Posts tagged ‘international’

Sunday, July 5, 2015

Refined Propaganda: China’s “National Security Law”, and PLA Exercise in Hong Kong

CCTV coverage, July 4

See what happens? – Xinwen Lianbo, CCTV, July 4.
The exercise didn’t feature
prominently in the broadcast,
and was only shown among a
collection of short news
owards the end of the program.

 

 

“People’s Liberation Army” (PLA) troops stationed in Hong Kong conducted a military exercise at Castle Peak (青山, Green Hill) on Saturday morning, China News Service (CNS, 中国新闻网) reported on the same day. More than 500 Hong Kongers “from all walks of life” were invited as guests, according to the report. An imaginary enemy was occupying twelve successive mountain hills there, according to the screenplay, looking for opportunities to infiltrate the city area and to do damage there (训练场内,依次相连的12个山头被一股假想敌占据。指挥所、迫击炮阵地、地堡工事,假想敌在高地构筑阵地,企图伺机对香港市区实施渗透破坏).  It was the PLA’s task to “annihilate them on the spot”, before they could enter the city (在他们尚未进入市区之前,解放军需要将其就地歼灭).

If the CNS report (whose audience will be mainly mainlanders) reflects what the invited Hong Kongers felt, it was as much a revolutionary opera as an exercise:

In the morning at 10:50, three signal lights rose into the air, and the long-awaited PLA-simulated naval gunfire was opened. At command, the enemy targets were shrouded in smoke.

上午10时50分,三发红色信号弹升空,等待已久的解放军模拟舰炮火力率先开火。一声令下,敌方目标即被硝烟笼罩。

[…]
The turns of firepower attacks didn’t stop. Armed helicopters had just taken off, when mortar bombs arrived at high speed. As the flight speed was too fast, and as the sunlight hampered the eye, the trajectories weren’t clearly visible, but explosions, one to another, could be seen on the opposite hilltop. Six rounds of ten mortars firing, and the enemy targets had suffered heavy destruction.

轮番的火力攻击,并未就此收手。武装直升机刚刚飞离,迫击炮弹急速而来。因飞行速度过快,加之阳光刺眼,现场还没看清弹道,炮弹就已在对面的山头上密集爆炸。10门迫击炮6次齐射,敌方目标遭受猛烈的压制摧毁。

You can probably imagine the rest.

Either the SCMP reporter, the CNS correspondent or this blogger’s translation has got some details wrong though. According to the SCMP, it wasn’t six mortars, but six military helicopters that were mobilised fired on targets set up on the mountain from distances of about 1km.

Either way, the SCMP quotes former Hong Kong security chief Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee (叶刘淑仪) as saying that

I don’t think we need to read too much into the timing. I think the garrison has a duty to assure us that they are well-prepared and ready to defend Hong Kong if there is any threat to our security

Her comments referred to a possible link between the exercise, and a sweeping and controversial national security law, passed by China’s “National People’s Congress” three days earlier.

Apparently, the guests did the propaganda work within Hong Kong, telling the SCMP reporter that the timing of the exercise was unimportant, and that the PLA was merely trying to show Hong Kong that it had the power to protect the city.

Radio Free Asia (RFA), a US broadcaster supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), points out that the exercise on Saturday had been the first time that the PLA troops stationed in Hong Kong had invited media and guests. Two of these, Regina Ip, Ma Dingsheng (马鼎盛, apparently a Fenghuang/Phoenix-affiliated miltary commentator from Hong Kong), are quoted both by the SCMP, and RFA.

The Economist points out that state security is a job for the top, conveying

the remarkable range of Mr Xi’s worries, with potential threats seen to be emanating from sources as diverse as the internet, culture, education and outer space.

While the vagueness of the “national security law passed in Beijing could be followed by detailed regulations later, it was unlikely that its key terms will ever be defined more precisely. To Mr Xi, vagueness is a useful weapon.

There could be a little relief in Hong Kong, however, the Economist adds, given that the bill would not be applied in the territory.

That said, the bill isn’t lacking ambition outside mainland China. Ît obliges not only Hong Kong or Macau, but Taiwan, too, to defend China’s sovereignty, notes the SCMP. Huanqiu Shibao (环球时报, in an article rendered here by Sina), notes that the passing of the “National Security Law” had ccaused shock in Hong Kong and Taiwan (全国人大常委会高票通过新的国家安全法,在香港和台湾引发震撼).

The Huanqiu article suggests – without becoming to specific about this question – that worries in Hong Kong that people seen as daring oppositionals like Joshua Wong (黃之鋒) could be arrested when visiting mainland China were unfounded, as the bill was not applied in Hong Kong for the time being (即使法律暂时不在香港执行).

There were, of course, many people in Hong Kong who welcomed the new state security law, Huanqiu adds. But the article also quotes BBC coverage according to which the government and the public in Taiwan (literally: the court and the commonality, 台湾朝野一致反对大陆新国安法) unanimously opposed the bill.

The propaganda approach is pretty global, and China appears to have learned a lot from the Western political class, in terms of more refined propaganda. Pretty much the way most of Germany’s mainstream media make people believe that Greece’s political class and activists are pampered (and costly, for Germans) idiots, Huanqiu fosters a climate in which mainlanders will no longer ask why the liberties customary in Hong Kong shouldn’t be applied in mainland China, but rather, why there should be “special treatment” for anyone within “Greater China”.

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Related

» One Movement, two Pictures, Nov 27, 2014

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Saturday, July 4, 2015

From “taz” to Deutsche Welle: a “Charming Opportunity”

Ines Pohl had been editor-in-chief at the green-liberal taz (“tageszeitung”) since 2009, and will “reinforce the team at the DW studio in Washington” by the end of 2015, Deutsche Welle (DW) wrote in a press release on Friday.

Her work stands for the values that characterize journalism at Deutsche Welle. Her switch to Deutsche Welle is a genuine gain and will strengthen our coverage of the USA, particularly in the coming election campaigns

Ihre Arbeit steht für die Werte, die den Journalismus in der Deutschen Welle ausmachen. Ihr Wechsel zur DW ist ein echter Zugewinn und wird unsere USA-Berichterstattung gerade im kommenden Wahlkampf stärken,

the press release quotes DW program director Gerda Meuer.

Three correspondents work at the Washington studio, according to DW. Pohl herself is quoted by DW as being charmed by the opportunity to do journalism at DW in its entire digital and interactive scope (Und die Möglichkeit, bei der DW Journalismus in seiner ganzen digitalen und interaktiven Bandbreite zu machen, ist für mich reizvoll).

