Archive for ‘propaganda’

Sunday, September 18, 2022

Patriotic Pep Talk: Angry, angrier, scientific

zhuchiren_04
Click picture for CRI video

The following is a transcript of a video by China Radio International (yes, China’s former foreign radio  broadcaster still exists somehow – CGTN in English and in Russian, CRI in Chinese).

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

大家好!这里是『国际三分钟』。 我是爱丽。 Hello! This is “International – Three Minutes”. I’m Ai Li.
继芯片法案之后,美国又准备在生物科技领域出招了。当地时间12日美国总统拜登签署了一项鼓励美国生物技术生产和研究的行政命令,旨在促进美国的生物制造。多家美媒体国解读此举仍然是『针对中国』。 Following its CHIPS and Science Act, America is now preparing to make a move in the field of biotechnology. On September 12, U.S. President Biden signed an executive order on a National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Initiative, aimed at promoting American biomanufacturing. A number of U.S. media read this as yet another move “targeted at China”.
五角大楼说的更为直接。14日白宫举办生物技术和生物制造峰会,与会人员包括国家安全顾问沙利文,和国防部副部长凯瑟琳·希克斯等人。 The Pentagon is even more straightforward. On September 14, the White House held a biomanufacturing summit which included national security advisor Jake Sullivan and deputy defense secretary and Kathleen Hicks.
希克斯在谈及投资生物技术对国防部的意义时表示,我们知道像中国这样的战略竞争对手也在优先考虑这些技术。他们想取代美国的领导地位,他们想挑战我们的竞争力。 Discussing the significance of biotechnology for national defense, Hicks said that it was known that strategic competitors like China were also considering these technologies a priority. [China] wanted to replace American leadership and challenge its competitiveness.
实际上,美国拥有世界上最强大的生物技术产业,在全球研发应用设施,基础研究方面,美国一直处于优先地位。2020年QS大学排名显示,在生命科学与医学排名前200的高校中,美国有61家入选。2019年全球市场排名前10名的生物医药公司中,美国占6家。截至2021年,在全球所有59座P4级别生物实验室中,美国独占13 – 14座。 In reality, America has the strongest global position in the biotechnological industry. In terms of R&D facilities and fundamental research, America always ranks first in global research. In the 2020 QS World University Rankings, as for life sciences and medical science rankings of the first 200 universities, 61 were American. In the [or a?] 2019 global market ranking, among the first ten biological drug companies, six were American. By 2021, U.S. P4-level biolaboratories dominated globally with 13 or 14 labs.
另外,在生物科技专利数量,专利活跃度,专利资产指数和竞争影响力等方面的领域优势,美国都很明显。中国短期内并不会对美国生物科技的全球地位产生威胁。 Also, as for the number of patents, patent activity, patent investment indices and competitive influence etc., America also has obvious advantages. China won’t be a threat to America’s global number-one position in biotechnology in the short term.
拜登政府之后已把目光转向生物技术。目的在于这背后巨大的经济利益更在于维护其科技霸权。 The Biden administration has since turned its attention to biotechnology. That’s because there are enormous economic interests behind it to protect their technological hegemony even better.
现在生物科技被广泛应用到各个领域。比如说,医疗方面的生物制药,农业方面的有机肥农药,工业方面的化学品甚至燃料,等等都跟生物科技有关。论对国家经济发展影响力,生物科技比之芯片领域毫不逊色。 Biotechnology is applied in a wide range of areas. For example, biological medication production for medical treatment, organic fertilizers and pesticides, industrial chemicals and even fuel are all related to biotechnology. Talking about influence on national economic development, biotechnology matters no less than the field of chips.
