Posts tagged ‘business’

Monday, September 12, 2022

A Vice-Ministerial Visit to Taiwan and its Story

圖說:駐立陶宛台灣代表處正式掛牌設立,新獲任命的首任代表黃鈞耀及同仁攝於館牌前。 Splittist doorplate – click photo for source

A 28-person Lithuanian delegation of laser and biotechnology company representatives led by the Baltic nation’s Vice Minister of Economy and Innovation Karolis Žemaitis has reportedly arrived in Taiwan for an official visit today (Monday, September 12 UTC).  Also today, Lithuania’s public broadcaster LRT republished a Voice of America article saying that espite offering to build high-speed rail, China charm offensive loses appeal in Baltics.

National security may have been about as much a factor in the cooling relations between China and several of its European partners, as have unfulfilled business expectations.

The Latvia state security service published a report in 2020 “essentially saying that Chinese activities in Latvia are very similar to Russian intelligence activities”,

the article quotes Martins Hirss, a researcher at the University of Latvia. The China-Central-Europe connection originally included “seventeen-plus-one” nations, i. e. Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The Voice of America / LRT article also quotes an observer as saying that China will work in a more ‘targetted’ way, enhancing its profile where it already exists in a positive manner, for example, Hungary, Serbia.

All three Baltic countries have ended participation int the 17+1 format by now, leaving China with Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (14+1 or Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, China-CEEC).

Lithunia not only led the departure of the Baltic cooperation members (Estonia and Latvia followed in August  this year), but has also endured a particularly intense conflict with Beijing over the name of Taiwan’s de-facto embassy in its capital Vilnius  – The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania in English, or 駐立陶宛台灣代表處 in Chinese.

That was followed by Chinese economic warfare against Lithuania which in turn not only triggered a legislative process on the level of the European Union, but also likely convinced Lithuania’s two Baltic neighbors that they stood more to lose than to gain from “partnership” with China.

According to Taiwan’s foreign ministry as quoted by “Focus Taiwan”, the English-language website run by Taiwan’s Central News Agency CNA,

the fourth Lithuanian delegation led by a deputy minister-level official to Taiwan this year, following visits by Žemaitis’ immediate predecessor Jovita Neliupšienė on June 12, Ministry of Agriculture Vice Minister Egidijus Giedraitis on June 22, and Lithuanian Deputy Transportation Minister Agne Vaiciukevičiūtė on Aug. 6

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Related

Sender Viesintos, Wikipedia, acc Sept 12, 2022

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Thursday, September 8, 2022

The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

taiwanren_are_also_chinese

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China” (Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.” (We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.” (Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.” (Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”. If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle. This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it.
Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

table_one_mainland_china

or the other way round,

Table 2

table_two_orc
Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

table_three_orc

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be
table_must_not_exist
because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

table_four_taiwan
That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Sunday, July 24, 2022

Headlines: Guanchazhe, Shanghai, July 24

20220224_guanchazhe_press_review

Guanchazhe, headlines at 07:30 UTC

(1)     Actual Guanchazhe article there. Wikipedia has a useful article in English on Wentian space laboratory cabin module
(2)     Link
(3)     It’s more of a rant (you wouldn’t need academics for that, but it probably looks more authoratitve this way).
The article may contain some news for you however if you believe that Western sanctions against Russia are happily supported (or admired) everywhere else in the world
Friday, July 8, 2022

Chinese-Philippines Ties: “Brimming with Expectations”

The following is my translation of a press release by the Chinese foreign ministry (FMPRC), published on Wednesday morning (GMT) this week.

Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

Lines of disputes in the South China Sea (map)

一百聞不如一見:
maritime disputes (click map for source)

Main Link: 

Wang Yi meets Philippine national security advisor Carlos

王毅会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯

On July 6 local time, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Philippine National Security Advisor Ms Carlos1) in Manila.

