Three in one Go: “Chairman Xi Jinping’s firm and powerful words have once again made the world feel how China takes up the responsibility of a major power”

French President Emmanuel Macron’s and European Union Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s current visits to China were preceded by Spanish President of the Government, Pedro Sánchez. The latter was part of a one-afternoon triptych – but neither Sanchez nor the two other guests of Chinese State Chairman Xi Jinping were the holy guys. That would be Xi Jinping himself.

Xi Jinping meets Spain’s Prime Minister, Xi Jinping meets Malaysia’s Prime Minister, Xi Jinping meets Singapore’s Prime Minister: CCTV Evening News, March 31

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The following is my translation of an article first published by one of Xinhua’s glossy (online) brochures, named “First Perspective”. Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

This blogpost is followed by a quiz, so keep reading to the end.

First Observation | “The Three Concentric Circles” of China’s Diplomacy as cognizable from Chairman Xi Jinping’s Foreign-Affairs Meetings
第一观察丨从习近平主席密集外事会见看中国外交“三个同心圆”

[From Graphics]
第一观察 (“First Perspective”, a reader published by Xinhua), Issue 315
Produced by Xinhua’s Domestic Department
Produced by Xinhua First Studio
第一观察 ３１５期
新华社国内部制作
新华社第一工作室出品

The wind of spring is warm and kind. On Chan’An Road in Beijing, the Spanish, Malaysian and Singaporean flags are hanging next to the five-star red flag [i. e. the PRC flag] , fluttering in the wind. China warmly welcomes three important visiting foreign leaders.
春风和煦，北京长安街上，西班牙、马来西亚、新加坡的国旗分别同五星红旗并排悬挂、迎风招展。中国热情欢迎来华访问的三位外国政要。

On March 31, Chairman Xi Jinping met separately with Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar, and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Great Hall of the People. A person in charge at the foreign ministry told reporters that with Xi Jinping’s meetings as a circle, three concentric circles can be drawn. When looking at bilateral relations, you can see that China has regional relations. It is important to take a long-term perspective to see the global significance of China’s recent diplomatic activities.
3月31日，习近平主席在人民大会堂分别会见西班牙首相桑切斯、马来西亚总理安瓦尔、新加坡总理李显龙。
外交部一位负责人告诉新华社记者，以习近平主席会见为圆心，可以画出三个同心圆，借此看双边关系、看中国同有关地区的关系，更要把目光放长远，看到近期中国一系列外交行动的世界意义。

(1)
（一）

The first concentric circle is about the level of bilateral relations.
第一个同心圆是双边关系层面。

This year is significant for China’s relations with Spain, Malaysia and Singapore.
今年对中国同西班牙、马来西亚、新加坡三国的关系都有着重要意义。

2023 marks the 50th anniversary China’s establishment of diplomatic relations with Spain. In early March, Xi Jinping exchanged messages with Spanish King Felipe 6th on the 50th anniversary of China and Spain establishing diplomatic relations.
2023年是中国同西班牙建交50周年。3月初，习近平主席还同西班牙国王费利佩六世就中西建交50周年互致贺电。

At the meeting [with Sanchez], Xi Jinping summarized the half-century experience of developing Chinese-Spanish relations as “adhering to mutual respect, exchange and dialogue, and proactively developing mutually beneficial cooperation”.
会见中，习近平主席用“坚持相互尊重、交流对话，积极开展互利合作”概括半个世纪以来中西关系发展的经验。

Setting out from the 50th anniversary, how can the good bileateral relations be developed further?
如何以建交50周年为新起点，进一步发展好两国关系？

Xi Jinping emphasized that “the two sides should persist in planning the two countries’ relations from a strategic perspective”, “build bilateral relations with strategic focus”, strengthen the development of strategic connectives, dredge cooperative potentials”, must do a good job at the Chinese-Spanish Cultural and Touristical Year activities, and promote the exchange of global civilizational dialogue and exchange”.
习近平主席强调“双方应该坚持从战略高度和长远角度谋划两国关系”“打造具有战略定力的双边关系”，“要加强发展战略对接，深挖合作潜力”，“要搞好中西文化和旅游年活动，推动世界文明对话交流”。

This year marks the tenth anniversary of China and Malaysia establishing comprehensive strategic partnership relations, and next year will see the 50th anniversary of China and Malaysia establishing diplomatic relations.
今年是中马建立全面战略伙伴关系10周年，明年将迎来两国建交50周年。

This visit to China was Prime Minister Anwar’s first after taking office. During this visit, the two sides reached consensus on the building of a Chinese-Malaysian human-destiny community¹⁾ which will surely open a new chapter in the history of our two countries’ relations.
此次中国之行是安瓦尔总理上任后首次访华。此访期间，双方就共建中马命运共同体达成共识，必将开启两国关系新的历史篇章。

Among the South-East Asian countries, Singapore is the one participating most deeply in China’s reform and opening, and the one whose interests are most closely in harmony with China’s. Chairma Xi Jinping used the words “forward-looking”, “strategic” and “exemplary” to characterize the two countries’ relations. This kind of relations also set an example for regional countries.
在东南亚国家中，新加坡参与中国改革开放程度最深，同中国利益融合最密切。习近平主席用“前瞻性、战略性、示范性”定位两国关系，这样的关系也为地区国家树立了标杆。

