Jacob, Assistant Director and Fellow at the Delhi Institute of Chinese Studies. Putting aside disputes as advocated by China was easier to practice for larger, than for smaller countries – indeed, the approach constituted a form of hegemony. Besides, China’s focus on initiatives like these was both exceptional among Asian countries, and also failed to acknowledge other maritime traditions and powers.

Jacob doesn’t mention the worn and corny Zheng He narrative, to which even the most benevolent listeners to the CCP tales might feel overexposed, and he doesn’t use the term arrogance either, but then, he hardly needs to. Anyone familiar with the subject can – probably – relate to what he writes.

In short, Jacob sees a new version

of the ancient Chinese political governing philosophy of tianxia. While the concept has been variously defined over history, at its most basic, it represented the rule over peoples with different cultures and from varied geographical areas by a single ruler.

Practically none of these points are mentioned by Mao; he just writes that Jacob doubts China’s ability or preparedness to understand India’s position in the historical Silk Road, and its practical implications, as well as as India’s interests and sensitivities on the Asian mainland and its waters.

It is obvious, writes Mao, that India does not want to respond to Xi Jinping‘s One-Belt-one-Road call, but it is just as obvious, that India is interesting in doing business with China. It could even become the second-largest shareholder in the Asian International Infrastructure Bank (AIIB). India also promoted Sino-Indian railway and port construction (Mao mentions Mundra Port in particular).

However, Mao writes, there is a lack of political and strategic consensus with China (在政治上和战略上与中方缺乏共识). China was focused on economic cooperation, India was focused on border disputes. Regional rivalries – not necessarily recognized by Mao as such – and America’s Asia-Pacific Rebalance (亚洲再平衡) and Narendra Modis Act East policy (向东行动) were connecting to each other on a global level.

And China’s economic involvement in the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir regions – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – constituted a flagship of China’s One-Belt-one-Road initiative. Nothing to please India.

In short, India’s non-participation in the One-Belt-one-Road initiative just reflects the objective fact of a “new bottleneck” in current Sino-Indian relations. The author [i. e. Mao Silwei] believes that as long as the two sides can gradually broaden a consensus concerning the handling of border issues, and pay attention to communication concerning maritime security, there should be hope for finding links between the two countries’ development strategies.

总之，印度不参加“一带一路”只是一种表象，它折射出当前中印关系正处于一个“新瓶颈”的客观现实。在笔者看来，只要双方在处理边界问题方面能逐渐增加共识，并在海上安全领域重视沟通、开展合作，中印两国的发展战略相互对接应该是有希望的。

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Updates / Related

» Small Country Diplomacy, Sino-NK, June 22, 2015
» Staying Alive in Tibet, March 31, 2012
» Two Divisions Wanting to Die, Aug 24, 2010

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Dempsey Visit: China People’s Broadcasting Station explains US-Vietnamese Partnership

Huanqiu Shibao had a rendition on a China People’s Broadcasting Station (CPBS, aka China National Radio) on Sunday. The following is a translation of the rendition.

Main Link: http://world.huanqiu.com/article/2014-08/5108330.html

China People’s Broadcasting Station Net (CPBS Net), Beijing, August 17 – According to the Voice of China’s “CPBS News”, the war that lasted for twenty years, from 1955 to 1975, gave both America lasting pain. After the end of the war, the two countries started opposing each other for twenty years, until the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1995.

央广网北京8月17日消息 据中国之声《央广新闻》报道，1955年到1975年，历经20年的越战给美越两国人民造成了永久的伤痛。越战后，美越两国开始了长达20年的对抗，直到1995年，两国才正式建立外交关系。

But after a family feud of half a century, and during the nineteen years of U.S.-Vietnamese relations that followed, tremendous changes have taken place. Just this month, on August 13, and for the first time after 43 years, an American Chief of Staff, Martin Dempsey, visited Vietnam, the highest-level military visiting Vietnam. Also, America will remove some parts of the arms embargo that had been in place for thirty years. Some Analysts believe that the warming up [in the two countries’ relations] is food for thought. [Voice of China’s] “Global Mandarin Broadcasting Network” America observer Yu Hao explains:

