Posts tagged ‘America’

Wednesday, November 30, 2022

Jiang Zemin, 1926 – 2022

Source: Wikimedia Commons - click picture for source

Wikimedia Commons – click picture for source

Jiang Zemin (江泽民), one of the CCP leadership’s many trained engineers, the man who invented the socialist market economy and the three represents, … Relatively untarnished by the June-4 crackdowns, he became the CCP’s chairman (or secretary general) in June 1989, by means of what official Chinese sources usually refer to as an “election”, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth CPC Central Committee.  Jiang had spent some time abroad, as a trainee at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in 1955, and later worked in leading technical and party functions in trades as different as the automotive and soap-manfucaturing industries. His work turned more administrative and governmental some time after 1980.

In October 1992, he told the 14th CCP party congress that

To establish a socialist market economy we must do the following important and interrelated tasks.  First, we must change the way in which state-owned enterprises operate, especially the large and medium-sized ones, and push them into the market so as to increase their vitality and efficiency. This is the key to establishing a socialist market economy, consolidating the socialist system and demonstrating its superiority.

Based on Deng Xiaoping‘s concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义), the socialist market economy (社会主义市场经济) focused on growth – something Deng kept emphasizing, sometimes against opposition from more conservative party leaders such as Chen Yun. Even Jiang is said to have come fully behind Deng’s all-out advocacy of growth once the paramount elder had made his inspection tour to the south (i. e. Shenzhen), garnering local support for his reform agenda, and proving that he was still China’s most powerful man, even if (mostly) from backstage.

Unlike his mentor Deng Xiaoping, he was no revolutionary veteran, and therefore lacked some or much of the traditional authority to head the party’s central military commission at the time. He led the commission anyway, and worked to make it clear that he was no mere civilian business promoter, according to a short news notice by German newsmagazine Der Spiegel in January 1995:

Those who criticize me for raising glasses with Western leaders must understand that this is tactics,

he told PLA officers in Chengdu, according to a central committee document the Spiegel said it had on hand.

I’m aware that the West remains our main enemy.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics has remained one of the CCP’s slogans, even as Jiang’s (and Deng’s) propensity to growth lost favor among the fourth generation of party leadership, i. e. the previous (Hu-Wen led) politbureau. The term socialist market economy has become less frequently used. In June 2011, China Daily hailed the concept as evidence for the wisdom of the CPC and its able leadership of the Chinese people in their endeavor to build a prosperous, civilized, democratic and harmonious modern socialist state and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation only in June 2011, but left no doubt that the Deng-Jiang approach had been second stage in a three-stage development strategy, and that

Now we are striding forward toward the strategic objective of the third stage. From now to the mid-21st century, China will be in a period of in-depth development of industrialization, informatization, urbanization, marketization and internationalization, an important period of strategic opportunities for economic and social development, but also a period with prominent social contradictions.

The three-staged approach referred to by the above China-Daily article of June 2011 had been spelled out by Jiang Zemin’s predecessor Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), in 1987. Jiang was to replace Zhao two years later, after Zhao had been ousted in the process of the June-4 crackdown. Li Peng (李鹏), state council chairman at the time of the crackdown, and the Standing Committee of the “National People’s Congress” afterwards, referred to the third stage as a the one where

we will catch up with medium-level developed countries in terms of per capita GNP by the middle of this century, achieve modernisation by and large and turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic and culturally advanced socialist country,

in January 2001, speaking to an audience in India.

The Hong Kong handover in 1997 added to the glorious picture of growth, this time in terms of political power. But appointing the former British colony’s tycoon Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) as the chief executive of the newly-created special administrative region (or having him “elected”) was probably one of Jiang’s leadership’s less lucky choices. In October 2000, enraged by Hong Kong journalists’ questions about if the CCP supported Tung’s candidacy for a second term, and if so, how that support could play a role, if Tung was really to be elected, Jiang told the questioners that they were “too simple, sometimes nayifu”. Tung, deeply embarrassed (by his fellow Hong Kongers, his boss, or both sides), was laughing in the background.

In his angry lecture, Jiang also advised the Hong Kong press people to learn from Mike Wallace, an American anchorman who had interviewed him about a month earlier, in the seaside resort of Beidaihe. It had been an unusual  interview, by CCP leadership standards, one that Jiang had visibly enjoyed, and one that had probably gone very well for him, in terms of public relations. Compared to his successor, he came across as a cosmopolitan, with a certain command of several foreign languages, including English, Russian, and arguably some German. When Spiegel journalists met with Jiang in 2002, they were greeted in German, with no accent.

Jiang had stated the need to deepen the reform of the system of distribution and the system of social security, in his 14th CCP party congress speech of October 1992, but that was basically that. If in essence, the objective of socialism was to liberate and develop the productive forces, to eliminate exploitation and polarization, and ultimately to achieve common prosperity, liberating the productive forces certainly came first. Growing divides between rich and poor didn’t appear to trouble either Jiang, or Zhu Rongji‘s (朱镕基) state council.