This time, the two countries have taken another step, elevating Chinese-Singaporean relations to a comprehensive high-quality, forward-looking partnership level, thus setting yet higher standards and goals for their bilateral relations. Chairman Xi Jinping pointed out that the Chinese side wanted to strengthen strategic connections with Singapore, deepen strategic connectives, and conscientiously turn “high quality” into a most distinct mark of Chinese-Singaporean cooperation.
此次两国更进一步，将中新关系提升为全方位高质量的前瞻性伙伴关系，为双边关系确立了更高的标准和目标。习近平主席指出，中方愿同新方加强战略沟通，深化战略对接，切实使“高质量”成为中新合作最鲜明的标识。

(2)
（二）

The second concentric circle is about the level of regional relations.
第二个同心圆是地区关系层面。

Spain is a member of the EU, and Malaysia and Singapore are China’s neigbors and also member states of ASEAN. At the three meetings, Chairman Xi Jinping discussed China’s cooperation with the relevant regions from different perspectives.
西班牙是欧盟成员国，马来西亚、新加坡是中国周边邻国，也是重要的东盟成员国。三场会见，习近平主席从不同角度谈到中国同相关地区合作。

China and Europe are comprehensive strategic partners, opportunities for one another, and common interests between China and Europe outweigh their disagreements by far. There is reason to believe that the European side understands this argument. But there is a precondition to develop Chinese-European relations well, which is that Europe maintains its strategic autonomy. That is precisely what Chairman Xi emphasized in his many meetings with European leaders.
中欧是全面战略伙伴、是彼此机遇，中欧间的共同利益远大于分歧。相信欧方也明白这个道理。但要发展好中欧关系，有一个前提，那就是需要欧方坚持战略自主。这也正是习近平主席多次同欧方领导人会晤时所强调的。

During the second half of the year, Spain will take the chairmanship of the European Union. Chairman Xi Jinping emphasized that he hoped Spain would play a positive role in promoting Chinese-European relations.
今年下半年，西班牙将接任欧盟轮值主席国。习近平主席强调，希望西班牙为促进中欧对话合作发挥积极作用。

In 2021, Chairman Xi Jinping made the “five proposals on building our home together” to the ASEAN countries. At these meetings with the two ASEAN leaders, regional cooperation has been an important part of Chairman Xi Jinping’s talks.
2021年，习近平主席面向东盟国家提出中国与东盟“五大家园”建设。此次会见两位东盟国家领导人，区域合作是习近平主席谈话的重要内容。

Meeting Prime Minister Anwar, Chairman Xi Jinping emphasized that together with Malaysia, China wanted to enhance Asian civilization, uphold strategic autonomy, hold fast to the original intention, support the central position of ASEAN, resolutely resist the cold-war mentality and confrontation, and join forces to build the common home²⁾.
会见安瓦尔总理，习近平主席强调，中方愿同马方一道，弘扬亚洲文明，坚持战略自主，坚守东亚合作初心，支持东盟中心地位，坚决抵制冷战思维和阵营对抗，合力建设好共同家园。

Meeting Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman Xi Jinping pointed out that we should cherish and safeguard the good Asian regional development momentum that hasn’t been easy to come by, jointly protect the regional peace dividend, and safeguard the correct direction of economic globalization and regional economic integration.
会见李显龙总理，习近平主席指出，我们尤其应该珍惜和维护亚洲地区来之不易的良好发展势头，共同守护好地区和平红利，维护好经济全球化和区域经济一体化正确方向。

During these years, the Asian region has maintained general peaceful and stable development, the good momentum of overall rise, all of which has been achieved by the people in the region, by their own hard work and wisdom. In today’s world of turmoil, the Asian peoples must all the more exclude external interference, and protect and develop their homeland well.
这些年来，亚洲地区保持总体和平稳定和快速发展、整体崛起的良好势头，这些都是地区国家人民通过自己的勤劳和智慧取得的，在当今变乱交织的世界，亚洲人民更要排除外部干扰，守护好、发展好自己的家园。

“We don’t allow any country to deprive the Asian peoples of the right to strive for a better and prosperous future.” Chairman Xi’s words were profound.
“不允许任何国家剥夺亚洲人民追求更美好幸福生活的权利。”习近平主席的话意味深长。

(3)
（三）

The third concentric circle is about the global level
第三个同心圆是世界层面。

At the tree meetings, the recent set of diplomatic actions taken by China have shown the world a China that is full of vitality, that maintains openness, but also shoulders responsibility as a great power, and, in a world of upheaval and change, provides more determinacy.
三场会见，连同近期中国一系列外交行动，向世界展现出一个充满活力、坚持开放、担当负责的大国形象，为动荡变革中的世界注入了更多确定性。

Just take March this year as an example, when Chairman Xi Jinping met several leaders from abroad who visited China, participated in the CPC’s dialog meeting with other political parties of the world and gave a keynote speech, and made a state visit to Russia on its invitation.
China facilitated the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, China hosted the 2023 China Development Forum³⁾, and the Boao Forum for Asia⁴⁾ … …
仅以今年3月为例，习近平主席会晤多位来访外国领导人、出席中国共产党与世界政党高层对话会并发表主旨讲话、应邀对俄罗斯进行国事访问；中国促成沙特和伊朗恢复外交关系；中方举办中国发展高层论坛2023年年会、博鳌亚洲论坛2023年年会……

