China-GCC Summit: “Let’s be Partners in our Civilizational Rise”

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“The Chinese people see the Arab people as good friends”, then Chief State Councillor Wen Jiabao told his hosts during a visit to the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, thirteen years ago. A few months earlier, then Chinese special representative to the Middle East, Wu Sike, had told a press conference in Beijing that Islamic countries from government to the people, all understand and support the measures the Chinese government took to maintain stability.

To prove that, Xi Jinping held a summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (in the following: GCC) country leaders in Riyadh on Friday last week. Judging by the faces around the table, only God knows for sure how understanding and supportive the GCC leaders really are, but business is business, and maybe Arab heads of state and govenment never look happy during official appointments anyway. At any rate,

Mohammad Altowaim, a member of the Saudi Chinese Business Council, told the Global Times that he read Xi’s article carefully twice, and the second time he read it to his friends, he read it loud

China’s propaganda usually limits its posts on Twitter to trite feelgood quotes from their great helmsman, but Xi Jinping’s actual “keynote speech” was ambitious. How connective the interfaces of both sides, coined “highly complementary” by Xi, will turn out to be, remains to be seen.  But China’s reference point and litmus test – America – is showing promising signs: Washington is not happy, says CNN.

The following is my translation of Xi Jinping’s keynote speech, given at the China-GCC summit on Friday afternoon local time in Saudi Arabia. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Esteemed Colleagues, Secretary General Nayef, Hello Everyone!
尊敬的各位同事，
纳伊夫秘书长：
大家好！

First of all, let me sincerely express my heartfelt gratitude to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its efforts in holding the first Chinese-Gulf-Cooperation Council countries’ summit. I’m very glad that we are getting together all at once, to discuss the development of Sino-GCC relations together.
首先，我谨对沙特阿拉伯王国为举办首届中国－海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会峰会作出的努力表示衷心感谢。很高兴同大家齐聚一堂，共商中海关系发展大计。

China and the GCC countries share a history of nearly two-thousand years of friendly contacts. China and the GCC countries have maintained and valued peace, harmony, and sought the real knowledge of “Eastern wisdom”, along the ancient Silk Road. Ever since the GCC was established in 1981, China and the GCC have, for more than fourty years, written a brilliant work of unity and mutual help and win-win cooperation.
中国同海合会国家有近两千年友好交往历史。双方人民秉持重和平、尚和谐、求真知的“东方智慧”，沿着古丝绸之路往来不绝。1981年海合会一成立，中国即同海合会建立联系。40余年来，双方谱写了团结互助、合作共赢的灿烂篇章。

China and the GCC countries relations have, after all, achieved rapid development rooted in deep mutual trust. China and the GCC countries have always supported each others’ sovereignty and independence, respected each others’ paths of development, equality of big and small countries without exception, and firmly maintained multilateralism. Rooted in highly complementary [economies], with China’s vast consumer market and its perfect industrial system and with the GCC’s rich energy resources and increasingly diversified development, the two sides are natural cooperation partners. Rooted in popular sentiment, China and the GCC both belong to the Eastern civilization, with similar civilizational values and its peoples knowing each other well. Rooted in trials and tribulations lived through together, facing the challenges of international and regional instabilities and the financial crisis, the COVID-19 epidemic situation, and major natural disasters, the two sides have been in the same boat, keeping watch over each other.
中海关系之所以实现跨越式发展，归根于深厚互信，中国和海合会国家始终相互支持彼此主权独立，尊重各自发展道路，坚持大小国家一律平等，坚定维护多边主义。归根于高度互补，中国拥有广阔消费市场，工业体系完备；海方能源资源丰富，经济多元化发展方兴未艾，双方是天然合作伙伴。归根于民心相通，中海同属东方文明，文化价值相近，人民相知相亲。归根于患难与共，面对国际和地区风云变幻以及金融危机、新冠肺炎疫情、重大自然灾害等挑战，双方同舟共济，守望相助。

Colleagues!
各位同事！

Facing a century of turbulent changes, the GCC countries have united in their strife for self-improvement, have overcome the negative epidemic impact and achieved economic growth, actively promoted political solutions for regional hotspots and problems, promoted the GCC to become the Middle Eastern Gulf’s most vital regional organization, which is highly appreciated by China. At a historical crossroads, let’s contintue the good tradition of China-GCC strategic partnership, and substantiate the content of China’s and the GCC’s strategic relationship.
面对百年变局，海合会国家团结自强，克服疫情影响实现经济增长，积极推动地区热点难点问题政治解决，推动海合会成为中东海湾最具活力的地区组织，中方对此高度赞赏。站在历史的十字路口，我们要赓续中海友好传统，以建立中海战略伙伴关系为契机，充实中海关系战略内涵。

Let’s be partners in unity and continuously solidify mutual political trust, let’s firmly support each others’ core interests. Let’s jointly uphold the principle of non-interference, join hands for a genuine practice of multilateralism, and protect the numerous developing countries’ common interests.
——做共促团结的伙伴。我们要不断夯实政治互信，坚定支持彼此核心利益。共同维护不干涉内政原则，携手践行真正的多边主义，维护广大发展中国家共同利益。

Let’s be jointly-planning¹ partners. Let’s strengthen strategic development interfaces, bring complementary advantages into play, and train the kinetic energy of development. China looks forward to cooperating with all parties to promote and implement global development initiatives, to implement the United Nations’ agenda for sustainable development, and to promote regional development and prosperity.
——做共谋发展的伙伴。我们要加强发展战略对接，发挥互补优势，培育发展动能。中方期待同各方一道推进落实全球发展倡议，落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程，促进地区发展繁荣。

Let’s be partners in building security together. China will continue its firm support for GCC countries’ protection of their security, its support for the region’s countries in solving disagreement through dialogue and consultations, and in building a Gulf security framework. GCC countries are welcome to participate in global security initiatives and in upholding regional peace and stability together.
——做共筑安全的伙伴。中国将继续坚定支持海合会国家维护自身安全，支持地区国家通过对话协商化解分歧，构建海湾集体安全架构。欢迎海合会国家参与全球安全倡议，共同维护地区和平稳定。

Let’s be partners in our civilizational rise. We should enhance communication between our peoples, enrich cultural exchanges, learn from each others’ outstanding civilizational products, promote the eastern civilizations’ profound marrows, and make positive contributions to humankind’s civilizational development and progress.
——做共兴文明的伙伴。我们要增进民心相通，丰富人文交流，借鉴彼此优秀文化成果，弘扬东方文明深厚精髓，为人类文明发展进步作出积极贡献。
Colleagues!
各位同事！

During the coming three to five years, China would like to make efforts with the GCC countries in the following major fields of cooperation:
未来3到5年，中国愿同海合会国家在以下重点合作领域作出努力：

Firstly, let’s build a new pattern of three-dimensional energy cooperation. China will continue to import great quanitities of crude oil from GCC countries, broaden its imports of liquified natural gas, strengthen upstream oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and cooperation in engineering services and refining logistics. Full use should be made of Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, and the settlement of accounts in RMB should be developed. Hydrogen power, energy storage systems, wind and solar energy, intelligent electrical networks and other cooperation on clean and low-carbon energy technology as well as localization of new energy source equipment should be developed. A Sino-GCC forum for the peaceful use of nuclear technology as well as a Sino-GCC demonstration center for nuclear safety should be established, and 300 technical talents from GCC countries be educated in the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
第一，构建能源立体合作新格局。中国将继续从海合会国家持续大量进口原油，扩大进口液化天然气，加强油气上游开发、工程服务、储运炼化合作。充分利用上海石油天然气交易中心平台，开展油气贸易人民币结算。加强氢能、储能、风电光伏、智能电网等清洁低碳能源技术合作和新能源设备本地化生产合作。设立中海和平利用核技术论坛，共建中海核安保示范中心，为海合会国家培养300名和平利用核能与核技术人才。

