Posts tagged ‘communication’

Wednesday, September 28, 2022

Air Defense Competition, Particular Honors and Promotions

media_war_praparation_mobilization
“Hold on to revolution, advance production, advance work, advance war preparation”
The following is my translation from an article first published by the “China Defense Paper” (中国国防报), a paper run by a “People’s Liberation Army” publishing house which also publishes the “People’s Liberation Army Daily”. It was published online by China’s ministry of defense website on September 9, 2022.
Development of civil air defense reportedly started in 1950, when the CPC Central Committee issued a circular for an organizing committee that would then establish a “Central People’s Air Defense Committee” (中共中央发出通知,成立中央人民防空委员会筹委会). “Baike Baidu”, an online encyclopedia:

The masses are both the object and the force of Civil Air Defense. In addition to Civil Air Defense staff, the important goals of partners like government agencies, enterprises and public institutions as well as from all sides of society are also included, as are all aspects of societal life. Civil Air Defense are manifold, including evacuations, camouflage, dealing with the aftermath of air raids, etc..
人民群众既是人民防空对象,又是人民防空力量。人民防空对象除了人员以外,还包括政府机构、企业事业单位等重要目标,以及社会生活的各个方面。人民防空行动形式多样,包括疏散防护、隐蔽防护、消除空袭后果等。

There have been earlier days of mass mobilization, then against a suspicious power very near there – the USSR, in the 1960s.
The concept of mass mobilisation was confirmed in the 1990s, with an air defense law

adopted at the 202nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on October 29, 1996, promulgated by Order No. 78 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on October 29, 1996, and effective as of January 1, 1997.


According to the 1996 air-defense law,

[a]s authorized by the State Council and the Central Military Commission, the major military commands shall exercise leadership in the work of civil air defense in the areas under their command.

The article you are going to read describes three particular fields of competition: satellite communication, mobile-devices communication and shortwave communication.
As far as these fields of science are concerned, the 1996 law stipulates that

The tasks to be performed by mass organizations for air defense in time of war include dealing with emergencies, doing rush repairs, providing medical aid, preventing and extinguishing fire, engaging in epidemic prevention, disinfection and sterilization, eliminating contamination, ensuring signal communications, rescuing people, doing emergency transportation of goods and materials and maintaining public order, and in time of peace they shall assist the departments for fighting against floods and earthquakes in dealing with emergencies and doing disaster relief.

That said, the army wants specialized people within its ranks, not somewhere else. And as Chinese people can be drafted (without being asked), a guideline published (or publicised) by the “PLA” in August suggests that drafts during the later months of this year would be based on skills which are particularly relevant for war prepration.

The article.
Main Link: “I particularly care about this honor” (我特别看重这份荣誉)

From August 30 to August 31, the 2022 Henan Provincial Civil Air Defense System Skills Competiton was carried out in the city of Hebi. In contrast to the past, success during the competiton was linked to the contestants’ professional advancement. For example, workers and handymen, no matter if junior, intermediate or senior workers, can all be promoted to a higher position right away, with payment and status being adjusted accordingly.
8月30日至31日,2022年河南省人防系统职业技能竞赛在鹤壁市举行。与以往不同,这次竞赛成绩与参赛选手个人职业等级晋升挂钩。比如,对于工勤技能岗位人员而言,无论是初级工、中级工还是高级工,只要进入竞赛前3名,均可直接晋升为技师,工资待遇也会相应调整。

This change has been made because the Civil Air Defense System Skills Competiton has been integrated into the 2022 Henan Provincial vocational technical skills competiton plan. “The Civil Air Defense communication skills competition is technologically demanding, strict in its standard requirements, and should enjoy preferential regional industrial and technical competition policies.“ Someone in charge at the provincial Human Resources and Social Security Department’s professional capacity-building office explained that “according to the ‘Henan Province Professional Skills Competition (trial) Administrative Method’, three new items have been added this time, concerning: Civil Air Defense satellite communication, Civil Air Defense shortwave communication, and Civil Air Defense mobile device operators. With certain results, participants qualify for professional promotion.
变化,源于这次人防技能竞赛被纳入2022年河南省职业技能竞赛计划。“人防通信技能竞赛,技术含量高、标准要求严,理应享受地方职业技能竞赛优惠政策。”该省人社厅1职业能力建设处相关负责人介绍,依据《河南省职业技能竞赛管理办法(试行)》,此次新增了人防卫星、短波、移动通信机务员3个项目;参赛人员取得一定成绩,即获得职业等级晋升资格。