A number of major moves and vigorous actions have attracted global attention. Recently, dignitaries, entrepreneurs, experts, scholars and delegates of international organizations have come to China one after another to take part in activities, vividly experiencing the vitality and pulsation of China’s development. The official three government leaders’ visits were in conjunction with the Bo’ao Forum for Asia.
一系列重大举措、有力行动吸引世界目光。近期，各国政要、企业家、专家学者和国际组织代表纷纷来华出席活动，真切感受到中国发展的活力与脉动。三位外国政府首脑，正是结合出席博鳌亚洲论坛年会对中国进行正式访问的。

During the meeting, Chairman Xi Jinping repeatedly talked about “Modernization with Chinese Characteristics”, thoroughly pointing out the global significance of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by means of Modernization with Chinese Characteristics.
会见中，习近平主席多次讲到“中国式现代化”，深刻指出以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴的世界意义。

Facts have proven that the better China develops, the better it can share development opportunities with all countries, and make a greater contribution to the world.
事实已经证明，中国发展越好，就越有能力同各国分享发展机遇，为世界作出更大贡献。

At the meetings, the three foreign leaders discussed global peace and development respectively, from their own perspectives.
会见中，三位外国领导人从各自视角谈及世界和平与发展这个话题——

Prime Minister Sanchez gave a positive assessment of China’s position paper concerning a political solution of the Ukraine crisis and expressed his appreciation of China’s constructive role in a political solution of the Ukraine crisis.
桑切斯首相积极评价中方关于政治解决乌克兰危机的立场文件，表示赞赏中方为政治解决乌危机发挥的建设性作用。

In view of China’s recent successful facilitation of Saudi Arabian-Iranian dialogue, Prime Minister Anwar said that this once again shows China’s constructive role in the promotion of peace. He was deeply moved by the “extremely far-sighted” Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. Prime Minister Anwar said that Chairman Xi Jinping is a great politician with global influence who not only changed the course of China’s historic development, but who also brought hope for global peace and development.
看到近期中方成功促成沙伊北京对话，安瓦尔总理表示，这再次表明中方为促进和平发挥的建设性作用。感慨于全球安全倡议、全球发展倡议、全球文明倡议“极富远见”，安瓦尔总理表示，习近平主席是具有世界影响的伟大政治家，不仅改变了中国的历史发展进程，也为世界和平与发展带来希望。

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said: “Singapore advocates respect between states, peaceful coexistence, win-win cooperation, avoidance of conflicts, and joint reactions to dangers and challenges.” Clearly, this is congenial with the new type of international relations advocated by China.
李显龙总理表示：“新加坡主张国与国应相互尊重、和平共处、互利合作、避免冲突，共同应对风险挑战。”显然，这同中方倡导的新型国际关系理念是相契合的。

At the meetings, Chairman Xi Jinping’s firm and powerful words have once again made the world feel how China takes up the responsibility of a major power.
会见中，习近平主席坚定而有力的话语，让世界再次感受到中国作为负责任大国的历史担当。

________________

Notes

1)	Aka “community with a shared destiny for mankind”, or “community of common destiny”
2)	Accidentally or not, “共同家园” is how Mikhail Gorbachev’s reference to a “Common European home” is frequently translated into Chinese. Xi doesn’t appear to be superstitious.
3)	Literally: “China Development High-Level Forum 2023”
4)	Literally: “2023 Bo’ao Asia Annual Forum”

________________

Quiz

Which country is featured in this article without being mentioned even once?

________________

Chinese Academic on WSJ Reporters’ Expulsion: Butts have to be spanked

The following is a translation of an opinion article by Yang Hanyi, a regular columnist with the internet newsmagazine Guanchazhe Online (aka “Observer”), and researcher at the Shanghai Spring and Autumn Development Strategy Institute.

Guanchazhe is privately-run, according to this Wiki, and seems to be replacing “Huanqiu Shibao” as a voice for post-1990 fenqings, plus indignant little emperors of all ages.

Yang’s article goes far beyond the WSJ “incident” – and this probably reflects the political motivation behind revoking the three press credentials. It appears to reflect Beijing’s frustration with American sanction policies, the murder of Qasem Soleimani, and the demonstrations in Hong Kong (blamed on the West), among others. It also tries to sketch a roadmap of how to deal with the press in future.

However, Guanchazhe notes that the article’s content is only the opinion of the author, and not written on behalf of the platform.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

On February 19, a spokesman of China’s foreign ministry announced at a press conference that from that day onwards, the credentials of three Beijing reporters of America’s “Wall Street Journal” would be revoked. In peoples’ memory, this is the first time in the decades of reform and opening up that the government has handed down an “edict of expulsion” against several reporters of the same medium at the same time.

2月19日，中国外交部发言人在记者会上宣布，即日起吊销美国《华尔街日报》三名驻京记者证件。在人们的记忆中，这是改革开放几十年来中国政府首次对来自同一家国际媒体的多名记者同时下“逐客令”。

I’d just like to say: “well done”.