Another trend however did – the growing influence of a qigong-related, or buddhism-related religious organization, Falun Gong. In reaction to an incident in Tianjin, a massive silent protest involving over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners or supporters was organised in Beijing on April 25, 1999. The CCP leadership declared Falun Gong an “evil cult” in July, 1999, and started a lasting crackdown, initially supplemented with extended evening news propaganda featuring allegations against the organization which were hardly more “scientific” than the “evil cult” itself. Here, too, Hong Kong’s unfortunate chief executive Tung Chee-hwa was walking on eggshells, trying to please both his superiors in Beijing, and the public in Hong Kong.

When Jiang stepped down as the CCP’s secretary general in November 2002, he had held the post for more than thirteen years. He relinquished state chairmanship in March 2003, and the party’s central military commission chairmanship in September 2004.

Jiang Zemin was born in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, in 1926. He is survived by his wife Wang Yeping (王冶坪, also born in Yangzhou), and by two sons, Jiang Mianheng (江绵恒) and Jiang Miankang (江绵康).

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Related
» Jiang Zemin’s Health Matters, July 8, 2011
» Tiger on the Brink, New York Times, about 1998

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Most headlines in during Jiang’s life after retirement came from Falun-Gong affiliated media. The close interest from these quarters was no coincidence.

Sunday, September 18, 2022

Patriotic Pep Talk: Angry, angrier, scientific

zhuchiren_04
Click picture for CRI video

The following is a transcript of a video by China Radio International (yes, China’s former foreign radio  broadcaster still exists somehow – CGTN in English and in Russian, CRI in Chinese).

