Sino-Russian Joint Statement concerning the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era

The following are my takeaways from the  current March 2023 “Sino-Russian Joint Statement concerning the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era”.

Many topics had been touched upon before, in Beijing’s and Moscow’s “joint statement on international relations”, issued in Beijing in February 2022, but that statement had been issued shortly before Russia tried a full invasion of Ukraine.

According to the March 2023 statement, Sino-Russian relations are not similar to military and political alliances of the cold-war era, and not directed against third countries. Beijing and Moscow say they want to build “exemplary major-power relations” – viewing each others as “priority partners”, respecting each other all along, and treating each other as equals.

That’s basically the same model Xi Jinping tried to introduce into Chinese-American relations ten years ago, as described by Xinhua back then in June 2013, and further explained by Yang Jiechi, CPC Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group secretary at the time.

The March 2023 statement then highlights the usual emerging multi-polar world, one where “peace, development, cooperation and win-win are the unstoppable historic trend” (reads as if there had been no international cooperation before 2023), and an increasingly strong position of emerging markets and developing countries and where regional powers (地区大国, Russia? :)))  “resolutely defend their legitimate interests”.

^{Bragging in German, eating humble pie in Chinese: Sputnik/Rossya Segodnya propaganda celebrates first anniversary of full-scale Ukraine invasion as “dawn of a new world order (Febr 24, 2023) and covers Russia’s support for “China’s core interests” (March 22, 2023)}

Economic Cooperation

The two sides “adhere to the principle of mutual benefit” and intend to further deepen cooperation in the fields of modernisation.  A fair and predictable investment environment is to be created, and financial cooperation (with increased use of own currencies) and mutual supplies of agricultural products and food (互输农产品和粮食的多样性和供应量) are also on the agenda. There’s talk about diversity in those supplies, too, so it seems to avoid the question if this is meant to support food security in China, or if it is just meant to make Russian markets more diverse.
Increased use of own currencies isn’t a new topic. Xi Jinping raised the topic in a speech to a Gulf-Cooperation Council audience, too, in December last year, and Putin had advocated it as soon as in 2008. Cooperation on technology and innovation, such as AI, internet of things, 5G, low-carbon economy are also mentioned by the 2023 joint statement.

The remarks about iinvestment also refer to a Sino-Russian Investment Cooperation Planning Outline (中俄投资合作规划纲要), which is part of the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship.  Supply chain stability and security, optimized trade structures and cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises of both sides are to be promoted.

It’s hard to tell from declarations like this one how far it will help Russia to develop its economy, but it does probably throw Moscow an economic lifeline. That, however, goes without saying even without this month’s joint statement. China doesn’t want Putin to go under.

Russian-Ukrainian war

Which leads us to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The two sides express deep concern about comprehensive challenges for international security, express believe that there is a shared fate of all countries and peoples and that no country should achieve its own security at the costs of other countries’ security.
双方对国际安全面临的严峻挑战深表关切，认为各国人民命运与共，任何国家都不应以他国安全为代价实现自身安全。

It hadn’t read much differently in February 2022, a few weeks prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine:

The sides are gravely concerned about serious international security challenges and believe that the fates of all nations are interconnected. No State can or should ensure its own security separately from the security of the rest of the world and at the expense of the security of other States. The international community should actively engage in global governance to ensure universal, comprehensive, indivisible and lasting security.

Less obviously related to the Ukraine war, maybe, but from the 2023 statement, one year on:

The two sides emphasize the significance of the “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races” and reaffirm that “a nuclear war cannot be won or won”.
双方强调《五个核武器国家领导人关于防止核战争与避免军备竞赛的联合声明》的重要意义，重申“核战争打不赢也打不得”。

How reliable this assurance will be, remains to be seen. Russia has toyed with nuclear threats during the past year, and continues to do so.

Multipolar World

In the broadly  and vaguely defined field of “terrorism”, the 2023 statement is more detailed than in that of 2022, demanding “objective, fair and professional” investigation of Nord Stream attack (应对“北溪”管线爆炸事件进行客观、公正、专业的调查) and agreeing to strengthening law enforcement cooperation concerning the “three evils”, including color revolutions, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), transnational organized crime, economic crimes, and drugs trade. Listing ETIM, popular uprisings and organized crime in one go is certainly an intentional step to make the Sino-Russian public (and unknown swathes of international public opinion) get used to this kind of world view.