对此我只想说“干得漂亮”。

As is well known, this incident started with the “WSJ”‘s publication of a flow of racism and prejudice, “China is the real sick man in Asia”, slandering the Chinese government’s and peoples’ great efforts to resist the new coronavirus epidemic. Once this was published, many netizens rushed forth the the “WSJ”‘s social media accounts and denounced the racism. America’s nationwide broadcaster NBC, in a report, also criticized the “WSJ”‘s headline as it could create fear, anxieties, and a hostile mood. Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, on February 6, named the author and criticized his arrogance, prejudice and ignorance. But facing the stern message of the Chinese side, [the WSJ] then turned to summoning the pretense of freedom of the press and of speech. For a while, the author said that the choice of the headline was freedom of editing, for a while they said that they had meant to refer to the Ottoman Empire without malign intentions, and even that [The remaining accusations are beyond my translation skills, but this article may reflect all or some of them]. Do they really believe that people don’t know those things behind western media?

众所周知，这起事件的起因是《华尔街日报》2月3日发表了一篇流淌着种族主义偏见的文章《中国是真正的“亚洲病夫”》，诋毁中国政府和人们抗击新冠疫情的努力。此文一发，大批网民涌至作者和《华尔街日报》社交媒体页面上留言指责种族主义。美国全美广播公司在报道中也批评《华尔街日报》的标题可能制造恐惧、焦虑和敌对情绪。中国外交部发言人华春莹更是于2月6日点名批评该文作者的傲慢、偏见和无知。但面对中方的严正交涉，他们又搬出新闻自由、言论自由的幌子，一会儿作者说起标题是编辑的自由，一会儿说我们没有恶意只是玩了个奥斯曼帝国的梗，一会儿说我们甚至以病夫自黑呢。如今中国采取惩罚措施，《华尔街日报》发行人威廉•刘易斯又甩的一手好锅，说评论部门惹的祸，不好怪到新闻记者头上来哟，真以为人们不知道西方媒体背后那些事呢？

In recent years, everyone has clearly seen America’s so-called great-power competition, not only in correct and fitting words in national defense strategy papers, not only by openly kidnapping the international community with domestic laws^*), not only by telling the world with an honest face that we “tell lies, cheat and steal”, not only trampling on international conventions for the protection of diplomats by public assassination, but also by carrying a gun and a stick on a somewhat concealed battlefield which is the battle of public opinion.

近年来大家都看清了美国所谓的大国竞争，不仅名正言顺地写在国防战略报告里；不仅堂而皇之用国内法绑架国际社会；不仅正大光明地告诉世界“我们撒谎、欺骗、偷窃”；不仅践踏保护外交人员的国际公约公然行刺，也包括在另一片略微隐蔽的战场上夹枪带棒，这就是舆论话语的战斗。

Yang’s article describes news media as rather low-cost “mouthpieces of national interests” with a frequently high impact on international public opinion and politics, while America hardly found a way to compete with Huawei. And while an old-style empire’s embarrassing situation was understandable, and while one could even appreciate the comical nature of foreign medias’ blackening of China, butts that deserved a spanking still needed to be spanked (但好笑归好笑，屁股该打还是要打的).

It continues with a tour of American crimes and double standards (perceived or real – you decide from case to case), from a recently announced obligation for China’s state or party media to register as foreign agents or diplomatic missions in the US, to an NBA executive’s support of Hong Kong’s democracy movement (instigating chaos elements in HK / 怂恿乱港分子), the publication of a coronavirus-China-state-flag cartoon in Denmark, the WSJ’s sick-man-of-Asia statement, and inconsistencies in measures against anti-semitic or anti-black messages online while lacking protection of China against being being scolded.

The “Charlie Hebdo” massacre is broached, too, and so is responsibility as the other side of the coin (freedom being the other one).

Has the “WSJ” published free speech which insults Chinese? Yes. Must it be held responsible for publishing such remarks? Yes.

《华尔街日报》有没有发表侮辱中国人文章的言论自由？有。那它需不需要为发表这样的言论负责？需要。

The article then refers to Singapore as a place to learn from, when dealing with “misreporting”, citing a lawsuit by Lee Kuan Yew against the Far Eastern Economic Review‘s editor-in-chief as an example – according to the author, that was in 1989 -, and a case against the Asia WSJ, also in Singapore, in 1991, about contempt of court.

Yang on the other hand cites Beijing’s “unreliable entities list” as a conceivable tool.

____________

Note

^*) There are probably two aspects to this accusation. One could be the US sanctions regime against Iran (and maybe also against North Korea, even if China officially supports those), and another would be a widely held belief that there is a rift between the US and the rest of the West about how to interact with China.

____________

Related

FMPRC daily briefing online, Febr 19, 2020
Be more Xinhua, Oct 10, 2009

“Trade War”: Doing their Worst, doing their Best

Probably, there would be a (not inevitable yet) moment when nearly everyone realized that the trade conflict between America and China has turned into an economic war. The moment isn’t easy to define in advance. Maybe it’s when China halts its rare-earth exports. But that war would be the first war that might benefit school children’s education as they are running out of smartphones. Can war be war when it makes people smarter?

The Economist, not quite the Great Friend of the Chinese People more recently, tried to sound some more understanding notes than usual last month. Addressing accusations that China had ‘reneged’ on commitments made earlier during the talks, the paper points out that “complicating matters, negotiations have been conducted in English, with the draft agreement […] also in English. As it is translated into Chinese and circulated among more officials, changes are inevitable.”

And Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s prime minister and no Great Friend of the Chinese People either, claims that he doesn’t really care about who’s spying on him or his country: “We have no secrets,” and …

“… let them do their worst.”

Not sure if Malaysian techies would agree. But if they really have no secrets, Mahathir may be right, and Malaysia has nothing to lose, because it has nothing.

