“Three Proposals, concerning the Development of Agriculture and Rural Areas”

The following are translated excerpts from an article by China’s domestic radio network, CPBS. Links within blockquotes added during translation.
Main Link: “Suggestions for increased investment into the construction of rural infrastructure”

^{Han Fengxiang, CPBS coverage, March 10, 2023}

CPBS online, Beijing, March 10, Reporter Wang Chi. 2023’s No. 1 central document has made clear provisions concerning increased investment in rural infrastructure construction and the promotion of the rural industries’ high-quality development. Three proposals brought about by Han Fengxiang, delegate to the National People’s Congress and director of Fenghuangshan Agricultural Machinery Farmers Professional Cooperative in Lishu County, Siping City, Jilin Province, are closely related to the development of agriculture and rural areas. They are “Proposal concerning increased investment in large agricultural counties’ rural infrastructure”, “Proposal on increased support for integrated technology for black-soil conservation and practical solidification of food security foundations in Jilin”, and “Proposal for increased support for professional agricultural cooperatives”.
央广网北京3月10日消息（记者王迟）2023年中央一号文件对加强农业基础设施建设，推动乡村产业高质量发展等方面作出了明确规定。今年全国两会，全国人大代表、吉林省四平市梨树县凤凰山农机农民专业合作社理事长韩凤香带来的三份议案均与农业农村发展密切相关，分别为《关于加大对农业大县农村基础设施投入力度的建议》《关于加大黑土地保护集成技术支持力度 切实夯实吉林粮食安全根基的建议》《关于加大对农民专业合作社扶持力度的建议》。

[…]

Proposal to increase support for farmers’ professional cooperatives
There are currently agricultural 3,040 cooperatives in Lishu County. “Farmers have joined cooperatives to farm the land intensively. The level of mechanization and the production efficiency have seen great improvement. Apart from land dividends, they also increase incomes by working as agricultural machine operators, working outside the cooperative, etc.”, Han Fengxiang told this reporter.
建议加大对农民专业合作社的扶持力度
目前，梨树县有农民合作社3040个。“农民加入合作社，将土地进行集约经营，农业机械化水平和生产效率都有了很大提高，社员们除了土地分红，还通过在合作社当农机手、外出打工等增加收入。”韩凤香告诉记者。

Han Fengxiang said that taking Lishu County as an example, there are many cooperatives, but only 266 of them have reached above-county-level model cooperative standard^*), while most of them don’t meet the standards. They are rather small, without much strength, and low degrees of specialization. There are especially few large-scale specialized agricultural machinery cooperatives and cultivation cooperatives, and they could hardly meet the requirements of scales and standardization of all villages. To a certain degree, this had hampered the development of expanded farming.
韩凤香表示，以梨树县为例，合作社数量很多，但其中达到县级以上示范社标准的合作社仅有266家，多数合作社不够规范。规模较小、实力不强、专业化程度低，特别是大型农机农民专业合作社、养殖合作社较少，难以满足各村规模化、标准化作业需要，在一定程度上制约了规模化经营发展。

Therefore, Han Fengxiang suggests to continuously increase the extent of support for farmers’ and agricultural machinery specialization cooperatives, to improve complementary agricultural machinery subsidy standards, expand the scope of subsidies, and to strengthen the cooperatives’ motivation to update and to renew machines and equipment. Secondly, continuously bring into play the positive factors of cooperatives in socialization services, to explore business opportunities in line with local circumstances, thus safeguarding farmers’ incomes and protecting national food security at the same time.
为此，韩凤香建议进一步加大对农民农机专业合作社的扶持力度，提高配套农机具补贴标准，扩大补贴范围，增强合作社更新换代机械设备的积极性。其次，进一步发挥合作社在社会化服务中的积极作用，因地制宜探索适合本土的经营模式，既保证农民收益，又维护国家粮食安全。

[Contact data]

________________

Note

*)

Out of those 3,040 cooperatives in total, mentioned in the previous paragraph, that is. China’s central-goverment ministry of agriculture calls on agricultural departments of all provinces, “autonomous regions”, municipalities under the central government and of East Turkestan (Xinjiang) “to implement the central government’s requirements concerning the highlighting of developing new business units, and the deepened promotion of requirements for the stablishment of model farming cooperatives”.

