Posts tagged ‘Europe’

Wednesday, September 6, 2017

Huanqiu Shibao Editorial: No Need for Lessons from London, re North Korea

British prime minister Theresa May gave Japan’s NHK television an interview on Friday.  NHK doesn’t appear to share its interviews on youtube (one with then U.S. president Barack Obama wasn’t available either, last year), but this video provides some excerpts:

Update, Sept 27, 2017:
The video appears to have been removed.
Soundtrack may be available on request.

The interview provoked “Global Times” articles that did their best to come across as condescending, both towards Britain and Japan. The “Global Times'” Chinese-language sister paper, Huanqiu Shibao, also criticized May’s interview, as follows.

Main Link: Editorial – No Need for Lessons from London, concerning North Korea
社评:北京不需要伦敦教如何对待朝鲜

British prime minister Theresa May set a firecracker on her way to Japan. Apart from criticizing North Korea, she also said, “Chinese pressure to block its illegal behavior plays a very important role.” She said, “we want to encourage China to do its utmost to exert pressure on North Korea”, this would be “the best way” to influence North Korea.”

英国首相特雷莎·梅在前往日本访问的途中就朝核问题放了一炮,除了批评朝鲜,她还说,“中国在对朝鲜施加压力阻止其非法行为这方面起着非常关键的作用。”她表示,“我们要激励中国尽其所能向朝鲜施压”,这是影响平壤的“最佳方式”。

Prime minister May probably doesn’t know much about the Korean peninsula. Her way of expressing her views sounded pretty much like rehashing the old lessons learned in Washington. Washington’s strategy to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue is slanted, the antagonism between the U.S. and North Korea keeps rising, and Washington just tries to push  the responsibility for the impasse to China, proclaiming that China had the ability to “control” North Korea. may is the first leader of a major European country to openly go along with this kind of preposterous reasoning.

梅首相大概对朝鲜半岛事务了解不多,她的此番言论听上去很像是对华盛顿说辞的复读和学舌。美国解决朝核问题的策略偏了,美朝对立不断升级,华盛顿就把突破僵局的责任推给中国,宣扬中国有能力“管住”朝鲜。梅首相如今成了欧洲大国中第一个公开附和这种歪理的领导人。

When Britain mentioned China recently, there was some blame game as well. The British foreign and defense secretaries suddenly said that Britain’s recently constructed aircraft carrier would go to the South China Sea to pledge “freedom of navigation”. London’s sudden enthusiasm for getting involved in East Asian affairs mystified the Chinese people.

英国这一段时间谈及中国时一直有些怪怪的,不久前英国外交大臣和国防大臣突然表示,英国新建造的航母将会赴南海宣示“航行自由”,伦敦这种对东亚事务突如其来的介入热情令中国人颇感莫名其妙。

As British power has withdrawn from East Asia long ago, it is without its bases here now, and there isn’t any of its military left. If the British government really wants to protect  its trade and investment interests in this region, it should choose its words carefully, and proceed carefully, respect the regional countries own ability and wisdom to create peace, rather than to point fingers and speaking irrelevant words.

大不列颠的力量早就退出了东亚,这里如今既没有它的基地,也不剩它的一兵一卒,如果英国现政府真想维护它在这个地区的商业和投资利益,就应当谨言慎行,尊重地区国家缔造自身和平的智慧和能力,而不是指指点点,说些不着边际的话。

The May government shouts out a slogan about “Global Britain”, apparently harboring aspirations to restore Britain’s worldwide influence. But is its way of exerting influence about “crashing cars to commit insurance fraud”? The previous British government said that Sino-British relations were entering a “golden age”. Prime minister May and her colleagues are now constantly using needling language towards China. Are they reversing Sino-British relations by 180 degrees? One has to say that testimony from the May government helps to brush off British attention.*)

梅政府喊出“全球英国”的口号,似乎心怀在世界范围内恢复英国影响之志。然而英国发挥影响的方式就是要与中国这样的大国“碰瓷”吗?上一届英国政府称中英关系进入“黄金时代”,梅首相和她的同僚如今不断发表对华绵里藏针的话,他们是要对中英关系做180度的反转吗?不能不说,梅政府高官们的舌头已经在帮英国刷注意力了。

Both the South China Sea issue and the North Korean nuclear issue are highly sensitive and complicated. If the May team’s talk becomes faster than their brains, there will be more funny shows to be watched.

南海问题和朝核问题都高度敏感复杂,如果梅团队的舌头转得比脑子还快,那就真会有越来越多的好戏看了。

Along with the increasingly provocative situation on the peninsula, the impact of North Korea’s development of nulear missiles does actually grow greater, and participation from outside ought to contribute to the easing of the situation, and to solving the problems – a role some of the currently involved countries appear to have difficulty in playing. This kind of futile dawdling on a hot spot partisanship will only aggravate the deadlocked situation.

随着半岛局势激化,朝鲜发展核导所产生的影响的确越来越大,外界的参与应当有助于缓和局势,解决问题,起目前一些当事国难以发挥的作用。那种蹭热点、站队帮腔的卷入只会加剧局势的僵持。

China is a neighboring country of North Korea, and Beijing has every reason to firmly oppose North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and its development of missiles. Beijing didn’t only join the sanctions against North Korea, but is the main bearer of these sanctions. To demand that China assume the bigger part of the remaining responsibilities Washington’s and its north-east Asian allies’ selfish manifestation, and when prime minister May joins them on that selfish platform, it is reckless and of no benefit.

中国是朝鲜的邻国,北京没有任何理由不坚决反对朝鲜拥核和发展导弹。北京不仅加入了对朝制裁,而且是这一制裁的主要承担者。要求中国承担起余下的绝大部分责任,是华盛顿和其东北亚盟友自私的表现,梅首相为它们的自私站台,是轻率而无益的。

The real difficulty in the current situation lies in the absence of effective communication. America and North Korea fiiercely fight each other with every word they say, piling up explosives. If London really wants to make a bit of a contribution, it should take a constructive approach that helps to removes blockages, rather than making window speeches. Prime minister May’s current position may not even get president Trump’s attention, because she doesn’t provide any practical problem-solving ability. Contrary to what one may expect, Tokyo may find her words pleasing, but Tokyo, weary of deadlock with Beijing, may be delighted by any mockery about China.

局势的真正困难在于形成不了有效沟通,美朝各说各话,相互斗狠,堆积起越来越多的爆炸性。伦敦如果真想给东亚和平做点贡献,它就应为打通相互对立的立场有创造性、别开生面的表现。梅首相这样表态,大概连特朗普总统都未必瞧得上,因为她没有提供任何实际解决力。倒是东京可能听着顺耳,但东京是因为与北京僵持得有些累,谁揶揄中国一句,它都会兴高采烈。

As the Conservative Party has lost many seats, May has become a weak prime minister. When people are weak, they often look for opportunities to show their “strength”. One would hope that what the May government is now shoging isn’t this kind of “cliché”.

梅所在的保守党丢了很多议席,她成了一个弱势首相。人在弱势时,往往愿意找机会显示一下自己的“强势”,希望梅政府所展现的并非这种“俗套”。

The May government is constantly “skirting the line” around China, and postures unduly about hong Kong, but all this won’t turn into real strength. Spittled statements don’t make Britain strong. Britain needs real economic growth, but Britain is moving further and further away from China, one of the most important economic partners.