Secondly, let’s make headway in financial and investment cooperation. China would like to cooperate with GCC countries to develop financial-supervision cooperation, facilitate GCC countries’ access to the Chinese capital market. establish sovereign wealth funds with GCC countries, and launch cooperation in numerous ways. Let’s explore and hold Sino-GCC industrial and investment cooperation forums. Let’s strengthen cooperation in the fields of investment in the digitized economy and in green development, and establish bilateral mechanisms for investment and economic cooperation. Let’s work on the interchangeability of our own currencies, deepen digitized currency cooperation, and promote the multiple central bank digital currency bridge project.
第二，推动金融投资合作新进展。中国愿同海合会国家开展金融监管合作，便利海合会国家企业进入中国资本市场。同海方成立共同投资联合会，支持双方主权财富基金以多种方式开展合作。研究举办中海产业和投资合作论坛。加强数字经济和绿色发展等领域投资合作，建立双边投资和经济合作工作机制。开展本币互换合作，深化数字货币合作，推进多边央行数字货币桥项目。

Thirdly, let’s expand new fields of cooperation on innovative technology. China would like to establish a big-data and cloud-computing center with GCC countries, strengthen 5G and 6G technological cooperation, jointly establish a number of innovation and startup incubators, and ten projects around cross-border e-commerce and communications infrastructure. Let’s establish a cooperation mechanism for meteorological cooperation between China and the GCC and hold research Sino-GCC research forums on climate change.
第三，拓展创新科技合作新领域。中国愿同海合会国家共建大数据和云计算中心，加强5G和6G技术合作，共建一批创新创业孵化器，围绕跨境电商合作和通信网络建设等领域实施10个数字经济项目。建立中海气象科技合作机制，举办中海应对气候变化研讨会。

Fourthly, let’s achieve new breakthroughs in space cooperation. China would like to carry out a series of cooperation projects concerning remote-sensing and communications satellites, space applications, and space infrastructure. Let’s select the best astronauts² for training. China welcomes GCC austronauts to the Chinese space station, to carry out scientific experiments on flights together with Chinese austronauts. GCC austronauts are welcome to participate in China’s Chang’E, Tianwen, etc. transport cooperation. and in the establishment of a Sino-GCC moon-probing and space-probing center.
第四，实现航天太空合作新突破。中国愿同海合会国家在遥感和通信卫星、空间应用、航天基础设施等领域开展一系列合作项目。开展航天员选拔训练合作，欢迎海合会国家航天员进入中国空间站，同中国航天员联合飞行并进行空间科学实验。欢迎海方参与中国嫦娥和天问等航天任务的搭载合作，研究成立中海联合月球和深空探测中心。

Fifthly, let’s build cooperation highlights in language and cultural cooperation. China is going to cooperate with 300 GCC universities, middle- and elementary schools for Chinese-language education to establish 300 Chinese-language classrooms, to provide 3000 “Chinese Bridge” summer (or winter) camps, establish Chinese Learning and Testing Centers and online Chinese classrooms. Let’s hold Sino-GCC language and cultural forums, build humanities exchange and mutual-learning and bilingual data bases.
第五，打造语言文化合作新亮点。中国将同300所海合会国家大中小学合作开展中文教育，同海合会国家合作设立300个中文智慧教室，提供3000个“汉语桥”夏（冬）令营名额，建立中文学习测试中心和网络中文课堂。举办中海语言文化论坛，共建中海人文交流和互鉴双语文库。

Colleagues!
各位同事！

China and the GCC countries all shoulder their own responsibilities in the mission of rejuvenated national development. The Sino-GCC relations are both old and young. Let’s connect the past and the future, advance hand in hand, and jointly initiate the beautiful future of Sino-GCC relations!
中国和海合会国家各自肩负民族发展振兴的光荣使命，中海关系既古老又年轻。让我们继往开来，携手奋进，共同开创中海关系美好未来！

Thank you all!
谢谢大家！

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Notes

1	共谋 (gòngmóu) is actually a rather negative verb – to scheme, to conspire, etc.. “Jointly plan” is also a possible translation, but by far the nicest one among a rather nasty lot.
2	Chinese-English nomenclature: taikonaut

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Related

How to speak to Pakistan, April 22, 2015

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Learning Chinese with the CCP: Hantui (汉推)

Links within blockquotes added during translation.
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Looking back at the past year, our institute has made whole-hearted efforts, has broken new ground for new conditions, and has achieved new successes. Summarizing the past and looking at the future, our institute will, based on the current solid foundations, continue its efforts, to contribute its own strengths to the cause of the motherland’s promotion of the Chinese language.

回顾过去的⼀年，我院竭诚努力，在汉语教学和文化推广方面开拓了新局面，取得了新成果。总结过去，放眼未来，我院将在当前坚实的基础上，继续努力，为祖国的汉推事业贡献自己的⼀份力量。

Mrs Wang Xi (王冏), head of the Confucius Institute in Sibiu, Romania,
as quoted by Radio Romania International (ROI), Dec 20, 2019
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Hantui

Hantui is the abbreviation for the International Han (Chinese) language^*) promotion.

汉推是汉语国际推广的简称。

With the arrival of the “Chinese language fever”, all countries in the world were in need of a sharp increase in Chinese language teachers. To cope with the situation, the international Chinese Language Promotion , as a field of study,  appeared within China. Different to the training of Chinese teachers [for foreign students], the targets of this field of studies were Chinese language learners abroad, with Chinese language training  crossing the national threshold to carry out Chinese-language education.

随着“汉语热”的到来，世界各国需要汉语教师的数量猛增，针对这种情况国内出现了汉语国际推广这个专业。与以往对外汉语教师培养不同的是，这个专业的培养对象是面向国外汉语学习者的，是走出国门进行汉语教学的。

Currently, there are about a dozen universities and colleges which have opened related fields of studies, with Beijing Normal University being rather distinctive among them. As the Beijing base for the international promotion of the Chinese language, Beijing Normal University opened the Chinese Language Promotion’s master degree class (abbreviated: hantui ban), using new educational methods to comprehensively train the students’ abitities to satisfy overseas students’ curiosity about Chinese language and culture. Beijing Normal University’s methodology has been positively evaluated by many, receiving the American College Board‘s, the Hanban’s, and other units’ positive evaluation. This field of studies has also become popular. According to people in charge of it, 800 out of Beijing Normal University’s graduate [or post-graduate] students have entered themselves for this field’s examinations in a very intense competition.

目前，国内有十几所高校在汉办的协助下开设了相关专业，其中北京师范大学是比较有特色的。作为汉语国际推广的北京基地，2006年北京师范大学成立了汉语国际推广硕士班（简称汉推班），采用了新的培养模式，全方位培养学生的能力，以满足海外学生对中国语言和文化的好奇。目前北师大模式已经获得了广泛的好评，得到了美国大学理事会（college board)，汉办等单位的好评。这个专业也成为热门。据相关负责人介绍，今年北京师范大学的研究生考试中，有800人报考这个专业，竞争十分激烈。

Among the students enrolling at the about a dozen universities and colleges nationwide in 2006, there are currently more than 300 [post] graduate students reading again. The pattern is that the first year is for specialized knowledge training in China, the second is for internships abroad, and the third year is for completing the graduation thesis back in China. If staying abroad during the third year, students in internships can apply for an extension, or complete their graduation thesis abroad.