German daily Die Welt notes that DW’s new English-language (television) program is director Peter Limbourg‘s pet project, meant to  make the broadcaster more competitive internationally. And the paper suggests that presumably, having been a member of the Internationale Journalistenprogramme (IJP)  board of trustees, along with the DW director, facilitated Ines Pohl’s switch to DW. She is also a member of the “Reporters without Borders” (RSF) board of trustees – until December 2014, Limbourg had been a member of that panel, too, but resigned the post on the organization’s request, according to an RSF press release that month. There had been disagreement between Limbourg and RSF about DW’s cooperation with Chinese television broadcaster CCTV.

Pohl apparently left her post as taz chief editor on June 30.

Friday, July 3, 2015

Argentinian Radio on Strike

Radio Argentina al Exterior (RAE) QSL card, 1980s

Radio Argentina al Exterior (RAE) QSL card, 1980s. The station is still active on shortwave in a number of languages – Spanish, Portuguese, English, German, French, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese.

Radio Nacional employees went on a 24-hours’ strike at 6 a.m. local time on Thursday (3 a.m. UTC), and there will be another strike on Monday, July 6, also starting at 6 a.m., writes APSF (Asociación de Prensa de Santa Fe), a labor union. According to the notice, the strikes are motivated by demands for a rise in payment for all employees at the country’s public radio, and demands to put an end to staff precarization (i. e. to enter permanent work contracts).

A blog post by Prensa Radio Nacional writes that patience has a limit, and that the listeners must know this., apparently defending the radio staff against accusations from the broadcasting authorities.

The workers who are today accused of letting their audience down are exactly those who prevented privatization and thanks to whom we still have this public radio you like to listen to.
This radio today is not the fruit of those in the spotlight, but of the silent efforts made by technicians and journalists in the durable station plant.

Los trabajadores a los que hoy acusan de dejar sin “aire” a los oyentes son los mismos que impidieron  en los 90 los intentos de privatización y gracias a ello, tenemos hoy esta radio pública que a ustedes les gusta escuchar.
La radio actual no es fruto de unos iluminados sino del silencioso  esfuerzo de los operadores técnicos y periodistas de la planta estable de la emisora.

Director Maria Seoane and vice director Vicente Muleiro hadn’t met with delegates from the committees for years, writes Prensa Radio Nacional, and kept focusing on small issues rather than the pressing ones, according to the blogpost.

They say that they belong to the national and popular camp [apparently a union motto], but they are not in a dialogue with the workers, whom they ignore and whom they try to make invisible.

Ellos dicen pertenecer al campo Nacional y Popular pero no dialogan con los trabajadores, los ningunean y tratan de invisibilizarlos.

This strike could have been avoided, and as journalists at the information service we like our work, despite zero recognition from the part of the authorities.

Este paro se podría haber evitado, a los periodistas del Servicio Informativo nos gusta nuestro trabajo, a pesar del nulo reconocimiento que existe por parte de las autoridades.

The criticism follows these quotes but is, unfortunately, beyond my very limited language skills.

The strike includes Argentine foreign radio, Radiodifusión Argentina al Exterior (RAE).

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Related

H/t to Medios y Opinión‘s link collection, July 2, 2015

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Friday, June 12, 2015

The BoZhu Interviews: If you want to Believe the Best or the Worst about China, it’s easy enough –

Ji Xiang about getting started with China, stereotypes, and finding a balance between Chinese and Western ways of life.

Ji Xiang is a blogger from Europe who lives in China. In his first blog post, in 2008, he explained how he got his Chinese name. And he is probably one of very few foreign China bloggers who started blogging almost right on arrival in the country, and have kept to the habit ever since.

Q: Ji Xiang, you are Chinese by name, but you are actually from Europe, right?

That’s right. My mom’s British, and my dad’s Italian. I grew up in Italy, although I have also lived in Britain. It’s not too obvious unless you look at my blog very carefully though. Interestingly, some of my readers have assumed I was American in the past.

Q: Could that be because your stance comes across as more “pro-Western” than that of most sinologists or Westerners who speak Chinese? It seems to me that both Foarp and you stand out as rather critical of what might be called “cultural relativism”, or a preparedness to find human rights violations tolerable because of a country’s culture, a “situation on the ground”, etc.

Well, I’m not sure if that makes you seem more like an American or not. Foarp is after all British. But to be honest, I think a lot of Westerners who speak Chinese have the same sort of opinions as I do. I don’t think of myself as “pro-Western” really, I am quite aware of all the bad things Western countries have done around the world, and the shortcomings of the “West” (if there really is such a thing as the West. But that’s another debate). But that doesn’t necessarily mean being pro-Chinese.

When it comes to human rights violations, I don’t really buy cultural justifications. I mean, East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea have created systems where basic human rights are respected, so it obviously isn’t only Western countries which can reach that point. The argument that human rights have to be put aside when a country is still poor and developing is more complicated. I think certain basic rights, like the right not to disappear, be tortured or speak your mind without going to jail, should be respected, and I don’t think the right to have a full belly clashes with these other rights.

There might however be a good argument for not holding elections in countries where most of the people are illiterate, or divided along ethnic or tribal lines. Say in Yemen or Burkina Faso. Even in Arab countries, it is clear that elections often bring religious fundamentalists to power.

Q: You went to China as a teacher in 2005, and came back to the country as a student. How did you get interested in China? You’ve spent a number of years there now, haven’t you?

I actually taught in China in 2004, and that was just for a summer. I then went back to China because I got a scholarship to get a master’s degree there. I have spent over six years in China by now.

Q: Was 2008 a good time to start a blog? You might have started one in 2005, the heydays of the (English-language) “Chinese blogosphere”. Was there a key moment where you felt that you should share your experiences, which got your blog started?

Well in 2005 I didn’t live in China, and had only spent a few months there. I had no basis for writing a blog about it. I only discovered recently that that was supposed to be the heyday of the “Chinese blogosphere”. Pity I missed it. I started my blog when I started living in China full-time. In the beginning, it was mainly to share my experiences with my family and friends back home. Now it’s turned more into a blog of commentary about China.

Q: Do the statistics or feedback give you an idea about who your readers are?

A bit. Most of my hits are from the United States, but I think that might be to do with the fact that most of the VPNs people use in China redirect there. Curiously, I also seem to have a lot of readers from Germany, Ukraine and Russia (well, you are one of the ones from Germany). Other than that, my most read posts are the ones with titles which people can come across randomly on Google.

Q: Apart from the blogs your blogroll, are there others – about China or other countries and topics – that you read regularly?

To be honest, not really. I mostly look at those few blogs on China which are on my blogroll (which includes your one). And there is my uncle’s blog, he lives in Israel and blogs about his life there and Israeli topics.

Q: Did family history contribute to your interest in China?