“Integrating war preparation competitions, practicing perfect mastery and ability.” In accordance with this line of thought, Henan Province Civil Air Defense Office first mobilized those to sign up who were up to the condition, and then instructed Municipal Civil Air Defense Offices to hold preliminary competitions to select the best from those already best so as to ensure a high starting point for the provincial finals.
“结合备战竞赛,练强过硬本领。”按照这一思路,河南省人防办首先动员符合条件的人员踊跃报名参加,然后指导各地市人防办举办预赛、优中选优,确保省决赛的高起点。

To ensure impartiality and fairness, the National University of Defense and Technology’s School of Communication and Information, counterpart units from Shandong, Guangxi, Sichuan and other provinces, Hebi City Fire and Rescue Brigade and other third parties were invited to send referees.
Extra efforts were made in the design of the test settings. For example, shortwave transmitter-receivers had to work with groundwaves instead of skywaves, because propagation of the latter is variably influenced [by the ionosphere]. This is how variations in assignment conditions for the participants were avoided.
为保证竞赛公平公正,他们不仅邀请国防科技大学信息通信学院,山东、广西、四川等兄弟单位,鹤壁市消防救援支队作为第三方,派出专家和技术人员担任裁判,而且还在赛题设置上下了一番功夫。比如,短波电台要借助地波而不是天波进行通联,天波受天气影响较大,这样可避免前后上场的选手作业条件出现较大差异。

Zhang Guoyin, a high-level worker from Zhengzhou City Civil Air Defense Office, achieved the second position at the Civil Air Defense mobile device operators which means that, according to the rewards policy, he can be promoted to the position of a technician*) right away. “The things demanded in this competiton are pretty much what I’m practising and using regularly anyway, so I could do this quite safely.” Zhang Guoyin told this reporter that to get promoted had by no means been as easy in the past. In 2016, he passed his high-level worker exam, but the acceptance quota was limited, and he was only promoted in 2019.
郑州市人防办高级工张国印,在移动通信机务员赛项中获得第二名,按照奖励政策,他可以直接晋升为技师。“这次竞赛的内容,基本都是平时常训常练常用的,考起来得心应手。”张国印告诉记者,以前晋级可没这么顺利。他在2016年通过了高级工考试,但受名额数量所限,直到2019年才得以晋升。

Tan E, winner of the gold medal at the shortwave communication operators’ competition, is a technician at the Provincial Civil Air Defense command information support center. As far as technicians are concerned, the first three of them [in the competition], won’t be benefitted in terms of payment, but are exempted from two theoretical senior-technician exams. They also earn themselves a title as “Henan Province technology experts”. “I used to be with the signal corps, and I particularly care about this honor.” Holding his certificate in his hands, Tan E couldn’t hide his joy.
在短波通信机务员赛项中夺得金牌的谭峨,是省人防指挥信息保障中心的一名技师。对于技师而言,前3名的成绩虽然不与工资待遇挂钩,但可在高级技师考试中免考2门理论,并可获得“河南省技术能手”称号。“我曾是一名通信兵,特别看重这份荣誉。”谭峨手捧荣誉证书,难掩心中的喜悦。

There were also active engineers taking part. Gao Bing, associate engineer from the Nanyang Civil Air Defense Office, Liu Wei, intermediate engineer from Hebi Civil Air Defense Office, won gold medals in satellite and mobile device operations respectively. These are excellent successes, laying the foundations for their next professional evaluations. Zhu Anwei, second-class floorwalker at the Provincial Civil Air Defense Office, believes that competiton among staff from specialised technological posts doesn’t only help the participants’ maturity and progress, but also provides everyone with role models, goals to achieve, and is beneficial for the promotion of building skilled and talented echelons.
竞赛场上还活跃着工程师人员的身影。南阳市人防办助理工程师高冰、鹤壁市人防办中级工程师刘伟,分别获得卫星、移动通信机务员竞赛项目金牌。优异的成绩,给他们下一步的职称评定奠定了基础。省人防办二级巡视员朱安伟认为,安排专业技术岗位人员上阵比武,不仅对他们个人成长进步有帮助,而且能让大家学有榜样、赶有目标,有利于推动技能人才梯队建设。