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

大家好!这里是『国际三分钟』。 我是爱丽。 Hello! This is “International – Three Minutes”. I’m Ai Li.
继芯片法案之后,美国又准备在生物科技领域出招了。当地时间12日美国总统拜登签署了一项鼓励美国生物技术生产和研究的行政命令,旨在促进美国的生物制造。多家美媒体国解读此举仍然是『针对中国』。 Following its CHIPS and Science Act, America is now preparing to make a move in the field of biotechnology. On September 12, U.S. President Biden signed an executive order on a National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative, aimed at promoting American biomanufacturing. A number of U.S. media read this as yet another move “targeted at China”.
五角大楼说的更为直接。14日白宫举办生物技术和生物制造峰会,与会人员包括国家安全顾问沙利文,和国防部副部长凯瑟琳·希克斯等人。 The Pentagon is even more straightforward. On September 14, the White House held a biomanufacturing summit which included national security advisor Jake Sullivan and deputy defense secretary and Kathleen Hicks.
希克斯在谈及投资生物技术对国防部的意义时表示,我们知道像中国这样的战略竞争对手也在优先考虑这些技术。他们想取代美国的领导地位,他们想挑战我们的竞争力。 Discussing the significance of biotechnology for national defense, Hicks said that it was known that strategic competitors like China were also considering these technologies a priority. [China] wanted to replace American leadership and challenge its competitiveness.
实际上,美国拥有世界上最强大的生物技术产业,在全球研发应用设施,基础研究方面,美国一直处于优先地位。2020年QS大学排名显示,在生命科学与医学排名前200的高校中,美国有61家入选。2019年全球市场排名前10名的生物医药公司中,美国占6家。截至2021年,在全球所有59座P4级别生物实验室中,美国独占13 – 14座。 In reality, America has the strongest global position in the biotechnological industry. In terms of R&D facilities and fundamental research, America always ranks first in global research. In the 2020 QS World University Rankings, as for life sciences and medical science rankings of the first 200 universities, 61 were American. In the [or a?] 2019 global market ranking, among the first ten biological drug companies, six were American. By 2021, U.S. P4-level biolaboratories dominated globally with 13 or 14 labs.
另外,在生物科技专利数量,专利活跃度,专利资产指数和竞争影响力等方面的领域优势,美国都很明显。中国短期内并不会对美国生物科技的全球地位产生威胁。 Also, as for the number of patents, patent activity, patent investment indices and competitive influence etc., America also has obvious advantages. China won’t be a threat to America’s global number-one position in biotechnology in the short term.
拜登政府之后已把目光转向生物技术。目的在于这背后巨大的经济利益更在于维护其科技霸权。 The Biden administration has since turned its attention to biotechnology. That’s because there are enormous economic interests behind it to protect their technological hegemony even better.
现在生物科技被广泛应用到各个领域。比如说,医疗方面的生物制药,农业方面的有机肥农药,工业方面的化学品甚至燃料,等等都跟生物科技有关。论对国家经济发展影响力,生物科技比之芯片领域毫不逊色。 Biotechnology is applied in a wide range of areas. For example, biological medication production for medical treatment, organic fertilizers and pesticides, industrial chemicals and even fuel are all related to biotechnology. Talking about influence on national economic development, biotechnology matters no less than the field of chips.
近些年中国在生物技术领域确实取得了一定的成绩。目前我们已经初涉形成门类齐全功能完备的生物经济产业体系,在生物医药生物育种,生物材料,生物能源等产业部门已经产生具有影响力的创新型企业。比如科创板上市企业中,生物企业占比就达1/3。 China has, in recent years, achieved certain successes. Currently, we have started shaping a category of fully functional and faultless biotechnological economic and industrial system. In the industrial sections of medicine, biomaterials and bioenergy etc., influential innovative companies have been created. For example, among the companies entering the Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market, one third are biotech companies.
从战略角度来看,机械化曾经让英国称霸世界。信息化又让美国问鼎世界第一强国。美国非常担心将来如果生物技术产业化使中国实现超越,自身的国际地位就将不保。也正是基于此美国有些急眼想走老路子,想通过制裁封锁中国生物科技领域的进步达到稳固其全球霸权的目的。 Seen from a strategic point of view, mechanizaton once helped Britain to declare itself the global hegemon. Informatization made America the global number one. America is really worried that in future, if biotechnological production helps China to overtake it, it may not be able to maintain its international position. It is also therefore that America is anxious to take the old path and wants to solidify its global hegemony by putting sanctions on the progress of China’s biotechnological sector.
『美国之音』就报道称,拜登新行政令被人为是对上个月签署的『芯片法案』作出的一项补充。美国『财富』杂志称,拜登的新行政令给美中经济竞争在添新战线。总之新政令是一个『风向表』,他预示着美国对中国的技术限制已经从芯片能源扩大到了生物领域。 According to the “Voice of America”, Biden’s new executive order is believed to be supplementary to the “CHIPS and Science Act”. American “Fortune” magazine said that Biden’s new executive order will add a new battlefront to U.S.-Chinese economic competition. In short, the new executive order is a “wind direction indicator”, foretelling that America’s technological restrictions on China are now expanding from the chip energy field to the field of biotechnology.
按照美国行事风格我们可以预测,如果此次新政令没有达到美方的预期效果,那很有可能像在芯片领域一样。他们会继续寻求对中国的精准打击。遗憾的是,生物领域本可以是一个美方有技术,中方有市场的合作领域,而美国现在非要打破这个平衡。 Because of America’s style of action, we can predict that if this new executive order doesn’t have the effect expected by the U.S., it will most probably resemble that of the CHIPS and Science Act. They will continue to seek for accurate strikes at China. What’s unfortunate is that biotechnology couldbe a field of cooperation, with the U.S. having the technologoy and with China having the market. But the U.S. has inisted on breaking this balance.
奈何。俄罗斯『独立报』评论称,对于美国不断升级的限制措施,中国有不同的应对举措,但最终这将促使中国加大对科技研发的投入,并努力确保独立性。说得不错。我们能做要做的。就是利用好巨大的市场优势,培育,挖掘,吸纳生物领域顶尖人才,加速推进生物科技和产业自立自强! Nothing doing. Russia’s “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” writes in an editorial that China has different options to respond, but in the end, this will induce China to increase its commitment to technological R&D and make efforts to ensure its independence. Well said. We can and we will. Just make good use of the advantages of a giant market. Nurture, unleash and attract top-notch talents in the field of biotechnology, and speed up the promotion of biotechnology and bioproduction!

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Related

“Cold War mentality”, Asia Financial
And now, no news, Nov 20, 2021
By any other name, March 30, 2018
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Wednesday, September 14, 2022

Li Zhanshu: “Russia made an important Choice and acted firmly”

li_zhanshu_television

Meeting Valentina Ivanovna Matviyenko
Xinwen Lianbo, Sept 11, 2022

Li Zhanshu’s talk isn’t exactly going viral on Chinese mass media, and appears to be only just beginning to catch attention on Twitter . The current Chairman of the Standing Committee of the “National People’s Congress” (China’s rubberstamp parliament), told Russian parliament speaker Vyacheslav Volodin and leaders of Russian parliament factions that

We see that the United States and its NATO allies are expanding their presence near the Russian borders, seriously threatening national security and the lives of Russian citizens. We fully understand the necessity of all the measures taken by Russia aimed at protecting its key interests, we are providing our assistance,

and

On the Ukrainian issue, we see how they have put Russia in an impossible situation. And in this case, Russia made an important choice and responded firmly

A transcript (and a much-shared video) on Twitter in Chinese:

对俄罗斯在核心利益和重大关切问题,中方对俄罗斯也是表示理解和充分的支持。就像现在的乌克兰问题,美国和北约直接逼到俄罗斯的家门口,涉及到俄罗斯的国家安全和人民的生命安全,在这种情况下,俄罗斯采取认为适合应当的一些措施,中方是表示理解的,并且从不同方面给予策应。

https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js
The translator adds a disclaimer, saying he doesn’t understand Li’s Shanxi accent too well, but that this is about what he said.