Not really. I don’t have any relatives who have lived or live in China. Having said that, the first time I came to China was with my parents. They are active in the international Esperanto movement, and in 2004 the World Esperanto Congress was in Beijing, so they were going to China to attend it and I went with them. That’s when I first got interested in China. Being able to speak Esperanto helped plug me in to the community of Chinese Esperanto speakers, which has been a nice way to get to know some cool, unusual Chinese people.

Q: Most bloggers will sometimes be surprised by the responses a post of them triggers. Have there been reactions and comments that surprised you during the past seven years?

After visiting Vietnam, I wrote a post on why the Vietnamese dislike China. It got quite a few reactions from Vietnamese readers, most of them proving my original point. One of them actually claimed that Daoism, the I Ching and the idea of Ying/Yang originally came from Vietnam and not from China. Total nonsense as far as I know. Unfortunately unreasonable nationalism is widespread throughout Asia. At its basis lies a wall of mental rigidity and misinformation which is very hard to break through.  Then again, Europe was probably similar up until the Second World War. And Westerners have their own unreasonable prejudices, just look at the persistence of antisemitic tropes among some people, or how so many Europeans will complain that immigrants get more benefits from the state than locals even when it just isn’t true.

Q: It seems that you’ve got most of your Chinese education in the North. Is that so, and do you think it differs from learning Chinese language, ways of interaction, etc., in the South?

You are correct. Although I’ve traveled all over China, I live in Beijing. It’s a stereotype to say that the North is best for learning to speak Mandarin, but actually I think you can learn just as well in most big Southern cities, because nowadays most people speak it there too. I think the Southern Chinese do tend to be a bit more like we imagine the Chinese to be (quiet, indirect, reserved), but in the main I don’t think the cultural difference between Northern and Southern China is that huge. It might not even be as big as the one between Northern and Southern Italy! Whether you live in a small or a big city, and a rich or a poor part of China, probably makes more difference to your experience. But I’ve never lived in Southern China, so I stand to be corrected.

Q: How would you describe your daily life? Is it becoming still more “Chinese”, concerning your choice of food, newspapers, internet sources, or television?

In some ways I am, and in some ways I’m not. I would say that my lifestyle has stopped becoming more Chinese for a while. In fact, after an initial enthusiasm for “going native”, which many foreigners have at first, I think I have found a balance. In a city like Beijing you can find loads of foreign amenities, and it would be silly not to make use of them. On the other hand I wouldn’t want to live in a bubble like some expats do. It really comes down to who you hang out with, and I still hang out with lots of Chinese.

When it comes to food I am pretty Chinese: I like eating Chinese food when it’s properly made, and I even do my best to cook it at home. I have long stopped eating street food or patronizing cheap, hole-in-the-wall type places though, because of concerns about the hygiene and the quality. Many Chinese seem to have come to the same conclusion. Foreigners who pride themselves on being able to eat in such places without minding the consequences are either young foreign-exchange students, or they are pretty dimwitted.

When it comes to media, I still look at Chinese newspapers every now and again to see what they say, but for real news I mostly turn to foreign sources. Of course the language is one issue (it is obviously still much quicker for me to read in English or Italian), but also I think the European media is just superior in terms of giving you a decent picture of what goes on in the world, and, when it comes to sensitive issues, even in China! Same for entertainment: although I sometimes watch Chinese shows and films, in the main I still watch far more foreign ones. I make full use of Chinese internet sites like Baidu or Weibo though.

Q: Do you see changes on Weibo, in terms of real-name requirement, censorship, etc.?

When I got an account in 2011, it still wasn’t necessary to give your ID/passport number. As far as I know now it is, although I have heard you can still get away with giving a false one. In any case, I am sure that if they really want to they can find out who you are.

Q: Generally, when reading your blog, I got an impression overtime that you might think of China as a project, as a country or civilization headed into a rather benign future, compared with Western societies. And on the other hand, your criicism of China, or its political system, sounds pretty much like the general global criticism of it. Is this an accurate impression?

I’m not entirely sure where you got that impression from. I have unquestionably been getting more pessimistic about China, its system and its prospects over the last few years. I think to an extent the current system is geared in such a way that China always gives the impression to outsiders that it’s almost on the cusp of becoming a decent, progressive, modern and confident society, but then it never quite does. I think the political system is good at producing GDP growth, but pretty hopeless at solving the country’s huge social problems. Yes, China has more and more subways and high speed railways, and that’s useful and good for the people, but surely a country like China could do so much better than just that?

I hope China gets better with time, but I don’t think it’s a given that, if you wait 20 or 30 years, it’s all going to be much better. That’s how a lot of Chinese seem to think: just wait a few decades, and everything will solve itself. Unfortunately it’s not that simple.

I think my criticism is also a bit different from that of someone who’s never lived in China, because I am far more aware of aspects like the rise of Chinese nationalism, which many foreign commentators seem blissfully unaware of.

Q: That unawareness seems to be quite a phenomenon. This is what Bruce Anderson (himself not necessarily a human-rights champion) said about Edward Heath, in a BBC radio documentary. Former German chancellor Helmut Schmidt might be another case in point.

Is there something Russia (for example) could learn from China, in terms of soothing external propaganda, or winning influential people over abroad?

Well, Chinese officials certainly are very good at flattering foreign visitors, saying the right things to them, and appearing reasonable and friendly. I don’t have much experience with the Russians, but I doubt they are as good at it. It’s probably not something you can learn either, it’s deep-rooted in the culture.

You have to remember that most Westerners know little about China, and obviously want to be open-minded. The unawareness of the rise of Chinese nationalism probably also lies in the fact that China does tend to leave other countries alone, as long they don’t have any territorial disputes with China of course, and as long as they don’t express any views on what China defines as its “internal affairs”. Of course China’s neighbours are very aware of its nationalistic side, especially the ones which have territorial disputes with it. But people in other parts of the world don’t get to see this side of things. And its not obvious to the casual visitor either.

The European media also focuses too much on the Middle East and almost never talks about Asia’s potentially explosive problems, like the dispute in the South China Sea and the anti-Japanese feeling in China or Korea. The only thing they ever talk about is the issue of Tibet, which has certainly damaged China’s image.

Then again, the real issue is one of projection. Many left-wing Westerners are predisposed to think well of any power which challenges the United States anywhere, regardless of what it really is or does. If you want to believe the best about China (or the worst for that matter), and you don’t live there, it’s easy enough. Right wingers on the other hand may see China’s rise as a vindication of free market economics, or god knows what. Everyone sees what they want to see in China, and no one knows much about it. This has always been the case.

Q: Do you have arguments with Chinese nationalists?