Those who have earned themselves gold and silver medals have been awarded, and the others don’t consider their participation wasted time either. According to releveant regulations, those who finished 4th to 10th can be promoted. “A moment on stage takes several years of practice off-stage.” According to what leaders at the Civil Air Defense Office say, having gone through several months of ample war preparation not only brought the participants’ professional skills to new levels, but also built a good atmosphere within the provincial civil air defense system that leans on personal technical skills and on real accomplishment and improvement.
摘金夺银者有奖,其他参赛人员也不虚此行。每项赛事中获得第4至10名者,也可按相关规定晋升职业技能等级。“台上一分钟,台下数年功。”该省人防办相关领导介绍,经过几个月的充分备战,这次竞赛不仅让参赛选手业务技能上了一个大台阶,而且在全省人防系统中营造了凭技能立身、靠实绩进步的良好氛围。

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Note

*) A reformed eight-level remuneration scale has reportedly been in place earlier this year. It includes the ranks of 学徒工 (apprentice), 初级工 (junior worker), 中级工 (intermediate worker), 高级工 (senior worker), 技师 (technician), 高级技师 (senior technician), 特级技师 (top senior technician), 首席技师 (chief technician) – see Industrial Bank of China and the CPC Central Committee’s “Qiushi” (bimonthly English-language edition) for sources
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Saturday, September 24, 2022

Newly appointed Russian Ambassador to China addresses Chinese Public

Igor Morgulov is Russia’s new ambassador to China, replacing Andrey Denisov there.

According to Russia’s state-run “Sputnik” website, Morgulov was born on May 4, 1961 and graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University’s Asian and African Countries’ Research Institute. He speaks Chinese and English as foreign languages (even “fluently” according to RIAC, a thinktank’s website). He held the post of Counselor and Minister of the Russian embassy in China from 2006 to 2009, headed the Russian foreign ministry’s Asian Department next, and was appointed deputy foreign minister in 2011. Still according to “Sputnik, he has been awarded the “For Merit to the Fatherland” medals, order 4 and order 2, among other awards. “Sputnik” also quotes from President Putin’s presidential decrees that remove Morgulov from his previous post and appoint him to his new one, similar to the way TASS newsagency also does.

When you google Morgulov’s role as a deputy foreign minister, you’ll probably get the impression that central, east and southeast Asia were his main fields of work from 2011 to 2022, as well – including Russia’s relations with North and South Korea, as well as the Korean nuclear issue.
As a rule, there appear to be about half a dozen to ten deputy-minister posts in Moscow – see “Current Deputy Foreign Ministers” on Wikipedia. In that light, becoming Russia’s ambassador to China should count as quite a promotion (it’s probably the most important embassy for Moscow anywhere around the world).

Morgulov addressed the Chinese public by video this week, published by China News Service on Youtube on Friday.
20220923_morgulov_china_news_service_video
Click photo for video

Translation:

亲爱的中国朋友们,你们好。首先请允许我自我介绍一下。我是莫尔古洛夫。本月13日俄罗斯总统普京把我任命为新的俄罗斯驻华大使。对我来讲,这是一个很大的荣幸,也是很大的责任。 Dear Chinese friends, pleased to meet you. Allow me to introduce myself. I’m Morgulov. On the 13th of this month, Russian President Putin has appointed me as Russia’s new ambassador in China. For me, that’s a great honor and a great responsibility.
1983年,作为第一批苏联留学生的一员,我首次来到中国。从那时候起,我的职业生涯同你们的古老而日新月异的美丽的国家紧密地联系在一起。在当今的复杂多变的国际形势下,俄中两国建立的新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系具有特殊的意义。 In 1983, I came to China for the first time, as a member of a group of Soviet students abroad. Ever since, my professional career has been closely linked to your ancient and rapidly progressing beautiful country. In today’s complicated and unsettled international situation, the comprehensive strategic partnership established by Russia and China in the new era is of special significance.
在新的岗位上,我愿意同中国朋友们积极合作,为落实好俄中两国元首所达成的重要的共识进一步推动两国关系全面发展,加强俄中两国人民之间的传统友谊而努力。朋友们,下个月我将要抵达北京。期待与大家尽快相见。谢谢。 On my new post, I wish to work actively with our Chinese friends, to implement well the important consensus reached between the Russian and Chinese heads of state and to promote our two countries’ relations further, and to make great efforts to strengthen the traditional friendship between the peoples of our two countries. Friends, next month, I will arrive in Beijing. I hope to see you all very soon. Thank you.

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Related

“Important choice, firm action”, Sept 14, 2022
Restive bulk of allies, May 6, 2022

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Saturday, August 27, 2022

What do Xi Jinping’s and Kim Jong-un’s Congratulatory Telegrams look like?

Punched tape, email, portable document format? Don’t know about you, but when I hear that Putin sends a congratulatory telegram to Kim Jong-un, I’d really like to know what that telegram looks like. If you do, too, keep reading. If not, don’t let me bore you.

20220519_putin_congratulatory_telegram_to_kim_jong_un
Victorious triple chin

“Ars Technica”, in a blogpost of June 2013, gives us a first clue:

Samuel Morse’s version of telegraphy—Morse code over the wire—died a long time ago. It was replaced by Telex, a switch-based system similar to telephone networks, developed in Germany in 1933. The German system, run by the Federal Post Office, essentially used a precursor to computer modems and sent text across the wire at about 50 characters per second. Western Union built the US’ first nationwide Telex, an acronym for Teleprinter Exchange, in the late 1950s.

Ordinary Chinese cadres appear to send faxes – they are considered to be more reliable or legally binding than emails, and fax machines are relatively easily available.

As I have no idea what North Korea‘s or Russia’s “telegrams” look like, I’ll focus on China’s. The political folklore on both sides of the Yalu River is becoming more alike by the day, anyway.

There is an article concerning diplomatic protocol available online, written by quite an authority, it seems, but without verifiable autenticity. According to  the info provided, the autor would be a former advisor or counselor  at the Chinese foreign ministry’s (FMPRC) protocol department (礼宾司). His name is Wu Deguang, born in 1938.

This is how he is quoted:

Congratulatory telegrams and congratulatory messages are most frequently used methods of congratulations. State leaders, foreign ministers and diplomatic envoys overseas generally use diplomatic letters, diplomatic telegrams or formal diplomatic notes  to send letters or telegrams of congratulations. Leaders’ congratulatory telegrams can usually be passed on by the relevant embassies or consulates abroad, or directly be sent by electronic means (电传)*).
贺电和贺函是最常用的祝贺方式。国家领导人、外长、驻外使节一般采用外交函件、外交电报或正式照会的方式发送贺函、贺电。领导人的贺电可通过有关驻外使领馆转递,也可通过电报局或经电传直接拍发。

Different from a lot of other things (and people), Chinese authorities don’t show congratulatory telegrams received around like trophies. So there remains an air of mystery around those messages, or their substance.

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Notes

*) The “Yellowbridge” online dictionary explains “electronic means” as follows:
yellowbridge_dianchuan

Tuesday, August 2, 2022

Émissions Ondes Courtes de Tamsui, Taiwan, en Français

Le retour du service français de Radio Taiwan International aux ondes courtes, printemps 2020 QSL

Le retour du service français de Radio Taiwan International aux ondes courtes, printemps 2020 QSL

