“Half Investor Angst, Half Schadenfreude”

End of Days?
Seems that Nathan Sperber put a few things straight there:

The essential thing to bear in mind about Western coverage of the Chinese economy is that the bulk of it responds to the needs of the ‘investor community’. For every intervention by a public-minded academic like Ho-fung Hung, there are dozens of specialist briefings, reports, news articles and social media posts whose target audience is indivquaiduals and firms with varying degrees of exposure to China’s market, as well as, increasingly, the foreign policy and security establishments of Western states.

That was in September.
Elsewhere, in “Le Monde Diplomatique”^*), Sperber points out that as far as the manufacturing industry is concerned, China adds as much value as the US and the EU combined.

China’s problems lie elsewhere, Sperber writes – the economy doesn’t create a sufficient number of jobs that would match the qualifications of the young. Even though their skills exceed those of previous generations, they have to fear unemployment and poverty. But that, writes Sperber, isn’t something particularly Chinese.

Technically, the country isn’t even in a recession. So don’t expect China to save the West from its own  corporate greed. If you want democracy to prevail, don’t count on a Chinese implosion. Rather than that, disempower the corporations and make sure that political decisions can’t be bought.
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Note

^*) “Le Monde Dipomatique”, German ed., December 2023, page 21

“New Development Concept” (新发展理念)

If you go by this online glossary by “The Center of Strategic Translation”,

[T]he roots of the problem set tackled by the New Development Concept stretch back to the early Reform Era,

i. e. the late 1970s. Growth had mainly been driven by “government investment in fixed capital assets and strong foreign demand for cheap Chinese goods” – and eventually, rising Chinese wages had to lead to a loss of those markets for cheap products. Also, there were limits to how much infrastructure and building was needed in China.

The “New Development Concept” is described as an answer to the problem the CPC is now facing. It is basically described as an approach to try to access new sources of growth.

Until 2018, that would be a switch from investment-driven to supply-side structural reform, i. e. gradually cutting enterprises that didn’t meet with domestic demand, and support new technological frontiers where the state hoped for new breakthroughs. “[U]nder the pressure of a grueling trade war”, as the article describes it, economic security came to flank the “new development concept”, often borrowing from the already existing Total National Security Paradigm (总体国家安全观).

This “New Development Pattern“ (新发展格局) would rely on

domestic consumers to power the Chinese economy and on a homegrown scientific-industrial complex to power China’s technological advance.

“[A] schema of self-sufficiency” is brought up in this context, but I suppose that shouldn’t be read as if the idea of self-sufficiency hadn’t been around in China before. While food security, for example, seems to have emerged rather recently as a keyword, China has never been too dependent on food imports, despite a rather small (and probably diminishing) share of arable land in its overall territory.

Certainly however, the CPC leaders have been aware of the limits of the post-Mao development model, driven by investment. As early as in 2014, Xi Jinping told Russian television that

After 30 years of reform, China has entered the deep water [or blue water], and all the pleasant reforms have been completed. The delicious meat has been eaten, and what is still on the dishes are rather tough bones. This requires our courage, and steady moves. Courage means to push reform even when it is difficult, and to prove worthy, to tackle the hard bones, and to enter dangerous shoals. Steadiness is about keeping to the accurate direction, driving steadily, and, above all, to avoid disruptive mistakes.

There are arguments that would make China’s “wolf warrior diplomacy” look logical: if China’s economy becomes less attractive for foreign investors, you may have to intimidate them, rather than to lure them. But then, China has since abandoned some of that confrontational policy, at least in its communications with Washington. Maybe the chance of “hostile forces” did come as a surprise for Beijing after all.

As for the glossary, I can’t really judge its accuracy and reliability, but it does look like a good source to me to understand CPC party documents and articles.

Upgrades, common prosperity and “no ‘welfarism'” – Xi’s 2021 talk on financial and economic affairs

“Qiushi” published excerpts in October 2021, from a talk given by Xi Jinping about two months earlier, on August 17, 2021 at the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission‘s 10th meeting. Xi touched upon “welfarism” (福利主义), “involution” (内卷) and “lying flat” (躺平). His talk may not describe the current outcomes of the CPC’s recent economic policies well, but it  might say a few things about their intended effects.

“The party recognized that poverty isn’t socialism”, Xinwen Lianbo, 2021
I’ve only translated the first paragraphs of the article. Follow the main link underneath to read more there, or buy yourself a personality-cult-book at Xinhua’s webstore.

Main Link:

“Firmly promote common prosperity” (扎实推动共同富裕)