Well, in a sense I do, because I have political arguments with people in China, and most Chinese are nationalists at some level, although the level varies. The level of open-mindedness towards opinions which clash with modern Chinese nationalism, as the schools and media have constructed it, also varies. I know many Mainlanders who are perfectly open minded even about issues like Taiwan, and don’t just toe the line. I think they are a minority however. And by the way, they aren’t necessarily the people with most international exposure. On the other hand if you are talking about dyed-in-the-wool fenqing, rational debate is all but impossible.

Q: You have blogged in English for nearly seven years, and quite recently, you have also started a blog in Italian. What’s next? A blog in Chinese?

My written Chinese is really not good enough to blog in it. I would actually be more likely to start a blog in Esperanto, a language I also speak.

Q: Ji Xiang, thanks a lot for this interview.

The interview was conducted by an exchange of e-mails.

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Related

All BoZhu Interviews

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Tuesday, June 9, 2015

Twenty Years ago: Island Democracy seeks Recognition

1. A Democracy introduces itself

It had been a long and challenging journey, the president said. But there he was, at the lectern at Cornell University, his alma mater, delivering his Olin lecture.

He represented a country with a per-capita income of USD 12,000, its international trade totalling US$180 billion in 1994, and foreign exchange reserves of over US$99 billion, more than those of any other nation in the world except Japan.

His country had developed from a developing country to an industrialized country, and, in a peaceful transition, into a democracy.

Almost every president of the world may tell this kind of story. But this one, told on June 9, 1995, at Cornell University, was a true story. And the president who told it wasn’t welcomed by his colleague Bill Clinton, but shunned instead.

There were no official diplomatic relations between the visiting president’s country, Taiwan, and the United States. Washington recognized the Chinese government in Beijing, which claimed to represent both China and Taiwan.

That the Taiwanese president in 1995, Lee Teng-hui, had been allowed to visit the US didn’t go without saying. He wasn’t a state guest, but the university’s guest.

But his concern wasn’t that of agricultural economist or an academic – it was a politician’s concern:

I deem this invitation to attend the reunion at Cornell not only a personal honor, but, more significantly, an honor for the 21 million people of the Republic of China on Taiwan. In fact, this invitation constitutes recognition of their remarkable achievements in developing their nation over the past several decades. And it is the people of my nation that I most want to talk about on this occasion.

He only fulfilled this promise by half, if at all. Much of his talk was about himself: how he had listened in America and in Taiwan, and how he had learned. That he spoke on behalf of his people. That he heard the yearning of his people to contribute to the international community, with the Taiwan experience, development and democracy.

2. Lee Teng-hui

Even back then, twenty years ago, Lee was seen as the “father” of Taiwanese democracy, even if the ultimate goal or final success of democratization hadn’t yet been reached.

Like all Taiwanese of his generation (and the generation before), Lee grew up as a subject of the Japanese Emperor. From 1895 to 1945, Taiwan had been a Japanese colony. As a colony, Taiwan’s experience with Japan was less bad than China’s in the Japanese war from 1937 to 1945. And parts of Taiwanese population – especially the elites, and not only those of the upper classes – were co-opted by the Japanese elites. Lee Teng-hui’s family was probably co-opted, too. Lee’s brother, Lee Teng-chin, was killed in the Second World War, as a member of the Japanese military. His name is registered in the internationally controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which also contains the name of 14 A-class war criminals.

Reportedly, Lee also tried Communism, out of hatred against the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek‘s Nationalist Party, that had fled to Taiwan to “recover the Chinese mainland” from there.

After Communism, Lee tried the Christian religion, apparently with lasting success. And finally, he had himself co-opted by the (more or less) hated KMT: in 1971, he joined the one-party dictatorship, became minister of agriculture shortly afterwards, then Taipei mayor in 1978, and vice-president in 1984. Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek and his father’s successor as a Republic-of-China president on Taiwan, supported the careers of “indigenous” Taiwanese like Lee, at the cost of the faction of traditional KMT officials who had fled Taiwan along with the Chiangs.

Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988. The KMT’s central committee elected Lee Teng-hui as party chairman and made him president of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Lee had tried a lot of things, and he had achieved a lot. And he had no small plans for his country.

3. The Will of the People, the Chicken, and the Egg

What a people wants, and if it “can want” anything, is up for arguments.

When a man follows the leader, he actually follows the mass, the majority group that the leader so perfectly represents,

Jacques Ellul wrote in the 1960s, and added:

The leader loses all power when he is separated from his group; no propaganda can emanate from a solitary leader.

Basically, it seems that political leaders in democratic mass societies opportunites to shape their countries are limited. But Lee had become president in extraordinary times. Opposition groups, and “illegally” founded political parties among them, had demanded the lifting of the decades-old martial law for a long time. And when Lee began his second term as president in 1990, after the two remaining years of what had originally been Chiang Ching-kuo’s term, students occupied what is now Taipei’s Liberty Square. Once Lee had been sworn in again, he received a fifty-students delegation and promised Taiwan’s democratization, less than a year after the Tian An Men massacre in China.

Democratization was hardly only on the minds of the opposition, or on Lee’s mind. Chiang Ching-kuo might have had similar plans, even if less ambitious, and American influence probably continued to matter, too, even after Washington had switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing, in 1979. But with Chiang Kai-shek in office, a bloodbath in reaction to the 1990 events would have been much more likely than democratic reform.

4. Full Speed, 1995

Lee Teng-hui’s Cornell speech was part of the first presidential election campaign ever since the KMT had seized power in Taiwan. The mass media, still quite under KMT control, made sure that Lee’s visit to the US wouldn’t go unnoticed at home. On June 6, 1995, Taiwan’s domestic media had started coverage, and that culminated on June 10 (local time in Taiwan), with the Olin lecture.

Back then, when Lee approached a convincing election victory in March 1996, there were misgivings within the KMT about Lee’s loyalty to the KMT goal of “unification” of China and Taiwan. In summer 1999, toward the end of his first democratically legitimized presidential term (and his last term), Lee defined Taiwan’s relations with China as state-to-state relations, or at least special state-to-state relations. Not for the first time, Beijing reacted angrily to the “splittist” in Taipei’s presidential palace.

5. The “New Central Plains”

A lot seems to suggest that in 2000, when his presidency ended, Lee helped to bring about a victory of the oppositional Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and their presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian. That spelled completion of the Taiwanese democratization project, but at the cost of Lee’s KMT.

After that, Lee continued his search for ways and visions for Taiwan. In “Taiwan’s Position”, a book published in 1999, Lee focused on his country’s Chinese heritage, but without making clear if he referred to China or Taiwan.

