“China, as a responsible country, …”

Xinhualogical (English), Sept 26, 2023:

China, as a responsible country, is never absent at multilateral forums in which it takes part, said Wang at a press conference on a newly-released white paper, titled “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions.”

–
Sputnik (Chinese), Sept 26, 2023:

Wang Yi: APEC should not be a wrestling ring of provocation and confrontation
王毅：APEC峰会不应该是挑起对抗的角斗场
America will hold the 30th APEC leaders’ informal meeting. Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi said at a press conference held at the State Council news buro of a white book titled “Working together to build a community of human destiny: China’s advocacy and action” that APEC is the highest-level, most widely-ranging and most influential mechanism for economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and should be a great stage for the promotion of cooperation, not a wrestling ring for provocation and confrontation.
美国将于11月举办亚太经合组织第十三次领导人非正式会议，中国外交部部长王毅在国务院新闻办公室举办的关于《携手构建人类命运共同体：中国的倡议与行动》白皮书新闻发布会上表示，亚太经合组织是亚太地区层级最高、领域最广、最具影响力的经济合作机制，应成为促进合作的大舞台，而不应是挑起对抗的角斗场。
Answering reporters’ questions^*) about whether Chairman Xi Jinping would attend the meeting, Wang Yi said:
“China is a responsible country, and we have never been absent from important multilateral forums where China participates. Concerning participation arrangements for APEC, we are maintaining communications with all parties and will officially publish information at the appropriate time.”
“中国是一个负责任的国家，我们从不缺席中方参与的重要多边论坛。关于出席亚太经合组织的安排，我们正在与各方保持沟通，会适时正式发布消息。”
Wang Yi pointed out that multilateral diplomacy is an important pillar of China’s participation and global governance and for the promotion of a community of human destiny. Obviously, it is also an important platform for the development of diplomacy between heads of state. Chairman Xi Jinping attaches great importance to multilateral diplomacy, and China’s role in global governance has become ever greater.
王毅指出，多边外交是中国参与全球治理、推进人类命运共同体的重要依托，当然也是开展元首外交的重要平台。习近平主席高度重视多边外交，中国在全球治理中发挥的作用越来越大。
[…..]

Wang’s warnings against “provocation” or “confrontation” can refer to lots of things, of course (the only thing being sure that they are targeting the U.S. as the host), but one of the issues on his mind is probably the attendance of Hong Kong’s chief executive. According to a report by Singapore’s “Lianhe Zaobao”, John Lee Ka-chiu may be locked out by the U.S. as the host country to the meeting. Washington had imposed sanctions on Lee at the time when he was Hong Kong’s security secretary, and played a role in implementing China’s “national security law” in Hong Kong.
It appears as if China makes his attendance at the informal summit a bargaining chip. It didn’t work on India, if Beijing tried it in the run-up to the G20 summit, too.
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Note

Sputnik’s article doesn’t make it clear if it was one reporter / one question, or several of either, but according to “Lianhe Zaobao”, the question was asked by a Bloomberg reporter.
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Related

John Lee: “Terrorism, iron fact”, June 3, 2020
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July Review: “Economy against the Wall, in a Cheap New Car”

“China is haunted by a secter”, Radio Austria’s China correspondent reported on July 11, “the specter of deflation”. The car market served as an example, with prices going down by the week, with inflation at zero percent, and producers’ prices at minus five percent. Price expectations that postpone purchases because cars will be cheaper one week later, and still cheaper two weeks later, put the breaks on demand, which makes profits drop, which makes wages drop, which makes demand drop further: “a downward spiral”, the correspondent explained. Add China’s family’s reduced savings (because of the pandemic), youth unemployment, interest rate cuts that don’t work anymore, and a general feeling of pessimism among the population. Investment by the state, on tick if need be, looked like the last resort.

You can see the state’s perplexity from the car market: China subsidizes the purchase of electric vehicles, thus contributing to the falling prices. The car manufacturers, on the other hand, have been told to stop their discount battle, but with little avail so far. Still, the subsidies continue, as if China wanted to drive its economy into the wall, in a cheap new car.

Die Ratlosigkeit des Staates kann man am Automarkt gut erkennen: China subventioniert den Kauf von Elektroautos und trägt damit zum Preisverfall bei. Die Autohersteller wurden hingegen zu einem Ende der Rabattschlacht gezwungen, bisher aber mit wenig Erfolg. Die staatlichen Subventionen laufen aber weiter. Es sieht fast so aus, als ob China seine Wirtschaft im billigen Neuwagen gegen die Wand fährt.