当地时间2022年7月6日,国务委员兼外长王毅在马尼拉会见菲律宾国家安全顾问卡洛斯女士。

Wang Yi said that Sino-Philippine have a thousand-year history of friendly relations. During the past six years, with the joint efforts of both sides, Sino-Philippine relations had achieved a change for the better and advanced quality. The election of President Marcos had opened a new page in Sino-Philippine relations, and the two countries’ peoples were brimming with expectations for the development of bilateral relations. This visit represents the Chinese side’s focus on Sino-Philippine relations and its support for the new government, the continuity and stability in China’s friendly policies toward the Philippines. China would like to cooperate with the Philippine side to implement the important consensus between the two heads of state, to deepen pragmatic cooperation and to initiate another “golden age” in Sino-Philippines relations.

王毅表示,中菲有着千年友好交往历史。过去6年来,在双方共同努力下,中菲关系实现转圜改善、提质升级。马科斯总统当选为中菲关系翻开了新的一页,两国人民对双边关系发展充满期待。此访旨在体现中方对中菲关系的重视和对菲新一届政府的支持,体现中国对菲友好政策的连续性和稳定性。中方愿同菲方落实好两国元首重要共识,深化各领域务实合作,开创中菲关系下一个“黄金时代”。

Carlos said that the two peoples of the Philippines and China were were deeply attached and culturally connected to each other. China was a friendly major power. Chairman Xi Jinping had emphasized that he wanted to create a prosperous and beautiful future together with the Ascia-Pacific countries. The Philippine side is fully in favor of this and would like to broaden exchange and cooperation with the Chinese side, handle disagreements properly, promote mutual trust, improve confidence, gather goodwill and strengthen friendship.

卡洛斯说,菲中两国人民相亲、文化相通。中国是友善的大国。习近平主席强调要同亚太国家共创共享和平繁荣的美好未来,菲方完全赞同,愿同中方扩大交流合作,妥善处理分歧,促进互信、增强信心、积累善意,巩固友好。

Wang Yi said that China had never followed the traditional great powers’ road of colonialism and lootings and that it would maintain its own peaceful development, maintain cooperation and win-win, maintain shared development of opportunities with neighboring countries, join hands to build the community of human destiny2) together and take good care the global village inhabited by all of us together.

王毅说,中国从不走传统大国殖民掠夺的老路,将坚持自身和平发展,坚持合作共赢,坚持与邻国分享发展机遇,携手共建人类命运共同体,呵护好我们共同居住的地球村。

Wang Yi emphasized that China and the Philippines were neighbors neither of which could be moved away, and our choice was friendship, friendship, and friendship again. The healthy continuation and the stable development of Sino-Philippine relatoins was in accordance with the two countries’ and the two peoples’ fundamental and long-term interests. Given the current international and regional situation full of uncertainty and instability, the two sides must continue and enhance their traditional friendship, and let Sino-Philippines relations become more stable and durable, so as to keep them moving forward on the right track.

王毅强调,中菲是搬不走的邻居,我们唯一的选择就是友好、友好、再友好。中菲关系健康持续稳定发展符合两国和两国人民的根本和长远利益。面对当前充满不确定不稳定性的国际地区形势,双方要传承弘扬传统友好,使中菲关系更加稳固坚韧,始终沿着正确轨道向前发展。

Both sides believed unanimously that people-to-people exchange should be strengthened and that the two countries’ friendly public opinion and the societal foundations of the two countries’ friendship be solidified.

双方一致认为应加强人文交流,夯实两国友好的民意和社会基础。

The two sides unanimously believed that the valuable experience of the two countries should be summed up, the overall situation of Sino-Philippine friendship should be actively protected, bilateral relations should not be defined by disputes, and definite differences not be allowed to be in the way of the two countries’ cooperation.

双方一致认为应总结两国交往宝贵经验,努力维护中菲友好大局,不以争议定义双边关系,不让具体分歧阻碍两国合作。

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Notes

1) Clarita Reyes Carlos, aka Clarita Carlos
2) frequently, but not precisely, translated as a community with a shared future
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Friday, April 8, 2022

SARS-Covid Outbreak: a Meeting with Experts and Entrepreneurs

While the Shanghai lockdown (which must not be called a lockdown) continued, China’s state council held a meeting “with experts and entrepreneurs” on Thursday, to “analyse economic conditions and hear ideas and suggestions about the next steps”, Xinhua news agency reported on Friday. Li Keqiang chaired the meeting in his capacities as member of the CPC politburo standing committee and as chief state councillor.