2006年在全国十几所高校同时招生，目前有300多人再读研究生。其培养模式是，第一年在国内进行专业知识的培训，第二年出国实习，第三年回国完成毕业论文。如果第三年仍然在国外实习的同学可以申请延期或者在海外完成论文。

Baike Baidu, accessed Dec 20, 2019

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Tea culture propaganda base

Chinese International Language Promotion’s Tea Culture propagation base (International Tea Culture Base) is one of the Chinese Hanban’s 31 Chinese International Language Promotion’s bases, officially approved and established in December 2014. The base opened at Zhejiang Agriculture and Forestry University and is currently the only Chinese International Language Promotion base with the specialty of tea culture.

“汉语国际推广茶文化传播基地”（International Tea Culture Base）是国家汉办在全国建立的第31家汉语国际推广基地，于2014年12月正式批准成立。基地设立在浙江农林大学，是全国目前唯一以茶文化为特色的汉语国际传播基地。

The base centers on Chinese culture going global and the “belt and road” national strategy, integrates Confucius Institute development plans, makes ample use of Zhejiang Province’s time-honored tea culture, integrates all the province’s resources, strengthens top-level planning, actively explores contacts with Chinese and global tea culture, benefits from the universality of human health and other issues, establishes a tea quality system and a tea culture experience center as well as a tea culture experience center, builds a high-level international tea culture teaching team, […]

加强顶层设计，积极探索中国与世界在茶文化交往、益于人类健康等方面的共通性，建立茶质量标准体系，建设茶文化体验中心；组建高水平的茶文化国际教学团队，[…..]

Zhejiang A&F University, June 4, 2018

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Teachers’ grassroot branch discusses 19th central committee’s 4th plenary session’s spirit

So as to learn the solid promotion of “never forgetting where we started from, holding on to the mission”, the grassroot branch of the Southern base for the international promotion of the Chinese language held a thorough study of the implementation of the Party’s 19th fourth central committee’s plenary session‘s spirit, at Xiamen University’s Xiang’an Campus library B908, as a theme party day activity.

为推进“不忘初心、牢记使命”主题教育专题学习，11月20日上午汉语国际推广南方基地教师支部在厦大翔安校区图书馆B908召开深入学习贯彻党的十九届四中全会精神专题主题党日活动。

Happening to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the founding of the new China, the fourth plenary session of the 19th central committee is a highlight in the party’s and country’s undertaking’s overall situation and strategy. Based on the current and long-term perspective, from persevering with the party’s leadership, the people being the masters in their own affairs, rule according to the law being brought forward by organic unity, from reform and development stability, domestic policy, diplomacy and national defense, the unfolding of governing the party, the country and the army, the Jianling Buildings succinctly show to the inside and outside world the outstanding superiority of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The comrades at the grassroot branch conscientiously studied the central committee’s  “resolution concerning the upholding and perfecting of the socialism with Chinese characteristics system and the promotion of the national governing system’s and governing ability’s modernization” and other learning material and combined their efforts in collective exchanges of views.

适逢新中国成立70周年，十九届四中全会站在党和国家事业的全局和战略高度，立足当前、着眼长远，从坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一切入，从改革发展稳定、内政外交国防、治党治国治军等方面展开，高屋建瓴、提纲挈领地对内展示、向外昭示了中国特色社会主义制度和国家治理体系的显著优势。支部党员同志们认真研读了《中共中央关于坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度、推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化若干重大问题的决定》等学习材料，并结合自身领悟进行集体深入交流讨论。
[…]

The Southern Base of Confucius Headquarters, Xiamen University, Dec 5, 2019

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Note

^*) When a language is said to be “Chinese”, this usually refers to the Han nationality’s language, not to other languages spoken within the PRC.

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Related

向全世界讲好中国茶的故事 (tea propaganda), Zhejiang A&F University, Dec 20, 2019

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Shortwave Logs: Radio Romania International (RRI)

If you are looking for a European broadcaster on shortwave, the BBC World Service may come to your mind – or Radio Romania International (RRI). The latter’s range of program languages is quite diverse: English, Chinese, French, Romanian, Ukrainian, Russian, Arabic, Spanish, Italian, and German. One a week, on Sundays, there’s a broadcast in Hebrew, too, with a review of the week¹⁾.

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— Some history

According to the station’s website, first experimental radio programmes for target areas beyond Romania’s borders were aired in 1927. Broadcasting became official on November 1, 1928, on 747 kHz (401.6 meters) – apparently targeted at a domestic audience, in Romanian only. French and English programs followed in 1932, “to inform the diplomatic corps in the Romanian capital city”, and weekly programs in French and German were targeted at central and western Europe. Before the second world war, all foreign broadcasts depended on medium wave transmitters. When the first shortwave transmissions began, the focus appears to have been on the Balkans, and the Middle East. According to RRI, [i] t seems that the first letter received from abroad came from Egypt.

It’s a detailed account of RRI’s history (and that of its preceding organizations, all headquartered in Bucharest’s General Berthelot Street), and will most likely contain some information that is new to the reader.

Olt County’s coat of arms, as depicted on a QSL card of December 1985, and as of these days (click picture for Wiki entry)

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— Languages, Programs, Contraditions

RRI provides news, background reports and some cultural coverage. Much of the content is the same in English, German, and Chinese, but focus may differ somewhat. While there is news, some background information and cultural programming in all these languages, listeners’ preferred topics seem to count, too. German listeners frequently enquire about European and social issues – something that appears to be of less interest to Chinese listeners. The scope of Chinese programs may also be somewhat limited by air time: thirty minutes per broadcast in Chinese, rather than sixty, as is the case with some of the broadcasts in English, French, and German.

When it comes to international exchange or openness, RRI certainly can’t be accused of discrimination. The Institut Francais is shown among their partners on the French service’s web pages, and a link to the “Confucius Institute” in Bucharest adorns the Chinese-language main page, side by side with one to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (with no specified status).

According to RRI’s English service’s website, RRI’s Chinese service, which first went on air on October 1, 1999, benefited from […] Chinese language experts […] as well as our colleagues from Radio China International, the Romanian language department […].²⁾

Given the kind of “news” being broadcast by China Radio International (CRI), this kind of cooperation doesn’t look appropriate.

Some caveats: undue Beijing’s influence isn’t limited to RRI in particular, or to southeastern Europe in general³⁾ (as suspected by some German quarters). A number of German universities have opted for cooperation with the agency from Beijing, for example, and areas of cooperation are hardly less sensitive.

Also, RRI’s news broadcasts in Chinese don’t appear to differ from those of the English or German departments. When Chinese listeners hear about Romanian citizens who take to the street, opposing changes to the country’s legal system, or Japan’s prime minister emphasizing liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as Japan’s and Romania’s shared values and principles, it may be met with more open minds, than if broadcast by a source that is deemed hostile by its audience.