梅政府不断围绕着中国打“擦边球”,它在香港问题上尤其比前任政府更爱端不该端的架势,但是这一切换不来英国的真正强大。英国的强大不是声明纸沾着唾沫就能糊出来的,英国需要真正的经济增长,而梅政府正在一步步远离中国这个最重要的经济伙伴之一。

Notes

*) Not sure about my transation of this line — JR

____________

When May’s predecessor at 10 Downing Street declared a “golden age” in Britain’s relations with China, a German sinologist, Sebastian Heilmann, was quoted as saying that London had assumed the leading role in relations with China. And an article by German newsagency dpa worried that Xi, during his 2015 visit to the United Kingdomwas probably happy to see the human-rights topic basically dropped under the table in London, and the Europeans being split.

Now, Huanqiu Shibao appears to worry that there could be a 180-degree reversal (see blockquotes above) in London’s China policy.

But suggesting that China could do more, concerning North Korea, can hardly be read as a a turnaround in Britain’s China policy – even if no other European leader has chimed in with this criticism. Only Chinese hypersensitivities can consider a American-British commonality of this kind lèse-majesté. Huanqiu Shibao’s reaction may, however, show that Beijing can easily be needled these days, once North Korea is the issue.

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Monday, August 21, 2017

In the News & Blogs (Aug 1 – 21): Beijing’s Little Helpers abroad

“China Quarterly” cooperates with China censors / Taiwan hosts 2017 Summer Universiade / Kim spoils Fun for Chinese Guam Visitors / Red-noticed police / The First “Five Marvellous Years” / Want to be Chinese?

Doing Beijing’s Dirty Work (1): Academic Institutions

Update: Cambridge University Press restores articles, Washington Post, Aug 21, 2017

China Quarterly apparently cooperates with Beijing by blocking access to articles and e-books on their website.

Can we expect them to do better? I have my doubts. Their topic is China – and if they don’t cooperate, others will, and might replace the renowned magazine. That’s no excuse, of course, and they could still display character rather than opportunism, but one has to admit that they are facing a tough choice. If they decided otherwise, there would be no academic solidarity – alternative opportunists would chum up to Beijing.

What is therefore needed is a political answer. British legislators will need to make censorship cooperation of this kind illegal, and legislators in other free societies will need to do likewise.

You can’t do Beijing’s dirty work yourself, and remain democratic, liberal, or free.

The public needs to push a political decision. People who care about human rights (those of others, and of their own), should consider to join or support relevant pressure groups, rather than political parties.

If Chinese readers can be blocked from servers in free countries, there is no good reason why we, people who live in (still) relatively free societies, should keep access to them, when Beijing demands otherwise.

This scenario may appear far-fetched now – but what happens at Cambridge now would have been unfathomable two or three decades ago, too.

Besides, no man or woman in a free country should vote for political parties who are prepared to tolerate this kind of practice. Totalitarian challenges must be met with political answers.

Taiwan’s Twelve Days of International Fame

The 2017 Summer Universiade started in Taipei, on Saturday.

Chinese Holidaymakers: Kim spoils the Fun

Huanqiu Shibao (the Global Times‘ Chinese-language sister paper) worried about unwelcome side effects of the US-North Korean war of words during the first half of the month: More than 26,000 Chinese tourists had travelled to Guam in 2016, the paper noted in an article published online on August 11 – an increase by 11 percent compared to 2015. Huanqiu numbers reportedly provided by the Guam Visitors Bureau‘s China Representative Room, an organization that runs offices in mainland China and in Hong Kong.

Guam is an island in the western Pacific. It is U.S. territory, reportedly within reach of North Korean missiles (provided that the missiles are lucky), it hosts a naval base, an air base, a religious shortwave broadcasting station, and thousands of tourists annually.

The Huanqiu Shibao article also quotes from “Sina Weibo” exchanges between Chinese netizens and the Guam Visitors Bureau, where Bureau staff reportedly posted reassuring replies to questions like “will you soon be hit by missiles?”

Probably given the incomplete state of North Korea’s striking force (God knows where the missiles would actually go if the army tried to fire them into Guam’s adjacent waters), or Donald Trump‘s notoriety as a bigmouth with little consistency, no travel warning appears to have been issued by Chinese authorities. According to the BY article, the China Youth Travel Agency told reporters that

the company hadn’t received a political-risks warning notice to suspend departures to Guam until then, and reminded journalists to monitor the China National Tourism Administration’s travel risk reminders.

….. 公司还没有接到因政治风险暂停前往关岛的旅游团的通知,他提醒记者应及时关注国家旅游局的旅游风险提示。

According to statistics quoted by the article, most tourists visiting Guam are from Japan and South Korea, with rapidly rising numbers from mainland China.

Doing Beijing’s Dirty Work (2): Red-noticed Police

The arrest of a German citizen of Turkish origin, Dogan Akhanli, made it into German news during the weekend. According to GfbV, a German organization that keeps track of cases where authoritarian regimes use Interpol to harrass critics abroad, Akhanli was arrested by Spanish police in the city of Granada. Reportedly, Turkey had requested Interpol  to issue a read notice to Spain. The dust appears to settle now, and Akhanli is free again, but the organization calls for reforming Interpol and to make sure that it doesn’t become (or remain) a tool for silencing regime critics abroad.

In the same press release, GfbV notes that Dolkun Isa, secretary general of the World Uyghur Congress, had been arrested in Rome, on July 26 this year. Isa was on his way into the Italian senate when he was arrested. According to GfbV, Chinese authorities are now using Interpol’s “red notice” mechanism systematically, to restrict movement of the regime’s critics abroad, and thus creating a de-facto occupational ban against them (Chinas Behörden nutzen die „Red Notice“ inzwischen systematisch, um die Bewegungsfreiheit von im Ausland lebenden Menschenrechtlern einzuschränken und de facto ein Berufsverbot gegen sie zu verhängen).

It certainly wasn’t the first time that Isa had been arrested. In 2009, South Korea arrested him, apparently on arrival at the airport, and refused him entry into the country. Previously, he had been arrested by the UN security service when visiting the Human Rights Commission in Geneva.

The First Five “Marvellous Years”

China’s state television (CCTV) website reminds the public of CCP secretary general Xi Jinping‘s feats during his first five marvellous years (不平凡五年) in office. On August 14, the media organization published statistics of Xi’s speeches on foreign policy.

So: Want to be Chinese?

Given that under the secretary general’s correct leadership, China is becoming the marvel of the world (an unscientific condensed international press review by JR with no further sources), it should be no surprise that Daniel Bell wants better international access to Chinese citizenship, for meritorious citizens of the world who would like to share in that glory.

Ji Xiang posted some thoughts on that, early this month.