Main Link

Also attending were people representing China Railway Materials and Qingdao AInnovation  Technology company, stating their opinions about economic operation, company situations etc., and making suggestions about safeguarding logistics and rural capital provisions, and about promoting entrepreneurial innovation.

Mentioned as participants were deputy chief state councillor Han Zheng, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences researcher Yang Zhiyong, Bank of China researcher Guan Tao, and, as party of state officials, Hu Chunhua (politburo member and deputy chief state councillor), Liu He (same functions as Hu), Wang Yong (former SASAC chairman, now a member of the state council in charge of issues faced by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Xiao Jie (member of the state council and Secretary General of the State Council), Zhao Kezhi (Party Committee Secretary of the Ministry of Public Security and heading the ministry as member of the state council), and He Lifeng (member of the state council in charge of the National Development and Reform Commission, NDRC).

Xinwen Lianbo, April 8, 2022, evening broadcast

Xinwen Lianbo, April 8, 2022, evening broadcast

You can probably imagine the importance of Zhao Kezhi’s attendance in the context of the meeting’s hardly-mentioned real topic – but it makes sense to take note of every participant mentioned in communiqués like this one by Xinhua. Their tasks may speak greater volumes than the description of the agenda.

It needs to be said that the article doesn’t exactly emphasize China’s current SARS-Covid outbreak – it is only “casually” mentioned, as one of a number of suddenly emerging factors in international and domestic environment that are confronting the economy with greater uncertainties and challenges.

The obligatory reference to Comrade Xi Jinping is made at the beginning,  although it is technically meaningless. It may, however, indicate the limits of what participants may describe or suggest during such a meeting, and also, you have to mention Xi anyway. With reference to the “sudden domestic Covid outbreak situation” (国内疫情近期多发), a need both  to keep up the faith and to face up to the difficulties is emphasized. More generally, “high-quality development” is restated, and so is a need to deepen reform and individual initiative, and “a flexibility in accepting the challenges” (应变克难). Focus is also given to stable growth, stable employment and stable prices (稳就业, 稳物价).

Li pointed out problems faced particularly by SMEs and self-employed workers & business people. Help and support them pass through the crisis is mentioned, some concrete measures too, but without detailed outlines. Concrete measures are an utmost pace by which to handle VAT rebates, and to make funds arrive at the accounts of those in need.

The primary sector is required to provide ample harvests (farming) and advanced coal production capacities (energy), and “marketization, rule of law and internationalization” are also given a mention.

The meeting ranked fourth as a news item in China’s main evening news broadcast of Xinwen Lianbo” today, after an “important speech” given by Xi Jinping at the end of the Paralympics, a reference to an editorial about the “spirit of the Beijing Olympics”, and news about a telephone conversation between Xi Jinping and the president of the Philippines.

Saturday, February 19, 2022

Wang Yi: Minsk II “the only way”

Xinhua MSC coverage, Febr 19

Xinhua MSC coverage, Febr 19

Main link: FMPRC press release, Febr 19

On February 19 in the evening, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on invitation, took part in the 58th Munich Security Conference, gave a keynote speech by video link from Beijing. He answered the conference host’s questions concerning China’s approach and position concerning NATO eastward expansion, European security and the situation in Ukraine.

2022年2月19日晚,国务委员兼外长王毅在北京应邀以视频方式出席第58届慕尼黑安全会议中国专场并发表主旨讲话。王毅现场回答了主持人有关中方对于北约东扩、欧洲安全和乌克兰局势态度立场的问题。

Wang Yi said that the Cold War has long ended. Being a result of the Cold War years, NATO should judge the hour and size up the situation and make necessary adjustments. If NATO blindly expanded eastward, will that be conducive for maintaining long-term peace and stability in Europe? This is a question our European friends should seriously reflect on.

王毅表示,冷战早已结束,北约作为当年冷战的产物,应该审时度势,作出必要调整。如果北约一味东扩,是否有利于维护欧洲的和平稳定,是否有利于实现欧洲长治久安?这是一个值得欧洲朋友认真思考的问题。

Wang Yi emphasized that all countries’sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity ought to be respected and protected as this was a fundamental standard in international relations, reflecting the United Nations Charter’s objectives. It was also a principled position that had always been upheld by China, and Ukraine was no exception. If anyone doubted China’s position on this issue, that was just a hype with ulterior motives, and a distortion of China’s position.