We are now forging ahead towards the second centenary goal of struggle. To find answers to the changing main contradictions in our society and to satisfiy the growing demand of the people to a good life, promotion of the entire people’s prosperity, as a focus of the people’s happiness, must be laid as a foundation of the party’s long-term government. High-quality development requires high-quality workers. Only by promotion of common prosperity, only by increasing incomes of the inhabitants of the cities and the countryside, upgrades to human resources, the essential overall productivity can be improved and a foundation of motive power for high-quality development be laid.
现在，我们正在向第二个百年奋斗目标迈进。适应我国社会主要矛盾的变化，更好满足人民日益增长的美好生活需要，必须把促进全体人民共同富裕作为为人民谋幸福的着力点，不断夯实党长期执政基础。高质量发展需要高素质劳动者，只有促进共同富裕，提高城乡居民收入，提升人力资本，才能提高全要素生产率，夯实高质量发展的动力基础。当前，全球收入不平等问题突出，一些国家贫富分化，中产阶层塌陷，导致社会撕裂、政治极化、民粹主义泛滥，教训十分深刻！我国必须坚决防止两极分化，促进共同富裕，实现社会和谐安定。
At the same time, there needs to be an awareness that there are still prominent imbalances in our country’s development, that development and income allocation between cities and the countryside continue to show rather big differences. A new round of technolgical revolution and industrial revolution have invigorated economic development, but also with deep influence on gaps in employment and income allocation, including some negative influences that need to be reacted to and that need to be solved.
同时，必须清醒认识到，我国发展不平衡不充分问题仍然突出，城乡区域发展和收入分配差距较大。新一轮科技革命和产业变革有力推动了经济发展，也对就业和收入分配带来深刻影响，包括一些负面影响，需要有效应对和解决。
Common prosperity is an essential requirement of socialism and an important characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The common prosperity we are talking about is the entire people’s prosperity, a rich quality of the material and spiritual life of the masses, not the prosperity of a minority nor uniformly-arranged egalitarianism.
共同富裕是社会主义的本质要求，是中国式现代化的重要特征。我们说的共同富裕是全体人民共同富裕，是人民群众物质生活和精神生活都富裕，不是少数人的富裕，也不是整齐划一的平均主义。
We must study the different stages of our goals deeply, and divide the promotion of common prosperity into different stages: With the end of the “14th Five-Year Plan”, initial solid steps towards the entire people’s common prosperity will have been made, differences between people’s incomes and actual consumption levels will have been gradually reduced. By 2035, the entire people’s common prosperity will have achieved even more obvious substantial headway, and basic public services will have achieved levelled performances. By the middle of the century, the entire people’s common prosperity will have been basically achieved, and the differences between incomes and actual consumption levels be reduced to a reasonable size. It is urgently necessary to define the promotion of common prosperity’s operational outline and to issue scientific and feasible assessment criteria in correspondence with our national conditions.
要深入研究不同阶段的目标，分阶段促进共同富裕：到“十四五”末，全体人民共同富裕迈出坚实步伐，居民收入和实际消费水平差距逐步缩小。到2035年，全体人民共同富裕取得更为明显的实质性进展，基本公共服务实现均等化。到本世纪中叶，全体人民共同富裕基本实现，居民收入和实际消费水平差距缩小到合理区间。要抓紧制定促进共同富裕行动纲要，提出科学可行、符合国情的指标体系和考核评估办法。
To promote common prosperity, we must grasp the following principles well.
促进共同富裕，要把握好以下原则。
Encouragement of hard work and innovation to become rich. A happy life comes from struggle, and the building of common prosperity must rely on hard work and knowledge. We must persist in safeguarding and improving the people’s livelihood during development, put the promotion of high-quality development first. To improve people’s levels of education, we must increase universally fairer conditions for the development of abilities, raise the entire society’s human capital and professional skills, raise abilities to work and and to create, and the ability to become rich. We must avoid the solidification of social stratification, open channels for upward mobility, create opportunities for more people to become rich, shape an environment of participation to avoid “involution” and “lying flat”.
——鼓励勤劳创新致富。幸福生活都是奋斗出来的，共同富裕要靠勤劳智慧来创造。要坚持在发展中保障和改善民生，把推动高质量发展放在首位，为人民提高受教育程度、增强发展能力创造更加普惠公平的条件，提升全社会人力资本和专业技能，提高就业创业能力，增强致富本领。要防止社会阶层固化，畅通向上流动通道，给更多人创造致富机会，形成人人参与的发展环境，避免“内卷”、“躺平”。
We must maintain the fundamental economic system.^*) We must base ourselves on the early stage of socialism and maintain the “two unvaverings”. We must insist on joint development of public ownership as the main part and diverse-ownership economy, resolutely bring the public-ownership economy into play as the important factor to promote common prosperity, develop a healthy non-public-ownership economy at the same time, and the healthy growth of people of the non-public-ownership economy. We must allow some of the people to become rich first and at the same time emphasize that early prosperity carries following prosperity with it and helps following prosperity. The emphasis must be on the encouragement of people leading [on the road of becoming rich] who work hard, respect the law and dare to found entrerprises. dishonest means of becoming rich must not be advocated, and offenses against the law and regulations must be dealt with in accordance with the law.
——坚持基本经济制度。要立足社会主义初级阶段，坚持“两个毫不动摇”。要坚持公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展，大力发挥公有制经济在促进共同富裕中的重要作用，同时要促进非公有制经济健康发展、非公有制经济人士健康成长。要允许一部分人先富起来，同时要强调先富带后富、帮后富，重点鼓励辛勤劳动、合法经营、敢于创业的致富带头人。靠偏门致富不能提倡，违法违规的要依法处理。
Act to the best of your abilities. We must establish a scientific public policy system, divide the cade well, with a pattern by which everyone can hae his appropriate share. It will take greater efforts and more solid measures to give the masses a sense of achievement. At the same time, we must see that there is still a great gap between our country’s level of development and developed countries. Needs and potentialities must match with each other, guarantees and improvements of people’s livelihood must be built on sustainable economic and financial foundations. Don’t be overambitious, rein in your appetite, and don’t make promises that you can’t redeem. The government can’t take charge of everything. the emphasis has to be on strengthening the basic, generally beneficial and observant protection of the people’s livelihood. Even when the future level of development is higher and financial strength more solid, goals mustn’t be set too high, no exaggerated guarantees be given, and falling into the “welfarism” trap and raising idle people must be resolutely avoided.
——尽力而为量力而行。要建立科学的公共政策体系，把蛋糕分好，形成人人享有的合理分配格局。要以更大的力度、更实的举措让人民群众有更多获得感。同时，也要看到，我国发展水平离发达国家还有很大差距。要统筹需要和可能，把保障和改善民生建立在经济发展和财力可持续的基础之上，不要好高骛远，吊高胃口，作兑现不了的承诺。政府不能什么都包，重点是加强基础性、普惠性、兜底性民生保障建设。即使将来发展水平更高、财力更雄厚了，也不能提过高的目标，搞过头的保障，坚决防止落入“福利主义”养懒汉的陷阱。