For people who still use their 1990-something mobile, Digital Trends offers an instructive overview of what is at stake for Huawei, and the company’s American trade partners and customers.

Not so different from Mahathir, but from a more neutral position,  Singapore’s prime minister Lee Hsien Loong advocates openness, as this approach has benefitted Singapore since ancient times – no, he didn’t really say that.

But he has a clear message to both sides in the conflict, and an explanation as to why Washington’s unilateral approach is no option for Singapore:

Singapore cannot afford to adopt the same point of view. Being small, we are naturally disadvantaged in bilateral negotiations. We need to reform and strengthen multilateral institutions, not cripple or block them. More fundamentally, confining ourselves to a bilateral approach means forgoing win-win opportunities which come from countries working together with more partners. We need to build a broader regional and international architecture of cooperation. When groups of countries deepen their economic cooperation, they will enhance not just their shared prosperity but also their collective security. With more stake in one another’s success, they will have greater incentive to uphold a conducive and peaceful international order. This will benefit many countries big and small.

Huanqiu Shibao comes up with what they see as their country’s head of delegation‘s role at the summit:

After Lee Hsien-Loong had concluded his speech, He Lei asked the first question in the plenum, a two-fold one: firstly, how can China and America set out from the big picture of maintaining regional and global peace, from the great trend of peaceful development, thus properly settling the current contradictions and problems? And the other question: Singapore’s leader advocates that small countries should not take sides while the big countries’ relations are experiencing contradictions. How can, under the current conditions, a constructive conduct be achieved, and taking sides be avoided? Lee Hsien-Long replied to the first question that China and America needed to talk frankly, at the top levels, about the most fundamental problem, i. e. China’s current development, and the outside world’s need to adapt to China’s development. China and other countries all needed to adjust and adapt to this fact. Under this prerequisite, one by one and by discussing the issues as they stand, we will solve problems. Lee Hsien-Loong believes that in this process, China and America would gradually strengthen trust and make progress. As for the second question, Lee Hsien-Loong replied that “we do our best to be friends with both sides, maintaining relations on all fields, but will actively avoid to choose sides and join teams.”
After the banquet, He Lei’s assessment was that Lee Hien-Loong’s speech had been relatively peaceful and reasonable, and he was satisfied with Lee Hsien-Loong’s answers. He Lei said that Sino-Singapore relations had continuously improved in recent years, with continuous high-level exchange, which had established a good basis for a speech as given by Lee Hsien-Loong that evening. This was also a result of China’s continuous expansion of influence. He Lei, who has attended all of the three most recent Shangri-la meetings, has a profound feel for this.

李显龙演讲结束后，针对李显龙的发言，何雷在全场率先提问，包括两个问题：第一个是中美两国在当前如何能够从维护地区和世界和平的大局出发，能够从和平发展的大趋势出发，妥善解决当前存在的矛盾和问题？另一个问题是，在当前大国关系存在矛盾和问题的时候，新加坡领导主张小国不选边站。在当前这种局势下，如何做到积极作为、避免选边站队？对于第一个问题，李显龙表示，中美两国需要在最高层面开放坦率地接触，讨论两国之间最基本的问题，即中国正在发展，而外界需要适应中国的发展。中国和其他国家都需要调整并适应这一事实。在这一前提下，再逐个地、就事论事地讨论并解决问题。李显龙认为，在这一过程中，中美双方能够逐渐增进信任，取得进展。对于第二个问题，李显龙答道，“我们尽自己所能和两边都做朋友，发展并保持各个领域的关系，但主动地避免选边站队。”

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Related

Surveillance tycoons, Bloomberg, May 22, 2019
America must strike a balance, Nov 7, 2009

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Inside Report: the Singapore Summit

 

A very special moment …

 

and the very last moment …

… for world peace.

Trump Rhetoric against North Korea reveals Need for modernized US Foreign Policy

Donald Trump was born rich. That’s why he’s qualified to serve as US President. You only have to look the other way when he’s making decisions. To talk bullshit to the press (or on Twitter) is a decision, too. This is what he told the press in New Jersey, on Tuesday:

Q: Any comment on the reports about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities?

A: North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen. He has been very threatening beyond a normal state. And as I said, they will be met with fire, fury, and, frankly, power, the likes of which this world has never seen before.

Thank you.

Senator John McCain stated the obvious, still on Tuesday, in a radio interview: “You got to be sure you can do what you say you’re going to do.”

If that’s logical, it’s too logical for President Trump – and for some of his supporters, who refer to McCain as a “traitor” who “sabotaged” their idol. Because, who knows, if everyone would have kept his  mouth shut, Pyongyang might have been very afraid.

Trump is either a madman, or a bigmouth. We may be hopeful, for now, that he’s a bigmouth first. But that doesn’t mean that he can’t do damage. In fact, Washington is heading into a loss of face like the world has never seen. George W. Bush was the first wrecker’s ball operator against American credibility, and Trump is his worthy successor.

But sometimes, when an idiot is running the farm, his operations reveal structural weaknesses that began long before his reign.

It has been said countless times by now that there are “no good options” when it comes to North Korea. That’s easy to say, and when it’s said frequently enough, it begins to sound like an inevitable truth.

But the debate if there are “good” options, or only more or less lousy options, has little to do with North Korea. Instead, it has a lot to do with America. Whenever there’s a debate about foreign policy, it sounds as if America was in full control, and just needed to decide if they want to “take out” this or that dictator.