My active advocacy for  the “reform of heart and soul” in recent years is based on my hope to make society leave the old framework, applying new thought, face a new era, stir new vigor, from a transformation of peoples’ hearts. This goes deeper than political reform, and it is a more difficult transformation project, but we are confident that we will, based on the existing foundations of freedom and openness, achieve the building of a new Central Plain.

近年来,我积极倡导“心灵改革”,就是希望从人心的改造做起,让我们的社会走出旧有的框架,用新的思维,面对新的时代,并激发出新的活力。这是一个比政治 改革更加深入、也更为艰巨的改造工程,但是我们有信心,可以在社会自由开放的既有基础上,完成建立“文化新中原”的目标。

Lee had first used the term of “new central plains” in 1996. Scholars kept arguing about what he actually meant with the term. But these were hardly Chiang Kai-shek’s central plains, and, no less likely, Beijing’s.

But obviously, without the KMT, who had expulsed him for his “Taiwanization” business in 2001, and without public office, Lee wasn’t nearly as influential as before. Or, as propaganda expert Jacques Ellul put it in the 1960s, Moses (isolated from the masses) is dead on the propaganda level.

Incumbent Ma Ying-jeou, again a KMT president with rather “Chinese” manners, led a technocratically efficient government, but has been lacking success in terms of propaganda – and in terms of policies that would benefit all classes of society. Now, another “Taiwanese” politician is trying her luck. Tsai Ing-wen concludes her visit to the US today. In March 2016, Taiwan will elect another president. It could be her.

Sunday, June 7, 2015

“Star of the East” Aftermath: at Ease, under the Party’s and Government’s Help

A breathless Xinhua article published online by the People’s Daily today, with coverage which reads as if the whole story had unfolded only within the past twenty-four hours.

The Xinhua article seems to be the authoritative account of what happened, and how the authorities reacted. It was announced on Saturday evening's Xinwen Lianbo.

The Xinhua article seems to be the authoritative account of what happened, and how the authorities reacted. It was announced on Saturday evening’s Xinwen Lianbo. Click picture above for video.

On June 1, at about 21:30, the “Star of the East” from Chongqing’s Dongfang Ferry Company, on its way from Nanjing to Chongqing, suddenly capsized, hit by a tornado. In the furious storm and the surging waves, 456 passengers and crew were in a desperate situation.

6月1日21时30分许,重庆东方轮船公司所属旅游客船“东方之星”轮在由南京驶往重庆途中,突遇龙卷风顷刻翻沉,狂风暴雨,巨浪滔滔,456名旅客和船员陷入绝境。

Life is greater than the heavens!

生命大于天!

Under the strong leadership of the Party’s Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the Secretary General, under the State Council’s work group’s direct command, the party committees and governments of Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing and elsewhere, the united action of the central authorities, the People’s Liberation Army’s and Armed Police and maritime authorities rapid mobilization abilities, nationwide mobilization for search and rescue action quickly unfolded.

在以习近平同志为总书记的党中央坚强领导下,在国务院工作组直接指挥下,湖北、湖南、重庆等地党委和政府,中央有关部门统一行动,人民解放军、武警部队及海事部门迅速调集力量,一场举国动员的搜救行动迅速展开。

After receiving the report, Central Committee Secretary General, State Chairman, and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping issued important instructions right away, ordering the State Council work group to go to the site to guide the rescue work, and that Hubei Province, Chongqing Metropolitan, and other work groups unfold all efforts with their adequate strength, and properly deal with the aftermath.

接报后,中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平立即作出重要指示,要求国务院即派工作组赶赴现场指导搜救工作,湖北省、重庆市及有关方面组织足够力量全力开展搜救,并妥善做好相关善后工作。

Standing Politburo member and Chief State Councillor Li Keqiang immediately issued written instructions and, on behalf of the Party’s Central Committee and the State Council, and on behalf of Secretary Xi Jinping, hurried to the site by plane, directing the rescue and emergency reaction work.

中共中央政治局常委、国务院总理李克强立即批示,并代表党中央国务院、代表习近平总书记急飞事件现场,指挥救援和应急处置工作。

After the description of the political will behind the rescue work, the article goes into more technical and bureaucratic detail. Further down, the article mentions that the relevant local party committees and governments (i. e. Hubei Province, the Changjiang Maritime Bureau, Yueyang City, Shanghai, Jiangsu Province, Chongqing, Zhejiang Province, Fujian Province, Shandong Province, Tianjin Metropolitan authorities etc), on their own initiative, coordinated their actions. Support from companies with nationwide significance is also acknowledged.

The article also quotes reportedly positive coverage from the Wall Street Journal (WJS), and a Weibo message allegedly resent more than 100,000 times within a day, saying that “what most touched me is that the water level was lowered to facilitate the rescue work, with the Three Gorges Dam damming up water”.

That’s the role “social media” are meant to play in China, under the CCP’s guidance. Issuing authoritative information and news is for the authorities:

To publish authoritative news on ones own initiative is an effective medium to respond to society’s deep concerns. By the afternoon of June 6, the relevant authorites had done 13 press conferences, convened by the ministry of transport, the National Health and Family Planning Commission, the ministry of civil affairs, by the People’s Liberation Army, Hubei Province, and other people in charge who explained the situation and replied to the reporters’ questions, supplying information regarding the rescue and salvage work and the investigations in a timely, accurate, open and transparent manner.

主动发布权威信息,是回应社会关切的有效渠道。截至6日下午,有关部门已在事件现场召开了13场新闻发布会,交通运输部、卫计委、民政部、人民解放军及湖北省等相关负责人到会发布情况,并回答记者提问,及时、准确、公开、透明地传递救助、打捞、调查等信息。

After the incident, Associated Press, Reuters, CNN, BBC, and other foreign media, some 62 of them, arrived at Jianli, Hubei Province, covering the rescue work, the aftercare for the relatives, and how the aftermath was dealt with. Front command staff also organized three trips to the site for foreign media.

事件发生后,美联社、路透社、CNN、BBC等62家境外媒体先后抵达湖北监利,就事件救援、家属安置及善后处理等采访报道。事件前方指挥部还3次组织境外媒体赶赴事故现场采访。

The article’s firt page ends with the same character it started with: Xi Jinping giving an important speech on the morning of June 4, concerning the next steps of rescue work.

Assuming high responsibility for the people’s life and safety – the attitude of the party’s and state’s highest decision-making levels is distinctive!

对人民生命安全高度负责——党和国家最高决策层态度鲜明!

the Xinhua article jubilates, and concludes the first page of its online article (there are two more pages) with what it says is a quote from French daily Le Monde:

“At a time of disaster, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have built the image of responsible national leaders.”