Radio Taiwan International’s direct programs from Tamsui Émissions directes de Radio Taiwan Internationale de Tamsui
Shortwave is gaining ground: Radio Taiwan International’s French service will broadcast from its shortwave transmission site in Tamsui this month – every weekend (Fridays through Sundays) from 17:00 to 18:00 UTC on 11995 kHz and from 19:00 to 20:00 UTC on 9545 kHz.
August 05 – 07
August 12 – 14
August 19 – 21
August 26 – 28.
Pour la première fois, il y aura des émissions françaises de Tamsui, Taiwan, pour les regions européennes et nord-africaines. Selon Radio Taiwan Internationale,
Le programme de cette activité radiophonique en français sera diffusé en Ondes Courtes tous les vendredis, samedis et dimanches du mois d’août.
Fréquence 11995 kHz, 17h00-18h00, temps universel (19 h à Paris),
Fréquence 9545 kHz, 19h00-20h00, temps universel (21 h à Paris),
tous les week-ends.

mappemonde des émissions ondes-courtes de Radio Taiwan Internationale

Bonjour le Monde – les émissions réguliers de Radio Taiwan Internationale – source: RTI

Tests were carried out in July in a range of 308 to 325° reportedly, which suggests that both northern Africa and Europe should be good places to listen to the transmissions from Tamsui, northwestern Taiwan. Des émissions testes ont été effectués en juillet, dans un azimut de 308 à 325°.
RTI’s French service usually broadcasts for Europe on 6005 kHz, from 19:00 to 19:30 UTC, via Kostinbrod relay, Bulgaria. Listeners who don’t usually listen to the station’s internet programs (one hour of programming per day) will have a great opportunity to get to listen to programs they wouldn’t usually hear on shortwave. Normalement, il y a une émission par jour de Kostinbrod, la Bulgarie, chaque jour de 19:00 à 19:30 temps universel (21 – 21:30 h à Paris) sur 6005 kHz, pour l’Europe et l’Afrique du nord. En outre, il y a une transmission pour l’Afrique ouest tous les dimanches, en 13835 kHz (apparemment à partir d’Issoudun, Centre-Val de Loire, en France).
Si vous n’écoutez, d’habitude, les programmes français en ligne (il y en a une demie-heure sur les ondes courtes, mais des 30 minutes additionnels en ligne), les émissions de Tamsui vous donneront une belle occasion d’écouter des programmes rares sur les ondes courtes en août, car il y en aura 60 minutes par émission de Tamsui.
Wednesday, May 18, 2022

Li Keqiang at Yunnan University, in Accordance with their Wishes

“Yunnan University is still amazing” (云南大学还是了不起的), China’s chief state councillor Li Keqiang tells Yunnan University students at a graduation ceremony, and “Yunnan University will surely advance further”.  Not least, he wishes the students “a post in accordance with their wishes” (称心如意的岗位).

Source: Weibo - click photo for more

Source: Yunnan Univ. weibo channel
– click photo for more

All that seems to go without saying, but the last sentence could be important. After all, China’s “zero-Covid” policy will affect many graduates’ job searches – and Li is only too familiar with cases where that transit from learning to doing went wrong. In early February 2015, he met with students and graduates in Liping County, Guizhou, and heard complaints about student loans with hardly affordable interest rates.

Li, in general, is in charge of the economy – including its dark sides -, while Xi Jinping is in charge of lofty speeches and the spreading of Reagan-like optimism. Xi is becoming known as the man with his happy head firmly above the Olympic clouds: China’s aerospace sci-tech self-reliance, for example (earlier this month), or the skies more in general (May 2013), or with the idea that the party & the state can lock millions into their homes without reliable supplies of daily necessities and income and expect those millions to love the party & the state back for that.

What really surprised many onlookers today is that there was very little Covid policy to be seen during Li’s visit to Yunnan University today – certainly no face masks. In China, too, and on its campuses not least, there seems to be a feeling that China needs to enter the endemic stage, i. e. the era where a society begins “to live with Covid” as its effects become less dangerous or fatal.

