Posts tagged ‘Taiwan’

Monday, October 17, 2022

CPC’s 20th National Congress: “The Party will never degenerate”

2,300 delegates were supposed to attend in February, more precisely, according to Li Keqiang (main link) on Saturday morning, the number was 2,296, plus particular invitees (特邀代表), that would be 2,379 delegates, minus 39 delegates having asked for leave because of illness, i. e. 2,340 delegates present there.

“Major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics to be unfolded in a comprehensive way” was unfolded by Xi Jinping himself in his work report. You should be forgiven if you think that this is about Chinese consuls-general tweeting about how America bombs and China helps Africa, or how their tummies bulged with pride when Xi Jinping told the party’s national congress that Taiwaners had no right to be free when 1.4 million Chinese were not.

But major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics isn’t a diplomatic market-economy product – it was produced at home in Beijing, by the 19th Central Committee’s Sixth Plenary Session (according to their communiqué in November 2021).

Condensed self-flattery concerning the party’s “zero-Covid” policy (which probably didn’t go down as well with the audience outside the “Great Hall of the People” as other parts of Xi’s speech), and this.

We have kept nailing the nails, thus correcting and punishing the “four winds”, opposed the idea and phenomenon of privileges, stopped some unhealthy trends that hadn’t been brought to a halt for a long time, and investigated and punished obstinate chronic diseases which hadn’t been eliminated for many years. We have fought an unprecedented fight against corruption, and by “offending thousands, and living up to the 1.4 billion” [Chinese people], we have fulfilled our mission to dispel the disease and disorder. The multi-pronged struggle against corruption, by beating the tigers, swatting the flies and hunting the foxes, has achieved an overwhelming victory and overall consolidation, eliminating the serious hidden dangers within the party, the state, and the military. By uncompromising efforts, the party found self-revolution, thus escaping the historical cycle of order and chaos, of rise and fall, for a second time. This has made sure that the party will never degenerate, never change color, never change smell.
我们以钉钉子精神纠治“四风”,反对特权思想和特权现象,刹住了一些长期没有刹住的歪风,纠治了一些多年未除的顽瘴痼疾。我们开展了史无前例的反腐败斗争,以“得罪千百人、不负十四亿”的使命担当祛疴治乱,“打虎”、“拍蝇”、“猎狐”多管齐下,反腐败斗争取得压倒性胜利并全面巩固,消除了党、国家、军队内部存在的严重隐患。经过不懈努力,党找到了自我革命这一跳出治乱兴衰历史周期率的第二个答案,确保党永远不变质、不变色、不变味。

hu_jintao
No offense meant, miserable failure

If Bo Xilai had said that, it would have struck people as populism – but then, Bo never made it into the top ranks.
China’s “Communists” have announced many victories in the past. If this one is as decisive as Xi has claimed will be hard to prove or disprove as long as he remains in control of the narrative.

Just these few sidenotes for now.

Monday, October 10, 2022

President’s Double-Ten Speech 2022: Expect no Walk in the Park

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen looks ahead to her two remaining years in office. The following is an excerpt from her Double-Ten national day speech this morning (Monday), based on the presidential office’s Chinese text, and an English translation by CNA.