“中国共产党领导人在灾难时期树立了负责任国家领导人的形象。”法国《世界报》

The following two pages are mostly a chronicle of the rescue efforts, of blood, sweat, and respect for the dead (对逝者的尊重), apparently written to evoke the readership’s national pride and trust in the authorities.

Zhu Hongmei, a survivor saved from the wreck around noon of June 2, is hospitalized in Jianli. The article’s final line:

At Jianli County People’s Hospital, Zhu Hongmei’s condition is stable. She says that with the Party’s and government’s help, she feels at ease.

在监利县人民医院,病情平稳。她说,有党和政府的帮助,心里踏实。

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Related

»Mourning the Victims, Radio Japan, June 7, 2015
» Rescuers, Families Bow in Silence, NYT, June 7, 2015
» En quête de réponses, Le Monde, June 5, 2015
» Search complete, L. A. Times, June 6, 2015
» To the Directorate for Religious Affairs, Russian Orthodox Church, June 4, 2015
» Reluctant to embrace Transparency, NYT June 4, 2015

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Saturday, May 23, 2015

Chinese State Media: Earnest Expectations

1.

China Central Television (CCTV), via Enorth (Tianjin),  May 21, 2015

Communist Party of China Secretary General, State Chairman, and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping has recently given important instructions on the occasion of People’s Daily’s foreign edition’s 30th anniversary, fully approved the successes achieved by People’s Daily’s foreign edition during the past thirty years, and stated clear demands and earnest expectations concerning further foreign propaganda, and innovation in foreign propaganda methods.

中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平近日就人民日报海外版创刊30周年作出重要批示,充分肯定人民日报海外版30年来取得的成就,对进一步做好对外宣传工作、创新对外宣传方式提出明确要求和殷切期望。

Xi Jinping pointed out in his instructions that during the past thirty years, People’s Daily’s foreign edition actively spread splendid Chinese culture, proclaimed and introduced Chinese development and changes, and played an important role in foreign propaganda. He hoped that based on the past thirty years since People’s Daily’s foreign edition’s first publication, [the paper] would sum up their experiences, exploit their advantages to the full, innovate with keen determination, accept foreign readers’ methods with pleasure, and use easily understandable language when telling China’s story, propagating China’s voice, enhancing trust and dispelling doubts, to put together and accumulate bridges and ties.

习近平在批示中指出,30年来,人民日报海外版积极传播中华优秀文化,宣介中国发展变化,在外宣工作中发挥了重要作用。他希望人民日报海外版以创刊30年 为起点,总结经验、发挥优势、锐意创新,用海外读者乐于接受的方式、易于理解的语言,讲述好中国故事,传播好中国声音,努力成为增信释疑、凝心聚力的桥梁 纽带。

Member of the politburo’s standing committee and secretary of the CPC secretariat Liu Yunshan, member of the politburo’s standing committee, secretary of the CPC secretariat and head of the central committee propaganda department Liu Qibao respectively also gave instructions and demanded conscientious implementation of Secretary General Xi Jinping’s instructions, a grasp of the correct guidance, innovation of content and form, bringing into play characteristics and advantages, to further strengthen international discourse power and influence.

中共中央政治局常委、中央书记处书记刘云山,中共中央政治局委员、中央书记处书记、中宣部部长刘奇葆也分别作出批示,要求认真贯彻习近平总书记重要批示精神,把握正确导向,创新内容形式,发挥特色优势,进一步增强国际传播话语权、影响力。

2.

Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation QSL, 1987

Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation QSL, 1987

China Radio International (CRI), April 21, 2015

On April 20, State Chairman Xi Jinping held talks with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in Islamabad. After the talks, Xi Jinping and Nawaz Sharif inagurated the Sino-Pakistani United Research Center for small-scale hydropower and the Islamabad Chinese Cultural Center projects. Photos by Xinhua reporter Lan Hongguang.

CRI online report (reporter Wang Qi): At 20 hours local time, Chairman Xi Jinping, on his visit to Pakistan, is taking part in inauguration ceremonies of major Sino-Pakistani cooperation results, in video-link activities, and a second round of signing and exchange [of signed documents] ceremonies. State Chairman Xi Jinping and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also inaugurated China Radio International’s FM-98 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station in the station’s production room.

国际在线报道(记者 王琦):当地时间20日,正在巴基斯坦访问的习近平主席在巴首都伊斯兰堡出席中巴重大合作成果揭牌仪式、视频连线活动和第二批文本签字和交换仪式。期间,国家主席习近平和巴基斯坦总理纳瓦兹·谢里夫共同为中国国际广播电台FM98中巴友谊台制作室揭牌。

The host said: “Respected Chairman Xi Jinping, respected Excellency Prime Minister Sharif, please allow me now to delcare the ceremony opened. The leaders are asked to inaugurate these eight project plates: the Sino-Pakistani United Research Center for small-scale hydropower, the Islamabad Chinese Cultural Center projects, the China Radio International FM-98 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station production room …”

主持人说:“尊敬的习近平主席、尊敬的谢里夫阁下,现在请允许我宣布仪式开始。请领导人为以下8个项目揭牌,中巴小型水电技术国家联合研究中心、伊斯兰堡中国文化中心、中国国际广播电台FM98中巴友谊台制作室……”

In July 2010, then Chinese state chairman Hu Jintao and then Pakistani president Zadari jointly witnessed China Radio International and the Pakistani Broadcasting Corporation signing a media cooperation agreement. Starting on January 17, 2011, China Radio International started started broadcasting its Urdu and English programs in the five Pakistani cities of Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Multan and Kohat. In October 2012, the China Radio International FM-98 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station, cooperatively run by China Radio International and the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, officially started broadcasting. Then member of the CPC politburo standig committee Li Changchun and then Pakistani president Zadari attended the opening ceremony together, and revealed the commemorative plate of the ceremony. The Islamabad FM-98 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station was China Radio International’s first FM station in Pakistan.

2010年7月,在时任国家主席胡锦涛与时任巴基斯坦总统扎尔达里的共同见证下,中国国际广播电台与巴基斯坦国家广播公司正式签署媒体合作协议。自 2011年1月17日起,中国国际广播电台开始在巴基斯坦伊斯兰堡、卡拉奇、拉合尔、木尔坦和科哈特五座城市播出其乌尔都语和英语节目。2012年10 月,中国国际广播电台与巴国家广播公司合作的伊斯兰堡FM98中巴友谊调频台正式开播,正在巴基斯坦访问的时任中共中央政治局常委李长春、时任巴基斯坦总 统扎尔达里共同出席开播仪式,并为开播纪念牌揭幕。伊斯兰堡FM98中巴友谊调频台是中国国际广播电台在巴基斯坦首家整频率电台。

Currently, China Radio International programs cover all of Pakistan by FM, medium wave, and shortwave, among which FM-98 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station broadcasts a daily 18-hours program on the ground in Islamabad and Karachi, with six hours in Urdu and twelve hours in English. FM-93 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station broadcasts six hours daily in Lahore, Peshavar and Multan, with two hours in Urdu and 4 hours in English.Since their launch, the programs have become loved by Pakistani listener friends. Currently, there are more than 680 listerner clubs, building a bridge of friendship between the two peoples of China and Pakistan.