近些年中国在生物技术领域确实取得了一定的成绩。目前我们已经初涉形成门类齐全功能完备的生物经济产业体系,在生物医药生物育种,生物材料,生物能源等产业部门已经产生具有影响力的创新型企业。比如科创板上市企业中,生物企业占比就达1/3。 China has, in recent years, achieved certain successes. Currently, we have started shaping a category of fully functional and faultless biotechnological economic and industrial system. In the industrial sections of medicine, biomaterials and bioenergy etc., influential innovative companies have been created. For example, among the companies entering the Shanghai Stock Exchange STAR Market, one third are biotech companies.
从战略角度来看,机械化曾经让英国称霸世界。信息化又让美国问鼎世界第一强国。美国非常担心将来如果生物技术产业化使中国实现超越,自身的国际地位就将不保。也正是基于此美国有些急眼想走老路子,想通过制裁封锁中国生物科技领域的进步达到稳固其全球霸权的目的。 Seen from a strategic point of view, mechanizaton once helped Britain to declare itself the global hegemon. Informatization made America the global number one. America is really worried that in future, if biotechnological production helps China to overtake it, it may not be able to maintain its international position. It is also therefore that America is anxious to take the old path and wants to solidify its global hegemony by putting sanctions on the progress of China’s biotechnological sector.
『美国之音』就报道称,拜登新行政令被人为是对上个月签署的『芯片法案』作出的一项补充。美国『财富』杂志称,拜登的新行政令给美中经济竞争在添新战线。总之新政令是一个『风向表』,他预示着美国对中国的技术限制已经从芯片能源扩大到了生物领域。 According to the “Voice of America”, Biden’s new executive order is believed to be supplementary to the “CHIPS and Science Act”. American “Fortune” magazine said that Biden’s new executive order will add a new battlefront to U.S.-Chinese economic competition. In short, the new executive order is a “wind direction indicator”, foretelling that America’s technological restrictions on China are now expanding from the chip energy field to the field of biotechnology.
按照美国行事风格我们可以预测,如果此次新政令没有达到美方的预期效果,那很有可能像在芯片领域一样。他们会继续寻求对中国的精准打击。遗憾的是,生物领域本可以是一个美方有技术,中方有市场的合作领域,而美国现在非要打破这个平衡。 Because of America’s style of action, we can predict that if this new executive order doesn’t have the effect expected by the U.S., it will most probably resemble that of the CHIPS and Science Act. They will continue to seek for accurate strikes at China. What’s unfortunate is that biotechnology couldbe a field of cooperation, with the U.S. having the technologoy and with China having the market. But the U.S. has inisted on breaking this balance.
奈何。俄罗斯『独立报』评论称,对于美国不断升级的限制措施,中国有不同的应对举措,但最终这将促使中国加大对科技研发的投入,并努力确保独立性。说得不错。我们能做要做的。就是利用好巨大的市场优势,培育,挖掘,吸纳生物领域顶尖人才,加速推进生物科技和产业自立自强! Nothing doing. Russia’s “Nezavisimaya Gazeta” writes in an editorial that China has different options to respond, but in the end, this will induce China to increase its commitment to technological R&D and make efforts to ensure its independence. Well said. We can and we will. Just make good use of the advantages of a giant market. Nurture, unleash and attract top-notch talents in the field of biotechnology, and speed up the promotion of biotechnology and bioproduction!