Thursday, September 8, 2022

The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

taiwanren_are_also_chinese

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China” (Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.” (We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.” (Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.” (Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”. If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle. This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it.
Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

table_one_mainland_china

or the other way round,

Table 2

table_two_orc
Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

table_three_orc

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be
table_must_not_exist
because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

table_four_taiwan
That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

____________

Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

____________

Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Thursday, May 19, 2022

Enorth: China Eastern MU5735 Preliminary Investigation Report, April 20

wikipedia_airbus_a380_airliner

CCTV coverage, March 24, 2022

The following is my translation of a preliminary report (or its April-20 reproduction by Tianjin’s Enorth news portal) on China Eastern Yunnan Airlines MU5735 flight’s crash on March 21 this year. I.

My translation is partly based on an illustrative wiki which shows components of an Airbus A380. The crashed plane in question was a Boeing, but I couldn’t find a similarly informative description of a Boeing.

Questions, information and corrections are welcome.

“March-21” China Eastern MU5735 flight crash preliminary investigation status notification.
“3·21”东航MU5735飞行事故调查初步报告的情况通报
Source: Civil Aviation Administration of China website / author, [Enorth] editor: Jin Yongfeng / April 20, 2022, 17:37 h
来源: 中国民航局网站 作者: 编辑:靳永锋 2022-04-20 17:37:00

Summary: On March 21, 2022, a China Eastern Yunnan Airlines Boeing 737-800 type B-1791 on its MU5735 flight from Kunming to Guangzhou rapidly descended from its 8,900 meters travel altitude over Guangzhou air control territory, and finally fell to the ground and crashed in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region / Wuzhou City / Teng County / Langnan Township‘s / Molang Village.
内容提要:2022年3月21日,东方航空云南有限公司波音737-800型B-1791号机,执行MU5735昆明至广州航班,在广州管制区域巡航时,自航路巡航高度8900米快速下降,最终坠毁在广西壮族自治区梧州市藤县埌南镇莫埌村附近。

On March 21, 2022, a China Eastern Yunnan Airlines Boeing 737-800 type B-1791 on its MU5735 flight from Kunming to Guangzhou rapidly descended from its 8,900 meters travel altitude over guangzhou air control territory, and finally fell to the ground and crashed in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region / Wuzhou City Teng County Langnan Township’s Molang Village.
2022年3月21日,东方航空云南有限公司波音737-800型B-1791号机,执行MU5735昆明至广州航班,在广州管制区域巡航时,自航路巡航高度8900米快速下降,最终坠毁在广西壮族自治区梧州市藤县埌南镇莫埌村附近。飞机撞地后解体,机上123名旅客、9名机组成员全部遇难。

According to “International Convention on Civil Aviation regulations *), the investigating country must send a preliminary investigation report to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) within thirty days after the crash. This report’s content is often about factual information gathered until then, and does not include accident analysis or conclusions.
根据《国际民用航空公约》规定,在事故之日起30天内,调查组织国须向国际民航组织和参与调查国发送调查初步报告,其内容通常为当前所获取的事实信息,不包括事故原因分析及结论。目前《“3·21”东航MU5735航空器飞行事故调查初步报告》已完成,报告主要包括飞行经过、机组机务人员、适航维修、残骸分布等事实信息。主要情况如下:

The plane took off from Kunming Changshui International Airport’s runway 21 at 13:16, rose to its travel altitude of 8,900 meters by 13:27, and entered Guangzhou air control airspace along the A599  air route at 14:17. At 14:20:55 a “Deviation from prescribed altitude” alert appeared on Guangzhou air control’s radar. The plane broke away from its travel altitude, air control staff immediately called the crew, but got no reply. At 14:21:40, the radar recorded the last signal from the aircraft as “standard pressure altimeter 3,380 meters altitude at a groundspeed of 1,010 km per hour, direction 117 degrees”. Soon after, the radar signal disappeared.
飞机于北京时间13:16从昆明长水机场21号跑道起飞,13:27上升至巡航高度8900米,14:17沿A599航路进入广州管制区,14:20:55广州区域管制雷达出现“偏离指令高度”告警,飞机脱离巡航高度,管制员随即呼叫机组,但未收到任何回复。14:21:40雷达最后一次记录的飞机信息为:标准气压高度3380米,地速1010千米/小时,航向117度。随后,雷达信号消失。

wikipedia_airbus_a380_airliner

Aircraft tail, Wiki, CC BY-SA 3.0 – click picture for source –
this shows the design of an Airbus A380 which
may differ significantly from a Boeing 737