然 而，这长达半个多世纪的“家仇国恨”，在随后的十几年美越交往中发生着翻天覆地的变化。就在本月13号，时隔43周年后，美军参谋长联席会议主席登普西访 问越南，成为越战后首访越南的美国最高军事长官;而历经30年后，美国也将解除对越南部分武器禁运。有分析称，美越此时的“暧昧”关系值得深思。《全球华 语广播网》美国观察员余浩介绍：

What is the reason for the U.S. to lift the arms embargo against Vietnam right now? Most American media are looking at this with the background of rebalancing American forces towards Asia-Pacific, and Dempsey also emphasized in Vietnam that America didn’t want Vietnam to choose between the two big countries of America and China.^*) In recent years, both America and Vietnam have become wary about China and have strengthened military cooperation. One by one, American secretary of defense and secretary of state visited Vietnam, even exploring the possibility of American warships calling at Cam Ranh Bay, and this time, Dempsey hinted that the arms embargo against Vietnam could be lifted, and one could say that this was boosting U.S.-Vietnamese military cooperation. The ultimate success depends on U.S. Congress approval. However, during this year, many members of Congress have visited Vietnam, like Senate heavyweight John McCain who visited only a few days ago and said that at the earlierst, a partial removal of the arms embargo could be achieved by September this year.

余 浩：为何美国在这个时候要解除对越南的武器禁运呢？美国的媒体大多是将其放在美国亚太再平衡和南海主权争端中越关系紧张的大背景下来观察，登普西在越南也 强调，美国并没有让越南在美中两个大国之间进行选择。近年来美国和越南这两个对中国同样有戒心的国家强化军事合作关系，美国国防部长、国务卿相继访问越 南，甚至探讨美军军舰在金兰湾停靠的可能性，登普西此次放风解除对越南武器禁运，可谓是给美越军事合作加油打气，最后能否成功还取决于美国国会是否批准， 不过今年以来美国议员密集访问越南，重量级参议院麦凯恩前几天刚刚访问过越南，并且称解除对越武器禁运，最快有可能于9月份部分实现。

While America and Vietnam established diplomatic relations, military exchange between the two sides has only been superficial, but when it comes to trade cooperation, it is almost comprehensively in full bloom, having reached leapfrogging style.

虽然1995年美越建交，但双方的军事交流还仅仅是浅尝辄止，不过，说到双方的经贸合作，几乎是全面开花，实现了跨越式的发展。

In 1994, one year before the establishment of diplomatic relations, U.S. president Clinton lifted the economic embargo against Vietnam, and the two countries’ trade grew quickly. On December 10, 2001, the U.S.-Vietnamese bilateral trade agreement came into effect, and since then, trade relations have boomed. From January to July this year, Vietnam has exported goods to the U.S. totalling 16 billion U.S. dollars, a year-on-year increase of 24 percent. A forecast by the American Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam says that bilateral trade relations will reach 336 billion Dollars in 2014. Currently, Vietnam’s exports to America are the third-largest among ASEAN states, second ony to Malaysia’s and Thailand’s.

1994年暨美越建交前一年，美国总统克林顿宣布取消对越南经济的禁运政 策，当年两国的双边贸易便实现了快速增长，2001年12月10日，美越双边贸易协定生效，自此，美越经贸关系发展迅猛，今年1到7月，越南对美国货物出 口额为160亿美元，同比增长24%，越南美国商会预测，2014年越美双边贸易额将达到336亿美元，目前越南对美出口额在东盟国家中位居第三，仅次于 马来西亚和泰国。

Looking back at the Vietnam war, and exactly because of that war, America implemented a comprehensive arms embargo against Vietnam as early as in 1984. PLA National Defense University professor Li Li explains:

回首越南战争，正是由于这场战争，早在1984年，美国便对越南实施了全面的武器禁运。中国国防大学李莉教授介绍说：

In 1984, America officially passed this kind of law, banning all further supplies of military equipment. This included two levels, one about military high-tech, the supply of which wasn’t only prohibited for American companies, but also the entire European Union, countries the EU had relations with, had to join the ranks. This included some important advanced material technology, some electronic devices, or high-precision lathes the supply of which wasn’t allowed either. Adding to this, the definition of combat-class equipment is really broad, including missile equipment, these things are untouchable. It was a comprehensive limitation, and done very thoroughly.