20221010_president_tsai_ing_wen
Double-Ten speech 2022, click picture for video

疫情沒有擊倒我們,反而讓世界看見了臺灣的韌性。我們不只守住了疫情,更把我們往前推進了一步,成為我們心中更好的國家。 Instead of holding us back, the pandemic has helped the world see Taiwan’s resilience. Not only did we manage the spread of COVID-19, we helped Taiwan take a step forward, and made our country a better place.
但正如同棒球比賽一樣,這一局能夠化險為夷,並不代表,我們下一局就會風平浪靜。走過了上階段的疫情風暴,下一個階段我們挑戰更大,更需要我們沉著面對,共同解決。 But just as in baseball, being able to turn one inning around does not mean the next one will be a walk in the park. Having come through the outbreak of the virus, we know that our next challenges will be even greater, requiring a calm and collective response.
疫後的世界秩序,正在劇烈的變化。目前,歐美各國,正苦於通貨膨脹,和隨之而來的經濟衰退;臺灣的通膨,雖然還在可以控制的範圍,但我們仍然必須要因應,全球經濟衰退的變局。 The post-pandemic world order is in a state of rapid change. Countries across Europe and the Americas are suffering from inflation and the resulting economic downturn. While inflation in Taiwan is still at a controllable level, we must nevertheless prepare for the developments that might be triggered by a global economic contraction.
在此同時,全球供應鏈重組,仍在進行當中。臺灣雖然在半導體、以及資通訊軟硬體的領域,已經取得關鍵的地位;但在其他領域也必須要快步跟上,才能立於不敗之地。另外,極端氣候帶來的異常災變,也提醒我們,必須要建立更能夠快速應變的機制。 At the same time, global supply chains are still undergoing restructuring. Though Taiwan already holds a key position in the fields of semiconductors and information and communications technology hardware and software, we must quickly catch up in other fields to ensure our strong footing. In addition, disasters caused by extreme weather events remind us that we must build mechanisms for rapid response.
在經濟局勢的過程當中,我們還要面對的另外一個挑戰,那就是烏俄戰爭持續在進行;中國在南海、東海、以及臺灣海峽的軍事行動,衝擊印太地區的和平穩定。我們絕對不能忽視,軍事的擴張,正在挑戰自由民主的世界秩序。這些變局,都跟臺灣息息相關。 Aside from economic developments, Russia continues its war against Ukraine, while China’s military activity in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait undermines peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We absolutely cannot ignore the challenge that these military expansions pose to the free and democratic world order. These developments are inextricably connected with Taiwan.
臺灣正處在變局之中。我們不能抱著僥倖的心態。我們必須堅定民主立場,審慎的做出準備,隨時因應瞬息萬變的情勢。 With Taiwan a part of this changing landscape, we cannot leave things to chance. Instead, we must stand up for our democracy, and prepare prudently and sufficiently to respond to any possible contingency.
回顧過去,正是因為臺灣的韌性,我們才能夠度過疫情的挑戰。未來的兩年,在我任期的最後,我們不僅要持續站穩「四個堅持」的立場,更要在經濟產業、在社會安全網、在民主自由體制、在國防戰力,打造更精實的「四大韌性」。 Looking back, we can see that we were able to weather the challenges of the pandemic precisely because of Taiwan’s resilience. Over the remaining two years of my term, we will continue to resolutely uphold our Four Commitments. We will also enhance the resilience of four key areas: our economy and industry, social safety net, free and democratic government system, and national defense.
把中華民國臺灣,打造成為一個更強韌的國家,就是現階段國家發展,最重要的目標。 The work of making the Republic of China (Taiwan) a more resilient country is now our most important national development priority.

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Related

An Economy with new Bones, May 20, 2016
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Monday, September 12, 2022

A Vice-Ministerial Visit to Taiwan and its Story

圖說:駐立陶宛台灣代表處正式掛牌設立,新獲任命的首任代表黃鈞耀及同仁攝於館牌前。 Splittist doorplate – click photo for source

A 28-person Lithuanian delegation of laser and biotechnology company representatives led by the Baltic nation’s Vice Minister of Economy and Innovation Karolis Žemaitis has reportedly arrived in Taiwan for an official visit today (Monday, September 12 UTC).  Also today, Lithuania’s public broadcaster LRT republished a Voice of America article saying that espite offering to build high-speed rail, China charm offensive loses appeal in Baltics.

National security may have been about as much a factor in the cooling relations between China and several of its European partners, as have unfulfilled business expectations.

The Latvia state security service published a report in 2020 “essentially saying that Chinese activities in Latvia are very similar to Russian intelligence activities”,

the article quotes Martins Hirss, a researcher at the University of Latvia. The China-Central-Europe connection originally included “seventeen-plus-one” nations, i. e. Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The Voice of America / LRT article also quotes an observer as saying that China will work in a more ‘targetted’ way, enhancing its profile where it already exists in a positive manner, for example, Hungary, Serbia.

All three Baltic countries have ended participation int the 17+1 format by now, leaving China with Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (14+1 or Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, China-CEEC).