But obviously, no hopeful event such as graduation can do without a peek across the clouds:

The Chief State Councillor hopes that the studious sons and daughters of Yunnan University will stand on solid ground, achieving sky-high successes from there (总理希望云大学子站在坚实的土地上,创造高上云端的成就),

he told the crowd before leaving again on his modest minibus.
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Updates/Related

Thank you, you too, May 18, 2022
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Monday, April 18, 2022

Cute Pandas and Lovely Tanks – CRI and CGTN cover Russia’s War in Ukraine

CRI Russian / CGTN Russian war coverage

How is our motherland doing, comrades?
CRI Russian / CGTN Russian war coverage

I don’t speak Russian, but it seems that China Radio International’s (CRI) coverage leaves nothing to be desired when you want to be kept up to date with your country’s war in Ukraine (without too much disturbing news, I suppose). The first 25 minutes of CRI’s Russian program at 17:00 UTC on Sunday were all about Donbas, with a CGTN correspondent reporting from there.

CRI might have dispatched its own correspondents a few years ago, when the station was actually an organization in its own right, and quite a fiefdom at that. CRI’s then director, Wang Gengnian, even delivered his own annual new-year address.

Some adjustments for synergy were called for, and the central committee delivered, early in 2018, by amalgamating CRI, CPBS (domestic radio) and television into a “Central Radio and Television Network” (中央广播电视总台).   Some three years later, many CRI language broadcasts on shortwave were replaced by mere music loops or endless repetitions of always-the-same cultural programs.

Taiwan’s government appeared to have similar plans for Radio Taiwan International (RTI) – not to take them off the airwaves, but to create an tri-medial organization, integrating RTI, Taiwan’s national newsagency CNA, and public television. Instead, RTI got a new director-general, and its Spanish, French and Korean services returned to shortwave from a mere online existence.

Now, questions are occasionally asked which plan for RTI was better – the one devised in 2018 or the one actually implemented in 2019 and onward. In my view, starting an international television channel on the one hand as is done with “Taiwan+” and keeping RTI as a station focused on audiences in different languages looks like a comparatively wise choice.

For one, RTI might provide a pool of foreign-language speakers for television if need be. Also, if I go by my own fondness for radio, “Taiwan+” isn’t for me, and never will be. In fact, it’s nice to be spoken to in my first language by RTI’s German department.

But above all, developments at Radio Japan and CRI aren’t looking really promising. At Radio Japan, English is only broadcast on shortwave three times a day, and as for the news, that’s only a soundtrack from NHK’s global  English-language television channel. (You won’t even know who’s speaking at times, because obviously, you are missing out on the subtitles.) And while I don’t know what they are talking about in Russian on China’s foreign media, I seem to notice that there is a similar problem with the CGTN correspondent’s contributions that are also used by CRI, i. e. by “Central Radio and Television Network” foreign-radio channel. The correspondent, Kirill Volkov, seems to interview a number of people for his video productions, but as a listener, you can only guess who he is talking to.

It is easy to think that CRI’s German service has lost some of its (not too numerous anyway) German listeners after leaving shortwave, along with many other CRI language services. The German editorial department’s current trimedial attempts at agitating their listeners in China’s favor may be good for a laugh every now and then, but contrary to CRI’s radio productions in the past, these days’ online content is useless.

20220130_dreckskerle_20220126

“Some US politicians behave more and more like
dirty swines!” -CRI German’s
“sharp commentary” online, January 2022

In that regard, one has to wonder why RTI has recently been busy with grandstanding of this kind. Reportedly, what really happened is that the same half-hour Russian program in Russian already in existence for Europe has been rebroadcast for an additional 30-minutes time slot on another frequency.

Stunts like the above seem to suggest that RTI’s directors are worried that the government might cut RTI’s budget.

That shouldn’t happen. If Taiwan’s government wants to raise its country’s “international visibility”, it can’t do without RTI, and it can’t do without shortwave. At least, Taipei better wait how “Taiwan+” develops before making cuts to the foreign-radio budget.

Wednesday, March 23, 2022

Biden-Xi Videolink last Friday: “Some People haven’t put the positive statements of Mr. President into practice”

When one guy knows what the other one thinks while saying something completely different, that’s probably called successful diplomacy – at least when relations are rotten. That’s also true for the video meeting of the American and Chinese heads of state last Friday (March 18).
What strikes the reader of the communiqués are the shares of the two participants in each others’ readouts.