There would be a fairly good option, concerning North Korea – the only question is if Trump is the president who can do it. Maybe he can – after all, he has no face, and therefore can’t lose face.

Either way: what is the fuss about the impossibility to recognize North Korea as an equal in international relations? Not as an equal in ethical terms, obviously, but as an equal member of the United Nations?

The problem is that both America and China follow the Yang Jiechi doctrine: that [your country] is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.

America is a hegemon in decline. That means that, to maintain its international influence, it will have to modernize its foreign and military policies. It needs to find partners, rather than junior partners. And it needs to understand what constitutes a problem, and what doesn’t. America can no longer afford to exhaust all other options before doing the right thing.

If America can do business with China – a totalitarian country -, there is no plausible reason as to why it shouldn’t do business with North Korea, too. North Korea’s neighbors would hardly object. A policy – or mere rhetoric – that suggests a war on their territory is not popular there. And Pyongyang would be only to happy to reduce its dependence on Beijing.

Therefore, the first step should be to accept North Korea’s status as a nuclear power. If China should have any concerns about that, let it be Beijing’s problem. America may offer some inexpensive assistance, if deemed auspicious, but why should they tackle the main responsibility for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula if Beijing considers North Korea a bargaining chip against Taiwan?

Let’s face it: there is nothing any power on earth can do when Beijing protects the regime in Pyongyang. But there is a lot that can be done to defend South Korea, Japan, and – not least – Taiwan.

Therefore, Washington should reach out to Pyongyang.

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Updates/Related

Moon: Peace a national interest, BBC, Aug 14, 2017

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Liu Xiaobo, 1955 – 2017

It won’t be long before Liu Xiaobo‘s first post-mortem biography will be published. But it won’t have the last word. There will be further biographies, and each of them will be contested. That’s because of the man himself, and because of his country. He was a man with a conscience, and his country has been a totalitarian dictatorship for nearly seven decades – if you count the KMT’s martial law in, it’s been a dictatorship for much longer than that.

Liu Xiaobo’s political lifespan lasted for three or four decades. That doesn’t count as long in China. The Communist Party’s propaganda works tirelessly to create and sustain the “People’s Republic’s” population’s imagination of a civilizational history of five or more millenia. And at the same time, the party needs to sustain the notion that the most recent seven decades had been the best in China’s history. Not only the past fourty, after the leadership’s decision to “reform and to open up”, but the past seven decades, including Maoism. CCP propaganda’s aim is to build an image of its rule where the pre- and post-1978 decades are one political unit, without substantial contradictions within.

In all likelihood, Liu Xiaobo had foreseen that trend. Many Chinese dissidents, no matter if opponents of China’s cultural restauration, or opponents of the KMT’s military dictatorship on Taiwan, saw a Chinese complacency at work, considering itself the center of the universe.

Cultural criticism is rarely a rewarding trade, but in China, it can be lethal, as shown in Liu Xiaobo’s case.

Liu’s last camp and prison term, which began in 2009 and ended with his relase on medical parole, with cancer in its final stage, had been based on the accusation that he had “incited subversion of state power”. But the Beijing First Intermediate People’s Court’s verdict – passed on Christmas day of 2009, probably to keep the level of international attention as low as possible –  only reflected the CCP’s fear of Liu, not the likely divide between the dissident and his people. A likely divide only, because in a totalitarian dictatorship, these things are more uncertain than in an open society. Hu Jia, himself a dissident who spent more than three years in prison from 2007 to 2011, noted during Liu’s dying days that only about one out of a hundred Beijingers knew who Liu Xiaobo was. Michael Bristow, the BBC’s China correspondent  in 2011, made a similar observation back then.

The 1980s mostly came across as a period of economic optimism, but accompanied by phenomena that were viewed negatively – particularly corruption, which was one of the factors that propelled the June-4 movement at its beginning.

Liu’s answer to what was frequently seen as China’s ailments was “westernization”. Stays in Western countries seem to have intensified his idea, just as Deng Xiaoping is said to have had his own cultural shock when visiting Singapore, in 1978.

But there lies a difference between the great statesman, and the great dissident. Singapore, a highly developed city state led by a family clan, is a model not only for authoritarian Chinese nationals – Taiwanese law-and-order-minded people tend to prefer Singapore as a holiday destination, rather than “messy” Hong Kong.

Liu Xiaobo’s model of development was Hong Kong of the 1980s. It was also the crown colony that provided the intellectual in his early thirties with some public resonance. In one of the interviews, given by Liu to a magazine named Kaifang at the time, Liu made statements that astonished the interviewer:

Q. Under what circumstances can China carry out a genuine historical transformation?
A. Three hundred years of colonialism.  Hong Kong became like this after one hundred years of colonialism.  China is so much larger, so obviously it will take three hundred years of colonialism.  I am still doubtful whether three hundred years of colonialism will be enough to turn China into Hong Kong today.

Q. This is 100% “treason.”
A. I will cite one sentence from Marx’s Manifesto of the Communist Party: “Workers do not have motherlands.  You cannot take away what they don’t have.”  I care about neither patriotism nor treason.  If you say that I betray my country, I will go along!  I admit that I am an impious son who dug up his ancestors’ graves and I am proud of it.