Thursday, August 3, 2017

Sino-Belarusian Cooperation: Many warm encouraging words

Links within blockquotes added during translation – JR

Deputy Head of the Belarus President Administration Nikolai Snopkov called on the Chinese business to adopt a more active position on the matter of establishment of joint ventures in Belarus during the negotiations with a Chinese delegation led by Xiao Yaqing, Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission at China’s State Council on 1 August,

the Belarusian Telegraph Agency reported on Tuesday. If you go by the way the newsagency quoted Snopkov, he struck a self-assured tone:

I believe that the corporations attending the current meeting that are discussing projects with Belarus will take an active position on the matter of setting up joint ventures in Belarus. We have heard many warm encouraging words from Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko. I think this will give an impetus to the effort to implement the most effective projects in the shortest possible time.

The Belarusian administrator also referred to the platform for his country’s cooperation with China, the Belarus-China industrial park Great Stone (aka China-Belarus Industrial Park).

A leaflet from the industrial park’s administration explains Belarus’ relevance for the Chinese “One-belt-one-Road Initiative” as seen from Minsk:

The Republic of Belarus borders with the European Union and Russia, and is a trade corridor between the Europe Union and the EAEU.

Snopkov also mentioned the role of “powerful effective competitive state-run corporations”. Minsk and Beijing appear to agree that state-owned enterprises should continue to play an important role in their economies. In its July-22 edition, the Economist noted*) that

Strengthening the SOEs is consistent with Mr Xi’s belief in tighter state control of just about every aspect of society. A regulatory clampdown on bank lending to big companies, for example, is a way not just to clean up shadowy fnancial practices but to influence how private firms spend their cash.

Belarus’ president Alexander Lukashenko, himself a leading expert for everything from nookies for the motherland and delivery times to potatos and military technology, would hardly disagree.

____________

Note

*) Much, but not all of the “Economist” article can be found in this English lesson on the Sohu platform.

____________

Related

Gratuitous military assistance, BelTa, June 21, 2017

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Saturday, July 29, 2017

Zis is like Zed

So much to write about.

 

Monday, March 27, 2017

Populism in China (1): The Downfall of Bo Xilai

There is no Weltinnenpolitik yet, but there are cross-civilizational trends.

The City of Red Songs

There would be no second chance. Gerhard Schröder, former chancellor of Germany, was in a hurry in June 2011, on the sidelines of a forum in southwestern China’s metropolis of Chongqing. He was therefore lacking the time to attend one of the red-song nights that were customary there. But he still pleased his interlocutors with a German proverb: Where people sing, you can settle down – wicked people sing no songs.

In full, the red-songs custom advocated by Chongqing’s party chief Bo Xilai was Singing revolutionary songs, Reading classic books, telling stories and spreading mottos. There would be nine more months of that before Bo Xilai was toppled by his CCP comrades.

A Hudong article explained the activity at the time. It was a mass concept, started in Chongqing in 2008, which was greeted with enthusiasm there, and elsewhere in China. The concept wasn’t outdated, because

if a country and a nation have no correct thought and advanced culture, it will lose its backbone. The current deep changes of the economic system, the structure of society, and the profound adjustment of interest patterns must be reflected in the ideological field. There is diversity in peoples’ minds, and although the mainstream is positive and healthy, while some peoples’ material life conditions have improved, spiritual life is somewhat empty. To change that condition, and to ensure a safe passing of the torch in the cause of the party and the country, the red flag must be righteously upheld, the ideology of Marxism must be consolidated in its guiding position within the ideological field, and the attractiveness and the cohesive power of socialist ideology must be strengthened.

一个国家和民族没有正确的思想、先进的文化,就会失掉主心骨。当前,经济体制深刻变革、社会结构深刻变动、利益格局深刻调整,必然反映到意识形态领域。人们的思想日趋多元多变多样,虽然主流积极健康向上,但一些人物质生活改善了,精神生活却有些空虚。为了彻底改变这种状况,保证党和国家的事业薪火相传,必须理直气壮地举红旗,不断巩固马克思主义在意识形态领域的指导地位,增强社会主义意识形态的吸引力和凝聚力。[Links within these lines omitted.]

According to the HuDong article, CCP politbureau member and Chongqing party secretary Bo Xilai (薄熙来) had deplored the phenomenon of young people who sang decadent songs (唱 .. 靡靡之音, chàng mímí zhī yīn), who were reading “fast-food” kinds of literature (读 .. 快餐文化, dú kuàicān wénhuà), told “low and vulgar stories” (讲 .. 低俗故事, jiǎng dīsú gùshì), and “spread pornographic or dull scripts/pieces” (传 .. 黄段子、灰段子, chuán huáng duànzi, huī duànzi).

So, apparently, there were dirty songs, too. Maybe things weren’t as simple as Schröder had believed. At least one  reader and forum commenter of China’s Huanqiu Shibao didn’t trust Schröder’s expertise and wrote:

OK, listen [to the red songs], you won’t comprehend them anyway. It will be as if you were listening to folk songs.

听吧,反正听不懂,就当听民歌了

The “Chongqing Model” was controversial, at least in the perceivable medial public of China. The party elite wasn’t entirely in love with Bo’s pretentious neo-Maoism. A vice president of Law School at China University of Political Science and Law was quoted by the English-language party mouthpiece “Global Times”:

There have been 104,000 “Red Song Concerts” in Chongqing, with 80 million participants. It cost 1,500 yuan ($231) per person for onsite renting and costume expenses, 210 million yuan in total. Adding in the offwork compensation and transportation the final cost is 270 billion [sic – probably means million – JR] yuan. Why don’t they use the money for health insurance?

Bo Xilai’s “Populism”, 2007 – 2012

At the grassroots, however, Bo’s leadership style appears to have worked (maybe it still does). The Chongqing Model wasn’t just about folklore, red or otherwise.

Chongqing (Sichuan province) residents set off firecrackers today, celebrating the execution of the provincial-level city’s former chief justice Wen Qiang (文强), cqnews.net reported in July 2010. The Wall Street Journal explained:

Wen Qiang was put to death following the rejection in May by China’s Supreme Court of an appeal of his conviction on charges including bribery, shielding criminal gangs, rape and inability to account for millions of dollars in cash and assets, according to Xinhua news agency. Xinhua didn’t say how Mr. Wen was executed.

Punching black crime and uprooting vice (拳打黑除恶) was the name of the campaign that cost Wen his life – according to the historical records as Bo would have it, he and his police chief Wang Lijun not only battled against gangs, but infiltrated cadres, too.

The now defunct website Chinageeks published an English translation of Zhang Wen, a former chief editor of the Xinhua magazine Globe:

Bo Xilai and the “northeast tiger” Wang Lijun entered Chongqing and started a war and began a “battling corruption and evil” movement that has gradually begun to spread nationwide and worldwide. This action is in line with the people’s wishes, and at the same time, also in line with what central authorities wish.

At first, the public opinion was very one-sided; no one could find any fault with Bo. The controversy and difference of opinions came with the case of Li Zhuang. Proponents of the democratic rule of law questioned and criticized the legality of Chongqing [court] proceedings, but Bo Xilai’s supporters hold that punishing lawyers who defend “bad people” is appropriate.

Bo Xilai’s wife Gu Kailai is a high-level lawyer who has been working for many years. The two have been together for many years and Bo himself was once the head of the Ministry of Commerce, and thus often negotiated international legal issues with foreign opponents. Because of this, Bo Xilai should have a solid conception and knowledge of the law.