The crash site is in a valley stretching from the southeast to the northwest near Molang Village of Langnan Township in Teng County, of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region’s Wuzhou City. A 45 square meters puddle of 2.7 meters depth is clearly visible on the ground, and has been determined to be the point of impact at 23° 19′ 25.52” north and 111° 06′ 44.30” east. The plane’s debris was mainly found on and under the ground in an azimuth of zero to 150 degrees from the point of impact. About twelve km from the point of impact, the right wingtip’s trailing edge was found. Mountain forests and vegetation at the crash site showed traces of fire. The right wingtip’s trailing edge was found about twelve km away from the impact point. Horizontal stabilizers and the vertical stabilizer, rudders, the left and right engines, the greater wings, body components, the undercarriage, cockpit inside components and other main wreckage were found at the site. After the wreckage had been searched and gathered, it was taken to a dedicated depot as a whole to be tidied up and to be identified,and for the pieces to be placed into their actual positions, to facilitate further inspection and analysis.
事故现场位于广西壮族自治区梧州市藤县埌南镇莫埌村附近一个东南至西北走向的山谷中。现场可见面积约45平米、深2.7米的积水坑,判定为主撞击点,位置为北纬23°19′25.52″,东经111°06′44.30″。飞机残骸碎片主要发现于撞击点0°至150°方位范围内的地面及地下。距主撞击点约12公里处发现右翼尖小翼后缘。事故现场山林植被有过火痕迹。现场发现水平安定面、垂直尾翼、方向舵、左右发动机、左右大翼、机身部件、起落架及驾驶舱内部件等主要残骸。所有残骸从现场搜寻收集后,统一转运到专用仓库进行清理、识别,按照飞机实际尺寸位置对应摆放,便于后续检查分析。

The Investigation shows that the flight crew on duty, the cabin crew and maintenance staff were qualified in accordance with the requirements, and the aircraft’s airworthiness documents were valid, with neither the most recent A-check (31A) nor the most recent C-check (3C) being beyond the time limits specified in the maintenance plans. There was no malfunction information before the flight and at the short-stop release on that day, no dangerous goods were declared, and the flight route, its vicinity and the monitoring equipment showed no anomalies. The last normal radiotelephony communication with the crew was at 14:16. The plane’s two flight recorders were badly damaged, and data restoration and analysis is ongoing.

经调查,当班飞行机组、客舱机组和维修放行人员资质符合要求;事故航空器适航证件有效,飞机最近一次A检(31A)及最近1次C检(3C)未超出维修方案规定的检查时限,当天航前和短停放行无故障报告,无故障保留;机上无申报为危险品的货物;此次飞行涉及的航路沿途导航和监视设施、设备未见异常,无危险天气预报;在偏离巡航高度前,机组与空管部门的无线电通信和管制指挥未见异常,最后一次正常陆空通话的时间为14:16;机上两部记录器由于撞击严重受损,数据修复及分析工作仍在进行中。

Follwing up, the technical investigation team will continue to carry out in-depth wreckage identification, classification and inspection, flight data analysis, the required tests, verification and other investigations.
后续,技术调查组将依据相关程序继续深入开展残骸识别、分类及检查、飞行数据分析、必要的实验验证等调查工作,科学严谨查明事故原因。

____________

Notes

*) also known as the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
____________

Related

“Vicious smearing against China”, “Global Times”, May 18, 2022
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Friday, May 6, 2022

Central Asia: Russia’s Restive “Bulk” of Allies

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

In another bid to prove his president’s claim to the global public that you can’t isolate Russia, Russian foreign minister Lavrov wrote in a signed article for Rossiyskaya Gazeta that Russia could see its trade with Central Asia growing dynamically despite “the turbulent geopolitical situation”, and that “the bulk” of Central Asian countries were Russia’s allies.

There’s probably a need to emphasize that, although the Russian government-owned Rossiyskaya Gazeta may not be an ideal communication channel to the Central Asian public.

QSL card from Radio Tashkent, December 1985

That was long ago: a QSL card
from Radio Tashkent, December 1985

But then, security issues aren’t only Russia’s issue. Its allied “bulk” is worried about Moscow’s miltary rampage in Ukraine, and China’s relations with Central Asia may become affected, too.

“Due to its size and geography, China’s role [in Central Asia] will grow [following the war], but the SCO won’t have many success stories to point to”,

RFA/RL quotes Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

“Beijing is also now seen as a supporter of Russia and as a country that isn’t doing much to restrain Moscow when many [SCO members] are seeing it as a potential threat.”

Pengpai News (“The Paper”, Shanghai), by no means a natural critic of Russia, suggested in an article on April 25 that

Since Russia started its “special military operation” againly been upped further, and their immediate and long-term political and economic effects are slowly emerging. In the five Central Asian countries that once belonged to the Soviet region, the Russian-Ukrainian state of affairs has given rise to worries, with their approach becoming more and more subtle.