[…]

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Note

*)	Referring to China’s fundamental economic system as seen by the CPC, i. e. its rules for ownership of means of production

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Related

Preaching water, living in France, Jan 14, 2015
“What else is there to say”, “Global Voices”, Febr 17, 2009
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11th Moscow Conference on International Security: “Hierarchial West, Egalitarian Russian-Chinese Friendship”

The following is my translation of a article by Russia’s Sputnik newsagency in Chinese, published online last night (Tuesday night) and updated this morning (Wednesday) Greenwich Mean Time. It is billed a “commentary”, but doesn’t really match the criteria. It looks more like a report. The 11th Moscow Conference on International Security is its main topic, but it also seems to contain some carefully calibrated propaganda, targeted at a Chinese readership.

The article starts with a reference to Putin’s video address to the conference, but then gathers assessments from a number of Chinese and Russian pundits.

Links within blockquotes have been added during translation.

Another video address, Putin on August 15 (CCTV)

NATO links up with AUKUS to put pressure on China and Russia
北约联合AUKUS是为了施压中俄
Commentary
评论
Russian-Chinese relations aren’t influenced by fluctuations in the global situation. Russia’s and China’s cooperation in the field of security won’t pose a problem to third parties. Even though the West is trying to isolate Russia, there is no change in Sino-Russian friendship.
俄罗斯和中国的关系不受世界局势波动的影响。俄中在安全领域的合作不会给第三方带来问题。尽管西方企图孤立俄罗斯，但中俄友谊不变。
Russian president Putin pointed out in his video message to the 11th Moscow International Security Conference participants and guests that most countries were prepared to defend their sovereignty and national interests. The Russian president also said that a multipolar world is now taking shape and that new economic and political centers are continuously becoming stronger.
俄罗斯总统普京在向第十一届莫斯科国际安全会议与会者和嘉宾的视频致辞中指出，大多数国家准备捍卫本国主权和国家利益。 俄罗斯总统还说，多极世界正在逐渐形成，新的经济和政治中心也在不断加强。
Referring to global security threats, Putin pointed out that America was trying to change the relations between the nations in the Asia-Pacific region in accordance with its own wishes. Carrying out the so-called “Indo-Pacific strategy” was essentially about creating a military and political alliance controlled by Washington. In his speech to the conference’s participants, Putin emphasized that “it can’t be ruled out that NATO will carry out comprehensive integration with the already-created AUKUS group”.
谈到全球安全威胁，普京指出，美国试图按照自己的意愿改变亚太地区现存的国家间关系体系。推行所谓“印太战略”，实质上就是为了打造华盛顿控制的军事政治联盟。普京在向与会者发表的讲话中强调：“不排除北约同已经创建的 AUKUS 集团进行全面整合这一走向。”
Anatoly Smirnov, director of the National Institute of Research of Global Security, pointed out in an interview with Sputnik that Asian countries have similar concerns about these processes.
国家全球安全研究所所长阿纳托利·斯米尔诺夫在接受俄罗斯卫星通讯社采访时指出，亚洲国家对这些进程也有类似的担忧。
Anatoly Smirnov said: “The strengthening of NATO integration with AUKUS is about putting double pressure on China and on Russia’s east. This includes roping Japan and South Korea into AUKUS. They want to make Russia and China divert resources for their countries’ development plans into the protection of their sovereignty. At the same time, America and the European Union leaders also try to create trouble for countries that reject these policies. Many Asian countries understand this policy very clearly, a rip-off policy that includes all kinds of pressure, containment, blackmail and bluff, financial and sanction obstacles and rude campaigning for American and Western interests.”
阿纳托利·斯米尔诺夫说：“西方加强北约同AUKUS的整合是为了向中国和俄罗斯东部实施双重压力。包括拉拢日本和韩国加入AUKUS。他们想让俄罗斯与中国把资源从本国发展计划中挪出，以用于保护其主权。与此同时，美国和欧盟领导人还试图为那些拒绝与响应他们政策的国家制造麻烦。亚洲许多国家已经清楚地意识到这种包括各种施压、围堵、讹诈、金融和制裁障碍、无礼游说美国和西方利益在内的敲诈政策。”
Chinese defense minister Li Shangfu was among the more than 800 delegates from 76 countries attending the conference. Current affairs commentator and a high-level researcher at People’s University of China School of Finance Zhou Rong points out that the Chinese defense minister’s visit shows the continuous development of relations between the two armies.