But in the end, in the Li Zhuang case, the organs of justice in Chongqing left a bad impression that they might violate legal procedures. Precisely because of this, some people’s opinions on Bo Xilai changed dramatically. I myself once wrote an essay expressing pity that Bo Xilai hadn’t turned out to be the sort of high-quality modern politician [we had hoped].

Chongqing was a small pond for a big fish – Bo Xilai appeared to have hoped for a permanent seat in the CCP’s central politburo, but landed the job as party secretary of Chongqing instead. Chongqing wasn’t an insignificant city, but it was far from where central Chinese power was. Only an alernate politburo membership linked him to Beijing. From 2008, his Maoist song events raised nationwide attention, and even beyond China – Henry Kissinger apparently leapt at the chance Schröder had missed.

In 2011, Bo Xilai started his second campaign for a permanent seat at the CCP’s top table. While the Economist found Bo’s style refreshing, it noted nervously that

The region’s party chief, Bo Xilai, is campaigning for a place on the Politburo Standing Committee in next year’s leadership shuffle. He looks likely to succeed. Like every other Chinese politician since 1949, he avoids stating his ambitions openly, but his courting of the media and his attempts to woo the public leave no one in any doubt. Mr Bo’s upfront style is a radical departure from the backroom politicking that has long been the hallmark of Communist rule and would seem like a refreshing change, were it not that some  of his supporters see him as the Vladimir Putin of China. Mr Bo is a populist with an iron fist. He has waged the biggest crackdown on mafia-style gangs in his country in recent years. He has also been trying to foster a mini-cult of Mao, perhaps in an effort to appeal to those who are disillusioned with China’s cut-throat capitalism.

Bo didn’t appear to aim for the top job as secretary general, the Economist noted, as that position appeared to have been reserved for Xi Jinping. Indeed, Xi succeeded Hu Jintao as party secretary general in autumn 2012, and as state chairman in March 2013.

Bo Xilai’s plans didn’t work that smoothly. In November 2011, a British citizen, Neil Heywood, died in a hotel in Chongqing. Given that Chinese courts don’t work independently from the party, the circumstances of his death can’t be considered resolved. A Chinese court found Gu Kailai, Bo Xilai’s wife, guilty of killing Heywood, and after only one day in court, she got a suspended death sentence.

The BBC‘s China editor Carrie Gracie tried to shed light on the circumstances of Bo Xilai’s rise and fall, and the role Heywood’s death played in the latter, but didn’t find too many interlocutors. Instead, she presented a Rocky Horror Picture Show of elite power struggles with Chinese characteristics. Bo Xilai as the avenger of the common man, a crashing, media-savvy scourge of organized crime, who addressed the public directly, without party media filtering. That hadn’t happened since Mao’s days – “think Donald Trump”.

With support from local police chief Wang Lijun, who fancied leading roles in martial-arts television, too, Bo had exercised a regime that labeled opponents as mafiosi and not only jailed them, but expropriated them too, in favor of Chongqing’s budgets.

It isn’t contested that Bo Xilai and Wang Lijun prosecuted the real or supposed gangsters’ advocates, too, with questionable means. Gracie quotes one of these advocates, Li Zhuang (see above, Zhang Wen’s criticism of Bo Xilai), as Li describes how he was arrested by Wang Lijun personally:

The scene was so over-the-top, loads of police cars surrounding the plane, riot police in helmets and camouflage, armed with submachine guns. I asked, “Why the big show? Is it Obama’s state visit or are you capturing Osama Bin Laden?”

We were surrounded by a huge scrum of reporters. He wanted to show his authority on camera. He was in a trench coat, hands in his pockets. He said: “Li Zhuang, we meet again.”

There were admirers of Bo and Wang, there were critics and enemies, and there were people who detested the two. But at the grassroots, the fans appeared to be numerous. According to Gracie, there are still many.

Making inconvenient lawyers disappear was no unique feature of Bo Xilai, however. The party leadership with Xi Jinping at the core has been proving for years that to them, the rule of law is a theroretical nicety they may or may not care about.

Gracie reduces the causes of conflict between the noisy polit-soloist Bo Xilai and the basically “collectivist” leadership in Beijing on a personal rivalry between princeling Bo and princeling Xi.

Certainly, top politicians’ egos can hardly be overestimated, and when they are Chinese, ostentatious modesty shouldn’t fool anyone.

But Xi alone wouldn’t have gotten Bo under control. Neither with the sudden Neil-Heywood scandal – that became known as the Wang-Lijun incident in China after the police chief fled into the next US consulate and being passed on to the central authorities from there (but only after having spilled the beans). Nor otherwise.

The question suggests itself if Bo Xilai’s career wasn’t finished in summer 2011 anyway, given wide-spread disapproval among the party elite, of his egotistic leadership style in Chongqing.

“Unity is strength” was one of the “red songs” Bo Xilai had them sing in Chongqing (above: October 8, 2009). But it wasn’t only the Xi faction that saw a lack of just that on Bo’s part. Bo was putting himself forward, and that had been a taboo during all the post-Mao years.

He didn’t denigrate his leading comrades – appearances like that of Donald Trump as a campaigner, cursing fellow members of his political class, would have been inconceivable. But putting himself into the limelight (and casting it away from others) amounted to the same thing, by Chinese standards. Besides, given his anti-corruption renown, sanctimonious as it may have been, could have threatened his “comrades”. A tribun within their ranks – that couldn’t work.

Xi Jinping and his predecessor Hu Jintao are said to be rivals. But within the Hu camp, Bo’s populism didn’t seem to resonate either. On the contrary: Wen Jiabao, chief state councillor (aka “prime minister”) during the Hu Jintao era, had been a tireless, even if unsuccessful, advocate of political reform, way beyond economics or technology.

At a press conference in March 2012, after the closing ceremony of the annual “parliament” plenary sessions, Wen warned that China wasn’t immune against another cultural revolution. That John Garnaut, an Australian correspondent in Beijing, got the opportunity to talk with Hu Dehua, one of Hu Yaobang’s sons, may also count as an indication that the comparatively liberal factions in the party leadership were at least as sick of Bo Xilai’s revolutionary operas, as were the Xi supporters.

Garnaut, two weeks after Wen’s press conference, in an indirect account of his conversation with Hu Dehua*):

Hu Dehua told his father how pessimistic he felt about his country’s future. Hu Yaobang agreed that the methods and ideologies of the 1987 anti-liberalization movement came straight from the Cultural Revolution. But he told his son to gain some historical perspective, and reminded him that Chinese people were not joining in the elite power games as they had 20 years before. He called the anti-liberalization campaign a “medium-sized cultural revolution” and warned that a small cultural revolution would no doubt follow, Hu Dehua told me. As society developed, Hu Yaobang told his son, the middle and little cultural revolutions would gradually fade from history’s stage.

From there, everything went fast. Still in March, Bo was dismissed as Chongqing’s party chief. He also lost his alternate membership in the politburo. In summer 2012, his wife Gu Kailai got her commuted death sentence, and in September 2013, Bo was sentenced to life in prison – based on the usual charges for unrigged politicians: corruption.

Is there a Chongqing Heritage?