It’s all about dollars, CCTV coverage, July 4, 2023

As the promise of rising prosperity loses some of its luster, repression has to take its place: the spy that reported you may well be your neighbor, your wife, or your own child. The espionage law, in its second article, points out that

Anti-espionage work insists on the party central committee’s centralized and unified leadership, the overall concept of national security, joint open and secret work, the combination of specialized and mass-line work, insisting on proactive defense, punishment in accordance with the law, treatment of both the cause and the symptoms, and the strengthening of the national people’s defense line.

第二条　反间谍工作坚持党中央集中统一领导，坚持总体国家安全观，坚持公开工作与秘密工作相结合、专门工作与群众路线相结合，坚持积极防御、依法惩治、标本兼治，筑牢国家安全人民防线。

Apart from some typical cases of espionage, the anti-espionage law, states in the first paragraph of its fourth article that

Espionage as stated in this law refers to the following activities:

(1) Activities that endanger national security, carried out or prompted or financially aided by espionage organizations and their agents, or carried out by organizations or individuals in collusion with them.

本法所称间谍行为，是指下列行为：
（一）间谍组织及其代理人实施或者指使、资助他人实施，或者境内外机构、组织、个人与其相勾结实施的危害中华人民共和国国家安全的活动

[…]

According to article 13,

People’s governments at all levels and related departments should organize and develop anti-espionage vigilance propaganda and education, turn the anti-espionage law’s vigilance knowledge into educational, training, and law popularization content, and strengthen the entire people’s anti-espionage awareness and self-cultivation.

第十三条　各级人民政府和有关部门应当组织开展反间谍安全防范宣传教育，将反间谍安全防范知识纳入教育、培训、普法宣传内容，增强全民反间谍安全防范意识和国家安全素养。

I’ve tried my own bits of translation (taking the CPC folklore it contains into account), but there’s a full translation as well, done by China Law Translate and republished by the American Air University.

“China Daily”, on August 4, wrote that

some Western media outlets have recently expressed so-called “concerns” over the law, sensationalized its impact on investment and business environment, and some even maliciously misinterpreted it as “encouraging citizens to spy on each other”.

The paper quotes an official with the ministry of state security as saying that “companies and their employees who abide by Chinese law and provide normal commercial services are not bound by the article”. Which still leaves the question open what is considered abidance, and what isn’t.

What struck me is that in defense of its “anti-espionage law”, Chinese media rarely seem to emphasize that there is actually knowledge that needs to be protected, because the country is switching from mostly growth-driven to “high-quality” development (which would, obviously, presume that there is stuff foreign agents would want to steal in the first place).

Then again, intimidation is definitely one of the objectives, if not the main objective, of the “anti-spy law”.

“Strictly Controlled Law Enforcement”: CCTV proclaims revised “Anti-Espionage Law”

The article translated underneath was published online by China’s national television broadcdaster today. Please refer to the links under “Related”, underneath my translation, for the law in full.

A word of warning: neither my translation nor those of others are necessarily correct. Also, the emphasis on “control” of state-security organs shouldn’t even be trusted in free societies, let alone in China.

The way “national security” is “protected” in Hong Kong might give you an idea.

Establishing and improving coordination mechanisms on the national level – newly revised “PRC anti-espionage law” comes into effect today
Source: CCTV

建立健全国家层面协调机制 新修订的《中华人民共和国反间谍法》今起施行
来源：央视网 | 2023年07月01日 13:12:30

CCTV News: The newly revised “PRC anti-espionage law” comes into effect today (July 1). It includes an improved definition of espionage activities, and along with strengthening anti-espionage work, it it attaches importance to supervision and restrictions of those who exercise who exercise legal force.

央视网消息：新修订的《中华人民共和国反间谍法》今（7月1日）起施行。其中，完善了间谍行为的定义，在加强反间谍工作的同时，注重对国家安全机关工作人员行使公权力的监督制约。

Based on the original provision, the newly revised “anti-espionage law” clearly declares activities of “organizations and agents relying on espionage” who “carry out cyber attacks against state organs, secret-work units or key information facilities” espionage. Also, it is applied on espionage activities against third countries, specifying espionage organizations or agents in the PRC or on state territory, those who use Chinese citizens, organizations or other conditions, who engage in espionage against third countries, endangering the PRC’s national security.

