EU: “Just protecting the freedom of expression”

All the news that’s fit to blog.

Fri, Febr 24, 2023	One year after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, China publishes a Confucius-says “position paper”. Originally, it had been advised as a “peace plan” by China’s supreme diplomat Wang Yi, but has since been de-ambitioned. Meantime, China’s foreign-ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin (汪文斌) offers a clue as to why: FMPRC tweet, Febr 24, 2023
Thu, Febr 23, 2023	The central committee of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) approved a timetable that presidential nominations would be decided by April 12, and Legislative Yuan nominations in May. It appears to be widely accepted among the party’s legislators that, in the light of a poor showing in Taiwan’s “mid-term elections”, i. e. the country’s local elections in November 2022, more time is needed to prepare for the nation-wide presidential and legislative elections next year. Lai Ching-te, the incumbent Tsai administration’s current Vice President, has recently been elected chairman of the DPP, and Chen Jien-jen, Lai’s predecessor as Taiwan’s Vice President from 2016 to 2020, became head of the cabinet in January this year. Source: 央廣 / Radio Taiwan International
Wed, Febr 22, 2023	High-level foreign-policy and defense officials from Japan and China met at Japan’s foreign ministry in Tokyo on Wednesday. It was the first such meeting after an interruption of about four years. Chinese Deputy foreign minister Sun Weidong (孙卫东) was quoted as saying that there was “an important consensus” that neither country posed a threat for the other. However, Sun also said that there were Chinese concerns about Japan’s “strategic documents” issued in 2022, and Japan’s increasing cooperation with “outside forces” (域外力量), and about “negative tendencies” in Taiwan. Source: Radio Japan
Wed, Febr 22, 2023	Russian president Vladimir Putin met China’s chief diplomat Wang Yi in Moscow on Wednesday. The Kremlin published a detailed account of the meeting the same day. Source: Kremlin
Wed, Febr 15, 2023	Pyongyang was said to have gone under a Covid-related lockdown in late January, allegedly lasting from January 25 to 30. But was there a lockdown at all? Source: SinoNK
Tue, Febr 14, 2023	Chen Xuyuan (陈戌源) was – effectively, maybe not nominally yet – fired as chairman of the Chinese Football Association earliert his month, after having been confronted with the usual suspicions of “serious violations of discipline”, which appears to serve as a regular CPC codeword for corruption charges. Chen, a Shanghai native born in 1956, was also the football association’s deputy party secretary. Source: Ifeng
Mo, Febr 13, 2023	“Less then half the world is on the internet”, a BBC documentary broadcast told the audience on February 11, two days ahead of World Radio Day. Source: BBC
Tue, Febr 7, 2023	Critics of the EU’s censorship policy against Russia’s foreign-language service “RT” had a field day early this month, after the EU’s high-representative for for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, had told a “European Union External Action” (EEAS) conference that by imposing “restrictive measures on the Kremlin’s propaganda machinery and effectively ban them from operating within the European Union”, “we are not attacking the freedom of expression, we are just protecting the freedom of expression”. The EU’s “restrictive measures” aren’t limited to banning RT work from within the EU. Access to RT from EU countries is only possible via VPN. This includes the organization’s German and Chinese services. Main Source: EEAS

The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China”	(Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.”	(We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.”	(Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.”	(Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”.	If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle.	This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it. Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

or the other way round,

Table 2

Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be

because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Ko Wen-je discusses his Chances to be elected President, Cross-Strait Relations

The following is a translation of an article by Radio Taiwan International‘s Chinese service.

The article contains interesting quotes from an interview Ko Wen-je gave Next TV, but leaves out critical comments he reportedly made about Xi Jinping‘s Qin-Shi-Huang kind of actions.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Xi Jinping acting like Qin Shi Huang?

Main link:

No great chance to be elected president/ there are currently no cross-strait relations

Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je said in an interview aired on July 9 that concerning the 2024 presidential elections, he was “taking a preparatory look at the issue” but his own view of the odds for him wasn’t promising, there would be new politicians, and the situation would be different.

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的專訪中表示，對於2024總統「照這樣準備」，但自評勝算很低，且到那時會有新的政治人物出現、也沒有連任問題，戰局會不同。

Ko’s interview was broadcast on July 9 by Next TV. Asked by host Chen Yalin about the participation issue in the 2024 presidential elections, Ko declared for the first time that “I am still looking at such preparations, preparing for the presidential elections, just choosing like that, does it work or doesn’t it.”