李莉： 1984年美国是正式通过这样一个法律，禁止以后再继续向越南民主主义人民共和国出售所有相关军事装备的物品，包括两个层面，一个就是军事高技术，他不仅 自己不允许向越南提供，此外要求整个欧盟，包括所有和他有关系的国家，都参与到这个行列当中，包括新的一些重要的材料技术，包括一些信息技术、一些电子仪 器、精密的车床加工的这些技术都不允许提供。 此外，就是战斗类的装备是非常宽泛的，涉及陆海空，包括导弹类的装备，这些东西更是碰都不允许碰的，是全面的一个限制，做的是非常彻底。

By following two previous U.S. secretaries of defense and visiting Vietnam, too, joint chief Dempsey almost stirred a “Vietnam-mania”. According to one point of view, American intervention in the South China Sea is no longer just a posture, but some kind of real action. When secretary of state Kerry had just left Vietnam, Dempsey entered, so how come that currently, high American officials, one after another, visit Vietnam, especially a high-level military official? Xu Liping, director of the Chinese Academy of Social Studies’ China Network for the Asia-Pacific Research analyzes:

继此前两任美国防长访问越南，参谋长联席会议主席登普西也前往河内，美 国军方似乎掀起了“越南热”。有观点认为：美国对南海的干预，不再仅仅是一种姿态，而是一种实际的行动。美国国务卿克里前脚刚离开越南，登普西就紧随其 后，那么美国高官为什么会选择此时陆续访越，尤其是美军方高层？中国社科院亚太研究所文华研究室主任许利平分析：

I think that one should say that Dempsey’s visit to Vietnam is an important part of a close U.S.-Vietnamese relationship. Because we know that last year, Vietnam’s state chairman Truong Tan Sang visited the U.S., and Vietnamese-U.S. relations were raised to a level of comprehensive partnership. This is a very important point of view, because as we know, America’s relations with south-east Asian nations like Indonesia have also been raised to the level of comprehensive partnership. One could say that this is a new form of American relations with Asian countries. To strengthen economic relations with them is also an important part of the American rebalancing strategy towards Asia-Pacific, so I believe that Dempsey’s visit is another aspect of this component.

许利平：我想登 普西访问越南的话应该来说是越南和美国密切关系的一个重要组成部分，因为我们知道，去年越南国家主席张晋创也访问了美国，把越南和美国的关系提升为全面伙 伴关系，是一个非常重要的转折点，因为我们知道美国和东南亚的国家比如说印度尼西亚也提升为全面伙伴关系，应该来说也是美国和亚洲国家一个新型的伙伴关 系，强化这些亚洲国家在经济上面的联系，也是美国亚太再平衡战略的一个重要的组成部分，所以我觉得登普西访问也是这种组成部分的一个方面。

The highlight of Dempsey’s Vietnam visit is the strengthening of the two countries’ military cooperation, and a focus on maritime security. Some experts believe that this could put pressure on China.

登普西此次访越，亮点是两国合力加强军事合作，聚焦海事安全。有分析称，这将给中国施加压力。

Xu Liping: One should say that this is a breakthrough in U.S.-Vietnamese relations. America hopes that lifting the arms embargo will increase American arms exports which is, in fact, important for the U.S. economy. From a Vietnamese perspective, all arms imported by Vietnam have come from Russia, and that makes it a rather single market, and if America lifts the arms embargo, I guess this would increase Vietnam’s defense capabilities. Both sides can thus take what they need. Thirdly, and personally, I believe that of course, America’s strengthening of relations with Vietnam also includes considerations about the South China Sea. In fact, America wants to turn Vietnam into a chess piece for disputes with China, but their cooperation with Vietnam on the South China Sea issue is limited because on the one hand, Vietnam still has many misgivings about the U.S., and on the other hand, America, domestically, isn’t too relaxed about Vietnam either. So I think the cooperation between the two will be of a rather limited kind.