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Related

“Cold War mentality”, Asia Financial
And now, no news, Nov 20, 2021
By any other name, March 30, 2018
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Thursday, September 8, 2022

The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

taiwanren_are_also_chinese

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China” (Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.” (We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.” (Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.” (Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”. If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle. This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it.
Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

table_one_mainland_china

or the other way round,

Table 2

table_two_orc
Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

table_three_orc

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be
table_must_not_exist
because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

table_four_taiwan
That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Monday, August 29, 2022

Radio Pravda dlya Rossii (“Truth for Russia”) on Vacation

According to its Twitter account, Radio Truth for Russia / Радио Правда для России (Radio Pravda dlja Rossii) is currently taking a summer break. Not sure if this affects their shortwave transmissions.
hf_transmitter_radio_pravda_for_russia
Please check their Twitter feed for updates.

Information about times and frequencies of their broadcasts on shortwave – in addition to their youtube channel – vary, but 9670 kHz, 6070 kHz and 13600 kHz are often mentioned.


For a number of reasons (safety, appropriate use of donations, etc.), I wouldn’t expect QSL cards from this broadcaster.

Sunday, July 24, 2022

Headlines: Guanchazhe, Shanghai, July 24

20220224_guanchazhe_press_review

Guanchazhe, headlines at 07:30 UTC

(1)     Actual Guanchazhe article there. Wikipedia has a useful article in English on Wentian space laboratory cabin module
(2)     Link
(3)     It’s more of a rant (you wouldn’t need academics for that, but it probably looks more authoratitve this way).
The article may contain some news for you however if you believe that Western sanctions against Russia are happily supported (or admired) everywhere else in the world
Tuesday, May 24, 2022

Guizhou: Old Revolutionary Areas brimming with Happiness


Main Link: Advance bravely on the new journey (奋进新征程), CCTV main evening news, May 22, 2022

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Listening to Xi Jinping, brimming with happiness

Brimming with happiness: guess who
they are listening to

Advance bravely on the new journey, contribute feats to the new era, see the new face of the old revolutionary areas – Continue the red bloodline to write a flamboyant new Guizhou chapter by your actions
【奋进新征程 建功新时代·走进老区看新貌】赓续红色血脉 谱写多彩贵州新篇章

Source: CCTV, May 22, 2022, 19:10 Beijing time
来源:央视网2022年05月22日 19:10

CCTV news (Xinwen Lianbo): Guizhou was the province where the Red Army’s activity went on longest and with the broadest scope; Hunan, Hubei, Chongqing and Guizhou, [aka 湘鄂川黔] left and right of the Changjiang, the old revolutionary base area covered some 43 counties (cities and regions). Since the Communist Party of China’s 18th National Congress, under the strong leadership of the Party’s Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, the cadres and masses in Guizhou have made full use of revolutionary tradition, continued [gēng xù] the red bloodline, struggled collectively, and wrote a colorful chapter of Guizhou’s modernization and construction.
央视网消息(新闻联播):贵州是长征时红军活动时间最长、活动范围最广的省份,湘鄂渝黔、左右江革命老区覆盖贵州43个县(市、区)。党的十八大以来,在以习近平同志为核心的党中央坚强领导下,贵州广大干部群众发扬革命传统,赓续红色血脉,团结奋斗,谱写多彩贵州现代化建设新篇章。

Guizhou’s Zunyi belongs to the old revolutionary area of Hunan, Hubei, Chongqing and Guizhou, and Huamao Village is located in the mountainous northwestern area of Zunyi City. In May, Huamao Village with its white walls and grey roof tiles is surrounded by crystal-clear water and green hills, the farming hotbeds are flourishing, and large numbers of tourists come to the village for sight-seeing and to experience the ancient ways of producing ceramic art. It is hard to imagine that this beautiful village with its flourishing industries and tourism was once called “the fields of desolate reeds” for being overwhelmed with poverty.
贵州遵义属于湘鄂渝黔革命老区,花茂村地处遵义市西部山区。五月的花茂村绿水青山环抱白墙灰瓦,农业产业园里采收正旺;大批游客来村里参观游览,体验古法陶艺。然而很难想象,现在这个产业兴、旅游旺的美丽村庄在多年前因为贫困荒芜被叫作“荒茅田”。

Guizhou was once the whole country’s poorest province with the largest number of poor inhabitants and with most intense and widely-spread poverty, and more than half of these impoverished areas were part of the old revolutionary base territory.
贵州曾经是全国贫困人口最多、贫困程度最深、贫困面最广的省份,而这些贫困地区中又有一半以上属于革命老区。

Secretary General Xi Jinping has shown concern [qiānguà] for the old area’s masses all along, and wanted to build the old revolutionary area better, so that the people of the old areas would lead better lives. After the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Secretary General Xi Jinping has visited Guizhou twice for inspection and research. Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that “good days come after hard work”, and that poverty needn’t be feared and every difficulty can be overcome as long as there is confidence and determination.
习近平总书记始终牵挂着老区群众,要把革命老区建设得更好,让老区人民过上更好生活。党的十八大以来,习近平总书记两次到贵州考察调研。在遵义花茂村,习近平总书记强调,好日子是干出来的,贫困并不可怕,只要有信心、有决心,就没有克服不了的困难。