All the same, turning October 1, 1949 into common ground between the audience and the station’s first broadcast in Chinese (October 1, 1994) spells a major contradiction, when suggesting at the same time, on a different history page, that RRI services turned towards the future, towards once again building a bridge between Romania and the democratic world and re-establishing the link between Romanians living abroad and those back home, a link that had been weakened on purpose by the totalitarian regime.

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— Audience

RRI doesn’t offer detailed statistics – few international broadcasters do. It seems likely, however, that a presence on shortwave makes a difference for the better. I wouldn’t hear or read much about the country, if its signals didn’t come in handy. I’m suspecting that within Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, you can listen to RRI with a pressing iron (any appliance with spiral coils should do).

What has kept this blogger from giving feedback to the station is their online policy. It seems that everything that is mentioned in their listener’s-feedback programs goes right online, as a transcript. Facebookers probably won’t mind, but more traditional listeners may be a different story.

Either way, RRI certainly has its fans, and its multipliers.

–

— Shortwave

Shortwave plays an important role, at least when it comes to middle-aged and old listeners. For one, there’s the technical aspect. Nobody is encouraged to disassemble and reassemble his smartphone, or to boost its transmission power or its sensitivity. Use of shortwave, however, involves technical aspects, and people interested in some DIY. And while an app user may brush any source of information away after a few seconds, shortwave listeners’ attention span is likely to be sturdier.

It would seem to me that among a number of other aspects (sound not least – I find digital sound ugly), shortwave broadcasting signals respect for the listeners. It is more costly than web-based communication, it doesn’t provide broadcasters with as much information about how “efficient”, in terms of listener numbers, their productions actually are (which means that even the invisible listener matters), and it doesn’t ask if a listener lives under circumstances that allow for internet access – be it for economic or censorship reasons.

Shortwave is therefore a unique RRI feature. Bulgaria abandoned its shortwave transmissions years ago, so did Radio Poland, Radio Ukraine International, and Radio Prague (except for some airtime on German or American shortwave stations respectively). Radio Budapest, once one of the most popular Eastern European external broadcasters, is history.

–

— Recent RRI logs

Broadcasts in Chinese, German, and Hebrew
Time UTC	Lang.	Date	Freq.	S	I	N	P	O
07:00	German	Jan21	7345	5	5	5	4	4
13:30	Chinese	Jan21	9610	4	5	5	3	4
17:05	Hebrew	Jan21	9790	4	5	5	3	4

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Footnotes

¹⁾ RRI’s website states 19:05 hours as the beginning of the transmission, which is standard time in Romania, and in Israel (17:05 GMT/UTC).
²⁾ The Romanian department at CRI still exists, with an online presence, and medium/shortwave transmissions.
³⁾ The “Spiegel” interview in German.

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Human Rights and Economic Records: Botched Measures and Terrible Occurrences

Before the old (lunar) year leaves and a new comes in, things need to be tidied up in China. However, efforts to calm the stock markets by new management measures appear to have been unsuccessful. And in Hong Kong, where RMB trading, is unrestricted, people pay less for China’s currency, according to the New York Times.

There’s still other bad news, and the indicator in this case, too, is Hong Kong.

“Something terrible has happened. We are all afraid. We are leaving now,” an employee told me a few hours before locking the doors for the foreseeable future.

That’s how the BBC‘s correspondent in the former British colony, Juliana Liu, concluded an entry in the broadcaster’s China blog on Monday, and the topic, of course, is the case of five Hong Kong citizens, all associated with the Causeway Bay Bookstore, who have gone missing since October last year. The latest case is Paul Lee, and he went missing late in December.

Hong Kong’s SCMP, one of East Asia’s leading English-language papers, but one with an uncertain future, reported on Monday the first precept speech by a Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. The guy who’s imitating the late great dictator is, of course, current party secretary general, state chairman, and the central military commissions’ (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping. The speech is seen as part of Xi’s efforts to reform China’s military, but obviously, the – probably intended – signal goes beyond the armed forces project.

Given that no other former CMC chairman, from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, had given a military precept, an associate professor at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law concludes that Xi’s power and authority is even higher than them.

This may or may not be true. If  Wang Qishan, rather than Li Keqiang, ranks second in terms of power or influence within the party, the assessement may be correct. But then, maybe Deng Xiaoping, who faced open ideological competition at times by more conservative party veterans like Chen Yun, simply didn’t need to show off his autority by admonishing the military.

Back then, too, the party was corrupted. But that was at a time when – or that’s how it felt, anyway – everyone had a chance to become rich. Now, there’s a two-fold challenge of corruption and slowing growth.

This could mean that Xi has powers because potential rivals do not want to challenge him, so as not to rock the not-so-stable boat.

If China’s regime manages the switch from an export-led economy to a more services-oriented economy successfully, the doubts in Beijing’s macro-economic control of the economy won’t persist – some disappeared people, in China or elsewhere, have never been a great concern to business.

All the Xidadamania aside however, confidence in mainland China, in Hong Kong, and abroad, appears to be slipping, at least currently.

In an interview with German national radio on Thursday, Markus Taube, a professor at a university in Germany’s Ruhr region, stated “a massive loss of confidence” in China:

What we see in China at the moment, definitely, is a massive loss of confidence. All market actors can see that the CCP has clearly lost its former control capacity. Until now, the Chinese market was always a very [unreadable] […]. Now, this ability to lead isn’t in place and that the state has failed several times, on its own promises.

Das, was wir in China momentan definitiv sehen ist ein massiver Vertrauensverlust. Alle Marktakteure sehen, dass die Kommunistische Partei offensichtlich ihre frühere Steuerungskapazität verloren hat. Bislang war der chinesische Markt immer ein sehr [unreadable] … Fundamentaldaten haben da kaum eine Rolle gespielt, und es war das Vertrauen einfach da, dass die Partei, der Staat, im Endeffekt die Richtung vorgibt [unreadable]. Jetzt ist es so, dass diese Führungsfunktion fehlt und dass der Staat mehrfach versagt hat, auf seine eigenen Versprechen hin.

Not least, Taube said, the “anti-corruption campaign” has discouraged Chinese decisionmakers in charge of approving (or delaying) investment projects.

Given that Chinese control mechanisms – concerning the financial markets – are out of order, Taube, with an audible sigh, introduces an old friend from the 2009 tool cabinet:

It sounds unorthodox, but probably, in the current situation, it would be more appropriate to issue another stimulus package, in that the state, again, to a great extent, pumps money into the economy. A classical Keynesian stimulus package to create state-induced demand so as to restore the economic dynamics on a basic level.

Es klingt sehr unorthodox, aber wahrscheinlich ist es in der momentanen Situation tatsächlich eher angesagt, ein klassisches Konjunkturpaket wieder aufzusetzen, einen Stimulus, in dem der Staat einfach in großem Maße wieder Geld in die Volkswirtschaft hineinpumpt. Also ein klassisches keynesianisches Konjunkturprogramm, in dem einfach staatlich induziert Nachfrage geschaffen wird, und damit einfach die volkswirtschaftliche Dynamik auf einem grundlegenden Level wieder stabilisiert wird.

That said, Taube doesn’t judge the situation by standards of five-year plans, or by taking the long view, as recommended by the Lord of the Confucius Institutes. Taube advocates a stimulus because the methods tried more recently haven’t worked and wouldn’t turn the tide for the coming six months.