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的壹電視專訪中，被主持人陳雅琳問及參選2024總統問題，他首度表態「我還是照這樣準備，準備選總統，就這樣去選，行或不行」。

The host followed up, asking “what is the chance that it would work?”, and Ko answered that if you lean on personal popularity to win, the mobilization abilities of the blue and green camps were both strong, and only if you lead by eight percent from the beginning, “if you ask me at this stage, the chances to get elected would be very low.” “When all media are playing the game like this, it can’t be easy.” Also, there would be new politicians by then, and there wouldn’t be re-election issues, which would make it a different campaign.

主持人追問「你覺得行的比例差不多多少」，柯文哲回應若要靠個人聲望贏，藍綠動員能力強，除非一開始就領先8%，「你問我現階段，選了贏的機會很低」，「所有的媒體這樣打，不容易啦」，且到那時都是新的政治人物、也沒有現在連任的問題，戰局會不同。

Ko Wen-je said that he was in a very calm mood now, with doing his work at the Taipei government, and if it [the presidential opportunities] was there, that would be fine, and otherwise, let it be. There was no need to care.

柯文哲表示現在心情都很輕鬆，正常在北市府開工，行就行、不行就算了，何必那麼在意。

Ko also said that at this stage, there were no cross-strait relations, only a Taiwan issue within the confrontation between China and America, with both China and America having their bottom lines. “Frankly speaking, my conduct and actions wouldn’t differ much from Ying-wen’s [President Tsai].”

柯文哲並表示，現階段沒有兩岸關係，只有中美對抗架構下的台灣問題，中美各有底線，「坦白講，我所作所為跟小英(蔡總統)的做法其實也差不多」。

Asked by the host about the Hong Kong national security law and the cross-strait situation, Ko Wen-je said that China has to reflect on how to deal with the people’s longings for democracy and freedom once arriving at a certain stage of economic development.

主持人問及對香港國安法及兩岸情勢問題，柯文哲表示中國必須思考當經濟發展到一個程度時，該如何處理人民對民主自由的渴望。

Asked what he had to say to China’s chairman Xi Jinping, Ko Wen-je said that [Xi] had better respect Taiwan. Democracy and freedom were the core of Taiwan’s politics, cherished by the Taiwanese, and, more importantly, the Taiwanese would want to retain it. Therefore, [Xi] needed to understand Taiwan’s current situation.

至於對中國國家主席習近平有何話說，柯文哲表示，他還是要尊重台灣。民主自由是台灣政治的核心；台灣人會珍惜它、更重要的是台灣人會去想要保有它，所以他必須了解台灣的現況。

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Updates / Related

Taipei to continue forum with Shanghai (click picture)

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Presidential Elections 2nd Debate

A video showing yesterday’s (December 25, 2019) second round of the presidential elections debate between President Tsai Ing-wen (DPP), the KMT’s nominee and Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu, and James Soong Chu-yu (PFP). (The design doesn’t seem to suggest that the rebroadcaster would be entirely above party lines. Indeed, according to Wikipedia, Sanlih Entertainment Television (SET) “leans heavily to the Pan-Green Coalition.”)

There’s also a transcript on Facebook. – a great chance for us learners of the Chinese language to read along.

No warranty for the completeness and accuracy of either source.

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Update

A third debate is scheduled for December 27 at 7 p.m. Taiwan standard time (that should be 11 a.m. UTC), to be broadcast by Taiwan Television (TTV).

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Related / more Updates

“Real debate” on Dec 29, Taiwan News, Dec 27, 2019

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Double-Ten 2019: Tsai’s speech, Han’s white paper

–

1. President’s speech

President Tsai Ing-wen’s national day speech is available

• • in Chinese and
  • in English

Among other issues, she rejected the “one country, two systems” concept advocated by Beijing.

Former president Ma Ying-jeou (2008 – 2016) and former vice president Lü Hsiu-lien (Anette Lü, 2000 – 2008) attended the event.

–

Han Kuo Yu’s white paper

KMT presidential candidate (and Kaohsiung mayor) Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) gave a speech at a flag-raising ceremony in Kaohsiung on October 9.

Han has also announced a white paper concerning relations with mainland China. The KMT’s “92 consensus” (九二共識) is believed to feature prominently in Han’s policies (as it has in former president Ma Ying-jeou’s), and the paper is also excpected to state “the defense of the Republic of China’s sovereignty”, “under the precondition of “one China with different interpretations” (一中各表).

While the “92 consensus” has long been disputed in Taiwan anyway (including the question if Beijing actually ever recognized such a consensus, or if it has been a KMT fantasy all along), Beijing’s more recent demands – “one country, two systems” to include Taiwan – mean that either way, a KMT president would be at odds with Beijing, just as is the current Tsai administration.