王毅强调,各国的主权、独立和领土完整都应当得到尊重和维护,因为这是国际关系的基本准则,体现的是联合国宪章的宗旨,也是中方一贯秉持的原则立场,对乌克兰也不例外。如果有人在此问题上质疑中方的态度,那就是别有用心的炒作,也是对中方立场的歪曲。

Wang Yi said that as a permanent Security Council member, China had always decided on its position based on the merit of the issue itself, thus handling international matters. China believed that concerning the Ukraine issue, one should get back to the Minsk II starting point. As this agreement was binding,  agreed upon by all parties after negotiations, and obtained the Security Council’s approval, it was the only way to solve the Ukraine issue. According to our understanding, both Russia and the European Union support Minsk II, and when I had a phone conversation with US Secretary of State Blinken recently, America also expressed support. As that’s the case, why can’t the parties sit down together for a full discussion, produce a roadmap and a timetable towards a workable protocol? What every party needs to do now is to earnestly assume responsibility, make efforts for peace, rather than blindly pushing up raising tensions, creating panic and make war.

王毅表示,中国作为安理会常任理事国,一贯按照事情本身的是非曲直决定自身立场,处理国际事务。中方认为,在乌克兰问题上,现在应该尽快回到新明斯克协议这一原点。因为这一协议是当事方通过谈判达成的具有约束力的协议,得到了联合国安理会的核可,是解决乌克兰问题的唯一出路。据我了解,俄罗斯、欧盟方面都支持新明斯克协议,前不久我同美国国务卿布林肯通电话时,美方也表示支持。既然如此,为什么各方不能坐在一起进行充分讨论,制定出落实协议的路线图和时间表。当前各方需要做的是,切实负起责任,为和平而努力,而不是一味推高紧张,制造恐慌,甚至渲染战争。

As for the prospects of solving the Ukraine issue, Wang Yi said that Ukraine should become a bridge, connecting East and West, rather than a frontline state in the confrontation of powers. As for European security, all sides could raise their own concerns, with Russia’s reasonable security concerns being respected and taken seriously. China expected that all sides should find a solution through dialog and consultation.

至于乌克兰问题解决前景,王毅表示,乌克兰应当成为东西方沟通的桥梁,而不应该成为大国对抗的前沿。对于欧洲安全,各方都可以提出自己的关切,其中俄方的合理安全关切应该得到尊重和重视。中方期待各方通过对话协商,找到真正有利于维护欧洲安全的解决方案。

Thursday, February 17, 2022

Deutsche Welle Russian Service: Office closed, back to the Shortwaves?


Deutsche Welle (DW) was considering a return to shortwave for its Russian language service and was checking with airtime providers, DARC Radio, a weekly program broadcast on shortwave by Germany’s main ham radio association, reported on Sunday, quoting “first-hand information”.
There appear to be no other reports that would support or confirm this, however, at least not online, and not from DW itself.

Deutsche Welle’s Moscow bureau had closed on February 4, following a ban by Russian authorities, apparently in retaliation for an earlier ban on broadcasts by Russia’s RT in Germany.

Michaela Küfner, a Deutsche Welle reporter, travelled with federal chancellor Scholz’ delegation to Moscow on Tuesday and asked the first question at the Putin-Scholz press conference that followed the talks between the two leaders. The closing-down of DW’s Moscow bureau was also discussed in the Putin-Scholz meeting of several hours.

The German chancellor’s visit was formally considered an inaugural visit, but probably mainly served collective Western efforts to deal with the ongoing Russia-Ukraine and Russia-NATO tensions.

deutsche_welle_qsl_schwerin_motiv

From Nordstream Country with love: a DW QSL card featuring the Cathedral of Schwerin, capital of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Tuesday, January 4, 2022

Xi Jinping’s “Inspiring New Year Address” in the Tibetan Media

The following is a translation of a Chinese-language piece by “Tibet Daily”, the CPC’s party organ published in Tibet. It was also broadcast by PBS Tibet, even as late as on January 3.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

The 2019 enthusiasm routine (Google search result)

The 2019 enthusiasm routine (Google search result)