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Updates/Related

» Executives Disappearing, HP, Jan 8, 2016

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Emphasizing District-Level Cooperation and Mass Work: Xinhua reviews Xi Jinping’s State Visit

The following is a translation of an article published by Xinhua news agency on Tuesday. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Chairman Xi Jinping’s first [update/correction: state] visit to America has been successfully concluded. It hasn’t only brought the nervous talk about qualitative changes in Sino-American relations to an end, but it also provided the global economy with positive expectations, successfully managed differences and risks, and to the Asia-Pacific and even to the world’s peace and stability, it has brought positive energy.

习近平主席对美首次国事访问圆满落下帷幕，不仅给半年来沸沸扬扬的中美关系质变论画上了句号，也给全球经济带来正面预期，并成功管控分歧与危机，给亚太乃至世界和平稳定带来满满的正能量。

This shows once again that the new type of big-power relations between China and America are possible, feasible, and projectable. On the road of building [these relations], some indications can be found:

这再次表明，中美新型大国关系可能、可行、可期，其建立之道，由此也可见端倪：

— From the bottom to the top. America’s elites, particularly its strategic elites, are worried about China, talk negatively about the direction of Sino-American relations, while the the district levels and common people are less affected by ideological and national-security interference, with a positive development for Sino-American relations. As for American diplomacy, Chairman Xi therefore particularly emphasized regional and local cooperation and doing mass work, to explore how the roads of the Chinese dream and the American dream are interlinked.

——以下博上。美国的精英，尤其战略精英，对华忧虑重重，存在唱衰中美关系倾向，而州及民众层面较少受意识形态、国家安全等问题干扰，发展对华关系积极。习主席对美国外交故而特别强调省州合作与做民众工作，探索中国梦与美国梦相通之道

— Adding to the existing quantities. Bilateral Sino-American trade is at an annual average of six-hundred billion US dollars, and Chinese investment in America is expected to rise to 200 billion US dollars by 2020. American diplomacy constantly digs into the potentials of economic cooperation, [no translation found]. The Sino-American Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is considered important by both sides.

——以存量博增量。中美双边贸易额年均达6000多亿美元，预计到2020年中国在美投资规模达2000亿美元。对美外交，就是不断深挖经贸合作潜力，做大压舱石。中美投资协定谈判（BIT）因而为各方所看重。

— Shelving smaller differences from common ground. China and America are the world’s leading powers, and interest conficts are inevitable. What matters is mutual respect, to follow the principles of no clashes and no confrontation [or antagonism], to strive for common ground while setting small aside differences. For example, in the previous stir about internet hacking issues, the theft of trade secrets was a small [legal] case, while the common ground is about rules for an open internet, with great peace and security. Having grasped this trend, through the U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum and other activities, and the promotion of network cooperation, had become a highlight of Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to America. Arriving at consensus concerning the joint statement on climate change and other issues, and having built a solid foundation for the United Nations Climate Change Conference to be held in Paris at the end of this year, are commended by the world.

——以大同存小异。中美都是世界首屈一指的大国，利益分歧在所难免，关键是相互尊重，遵循不冲突、不对抗的原则，求大同、存小异。比如此前炒得沸沸扬扬的网络黑客问题，异的是窃取商业秘密的小案件，同的是网络的开放、和平与安全大的规则。把握这一趋势，通过举办中美互联网论坛等活动，推动网络合作成为习主席访美成果亮点之一；通过达成中美气候声明等共识，为年底在巴黎召开的联合国气候变化大会成功奠定坚实基础，为世界所称道。

[Global order issues / One-Belt-one-Road initiative / U.S. concerns alleviated]

[global governance]

The Chinese and American path of establishing new-type big-power relations is constantly explored further. Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to America has provided an example for this kind of exploration, directing the focus on the future development of Sino-American relations, and an example for the new-type big-power relations of the 21rst century.

中美建立新型大国关系之道，是不断探索的。习近平主席访美，是这种探索的成功之举，引领中美关系的未来发展，也为21世纪新型国际关系的建立做出了表率。

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Related

» Safe for democracy, Wikipedia, acc. Oct 6, 2015
» Safe for authoritarianism, FP, June 4, 2015
» No meeting without substance,Oct 2, 2015
» Your sea is our sea, July 16, 2015

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Leadership Styles: No Meeting without Substance

The Taipei Times compared Pope Francis‘ and Xi Jinping‘s leadership styles: the Chinese traveller to America was outwardly strong and internally weak, while the Roman-Argentinian was the exact opposite, the paper wrote in an online article on Tuesday. As a man who kept close to the public, was met with large crowds of people wherever he went and held Mass for almost 1 million people, the Pope had been a perfect example of soft power.

That was a bit like lauding a model mineworker for churning out tons of coal every day, and criticizing a goldsmith for not doing likewise – or vice versa.

Soft power abroad? Quite a number of Chinese people – especially Chinese people with some exposure to foreign cultures and hurt feelings – may long for it, and the Economist logically threatened Xi with something worse than criticism: neglect. But the politburo could care less. As long as the results are satisfactory – and as long as people at home can be made believe that Americans (not just at Boeing) could hardly wait for the Chinese visitor, everything is staying the desirable course.

But what are the results?

The two sides reached broad consensus and achieved a number of positive results, Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) wrote on Sunday:

According to a list published by the Chinese ministry of commerce on September 26, the major consensus and results reached by the two sides can be counted as 49 points, fitting into five big categories. Obama, on his own initiative, reiterated that America maintained the one-China principle and did not support “Taiwan independence”, “Tibet independence”, “Xinjiang independence”, and that America would not get involved in Hong Kong affairs.^*)

据中国商务部26日公布的成果清单透露，双方达成的主要共识和成果可分5大类共49项。奥巴马在峰会上主动重申，美国坚持一个中国政策，不支持“台独”、“藏独”、“疆独”，也不介入香港事务。

According to Xinhua reports, Xi Jinping made important suggestions concerning the next stage of Sino-American relations, emphasizing the need to promote Sino-American relations that would always develop along the correct track. The two sides agreed to continue efforts to build Sino-American great-power relations of a new type. He [Xi] also emphasized that the Chinese nation was highly sensitive about matters concerning China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He hoped that America would scrupulously abide by the relevant promises, not to support any action aimed at harming China’s unity and stability.

据新华社报道，习近平就下阶段中美关系发展提出重要建议，强调要推动中美关系始终沿着正确轨道向前发展。双方同意继续努力构建中美新型大国关系。他亦强调，中华民族对事关中国主权和领土完整问题高度敏感。希望美方恪守有关承诺，不支持任何旨在损害中国统一和稳定的行动。

In this regard, Obama, on his own initiative, reiterated that America maintained the one-China principle, scrupulously abided by the principles of the three Sino-US Joint Communiqués, and that this position would not change. America did not support “Taiwan independence”, “Tibetan independence”, and “Xinjiang independence”, and would not get involved in Hong Kong affairs. This is the second time after denying American connection to Hong Kong’s “Occupy Central”, during the APEC summit last year, that Obama stated his position.^*)

对此，奥巴马主动重申，美国坚持一个中国政策，恪守中美三个联合公报原则，这一立场不会改变。美国不支持“台独”、“藏独”、“疆独”，也不介入香港事务。这是奥巴马继去年APEC期间否认美国与香港“占中”活动有关后，再次公开对有关议题做出表态。

The 49 projects, results and consensus concern the five great fields of Sino-American great-power relations of a new type, practical bilateral cooperation, Asia-Pacific affairs, international affairs, and global challenges. Among these, nearly twenty negotiation points pertaining to financial and trade cooperation and the Sino-American Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), awaited by all circles, have made progress. The information published by the Chinese ministry of information pointed out that both the Chinese and American leader had reiterated that to reach a high-level investment agreement was “the most important economic issue between the two countries”, and that both sides had agreed to strongly push the negotiations and to accelerate the work.