目前,中国国际广播电台节目已通过调频、中波、短波等制式覆盖巴基斯坦全境,其中调频FM98中巴友谊台在伊斯兰堡、卡拉奇落地,每天共18小时节目,包括6小时乌尔都语和12小时英语节目,调频FM93中巴友谊台在拉合尔、白沙瓦、穆尔坦落地,每天共6小时节目,包括2小时乌尔都语和4小时英语节目。节目自开播以来深受巴基斯坦听众朋友喜爱,目前已拥有680多个听众俱乐部,为中巴两国人民架起了一座友谊的桥梁。

Concerning the future plans for the FM-98 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station’s production room, Chen Xiang, responsible for the production room, said: “in future, FM-98 Sino-Pakistani Friendship Station’s production room, under the management of the Chinese side’s management team, by hiring local media professionals, will create a  radio, video and new media broadcast products liked by local listeners, in accordance with localized broadcasting development thought, based on market research and listeners’ feedback. We will comprehensively enhance China Radio International’s propagation effectiveness, actively coordinate the ‘One Belt and One Road’ and the ‘Sino-Pakistani Economic Corridor’ national strategies, and provide our own contribution to boosting our two countries’ traditional friendly  foundations, in accordance with the will of the people.”

FM98中巴友谊台制作室建立后未来将作何规划,制作室负责人陈翔说:“未来FM98中巴友谊台将按照本土化传播的发展思路,在中方管理团队的管理下通过招聘当地媒体专业人士,根据市场调研和听众反馈设计和制作本土听众喜闻乐见的音频、视频和新媒体传播产品,全面提升国际台在巴社会和民众中的传播效力,积极配合‘一带一路’和‘中巴经济走廊 ’国家战略,为夯实两国传统友好的民意基础做出自己的贡献。”

U.S. International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB) audience research analyst Kim A. Elliott put together English-languages sources from China and Pakistan in October 2012, when then Pakistan president Asif Ali Zadari and China’s then top propaganda official Li Changchun opned the FM-98 station. Back then, too, localization of program content (and staff) was one of the issues mentioned in the communiqués and statements.

3.

World of Radio / DX Listener Digest, April 30, 2015, quoting Bill Whitacre, of IBB frequency monitoring:

When we “test” to see how serious the Chinese are about jamming a particular frequency used for Mandarin or Tibetan by moving the new frequency is found and jammed within 4 minutes. That`s one helluva of a monitoring network and rivals what the Russians could do in the depth of the cold war.

Beijing is also known to “go after” some religious broadcasters and as Gary points out they are notoriously paranoid about any “movement” that puts anything above the State.

4.

Oriental Outlook / Sina, via Zhangjiakou Online, April 28, 2015:

Just when the BBC discontinued their Chinese broadcasts, you only needed to turn on a radio in any corner in London and tune it to AM 528, and you could listen to China’s international broadcasting station’s English program for three hours a day. “Our broadcasts have many listeners not only in Britain, but even in Europe”, station manager Zhang Zhe told our reporter.

就在BBC停止中文广播时,在伦敦的每一个角落,只要打开收音机,放到AM528的波段上,每天都能听到来自中国国际广播电台3个小时的英文广播节目。“我们的广播在英国乃至整个欧洲都有不少听众。”中国国际广播电台驻英国的站长张哲对本刊记者说

The original article was apparently first published in Oriental Outlook (望东方周刊). Author: Wang Yahong (王亚宏). Probably years ago, but ZJK online treats it as “news”.

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Related

» 向世界讲好厦大故事, Xiamen University propaganda, May 23, 2015
» A look at the Rumors, April 13, 2015
» BBC accuses China of Jamming, Febr 26, 2015

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Monday, May 18, 2015

Eurasian Challenges (1): Belittling Taiwan to Please China

Following his attendance in Moscow at the commemoration of the 70th VE Day anniversary, Chinese party and state leader Xi Jinping paid a three-day state visit to Belarus. Tokyo-based online magazine The Diplomat published a summary of Xi’s visit on May 12, quoting Belorussian president Alexander Lukashenko – as, in turn, quoted by Xinhua newsagency -, as saying that

I adopted China’s step-by-step economic reform style in Bearus and believe that the most important prerequisite for economic development and economic reforms is social stability.

The Diplomat article also quoted Xi Jinping, again via Xinhua, as saying that the “Chinese president” wanted to turn a joint Belarus-Sino industrial park into a pearl on the Silk Road Economic Belt.

The article points out that public attitudes in Eastern Europe were generally more open toward China than in Western Europe, and describes how Beijing tunes its policies and institutions on these two regions, depening on the degrees of openness.

Both Lukashenko and Xi noted that Belarus, thanks to its geographical placement as the gateway between Eurasia and Europe, has a major role to play in bringing the Silk Road Economic Belt to Europe, according to The Diplomat.

As on May 8 in a ceremony in Moscow, Xi also presented medals to World War 2 veterans in Belarus. In both ceremonies, the veterans had reportedly fought in the Japanese War.

Belarussian English-language media – there doesn’t seem to be a great deal of them – appear to remain silent on a joint statement published by the two heads of state, which includes a regular Belarussian political tribute: belittling Taiwan to please China, as Taiwan News put it on Tuesday.

According to the Chinese version of the joint statement,

Belarus reiterated that it it adhered to the one-China policy, acknowledged that the People’s Republic of China represents the entirety of China as its only legal government, that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China’s territory, that [Belarus] opposes any kind of “Taiwan independence”, promises not to establish official relations with Taiwan or to officially interact with Taiwan, that it opposes the accession of Taiwan to any international or regional organizations [where participation is limited to] sovereign states, that it will not sell arms to Taiwan, that it will support peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait and all the Chinese government’s efforts to achieve national reunification.

白方重申坚持奉行一个中国政策,承认中华人民共和国政府是代表全中国的唯一合法政府,台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分,反对任何形式的“台湾独立”,承诺不与台湾建立官方关系和进行官方往来,反对台湾加入任何仅限主权国家参加的国际组织和地区组织,不向台湾出售武器,支持两岸关系和平发展及中国政府为实现国家统一所作的一切努力。

According to the Taipei Times on May 13, Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Anna Kao (高安) said the ministry “deeply regrets” that Minsk reiterated the position it had long held for the sake of “ingratiating itself with mainland China”.