Both the “insults” and Liu’s expressly stated pessimism probably made for a divide between him and many Chinese (as far as they got to know his story). Or, as Roland Soong, a blogger from Hong Kong, noted next to his translation of the 1988 interview, as of 2010, “I suggest that unless Charter 08 (or any other message) can connect with many people in other social strata, it will remain a mental exercise among ‘public intellectuals.'”

And nothing works in the modern middle kingdom, unless it comes with a festive up-with-people sound. (In that sense, China is globalizing indeed.)

When Soong translated the interview quoted from above, and added his assessment of the Charter 08, the global financial crisis had been wreaking havoc on Western economies for about two years, and at least one of the Charter’s demands had fallen from the tree since: #14 called for

Protection of Private Property. We should establish and protect the right to private property and promote an economic system of free and fair markets. We should do away with government monopolies in commerce and industry and guarantee the freedom to start new enterprises. We should establish a Committee on State-Owned Property, reporting to the national legislature, that will monitor the transfer of state-owned enterprises to private ownership in a fair, competitive, and orderly manner. We should institute a land reform that promotes private ownership of land, guarantees the right to buy and sell land, and allows the true value of private property to be adequately reflected in the market.

There wasn’t necessarily a conflict on this matter, between the party leadership and the authors of the Charter – time will show how the CCP is going to handle the remaining state sector of the economy. But among everyday Chinese people, this demand would hardly strike a chord. Besides, who can imagine a transfer of state-owned enterprises to private ownership “in a fair, competitive, and orderly manner”?

In the Charter’s preface, the authors wrote:

The Chinese people, who have endured human rights disasters and uncountable struggles across these same years, now include many who see clearly that freedom, equality, and human rights are universal values of humankind and that democracy and constitutional government are the fundamental framework for protecting these values.

It was a cautious description of the status quo: Liu and his co-authors understood that only a critical minority would side with them. And indeed, there was more to endure in the pipeline. The educational dictatorship China is now entering encourages anticipatory obedience rather than awareness, and it is likely to succeed. When you keep beating people up long enough – and provide them with a hopeful perspective for the future -, there is little that can help people of conscience to counter the propaganda.

This may be the main difference between Liu and his enemies (and many of his admirers, too): in the eyes of many, only hard power – no matter if you refer to it as “the people’s power” or as the “authorities” -, creates reality. If the realities are good, you don’t need to get involved. If they are evil, you can’t get involved. And when realities come in many shades of grey, you either needn’t or can’t get involved. The power of the powerless is no reality in these peoples’ world – unless they begin to tilt, so that re-orientation appears advisable.

That’s a stabilizing factor, so long as realities remain what they appear to be.  But appearances can be deceiving, often until the very last hour. Who of the Egyptians who ditched their longtime president in 2011, in colossal demonstrations, had known weeks before that he wanted to get rid of him? A mood had capsized. It wasn’t about awareness.

A manipulated and intimidated public tends to be unpredictable, and that can turn factors around that were originally meant to add to “stability”.

China’s leaders feared Liu Xiaobo. They feared him to the extent that they wouldn’t let him leave the country, as long as he could still speak a word. But in all likelihood, they fear China’s widespread, politically tinged, religious sects even more, which have a tradition at least as long as Chinese scholarship. Falun Gong is only one of its latest manifestations.

By suppressing public intellectuals not only before 1978, but after that, too, they provided space for nervous moodiness. The Communists themselves want to “guide” (i. e. control) public awareness, without leaving anything to chance.

But chance is inevitable. Totalitarian routine may be able to cope for some time, but is likely to fail in the long run, with disastrous consequences.

In that light, the CCP missed opportunities to reform and modernize the country. But then, the party’s totalitarian skeleton made sure that they could only see the risks, and no opportunities, in an opening society.

What remains from Charter 08 – for now – is the courage shown by its authors nine years ago, and by the citizens who affirmed it with their signatures.

Each of them paid a price, to varying degrees, and often, their families and loved ones did so, too: like Liu Xia, who had hoped that her husband would not get involved in drafting the Charter, but who would never dissociate herself from him.

Nobody is obligated to show the same degree of courage, unless solidarity or conscience prescribe it. In most cases, making such demands on oneself would be excessive. But those who hate the Lius for their courage – and for lacking this courage themselves – should understand that their hatred is wrong. One may keep still as a citizen – but there is an inevitable human duty to understand the difference between right and wrong. By denying our tolerance toward despotism and by repressing awareness of our own acquiescence, we deny ourselves even the small steps into the right direction, that could be taken without much trouble, or economic hardship.

May Liu Xiaobo never be forgotten – and may Liu Xia find comfort and recovery.

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Updates/Related

再生：致刘晓波, Woeser, July 13, 2017
Rebirth, Woeser/Boyden, July 16, 2017
Wiedergeburt, Woeser/Forster, July 27, 2017
The abuse hasn’t stopped, Wu Gan, July 25, 2017

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2015 Review (3): “People’s Daily” lauds Xi Jinping, the People Person

Those with common aspirations can’t be separated by mountains or seas (志合者，不以山海为远), People’s Daily wrote in an editorial on Thursday, adding that State Chairman Xi Jinping went on travels abroad eight times in 2015, visiting fourteen countries on four continents and attending nine international conferences, meeting 62 state leaders and telling the gospel, or writing articles about, new-type international relations (新型国际关系), the building of one-belt-one-road, maintenance of world peace and development, and other important issues. All that by telling the “China story” (讲述“中国故事”), explaining the “China opportunity” (阐明“中国机遇”), stating the “China Program” (提出“中国方案”), and expressing “China’s attitude” (表达“中国态度”), thus leaving a deep impression on the international community. People’s Daily mentions the Bao’ao Asia Forum in March, the APEC summit in November, the G20 summit, and, also in November, Xi’s visit to Singapore in November.