新修订的《反间谍法》在原本的规定上，将“投靠间谍组织及其代理人”“针对国家机关、涉密单位或者关键信息基础设施等实施网络攻击等行为”明确为间谍行为。同时，增加针对第三国的间谍行为，明确间谍组织及其代理人在中华人民共和国领域内，或者利用中华人民共和国的公民、组织或者其他条件，从事针对第三国的间谍活动，危害中华人民共和国国家安全的，适用本法。

The newly revised “anti-espionage law” strictly regulates the range in which state security staff can legally exercise authority. It limits the premises of law enforcement, requires that state security organs exercise carry out their duties in accordance with the law while investigating espionage under rightful circumstances. It strictly controls law enforcement, specifying that places, facilities, properties unrelated to espionage activities must not be seized, taken into custody or frozen, and that information gained and referenced must not go beyond tje range and requirements of what anti-espionage work requires.

新修订的《反间谍法》对国家安全机关工作人员依法行使职权作出了严格规范，限定执法前提，要求国家安全机关行使相关职权必须是依法执行反间谍工作任务、调查间谍行为、因反间谍工作需要等法定情形。并且严控执法限度，明确不得查封、扣押、冻结与间谍行为无关的场所、设施、财物，查阅调取不得超出执行反间谍工作所需的范围等要求。

Moreover, the newly revised “anti-espionage law” also clearly establishes and strengthens national-level anti-espionage coordination mechanisms and regulates state organs, social organizations’ etc. security responsibilities in their anti-espionage work.

此外，新修订的《反间谍法》还明确建立健全国家层面的反间谍工作协调机制，规定了国家机关、社会组织等在反间谍工作中的安全防范责任。

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Related

“Anti-espionage law” in Chinese
“Anti-espionage law” in English (translated by China Law Translate)
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Protests: Don’t stirr Trouble, Comrade Jiang

–

The party leadership might be concerned that Jiang Zemin’s death could lead from public mourning to an idolization of the deceased leader, and to more protests from there (rhymes with “past leaders were better than you guys at the top”).

Also, the party may want to serve a reminder of what it can do if it considers its rule threatened (rhymes with June 4, 1989).

While the current protests are heavily censored, June 4, 1989 was mentioned in yesterday’s main evening news, in a read-out Jiang Zemin obituary, even if n ot as “liu-si”, but rather as ījiǔbājiǔ nián chūn xià zhī jiāo:

As mayor and as municipal party secretary of Shanghai, Comrade Jiang Zemin led the cadres and masses in Shanghai to raise their spirits and to daring exploration, promoting great breakthroughs in Shanghai’s opening-up and its socialist modernization. The development and opening-up of Pudong was taking shape, he promoted party-building, and the building of spiritual civilization and of society saw major progress. As spring passed into summer in 1989, serious political crisis occurred in our country. Comrade Jiang Zemin supported and carried out the Party Central Commission’s correct decision to take a clear-cut stand and to fight against turmoil, and the correct decision to defend socialist state power, to protect the fundamental interests of the people, and to closely rely on the numerous party members, cadres and masses to vigorously protect Shanghai’s stability.
一九八五年，江泽民同志任上海市市长、中共上海市委副书记。一九八七年，江泽民同志在党的十三届一中全会上当选为中共中央政治局委员，并任中共上海市委书记。担任上海市长、市委书记期间，江泽民同志带领上海广大干部群众振奋精神、勇于探索，推动上海改革开放和社会主义现代化建设取得重大突破，浦东开发开放蓄势谋篇，推动党的建设、精神文明建设、社会建设取得重大进步。一九八九年春夏之交我国发生严重政治风波，江泽民同志拥护和执行党中央关于旗帜鲜明反对动乱、捍卫社会主义国家政权、维护人民根本利益的正确决策，紧紧依靠广大党员、干部、群众，有力维护上海稳定。
In 1989, at the 13th Central Committee’s fourth plenary session, Comrade Jiang Zemin was elected into the politburo’s standing committee, and the central committee’s general secretary. The same year, the 13th central committee’s fifth plenary session made  Jiang Zemin should become chairman of the party’s central military commission.  In 1990, at the 7th National People’s Congress’ third session, he was elected chairman of the People’s Republic of China’s central military commission.
一九八九年，在党的十三届四中全会上，江泽民同志当选为中共中央政治局常委、中央委员会总书记。同年，党的十三届五中全会决定江泽民同志为中共中央军事委员会主席。一九九〇年，在七届全国人大三次会议上当选为中华人民共和国中央军事委员会主席。

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Related

王丹：就算江執政 中國也不會有民主, RTI, Dec 01, 2022
Popular History Reader, July 31, 2012
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Jiang Zemin, 1926 – 2022

Wikimedia Commons – click picture for source

Jiang Zemin (江泽民), one of the CCP leadership’s many trained engineers, the man who invented the socialist market economy and the three represents, … Relatively untarnished by the June-4 crackdowns, he became the CCP’s chairman (or secretary general) in June 1989, by means of what official Chinese sources usually refer to as an “election”, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth CPC Central Committee.  Jiang had spent some time abroad, as a trainee at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in 1955, and later worked in leading technical and party functions in trades as different as the automotive and soap-manfucaturing industries. His work turned more administrative and governmental some time after 1980.