The KMT’s last Chance: Waste Separation in Shanghai

Main Link: Anyone may criticize the KMT, but not former “honorary member” Terry Gou (王丰：谁都有资格批评国民党，但前“荣誉党员”郭台铭没有)

Wang Feng (王丰), born 1956 in Taichung, Taiwan, to a mother from Jiangsu and a father from Hubei, is president of the China Times Group. He is also an occasional interviewee of Guanchazhe, an online news and commentary portal based in Shanghai. The China Times has been owned by Tsai Eng-meng (蔡衍明), a China-leaning businessman, since 2008. While Taiwan’s pan-green political camp detests the paper and doubts its integrity, in turn, Wang Feng, defending the paper in July this year against accusations that it had been taking “phone calls” from China’s “Taiwan Affairs Office” (TAO), criticized the accusers, saying that freedom, democracy and human rights were Taiwan’s hard-won values, and that a pluralistic and democratic society was the only thing Taiwan had over China.

Reporters without Borders (RSF) criticized the China Times Media Group for filing a lawsuit against the Financial Times’ correspondent Kathrin Hille (who had apparently reported about the alleged link to the “TAO” first), calling the legal action abusive. There doesn’t seem to be any news online about if and how the group’s legal proceedings have continued since.

That wasn’t an issue in Wang Feng’s most recent interview with Guanchazhe (published on Saturday) either. It centers around Foxconn founder Terry Gou‘s (郭台銘) withdrawal from the KMT, which had made him an honorary member only in April.

Based on opinion polling, Gou lost the KMT primaries to Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) in July this year.

Han Kuo-yu is now the KMT’s nominee, and therefore the KMT’s official challenger of incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen (DPP),  in Taiwan’s presidential elections, scheduled for January 11, 2020. However, his chances to emerge as Taiwan’s next president have faltered, not least since the beginning of large-scale demonstrations in Hong Kong, against a (now apparently scrapped) extradition law draft by the special administrative zone’s government. The Hong Kong events seem to have raised the Taiwanese public’s awareness of what the “one-country-two-system” approach, advocated by China’s party and state leader Xi Jinping as a “model” for Taiwan, would mean in practice, and an apparent unpreparedness by Han Kuo-yu to criticize Beijing has added to his problems on the campaign trail.

Criticizing Beijing, of course, is nothing Wang Feng would do either, nor would it be something Guanchazhe could publish anyway. If the KMT (rather than Taiwan in general) has any advantage over China in Wang’s book, it wouldn’t be “pluralistic and democratic Society” (as stated in his announcement to sue the Financial Times and the Taiwanese media who had referred to the FT’s Coverage), but the KMT’s potential skills in managing waste separation in, say, Shanghai (比如国民党的环保能力非常强，现在上海在搞垃圾分类，国民党可以派人来当顾问，帮大陆做得更方便、更干净). In such fields, the KMT should enter a competition with the Chinese Communist Party, Wang said, not so much in terms of votes (obviously), but in helping Taiwanese compatriots to leave a favorable Impression on mainland compatriots” (争取人心，不是去争取选票，而是要争取大陆同胞对台湾同胞的好感), and in making peoples’ lives easier.

The “big picture” Wang drafts for the KMT in the interview might be summed up as think global, act in China, suggesting that solving China’s (environmental) problems would contribute to solving the world’s problems. His interview can also be seen as part of Guanchazhe’s efforts to prepare the Chinese public (or the share of it that cares) for a (no longer unlikely) re-election of Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s president.

Terry Wang, apparently a very sensitive man when his own professional integrity, or that of his paper, is called into question, doesn’t mince his words about Terry Gou. As a man who had portrayed himself as a principled man who believed in Mazu and Guan Gong, Gou hadn’t done himself a favor by withdrawing  from the KMT, “neither in terms of business nor politically” (换言之，他现今的脱党举动会在他未来不管是企业还是从政的道路上，布下一个非常不好的变数，而所谓的变数就是让人对他的诚信产生根本的否定), Wang says. He also cites Gou’s management style at Foxconn as an example as to how void his recent criticism of the KMT actually were. After all, if Gou – contrary to the KMT old guards – was indeed a modernizer, he could have democratized Foxconn (郭台铭不“迂腐陈旧”，难道鸿海敢搞企业民主、开明治理吗).

As for the state of the KMT’s unity, Wang suggests a numerical game to predict how the Party would fare:

There is a precondition for the KMT being united, and it is that their candidate must be in a safe zone of winning the elections, or moving close to losing. In such situations, there is a likelihood for unity. If Han Kuo-yu’s support rate isn’t more than 30 percent, but 20 percent or lower, the KMT may split.