来自76个国家的800多名代表中，中国国防部长李尚福出席了本届会议。时事评论员、中国人民大学重阳金融研究院高级研究员周戎就此指出，中国防长访问俄罗斯体现了两军关系的不断发展。
Expert Zhou Rong says: “When Li Shangfu visited Russia for the first time after taking office, the two sides already exchanged opinions about Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. His further visit to Russia after four months marks the concrete implementation and advance of the two countries’ strategic military cooperation. A framework for Chinese-Russian military exercises have been planned for a long time. So, the Chinese defense minister’s visit is even more about strengthening trust in the development of strategic relations between the two countries’ military, to demonstrate that there is no change in Chinese-Russian determination to develop their comprehensive strategic partnership relations. No matter how much the international community may isolate Russia, the Chinese government’s friendship with Russia doesn’t change.”
周戎专家说：“李尚福防长就职后首次访问俄罗斯时，双方已就中俄战略合作交换了意见。时隔四个月后再次访俄，则是对两国已达成军事战略合作的具体落实和推进。另外，中俄战略军演框架早已规划。因此中国防长访问俄罗斯，更多的是增进两国军队发展战略关系的信心，表现出中国与俄罗斯发展全面战略合作伙伴关系的决心不变。无论国际社会如何孤立俄罗斯，中国政府对俄罗斯人民的友好情谊不变。”
Expert Zhou Rong believes that one of the goals of the Chinese defense minister’s particiipation in the Moscow Security Conference is to convey the message to his foreign colleagues that China’s position concerning the Ukraine crisis hasn’t changed.
周戎专家认为，中国防长参加莫斯科安全会议的目的之一就是向外国同行传达中国对乌克兰危机的立场。
Concerning this, Zhou Rong’s thought is that “it needs to be emphasized that China’s support doesn’t mean that its position concerning the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has changed. China has always emphasized its stance on the side of peace. We see that defense minister Li Shangfu’s main objective is to participate in the 11th Moscow Security Conference. I believe that while visiting Russia, he will emphasize China’s just position on the Ukraine crisis and, from the platform in Moscow, convey this attitude to the world. Not long ago, China also took part in a peace summit held by Saudi Arabia. The nature of that summit underwent a dramatic change by China’s participation. Without China, it could have been seen as an anti-Russian-alliance summit. After the summit, the Chinese and Russian foreign ministers also had a timely telephone call and exchanged their views. This time’s Chinese-Russian defense ministers dialogue can move the awareness further that the fundamentals of Chinese-Russian cooperation won’t change, that China’s fundamental position concerning the Ukraine problem won’t change, and that China will continue to promote regional stability and the concept of global peace.”
周戎专家就此发表了自己的看法：“需要强调的是，中国的支持并不意味着中国在俄乌问题上的立场发生变化，中国始终强调站在和平一方。我们看到，李尚福防长赴俄罗斯的主要目的是参加第十一届莫斯科国际安全会议。相信访俄期间，他也会强调中国在乌克兰危机上的公正立场，并通过莫斯科平台向世界传递这一态度。不久前中国还参加了沙特举办的和平峰会。该峰会因为中国的参加，性质发生极大变化。如若没有中国，可能就会被认为是反俄联盟峰会。峰会后中俄外长也及时互通电话，就问题交换了意见。此次中俄防长对话能够进一步强化意识，即中俄两国军事合作的基本盘不会变，中国在乌克兰问题上的基本立场不会变，中国将继续促进地区稳定，推动世界和平理念。这也恰恰是中国不会接受俄罗斯被孤立的原因。”
In his speech on the first day of the conference, Li Shangfu told the plenum that Chinese-Russian comprehensive strategic partnership relations had entered a new era of sustainable and stable development. Chinese-Russian relations in the military field had established an example of cooperation that was non-algined, non-confrontative and not directed against third parties.
在会议的第一天，李尚福在全体会议上致辞时指出，中俄全面战略协作伙伴关系进入新时代持续稳定发展。中俄军事领域关系树立了不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方的合作典范。
Russian defense minister Shoigu’s assesssment of Russian-Chinese relations was similar. He said that from every perspective, these relations were already exceeding the level of strategic partnership.
俄罗斯国防部长绍伊古对俄中关系也做出了类似的评估。他说，从各个方面来看，这些关系已经超越了战略关系的水平。
Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ deiputy director Alexander Lomanov said in an interview with Sputnik that Russia and China have shaped a common language to describe mutual cooperation. It was very important that the two countries’ military people also had this common language.