________________

Related

黑土地保护法 , MOE, June 24, 2022
Qu Dongyu, FAO, Aug 1, 2019
________________

China’s Position: Ukraine still hopes for the Best

On February 27, Ukraine issued a rejection of sorts of China’s February 24 position paper “on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. Advisor to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Mykhailo Podolyak, told “Freedom TV”  that the only effective measure the position paper called for was “immediate cessation of fire.”

“This means that Russia will remain in the occupied territories, we will have a new dividing line, and we will have a slow absorption of Ukraine. That is, the slow death of Ukraine,” the TV station quoted Pdolyak.

The rejection from Zelensky’s office, but only in an unofficial interview, suggests that Kiev doesn’t want to anger Beijing and possibly provoke Chinese lethal-arms supplies to Russia that wouldn’t happen otherwise.

^{中共中央外事工作委员会办公室主任王毅会见乌克兰外长库列巴，慕尼黑，Febr 18, 2023}

In an article published on March 3, “Freedom TV” quotes interviewees as saying that “it is too early to say that China is openly opposing Ukraine”. China’s “global ambitions”, its long common border with Russia, and its dependence on Russian energy supplies as well as the two countries’ traditional alliance are quoted as factors supporting the bilateral relationship, but “Beijing will not sacrifice its own well-being because of Russia, experts are sure”.

Part of China’s “well-beings” is the arable land it owns in Ukraine. It shouldn’t be too difficult to replace, given that Beijing’s investment companies are scouting all continents for farmable land to buy or rent, but it wouldn’t be fun to see the goose being killed by Russia – even if it isn’t quite the “golden” goose.

Besides, at least one of “Voice of America’s” interlocutors, Taiwan International Strategic Study Society director Ching-Sheng Lo (羅慶生), took a rather critical view of China’s food security, a year ago.

Lo Ching-Sheng says: “Having bought that much grain, with storage for a year and a half, there’s nothing to care about – no problem in the short run. If this should turn into an Afghanistan kind of war of twenty years, China’s problems will be very big.”
罗庆生说：“因为中国买了太多粮食的关系，它储存了一年半的粮食，所以一年半之内它不会有事情，所以短期的话没问题。长期的话，如果说变成阿富汗战争那个样子打个20年，那中国的问题就很大了。”

But the Russian hinterland will count more than Ukraine – be it for China’s “global ambitions”, be it for its food security. Beijing took a speaking decision in early February, 2022, a few weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine started. Answer to the unfolding crisis: more grain imports from Russia.

Ukraine’s hopes on China are unreasonably high. As Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a fellow for international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote,

The party can survive setbacks in the chip war, but the stakes are much higher in the fight for food security. Failure on the food security front will threaten the survival of the regime.

________________
Related

Kuleba addresses Asia, March 22, 2022

________________

China is wary of new China Strategies – of course

German-Chinese relations are under review by Germany’s federal government – Beijing is worried

I actually wanted to ignore the visit to Taiwan by “Free Democrat” (FDP) members of Germany’s federal parliament. The FDP  would drop Taiwan like a hot potato if Xi Jinping put China’s state-owned enterprises up for international privatization. It is understandable that Taiwan welcomes foreign visits, this one included, but forget that talk about “friendship”.

That said, China’s ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, makes sure that the German visit to Taiwan can’t be ignored – he’s making another fuss of it, in Germany’s business-friendly “Handelsblatt”, warning German politics “not to play with fire and not to test China’s red lines”. He is also worried that the German “traffic-light coalition”, consisting of Social Democrats, Greens, and the FDP (whose trademark color is yellow) would entirely follow America’s China policy.