国民党的团结必须有一个大前提，就是候选人是在胜选的安全区域，或接近落选的危险边缘，这样他们才有团结的可能性。如果韩国瑜今天不是30%多的支持度，而是20%多或更低，那么国民党就会是分裂的。我刚还在想，国民党的这些人跟战国七雄很相似，他们心中永远有个战国心态，就是“老子弱的时候，就臣服于强者；老子强的时候，又蠢蠢欲动想分裂”。

According to Radio Taiwan International‘s (RTI) German service on September 12, Gou may register as an independent candidate until September 17. He is widely expected to run for president as an independent now. That, however, could force him to state his positions, much more explicitly than up to now, reckons Frozen Garlic, a blogger who has focused on the topic of Taiwan’s elections for more than nine years. Even though Gou had mostly served platitudes during a visit to Chiayi city council earlier this month (and before withdrawing his KMT honorary Membership),

[e]very time Gou speaks, he gives Tsai [DPP] and Han [KMT] an opening to question him and force him to defend his positions and the implications of those positions.

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Related

“We uphold our principles,” Jan 2, 2019

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Updates/Related

Gou bows out, RTI, Sept 17, 2019

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One Movement, Two Takes

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Beijing, April 30

Main Link: May-Fourth 100th Anniversary solemnly held at Great Hall of the People, Xi Jinping gives important Speech (纪念五四运动100周年大会在京隆重举行 习近平发表重要讲话)

Xinhua Beijing April 30 — A meeting to mark the 100th anniversary of the May-Fourth movement was solemnly held in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee, State Chairman, and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping gave an important speech at the meeting, emphasizing that for the past 100 years, the May-Fourth movement has been a continuous struggle of one youthful Chinese generation after another, marching forward under triumphant songs, creating 100 years of a youthful China, and a youthful nation, by their youthful selves. The main theme of the new era’s Chinese generation’s movement, its youthful movement’s direction, its youthful mission, is to uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, to be together with the people, to achieve the goal of the struggle for the “Two Centenaries” and the dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

新华社北京4月30日电 纪念五四运动100周年大会30日上午在北京人民大会堂隆重举行。中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平在会上发表重要讲话强调，五四运动以来的100年，是中国青年一代又一代接续奋斗、凯歌前行的100年，是中国青年用青春之我创造青春之中国、青春之民族的100年。新时代中国青年运动的主题，新时代中国青年运动的方向，新时代中国青年的使命，就是坚持中国共产党领导，同人民一道，为实现“两个一百年”奋斗目标、实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦而奋斗。

Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Wang Huning, Zhao Leji, Han Zheng and Wang Qishan attended the meeting.

李克强、栗战书、汪洋、王沪宁、赵乐际、韩正、王岐山出席大会。

In the Great Hall of the People’s great hall, the atmosphere was solemn and enthusiastic. Above the podium, red banners were hanging with the inscription “commemorating the May-Fourth Movement’s 100th anniversary”, and behind at the center, there was a red banner saying “1919 – 2019”, and ten red flags in rows at both sides. In a distance, from the second floor, there was the slogan “Closely united around the Party’s Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, make full use of the great May-Fourth spirit, uphold the correct direction of the new era’s Chinese youth movement, and do your utmost to achieve the dream of the Chinese nation’s great rejuvenation, the magnificient and youthful chapter!”

人民大会堂大礼堂气氛庄严热烈。主席台上方悬挂着“纪念五四运动100周年大会”会标，后幕正中是“1919－2019”的红色字标，10面红旗分列两侧。大礼堂二楼眺台悬挂标语：“紧密团结在以习近平同志为核心的党中央周围，发扬伟大五四精神，坚持新时代中国青年运动正确方向，奋力谱写实现中华民族伟大复兴中国梦的壮丽青春篇章！”

Before the beginning of the meeting, everyone loudly sang “I and my China”, “Without the Communist Party, There would be No New China”, “Glorious! Communist Youth League of China”, “Ode to the Motherland”, and other songs, everyone brimming with surging youthful passion.

大会开始前，全场高唱《我和我的祖国》、《没有共产党就没有新中国》、《光荣啊，中国共青团》、《歌唱祖国》等歌曲，会场洋溢着澎湃的青春热情。

[…]

Taipei, May 3

Main Link: 100 years of May-Fourth / Chen Ming-tong: Mainland doesn#t see Mr De and Mr Sai, Taiwan guided by May Fourth 五四百年／陳明通：大陸不見德賽先生 台灣引航五四

On this year’s 100th anniversary of the May-Fourth  Movement, [Taiwan’s] Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Chen Ming-tong has pointed out that strangulation of thought and freedom of speech control of young “listening to the party, going with the party”, an imbalance and twists between political reform and economic development, turning their backs to the May-Fourth spirit, all of mainland China ransacked and did away with the figures of “Mr Sai and Mr De”. Only with the practice of democracy on both sides of the Taiwan Strait could there be communication among equals, peaceful coexistence and a resolution of differences.