As for the world beyond bilateral relations, the multipolar one with the unstoppable historic trends of peace, development, cooperation and win-win, Beijing and Moscow emphasize “the democratization of international relations“, every country’s “right to choose its own path of development (with the likely exceptions of Taiwan and Ukraine, if it is up to China and Russia), and a continued implementation of the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Eurasian Economic Union signed on May 17, 2018.^*)

Taiwan

As mentioned before, “democratization of international relations” isn’t for everyone in the Sino-Russian statements  – not for Ukraine or Taiwan.

Russia reiterates its scrupulous respect of the one-China principle, acknowledges that Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory, opposes any form of “Taiwan independence”, firmly supports China’s actions to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
(俄方重申恪守一个中国原则，承认台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，反对任何形式的“台独”，坚定支持中方维护本国主权和领土完整的举措。)

Indeed, both issues. Ukraine and Taiwan, are closely related. Both China and Russia intend to annex foreign territory (Russia has already done so, although not to the extent  it would like to, and China, if it wants to attack Taiwan, will have to depend on its Russian hinterland. However, Moscow’s compliance with Beijing’s “one-China” charade is no particular hint into that direction, as it is being played along with by many other countries too, although in varying degrees. All the same, China’s planned aggression of its own, against Taiwan, is one of the reasons why it needs to cultivate relations with Moscow as closely as it does.

Military concerns

China and Russia (apparently) see U.S. in breach of Biological Weapons Convention, and call for institutionalized effective inspection mechanisms. Demands for  were quite likely included at Russia’s particular request. The Ukraine bioweapons conspiracy theory of March 2022 – a year ago – may remain a scarecrow in the Moscow muppet show, and probably works well on parts of the global public. The March 2023 statement deplores a U.S. “cold-war mentality” and the “negative influence” of the Indo-Pacific Strategy” on regional peace and stability in that region.

As far as Beijing and Moscow are concerned, NATO isn’t welcome in the Indo-Pacific either. The statement says that NATO should remain a regional (i. e. European) and defensive alliance. The statement also expresses concern about NATO “undermining” Asia-Pacific “peace & stability”.

Generally speaking, China seems to get more out of the strategic partnershp and the “major-power relationship” than Russia. That becomes obvious, because apart from the EAEU bits, most concerns are rather about China’s than about Russia’s. There are, however, demands that there should be no unilateral sanctions without approval of the United Nations Security Council (not an issue in the 2022), and a note that

the two sides oppose politization of international cultural cooperation, and discrimination against people in the fields of culture, education, science, and sports, based on nationality, language, religion, political or other beliefs, or national or social origin.
双方反对国际人文合作政治化，反对以国籍、语言、宗教、政治或其他信仰、民族或社会出身为由歧视文化、教育、科学、体育界人士。

This may be read as a hint to the “Olympic Committee”, among others.

Covid Pandemic

I’ve left that out here. Both Sino-Russian statements, Febr 2022 and March 2023, are full of it, with the usual complaints and demands, but the world is moving on.

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Note

*)

There needs to be a mention of the institution that are supposed to help bring about the multipolar world, according to Beijing and Moscow. That would be – according both to this month’s and the 2022 statements – the WTO (including remarks that can be read as a Chinese reaction to “discrimination” against it concerning the chip industry), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, G20, and APEC. Accession of the African Union was added to the G20 issue this time, but hadn’t been a year ago.

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Related / Updates

「主要重点是经济方面和高科技领域」, sputnik.cn, Mar 26, 2023
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China’s Position: Ukraine still hopes for the Best

On February 27, Ukraine issued a rejection of sorts of China’s February 24 position paper “on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. Advisor to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Mykhailo Podolyak, told “Freedom TV”  that the only effective measure the position paper called for was “immediate cessation of fire.”

“This means that Russia will remain in the occupied territories, we will have a new dividing line, and we will have a slow absorption of Ukraine. That is, the slow death of Ukraine,” the TV station quoted Pdolyak.