At first glance, Bo Xilai’s “populism” or “Maoism” is finished. But Bo counted as a champion of many Chinese from the political left. A comment in German weekly Die Zeit, in September 2013, saw the verdict against Bo as a signal from the top that resistance against economic reform was futile.

To assess Bo Xilai’s political heritage objectively. The CCP may be beyond the era when beaten opponents were airbrushed from all photos and records. But the question about how publicly or privately-owned China’s economy should be might impose itself with any questions about Bo Xilai, and the now seven-member standing committee of the politburo can’t use such questions.

A political scientist of Beijing University, He Weifang (贺卫方), hinted at problems in assessing the Chongqing Model’s performance, from 2007 to 2012:

It is generally believed that the so-called “Chongqing Model” is mainly shaped by three aspects: “red culture” on the political level, “targeted actions against dark and evil forces in Chongqing“, and the reduction of the income gaps between the poor and the rich. The most criticized aspects are the former two, although there is support for the two of them in Chongqing and elsewhere. The third aspect isn’t that controversial. However, all data published concerning the efficiency of the measures taken to narrow the income gap are actually issued by the Chongqing authorities, and therefore lacking neutral assessment. Also, we can see that the whole process is strongly government-led, whose focus isn’t on creating a market logic of equal opportunities. If this approach will or will not lead to mistakes in financial policies, including the rural land policies‘ impartiality, is also questionable. And then there are concerns about life today being lead on future earnings, short-term inputs being made to curry favor with the public, which may come at high future costs.

答:一般认为,所谓的重庆模式主要由三方面内容构成:政治层面上的红色文化,执法层面上的“打黑除恶”以及民生方面的缩小贫富差距。最受诟病的是前两者,虽然在重庆和其他地方,似乎也有一些人人对于“唱红”和“打黑”表达支持。第三方面内容相对较少争议。不过,那些举措究竟对于缩小贫富差距产生了怎样的效果,目前得到的信息都是由重庆当局发布的,缺少中立的评估。另外,我们可以看到整个过程是在政府强势主导下进行的,其重点并非创造机会均等的市场逻辑。这种做法是否会带来财政决策中的失误,包括重庆所推行的农村土地政策的公正性,都是大可怀疑的。还有寅吃卯粮的隐忧,短期内的高投入讨好了民众,但是却需要未来付出巨大的代价。

If Bo Xilai was a populist, one of Donald Trump’s kind, or Putin’s, or Neil Farage’s, or whoever, one has to ask oneself how much influence he has maintained over Chinese politics to this day. After all, populists like Geert Wilders aren’t ineffective, merely because they can’t lay their hands on the imperial regalia.

When looking at European populism – that’s only a snapshot, of course -, one can get the impression that populists may not be elected, but they do leave marks on politics, from Merkel’s Willkommenskultur back to the traditional Christian Democrats’ policies, and Britain’s Brexit, implemented not by its original proponents, but by Theresa May, who had used to be a lukewarm supporter of Britain’s EU membership.

Populism is hardly ever the common peoples’ business, but that of the elites. The battles are fought within the political class, as observed by Hu Yaobang in the late 1980s. That is about as true in Europe. However, these battles within the superstructure may create or intensify certain trends in the public mood – and once policies have moved sufficiently into the “populist” direction, the support for these parties wanes, and the electorate turns back to the long-established parties. After all, Joe Blow doesn’t want to look like an extremist.

When Xi Jinping announced China’s new role as a guardian of free trade at the Davos forum in January, German Handelsblatt China correspondent Stephan Scheuer hailed the party and state leader’s “dressing-down for populists”. In Davos, Xi had become “a pioneer of fair-minded globalization”.

What could be beginning to show in China is a comparatively strong Maoist component in propaganda, as long as this doesn’t come at the cost of China’s privileged, and as long as this doesn’t require substantial reallocation of means or wealth to poor classes of population, or laggard regions. But whenever the name “Bo Xilai” should appear in any token event, the exorcists will be just around the corner.

Saturday, February 18, 2017

Mayor Carmena, the Scuttling Dalai Lama, and the Inseparably close Sino-Spanish Links

The following is an online article published by Voice of Tibet, a broadcaster from Norway.

Main Link (1):
→ Madrid considers inviting Dalai Lama to take part in Peace Conference – Communist China Overseas United Front Organization: this Hurts the Feelings of the Chinese People

Voice of Tibet, Febr 17, 2017 – The mayor of Madrid has met the American film star and Tibet supporter Richard Gere and mandated him to invite His Holiness the Dalai Lama to attend a peace forum in April. Communist Chinese organization “→ China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification”, immediately expressed protest towards the Madrid city government, saying that the Dalai Lama was a “defector”, and demanding that Madrid should not “hurt the dignity of  Chinese people, nor hurt Chinese feelings”.

【西藏之声2017年2月17日报道】西班牙马德里市市长会见美国援藏影星理查•基尔,拜托他邀达赖喇嘛尊者出席4月的一场和平论坛。中共海外统战机构“中国和平统一促进会”立即向马德里市政府表达抗议,称达赖喇嘛是“叛逃者”,并要求马德里市不要“伤害中国人的尊严,伤害中国人的感情”。

A number of Spanish media have concurrently reported that American film star Richard Gere visited Madrid. The website “Think Spain” reported on February 15 that on February 14, Madrid mayor Manuela Carmena had met with Richard Gere.

西班牙多家媒体近日均报道了美国影星理查•基尔到访马德里市的新闻。ThinkSPAIN网站 15日报道说,14日当天,马德里市女市长卡梅娜(Manuela Carmena)与理查•基尔见面。

Carmena mandated Gere to deliver an invitation to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, hoping that His Holiness would take part in the “Forum on Violence and Education for Peace”, to be held in Madrid from April 17 to April 19. It is reported that mayors from various big cities worldwide, political leaders, and social science experts are going to attend.

卡梅娜拜托基尔向达赖喇嘛转达邀请,希望尊者能够参加定于4月17日至19日在马德里举行的“暴力与和平教育论坛”(Forum on Violence and Education for Peace),据悉将有世界各大城市的市长、政治领袖,以及社会科学专家出席。

In an article published on their official website, the CCP-United-Front-led “China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification” pointed out that members of the Spanish [secton of the] “China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification” had, “for the first time, taken action, and convened leadership meetings for that very night”, and with their efforts during that night, they had drafted “a protest letter, seriously protesting the Tibetan independence ‘separatist Dalai Lama’s participation’ in the ‘Madrid Peace Forum’.”

由中共统战部指挥安排的“中国和平统一促进会”17日于官网刊文,指西班牙中国和平统一促进会成员“第一时间行动起来,连夜召开骨干会议”并且在“连夜努力下”起草了一封“严重抗议‘藏独’分裂者达赖喇嘛出席‘马德里和平论坛’”的抗议信。”

Members of said organisation handed the protest letter to Madrid city government staff, demanding that it should be handed to the mayor. According to their statements, Communist Chinese embassy officials also made representations to the city government.