Earnest and affectionate trust stirs people into action. After The CPC’s 18th National Congress, Guizhou launched an overall attack on absolute poverty, held poverty in check and pulled out the roots of poverty, and from infrastructure construction to relocation projects, the state has, in its central budget, arranged 124.22 billion Yuan RMB for key infrastruc-ture construction and relocation in the old revolutionary areas. Guizhou has dispatched nearly 100,000 cadres into the old areas to be stationed there for mutual help and support, to establish mechanisms with long-term effects, employment security, education and medical care, etc. continuously improving and continuously solidify the old-areas masses’ “two free-from-worries and three guarantees” foundations.
殷殷嘱托饱含深情,催人奋进。党的十八大以来,贵州向绝对贫困发起总攻,挪穷窝、拔穷根,从基础设施建设到易地搬迁项目,国家安排中央预算内资金1242.18亿元重点支持老区建设;贵州选派近10万名干部在老区驻点帮扶,建起对口帮扶长效机制;就业保障、教育医疗等体系逐步完善,全面夯实老区群众“两不愁、三保障”基础。

In December 2019, Huamao village, based on special-interest tourism and agricultural development, got completely rid of poverty. In November 2020, Hunan, Hubei, Chongqing and Guizhou, in the old revolutionary areas left and right of the Changjiang, the 35 poor districts were cleared.
2019年12月,依靠特色旅游、现代农业发展起来的花茂村全部脱贫。2020年11月,湘鄂渝黔、左右江革命老区贵州境内的35个贫困县全部摘帽。

The people’s lives become more prosperous with each passing day, and the landscape sees rapid development. During the past ten years, advantageous and characteristic trades of vegetables, edible mushrooms and tea leaves have taken shape in Guizhou’s old revolutionary areas. It used to be said that “the water won’t nourish the people next to it”1) in the mountains. Having relocated and become free from poverty, the masses have become new citizens of cities and towns. During the past ten years, in districts in Guizhou, one after another, the expressway has been extended and built through Zunyi and southwestern Guizhou. Airports have been built and expanded. At present, the Guiyang-Nanning High-speed Railway’s Guizhou section is being built, and train traffic is scheduled for next year. In the future, high-speed railways will link all old revolutionary areas in Guizhou with each other. Today, the old revolutionary areas’ masses are brimming with happiness.
人民生活蒸蒸日上,老区面貌日新月异。十年来,贵州革命老区形成蔬菜、食用菌、茶叶等特色优势产业;曾经“一方水土养不了一方人”的大山里,群众们通过易地扶贫搬迁成为城镇新市民。十年来,贵州革命老区县县通高速,遵义、黔西南等地新建、扩建机场。眼下,贵南高铁贵州段即将铺轨,明年建成通车。未来,高铁网将串联起贵州境内所有革命老区。如今,老区群众洋溢着满满的幸福感。

Having kept to the bottomlines of development and ecology ever since the CPC’s 18th National Congress, a new landscape of green development has been painted on this red-colored homeland. Guizhou’s old revolutionary areas have fully implemented the river-chief system and developed industries typical for the mountainous areas. Next, Guizhou will focus on the old revolutionary areas’ high-quality development2), accelerate the formation of newly emerging industrial clusters, promote new-type industrialization, new-type urbanization, agricultural modernization and tourism industrialization, sparing no effort on the new road of West development in the new era.
守住发展和生态两条底线,党的十八大以来,这片红色热土上还不断绘就绿色发展新图景。贵州革命老区全面落实河长制,发展山地特色产业。接下来,贵州聚焦革命老区高质量发展,加速培育新兴产业集群,推动新型工业化、新型城镇化、农业现代化和旅游产业化,奋力在新时代西部大开发上闯出新路。

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Notes

1) The original saying is that “each place has its water for its people”, and it’s changed here to suggest that there was no survival in the mountains in Guizhou
2) In the CPC’s words, “high-quality development” is “the establishment and improvement of an economic system for green, low-carbon and circular development”, in accordance with a report by the CPC’s 19th national congress in 2017
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Wednesday, April 20, 2022

You Sikun: Russian-Ukrainian War a “Great Revelation”