The rejection from Zelensky’s office, but only in an unofficial interview, suggests that Kiev doesn’t want to anger Beijing and possibly provoke Chinese lethal-arms supplies to Russia that wouldn’t happen otherwise.

^{中共中央外事工作委员会办公室主任王毅会见乌克兰外长库列巴，慕尼黑，Febr 18, 2023}

In an article published on March 3, “Freedom TV” quotes interviewees as saying that “it is too early to say that China is openly opposing Ukraine”. China’s “global ambitions”, its long common border with Russia, and its dependence on Russian energy supplies as well as the two countries’ traditional alliance are quoted as factors supporting the bilateral relationship, but “Beijing will not sacrifice its own well-being because of Russia, experts are sure”.

Part of China’s “well-beings” is the arable land it owns in Ukraine. It shouldn’t be too difficult to replace, given that Beijing’s investment companies are scouting all continents for farmable land to buy or rent, but it wouldn’t be fun to see the goose being killed by Russia – even if it isn’t quite the “golden” goose.

Besides, at least one of “Voice of America’s” interlocutors, Taiwan International Strategic Study Society director Ching-Sheng Lo (羅慶生), took a rather critical view of China’s food security, a year ago.

Lo Ching-Sheng says: “Having bought that much grain, with storage for a year and a half, there’s nothing to care about – no problem in the short run. If this should turn into an Afghanistan kind of war of twenty years, China’s problems will be very big.”
罗庆生说：“因为中国买了太多粮食的关系，它储存了一年半的粮食，所以一年半之内它不会有事情，所以短期的话没问题。长期的话，如果说变成阿富汗战争那个样子打个20年，那中国的问题就很大了。”

But the Russian hinterland will count more than Ukraine – be it for China’s “global ambitions”, be it for its food security. Beijing took a speaking decision in early February, 2022, a few weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine started. Answer to the unfolding crisis: more grain imports from Russia.

Ukraine’s hopes on China are unreasonably high. As Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a fellow for international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote,

The party can survive setbacks in the chip war, but the stakes are much higher in the fight for food security. Failure on the food security front will threaten the survival of the regime.

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Related

Kuleba addresses Asia, March 22, 2022

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EU: “Just protecting the freedom of expression”

All the news that’s fit to blog.

Fri, Febr 24, 2023	One year after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, China publishes a Confucius-says “position paper”. Originally, it had been advised as a “peace plan” by China’s supreme diplomat Wang Yi, but has since been de-ambitioned. Meantime, China’s foreign-ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin (汪文斌) offers a clue as to why: FMPRC tweet, Febr 24, 2023
Thu, Febr 23, 2023	The central committee of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) approved a timetable that presidential nominations would be decided by April 12, and Legislative Yuan nominations in May. It appears to be widely accepted among the party’s legislators that, in the light of a poor showing in Taiwan’s “mid-term elections”, i. e. the country’s local elections in November 2022, more time is needed to prepare for the nation-wide presidential and legislative elections next year. Lai Ching-te, the incumbent Tsai administration’s current Vice President, has recently been elected chairman of the DPP, and Chen Jien-jen, Lai’s predecessor as Taiwan’s Vice President from 2016 to 2020, became head of the cabinet in January this year. Source: 央廣 / Radio Taiwan International
Wed, Febr 22, 2023	High-level foreign-policy and defense officials from Japan and China met at Japan’s foreign ministry in Tokyo on Wednesday. It was the first such meeting after an interruption of about four years. Chinese Deputy foreign minister Sun Weidong (孙卫东) was quoted as saying that there was “an important consensus” that neither country posed a threat for the other. However, Sun also said that there were Chinese concerns about Japan’s “strategic documents” issued in 2022, and Japan’s increasing cooperation with “outside forces” (域外力量), and about “negative tendencies” in Taiwan. Source: Radio Japan
Wed, Febr 22, 2023	Russian president Vladimir Putin met China’s chief diplomat Wang Yi in Moscow on Wednesday. The Kremlin published a detailed account of the meeting the same day. Source: Kremlin
Wed, Febr 15, 2023	Pyongyang was said to have gone under a Covid-related lockdown in late January, allegedly lasting from January 25 to 30. But was there a lockdown at all? Source: SinoNK
Tue, Febr 14, 2023	Chen Xuyuan (陈戌源) was – effectively, maybe not nominally yet – fired as chairman of the Chinese Football Association earliert his month, after having been confronted with the usual suspicions of “serious violations of discipline”, which appears to serve as a regular CPC codeword for corruption charges. Chen, a Shanghai native born in 1956, was also the football association’s deputy party secretary. Source: Ifeng
Mo, Febr 13, 2023	“Less then half the world is on the internet”, a BBC documentary broadcast told the audience on February 11, two days ahead of World Radio Day. Source: BBC
Tue, Febr 7, 2023	Critics of the EU’s censorship policy against Russia’s foreign-language service “RT” had a field day early this month, after the EU’s high-representative for for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, had told a “European Union External Action” (EEAS) conference that by imposing “restrictive measures on the Kremlin’s propaganda machinery and effectively ban them from operating within the European Union”, “we are not attacking the freedom of expression, we are just protecting the freedom of expression”. The EU’s “restrictive measures” aren’t limited to banning RT work from within the EU. Access to RT from EU countries is only possible via VPN. This includes the organization’s German and Chinese services. Main Source: EEAS