该组织几名成员将抗议信交给马德里市政府工作人员,要求转交市长。而据他们的新闻声明,中共驻西班牙大使馆的官员也向该市政府就此进行了交涉。

In their protest letter, the Chinese Communist United Front organization “China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification” [abreviated by VoT author]  vilified the Dalai Lama as someone who had defected abroad, carrying out activities [intended to] split the motherland … attacking the Tibet policies of the Chinese central government and Tibet’s development and progress … inciting believers to create violent incidents and to damage stability in the Tibetan region …”

在抗议信中,中共海外统战机构“统促会”诋毁达赖喇嘛“叛逃国外,进行分裂祖国的活动……攻击中国中央政府的西藏政策和西藏的发展进步……并煽动信众制造暴力事件,破坏藏区稳定……”

The “China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification” [abreviated by VoT author], just as other Chinese Communist organizations “representing” the common Chinese people, said they hoped that the Madrid city government “won’t hurt the dignity of Chinese people, or hurt their feelings.”

统促会并如其他中共机构一般“代表”了中国百姓,称希望马德里政府“不要伤害中国人的尊严,伤害中国人的感情。”

Recently, University of California San Diego branch university’s invitation to the Dalai Lama to attend the graduation ceremony raised protest from its overseas Chinese student groups. The management didn’t change their decision, and the overseas Chinese student groups modified their protests to demanding that it should be ensured that the Dalai Lama’s speech should not touch upon politics.

近日,美国加州大学圣地亚哥分校因计划邀请达赖喇嘛出席毕业典礼,而引起该校中国留学生团体的抗议。校方未改变决定,留学生团体便转为要求确保达赖喇嘛的讲话不牵涉政治。

Columbia University Contemporary Tibetan Studies Institute director Professor Robert Barnett pointed out in an interview with INSIDE HIGHERED that everyone should be aware of this kind of foreign governments’ bullying against academic institutions. He praised the university for not withdrawing from an important position, but also suggested that it should immediately open opportunities for dialogue between the Chinese students and the Dalai Lama, such as arranging a private meeting between them and the Dalai Lama.

哥伦比亚大学现代西藏研究所所长罗伯特•巴内特(Robert Barnett)接受媒体INSIDE Highered采访时指出,各方应该关注此类学术机构被外国政府霸凌的现象。他赞扬校方没有后退是一个重要的立场,但也提议校方立刻打开与中国学生对话的机遇,比如安排他们与达赖喇嘛之间的私下会面。

The VoT article adds a photo apparently first posted by the “reunification council”, taken by the latter as they “ran into” Chinese embassy staff at the Madrid city government premises as they taking their protest letter there.

VoT’s online article apparently refers to → this online posting by the “reunification council”. Here goes:

Main Link (2):
→ Madrid City Mayor invites Dalai Lama participation in “Madrid Peace Forum” – Spanish [section of] the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification hands Letter of Protest to Madrid City Government

On February 15, Madrid city mayor Manuela Carmena met with famous visiting American film star Richard Gere, and expressed her hope that she could invite the Dalai Lama through Gere, to attend the Madrid “Concerning Municipal Violence and Peace-handling Forum of the Educational World”. Richard Gere is a believer in Tibetan Buddhism, and a faithful follower of the Dalai Lama.

2月15日,马德里市长Manuela Carmena会见了到访的美国著名影星Richard Gere,表达了希望能够通过他邀请达赖喇嘛参加马德里城市“关于城市暴力与和平相处教育世界论坛”。Richard Gere是藏传佛教的信徒,也是达赖喇嘛的忠实追随者。

As the news had burst out, it immediately caught the attention of Chinese people travelling Spain. Ever since the Dalai Lama’s defection in 1959, the establishment of a “exile government” and the drafting a bogus constitution, he has carried out actions to split the motherland.

新闻爆出之后,立即引起了旅西华人的关注。达赖喇嘛自从1959年叛国以来,建立“流亡政府”,制定伪宪法,进行分裂祖国的活动。

Once the news was reported, and everyone became aware of the situation, the Spanish [section of] the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification under the leadership of chairman → Xu Songhua, took action for the first time, immediately in the same night, convening a leadership meeting. At the meeting, all unified their ideology, pooled knowledge for everyone’s benefit, and reported to related parties. In the end, a protest letter, bilingual in Chinese and Tibetan, ‘”seriously protesting ‘Tibetan independence’ divider Dalai Lama’s attendence at the ‘Madrid Peace Forum’ was drafted.

新闻一经报道,大家在得知这样的情况后,西班牙中国和平统一促进会在徐松华主席的带领下,第一时间行动起来,立即连夜召开的骨干会议。在会议上大家统一思想、集思广益,并且向有关方面做了汇报。最终起草了一封“严重抗议‘藏独’分裂者达赖喇嘛出席‘马德里和平论坛’”的中西文双语抗议信。

The letter was completed with the efforts of everyone during that night, and early next morning, under the leadership of Chairman Xu Songhua – together with → Fundación Orient chairman of the board and Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification senior consultant Julia Zhang, deputy chairman Liu Guangxin and Xu Zhenhai – was handed to Madrid city government.

信件在大家连夜的努力之下起草完毕,并且在第二天一早在徐松华主席的带领下,一同诚信基金会董事长、西班牙中国和平统一促进会高级顾问Julia张女士,副主席刘光新和徐振海交于马德里市政府。

When the four arrived at Madrid city government, time was nearing closing time, and in the end, the four handed the letter to city government staff, to have them pass it on to mayor Carmena, and expressed their severe protest. As they were leaving, they ran into Chinese embassy’s [title] Huang Yazhong and spokesman Ji Dengyun. The two had just made serious representations to the Madrid city government on behalf of the embassy in Spain, concerning the matter. Having bumped into each other, the two sides exchanged their views and opinions, expressing anger and strong protest against mayor Carmena’s mistaken practice of hurting the friendship between the peoples of China and Spain.

一行四人抵达马德里市政府已经接近下班时间,最终四人将信件交给市政府的工作人员,让其转交给马德里市长Carmena女士。并表达了严厉的抗议。四人一出市政府门口,迎面碰上驻西大使馆公参黄亚中和新闻发言人吉登云。他俩代表驻西使馆就此事件刚刚也向马德里市政府严重交涉过。在此一碰,双方交换了意见看法,对卡梅拉市长伤害中西人民友谊的错误做法表示愤怒和强烈抗议。

The protest letter’s complete wording:

抗议信件全文如下:

Seriously protesting “Tibetan Independence” Separatist Dalai Lama’s Attendence at “Madrid Peace Forum”

Respected Madrid City Mayor Ms Carmena:

尊敬的马德里市政府市长卡梅拉女士:

[no translation found]

春祺不一。

We thank Madrid mayor and Madrid city government for their participation in the Chinese Spring Festival activities, their support and help. We appreciate it.

感谢市长和马德里市政府在庆祝中国春节活动中的参与,支持与帮助。我们予以积极评价。

Yesterday, at the shocking news that you wanted to invite the Dalai Lama through American film star Richard Gere, from April 19 to 21, at the Madrid “Concerning Municipal Violence and Peace-handling Forum of the Educational World”, we felt shock and disbelief. Therefore, we send you a letter to cancel this mistaken decision.