The government’s colors

Nils Schmid, the Social Democrat parliament group’s spokesman on foreign affairs, says that he is “somewhat surprised” by Wu’s criticism. “The SPD parliamentary group demanded an adjustment of China policy, and the coalition agreement contains unambigious statements.”

The Chinese embassy has certainly laid its hands on one or several drafts of Berlin’s strategy papers. However, Schmid suggests that it must be a version that is several months old, and says that there is no final version yet. He adds that “contrary to China, where the state-controlled media certainly wouldn’t publish a similar criticism by foreign ambassadors, the Chinese ambassador has the opportunity to do so without being censored, around here.” This showed that there was systemic competition between China and democratic states after all.

Gyde Jensen, deputy chair of the FDP’s parliament group, says that Wu Ken’s answers show how fundamentally differently China interprets guiding liberal principles (“liberale Leitprinzipien”) and “bereaves them of their core concept, such as free markets, entrepreneurial freedom, human rights and multilateralism”. That alone was enough to explain why Germany needed a comprehensive China strategy, “for the record for everyone, China not least, to show how we see these principles and concepts and which action or rules we derive from them.” This included Germany’s interpretation of the “One-China policy”, concerning Taiwan.

China’s ambassador to Germany probably chose the “Handelsblatt” as an interlocutor not least because of its business-friendly position. However, by far not all German business is as involved in business with China as he appears to believe.

If it was up to Beijing, the Communist Party of China would determine China’s policy on Western countries, and business would continue to determine the West’s China policies. That was, of course, an extremely profitable arrangement for China, and it’s not really surprising that Beijing would like to keep it in place.

But every relationship, economically and politically, has to be in its stakeholders’ mutual interest (to borrow a Chinese slogan). Germany’s China policy will still be partly business-driven: if German business had got the “access” to Chinese markets it has long dreamed of, a tougher German policy on China would be almost inconceivable.

In that light, there is no reason to sing the praise of either Germany’s, America’s or any country’s government and their sudden attention for human rights et al. But there is reason to welcome their “tougher” policies. Depending on the “last versions” and their implementation, they may be in the national interest of our countries – at last.
________________

Related

“The Ukraine crisis it has triggered”, “China Daily”, Jan 10, 2023
________________

Some Porridge, some Rice: China’s New Normal?

–
Xi Jinping’s new year address for 2023 has been flowery as usual, but it also comes with some frugal characteristics. If it is such great news that China has maintained its position as the world’s second-largest economy, times must be tough indeed, especially when you take into consideration that (according to China’s propaganda) the world’s biggest economy, i. e. America, has gone to hell in a basket. If they are still bigger than China now, where is China?

According to the great helmsman, China has “blown the trumpet to signal the brave beginning of a new journey” (吹响了奋进新征程的时代号角), with “stable and steady economic development” (stable and steady probably referring to the lowest growth numbers since the last years of Mao Zedong’s reign), a 19th consecutive bumper harvest this year (十九连丰), and “the consolidation of achievements made in shedding poverty”  (我们巩固脱贫攻坚成果). —Corrections, Jan 27^*)

How green is our motherland? (Source: Beijing News, Dec 31, 2022)

With the Scarce Resources always on your Mind

Generally, Chinese propaganda points out that its 19th bumper harvest in a row has been achieved while the world had been facing a food crisis. That’s not a big deal when you consider that Russia hasn’t blocked China’s northeastern provinces from the rest of the country, but it may be considered an invitation to the Chinese public to cherish self-sufficiency.

As for the “new phase of pandemic prevention and control now entered” by China, Xi doesn’t wade into the details, and just sees the light – or the dawn of a new era – ahead (目前，疫情防控进入新阶段，仍是吃劲的时候，大家都在坚忍不拔努力，曙光就在前头).
The lines closest to Xi’s heart – if the communist faith he’s wearing on his sleeves is real – are probably these:

After the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party I and other colleagues went to Yan’an together, to renew what we had learned about the magnificent years when the Party’s Central Committee prevailed over difficulties rarely seen over generations and to appreciate the spiritual strength of the old generation of communists. I frequently say that difficulties and deprivation only perfect the jade. The Communist Party of China’s past one-hundred years have been hard work in the open regardless of the weather, cutting their way through thistles and thorns,  – how difficult and great the journey has been. We want to advance further, keep struggling, and make tomorrow’s China even better.
党的二十大后我和同事们一起去了延安，重温党中央在延安时期战胜世所罕见困难的光辉岁月，感悟老一辈共产党人的精神力量。我常说，艰难困苦，玉汝于成。中国共产党百年栉风沐雨、披荆斩棘，历程何其艰辛又何其伟大。我们要一往无前、顽强拼搏，让明天的中国更美好。

Both China’s economic plans and its “great-power diplomacy” appear to be in some trouble. As for China’s economy, it would take a real lot of innovation to catch up with the ageing of society. And China’s “great-power diplomacy” (大国外交), although re-iterated by Xi in another new-year address one day ealier, to a meeting of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference on December 30th, appears to have fed its wolf-warriors some chalk. For now, that is.

There is no reason to believe that China has given up on “replacing” America, or on other major goals, “core interests” and what have you. But the CPC leaders are revisiting and reassessing the foundations of their power. The emphasis on food security suggests that self-sufficiency in that field will always be a priority – China doesn’t only distrust the sealanes, it also distrusts its immediate neighbors. And if America’s restrictions on chip and chip-manufacturing equipment supplies to China find international support and cooperation, China’s growth plans will probably need to be postponed.

When enumerating China’s moderate successes to Chinese People’s Consultative Conference members, Xi emphasized that those successes hadn’t been “easy to achieve” or “easy to come by” (来之不易). That term is linked to a proverb about man’s most basic needs, i. e. food and clothing. My try at a translation:

Some porridge and rice aren’t easy to come by,half a silk or cotton thread, permanently bear in mind how scarce are your resources.
一粥一饭，当思来处不易；半丝半缕，恒念物力维艰

That’s also where China’s grassroot propaganda – in the shape of newspapers more prominent than, say, “People’s Daily” – is taking us as it picks up Xi’s reference to the latest bumper harvest: to the countryside. Here, too, none of the bumper harvests has been “easy to come by”. The proverb didn’t feature prominently in politics articles before the end of December, while it was popular in all other kinds of (less basic-need-related) online articles or comments. Now, it is represents the flavor of the new era.

To help the readers understand the significance of this year’s output, his attention is drawn to a number of natural disasters.

Delicious Meat then, Tough Bones now

How planned are China’s readjustments? The new “cold war” China keeps warning us of may not have been intended by Beijing, but it was provoked by Beijing.

Either way, tough times have occasionally been predicted by China’s propaganda before, and by its supreme mouth not least. In February 2014, Xi Jinping told Russian television that

After 30 years of reform, China has entered the deep water [or blue water], and all the pleasant reforms have been completed. The delicious meat has been eaten, and what is still on the dishes are rather tough bones. This requires our courage, and steady moves. Courage means to push reform even when it is difficult, and to prove worthy, to tackle the hard bones, and to enter dangerous shoals. Steadiness is about keeping to the accurate direction, driving steadily, and, above all, to avoid disruptive mistakes.

The Russians must have been an understanding audience. Now, eight years later, Xi needs to find out how understanding the Chinese are.
________________

Notes

^*) Corrected – previous text:
… and “the consolidation of hard-earned achievements made in previous difficult missions” (我们巩固脱贫攻坚成果)
________________

The State of Xi – Dented, but Dominant?

–
Friday nights in Sanlitun are reportedly busy:

Increasing numbers of people are going around maskless too. Fear of the virus is receding in Beijing, at least among the young. Most have already been infected anyway.