Wuxiwooshee: Trying to transcribe Major-General Jin Yinan

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That’s Major-General Jin Yinan (金一南), a Chinese Major-General, Professor, author and CPBS radio columnist with peculiar opinions about the Netherlands and Norway (click picture underneath for more info):

Also, I find him difficult to understand.

Here goes:

Question: 欢迎收听一南军事论坛。我是[Zhou Yuting]。 北约军事委员会主席罗伯·鲍尔^*)一月二十八日在接受媒体采访时公开表态说，北约准备与俄罗斯直接对抗。他的这个表态迅速引发国际社会的广泛关注。对此，俄罗斯国家杜马回应称，这种言论正在将整个世界投入和战争。那么北约真的要直接与俄罗斯开战吗？ 和战争的威胁是否离人类越来越近。这些就是今天一南军事论坛要关注的话题。首先欢迎金一南教授。金一南教授，您好！

Jin Yinan: 你好！

Question: 我们都知道自从俄乌开战以来，以美国为首的西方国家在对俄罗斯实施多轮建立制裁的同时，还…不断的向乌克兰提供各种军事援助。那么，北约军事委员会主席罗伯·鲍尔的自谈表态是否意味着北约已经做好准备将直接与俄罗斯开战？

Jin Yinan: 他这种讲话就北约准备与俄罗斯直接对抗－－这种话的份量非常重。不是间接对抗。与俄罗斯直接对抗。几乎就说就让往这个欧洲大战faran中。这是一个非常严重的采取啊。我觉得一辈子两次世界大战see-sai和现在有长效和平的欧洲人应该对鲍尔的话感到非常震惊。 原来北约的整个态度－－谴责俄罗斯，制裁俄罗斯，提供优先的军备－－这个优先军备是什么呢？就wuxiwoosheewooshee现在慢慢转进wuxiwoosheewooshee。现在向乌克兰提供美国的Abrahams坦克，德国的”豹”式坦克等等适于最先进的一种坦克…，那就完全不是wuxiwoosheewooshee了，是wuxiwoosheewooshee。
[…..]

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Notes

Clues:	防御性的武器 — 进攻性的武器
*)	Robert Bauer
—	Want to try yourselves? Give it a go there (starts at 19′ 45”)

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Xi Jinping’s Rabbit of the Year

The following are translated excerpts of China’s main evening TV news, Xinwen Lianbo, on January 20th, 2023.
Links within blockquotes added during translation.
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CCTV News (Xinwen Lianbo): The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council held a Spring Festival meeting in the Great Hall of the People in the morning of December 20th. Communist Party of China Secretary General, State Chairman and Central Military Commissions Chairman Xi Jinping gave a speech on behalf of the Central Committee and the State Council, wishing a happy new year to the entire nation’s and the entire people’s nationalities, to the compatriots in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to the compatriots in Macau Special Administrative Region, and to the Taiwanese and overseas Chinese compatriots.
央视网消息（新闻联播）：中共中央、国务院20日上午在人民大会堂举行2023年春节团拜会。中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平发表讲话，代表党中央和国务院，向全国各族人民，向香港特别行政区同胞、澳门特别行政区同胞、台湾同胞和海外侨胞拜年。