Keep in mind what the leadership entrusted you with. Put into practice the originally intended mission. — Chairman Xi Jinping’s new year’s message evokes wide-spread strong reactions among cadres and masses

牢记领袖嘱托 践行初心使命——习近平主席新年贺词在西藏广大干部群众中引发强烈反响

Published on Jan 2, 2022, 09:50:57. Source: Tibet Daily. Authors: Zhang Meng/Shi Jinru/Zhou Tingting

发布时间:2022-01-02 09:50:57来源:西藏日报 作者:张猛 史金茹 周婷婷

“What we experiencing in these flying times is an indomitable and prospering China. You find people here who inspire affection and respect, every day sees new development, and a cause passed on through the generations.” Once Chairman Xi Jinping’s new year’s eve greeting had been published on New Year’s Eve, it immediately evoked enthusiastic reactions among the broad cadreship and the masses. Everyone, one after another, said that Chairman Xi Jinping’s speech had been heartwarming and activating. In the new year, they will unite even more closely around the Party’s Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, keep in mind what the leadership entrusted them with, put into practice the originally intended mission, struggle for the construction of a united, well-off, civilized, harmonious and beautiful socialist and modern Tibet, so as to welcome the victorious 20th CPC National Congress with exceptional achievements.

“在飞逝的时光里,我们看到的、感悟到的中国,是一个坚韧不拔、欣欣向荣的中国。这里有可亲可敬的人民,有日新月异的发展,有赓续传承的事业。”新年前夕,习近平主席的新年贺词一经发表,立即在我区广大干部群众中引发热烈反响。大家纷纷表示,习近平主席的话语温暖人心、催人奋进。在新的一年里将更加紧密地团结在以习近平同志为核心的党中央周围,牢记领袖嘱托、践行初心使命,为建设团结富裕文明和谐美丽的社会主义现代化新西藏而努力奋斗,以优异成绩迎接党的二十大胜利召开。

“2021 was a special year, with the 100th anniversary of the CPC’s foundation. It was also the second year for me as a teacher.” After graduating from Shaanxi Normal University, “post-95er”1 Huang Jiapei came to Linzhi City 2nd Primary School as a music teacher. He says: “Xi Jinping mentioned that we must not forget the originally intended mission, so that it will carry us through2. We can only succeed with an energetic mind and vigoroous action, by being sincere and conscientious. That’s the only way for us not to betray history, not to betray the era, and not to betray the people. As an educational worker who is both someone who “pursues his dream” and someone who pursues his dream by helping children, I deeply feel the responsibility I’ve taken. In the future, I will work with an energetic mind and vigorous action, sincerely and conscientiously, continuously improve myself, be dedicated and devoted to my work, to be someone who contributes to a beautiful and happy Linzhi and who educates ever more outstanding heirs of socialism.”

“2021年是特殊的一年,是中国共产党成立100周年,也是我正式成为一名老师的第二个年头。”从陕西师范大学毕业就来到林芝市第二小学担任音乐老师的“95后”黄嘉佩说,“习近平主席在新年贺词中提到,不忘初心,方得始终。我们唯有踔厉奋发、笃行不怠,方能不负历史、不负时代、不负人民。作为一名教育工作者,我既是一名‘追梦人’,也是助力孩子们追梦的人,深感肩负重任。未来,我将踔厉奋发、笃行不怠,不断提升自己,敬业奉献,为建设美丽幸福林芝贡献力量,努力培养更多优秀的社会主义接班人。”

“Chairman Xi Jinping said in his New Year’s Eve greeting that comprehensive moderate prosperity and casting off poverty is what the party owes the people. It is also a contribution to the world. To let everyone lead a better life, we can’t be satisfied with the successes we see so far. We still have a long road to go.” Huang Jiabin, first secretary at the Linzhi City rural task force at Beibeng Township‘s Gelin Village says: “To keep up ambition and wisdom is vital to prevent large-scale relapse into poverty. We will combine our advantages in a solid and practical way and do our utmost to help Gelin Village’s development.”