The following is a translation of a speech given by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan’s Speaker You Si-kun (游錫堃) on Tuesday, opening the national-day preparatory committee. “National day” refers to Taiwan’s double-ten celebrations.
Main link: National Day preparatory committee established – You Si-kun: strengthen the concept of Taiwan consciousness (國慶籌備會成立 游錫堃:強化台灣主體意識概念發想)

UDN coverage, April 19

UDN coverage, April 19

Legislative Yuan Speaker You Si-kun chaired the national-day celebrations peparatory committee’s opening session this morning. He said that the Russo-Ukrainian war is a great revelation for people worldwide and in Taiwan. This year, the general meeting office and the fireworks office1) are asked to actively plan and strengthen Taiwanese subject consciousness2) and cohesion as well as the will of the people to protect the land.

立法院長游錫堃今上午主持「中華民國各界慶祝111年國慶籌備委員會」成立大會。他在致詞時表示,烏俄戰爭對全球和台灣人民都有很大的啟示。今年的國慶活動,將請大會處及焰火處積極規畫,朝強化台灣主體意識及凝聚國人守土為國意志的概念來發想。

[The following paragraph is about technicalities concerning SARS-COVID prevention – left out here]

You Si-kun said that under last year’s rising changes and challenges, the national-day celebrations, besides improving preventive measures against the pandemic, also carved out high-quality celabratory activities. In addition to inviting the heros of the Olympics and Paralympics, those fighting the pandemic, those who defended Taiwan and stabilized society, were part of a heros’ motorcade to be cheered and thanked by people all over the country for their efforts and hard work for Taiwan.

游錫堃表示,去年在疫情升溫的變化與挑戰下,慶籌會除了完善防疫措施外,還能同時規畫出優質的各項慶祝活動,除了邀請奧運、帕運、防疫、捍衛台灣、安定社會、護衛國土的台灣英雄,搭上英雄車隊、出席國慶大會、接受全國人民喝采,感謝他們對台灣的付出與辛勞。

This was combined with work for the overseas compatriots, with the Overseas Community Affairs Council taking overseas compatriots to the national day evening banquets and the national-day gathering in front of the presidential palace. They saw the atmosphere of the Kaohsiung fireworks and the exciting events they brought for the Taiwanese. All celebration activities brought the crowds to many places, improving tourism revenues and earning public praise.

同時,還結合僑胞服務工作,由僑務委員會帶著僑胞到新竹市參加國慶晚會,也到總統府前參加國慶大會,再去高雄觀賞國慶焰火,讓大家感受歡樂的國慶氣氛,為國人帶來那麼多精彩的活動內容,各項慶祝活動也確實為各地帶來非常多的人潮,提高了觀光收益,廣獲社會好評。

You Si-kun said that the Russo-Ukrainian war is a great revelation for people worldwide and in Taiwan. This year, the general meeting office and the fireworks office1) are asked to actively plan and strengthen Taiwanese subject consciousness2) and cohesion as well as the will of the people to protect the land. This year’s national day holiday will be three days, from October 8 to October 10. He believed that the people would certainly the national-day events, hoped that everyone would have fun with combined education and entertainment, and that [the national day celebrations] would be activities with ample vitality, cohesion and consensus-building, and participation.

游錫堃說,烏俄戰爭對全球和台灣人民都有很大的啟示。今年的國慶活動,也請大會處及焰火處積極規劃,朝強化臺灣主體意識及凝聚國人守土為國意志的概念來發想。今年國慶日適逢3天的連續假期(10/8至10/10),相信國人一定會很期待國慶系列活動,希望大家能寓教於樂,讓國慶成為充滿活力、凝聚共識、全民參與的活動。

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Notes

1) 大會處及焰火處, the genereal meeting office and the fireworks office, both of them offices under the preparatory committee
2) Subject conciousness may not be the perfect equivalent – sociologists would be in a better position than I to judge -, but I found this term in a paper about Korean self-awareness-building, too
Monday, April 18, 2022

Cute Pandas and Lovely Tanks – CRI and CGTN cover Russia’s War in Ukraine

CRI Russian / CGTN Russian war coverage

How is our motherland doing, comrades?
CRI Russian / CGTN Russian war coverage

I don’t speak Russian, but it seems that China Radio International’s (CRI) coverage leaves nothing to be desired when you want to be kept up to date with your country’s war in Ukraine (without too much disturbing news, I suppose). The first 25 minutes of CRI’s Russian program at 17:00 UTC on Sunday were all about Donbas, with a CGTN correspondent reporting from there.