Lithunia not only led the departure of the Baltic cooperation members (Estonia and Latvia followed in August  this year), but has also endured a particularly intense conflict with Beijing over the name of Taiwan’s de-facto embassy in its capital Vilnius  – The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania in English, or 駐立陶宛台灣代表處 in Chinese.

That was followed by Chinese economic warfare against Lithuania which in turn not only triggered a legislative process on the level of the European Union, but also likely convinced Lithuania’s two Baltic neighbors that they stood more to lose than to gain from “partnership” with China.

According to Taiwan’s foreign ministry as quoted by “Focus Taiwan”, the English-language website run by Taiwan’s Central News Agency CNA,

the fourth Lithuanian delegation led by a deputy minister-level official to Taiwan this year, following visits by Žemaitis’ immediate predecessor Jovita Neliupšienė on June 12, Ministry of Agriculture Vice Minister Egidijus Giedraitis on June 22, and Lithuanian Deputy Transportation Minister Agne Vaiciukevičiūtė on Aug. 6

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Related

Sender Viesintos, Wikipedia, acc Sept 12, 2022

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Thursday, September 8, 2022

The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

taiwanren_are_also_chinese

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China” (Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.” (We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.” (Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.” (Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”. If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle. This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it.
Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

table_one_mainland_china

or the other way round,

Table 2

table_two_orc
Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

table_three_orc

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be
table_must_not_exist
because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

table_four_taiwan
That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Tuesday, August 9, 2022

Guesswork: 20th National Congress of the CPC (1)

Propaganda video, apparently with material from 2017

Propaganda video, apparently with material from 2017

Date: Not specified yet, but most likely in October or November,2022
Location: “Great Hall of the People”, Beijing
Participants: 2,300 delegates from 38 “electoral” bodies.
In charge of “elections”: The CPC organization department.
Candidates are selected in five steps, according to Li Cheng, quoting a organization department press release.
Menu

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Notes

*) “worthy to be called a wise (or brilliant) leader” (不愧为英明领袖) was another trial balloon, released by Cai Qi in 2017.

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Tuesday, August 2, 2022

Émissions Ondes Courtes de Tamsui, Taiwan, en Français

Le retour du service français de Radio Taiwan International aux ondes courtes, printemps 2020 QSL

Le retour du service français de Radio Taiwan International aux ondes courtes, printemps 2020 QSL

Radio Taiwan International’s direct programs from Tamsui Émissions directes de Radio Taiwan Internationale de Tamsui
Shortwave is gaining ground: Radio Taiwan International’s French service will broadcast from its shortwave transmission site in Tamsui this month – every weekend (Fridays through Sundays) from 17:00 to 18:00 UTC on 11995 kHz and from 19:00 to 20:00 UTC on 9545 kHz.
August 05 – 07
August 12 – 14
August 19 – 21
August 26 – 28.
Pour la première fois, il y aura des émissions françaises de Tamsui, Taiwan, pour les regions européennes et nord-africaines. Selon Radio Taiwan Internationale,
Le programme de cette activité radiophonique en français sera diffusé en Ondes Courtes tous les vendredis, samedis et dimanches du mois d’août.
Fréquence 11995 kHz, 17h00-18h00, temps universel (19 h à Paris),
Fréquence 9545 kHz, 19h00-20h00, temps universel (21 h à Paris),
tous les week-ends.

mappemonde des émissions ondes-courtes de Radio Taiwan Internationale

Bonjour le Monde – les émissions réguliers de Radio Taiwan Internationale – source: RTI

Tests were carried out in July in a range of 308 to 325° reportedly, which suggests that both northern Africa and Europe should be good places to listen to the transmissions from Tamsui, northwestern Taiwan. Des émissions testes ont été effectués en juillet, dans un azimut de 308 à 325°.
RTI’s French service usually broadcasts for Europe on 6005 kHz, from 19:00 to 19:30 UTC, via Kostinbrod relay, Bulgaria. Listeners who don’t usually listen to the station’s internet programs (one hour of programming per day) will have a great opportunity to get to listen to programs they wouldn’t usually hear on shortwave. Normalement, il y a une émission par jour de Kostinbrod, la Bulgarie, chaque jour de 19:00 à 19:30 temps universel (21 – 21:30 h à Paris) sur 6005 kHz, pour l’Europe et l’Afrique du nord. En outre, il y a une transmission pour l’Afrique ouest tous les dimanches, en 13835 kHz (apparemment à partir d’Issoudun, Centre-Val de Loire, en France).
Si vous n’écoutez, d’habitude, les programmes français en ligne (il y en a une demie-heure sur les ondes courtes, mais des 30 minutes additionnels en ligne), les émissions de Tamsui vous donneront une belle occasion d’écouter des programmes rares sur les ondes courtes en août, car il y en aura 60 minutes par émission de Tamsui.
Saturday, July 16, 2022