今年五四運動一百周年，陸委會主委陳明通指出，中共箝制思想言論自由、控制青年「聽黨話、跟黨走」，政治改革與經濟發展的失衡偏斜，背離五四精神，整個中國大陸遍尋不著「德先生與賽先生」身影。唯有兩岸都採行民主體制，才能對等溝通、和平共處、化解分歧。

In an address to a roundtable session for a”May Fourth 100th Anniversary: Mainland China’s Democracy Development Review” he said that “all-embracing freedom of thought”, as advocated as a school management guideline by then Beida University president had advocated “all-embracing freedom of thought” as a university management guideline by then Beida University president Cai Yuanpei, while these days, the Chinese Communist Party determined the May Fourth Movement as a history of the Communist Party’s struggle. Diverse and independent campuses, the spirit of freedom and openness, freedom of thought and speech had been strangled by the Communist Party, controlling the wave of  the young people “listening to the party, going with the party”.

陳明通3日出席「五四運動一百周年：中國大陸民主發展的反思」圓桌論壇時致詞指出，當年北大校長蔡元培倡導「思想自由、兼容並包」的辦學方針，如今中共將五四界定為共黨奮鬥史，中國大陸校園多元自主、自由開放的精神，已被中共箝制思想言論自由、控制青年「聽黨話、跟黨走」的反民主自由思潮。

[…]

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Related

One ROC, two Interpretations, Oct 10, 2011

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Updates / Related

A critical moment, SCMP, May 4, 2019

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“Deep-green,” but not the DPP’s candidate: Taipei’s Mayor wins another term

Taiwan’s municipal elections ended in a mostly blue (KMT) night, with the DPP apparently winning only in six cities or counties, and losing their stronghold in Kaohsiung to the KMT.

And the DPP people may still consider themselves lucky. After all, they had done their best to hand Taipei over to a KMT government, too, by nominating a DPP candidate instead of supporting independent candidate Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) as they had done four years earlier. Taipei’s election result has been extremely narrow. According to Wikipedia (as accessed today), Ke got 580,820 votes, compared with 577,566 for Ting Shou-chung (丁守中), his KMT competitor, and only 244,641 for the DPP contender.

Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA) points out that Ting lost to Ko with a difference of only 3,254 votes, i. e. less than 3 per mill, and that in accordance with the law, a sequester of the ballots and a check of the vote-counts accuracy can be requested from a court. (根據台北市選舉委員會的資料，尋求連任的市長柯文哲獲得58萬820票，當選台北市長。丁守中輸柯文哲3254票，差距小於有效票數的千分之3，依法可向法院聲請查封及驗票。)^*)

CNA:

After a deadlock of ten hours, Ke Wen-je won with 580,820 votes (41.05%) over Ding Shouzhong’s 577,566 votes (40.82%), with only 3,254 votes separating the two, which made this result the closest ever since the 1994 Taipei mayoral elections.

歷經逾10小時僵持，柯文哲以58萬0820票、41.05%得票率，擊敗丁守中的57萬7566票、40.82%，2人差距僅3254票，為1994年台北市長選舉以來，勝負雙方差距最小一次。

Ke Wen-je arrived at Four-four South Village at 2:35 in the morning, accompanied by Hsieh Ho-hsien‘s song “Taiwan’s Future.”

柯文哲在凌晨2時35分抵達四四南村，在歌手謝和弦「台灣的未來」歌聲下慢慢走到舞台，沿途獲得支持者熱烈歡迎與歡呼，而他的妻子陳佩琪、柯爸柯承發、柯媽何瑞英也在台上陪伴。

Not just Taipei’s, apparently. If the DPP would endorse him (on a national level) is a different question. Ko is still an independent, and – according to a Taiwan-based blog – about as gaffe-prone as Pasuya Yao. But either way, Pasuya Yao, not Ko, was the DPP’s candidate for the Taipei mayoral elections.

Ko’s relationship with the DPP has been somewhat uneasy recently, although “being deep-green is” his background.

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Note

^*) According to Radio Taiwan International‘s (RTI) English service, Ting Shou-chung, the KMT candidate, is contesting the election results.

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Related

Tsai steps down as DPP chair, RTI, Nov 24, 2018

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