CRI might have dispatched its own correspondents a few years ago, when the station was actually an organization in its own right, and quite a fiefdom at that. CRI’s then director, Wang Gengnian, even delivered his own annual new-year address.

Some adjustments for synergy were called for, and the central committee delivered, early in 2018, by amalgamating CRI, CPBS (domestic radio) and television into a “Central Radio and Television Network” (中央广播电视总台).   Some three years later, many CRI language broadcasts on shortwave were replaced by mere music loops or endless repetitions of always-the-same cultural programs.

Taiwan’s government appeared to have similar plans for Radio Taiwan International (RTI) – not to take them off the airwaves, but to create an tri-medial organization, integrating RTI, Taiwan’s national newsagency CNA, and public television. Instead, RTI got a new director-general, and its Spanish, French and Korean services returned to shortwave from a mere online existence.

Now, questions are occasionally asked which plan for RTI was better – the one devised in 2018 or the one actually implemented in 2019 and onward. In my view, starting an international television channel on the one hand as is done with “Taiwan+” and keeping RTI as a station focused on audiences in different languages looks like a comparatively wise choice.

For one, RTI might provide a pool of foreign-language speakers for television if need be. Also, if I go by my own fondness for radio, “Taiwan+” isn’t for me, and never will be. In fact, it’s nice to be spoken to in my first language by RTI’s German department.

But above all, developments at Radio Japan and CRI aren’t looking really promising. At Radio Japan, English is only broadcast on shortwave three times a day, and as for the news, that’s only a soundtrack from NHK’s global  English-language television channel. (You won’t even know who’s speaking at times, because obviously, you are missing out on the subtitles.) And while I don’t know what they are talking about in Russian on China’s foreign media, I seem to notice that there is a similar problem with the CGTN correspondent’s contributions that are also used by CRI, i. e. by “Central Radio and Television Network” foreign-radio channel. The correspondent, Kirill Volkov, seems to interview a number of people for his video productions, but as a listener, you can only guess who he is talking to.

It is easy to think that CRI’s German service has lost some of its (not too numerous anyway) German listeners after leaving shortwave, along with many other CRI language services. The German editorial department’s current trimedial attempts at agitating their listeners in China’s favor may be good for a laugh every now and then, but contrary to CRI’s radio productions in the past, these days’ online content is useless.

20220130_dreckskerle_20220126

“Some US politicians behave more and more like
dirty swines!” -CRI German’s
“sharp commentary” online, January 2022

In that regard, one has to wonder why RTI has recently been busy with grandstanding of this kind. Reportedly, what really happened is that the same half-hour Russian program in Russian already in existence for Europe has been rebroadcast for an additional 30-minutes time slot on another frequency.

Stunts like the above seem to suggest that RTI’s directors are worried that the government might cut RTI’s budget.

That shouldn’t happen. If Taiwan’s government wants to raise its country’s “international visibility”, it can’t do without RTI, and it can’t do without shortwave. At least, Taipei better wait how “Taiwan+” develops before making cuts to the foreign-radio budget.

Sunday, January 9, 2022

Press Review: Xi Jinping’s New Year’s Speech comforts the Bereaved


Guanchazhe newsitems on home page today (Sunday):

1) Tianjin is considerate — netizens, inasfar as their comments aren’t removed – praise the municipal authorities, including the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee Propaganda Department, for timely information,
2) a woman whose brother lost his life in military service (in East Turkestan) got wet eyes when listening to Xi Jinping’s new year’s speech (清澈的爱、只为中国), and
3) an academic currently in America who believes it’s in the Chinese genes to help each other.

Guanchazhe online, Shanghai, Jan 9, 2022

Guanchazhe online, Shanghai, Jan 9, 2022

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