Reactions abroad aren’t that sanguine: those who dare to, introduce controls.Passengers arriving in Taiwan from China have had to undergo nucleic acid tests since Wednesday (December 28), South Korea has announced restrictions on visa for Chinese travellers until the end of January, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and France have introduced restrictions or are about to do so, but Germany is too busy working on its national security strategy – not least because the federal states demand to participate in its definition.
–

The State of Xi

The Chinese leadership, according to Xi Jinping at the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference’s tea meeting on Friday, has reason to celebrate:

We have solemnly celebrated the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to the motherland, resolutely fought against “Taiwan independence” splittist behavior and foreign forces’ interference. We have continued to promote great-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics and maintained overall stability within the general external environment. These successes haven’t been easy to achieve. They are the fruits of united struggle by the entire party, the entire army, the entire nation’s nationalities – the fruits of tenacious struggle.
我们隆重庆祝香港回归祖国25周年。我们对“台独”分裂行径和外部势力干涉进行坚决斗争。我们继续推进中国特色大国外交，维护外部环境总体稳定。这些成绩来之不易，是全党全军全国各族人民团结奋斗、顽强拼搏的结果。

Let’s have some tea together

Deng Yuguan, a regular columnist for the Chinese service of the “Voice of America”, believes that his (rather gloomy, apparently)  predictions of last year, concerning China and Xi Jinping’s government, have come true. Among those, China’s external environment hasn’t been favorable in 2022 (外部环境和中国面临的地缘政治让中国好起来的因素没有出现). The party leaders with Xi as the core etc. would agree: “a turbulent and unsafe environment outside China’s borders” (外部环境动荡不安，给我国经济带来的影响加深) is what they called it after their annual economic work conference on December 15 and 16.
–
Deng sanctimoniously deplores that the situation now was even worse than his predictions, and that “Xi’s image has quickly fallen from his divine pedestal” (习的形象从高高在上的神坛快速跌落). That said, it’s just Xi’s image, not the guy himself yet, and some of the examples Deng cites to prove the great helmsman’s decline are as evil as you’d expect, but, by Chinese standards, also rather trivial: the Li Tiantian “incident” (李田田事件[编辑]), tennis star Peng Shuai’s sexual-assault allegations against Zhang Gaoli and her disappearance, and the “Xuzhou chained woman incident”. Then Deng moves to China’s lockdown policies, and to what turned out to be “the failure to fight the pandemic” (抗疫的失败对习的权威是巨大打击). Those, of course, are real blunders, but his conclusions may still be somewhat far-reaching, concerning Xi’s reign.
–
There had been some ups and downs already, such as the trade standoff with the Trump administration, but every time, Xi had been able to defend his status – most recently by stopping the spread of Covid within China, successfuly sold as Chinese victories over the West to the Chinese public (although only for a while, until people lost patience), writes Deng.
He doesn’t go as far as to suggest that Xi will be toppled, but

Now, he has started his third term at the 20th party national congress with a unified Xi team, but the failure to fight the pandemic – while it apparently hasn’t hurt his grip on power – has seen him crossing the peak of his power and authority, and entering a downward spiral.
如今，他虽然在二十大如愿以偿开启第三任期，并建立了一个清一色的习氏班子，抗疫的失败看起来并未动摇他对权力的绝对掌控，可从毛的案例来看，他跨过了权力和权威的巅峰期，进入下行通道。

Comparing Xi’s situation with Mao’s after the latter’s numerous setbacks, Deng doubts that Xi would be able to overthrow everything that opposes him and restore his power and authority that way. On the other hand, while weakened, he isn’t likely to be sidelined either, writes Deng, and so much for the rendition of his VoA column.
–
If the U.S.-led policy on semi-conductor restrictions on China should turn out to be successful, Xi’s greatest mistake will probably turn out to be China’s “more assertive” role after 2012. The “wolf-warrior diplomacy” was utterly useless (except for those attacked by it – Sweden, Lithuania, South Korea and many other countries have gained new insights on what a “powerful” China will do, and the U.S. seems to have gained some insights, too.  Much of the “turbulent and unsafe environment outside China’s borders” (CPC speak, see above) is a world made by China itself. Beijing hasn’t been powerful enough (yet) to shape the world in a way to its liking, but they’ve successfully left unpleasant turds all through the five continents.
–

Meantime, not all the news is bad for Beijing.

