Archive for January, 2019

Sunday, January 13, 2019

Tsai Ing-wen: Beijing’s Threats do Harm beyond Taiwan

When China threatens war, media do become interested in Taiwan (even though the threat is nothing new), Klaus Bardenhagen, a German correspondent in Taipei, wrote on January 6. His post links to an English translation of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen‘s new year’s address on January 1, to a summary of Chinese CCP secretary general and State Chairman Xi Jinping‘s “Taiwan message anniversary” speech (January 2), and to Tsai Ing-wen’s reaction to that speech (also on January 2).

Bardenhagen points out that the main newsworthy content in Xi’s speech was an equation of the “1992 consensus” with “one country, one systems” “one country, two systems”*) formula.

His post also reports President Tsai’s international press conference (or reception) on January 5 (see above video, statement in English).

Bardenhagen asked her what Taiwan would wish countries like Germany to do in this situation. Apparently, she didn’t reply with a specific demand to Germany, but to Taiwan’s general role in the community of other democracies:

When such a country faces difficulties and threats, we hope that the international community will watch this closely, speak on our behalf, and support us.

當這樣的國家面臨困難, 面臨威脅的時候,我們希望國際社會能夠重視,而且能夠替我們發聲、來協助我們

Because if a country like this one – that practices democracy and these internationally held values – is threatened and infringed upon, I believe that this harms democracy and many values. If Taiwan faces this situation and there is no international assistance to Taiwan rasing its voice, if Taiwan isn’t supported internationally, we have to ask which country will be next.

因為如果一個實踐民主,實踐這個國際共同的價值這麼努力的國家受到威脅,受到侵害,我相信,對民主,對很多的價值也是一種傷害。如果今天台灣面臨這樣的情況,國際不替台灣發聲,國際不為台灣來協助的話,我們要問下一個就是哪一個國家。

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Related

Press Reception, ROC President, Jan 5, 2019
“We uphold our Principles,” Jan 2, 2019

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*) Update/Correction, Aug 3, 2022

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Wednesday, January 2, 2019

Tsai Ing-wen: “We do not provoke, but we uphold our Principles”

The following  is my off-the-cuff translation of a statement made by Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen this afternoon, in response to remarks made by Chinese State Chairman Xi Jinping earlier today (all local time). This translation may contain errors.

One expression has remained untranslated; it had apparently been used by Xi Jinping earlier, and I don’t know its meaning – 心灵契合.


udn video (聯合影音), Jan 2, 2018

Main Link: President answers to Xi Jinping’s Remarks (full text), published by Radio Taiwan International (RTI)

After Chinese State Chairman Xi Jinping’s remarks on the 40th anniversary of the “Message of Compatriots in Taiwan” [on January 1, 1979], President Tsai Ing-wen answered personally, at the presidential palace, this afternoon (January 2). The wording is as follows:

在中國國家主席習近平發表「告台灣同胞書」40週年的紀念談話後,蔡英文總統今天(2日)下午也親自在總統府做出回應,全文如下:

Compatriots, friends from the media, good afternoon to everyone.

國人同胞,各位媒體朋友,大家午安。

This morning, Chinese State Chairman Xi Jinping made a so-called “Message of Compatriots in Taiwan” 40th-anniversary speech, proposing a one-country-two-systems plan and related content for Taiwan. As President of the Republic of China, I would like to explain our position concerning this matter.

今天上午,中國國家主席習近平,發表了所謂《告台灣同胞書》40 週年的紀念談話,提出了探索一國兩制台灣方案等相關內容,身為中華民國的總統,我要在此說明我們的立場。

First of all, I must seriously point out that we have never accepted a “92 consensus”. The basic reason is that this is a “92 consensus” defined by the authorities in Beijing. In fact, it just means “one China” and “one country, two systems”. What the leader on the other side of the Taiwan Strait said today has confirmed our misgivings. From here, I want to reiterate that Taiwan will not accept “one country, two systems”, and the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese public opinion also resolutely opposes “one country, two systems”, and this is also the “Taiwan consensus”.

首先,我必須要鄭重指出,我們始終未接受「九二共識」,根本的原因就是北京當局所定義的「九二共識」,其實就是「一個中國」、「一國兩制」。今天對岸領導人的談話,證實了我們的疑慮。在這裡,我要重申,台灣絕不會接受「一國兩制」,絕大多數台灣民意也堅決反對「一國兩制」,而這也是「台灣共識」。

Next, we are willing to sit down and talk, but as a democratic country, any political consultations and talks touching upon cross-strait relations must be authorized and supervised by the people of Taiwan, and conducted in a government-to-government mode. Under this principle, there are no people, no organizations who would have the authority to represent the Taiwanese people in political consultations.

其次,我們願意坐下來談,但作為民主國家,凡是涉及兩岸間的政治協商、談判,都必須經過台灣人民的授權與監督,並且經由兩岸以政府對政府的模式來進行。在這個原則之下,沒有任何人、任何團體,有權力代表台灣人民去進行政治協商。

The development of cross-strait relations – I said that very clearly in my new-year remarks yesterday – is that China must face up to the existing facts of the Republic of China on Taiwan rather than deny the democratic state system the people of Taiwan jointly established. Secondly, they must respect the adherence of the people of 23 million to freedom and democracy, and must not intervene in the Taiwanese people’s choices in a splitting and luring manner.

兩岸關係的發展,我在昨天的新年談話,說得很清楚,那就是中國必須正視中華民國台灣存在的事實,而不是否定台灣人民共同建立的民主國家體制;第二,必須尊重兩千三百萬人民對自由民主的堅持,而不是以分化、利誘的方式,介入台灣人民的選擇;

Thirdly, there is a need to handle the differences between the two sides in a peaceful manner among equals, instead of using pressure and threats in attempts to  make the Taiwanese yield. Fourthly, it has to be governments or legal mechanisms authorized by the governments who sit down to talk. Consultations unauthorized and unsupervised by the people cannot be considered “democratic consultations”. This is Taiwan’s position and the democratic position.