In October 1992, he told the 14th CCP party congress that

To establish a socialist market economy we must do the following important and interrelated tasks.  First, we must change the way in which state-owned enterprises operate, especially the large and medium-sized ones, and push them into the market so as to increase their vitality and efficiency. This is the key to establishing a socialist market economy, consolidating the socialist system and demonstrating its superiority.

Based on Deng Xiaoping‘s concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义), the socialist market economy (社会主义市场经济) focused on growth – something Deng kept emphasizing, sometimes against opposition from more conservative party leaders such as Chen Yun. Even Jiang is said to have come fully behind Deng’s all-out advocacy of growth once the paramount elder had made his inspection tour to the south (i. e. Shenzhen), garnering local support for his reform agenda, and proving that he was still China’s most powerful man, even if (mostly) from backstage.

Unlike his mentor Deng Xiaoping, he was no revolutionary veteran, and therefore lacked some or much of the traditional authority to head the party’s central military commission at the time. He led the commission anyway, and worked to make it clear that he was no mere civilian business promoter, according to a short news notice by German newsmagazine Der Spiegel in January 1995:

Those who criticize me for raising glasses with Western leaders must understand that this is tactics,

he told PLA officers in Chengdu, according to a central committee document the Spiegel said it had on hand.

I’m aware that the West remains our main enemy.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics has remained one of the CCP’s slogans, even as Jiang’s (and Deng’s) propensity to growth lost favor among the fourth generation of party leadership, i. e. the previous (Hu-Wen led) politbureau. The term socialist market economy has become less frequently used. In June 2011, China Daily hailed the concept as evidence for the wisdom of the CPC and its able leadership of the Chinese people in their endeavor to build a prosperous, civilized, democratic and harmonious modern socialist state and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation only in June 2011, but left no doubt that the Deng-Jiang approach had been second stage in a three-stage development strategy, and that

Now we are striding forward toward the strategic objective of the third stage. From now to the mid-21st century, China will be in a period of in-depth development of industrialization, informatization, urbanization, marketization and internationalization, an important period of strategic opportunities for economic and social development, but also a period with prominent social contradictions.

The three-staged approach referred to by the above China-Daily article of June 2011 had been spelled out by Jiang Zemin’s predecessor Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), in 1987. Jiang was to replace Zhao two years later, after Zhao had been ousted in the process of the June-4 crackdown. Li Peng (李鹏), state council chairman at the time of the crackdown, and the Standing Committee of the “National People’s Congress” afterwards, referred to the third stage as a the one where

we will catch up with medium-level developed countries in terms of per capita GNP by the middle of this century, achieve modernisation by and large and turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic and culturally advanced socialist country,

in January 2001, speaking to an audience in India.

The Hong Kong handover in 1997 added to the glorious picture of growth, this time in terms of political power. But appointing the former British colony’s tycoon Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) as the chief executive of the newly-created special administrative region (or having him “elected”) was probably one of Jiang’s leadership’s less lucky choices. In October 2000, enraged by Hong Kong journalists’ questions about if the CCP supported Tung’s candidacy for a second term, and if so, how that support could play a role, if Tung was really to be elected, Jiang told the questioners that they were “too simple, sometimes nayifu”. Tung, deeply embarrassed (by his fellow Hong Kongers, his boss, or both sides), was laughing in the background.

In his angry lecture, Jiang also advised the Hong Kong press people to learn from Mike Wallace, an American anchorman who had interviewed him about a month earlier, in the seaside resort of Beidaihe. It had been an unusual  interview, by CCP leadership standards, one that Jiang had visibly enjoyed, and one that had probably gone very well for him, in terms of public relations. Compared to his successor, he came across as a cosmopolitan, with a certain command of several foreign languages, including English, Russian, and arguably some German. When Spiegel journalists met with Jiang in 2002, they were greeted in German, with no accent.

Jiang had stated the need to deepen the reform of the system of distribution and the system of social security, in his 14th CCP party congress speech of October 1992, but that was basically that. If in essence, the objective of socialism was to liberate and develop the productive forces, to eliminate exploitation and polarization, and ultimately to achieve common prosperity, liberating the productive forces certainly came first. Growing divides between rich and poor didn’t appear to trouble either Jiang, or Zhu Rongji‘s (朱镕基) state council.