Xinhua communiqué of Biden-Xi videolink on March 18, 2022

Characters count: Biden 224 / 1187 Xi (Xinhua)

The White House’s readout contains only 164 words, none of which can be attributed to the Chinese interlcoutor alone – and it mentions implications and consequences if China provides material support to Russia. Xinhua, on the other hand, doesn’t even mention President Biden’s threat.
Let’s focus on the Xinhua communiqué.

The first cross-purposes talk is about the legendary “One-China policy”. This term, probably garaged in every joint statement ever issued by China and a new diplomatic counterpart, can mean very different things from one country to another. The US, for example, “acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position.” There’s no position taken by the United States here.

So when Biden declares that “that U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed”, Xi Jinping knows that this is no recognition of China’s claims concerning Taiwan. Still, as if they mean the same thing, Xi expresses tells Biden how much he values his statement.

Following that, Xinhua’s account moves on to Chinese accusations made by Xi. Sino-US relations hadn’t recovered from the difficulties created “by the previous administration” (i. e. the Trump admin, but without naming it). Rather, even more challenges to these relations were emerging. Xi continues:

In particular, some people in America send wrong signals to the forces [in Taiwan] supporting “Taiwanese independence”. If the Taiwan issue isn’t handled well, this can have a subverting effect on [Sino-US] relations. We hope that America attaches sufficient attention to this. The immediate cause for the situation in Sino-American relations is that some people on the American side don’t implement the significant consensus the two of us [Biden and Xi] have achieved, and that they haven’t put the positive statements of Mr. President into practice either. America’s strategic intentions towards China have created misinterpretations and wrong assessments.
特别是美国一些人向“台独”势力发出错误信号,这是十分危险的。台湾问题如果处理不好,将会对两国关系造成颠覆性影响。希望美方予以足够重视。中美关系之所以出现目前的局面,直接原因是,美方一些人没有落实我们两人达成的重要共识,也没有把总统先生的积极表态落到实处。美方对中方的战略意图作出了误读误判。

Xi ostensibly gives Biden “credit” by condemning the Trump administration. This follows an opportunistic pattern in China by which it also judges its own past dynasties. Every misery and every defect is blamed on (now powerless) sinister guys from the pre-“communist” past, and the CPC is the mother of all progress. That’s how those in power today can talk with each other and be at ease – albeit at the cost of historical accuracy, at least in public.

Also, Xi applies a similar ambiguity to opponents in America, as Biden America applies to the status of Taiwan. Who are those “some people on the American side”? They could refer to quarters within the Biden administration, but also to opposition politicians like Trumps former secretary of state Michael Pompeo – considered a spawn of hell by Beijing, for reasons like these.

As China doesn’t understand the concept of an opposition, those portrayed by Xi as saboteurs may just be some American newspaper columnist who happened to catch his eye.

Then the conversation – according to Xinhua – turns to Ukraine. Xi uses the same keywords as usual – avoiding escalation, paying attention to the tasks of the moment, overcoming “cold-war mentality”, etc.. Both heads of state agree, finally, to make efforts respectively to a) get their countries’ relations back on track and b) to find an appropriate solution for the “Ukraine crisis”.

Main Chinese concerns, apart from more stable Sino-US relations, appear to be economic issues. The situation “it had come to in Ukraine” wasn’t what China wanted to see, Xinhua quotes Xi. He criticizes “comprehensive and indiscriminate sanctions that caused “suffering among the common people, and points to a double challenge – Covid-SARS and economic development, both influenced by the two most recent crises.

There may be one deviation from the usual talk however: “only the one who attached the bell to the tiger  can remove it again”.

If Biden followed up and asked if this referred to him or to Putin (or Zelensky, or everyone) is not passed down on us, but one might guess that Xi didn’t mainly refer to Moscow.

Ding Xuexiang, Liu He and Wang Yi as well as other persons attended on Xi’s side of the meeting.

Friday, December 24, 2021

Merry Christmas, …

20211224_20161200_merry_christmas

Stay in touch

… and keep warming your hands here in this cold war.

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