Tired of a too-strong and newly weaponized greenback, some of the world’s biggest economies are exploring ways to circumvent the US currency,

notes a signed Bloomberg article. That’s not to say that the dollar is going to hell in a basket, according to the authors, but both sanctions and “[t]he he US currency’s rampant gains have [..] made Asian officials more aggressive in their attempts at diversification“.

So, let’s think of the dollars future reign (for whatever period) as something like Xi Jinping’s reign over China (according to Deng’s VoA column): possibly somewhat dented, but dominant all the same.

________________

Related

新年茶话会，习近平发表重要讲话, CPBS, Dec 31, 2022
________________

–

German Chancellor’s first China Visit: Opportunities and Liabilities

It is going to be the first visit to China for German chancellor Olaf Scholz who took office late last year with a three-party coalition (SPD, Greens, and FDP).

On Friday (November 4), he is scheduled to meet “President” Xi Jinping, according to his office’s website, and following that, a meeting his planned with him and Li Keqiang, his actual colleague as head of a government. Bilateral relations, international topics such as climate change, Russia’s “war of aggression” against Ukraine and the situation in the east Asian region are said to be on the agenda. “Federal Chancellor Scholz will be accompanied by a business delegation during his visit”, the office’s statement concludes.

^{Not everybody’s first visit}
Shanghai’s “Jiefang Daily” suggests^*) that

many European companies have experienced serious economic problems this year, because of the energy crisis, high inflation, rising interest rates and problems like the economic slowdown. It is crucial for these European companies to make up for these losses in Europe by profiting from the Chinese market. Brudermüller for example, CEO at Germany’s chemical giant BASF, plans to further expand BASF’s “favorable investments” in China. It’s business report shows that unlike in Europe, results in China have been positive.
欧洲很多企业今年以来由于能源危机、高通胀、利率上升和经济放缓等遭遇严重经营困难。对这些欧洲企业来说，用中国市场的收益弥补在欧洲的亏损至关重要。比如德国化工巨头巴斯夫集团首席执行官薄睦乐就打算进一步扩大巴斯夫在中国的“有利投资”。业绩报告显示，与在欧洲的亏损不同，巴斯夫集团在中国的增长一直是正向的。

–
Michelin’s business report, said to have been published on October 25, also shows rapidly rising sales in China, in contrast with an eight-percent drop in Europe, “Jiefang Daily” reports.

Michelin’s handsome China numbers notwithstanding, the “Global Times”, a Chinese paper for a foreign readership, blames a “sour-grape” mentality for France’s differences with Germany’s China policy. Those differences probably exist, with Paris being more skeptical about Chinese “opportunities” than Berlin, but you might consider Germany’s dependence on Chinese export markets as a liability, rather than as an opportunity, just as well.

While the SPD remains highly cooperative when it comes to China business, both its coalition partners have advised caution. And while it may be difficult to forecast a trend of future German investment in, exports to and supply chain connections with China, there are statements from German business circles you wouldn’t have heard a few years ago.

China itself rather bets on protectionism, but wants to get into the act globally, including in Germany (China setzt selbst eher auf Abschottung, will aber überall in der Welt mehr mitmischen, auch bei uns in Deutschland),

German weekly “Focus” quotes Martin Wansleben, head of the Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce.  Scholz should champion clear-cut rules.
It isn’t only France that is concerned about Germany’s economic dependence on China. “Voice of America’s” (VoA) Chinese service, too, points out that “the West shows growing concern about Chinese trade practices and its human rights record”, as well as unease about “Germany’s dependence on the world’s second-largest economic body” (对德国对中国这个世界第二大经济体的依赖感到不安).

VoA also quotes a German government spokesman as saying that while Berlin’s view on China had changed, “decoupling” from China was opposed by Berlin.

When you keep pressing people for a while, the main problem appears to be China’s aggressive policy against Taiwan. Most Germans (this blogger included) never expected that Russia would really invade Ukraine. Now that this has happened, peoples’ imagination has become somewhat more animated – and realistic.