Another trend however did – the growing influence of a qigong-related, or buddhism-related religious organization, Falun Gong. In reaction to an incident in Tianjin, a massive silent protest involving over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners or supporters was organised in Beijing on April 25, 1999. The CCP leadership declared Falun Gong an “evil cult” in July, 1999, and started a lasting crackdown, initially supplemented with extended evening news propaganda featuring allegations against the organization which were hardly more “scientific” than the “evil cult” itself. Here, too, Hong Kong’s unfortunate chief executive Tung Chee-hwa was walking on eggshells, trying to please both his superiors in Beijing, and the public in Hong Kong.

When Jiang stepped down as the CCP’s secretary general in November 2002, he had held the post for more than thirteen years. He relinquished state chairmanship in March 2003, and the party’s central military commission chairmanship in September 2004.

Jiang Zemin was born in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, in 1926. He is survived by his wife Wang Yeping (王冶坪, also born in Yangzhou), and by two sons, Jiang Mianheng (江绵恒) and Jiang Miankang (江绵康).

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Related
» Jiang Zemin’s Health Matters, July 8, 2011
» Tiger on the Brink, New York Times, about 1998

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Most headlines in during Jiang’s life after retirement came from Falun-Gong affiliated media. The close interest from these quarters was no coincidence.

The OHCHR’s “Xinjiang Assessment” causes Beijing a practical Headache

^{Probably one of China’s vocational schools (click picture for source)}
There have probably been few high-ranking UN officers who know better what human-rights violations are, than Michelle Bachelet, the 7th United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who left office yesterday, after presenting the OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China. And if there were statistics, it could well turn out that many of those who attacked her for being slow  (or worse) in publishing the OHCHR Assessment were close ideological neighbors of those “Chicaco Boys” who had Ms Bachelet – and her mother – tortured in Chile, in 1975.

Every paragraph of the Assessment is worth to be read carefully. It provides information about how China’s “judiciary” and extra-judiciary systems work. China itself has no face to lose anymore, but the report also contains a line that must have been really severely contested between the OHCHR and Beijing, because of the practical effects it may have on Chinese officials:

The information currently available to OHCHR on implementation of the Government’s stated drive against terrorism and “extremism” in XUAR in the period 2017- 2019 and potentially thereafter, also raises concerns from the perspective of international criminal law. The extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups, pursuant to law and policy, in context of restrictions and deprivation more generally of fundamental rights enjoyed individually and collectively, may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.

It is unlikely that any criminal “tigers”, i. e. high-ranking officials, will ever be arrested because of human-rights violations in their capacity as Beijing’s henchmen in Xinjiang – but lower-ranking “flies” have always been a different story. To maintain its system of terror and intimidation, Beijing must keep its “flies” assured that they will be protected by the mighty Chinese Communist Party.

That’s how the OHCHR report may provide a glimmer of hope for Uyghurs, and how it may cause a headache for Beijing.

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Note

“The Journey never ends”, M. Bachelet, August 31, 2022
“Firmly opposes”, PRC Mission, August 31, 2022

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Uighurs yesterday is Han Chinese today

Click picture for tweet

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Related

“Uighurs Today is the Han Chinese peoples’ Tomorrow”, August 19, 2018
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Forgetful Fury

There’s a lot of talk about China feeling uneasy about Russia these days – which may be so.

But don’t expect China to support any measures that could topple Russia’s regime. For one, they need Russia on their side if they try to invade Taiwan: politically for sure, and militarily (in terms of arms supplies or other kinds of technical support), probably. Also, it is generally useful to have a permanent backer at the UN Security Council (if the Chinese ambassador there forgets his smelling salts, for example, and passes out at a critical moment for feeling uneasy, next to Russia).

If you know China’s North Korea policy, you’ll know it’s Russia policy even better. North Korea is a disaster zone with missiles, and Russia is a gas station with missiles, working warheads, and veto power. And with tanks, obviously, but that doesn’t matter to China.

If China did anything that toppled Russia’s regime, it would be inadvertently.

But there’s another reason for China’s reservations, too. China’s regime is much worse than Russia’s. It’s fascinating how easily the hell named Xinjiang has been forgotten on the international scene. Do those who ask China to condemn the invasion of Ukraine really know who they are talking to? Do they want to prove the obvious, because they know the answer? Or do they hope for a moderating effect of Beijing’s unease, on Moscow’s killing spree?

The last point would be the likeliest. But it doesn’t look like a gamechanger either.

Be mad at Moscow, if you have to, but don’t be forgetful.
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Related

We cannot even die for a cause like them, Uyghur Times, March 2, 2022
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