在刚刚经历过“一月政变”的哈萨克斯坦,从总统托卡耶夫到外交部长和国防部长都在公开表态中与莫斯科保持了一定的距离。哈官方承诺不会成为帮助俄罗斯规避西方制裁的工具,并接待了专程到访的美国副国务卿,两国还宣布拟扩大高水平战略伙伴关系。

Kazakhstan’s regime, despite Russian military dispatches to quell demonstrations against the Tokayev regime only weeks earlier,

officially promised not to become a tool that would help Russia in evading the West’s sanctions, and received a US deputy secretary of state’s special visit. The two countries announced that they would broaden their high-level strategic partnership.

哈官方承诺不会成为帮助俄罗斯规避西方制裁的工具,并接待了专程到访的美国副国务卿,两国还宣布拟扩大高水平战略伙伴关系。

Timur Suleimenov, first deputy chief of Kazakhstan’s Executive Office, is quoted by Pengpai News as saying that his country, while a member of the Eurasian Economic Union,

we are also a member of the international community. We do not want America and the European Union to impose secondary sanctions on Kazakhstan, therefore we have to prove to our European partners that Kazakhstan will not become a tool for Russia to evade America’s and the EU’s sanctions. We will abide by the sanctions.”

“虽然我们和俄罗斯、白俄罗斯一样,是欧亚经济联盟成员,但我们也是国际社会的一员,我们不希望美国和欧盟对哈萨克斯坦实施二级制裁,因此我们必须向欧洲的伙伴证明,哈萨克斯坦不会成为俄罗斯规避美国和欧盟制裁的工具。我们将遵守制裁。”

Kazakhstan’s president, having just been protected from his own people by Russian troops,

presented, in his State of the Nation address on March 16, an entire set of reform plans, and acknowledged frankly that the Russian-Ukrainian state of affairs had made the importance of national independence obvious. He promised to carry out comprehensive political reform.

托卡耶夫在最近一次于3月16日所作的国情咨文中拿出了一整套改革方案,他坦言眼前的俄乌局势凸显了国家独立重要性,并承诺进行全面政治改革。

Uzbekistan is quoted as even telling Russia to stop its “aggressive” behavior (停止“侵略”行为). To find a peaceful solution, Uzbekistan’s foreign minister Abdulaziz Kamilov is quoted,

“We support the search for a peaceful solution to this state of affairs, and a solution to this conflict by political and diplomatic means”. For this, “(Russia) must first end military activity and its invasion.”

“我们支持寻求和平解决这一局势,并通过政治和外交手段解决这一冲突”。为此,“(俄罗斯)首先必须结束军事活动和侵略”。

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who are more dependent on Russia, and who have Russian military bases within their borders, kept “prudently silent” after the launch of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To offset the return of many of its migrant workers from Russia, however, Kyrgyzstan negotiated with South Korea and Turkey, apparently to find work for its citizens there, and asked Turkey to ease visa restrictions on migrant workers.

The fallout, according to Pengpai News, is there: Both Kazakhtan and Uzbekistan are drawing closer to America. Even Russians flee to Uzbekistan, the Pengpai article says, to avoid military service in Russia. And Uzbek nationals have been warned by their government that they could face five years in prison if they serve in Russia’s military.

Wednesday, March 23, 2022

Biden-Xi Videolink last Friday: “Some People haven’t put the positive statements of Mr. President into practice”

When one guy knows what the other one thinks while saying something completely different, that’s probably called successful diplomacy – at least when relations are rotten. That’s also true for the video meeting of the American and Chinese heads of state last Friday (March 18).
What strikes the reader of the communiqués are the shares of the two participants in each others’ readouts.

Xinhua communiqué of Biden-Xi videolink on March 18, 2022

Characters count: Biden 224 / 1187 Xi (Xinhua)

The White House’s readout contains only 164 words, none of which can be attributed to the Chinese interlcoutor alone – and it mentions implications and consequences if China provides material support to Russia. Xinhua, on the other hand, doesn’t even mention President Biden’s threat.
Let’s focus on the Xinhua communiqué.

The first cross-purposes talk is about the legendary “One-China policy”. This term, probably garaged in every joint statement ever issued by China and a new diplomatic counterpart, can mean very different things from one country to another. The US, for example, “acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position.” There’s no position taken by the United States here.

So when Biden declares that “that U.S. policy on Taiwan has not changed”, Xi Jinping knows that this is no recognition of China’s claims concerning Taiwan. Still, as if they mean the same thing, Xi expresses tells Biden how much he values his statement.