中美达成的49项目成果和共识涉及中美新型大国关系、双边务实合作、亚太地区事务、国际与地区问题、全球性挑战等五大领域，其中有近20项涉及金融和贸易合作，各界期待的中美投资协定（BIT）谈判业已取得进展。中国商务部26日公布消息指，中美两国领导人重申达成一项高水平投资协定的谈判是“两国之间最重要的经济事项”，双方同意“强力推进谈判，加快工作节奏”。

The Chinese achievement list unequivocally mentions: “The two countries’ leaders reiterate that to reach a high-level investment agreement is “the most important economic issue between the two countries”, and both sides agree to “strongly push the negotiations and to accelerate the work, so as to reach a mutually beneficial, double-win, high-level investment agreement”.

中方成果清单中明确提到：“两国领导人重申达成一项高水平投资协定的谈判是两国之间最重要的经济事项。高水平的投资协定将反映双方对于非歧视、公平、透明度的共同成果，有效促进和确保市场准入和运营，并体现双方开放和自由的投资体制。中美两国同意强力推进谈判，加快工作节奏，以达成一项互利共赢的高水平投资协定。”

China Institute of International Studies researcher Yang Xiyu says that this position [held by] the two heads of state was of historical significance, meaning that the world’s biggest developed and the world’s biggest developing country could, as fast as possible, achieve BIT, and that the world’s two biggest economic entities achieving BIT will raise the long-awaited effects, further solidifying the foundations of mutual trust in trade.

中国国际问题研究院研究员杨希雨表示，两国元首这一表态具有历史性意义，意味着世界上最大的发达国家和最大的发展中国家或尽快达成BIT，而世界上最大的两个经济体达成BIT协议将起到引领效应，进一步夯实中美互信的经贸基础。

[…]

Within the list of achievements, several points of consensus have been reached concerning Sino-American network security cooperation, such as China and America agreeing that each country’s government must not engage in, or knowingly support, the stealing of intellectual property rights, including trade secrets, and other classified trade information. China and America committed themselves to jointly define and promote appropriate standards of international society conduct on the internet, and to establish a high-level, joint dialogue system between the two countries, to strike at cyber crime and related issues. A number of American experts said that this was an important outcome of this [Xi] visit, and that strengthening cooperation about network security was a really important field of work in Sino-American relations. Indiana University professor and high-level Council of Foreign Relations network security researcher David P. Fidler believes that the two countries’ having achieved this consensus is “of major significance, and welcome news”.

此次成果清单中，中美网络安全合作达成多项共识。如中美同意，各自国家政府均不得从事或者在知情情况下支持网络窃取知识产权，包括贸易秘密，以及其他机密商业信息；中美承诺，共同继续制定和推动国际社会网络空间合适的国家行为准则，并建立两国打击网络犯罪及相关事项高级别联合对话机制。多位美国专家对此表示，这是此访重要成果，网络安全是中美加强合作的一个非常重要的领域。印第安纳大学法学教授、美国外交学会网络安全高级研究员戴维．菲德勒认为，两国达成的这一共识“意义重大且受人欢迎”。

The two sides will also strengthen anti-corruption cooperation, strengthen high-speed rail cooperation, strengthen cultural exchange cooperation, and reach consensus in reaction to global challenges, broaden practical cooperation on bilateral, regional and global levels, and manage and control differences and sensitive issues in a constructive manner, continuously achieving new positive results.

此外双方还在加强反腐败合作、加强高铁建设合作、加强文化交流合作及应对全球性挑战方面达成共识，将努力拓展双边、地区、全球层面各领域务实合作，以建设性方式管控分歧和敏感问题，不断取得新成果。

A benevolent label for these outcomes could be progress, and an accurate one would be unverifiable progress. It’s sort of obvious that Washington and Beijing wouldn’t issue a snafu statement at the end of the talks. What Beijing might consider a real achievement, however, is the prevention of an exchange of sanctions in the wake of the “network security”, i. e. hack-and-spy, controversies. That doesn’t go without saying – news coverage during late summer pointed to a chance that this could happen.

Hong Kong website Fenghuang (or Ifeng), in an article on September 22, attributed much of the success in defusing the conflicts to a visit by a delegation to Washington from September 9 to 12:

China attaches great importance to Sino-American relations and their future development, and does not ignore the concrete problems that occupy America.

中国关注中美关系大局及未来走向，并未怠慢美国关注的具体问题。

From September 9 – 12, politburo member and the central committee’s political and judicial committee secretary Meng Jianfu visited America in his capacity as Xi Jinping’s special envoy, together with [a delegation of] responsibles at offices for public security, the judiciary, network communication, etc.. He had talks with secretary of state John Kerry, homeland security secretary Jeh Johnson, national security adviser Susan Rice, and other central [US] authorities, to exchange views about cyber crime and other outstanding problems, and to achieve important consensus. Meng Jianzhu’s trip broke with old habits. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s diplomacy has become more direct and more practical.

9月9日至12日，中共中央政治局委员、中央政法委书记孟建柱以 习近平特使身份，率公安、安全、司法、网信等部门有关负责人访问美国，同美国国务卿克里、国土安全部部长约翰逊、总统国家安全事务助理赖斯等核心部门举行 会谈，就共同打击网络犯罪等突出问题深入交换意见，达成重要共识。中央政法委书记作为特使，打破以往惯例，习近平治下的中国外交更加直接务实。

That, and some more soothing soundbytes from Beijing, appeared to have had their effect on Washington, suggests Fenghuang:

On September 16, Obama made remarks about cyber security again, but according to Reuters, America will not impose sanctions on so-called “cyber attacks” before Xi Jinping’s visit, and maybe not afterwards either.

16日，奥巴马再次就网络安全放话，但据路透社报道，美国不会在习近平访美之前对所谓的“网络攻击”进行制裁，之后可能也不会。

After all, the main goal of the Obama administration had been to put pressure on Beijing, and to address domestic complaints, the Fenghuang article believed.

What looks credible – because it’s said to be long-established practice anyway – is that whatever consensus was indeed there between Washington and Beijing had been reached before Xi Jinping even set foot on American soil.

When he reached the American West Coast from Beijing, he meant business, not soft power – although there’s probably something charming to a 300-aircraft order form, at least among the stakeholders. The traditional microcosms were also conscientiously cultivated, even if Winston Ross of Newsweek was not convinced:

[Xi Jinping’s] handlers, who had corralled me and the reporters from the Associated Press, Bloomberg and the Los Angeles Times for the previous hour in anticipation of this exchange, apparently assumed we all spoke Mandarin. The Times reporter shot me a bewildered look. I shrugged. Xi said something to Oregon Governor Kate Brown that she found hilarious. We asked for a transcript of his remarks. We were not given one.

That occasion, Xi’s first stop – i. e. the meeting with American governors and Chinese provincial governors -, wasn’t (much) about substance, Ross alleged. He could have known better, even without translation: maintaining contacts between many layers of business and politics – not just the top echelons – is both a Chinese move to keep contacts going even if top-level relations between China and another country should deteriorate. Besides, while Confucius Institutes and other means of  indoctrination soft power may face some scrutiny at federal or central governments of democratic countries, regional authorities may lack the resources that such scrutiny would require.