徐利 平：这应该来说是美越关系的一个突破，美国希望解除武器禁令扩大美国的武器出口，实际上也是对美国经济的吃紧，对越南方面来讲，由于历史上的原因越南一直 的进口武器都是来自于俄罗斯，应该来说市场是比较单一的，如果美国武器的禁运的解禁我估计会提高越南的这种国防能力，双方是一种各取所需，第三，我个人认 为美国强化和越南的这种关系，当然也有南海方面的考虑，实际上美国也希望把越南作为中国在南海争端方面的一个棋子，但是实际上美国在南海问题上跟越南的合 作我觉得他是有限度的，因为一方面的话越南对美国还是有很多的疑虑的，第二个美国国内也并不是对越南很放心，所以双方之间我觉得是一种有限度的合作吧。

We have noted that year-on-year, Vietnam’s exports to the U.S. have risen by 24 percent from January to July. In these contacts with a superpower, and in political or economic terms, Vietnam hardly incurs any disadvantages. What do you believe is Vietnam’s mentality in this commitment to contacts with America – what are the values they are choosing?

我们注意到，越南今年1至7月对美国出口同比增长24%，在与超级大国交往中，越南似乎在政治和经济上都没有吃亏，您认为越南与美国的交往秉承什么样的思路和价值选择？

The fact that America and Vietnam establish this kind of comprehensive partnership, that they strengthen economic cooperation and that both sides take what they need is part of a Vietnamese objective to implement a rebalancing strategy in its foreign relations, in its diplomacy. Vietnam’s actual overall goal is to establish this kind of strategic partnersip with all great powers. In fact, Vietnam’s foreign ministry has said that it wants to establish strategic partnerships with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council, but America remains as a scond choice, and to establish this kind of comprehensive partnership and rebalancing is something Vietnam hopes to use to increase its regional influence. Actually, Vietnam doesn’t want to side with just one great power, and I believe that this, too, is an important part of Vietnam’s strategy of balancing great powers.

许利平：美国和越南建立这种全面伙伴关 系，加强经济的这种合作，各取所需，实际上越南的对外外交的一个思路是要实现一种对外的这种平衡的战略，实际上他的总体战略是要和所有的大国建立这种伙伴 关系，越南的外交部其实已经提出了要和五大常任理事国都要建立这种战略伙伴关系，但是和美国只是退而求其次，建立了这种全面的伙伴的关系，实际上越南是希 望通过这种大国的平衡的战略来突出越南在这个地区的影响力，实际上越南也不可能想要任何的大国一边倒，我觉得这也是越南的这个大国平衡战略的一个重要的组 成部分。

An hour and twenty minutes after publication, 44 Huanqiu readers had expressed anger at the article (or what it describes), four readers are delighted, one is bored, and 22 feel that what they’ve read is ridiculous.

Huanqiu, a paper and website with a rather nationalist readership, also reported on Martin Demsey’s visit during the past days, all in a rather noncommittal mode – something also frequently practised by Chinese media during the 1980s/1990s when covering (controversial) foreign issues, but quite different from the often stirring ways Huanqiu articles were written around 2008/2012.

____________

Note(s):

^*) “to choose between being a friend of the United States and a friend of China”, AFP, Aug 16, 2014

Similar statement:

“The Cold War is over. It ended. Russia’s not our enemy. The people of the Czech Republic don’t have to choose between being a friend of the United States or a friend with Russia, you can be both. We don’t believe in a zero sum world,” President Bush said today in Prague

Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2007

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Related

» Help to counter China, USA Today, Aug 18, 2014
» US urged to lift ban, VoV, Aug 14,2014
» 首次访问越南, Huanqiu, Aug 14, 2014
» Australia-US ties, BBC News, Aug 13, 2014
» 王毅晤越南副总理, Huanqiu, Aug 9, 2014
» Low-class nationalism, May 19, 2014
» Vo Nguyen Giap, October 4, 2013
» Giving away the Store, US News, July 23, 2013
» Syria & South China Sea, Aug 5, 2012
» Nothing to deploy, July 30, 2012
» Don’t get burned, June 21, 2012
» Communiqué, Oct 16, 2011
» Five Questions to a Hegemon, Aug 18, 2010
» Threat of an Invasion, April 29, 2009