俄罗斯科学院世界经济与国际关系研究所副所长亚历山大·洛马诺夫在接受俄罗斯卫星通讯社采访时表示，俄罗斯和中国已经形成了描述双边合作的共同语言，两国军人也有这种共同语言非常重要。
Expert Alexander Lomanov said: “That this common language has received approval and acceptance by the two countries’ military circles is an extremely important and constructive signal. It shows that Russian-Chinese relations, in all areas, have common principles and foundations. That’s to say, they are predictable. These declarations by the two defense ministers have explicitly confirmed that these relations won’t be influenced by situational turmoil. Sometimes, the West exerts more pressure on China than on Russia, and at other times, Russia faces greater pressure than China. These changes in Western policies are just there to create splits, to create the illusion in China that if Russia or China weaken their bilateral relations, they can earn themselves some advantages and convenience in their relations with the West. China and Russia have left this stage behind themselves and won’t fall for these kinds of tricks. This proves the maturity of relations. The two sides are perfectly aware that any promises and threats by Western countries aiming at Russia and China doubting each other are meaningless. The West is not prepared to develop substantial and constructrive relations with Russia or China. Only if the West arrives at the belief that it can’t destroy Russian-Chinese cooperation, Russia and China can face a matching partner – the Western powers.”
亚历山大·洛马诺夫专家说：“这一共同语言得到两国军界的认可和接受，是一个非常积极和建设性的信号。这表明俄中关系在各个领域都有共同的原则和基础。也就是说，它们都是可预测的。两国防长的这些表态明确证实了这些关系不受局势动荡的影响。有时西方对中国施加的压力比对俄罗斯大，有时俄罗斯面临的压力比中国大。西方政策的这些变化不过是为了制造分裂，给其中一方造成一种错觉，即俄中若削弱两国关系，可以给它们各自与西方的关系带来一些好处和方便。中国和俄罗斯已经超越了这个阶段，不会上这类伎俩的当。这证明了双边关系的成熟。双方十分清楚，西方国家任何旨在让俄中相互怀疑的许诺和恐吓都是毫无意义的。西方并没有准备与俄罗斯或中国发展实质性的建设性关系。只有当西方确信破坏不了俄中合作时，俄中两国才能面对一个配得上的对话者——西方大国。”
Alexander Lomanov emphasized the egalitarian characteristic of Russian-Chinese cooperation, pointing out that there were essential differences to Western-built alliances of all kinds.
亚历山大·洛马诺夫强调了俄中合作的平等特点，指出这与西方建立的各类联盟有着本质区别。
He said: “China has continuously emphasized during recent years that Sino-Russian relations are more than allied relations, that they go beyond alliance relations, this is a mechanism of higher quality. This is indeed the case. Western alliances are compeletely built on hierarchy. There are differences between major countries and non-major countries. Non-major countries must obey the major countries’ orders. Often, Western countries’ alliances are directed against others, against “bad” countries. Among Western countries, Russia and china are more and more often considered “bad” countries. At the same time, Russia and China actively protect themselves, but they won’t create trouble for others or use their combined economic and military strength to threaten others.”
他说：“近年来中方不止一次强调：中俄关系高于联盟关系，并超过联盟关系，这是一个质量更高的机制。事实的确如此。西方联盟完全建立在等级制度之上，有主要国家和非主要国家之别，非主要国家必须服从主要国家的命令。 通常，西方联盟是针对某人、针对“不好”的国家。在西方联盟中俄中越来越经常被列为“坏”国家。与此同时俄罗斯和中国正在积极努力保护自己，但不会以给他人制造麻烦或利用其经济和军事潜力的综合实力来恐吓他人为代价。”
On the Moscow International Security Conference, both the Russian and Chinese defense ministers have expressed their willingness to strengthen military support with the Asia-Pacific region. Shoigu pointed out that one of Russia’s most important cooperation partners there was India, and that Russia had historically established special relations with India. With Vietnam, Myanmar, Mongolia, Laos, Indonesia, Bangla Desh and other countries, Russia shares the experience of joint struggle against colonial rule.
在莫斯科国际安全会议上，俄中两国防长都表示要加强与亚太地区的军事合作。绍伊古指出，俄罗斯在该地区最重要的合作伙伴之一是印度，俄罗斯历史上与印度建立了一种特殊关系。俄罗斯与越南、缅甸、蒙古、老挝、印度尼西亚、孟加拉国等国都拥有共同反对殖民统治的斗争经验。
Li Shangfu said that China wanted to strengthen military exchange with all countries of the world, with ASEAN countries and bordering countries, and to improve the development and level of military relations with European Union countries. On the foundations of mutual trust, cooperation and win-win, China would also strengthen its traditional friendship with Latin America, the Caribbean and southern Pacific countries.
李尚福防长表示，中国愿加强同世界各国军队的军事交流，加强同东盟国家和周边国家的军事合作，提高与欧盟国家的军事关系发展水平。并在平等互信、合作共赢的基础上加强同拉美、加勒比、南太地区国家的传统友谊。