^{Absolutely rabbit: Kang Hui announces the happy gathering}

Xi Jinping emphasized that the outgoing year of the tiger’s thirty-ninth year I3 of the 60 year cycle [i. e. 2022] had been a year of utmost importance in the history of the party and the country. Facing an unusually stormy international environment and formidable duties of reform, development and stability at home, the entire party, the entire army and the entire country with all its nationalities rose to the challenges, fought unitedly, and based on the enthusiasm of the soaring tiger and the leaping dragon, dared to enter the tiger’s cave, and wrote, with fortitude and tenacity, a new chapter of socialist modernization.
习近平强调，即将过去的壬寅虎年，是党和国家发展史上极为重要的一年。面对风高浪急的国际环境和艰巨繁重的国内改革发展稳定任务，全党全军全国各族人民迎难而上、团结奋斗，凭着龙腾虎跃的干劲、敢入虎穴的闯劲、坚忍不拔的韧劲，书写了社会主义现代化建设的新篇章。

Li Keqiang presided over the meeting, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Han Zheng, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi and Wang Qishan attended the meeting.

李克强主持团拜会，栗战书、汪洋、李强、赵乐际、王沪宁、韩正、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希、王岐山等出席。

[…]

Xi Jinping pointed out that in traditional Chinese culture, the Rabbit is referred to as the auspicious Jade Rabbit, standing for resourcefulness and nimbleness, honesty and kindness, serenity and beauty. The auspicious rabbit represents symbolizes the increasingly auspicious peace, abundant vitality and youthful energy of the Chinese lands. In the lunar year of the Rabbit, we hope that the entire people, and especially many young people, will leap ahead in the way of the Rabbit and exert themselves in all areas of life in a graceful manner.

习近平指出，在中华传统文化中，兔被称为瑞兔、玉兔，代表着机智敏捷、纯洁善良、平静美好。吉兔呈祥，象征中华大地愈发安宁祥和、生意盎然、朝气蓬勃。在农历兔年，希望全国人民特别是广大青年像动如脱兔般奋跃而上、飞速奔跑，在各行各业竞展风流、尽显风采。

Leading and old comrades from the Central Committee, the National People’s Congress’s Standing Committee, the State Council, theNational Supervision Commission,  the Supreme People’s Court, the People’s Republic of China Supreme People’s Procurate, and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, attended the gathering.

中共中央、全国人大常委会、国务院、国家监委、最高人民法院、最高人民检察院、全国政协、中央军委领导同志和老同志出席团拜会。

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Related

“Open the Skies for the Young”, May 5, 2013

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Some Porridge, some Rice: China’s New Normal?

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Xi Jinping’s new year address for 2023 has been flowery as usual, but it also comes with some frugal characteristics. If it is such great news that China has maintained its position as the world’s second-largest economy, times must be tough indeed, especially when you take into consideration that (according to China’s propaganda) the world’s biggest economy, i. e. America, has gone to hell in a basket. If they are still bigger than China now, where is China?

According to the great helmsman, China has “blown the trumpet to signal the brave beginning of a new journey” (吹响了奋进新征程的时代号角), with “stable and steady economic development” (stable and steady probably referring to the lowest growth numbers since the last years of Mao Zedong’s reign), a 19th consecutive bumper harvest this year (十九连丰), and “the consolidation of achievements made in shedding poverty”  (我们巩固脱贫攻坚成果). —Corrections, Jan 27^*)

How green is our motherland? (Source: Beijing News, Dec 31, 2022)

With the Scarce Resources always on your Mind

Generally, Chinese propaganda points out that its 19th bumper harvest in a row has been achieved while the world had been facing a food crisis. That’s not a big deal when you consider that Russia hasn’t blocked China’s northeastern provinces from the rest of the country, but it may be considered an invitation to the Chinese public to cherish self-sufficiency.