Chinese central leaders waste no time with unsubstantial meetings. They waste no time with soft-power ambitions either. It’s the technology, stupid.

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Note

^*) VoA has a somewhat different take on this: according to their newsarticle on Wednesday, Obama referred to both the Three Joint Communiqués, and the Taiwan Relations Act, and that had been the only public remarks made about Taiwan during Xi’s state visit in Washington. Ta Kung Pao omitted the mention of the TRA.

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Related

» Joint Press Conference, White House, Sept 25, 2015
» Six-point proposal, Xinhua, Sept 25, 2015

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A Look at the Rumors about China Radio International

There has been some talk about plans among China’s leaders to close down a number of foreign-language services – the German-language department among them -, at China Radio International (CRI), China’s international broadcaster. Keith Perron, a radio producer in Taiwan, claimed inside knowledge and suggested that, according to this quote by Glenn Hauser‘s World of Radio, March 26:

At last month’s meeting of the committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in Beijing, one of the subcommittees, headed by Zhang Dejiang, who is also chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, will form a twelve-member board to look into the effectiveness of shortwave as a [unreadable] platform for China Radio International. Members include leaders from various former ministries, including the [unreadable], culture, propaganda, SARFT, and the central committee.They may be looking at shortwave cuts made in Australia, Canada, Russia, UK, and the US. Last year the Chinese government spent over 600 mega Yuan on the shortwave, that’s about 100 mega dollars US. It includes not only CRI, but China National Radio [aka Chinese People’s Broadcasting Station, CPBS — JR]. They will be looking at staff reductions. CRI currently has a staff of 8,500. They are looking at reducing some 40 percent, closing several of their overseas bureaus, closing CRI Television, some CRI language services. Looked at for axing are: Tagalog, Polish, Greek, Italian, German, Esperanto, Kroatian, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandic, Finnish, Bulgarian, and Danish. But English would be expanded, as would Chinese.

What struck me on December 31 last year – but it wouldn’t lead me to dramatic conclusions, of course – was that party secretary general and state chairman Xi Jinping had dropped CRI from his new-year’s address. The broadcaster was mentioned along with CPBS and CCTV by Xinhua’s introductory text, but not by Xi himself. Both Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin had made it a tradition to mention CRI, CPBS, and CCTV in their new year’s addresses – and CRI was always mentioned first.

To put the rumors about CRI into some perspective, though, Perron had been a critic of “waste” at CRI for some time, and understatment isn’t onw of his greatest hobbies. The Voice of America (VoA), for example, is a terminally ill patient, which might lead to the question who’s more dead – the American or the Chinese foreign broadcaster.

And Bernd Seiser, chairman of the Radio Taiwan International Ottenau Listeners’ Club, said in his April 10 club bulletin he had been told by CRI staff that

I can confirm that CRI will not terminate its German-language programs on shortwave.

However, listeners who wanted information on shortwave frequencies would need to enquire with the German department, rather than receive frequency notifications automatically by email, said Seiser.

So, how much truth is there in the rumors about closing the departments mentioned by Perron? That’s hard to tell.  For one, it appears unlikely to me that CPPCC committee activities would go completely unreported inside China (which appears to be the case – I’ve seen no such report in the Chinese media). However, it wouldn’t appear exactly unlikely that China’s top cadres want CRI to become more effective. Three years ago, CRI German still ran a program dedicated to listeners’ letters and emails, but the feedback, as a rule, appeared to be embarrassingly low. Regular broadcasts of telephone interviews with German listeners weren’t a terribly reviving factor either. By now, feedback from the audience is interspersed into CRI Panorama, a magazine with a variety of topics, rather than featured in a dedicated program. An editorial staff of 31, according to CRI German’s website anyway, might be expected to draw a bigger crowed on the other side of the radio, too. (That said, there’s no information concerning their working hours.)

What seems highly unlikely to me is a closure of the German department. For the time being, Germany is an important “partner” for the Chinese leadership, in technological and partly in political terms. For one, both China and Germany try to defend their inveterately high trade surpluses against a growing international chorus of criticism. Even a small congregation of “early Christians” is probably worth being nurtured, from the CCP’s point of view.

Will shortwave be reduced? Maybe, but not necessarily. If the early Christians want shortwave, maybe their prayers will be heard. And jamming of foreign broadcasters like VoA, BBC, or All India Radio, will remain in place anyway. To avoid making it unnecessarily obvious, domestic CPBS stations at least will continue to be used as informal jammers in future, too, along with the “Firedrake”.

Does CRI make a big difference in Germany? Hardly so. What does make a big difference is Chinese financial and economic engagement in Germany, and Chinese interest in German products: sponsoring professorships, taking a stake in a new (and not yet used-to-capacity) German seaport, buying Volkswagen cars, etc.. China’s money has great leverage in Germany, even in German politics.

China’s public diplomacy remains a seedling here – but that’s probably no reason to dump CRI German.

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Related/Updates

» 杨尚昆, 通过中国国际广播电台, Jan 1, 1993
» CRI 历史, CRI, undated
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Taiwan Newsarticle: European and American Universities refusing Cooperation with Confucius Institutes

The following is a translation of an article published online by Radio Taiwan International (RTI), on January 13 this year. RTI based their article on coverage by United Daily News (聯合報), the Liberty Times (自由時報, sister to the English-language Taipei Times), and Associated Press (AP).

I haven’t checked upon mainland coverage of these issues yet (RTI mentions Huanqiu Shibao, for example), but might do so next week.

As for Astrid Soderbergh Widding, the Stockholm University vice-chancellor quoted by RTI, the South China Morning Post quoted her in January as saying that “establishing institutes that are funded by another nation, within the framework of a university, is rather a questionable practice”.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Main Link:
Academic Freedom Threatened, European and American Universities refuse Cooperation with Confucius Institutes

Related Tag:
Confucius Institute

Mainland China’s Huanqiu Shibao reported on January 12 that Stockholm University has announced the termination, by the end of June, of its cooperation with the Confucius Institute in Stockholm – the first Confucius Institute founded in Europe, in 2005. The reason was that given the expansion of bilateral cooperation, this form of co0peration was no longer in step with the times. Before that, two American universities also said that they would not renew their contracts with the Confucius Institutes. These decisions reflect the concerns that the role of Confucius Institutes in the respective countries have caused.

大陸環球時報12日報導，瑞典斯德哥爾摩大學宣布，將在今年6月底關閉於2005年開辦的歐洲地區第一所孔子學院，理由是，隨著雙邊關係的拓展，這項合作已不符合時宜。在此之前，美國也有2所大學表示不再與孔子學院續約。歐美學府的這些決定反映出孔子學院的角色已在相關國家引發關切。

To alleviate doubts, Beijing promotes soft power

◎消除疑慮 北京推軟實力

Supported by its economic power, mainland China’s international political status has risen, Beijing’s rise received high global attention, and it also led to some doubts: to highlight China’s rise as a peaceful one, and to strengthen mainland China’s international influence, Beijing set out from the cultural level to actively promote soft power, and the establishment of Confucius Institutes abroad was what caught most attention among the promotional measures.