Xi’s Business Speech: The West has spat into your Porridge

China’s party, military and state leader Xi Jinping spoke to the CPPCC delegates of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce on Monday afternoon local time in Beijing.

One of the takeaways from his speech, probably not surprisingly, was  that he emphasized party leadership over business¹⁾. (Ask Jack Ma if he was surprised.)

^{习近平在看望参加政协会议的民建工商联界委员时强调 正确引导民营经济健康发展高质量发展，新闻联播，2023-03-06}

Maybe somewhat more strikingly, Xi went beyond the usual descriptions of a “difficult” etc. environment for China, and blamed  “containment carried out by Western countries under U.S. leadership” for at least some of the undeniable difficulties China is facing. He combined that with an emphasis on achievements of the past five years, using the phrase of “不易” again – i. e. achievements that hadn’t been easy to come by²⁾

What he did not mention was that no country in the world is obliged to throw first-class technology at China, and that it had been China that tested economic-coercion tools against countries like Australia and Lithuania.

The following is a short translated excerpt from Xi’s speech on Monday.

Xi Jinping pointed out that the five years that followed the party’s 19th National Congress have been extremely unusual and outstanding years. Our country’s external environment has suddenly changed. Uncertain factors that are hard to predict have significantly grown, and especially the Western countries under American leadership have carried out comprehensive containment, blockade and suppression, bringing unprecedented, serious challenges to our country. At the same time, we are facing a multitude of difficulties inside our country, such as repeated corona epidemics and growing downward pressure on the economy. We will adhere to the overall main key of seeking progress within stability, we will rise to the challenges, calmly respond, not believe in evil, we will not fear, won’t seek refuge, average GDP will grow by 5.2 percent, we won the fight against poverty as planned, built a society of moderate prosperity, reached the first two-centenary goal, promoted the party’s and nation’s achievements that have found global attention, and promoted our country’s steps into the construction of a new milestone of comprehensive socialist modernization. The successes of the past five years are the fruit of the entire party and the entire people unitedly struggling, showing the essence of the CPPCC representatives’ contributions.
习近平指出，党的十九大以来的5年，是极不寻常、极不平凡的5年。我国发展的外部环境急剧变化，不确定难预料因素显著增多，尤其是以美国为首的西方国家对我实施了全方位的遏制、围堵、打压，给我国发展带来前所未有的严峻挑战。同时国内也面临新冠疫情反复、经济下行压力增大等多重困难。我们坚持稳中求进工作总基调，迎难而上，沉着应对，不信邪、不怕压、不避难，国内生产总值年均增长5.2%，如期打赢脱贫攻坚战，全面建成小康社会，实现第一个百年奋斗目标，推动党和国家事业取得举世瞩目的重大成就，推动我国迈上全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程。5年来的成就，是全党全国人民团结奋斗的结果，也凝聚着广大政协委员的贡献。

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Notes

1)	「要引导民营企业和民营企业家正确理解党中央方针政策，增强信心、轻装上阵、大胆发展，实现民营经济健康发展、高质量发展。」
2)	「我们动态优化调整防控政策措施，较短时间实现了疫情防控平稳转段，新冠病亡率保持在全球最低水平，取得疫情防控重大决定性胜利。我们完整、准确、全面贯彻新发展理念，着力构建新发展格局、推动高质量发展，在全球通胀达到40多年来新高的情况下，我国物价总水平保持平稳，全年经济增长3%，在世界主要经济体中是很高的。这些成绩的取得，实属不易。」 Previously: 来之不易 (not easy to come by).

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Related

China’s “multilateralism” only for big powers, CNN / Landsbergis, March 7, 2023
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Wuxiwooshee: Trying to transcribe Major-General Jin Yinan

–

That’s Major-General Jin Yinan (金一南), a Chinese Major-General, Professor, author and CPBS radio columnist with peculiar opinions about the Netherlands and Norway (click picture underneath for more info):

Also, I find him difficult to understand.

Here goes:

Question: 欢迎收听一南军事论坛。我是[Zhou Yuting]。 北约军事委员会主席罗伯·鲍尔^*)一月二十八日在接受媒体采访时公开表态说，北约准备与俄罗斯直接对抗。他的这个表态迅速引发国际社会的广泛关注。对此，俄罗斯国家杜马回应称，这种言论正在将整个世界投入和战争。那么北约真的要直接与俄罗斯开战吗？ 和战争的威胁是否离人类越来越近。这些就是今天一南军事论坛要关注的话题。首先欢迎金一南教授。金一南教授，您好！

Jin Yinan: 你好！

Question: 我们都知道自从俄乌开战以来，以美国为首的西方国家在对俄罗斯实施多轮建立制裁的同时，还…不断的向乌克兰提供各种军事援助。那么，北约军事委员会主席罗伯·鲍尔的自谈表态是否意味着北约已经做好准备将直接与俄罗斯开战？

Jin Yinan: 他这种讲话就北约准备与俄罗斯直接对抗－－这种话的份量非常重。不是间接对抗。与俄罗斯直接对抗。几乎就说就让往这个欧洲大战faran中。这是一个非常严重的采取啊。我觉得一辈子两次世界大战see-sai和现在有长效和平的欧洲人应该对鲍尔的话感到非常震惊。 原来北约的整个态度－－谴责俄罗斯，制裁俄罗斯，提供优先的军备－－这个优先军备是什么呢？就wuxiwoosheewooshee现在慢慢转进wuxiwoosheewooshee。现在向乌克兰提供美国的Abrahams坦克，德国的”豹”式坦克等等适于最先进的一种坦克…，那就完全不是wuxiwoosheewooshee了，是wuxiwoosheewooshee。
[…..]

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Notes

Clues:	防御性的武器 — 进攻性的武器
*)	Robert Bauer
—	Want to try yourselves? Give it a go there (starts at 19′ 45”)

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Jiang Zemin, 1926 – 2022

Wikimedia Commons – click picture for source

Jiang Zemin (江泽民), one of the CCP leadership’s many trained engineers, the man who invented the socialist market economy and the three represents, … Relatively untarnished by the June-4 crackdowns, he became the CCP’s chairman (or secretary general) in June 1989, by means of what official Chinese sources usually refer to as an “election”, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth CPC Central Committee.  Jiang had spent some time abroad, as a trainee at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in 1955, and later worked in leading technical and party functions in trades as different as the automotive and soap-manfucaturing industries. His work turned more administrative and governmental some time after 1980.