Radio Taiwan International (RTI) 2022 Shortwave Transmissions to Europe, from Tamsui, in French and in German

Taiwan Blue Magpie, aka "long-tailed mountain lady", featured on RTI German Service's 2021 special QSL card

Taiwan Blue Magpie, aka “long-tailed mountain lady”, featured
on RTI German Service’s 2021 special QSL card

Test transmissions led to the choice of 11,955 11995 kHz for broadcasts at 17:00 UTC, and 9545 kHz for broadcasts on 19:00 UTC. All broadcasts in German are one-hour transmissions, and they provide listeners with an idea of the content they don’t usually get to hear on shortwave, as regular broadcasts via Kostinbrod relay, Bulgaria, are only 30 minutes long.
The other half of the program can usually only be found online.
The special summer transmissions at 17 and 19 hours from Tamsui can be heard on 17 and 19 h UTC on every Friday, Saturday and Sunday for the rest of July.

In August, every Friday, Saturday and Sunday, there will be direct transmissions from Tamsui in French, also one-hour programs, at 17:00 on 11,995 kHz and at 19:00 UTC on 9545 kHz.

Reception reports are reliably confirmed with special QSL cards for Tamsui transmissions, and the German and the French services issue QSL cards different from each other – so reporting on both language programs makes a lot of sense for collectors.

Sunday, June 19, 2022

Radio Taiwan International (RTI) 2022 Shortwave Transmissions to Europe, from Tamsui, in French and in German

Tamsui transmitters site, NW Taiwan, RTI QSL card 2015

Tamsui transmitters site, NW Taiwan, RTI QSL card 2015

Update: weekend transmissions in July and August from Tamsui, Taiwan

RTI German Service

As is tradition at RTI’s German Service, Radio Taiwan International has scheduled one-hour broadcasts directly from Tamsui, NW Taiwan, to Europe. Those are a great opportunity to listen to a wider range of RTI programs. Usually, outside this special summer season, you only get to hear about half of the gems RTI German has in store for its listeners – the other half can only be listend to online. Also, the usual RTI German broadcasting routine goes through a relay transmitting site in Bulgaria, on 5900 kHz from 19:00 to 19:30 UTC.

There will be test transmissions from Tamsui to Europe on Saturday, June 25, at the following times and on the following frequencies:

Time UTC/GMT Frequency
17:00 – 17:10 11995 kHz
17:30 – 17:40 11995 kHz
19:00 – 19:10 9545 kHz
19:20 – 19:30 7240 kHz
19:40 – 19:50 7250 kHz

Your reception reports will probably matter, because Radio Taiwan International  says they are going to choose the two frequencies that are reported to work best for their one-hour broadcasts in July.

Those July broadcasts are scheduled as follows (time only, for now):

Friday, July 08, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 08, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 08, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Friday, July 15, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 16, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 17, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Friday, July 22, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 23, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 24, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Friday, July 29, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 30, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 31, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC

RTI French Service

For the first time, Radio Taiwan International’s French service also broadcasts directly from Tamsui, Taiwan.

They plan to test the same frequencies as RTI German does, but on Saturday, July 2. The times and frequencies for the test transmissions, also ten minutes each, will be the same as the German service’s tests on June 25.

Here, too, listeners’ reception reports will define the choice of frequencies, according to RTI French. Their one-hour broadcasts are scheduled for August, on every weekend from Fridays through Sundays, i. e. the month following the German weekends, also at 17:00 UTC and 19:00 UTC respectively.

Radio Taiwan International reliably confirms reception reports with QSL cards.

Good DX, and happy listening!

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