As for the “new phase of pandemic prevention and control now entered” by China, Xi doesn’t wade into the details, and just sees the light – or the dawn of a new era – ahead (目前，疫情防控进入新阶段，仍是吃劲的时候，大家都在坚忍不拔努力，曙光就在前头).
The lines closest to Xi’s heart – if the communist faith he’s wearing on his sleeves is real – are probably these:

After the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party I and other colleagues went to Yan’an together, to renew what we had learned about the magnificent years when the Party’s Central Committee prevailed over difficulties rarely seen over generations and to appreciate the spiritual strength of the old generation of communists. I frequently say that difficulties and deprivation only perfect the jade. The Communist Party of China’s past one-hundred years have been hard work in the open regardless of the weather, cutting their way through thistles and thorns,  – how difficult and great the journey has been. We want to advance further, keep struggling, and make tomorrow’s China even better.
党的二十大后我和同事们一起去了延安，重温党中央在延安时期战胜世所罕见困难的光辉岁月，感悟老一辈共产党人的精神力量。我常说，艰难困苦，玉汝于成。中国共产党百年栉风沐雨、披荆斩棘，历程何其艰辛又何其伟大。我们要一往无前、顽强拼搏，让明天的中国更美好。

Both China’s economic plans and its “great-power diplomacy” appear to be in some trouble. As for China’s economy, it would take a real lot of innovation to catch up with the ageing of society. And China’s “great-power diplomacy” (大国外交), although re-iterated by Xi in another new-year address one day ealier, to a meeting of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference on December 30th, appears to have fed its wolf-warriors some chalk. For now, that is.

There is no reason to believe that China has given up on “replacing” America, or on other major goals, “core interests” and what have you. But the CPC leaders are revisiting and reassessing the foundations of their power. The emphasis on food security suggests that self-sufficiency in that field will always be a priority – China doesn’t only distrust the sealanes, it also distrusts its immediate neighbors. And if America’s restrictions on chip and chip-manufacturing equipment supplies to China find international support and cooperation, China’s growth plans will probably need to be postponed.

When enumerating China’s moderate successes to Chinese People’s Consultative Conference members, Xi emphasized that those successes hadn’t been “easy to achieve” or “easy to come by” (来之不易). That term is linked to a proverb about man’s most basic needs, i. e. food and clothing. My try at a translation:

Some porridge and rice aren’t easy to come by,half a silk or cotton thread, permanently bear in mind how scarce are your resources.
一粥一饭，当思来处不易；半丝半缕，恒念物力维艰

That’s also where China’s grassroot propaganda – in the shape of newspapers more prominent than, say, “People’s Daily” – is taking us as it picks up Xi’s reference to the latest bumper harvest: to the countryside. Here, too, none of the bumper harvests has been “easy to come by”. The proverb didn’t feature prominently in politics articles before the end of December, while it was popular in all other kinds of (less basic-need-related) online articles or comments. Now, it is represents the flavor of the new era.

To help the readers understand the significance of this year’s output, his attention is drawn to a number of natural disasters.

Delicious Meat then, Tough Bones now

How planned are China’s readjustments? The new “cold war” China keeps warning us of may not have been intended by Beijing, but it was provoked by Beijing.

Either way, tough times have occasionally been predicted by China’s propaganda before, and by its supreme mouth not least. In February 2014, Xi Jinping told Russian television that

After 30 years of reform, China has entered the deep water [or blue water], and all the pleasant reforms have been completed. The delicious meat has been eaten, and what is still on the dishes are rather tough bones. This requires our courage, and steady moves. Courage means to push reform even when it is difficult, and to prove worthy, to tackle the hard bones, and to enter dangerous shoals. Steadiness is about keeping to the accurate direction, driving steadily, and, above all, to avoid disruptive mistakes.

The Russians must have been an understanding audience. Now, eight years later, Xi needs to find out how understanding the Chinese are.
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Notes

^*) Corrected – previous text:
… and “the consolidation of hard-earned achievements made in previous difficult missions” (我们巩固脱贫攻坚成果)
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German Chancellor’s first China Visit: Opportunities and Liabilities

It is going to be the first visit to China for German chancellor Olaf Scholz who took office late last year with a three-party coalition (SPD, Greens, and FDP).