第三,必須以和平對等的方式來處理雙方之間的歧異,而不是用打壓、威嚇,企圖讓台灣人屈服;第四,必須是政府或政府所授權的公權力機構,坐下來談,任何沒有經過人民授權、監督的政治協商,都不能稱作是「民主協商」。這就是台灣的立場,就是民主的立場。

We are willing to conduct orderly and healthy cross-strait exchange on the foundations of “democratic consolidation” and “strengthening national security”. I would also like to reiterate that we must urgently establish a three-lane protection network for the safety of people’s livelihood, information security, and institutionalized democratic supervision mechanisms.

我們願意在「鞏固民主」以及「強化國家安全」基礎上,進行有秩序的、健康的兩岸交流,我也要重申,國內亟需要建立兩岸交流的三道防護網,也就是民生安全、資訊安全以及制度化的民主監督機制。

Cross-strait trade should be mutually beneficial, for both sides to prosper. However, we oppose the economic united front with Beijing’s method of “using gain as a lure”, with “benefiting only China” at the center, attracting Taiwanese technology, capital and talent “going to the mainland”. With all our efforts, we will promote the strategies and measures of “strengthening Taiwan”, consolidate Taiwan’s economic development route as the priority.

兩岸經貿應該互惠互利,共榮發展;但我們反對北京以「利中」為核心,以利誘及吸引台灣技術、資本及人才「走進中國大陸」的經濟統戰。我們將全力推動「壯大台灣」的各項策略跟措施,鞏固以台灣為主體、台灣優先的經濟發展路線。

Over the past two years, has carefully met its obligations as a member of the region, and actively contributed to cross-strait and regional peace and stability. We do not provoke, but we uphold our principles. We have endured pressure, but we have never abandoned our basic positions and promises concerning cross-strait relations. I would like to remind the Beijing authorities that big countries must act as big countries, with the responsibility of big countries, and that the international community is watching if there is change in China or not, and if it can turn into a partner who obtains trust. The “four musts” are the most basic and crucial basis on which cross-strait relations [must show if they] will or will not move towards positive development.

過去兩年來,台灣善盡區域成員的義務,積極貢獻於兩岸及區域的和平穩定。我們不挑釁,但堅持原則,我們飽受各種打壓,但我們從未放棄對兩岸關係的基本立場與承諾。我要提醒北京當局,大國必須要有大國的格局,大國的責任,國際社會也正看著中國能不能有所改變,成為受到信任的夥伴。「四個必須」正是兩岸關係能否朝向正面發展,最基本、也最關鍵的基礎。

The so-called 心灵契合 must be established on mutual respect and understanding, and on pragmatic handling on both sides of issues concerning the welfare of the people. For example, the most urgent issue of swine fever. Pressure on international companies to altering Taiwan’s name can’t bring about 心灵契合, buying Taiwan’s diplomatic allies won’t 心灵契合 either, and nor will military aircraft, warships that rotate around.

所謂的心靈契合,應該是建立在彼此的相互尊重與理解,建立在兩岸政府務實處理有關人民福祉的問題上。例如,眼前十萬火急的豬瘟疫情。施壓國際企業塗改台灣的名稱,不會帶來心靈契合;買走台灣的邦交國,也不會帶來心靈契合;軍機、軍艦的繞台,更不會帶來心靈契合。

Finally, I would like to reiterate that the nine-in-one regional elections that Taiwan’s grassroots public opinion would abandon sovereignty, or concessions concerning Taiwan.

最後,我要重申,九合一地方選舉的結果,絕不代表台灣基層的民意要放棄主權,也不代表在台灣主體性上做出退讓。

Democratic values are values and a way of life cherished by the people of Taiwan, and we call on China to bravely enter the democratic road. Only by doing so, they can really understand the Taiwanese peoples’ mindset and perseverance. Thank you.

民主價值是台灣人民所珍惜的價值與生活方式,我們也呼籲中國,勇敢踏出民主的腳步,也唯有如此,才能真正理解台灣人的想法與堅持。謝謝

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Related

New Year Address, ROC Presidential Office, Jan 1, 2019

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Wednesday, January 2, 2019

2018 Headlines (3) – Tsai Ing-wen’s Presidency after the November Municipal Elections

Radio Taiwan International (RTI) aired interviews with two political scientists on December 21, Lin Chong-pin (林中斌) of Tamkang University and Yu Chin-hsin (or Yu Ching-hsin, 游清鑫?) of National Chengchi University, discuss Taiwan’s November municipal elections and Tsai’s chances to get re-elected as president early in 2021, and the future of Tsai’s mainland policies.

Lin Chong-bin discussing Trump Kim meeting, South China Sea, on July 1, on VoA Haixia Luntan (click picture for video)

Lin Chong-bin discussing Trump Kim meeting, South China Sea,
on July 1, on VoA Haixia Luntan (click picture for video)

Born in 1942, Lin Chong-pin is a rather familiar face in Taiwanese and North American media. According to Wikipedia, he became a geologist around 1970, after studies at National Taiwan University and Bowling Green State University, and started political studies in 1978, at Georgetown University.

He served as an assistant to then US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and returned to Taiwan in 1995. He became a member of the Mainland Affairs Council in 1996, served as an advising member of the National Security Council from 2002, and as deputy defense minister from 2003 to 2004.

The Wiki entry also contains a list of books he authored, in English and in Chinese, and a gist of his views and assessment records of international politics.