昨日,惊悉您通过美国影星李察?基尔,欲邀请达赖参加四月十九曰至二十一日,在马德里召开的”关于城市暴力和平相处教育世界论坛”,我们感到震惊,不可思议。所以,致函您取消这一错误決定。

What kind of man is the Dalai Lama? He is one of the → Gelug school‘s Living Buddhas. Ever since he defected abroad in 1959, he established of a “exile government”, drafted a bogus constitution, and has carried out actions to split the motherland. Under a banner of “peace”, “non-violence”, and “human rights”, he scuttles to every place, spreading rumors, building up international public opinion, gaining uninformed peoples’ sympathy, attacking the Tibet policies of the Chinese central government and Tibet’s development and progress. He deceives, bewitches, bribes, utilizes and incites some believers  to create all kinds of disturbances and uses every opportunity to damage stability in the Tibetan region to achieve his delusional ideas of splitting up China.

达赖喇嘛是何许人?他是藏传佛教格鲁派活佛之一。自1959年叛逃国外以来,他建立“流亡政府”,制定伪宪法,进行分裂祖国的活动。打着“和平”,“非暴力”,“人权”旗号四处窜访,散布谣言,制造国际舆论,获取不明真相人们的同情,攻击中国中央政府的西藏政策和西藏的发展进步。欺骗,蛊惑,收买,利用和煽动一些信众制造各种事端和暴力事件,利用一切机会破坏藏区稳定,以实现他分裂中国的痴心妄想。

In recent years, after the real face of the the Dalai had been exposed, meetings between foreign leaders and the Dalai Lama has become less and less frequent, and the international news world’s interest in the Dalai Lama has become ever lower. The Chinese government has invested an enourmous energy in the building and development of Tibet, and Tibet has maintained stable development these years, with ever closer ethnic unity and religious relations. Tibetan development, the support from the entire nation for Tibet, and the implemenation of various projects and policies have continuously improved Tibet’s situation, with the Dalai Lama’s international status going down, and ever fewer places to go to. Ever since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Spain several decades ago, the two sides have continuously strengthened their exchanges in the fields of politics, economics, culture, etc., with ever deepening friendly cooperation. Especially in recent years, the momentum in Sino-Spanish economic and technical cooperation has been good, and Spain has become an important trade partner of China, within the European Union, with Sino-Spanish technological trade continuously improving, bilateral investment continuously expanding, and a big increase in Chinese tourists travelling to Spain. Currently, economic and trade exchange between China and Spain, with China’s “one belt one road” development strategy, have become inseparably close, and have added strong power to the two countries’ economic prosperity. Friendship between the two countries has continuously deepened and developed.

近年来,达赖真面目暴露之后,外国的国家领导人和达赖喇嘛见面的越来越少,国际新闻界对达赖喇嘛的关注度越来越低。中国政府对西藏建设和发展投入了巨大的精力,西藏这些年来持续不断地保持稳定发展,民族团结越来越好,宗教关系越来越好。西藏的发展、全国人民对西藏的支持以及各项政策措施的实施,使西藏的局面越来越好,而“藏独”分裂者达赖喇嘛在国际上的身价越来越低、越来越走不动。中西两国建交几十年來,双方在政治、经济、文化等方面的交流不断加强,友好合作关系不断深化。特别是近年来,中西经济技术合作势头很好,西班牙已成为中国在欧盟的重要贸易伙伴,中西技术贸易不断发展,双边投资合作不断扩大,到西旅游中国旅客大幅增长。当前,中西两国的经贸交流,在中国提出的“一带一路”发展战略上紧密对接,为中西两国的经济繁荣注入了强劲动力,两国之间的友谊在不断深化和发展。

We hope that the Madrid [city] government will uphold the friendly relations between China and Spain, and that it will not harm the dignity and the feelings of the Chinese people.

我们希望马德里政府,维护中西两国的友好关系,不要伤害中国人的尊严,伤害中国人的感情。

As Chinese immigrants living far from their native land, we respect Spanish dignity and traditional culture, abide by Spanish law and regulations, and hold Spanish liberties, democracy, and peace in high esteem. With sincere hopes for long-lasting Sino-Spanish friendship!

作为侨居西班牙的中国移民,我们尊重西班牙的民族尊严和传统文化,遵守西班牙的法律法规,崇尚西班牙的自由、民主与和平。衷心希望中西友谊长存!

[Spanish section of] the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, Febr 16, 2017

西班牙中国和平统一促进会
2017年2月16日

On February 9, Richard Gere had met with German chancellor Angela Merkel, in his capacity as chairman of the International Campaign for Tibet. Radio Berlin-Brandenburg (RBB) → noted that the meeting, scheduled to take 30 minutes, had lasted for three quarters of an hour. No information about the content of their discussions was given.

____________

Related

→ Imagen de la Reunión, Febr 14, 2017
→ Rising China, Rotten Diplomacy, Jan 11, 2013

____________

Saturday, January 28, 2017

China’s rising Aggression against Taiwan – is there anything we can do to counter it?

Nigeria told Taiwan earlier this month to move its de-facto embassy from the capital Abuja to Lagos, the country’s biggest city and its capital until 1976, and seat of the federal government until 1991. According to the Chinese foreign ministry,

Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister Geoffrey Onyeama told journalists after reaffirming the One-China Policy at a joint press conference with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, that Taiwan will now have to function in Lagos with a skeletal staff.

One could condemn the decision of the Nigerian government, who have reportedly been promised $40 bn Chinese investment in the country’s infrastructure, and the Taiwanese foreign ministry did just that.

But there will always be governments who are too weak to be principled – and most governments worldwide, and especially those of “developed” and powerful countries, have long played along with Beijing’s “one-China policy”. Big or small countries’ decisions are based on “national interest” (whichever way national interest may be defined).

Still, what Nigeria is doing to Taiwan shows a new quality in harming the island nation. A Reuters report on January 12 didn’t try to “prove” Beijing’s driving force behind the Nigerian decision, but quotes a Taiwanese perception that would suggest this, writing that Taiwan sees the “request” to move its representative office from the capital as more pressure by China to isolate it.

Reuters also wrote that

[w]hile economic ties between the mainland and Taiwan have grown considerably in recent years, their relations have worsened since Tsai Ing-wen, who heads a pro-independence party, was elected president of the island last year.
Beijing has been stepping up pressure on her to concede to its “one China” principle.

In fact, this isn’t just a move to make Taiwan “lose face”, or to re-emphasize the – in Beijing’s view – inofficial nature of Taiwanese statehood and sovereignty. This is an attempt on Taiwan’s lifelines, even if only a small one – for now. If Taiwan has to reduce staff at one of its embassies, simply because Beijing wants the host country to bully Taiwan, this affects Taiwanese trade. And this means that Beijing is making fun of a World Trade Organization member’s legitimate interests.

Looking at it under less formal aspects, this move via Nigeria is also an aggression against Taiwan’s democracy.

The Tsai administration’s position during the past eight months hadn’t even been “provocative”. All they can be blamed for is that they didn’t bow before Beijing’s hatpole, an alleged “1992 consensus” between the Chinese Communist Party and the Taiwanese National Party (KMT). In her inaugural speech in May, President Tsai Ing-wen still acknowledged the fact that there had been KMT-CCP talks that year, and the role the talks had had in building better cross-strait relations. But  she pointed out that among the foundations of interactions and negotiations across the Strait, there was the democratic principle and prevalent will of the people of Taiwan.