On Friday (November 4), he is scheduled to meet “President” Xi Jinping, according to his office’s website, and following that, a meeting his planned with him and Li Keqiang, his actual colleague as head of a government. Bilateral relations, international topics such as climate change, Russia’s “war of aggression” against Ukraine and the situation in the east Asian region are said to be on the agenda. “Federal Chancellor Scholz will be accompanied by a business delegation during his visit”, the office’s statement concludes.

^{Not everybody’s first visit}
Shanghai’s “Jiefang Daily” suggests^*) that

many European companies have experienced serious economic problems this year, because of the energy crisis, high inflation, rising interest rates and problems like the economic slowdown. It is crucial for these European companies to make up for these losses in Europe by profiting from the Chinese market. Brudermüller for example, CEO at Germany’s chemical giant BASF, plans to further expand BASF’s “favorable investments” in China. It’s business report shows that unlike in Europe, results in China have been positive.
欧洲很多企业今年以来由于能源危机、高通胀、利率上升和经济放缓等遭遇严重经营困难。对这些欧洲企业来说，用中国市场的收益弥补在欧洲的亏损至关重要。比如德国化工巨头巴斯夫集团首席执行官薄睦乐就打算进一步扩大巴斯夫在中国的“有利投资”。业绩报告显示，与在欧洲的亏损不同，巴斯夫集团在中国的增长一直是正向的。

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Michelin’s business report, said to have been published on October 25, also shows rapidly rising sales in China, in contrast with an eight-percent drop in Europe, “Jiefang Daily” reports.

Michelin’s handsome China numbers notwithstanding, the “Global Times”, a Chinese paper for a foreign readership, blames a “sour-grape” mentality for France’s differences with Germany’s China policy. Those differences probably exist, with Paris being more skeptical about Chinese “opportunities” than Berlin, but you might consider Germany’s dependence on Chinese export markets as a liability, rather than as an opportunity, just as well.

While the SPD remains highly cooperative when it comes to China business, both its coalition partners have advised caution. And while it may be difficult to forecast a trend of future German investment in, exports to and supply chain connections with China, there are statements from German business circles you wouldn’t have heard a few years ago.

China itself rather bets on protectionism, but wants to get into the act globally, including in Germany (China setzt selbst eher auf Abschottung, will aber überall in der Welt mehr mitmischen, auch bei uns in Deutschland),

German weekly “Focus” quotes Martin Wansleben, head of the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce.  Scholz should champion clear-cut rules.
It isn’t only France that is concerned about Germany’s economic dependence on China. “Voice of America’s” (VoA) Chinese service, too, points out that “the West shows growing concern about Chinese trade practices and its human rights record”, as well as unease about “Germany’s dependence on the world’s second-largest economic body” (对德国对中国这个世界第二大经济体的依赖感到不安).

VoA also quotes a German government spokesman as saying that while Berlin’s view on China had changed, “decoupling” from China was opposed by Berlin.

When you keep pressing people for a while, the main problem appears to be China’s aggressive policy against Taiwan. Most Germans (this blogger included) never expected that Russia would really invade Ukraine. Now that this has happened, peoples’ imagination has become somewhat more animated – and realistic.

The Social Democrats are more skeptical than its middle- and upper-class coalition partners when it comes to the West’s human-rights agenda, and rightly so. (If China put all its SOEs on international sale, you wouldn’t hear a word about the Uyghurs from Western governments anymore.)

But the Russian-Chinese alliance is a fact, and so is that alliance’s preparedness to annex third countries. That is something the Social Dems can’t ignore. If the press, the oppositional CDU/CSU and the SPD’s coalition partners statements are something to go by, the tide of German integration with China’s economy is being reversed.

“Nothing speaks against German SMEs continuing to import their special nuts and bolts from China”, a columnist mused on German news platform t-online last week, but not without a backup source.

China’s propaganda doesn’t look at Scholz’ visit in a way isolated from its other global contacts. In fact, the German visitor is mentioned in a row with General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan – all of them bearing testimony, or so the propaganda suggests, of how attractive “Chinese opportunities” (中国机遇) actually are.