The Social Democrats are more skeptical than its middle- and upper-class coalition partners when it comes to the West’s human-rights agenda, and rightly so. (If China put all its SOEs on international sale, you wouldn’t hear a word about the Uyghurs from Western governments anymore.)

But the Russian-Chinese alliance is a fact, and so is that alliance’s preparedness to annex third countries. That is something the Social Dems can’t ignore. If the press, the oppositional CDU/CSU and the SPD’s coalition partners statements are something to go by, the tide of German integration with China’s economy is being reversed.

“Nothing speaks against German SMEs continuing to import their special nuts and bolts from China”, a columnist mused on German news platform t-online last week, but not without a backup source.

China’s propaganda doesn’t look at Scholz’ visit in a way isolated from its other global contacts. In fact, the German visitor is mentioned in a row with General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Nguyễn Phú Trọng, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, Tanzania’s President Samia Suluhu Hassan – all of them bearing testimony, or so the propaganda suggests, of how attractive “Chinese opportunities” (中国机遇) actually are.

But Germany’s dependence on China, while worrying and in need to be cut back substantively, shouldn’t be viewed in an isolated way either. Scholz visit won’t even last for a full day, without an overnight stay, and also in November, Scholz will travel to Vietnam. Statistics appear to suggest that German industry will find backup sources there – if not first sources just as well.

And Annalena Baerbock, Germany’s foreign minister and one of the leaders of the SPD’s China-skeptic Green coalition partner, is currently travelling Central Asia. All the countries there “once hoped to be a bridge between Russia, China, and Europe,” German broadcaster NTV quotes her – the European Union needed to provide Central Asia with opportunities. Options beyond Russia and China, that is.

____________

Notes

*)	“Jiefang” actually “quotes foreign media”, but Chinese propaganda is often very creative in doing so – therefore no names here.

____________

CPC’s 20th National Congress: “The Party will never degenerate”

2,300 delegates were supposed to attend in February, more precisely, according to Li Keqiang (main link) on Saturday morning, the number was 2,296, plus particular invitees (特邀代表), that would be 2,379 delegates, minus 39 delegates having asked for leave because of illness, i. e. 2,340 delegates present there.

“Major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics to be unfolded in a comprehensive way” was unfolded by Xi Jinping himself in his work report. You should be forgiven if you think that this is about Chinese consuls-general tweeting about how America bombs and China helps Africa, or how their tummies bulged with pride when Xi Jinping told the party’s national congress that Taiwaners had no right to be free when 1.4 million Chinese were not.

But major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics isn’t a diplomatic market-economy product – it was produced at home in Beijing, by the 19th Central Committee’s Sixth Plenary Session (according to their communiqué in November 2021).

Condensed self-flattery concerning the party’s “zero-Covid” policy (which probably didn’t go down as well with the audience outside the “Great Hall of the People” as other parts of Xi’s speech), and this.

We have kept nailing the nails, thus correcting and punishing the “four winds”, opposed the idea and phenomenon of privileges, stopped some unhealthy trends that hadn’t been brought to a halt for a long time, and investigated and punished obstinate chronic diseases which hadn’t been eliminated for many years. We have fought an unprecedented fight against corruption, and by “offending thousands, and living up to the 1.4 billion” [Chinese people], we have fulfilled our mission to dispel the disease and disorder. The multi-pronged struggle against corruption, by beating the tigers, swatting the flies and hunting the foxes, has achieved an overwhelming victory and overall consolidation, eliminating the serious hidden dangers within the party, the state, and the military. By uncompromising efforts, the party found self-revolution, thus escaping the historical cycle of order and chaos, of rise and fall, for a second time. This has made sure that the party will never degenerate, never change color, never change smell.
我们以钉钉子精神纠治“四风”，反对特权思想和特权现象，刹住了一些长期没有刹住的歪风，纠治了一些多年未除的顽瘴痼疾。我们开展了史无前例的反腐败斗争，以“得罪千百人、不负十四亿”的使命担当祛疴治乱，“打虎”、“拍蝇”、“猎狐”多管齐下，反腐败斗争取得压倒性胜利并全面巩固，消除了党、国家、军队内部存在的严重隐患。经过不懈努力，党找到了自我革命这一跳出治乱兴衰历史周期率的第二个答案，确保党永远不变质、不变色、不变味。