It seems that this position – legitimate and reasonable – was too much for Beijing. This should be food for thought for everyone in the world who wants the will of the people to prevail.

J. Michael Cole, a blogger from Taiwan, wrote in September last year that China’s leadership

behaves very much like a 12-year-old: pouting and bullying when it doesn’t get what it wants. To be perfectly honest, it’s rather embarrassing and hardly warrants the space and scare quotes it gets in the world’s media. […]

Why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has kept at it for so long is because we, the international community, have allowed it to do so. From the hallowed halls of academia to the media, government agencies to the public sphere, we have allowed fear to regulate how we interact with China, with ourselves, and with the rest of the world.

His conclusion: we – and I assume that by “we”, he refers to all freedom-loving people who cherish democracy – need collectively stiffer spines, ; the times when we let the authoritarian-child determine what’s in our best interest should come to an end, not just in the political sphere but in other areas, including the embattled field of free expression, where the 12-year-old has been making a mockery of our proud traditions in journalism and academia.

I wasn’t sure if I agreed when I read this, months ago. Yes, it is true that China’s dollars are corrupting. But aren’t all dollars corrupting, if you are corrupt? Who forces us to take them? I’m wondering if South Africa in the 1980s would have faced sanctions if their white government and elites had had to offer then what Beijing has to offer now. And in that regard, I believe we should see clearly that Western countries frequently put their positions on sale easily, when they are offered the right price.

That was  a main factor in America’s motivation, in the 1970s, to acknowledge Beijing’s “one-China policy”. That’s why the EU is nearly spineless when it comes to interaction with Beijing. And that’s why Taiwan’s own elites are frequently eager to do business with China, even if this limits the island republic’s political scope further.

All the same, China’s measures against democracy are uniquely aggressive in some ways. Above all, they are completely shameless. If they serve their country, Chinese people may advocate them without the least disguise – because it serves China. When an American politician – Donald Trump – does a similar thing by ostensibly “putting America first”, he faces a bewildered global public who can’t believe their own ears. And yes, censorship and records where only the victor writes the history books and declares the defeated parties villains is part of hallowed Chinese tradition. There were Chinese people who were openly critical of that tradition during the 1980s or the 1990s. As far as I can see, there aren’t too many of them any more. (I’m not sure there are any left.)

Chinese “public opinion” may debate measures to optimize business, or CCP rule. But there are no competing visions in China. There is no public opinion. There is only guidance toward totalitarianism.

Can governments play a role in controlling China’s aggression against democracy? Not in the short or medium term, anyway. Any such movement has to start from the grassroots. And it won’t be a terribly big one, let alone a “collective” one, as Cole appears to hope.

But every right move is a new beginning, and a contribution to a better world. We can’t boycott China, and if we could, it might amount to a tragedy.

But we can make new, small, decisions every day: is this really the right time to arrange a students exchange with China? Why not with Taiwan? Is an impending deal with China really in one’s best interest? Could an alternative partner make better sense in the long run, even if the opportunity cost looks somewhat higher right now?

The CCP’s propaganda, during the past ten or twenty years, has been that you have no choice but to do business with China under its rule, no matter if you like the dictatorship and its increasing global reach, or not. The purpose of this propaganda has been to demobilize any sense of resistance, of decency, or of hope.

We need to take a fresh look at China.

As things stand, this doesn’t only mean a fresh look at the CCP, but at China as a country, too. During the past ten years, the CCP has managed to rally many Chinese people behind itself, and to discourage dissenters, apparently a minority anyway, from voicing dissent.

A new personal and – if it comes to that – collective fresh look at China requires a sense of proportion, not big statements or claims. It doesn’t require feelings of hatred or antagonism against China, either. We should remain interested in China, and continue to appreciate what is right with it.

What is called for is not a answer that would always be true, but a question, that we should ask ourselves at any moment when a choice appears to be coming up.

As an ordinary individual, don’t ask how you can “profit” from China’s “rise” (which has, in fact, been a long and steady collapse into possibly stable, but certainly immoral hopelessness).

Ask yourself what you can do for Taiwan.

Happy new year!

Friday, January 20, 2017

Xi Jinping in Davos: the Warming Sunshine of Economic Globalization

“Davos: China’s president Xi Jinping argues for a liberal economic order”, German business paper “Handelsblatt” titled on its front page on Wednesday. (Not quite the headline, though – that was a news article on Theresa May‘s Brexit speech.) The paper also quotes incoming US president Donald Trump‘s advisor, Anthony Scaramucci, as saying that the US didn’t want a trade war, “but we want fair trade”, and that Trump’s attacks on NATO and EU had been misinterpreted.

The editorial in the same edition is enthusiastic: Xi Jinping‘s Davos speech had been “a dressing-down for populists”, argues Handelsblatt editorialist Stephan Scheuer, and provided “a keynote for discussions of the coming years”. Xi’s unambiguous message was that China would “not close its doors, but open them further for the world.”

Scheuer’s Wednesday editorial seems to confirm the impression of a Chinese government researcher, Zhao Jinping (赵晋平), who was quoted by “People’s Daily” as saying that reactions to Xi’s speech had been sympathetic (共鸣).

Gulliver in Smurfland (Xinhua artwork)

Gulliver in Smurfland (Xinhua artwork)

While Zhao pointed out that globalization remained the international mainstream consensus, Xi Jinping himself found more flowery words to express the same belief (as quoted in another “People’s Daily” article):

“The global economy’s vast sea, if you like it or not, is there, and you can’t avoid it.” Xi Jinping pointed out that a desire to artificially cut every national economy’s capital flows, technology flows, flows of products, industries, and people, and to shrink the vast sea of the global economy to an isolated small lake, or a small river, was impossible, and would not be in correspondence with the historic trend. When facing economic globalization’s opportunities and risks, the right choice is to make full use of the opportunities, to cooperate to respond to challenges, and to guide the direction of economic globalization well.

“世界经济的大海,你要还是不要,都在那儿,是回避不了的。”习近平指出,想人为切断各国经济的资金流、技术流、产品流、产业流、人员流,让世界经济的大海退回到一个一个孤立的小湖泊、小河流,是不可能的,也是不符合历史潮流的。面对经济全球化带来的机遇和挑战,正确的选择是,充分利用一切机遇,合作应对一切挑战,引导好经济全球化走向。

And:

Protectionism is like locking oneself into a dark room, as if one wants to avoid the hardship, but also the warming sunshine. The result of trade wars would only bring harm to both sides.

搞保护主义如同把自己关进黑屋子,看似躲过了风吹雨打,但也隔绝了阳光和空气。打贸易战的结果只能是两败俱伤

But not everyone appears to have become fully convinced this week that the hero now lives in Beijing, and that the villain is going to reside in the White House. Frank Sieren, a columnist who had been accused by his former Deutsche Welle colleague Su Yutong of being too nice to Beijing more than two years ago, reminds his readers that Xi, no less than Trump, would stand against those who are currently lauding him – whenever that makes sense for him. And both Xi and Trump would have to pursue goals of their own: China would have to get more integrated with the world to be successful, and America would need to produce more goods at home, without making the products more expensive for Americans.

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