Obviously, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) also features prominently in the People’s Daily’s review.

This the-Chairman-and-the World series also included a review – one day earlier, on Wednesday – of how Xi Jinping told China’s story and how he let the world understand China, how he “told China’s story well, and well disseminated China’s voice” (讲好中国故事，传播好中国声音). This review included quotes from how Xi recognized the role of two-hundred Soviet pilots who had died on the Chinese battlefield, how he published an article in Vietnamese media about how the story of Tu Yoyo’s detection of artesemin and Sino-Vietnamese relations were connected, how the U.S. and China had fought together in World War 2, how, during his visit to Britain, Xi interlinked the lives of Shakespeare and Tang Xianzu, and how, generally speaking, Xi Jinping was good at giving friendly, trust-enhancing talks or speeches or writing articles of the same successful kind.

The editorial’s summary:

Interaction between countries depends on peoples‘ attachment to each other, and the peoples‘ attachment to each other depends on communication from heart to heart. Xi Jinping makes use of vivid stories, catches foreign audiences‘ interest, and sparks strong sympathetic responses. At the same time, he unobtrusively and imperceptibly changes listeners‘ stereotypes about China, dispels some existing misunderstandings, showing brilliant diplomatic wisdom.

国之交在于民相亲，民相亲在于心相通。习近平用生动的故事，抓住了国外听众的兴趣点，引发强烈的共鸣。同时，他使国外听众在潜移默化中，改变了对中国的刻板印象，消除了一些曾经的误解，展现出卓越的外交智慧。

An unobtrusive and imperceptible (潜移默化, see quote above) moral influence had been an issue close to Xi Jinping’s heart since January 2012 – if not much earlier.

There can be no other summary concerning Xi Jinping’s communicative skills, than the stuff composed by People’s Daily this week – it’s a long-term script. It would seem that the outgoing and incoming politburos, during summer and fall 2012, agreed that the CCP’s grip on power in China needed some of the personality cult that had accompanied Mao Zedong, but – for different reasons – Deng Xiaoping, too.

The good story of Xi Jinping’s people-person virtues probably started around winter 2012/13, with stories the party’s secretary-general (but not yet state chairman) Xi Jinping sat cross-legged on the farming family’s kang, how he blessed rural China in the 1970s, whereever he went as a young cadre, and how villagers were in tears when he left from there.

And once Xi was “elected” state chairman in March 2013,

Wearing a dark-blue suit and a red tie, the membership [badge] hanging on his chest, Xi Jinping, tall of stature, stood smiling, calmly and self-confident. His voice clear, bright and vigorous, looking frank and honest, resolute and steadfast, he revealed the power of stirring people to action.

身着深色西装，佩带红色领带，胸挂出席证，身材高大的习近平微笑站立，从容自信。清朗而浑厚的声音，坦诚而刚毅的目光，透出激奋人心的力量。

“The Xi Factor”, BBC short documentary

Stay tuned for more great deeds in 2016. The CCP script is demanding it.

Must-Ask Question: China’s Missiles targeting Taiwan

Radio Taiwan International (RTI) quotes Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou as saying in a press conference after his meeting with Chinese state chairman Xi Jinping that he brought up the issue of Chinese missiles aiming at Taiwan. According to Ma, Xi said that the missile deployments were a comprehensive arrangement and not targeted at the people of Taiwan [「部署是整體性，不是針對台灣人民」].

RTI also quotes from a Central News Agency (CNA) interview with the founder of a Canadian military magazine, Kanwa (漢和防務評論), Andrei Pinkov (平可夫). Pinkov reportedly said that clearly, China’s missiles, and land and naval forces were targeting Taiwan.

To expect Beijing to remove these deployments would be difficult:

[Pinkov] said, if you want the removal of missiles be implemented, the mainland will certainly demand the building of mutual military trust. “If there’s no trust built, how can the missiles be removed?” Also, where to store the removed stuff? Just a while ago, the mainland has announced to cut 300,000 military staff. That needs to be digested. If you make more cuts, how should they deploy the staff?

他說，撤飛彈的事情若要實際落實，大陸一定會要求建立雙方軍事互信，「互信沒建立，怎麼撤飛彈？」此外，撤除的東西要往哪擺？大陸先前宣布裁軍30萬人，人員都可能還在消化，若又再撤，人員要怎麼安排？

Pinkov said that although most of the international community viewed the Ma-Xi meeting favorably, but, he concluded, if this was really followed by the two sides establishing some military interaction, America might increase its restrictions on arms sales to Taiwan, and Japan, too, could become more vigilant about Taiwan. All these were problem Taiwan could face [under such circumstances].

平可夫表示，雖然國際社會對馬習會多是樂觀其成，但兩岸雙方若隨後在軍事上真的有一些互動，他推論，美國對台軍售的限制可能會更多，日本對台灣也會開始有戒心，這都是台灣可能面臨的問題。

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Related

» More sophisticated, Jamestown, April 1, 2010

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