In October 1992, he told the 14th CCP party congress that

To establish a socialist market economy we must do the following important and interrelated tasks.  First, we must change the way in which state-owned enterprises operate, especially the large and medium-sized ones, and push them into the market so as to increase their vitality and efficiency. This is the key to establishing a socialist market economy, consolidating the socialist system and demonstrating its superiority.

Based on Deng Xiaoping‘s concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义), the socialist market economy (社会主义市场经济) focused on growth – something Deng kept emphasizing, sometimes against opposition from more conservative party leaders such as Chen Yun. Even Jiang is said to have come fully behind Deng’s all-out advocacy of growth once the paramount elder had made his inspection tour to the south (i. e. Shenzhen), garnering local support for his reform agenda, and proving that he was still China’s most powerful man, even if (mostly) from backstage.

Unlike his mentor Deng Xiaoping, he was no revolutionary veteran, and therefore lacked some or much of the traditional authority to head the party’s central military commission at the time. He led the commission anyway, and worked to make it clear that he was no mere civilian business promoter, according to a short news notice by German newsmagazine Der Spiegel in January 1995:

Those who criticize me for raising glasses with Western leaders must understand that this is tactics,

he told PLA officers in Chengdu, according to a central committee document the Spiegel said it had on hand.

I’m aware that the West remains our main enemy.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics has remained one of the CCP’s slogans, even as Jiang’s (and Deng’s) propensity to growth lost favor among the fourth generation of party leadership, i. e. the previous (Hu-Wen led) politbureau. The term socialist market economy has become less frequently used. In June 2011, China Daily hailed the concept as evidence for the wisdom of the CPC and its able leadership of the Chinese people in their endeavor to build a prosperous, civilized, democratic and harmonious modern socialist state and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation only in June 2011, but left no doubt that the Deng-Jiang approach had been second stage in a three-stage development strategy, and that

Now we are striding forward toward the strategic objective of the third stage. From now to the mid-21st century, China will be in a period of in-depth development of industrialization, informatization, urbanization, marketization and internationalization, an important period of strategic opportunities for economic and social development, but also a period with prominent social contradictions.

The three-staged approach referred to by the above China-Daily article of June 2011 had been spelled out by Jiang Zemin’s predecessor Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), in 1987. Jiang was to replace Zhao two years later, after Zhao had been ousted in the process of the June-4 crackdown. Li Peng (李鹏), state council chairman at the time of the crackdown, and the Standing Committee of the “National People’s Congress” afterwards, referred to the third stage as a the one where

we will catch up with medium-level developed countries in terms of per capita GNP by the middle of this century, achieve modernisation by and large and turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic and culturally advanced socialist country,

in January 2001, speaking to an audience in India.

The Hong Kong handover in 1997 added to the glorious picture of growth, this time in terms of political power. But appointing the former British colony’s tycoon Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) as the chief executive of the newly-created special administrative region (or having him “elected”) was probably one of Jiang’s leadership’s less lucky choices. In October 2000, enraged by Hong Kong journalists’ questions about if the CCP supported Tung’s candidacy for a second term, and if so, how that support could play a role, if Tung was really to be elected, Jiang told the questioners that they were “too simple, sometimes nayifu”. Tung, deeply embarrassed (by his fellow Hong Kongers, his boss, or both sides), was laughing in the background.

In his angry lecture, Jiang also advised the Hong Kong press people to learn from Mike Wallace, an American anchorman who had interviewed him about a month earlier, in the seaside resort of Beidaihe. It had been an unusual  interview, by CCP leadership standards, one that Jiang had visibly enjoyed, and one that had probably gone very well for him, in terms of public relations. Compared to his successor, he came across as a cosmopolitan, with a certain command of several foreign languages, including English, Russian, and arguably some German. When Spiegel journalists met with Jiang in 2002, they were greeted in German, with no accent.

Jiang had stated the need to deepen the reform of the system of distribution and the system of social security, in his 14th CCP party congress speech of October 1992, but that was basically that. If in essence, the objective of socialism was to liberate and develop the productive forces, to eliminate exploitation and polarization, and ultimately to achieve common prosperity, liberating the productive forces certainly came first. Growing divides between rich and poor didn’t appear to trouble either Jiang, or Zhu Rongji‘s (朱镕基) state council.

Another trend however did – the growing influence of a qigong-related, or buddhism-related religious organization, Falun Gong. In reaction to an incident in Tianjin, a massive silent protest involving over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners or supporters was organised in Beijing on April 25, 1999. The CCP leadership declared Falun Gong an “evil cult” in July, 1999, and started a lasting crackdown, initially supplemented with extended evening news propaganda featuring allegations against the organization which were hardly more “scientific” than the “evil cult” itself. Here, too, Hong Kong’s unfortunate chief executive Tung Chee-hwa was walking on eggshells, trying to please both his superiors in Beijing, and the public in Hong Kong.

When Jiang stepped down as the CCP’s secretary general in November 2002, he had held the post for more than thirteen years. He relinquished state chairmanship in March 2003, and the party’s central military commission chairmanship in September 2004.

Jiang Zemin was born in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, in 1926. He is survived by his wife Wang Yeping (王冶坪, also born in Yangzhou), and by two sons, Jiang Mianheng (江绵恒) and Jiang Miankang (江绵康).