But Germany’s dependence on China, while worrying and in need to be cut back substantively, shouldn’t be viewed in an isolated way either. Scholz visit won’t even last for a full day, without an overnight stay, and also in November, Scholz will travel to Vietnam. Statistics appear to suggest that German industry will find backup sources there – if not first sources just as well.

And Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s foreign minister and one of the leaders of the SPD’s China-skeptic Green coalition partner, is currently travelling Central Asia. All the countries there “once hoped to be a bridge between Russia, China, and Europe,” German broadcaster NTV quotes her – the European Union needed to provide Central Asia with opportunities. Options beyond Russia and China, that is.

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Notes

*)	“Jiefang” actually “quotes foreign media”, but Chinese propaganda is often very creative in doing so – therefore no names here.

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Newly appointed Russian Ambassador to China addresses Chinese Public

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Igor Morgulov is Russia’s new ambassador to China, replacing Andrey Denisov there.

According to Russia’s state-run “Sputnik” website, Morgulov was born on May 4, 1961 and graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University’s Asian and African Countries’ Research Institute. He speaks Chinese and English as foreign languages (even “fluently” according to RIAC, a thinktank’s website). He held the post of Counselor and Minister of the Russian embassy in China from 2006 to 2009, headed the Russian foreign ministry’s Asian Department next, and was appointed deputy foreign minister in 2011. Still according to “Sputnik, he has been awarded the “For Merit to the Fatherland” medals, order 4 and order 2, among other awards. “Sputnik” also quotes from President Putin’s presidential decrees that remove Morgulov from his previous post and appoint him to his new one, similar to the way TASS newsagency also does.

When you google Morgulov’s role as a deputy foreign minister, you’ll probably get the impression that central, east and southeast Asia were his main fields of work from 2011 to 2022, as well – including Russia’s relations with North and South Korea, as well as the Korean nuclear issue.
As a rule, there appear to be about half a dozen to ten deputy-minister posts in Moscow – see “Current Deputy Foreign Ministers” on Wikipedia. In that light, becoming Russia’s ambassador to China should count as quite a promotion (it’s probably the most important embassy for Moscow anywhere around the world).

Morgulov addressed the Chinese public by video this week, published by China News Service on Youtube on Friday.

^{Click photo for video}

Translation:

亲爱的中国朋友们，你们好。首先请允许我自我介绍一下。我是莫尔古洛夫。本月１３日俄罗斯总统普京把我任命为新的俄罗斯驻华大使。对我来讲，这是一个很大的荣幸，也是很大的责任。	Dear Chinese friends, pleased to meet you. Allow me to introduce myself. I’m Morgulov. On the 13th of this month, Russian President Putin has appointed me as Russia’s new ambassador in China. For me, that’s a great honor and a great responsibility.
１９８３年，作为第一批苏联留学生的一员，我首次来到中国。从那时候起，我的职业生涯同你们的古老而日新月异的美丽的国家紧密地联系在一起。在当今的复杂多变的国际形势下，俄中两国建立的新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系具有特殊的意义。	In 1983, I came to China for the first time, as a member of a group of Soviet students abroad. Ever since, my professional career has been closely linked to your ancient and rapidly progressing beautiful country. In today’s complicated and unsettled international situation, the comprehensive strategic partnership established by Russia and China in the new era is of special significance.
在新的岗位上，我愿意同中国朋友们积极合作，为落实好俄中两国元首所达成的重要的共识进一步推动两国关系全面发展，加强俄中两国人民之间的传统友谊而努力。朋友们，下个月我将要抵达北京。期待与大家尽快相见。谢谢。	On my new post, I wish to work actively with our Chinese friends, to implement well the important consensus reached between the Russian and Chinese heads of state and to promote our two countries’ relations further, and to make great efforts to strengthen the traditional friendship between the peoples of our two countries. Friends, next month, I will arrive in Beijing. I hope to see you all very soon. Thank you.

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Related

“Important choice, firm action”, Sept 14, 2022
Restive bulk of allies, May 6, 2022

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