在經濟實力的支撐下，中國大陸的國際政治地位水漲船高，北京的崛起受到國際高度重視，也引發了一些疑慮；為了凸顯中國大陸是和平崛起，並強化大陸的國際影響力，北京從文化層面著手，積極推展軟實力，其中最受矚目的就是在境外設立孔子學院。

In November 2004, the first Confucius Institute put up its name plate in Seoul, and since, Confucius Institutes have also been established in countries in Asia, America, Europe, and Africa.

2004年11月，第一座孔子學院在南韓首都首爾掛牌；後來，亞洲、美洲、歐洲、非洲等許多國家也分別設立孔子學院。

By September 2014, 123 countries worldwide cooperated with mainland China, having set up 465 Confucius Institutes and 173 Confucius Classrooms. In America alone, 100 universities took part in such programs.

截至2014年9月，全球已有123個國家與大陸合作，開辦了465所孔子學院和713個孔子課堂，單單美國就有100所大學參與相關計畫。

Confucius Institutes lead in funding

◎主導經費教材 孔子學院惹爭議

The Confucius Institutes are usually set up right within the foreign universities that sign contracts with Beijing, but the [central] government in Beijing provides funding, chooses the staff that teaches abroad, and specifies the teaching material. This has caused quite some controversy.

這些孔子學院通常是直接設立在與北京簽約的外國學府裡，但卻由北京政府提供經費、選派教師並指定教材。此舉引發相當大的爭議。

It is [sometimes] said that Confucius Institutes operating within universities have some influence on the curricula of those schools and could endanger the schools’ integrity. These commentators believe that Confucius Institutes pose a threat to academic freedom.

有評論表示，孔子學院在大學內運作，對這些學校的課程具有一定的影響力，可能危及該校的完整性。批評者認為，孔子學院對學術自由構成威脅。

Stockholm University vice-chancellor Astrid Söderbergh Widding says that when institutions within universities are funded by governments of other countries, the approach does indeed pose problems.

斯德哥爾摩大學副校長維丁(Astrid Soderbergh Widding)就表示，大學內設立的機構是由另一個國家政府提供經費，這種作法的確有問題。

The ways Confucius Institutes operate have also attracted the attention of foreign governments. Indian and Japanese officials have questioned that Confucius Institutes only teach the Chinese language – [suggesting that] they also spread ideological attitued, and deliberately influence countries’ assessments of mainland China.

孔子學院的運作模式也受到外國政府的關注。印度和日本的官員曾經質疑，孔子學院不僅教授中文，也傳輸意識形態，意圖影響各國對中國大陸的評價。

A report published in October 2013 by American think tank “Project 2049 Research Institute” pointed out that while teaching Chinese, Confucius Institutes also inculcate ideological attitudes, thus influencing foreign circles’ judgment of Beijing.

美國華盛頓智庫「2049計畫研究所」就曾於2013年10月公布一份報告指出，孔子學院在教授中文的同時，也在灌輸意識形態，藉此影響外界對北京的評斷。

To promote academic independence, American scholars demand end to cooperation

◎維護學術獨立 美學者促停止合作

Nevertheless, Beijing’s strategy of promoting soft power by the establishment of Confucius Institues in numerous countries worldwide has seen growing resistance in recent years. Besides Stockholm University, universities and schools in America and Canada have terminated or suspended cooperation with Confucius Institutes.

不過，北京在世界許多國家設立孔子學院推廣軟實力的策略近年來遭遇越來越多的阻力。除了近日的斯德哥爾摩大學外，美國和加拿大去年都有大學院校終止或暫緩與孔子學院合作。

When the University of Chicago established a Confucius Institute in 2009, 174 professors of the university jointly opposed. Last year in April, 108 University of Chicago professors jointly demanded that after the cooperation term expire, cooperation with Beijing should be terminated, and the Confucius Institute no longer be allowed on the campus. They believed that the lecturers employed by Beijing had received special training to avoid or neglect politically sensitive topics such as “June 4” or Taiwan. They believed that with Beijing’s control of the lecturers employment and training would earn the University of Chicago’s academic program political  mainland official management and control of political speech and influence on freedom of religion.

芝加哥大學於2009年設立孔子學院時，該校就曾有174位教授聯名反對。去年4月，108位芝加哥大學教授聯名要求校方於合約到期後，終止與北京的合作，不再讓孔子學院進駐校園。他們認為，北京方面聘用的講師都受過特別培訓，在課堂上會規避或忽略例如「六四」及台灣等政治敏感議題；這些教授認為，由北京控制教師的聘用和培訓，將導致芝加哥大學的學術計畫受到大陸官方管控的政治言論及信仰自由所左右。

On September 25 last year, the University of Chicago announced that the five years of cooperation with the Confucius Institute would not be renewed after September 29.

去年9月25日，芝加哥大學宣布，與孔子學院的5年合約於該月29日到期後，不再續約。

Shortly afterwards, on October 1 2014, the Pennsylvania State University announced that they would terminate their five years of cooperation with the Confucius Institute.

緊接著，美國賓夕法尼亞州立大學也於去年10月1日宣布，終止與孔子學院的5年合作關係。

Beijing’s method of transmitting ideology needs to be corrected

◎傳輸意識形態 北京作法待修正

American paper Wall Street Journal wrote that the professors’ dissatisfaction with the Confucius Institutes came from lacking teaching skills and a refusal to accept some negative chapters in Chinese history^*).

美國華爾街日報曾說，這些大學對孔子學院的不滿來自於「無法教授技能和拒絕接受一些中國歷史負面內容的篇章」。

In June last year, the American Association of University Professors called for 100 U.S. universities cancel or renegotiate their contracts with the Confucius Institutes, because the Confucius Institutes were propaganda branches of mainland Chinese, particularly dissimenating the mainland authorities ideological attitudes, in violation of academic freedom.

去年6月，美國大學教授協會呼籲美國的100所大學，取消或重啟與北京的孔子學院談判協議，因認為孔子學院是大陸當局的宣傳分支，主要在傳播大陸當局的意識形態，此舉違反學術自由。

Even earlier, in June 2013, the Canadian Association of University Teachers called on Canada’s universities and schools to terminate relations with the Confucius Institute, because allowing governments of totalitarian states to guide curricula content, teaching material and the topics in classroom dialogue would harm the integrity of all universities.

加拿大大學教師協會則早在2013年6月即已呼籲加拿大的大學院校與孔子學院斷絕關係，理由是如果允許極權國家的政府機構主導課程內容、教材及課堂上的討論話題，將損及各大學的誠信。

The University of Manitoba, and the Toronto District School Board refused or suspended the establishment of Confucius Institutes last year, their main concern being that Confucius Institutes could interfere with academic freedom at the schools.

加拿大曼尼托巴大學(University of Manitoba)和多倫多教育局已於去年先後拒絕或暫停設立孔子學院，主要的顧慮就是孔子學院會干涉學校的學術自由。

But is the gradual termination of cooperation with Confucius Institutes by European and American countries purely based on concern about academic freedom, or does it represent an outbreak of fear of mainland China? Future developments will be worth continued observation.

然而，歐美國家紛紛停止與孔子學院的合作，純粹只是對學術自由發展感到憂慮，還是代表歐美國家對大陸的另一種恐中發作？後續發展還值得繼續觀察。

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Note

^*) If RTI referred to this WSJ blogpost, hiring practice rather than lacking skills were the source of dissatisfaction: the institutes’ hiring practices and refusal to acknowledge unflattering chapters of Chinese history.

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Related

» Unobtrusive and Imperceptible Moral Influence, Jan 7, 2012

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