Radio Taiwan International (RTI) also reports the reaction from Taiwan’s foreign ministry:

Concerning the content of mainland China’s and Belarussia’s joint joint communiqué, the Republic of China’s [Taiwan] foreign ministry said yesterday evening (May 12) that when mainland Chinese chief state councillor Wen Jiabao visited Belarus in 2007, and when the Belarussian president visited mainland China in 2013, all joint communiqués signed by the two sides mentioned “opposition against Taiwan joining any international and regional organizations [with participation limited to] sovereign states”. This time’s repetition of the old tune shows Belarus’ [is prepared to] curry favor with mainland China by issuing this statement which is ignorant of international realities and which inappropriately affects our country’s legal interests, on which the foreign ministry expressed regret.

針對中國大陸與白俄羅斯發布的聯合公報內容,中華民國外交部昨天(12日)晚間表示,2007年大陸總理溫家寶訪問白俄,2013年白俄總統訪問大陸時,雙方所簽署聯合公報就提及「反對台灣加入任何僅限主權國家參與之國際和地區組織」,如今舊調重彈,顯示白俄羅斯長期為討好大陸,而發表此一昧於國際現實並影響我國權益之不當聲明,外交部至表遺憾。

The foreign ministry reiterated that the Republic of China [Taiwan] is a free, democratic sovereign state with the right to apply, in accordance with the people’s wishes, for membership in international organizations in accordance with its legal interests. This decision and approach is unaffected by any individual country’s talk.

外交部重申,中華民國是一個自由民主的主權國家,依據人民意願有權利申請加入攸關其權益之國際組織,此一決心與作法,不受個別國家論調影響。

The foreign ministry said that after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, the Republic of Taiwan [Taiwan] had established a representative office in Belarus, but because of the low volume of business, decided to close it down in 2005. Business was taken care of by the representative office in Russia. Had there ever been arms trade between Taiwan and Belarus? Chiang Su-yih, former representative to Belarus, said that this was “absurd. That has never happened.”

外交部表示,蘇聯解體後,中華民國曾在白俄羅斯設立代表處,但由於業務量低,2005年決定裁撤,業務由駐俄代表處兼管。至於台灣與白俄羅斯間是否曾有武器交易?我國駐白俄羅斯前代表姜書益表示,「荒謬,從沒這回事」。

In an editorial on May 14, the Taipei Times cited the Belorussian-Chinese joint statement as an example of how President Ma Ying-jeou‘s concept of a “1992 consensus” had failed:

In view of Beijing’s continued denigration of Taiwan’s status, it is obvious that such a cross-strait consensus does not exist.

The Taipei Times’ Chinese-language sister paper, the Liberty Times, questions that a meeting between Eric Chu, chairman of president Ma Ying-jeou’s KMT, and Xi Jinping, in China earlier this month, was showing any positive effects, and quotes KMT legislator Johnny Chiang‘s (江啟臣) interpretation of the joint statement:

[Chiang said] Xi Jinping wanted to turn the cross-Strait- bottomline into an international bottomline, as a foretaste for Taiwan’s general elections next year, as a “warning” for Taiwan. The [oppositional] Democratic Progressive Party’s China Department director and [the party’s] legislator Chao Tien-lin believes that dignified and meaningful participation in international organizations was the common position of the Taiwanese people and should not be affected by unreasonable suppression and restrictions. Beijing should respect the Taiwanese peoples’ will and expectations, and “should not deepen Taiwanese society’s negative impression of Beijing”.

對於上述聲明,國民黨立委江啟臣認為,習近平把兩岸關係的底線,放在 國際上變成底線,有針對台灣明年大選情勢的味道,這是對台灣的「示警」。兼任民進黨中國事務部主任的立委趙天麟則認為,有尊嚴、有意義參與國際組織,這是 台灣人民的共同主張,不應遭受不合理的打壓與限制,北京應尊重台灣人民的意志與期望,「不要讓台灣社會加深對北京的負面觀感」。

Now, if you wonder how Beijing likes Taiwanese coverage of Chinese policies, Xinhua provides the answer. They aren’t happy at all.

Whenever that happens, and when criticism right from the CCP’s mouthpieces themselves would appear unbelievable even to a, by now, pretty conditioned Chinese public, one should look out abroad for a voice sympathetic to ones’ own position. Xinhua has found that Taiwan’s Want Daily (旺报) – apparently, according to Xinhua’s excerpts, anyway – commiserates with China, an innocent victim of Taiwanese media aggression.

Xinhua:

An editorial published [by Want Daily] on May 14 points out that Taiwanese media, when reporting or commenting on mainland or cross-strait news, are often full of bias and errors, having misguided Taiwanese peoples’ knowledge of mainland China and of mainland Chinese policies towards Taiwan. When influential Taiwanese media always report mainland Chinese and cross-strait news based on wrong understanding and with a partial attitude, how can the two sides of the Taiwan Strait ever open exchanges further up, and deepen goodwill and understanding, and how can the two sides of the Strait move from confrontation to reconciliation and blend with each other?

14日发表社论指出,台湾媒体报道或评论大陆与两岸新闻时经常充斥偏见与错误,长期误导台湾人对中国大陆及大陆对台政策的认知。如果有影响力的大众媒体总 是以错误的理解与偏颇的态度报道大陆与两岸新闻,两岸怎么可能借着交流的开放与深化增进善意与理解,两岸又怎么可能从对抗走向和解与融一?

Coverage on the joint statement with Belarus is among the list of media sins:

[…] The third is about the joint statement issued by the mainland and Belarus on May 10. A television station’s horse race was that “Belarus opposes Taiwanese participation in sovereign states’ organizations”.

[…..] 三是大陆与白俄罗斯于10日发表联合声明,一家电视台的跑马是“白俄罗斯反对台湾参加以主权国家参加的国际组织”。

But even in the eyes of somewhat critical Chinese readers, the way the Taiwanese paper – allegedly – defends the joint statement might come across as pointless:

As for Belarus’ and Beijing’s joint statement’s wording, it was used as early as in the two sides’ 2007 and 2013 communiqùés, and to keep playing the same tune is without much significance. The expanded interpretations by the media is only needed for internal political struggles.

至于白俄罗斯与北京联合声明中的用语,早在2007及2013年的双方公报中,都曾经出现过这些字眼,旧调重谈实无特别重要涵义。媒体扩大解读,只是为了内部政治斗争的需要。

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» Quoting Ma Ying-jeou, May 20, 2011

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