Following that, Xinhua’s account moves on to Chinese accusations made by Xi. Sino-US relations hadn’t recovered from the difficulties created “by the previous administration” (i. e. the Trump admin, but without naming it). Rather, even more challenges to these relations were emerging. Xi continues:

In particular, some people in America send wrong signals to the forces [in Taiwan] supporting “Taiwanese independence”. If the Taiwan issue isn’t handled well, this can have a subverting effect on [Sino-US] relations. We hope that America attaches sufficient attention to this. The immediate cause for the situation in Sino-American relations is that some people on the American side don’t implement the significant consensus the two of us [Biden and Xi] have achieved, and that they haven’t put the positive statements of Mr. President into practice either. America’s strategic intentions towards China have created misinterpretations and wrong assessments.
特别是美国一些人向“台独”势力发出错误信号,这是十分危险的。台湾问题如果处理不好,将会对两国关系造成颠覆性影响。希望美方予以足够重视。中美关系之所以出现目前的局面,直接原因是,美方一些人没有落实我们两人达成的重要共识,也没有把总统先生的积极表态落到实处。美方对中方的战略意图作出了误读误判。

Xi ostensibly gives Biden “credit” by condemning the Trump administration. This follows an opportunistic pattern in China by which it also judges its own past dynasties. Every misery and every defect is blamed on (now powerless) sinister guys from the pre-“communist” past, and the CPC is the mother of all progress. That’s how those in power today can talk with each other and be at ease – albeit at the cost of historical accuracy, at least in public.

Also, Xi applies a similar ambiguity to opponents in America, as Biden America applies to the status of Taiwan. Who are those “some people on the American side”? They could refer to quarters within the Biden administration, but also to opposition politicians like Trumps former secretary of state Michael Pompeo – considered a spawn of hell by Beijing, for reasons like these.

As China doesn’t understand the concept of an opposition, those portrayed by Xi as saboteurs may just be some American newspaper columnist who happened to catch his eye.

Then the conversation – according to Xinhua – turns to Ukraine. Xi uses the same keywords as usual – avoiding escalation, paying attention to the tasks of the moment, overcoming “cold-war mentality”, etc.. Both heads of state agree, finally, to make efforts respectively to a) get their countries’ relations back on track and b) to find an appropriate solution for the “Ukraine crisis”.

Main Chinese concerns, apart from more stable Sino-US relations, appear to be economic issues. The situation “it had come to in Ukraine” wasn’t what China wanted to see, Xinhua quotes Xi. He criticizes “comprehensive and indiscriminate sanctions that caused “suffering among the common people, and points to a double challenge – Covid-SARS and economic development, both influenced by the two most recent crises.

There may be one deviation from the usual talk however: “only the one who attached the bell to the tiger  can remove it again”.

If Biden followed up and asked if this referred to him or to Putin (or Zelensky, or everyone) is not passed down on us, but one might guess that Xi didn’t mainly refer to Moscow.

Ding Xuexiang, Liu He and Wang Yi as well as other persons attended on Xi’s side of the meeting.

Thursday, March 10, 2022

Flames of War, deeply felt and lamented by China

The following is my translation of a Xinhua report, republished by the Chinese government (State Council). There’s also a translation by “China Daily”, on their “English-Language Solutions” website. Blend them together as you see fit.

It might be worth mentioning that one of the participants on Xi’s side was Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), the Communist Party’s general office director, although Xi probably took part in the “video summit” in his capacity as China’s head of state.

March 8 Xi-Macron-Scholz "video summit"

Chinese pyramid: That’s the way Xi likes it


Main Link: Xi Jinping holds video summit with French and German leaders
习近平同法国德国领导人举行视频峰会

March 8, 2022, 19:53, Xinhua
2022-03-08 19:53 来源: 新华社

In the afternoon of March 8, Chinese state chairman Xi Jinping held a video summit with French president Macron and German chancellor Scholz.
新华社北京3月8日电 国家主席习近平3月8日下午在北京同法国总统马克龙、德国总理朔尔茨举行视频峰会。

Xi Jinping pointed out that in the current world, once-in-a-hundred-years changes and the centennial pandemic situation go hand in hand. They bring global challenges that require global cooperation. China and Europe speak numerous common languages in terms of seeking peace, seeking development, and promoting cooperation. We must shoulder responsibilities to bring more stability and certainty to a turbulently changing world. The two sides must take a continuous and far-sighted approach to strengthen dialogue, maintain cooperation, and promote Chinese-European relations. China’s development will bring more space for Chinese-European cooperation. Based on the principle of mutual benefit and double-win, the two sides must maintain and deepen green and digital partnership relations and pragmatic cooperation in all fieds. The two sides should continue and maintain multilateralism, and advance major global agendas.
习近平指出,当今世界,百年变局和世纪疫情交织,带来很多全球性挑战,需要全球性合作。中欧在谋和平、求发展、促合作方面有很多共同语言。我们要拿出担当,为动荡变化的世界注入更多稳定性和确定性。双方要加强对话,坚持合作,推动中欧关系行稳致远。中国的发展将为中欧合作带来更大空间。双方要继续本着互利共赢原则,持续深化绿色、数字伙伴关系和各领域务实合作。双方要继续坚持多边主义,推进重大全球性议程。