“习近平主席在新年贺词中提到,全面小康、摆脱贫困是我们党给人民的交代,也是对世界的贡献。让大家过上更好生活,我们不能满足于眼前的成绩,还有很长的路要走。”林芝市公安局驻墨脱县背崩乡格林村第一书记、驻村工作队队长黄家斌表示,“扶志扶智是防止规模性返贫及助力乡村振兴的关键因素,接下来他将结合自身优势,扎扎实实、尽心尽力为格林村发展添砖加瓦。”

“Chairman Xi Jinping’s New Year’s Eve message is full of power, inspiring the will of the people, and strengthening our confidence and determination to go forward.” Zhao Wei of a science popularization unit with Tibet Autonomous Region Science and Technology Association says: “During the past year, we have operated mobile science and technology shops in Shigatse, Naqu, Lhasa, Shannan and in other places. The science and technology truck gives basic rural farmers and shephard masses as well as young people an opportunity to experience the fascination of science in a nearby place, providing them with scientific knowledge to help citizens to improve their scientific qualities. Although some villages and townships are far above sea-level and have an adverse climate, we feel that it’s worth our efforts and our hard work when we see the curiousity and happiness in the faces of the masses and the children as they experience the basics of science. We are reviewing the past year and we are looking to the future. In the new year, we will take root in Tibet even more firmly, we won’t betray the era’s determination, we will dauntlessly advance, bravely climb the summits and constantly make new contributions to science and technology popularization in the new era’s Tibet.”

“习近平主席的新年贺词充满力量,激荡人心,坚定了我们砥砺前行的信心与决心。”西藏自治区科学技术协会科普工作队赵伟说,“过去一年,我们在日喀则、那曲、拉萨、山南等地开展流动科技馆、科普大篷车巡展工作,为基层农牧民群众和青少年送去近距离体验科学魅力的机会,为他们送去科学知识,助力公民科学素质提升。虽然有些乡镇海拔高、气候恶劣,可是,每当看到群众和孩子们充满好奇的眼神,以及动手体验科学原理时脸上洋溢着快乐的表情时,就觉得所有的艰苦与付出都是值得的。回顾过去,展望未来。新的一年里,我将更加坚定扎根西藏、不负时代的决心,奋勇向前,勇攀高峰,不断为新时代西藏科普工作作出新的贡献。”

“As we entered the new year, Chairman Xi Jinping’s New Year’s Eve address was most heartwarming. I felt even more inspired after listening to it. Here at Dekang Community, the residents also experienced a boost in their morale, being delighted and excited.” Song Yahang, resident work team member in Dekang Community, Lhorong County in Chamdo City, says: “In a blink of an eye, almost an entire year’s stay in Dekang Community passed by for me. Time and again I have experienced the vivid struggle of the residents by the things I have seen and heard as they were unearthed. I think they are models for the whole Dekang Community. It takes exactly hard-working construction workers like them to make Dekang Community’s future even better.” Song Yahang says that in the next step, it is planned to actively carry out activities to promote investment in the community, to let residents and business people filled with ideas, with the ability and willingness to work, take along those who want to help, to work hard to create a brand-new Dekang Community.

“跨年夜,习近平主席的新年贺词最暖心,聆听之后倍感振奋。我们德康社区居民也备受鼓舞,欢喜雀跃。”昌都市洛隆县德康社区驻村工作队队员宋亚航说,“一转眼,我到德康社区驻村将近一年,我一次次把自己所看到的、听到的、经历过的一个个鲜活的居民奋斗史挖掘出来,我觉得他们是整个德康社区的榜样。正是有了像他们这样勤奋努力的建设者,德康社区的未来和明天才会更加美好。”宋亚航表示,下一步,打算通过优惠的政策积极开展招商引资活动,让真正有想法、能干事、想干事的居民和商人引进社区,实现一人带动一帮人,以点带面的发展模式,为营造一个崭新的德康社区而努力奋斗。

Editor in charge: Li Xia

责任编辑:李霞


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Notes

1 born after 1995
2 While the CPC has put a comprehensive claim on being “the faithful inheritor and advocate of the outstanding traditional Chinese culture” rather recently, traditional sayings have always been part of CPC speech, though probably with varying emphasis through the decades. 不忘初心,方得始终 originally refers to Buddhism – the idea that the original intention is inseparable from the final fruit if the practice continues obliviously (according to “People’s Daily”, anyway).

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