^{No offense meant, miserable failure}

If Bo Xilai had said that, it would have struck people as populism – but then, Bo never made it into the top ranks.
China’s “Communists” have announced many victories in the past. If this one is as decisive as Xi has claimed will be hard to prove or disprove as long as he remains in control of the narrative.

Just these few sidenotes for now.

Newly appointed Russian Ambassador to China addresses Chinese Public

–

Igor Morgulov is Russia’s new ambassador to China, replacing Andrey Denisov there.

According to Russia’s state-run “Sputnik” website, Morgulov was born on May 4, 1961 and graduated from Lomonosov Moscow State University’s Asian and African Countries’ Research Institute. He speaks Chinese and English as foreign languages (even “fluently” according to RIAC, a thinktank’s website). He held the post of Counselor and Minister of the Russian embassy in China from 2006 to 2009, headed the Russian foreign ministry’s Asian Department next, and was appointed deputy foreign minister in 2011. Still according to “Sputnik, he has been awarded the “For Merit to the Fatherland” medals, order 4 and order 2, among other awards. “Sputnik” also quotes from President Putin’s presidential decrees that remove Morgulov from his previous post and appoint him to his new one, similar to the way TASS newsagency also does.

When you google Morgulov’s role as a deputy foreign minister, you’ll probably get the impression that central, east and southeast Asia were his main fields of work from 2011 to 2022, as well – including Russia’s relations with North and South Korea, as well as the Korean nuclear issue.
As a rule, there appear to be about half a dozen to ten deputy-minister posts in Moscow – see “Current Deputy Foreign Ministers” on Wikipedia. In that light, becoming Russia’s ambassador to China should count as quite a promotion (it’s probably the most important embassy for Moscow anywhere around the world).

Morgulov addressed the Chinese public by video this week, published by China News Service on Youtube on Friday.

^{Click photo for video}

Translation:

亲爱的中国朋友们，你们好。首先请允许我自我介绍一下。我是莫尔古洛夫。本月１３日俄罗斯总统普京把我任命为新的俄罗斯驻华大使。对我来讲，这是一个很大的荣幸，也是很大的责任。	Dear Chinese friends, pleased to meet you. Allow me to introduce myself. I’m Morgulov. On the 13th of this month, Russian President Putin has appointed me as Russia’s new ambassador in China. For me, that’s a great honor and a great responsibility.
１９８３年，作为第一批苏联留学生的一员，我首次来到中国。从那时候起，我的职业生涯同你们的古老而日新月异的美丽的国家紧密地联系在一起。在当今的复杂多变的国际形势下，俄中两国建立的新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系具有特殊的意义。	In 1983, I came to China for the first time, as a member of a group of Soviet students abroad. Ever since, my professional career has been closely linked to your ancient and rapidly progressing beautiful country. In today’s complicated and unsettled international situation, the comprehensive strategic partnership established by Russia and China in the new era is of special significance.
在新的岗位上，我愿意同中国朋友们积极合作，为落实好俄中两国元首所达成的重要的共识进一步推动两国关系全面发展，加强俄中两国人民之间的传统友谊而努力。朋友们，下个月我将要抵达北京。期待与大家尽快相见。谢谢。	On my new post, I wish to work actively with our Chinese friends, to implement well the important consensus reached between the Russian and Chinese heads of state and to promote our two countries’ relations further, and to make great efforts to strengthen the traditional friendship between the peoples of our two countries. Friends, next month, I will arrive in Beijing. I hope to see you all very soon. Thank you.

____________

Related

“Important choice, firm action”, Sept 14, 2022
Restive bulk of allies, May 6, 2022

____________