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Related
» Jiang Zemin’s Health Matters, July 8, 2011
» Tiger on the Brink, New York Times, about 1998

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Most headlines in during Jiang’s life after retirement came from Falun-Gong affiliated media. The close interest from these quarters was no coincidence.

German Chancellor’s first China Visit: Opportunities and Liabilities

It is going to be the first visit to China for German chancellor Olaf Scholz who took office late last year with a three-party coalition (SPD, Greens, and FDP).

On Friday (November 4), he is scheduled to meet “President” Xi Jinping, according to his office’s website, and following that, a meeting his planned with him and Li Keqiang, his actual colleague as head of a government. Bilateral relations, international topics such as climate change, Russia’s “war of aggression” against Ukraine and the situation in the east Asian region are said to be on the agenda. “Federal Chancellor Scholz will be accompanied by a business delegation during his visit”, the office’s statement concludes.

^{Not everybody’s first visit}
Shanghai’s “Jiefang Daily” suggests^*) that

many European companies have experienced serious economic problems this year, because of the energy crisis, high inflation, rising interest rates and problems like the economic slowdown. It is crucial for these European companies to make up for these losses in Europe by profiting from the Chinese market. Brudermüller for example, CEO at Germany’s chemical giant BASF, plans to further expand BASF’s “favorable investments” in China. It’s business report shows that unlike in Europe, results in China have been positive.
欧洲很多企业今年以来由于能源危机、高通胀、利率上升和经济放缓等遭遇严重经营困难。对这些欧洲企业来说，用中国市场的收益弥补在欧洲的亏损至关重要。比如德国化工巨头巴斯夫集团首席执行官薄睦乐就打算进一步扩大巴斯夫在中国的“有利投资”。业绩报告显示，与在欧洲的亏损不同，巴斯夫集团在中国的增长一直是正向的。

–
Michelin’s business report, said to have been published on October 25, also shows rapidly rising sales in China, in contrast with an eight-percent drop in Europe, “Jiefang Daily” reports.

Michelin’s handsome China numbers notwithstanding, the “Global Times”, a Chinese paper for a foreign readership, blames a “sour-grape” mentality for France’s differences with Germany’s China policy. Those differences probably exist, with Paris being more skeptical about Chinese “opportunities” than Berlin, but you might consider Germany’s dependence on Chinese export markets as a liability, rather than as an opportunity, just as well.

While the SPD remains highly cooperative when it comes to China business, both its coalition partners have advised caution. And while it may be difficult to forecast a trend of future German investment in, exports to and supply chain connections with China, there are statements from German business circles you wouldn’t have heard a few years ago.

China itself rather bets on protectionism, but wants to get into the act globally, including in Germany (China setzt selbst eher auf Abschottung, will aber überall in der Welt mehr mitmischen, auch bei uns in Deutschland),

German weekly “Focus” quotes Martin Wansleben, head of the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce.  Scholz should champion clear-cut rules.
It isn’t only France that is concerned about Germany’s economic dependence on China. “Voice of America’s” (VoA) Chinese service, too, points out that “the West shows growing concern about Chinese trade practices and its human rights record”, as well as unease about “Germany’s dependence on the world’s second-largest economic body” (对德国对中国这个世界第二大经济体的依赖感到不安).

VoA also quotes a German government spokesman as saying that while Berlin’s view on China had changed, “decoupling” from China was opposed by Berlin.

When you keep pressing people for a while, the main problem appears to be China’s aggressive policy against Taiwan. Most Germans (this blogger included) never expected that Russia would really invade Ukraine. Now that this has happened, peoples’ imagination has become somewhat more animated – and realistic.

The Social Democrats are more skeptical than its middle- and upper-class coalition partners when it comes to the West’s human-rights agenda, and rightly so. (If China put all its SOEs on international sale, you wouldn’t hear a word about the Uyghurs from Western governments anymore.)

But the Russian-Chinese alliance is a fact, and so is that alliance’s preparedness to annex third countries. That is something the Social Dems can’t ignore. If the press, the oppositional CDU/CSU and the SPD’s coalition partners statements are something to go by, the tide of German integration with China’s economy is being reversed.

“Nothing speaks against German SMEs continuing to import their special nuts and bolts from China”, a columnist mused on German news platform t-online last week, but not without a backup source.

China’s propaganda doesn’t look at Scholz’ visit in a way isolated from its other global contacts. In fact, the German visitor is mentioned in a row with General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan – all of them bearing testimony, or so the propaganda suggests, of how attractive “Chinese opportunities” (中国机遇) actually are.

But Germany’s dependence on China, while worrying and in need to be cut back substantively, shouldn’t be viewed in an isolated way either. Scholz visit won’t even last for a full day, without an overnight stay, and also in November, Scholz will travel to Vietnam. Statistics appear to suggest that German industry will find backup sources there – if not first sources just as well.

And Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s foreign minister and one of the leaders of the SPD’s China-skeptic Green coalition partner, is currently travelling Central Asia. All the countries there “once hoped to be a bridge between Russia, China, and Europe,” German broadcaster NTV quotes her – the European Union needed to provide Central Asia with opportunities. Options beyond Russia and China, that is.

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Notes

*)	“Jiefang” actually “quotes foreign media”, but Chinese propaganda is often very creative in doing so – therefore no names here.

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