Macron and Scholz expressed congratulations regarding the successful holding of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games. The world is facing many challenges, and fighting alone will only worsen the situation. The European side attaches importance to China’s important and positive role in global affairs and wants to work closeley with China to make common efforts to solve climate change, public health and other important global challenges. The European side wants to work together with theChinese side to  successfully hold a European-Chinese leaders’ meeting, to promote a continuous forward development of French-Chinese and German-Chinese as well as European-Chinese relations.
马克龙、朔尔茨表示,祝贺中方成功举办北京冬奥会。当今世界面临诸多挑战,单打独斗,只会使形势恶化。欧方重视中国在世界事务中发挥的重要和积极作用,愿同中方紧密合作,共同努力解决气候变化、公共卫生等重大全球性挑战。欧方愿同中方一道,办好欧中领导人会晤,推动法中、德中以及欧中关系不断向前发展。

The two sides exchanged views on the current situation in Ukraine.
双方重点就当前乌克兰局势交换意见。

Macron and Scholz explained their opinions and positions concerning the current situation in Ukraine, saying that Europe is facing the most serious crisis since World War 2, and that France and Germany support a negotiated solution of the problem, to give peace a chance. They thanked the Chinese side for advocating humanitarian proposals. They want to strengthen communication and coordination with the Chinese side, mediate peace and promote talks to avoid further escalation of the situation which would create an even more serious humanitarian crisis.
马克龙、朔尔茨介绍了对当前乌克兰局势的看法和立场,表示欧洲正面临二战以来最严重危机,法德支持通过谈判解决问题,给和平一个机会。感谢中方提出人道主义局势倡议,愿同中方加强沟通协调,劝和促谈,避免局势进一步升级,产生更严重人道主义危机。

Xi Jinping emphasized that the current situation in Ukraine is worrying. The re-ignition of the flames of war on the European continent is deeply felt and lamented by China. The Chinese side advocates that all countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected, that the United Nations’ charter’s objectives and principles should be complied with, that all countries’ reasonable concerns should be attached importance to, and all efforts directed at the peaceful solution of the crisis should be supported. The top priority job now is to avoid further escalation, let alone loss of control, in the tense situation. The Chinese side appreciates the French and the German efforts to mediate in the Ukrainian situation and wants to maintain communication and coordination with the French, German and European side to play a positive role together with the international community in accordance with any side’s requirements in this matter.
习近平强调,当前,乌克兰局势令人担忧,中方对欧洲大陆重燃战火深感痛惜。中方主张,各国主权、领土完整都应该得到尊重,联合国宪章宗旨和原则都应该得到遵守,各国合理安全关切都应该得到重视,一切有利于和平解决危机的努力都应该得到支持。当务之急是避免紧张局势升级,甚至失控。中方赞赏法德为斡旋乌克兰局势所作努力,愿同法方、德方和欧方保持沟通和协调,根据当事各方需要,同国际社会一道发挥积极作用。

Xi Jinping emphasized that we must jointly support Russian-Ukrainian peace talks, maintain momentum in the two sides’ negotiations, overcome difficulties to keep the talks going, and to arrive at results and peace. We would like to call for the greatest degree of limits and restraint to avoid a large-scale humanitarian crisis. China has put forward a six-point initiative concerning the humanitarian situation in Ukraine and would like to provide Ukraine with further humanitarian material aid. We want to work together to reduce the negative impact of the crisis. The relevant sanctions are creating shocks for the stability of global finance, energy, transportation and supply chains, create burdens for the global economy already under the negative impact of the pandemic, and are disadvantageous for all sides. We must actively advocate common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concepts. The Chinese side supports France and Germany setting out from Europe’s own interests, giving thought to lasting security in Europe, maintaining strategic independence and promoting the building of an equal, effective and sustainable European security framework. The Chinese side also views an equal dialogue between Europe, Russia, America and NATO with optimism.
习近平强调,我们要共同支持俄乌和谈,推动双方维护谈判势头,克服困难谈下去,谈出结果、谈出和平。我们要呼吁保持最大限度克制,防止出现大规模人道主义危机。中方提出了关于乌克兰人道主义局势的六点倡议,愿向乌克兰进一步提供人道主义物资援助。我们要一起努力减少危机造成的负面影响。有关制裁对全球金融、能源、交通、供应链稳定都会造成冲击,拖累疫情下负重前行的世界经济,对各方都不利。我们要积极倡导共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观。中方支持法德两国从欧洲自身利益出发,为欧洲持久安全着想,坚持战略自主,推动构建均衡、有效、可持续的欧洲安全框架。中方也乐见欧俄美及北约开展平等对话。

The two sides also exchanged views about the Iran nuclear issue.
双方还就伊朗核问题交换了意见。

Ding Xuexiang, Yang Jiechi, Wang Yi, He Lifeng and others took part in the meeting.
丁薛祥、杨洁篪、王毅、何立峰等参加会议。

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