Posts tagged ‘democracy’

Monday, October 12, 2020

Japan, Mongolia agree to jointly support Indo-Pacific policy

The following is a news article, originally by “The Paper” 澎湃新闻, republished by sohu.com.

Main link: Japan’s foreign minister to provide 25 billion Yen to aid that country in responding to new coronavirus (日外相访问蒙古国,将提供250亿日元贷款援助该国应对新冠)

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Japan’s foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi visited Mongolia on October 9 saying that a loan of 250 billion Japanese yen (about 1.6 billion RMB) would be provided to help Mongolia respond to the new coronavirus pandemic.

日本外务大臣茂木敏充于9日访问蒙古国,表示将提供250亿日元(约合人民币16亿元)的日元贷款,帮助蒙古国应对新冠疫情。

According to Kyodo news on October 10, at nine local time, Motegi held talks with Mongolia’s prime minister Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh and Mongolia’s foreign minister Nyamtseren Enkhtaivan in Mongolia’s capital Ulanbataar. In his talks with Motegi, Ukhnaagiin Khürelsükh expressed his gratitude for Japan’s support in combatting the new coronavirus epidemic, and Motegi replied by saying that [Japan] wanted to further deepen the development of bilateral relations. While meeting with Enkhtaivan, Motegi said that Japanese loans of 25 billion yen (about 1.6 billion RMB) would be provided to help Mongolia’s economy which was affected by the pandemic.

据日本共同社10日报道,当地时间9日,茂木在蒙古国首都乌兰巴托与该国总理呼日勒苏赫及该国外长恩赫泰旺分别举行了会谈。在茂木与呼日勒苏赫的会谈中,呼日勒苏赫对日本支援抗击新冠疫情的举措表示感谢,茂木则回应称愿进一步深化发展双边关系。在与恩赫泰旺的会谈中,茂木表示为援助受新冠疫情影响的蒙古国经济,将为其提供250亿日元(约合人民币16亿元)的日元贷款。

Motegi and Enkhtaivan said that Japan and Mongolia, as countries with “fundamental values such as democracy and rule of law”, would deepen bilateral relations in broad areas. During the talks, the two sides said that they would join forces to realize the so-called “free and open Indo-Pacific”. The two sides also said that they would continue to work together on the issue of “Japanese people kidnapped by North Korea” and hoped to solve the issue at an early date. “Nihon Keizai Shimbun” reported on October 10 that Mongolia and North Korea had established diplomatic relations in 1948 and had a deep friendship.

茂木与恩赫泰旺表示,日本与蒙古作为共同拥有“民主和法治等基本价值观”的国家,将在广泛领域深化双边关系。双方在会谈中表示,为实现所谓“自由开放的印度-太平洋”将通力合作。双方还称将在“朝鲜绑架日本人”问题上继续合作,愿早日解决该问题。《日本经济新闻》10日的报道称,蒙古国与朝鲜在1948年建立了外交关系,有着深厚的友谊。

After the talks, Motegi held an online press conference and emphasized that “in the future, the strategic partnership between the two countries would be further developed.

会谈后,茂木举行了在线记者会,强调“今后将进一步发展两国间的战略伙伴关系”。

(This article is from “The Paper”. For more information, please download “The Paper’s” app.)

(本文来自澎湃新闻,更多原创资讯请下载“澎湃新闻”APP)

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Related

Japan, Mongolia sign loan agreement, news.mn, Oct 12

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Saturday, August 1, 2020

Lee Teng-hui, 1923 – 2020

Lee Teng-hui and Nelson Mandela met twice: in 1993, when Mandela visited Taiwan, and in 1994, when Lee attended his inauguration as South Africa’s first democratically-elected president.

台湾的主张, 台湾,1999,p. 103

They were two 20th-century giants of democracy, and there were a number of experiences they had in common – struggles for emancipation, more or less intensive tries at Communism, and a crucial role in the democratization of their countries, respectively. But while Mandela led a long open struggle, spending many decades of it in jail, Lee rose through the ranks of the nationalist KMT, supported and promoted by Chiang Ching-kuo during the 1970s and 1980s.

Lee probably owed much of his career to Chiang’s intention to co-opt native Taiwanese citizens into the KMT – a party which Lee actually (and secretly) hated. In the end, he owed his presidency to Chiang, to those in the KMT who threw their weight behind him after Chiang’s death in January 1988, and his own skills as a politician and a technocrat.

Lee’s career came full circle after his presidency had ended in 2000. The KMT revoked his membership in 2001, citing violation of party rules, not least their former president’s and chairman’s close contacts with the Taiwan Solidarity Union.

The KMT had been a vehicle on which Lee pushed forward Taiwan’s democratization, and the re-emergence of Taiwan’s own identity. This rediscovery is still an ongoing process.

While Mandela’s successes and limits in democratizing South Africa were a matter of wide global concern, attention and respect, Lee’s achievements and setbacks mostly took place in the shadows. The likeliest situations that would make the global public look towards the island was when it was threatened by China, with words or military exercises.

Delivering a lecture to an audience at his American alma mater, Cornell University, in 1995, Lee described Taiwan’s situation this way:

When a president carefully listens to his people, the hardest things to bear are the unfulfilled yearnings he hears. Taiwan has peacefully transformed itself into a de­mocracy. At the same time, its international economic ac­tivities have exerted a significant influence on its relations with nations with which it has no diplomatic ties. These are no minor accomplishments for any nation, yet, the Repub­lic of China on Taiwan does not enjoy the diplomatic rec­ognition that is due from the international community. This has caused many to underestimate the international dimen­sion of the Taiwan Experience.

When Lee retired, he essentially moved from the “pan-blue” (KMT-dominated) political camp into the “pan-green” (DPP-dominated) one. He supported both President Chen Shui-bian, and then current President Tsai Ing-wen. And he was prosecuted by the KMT after Ma Ying-jeou had taken office as president in 2008. Lee apparently wasn’t accused of unjustified enrichment, but of “diverting funds and money-laundering”. In November 2013, he was acquitted.

While Lee was known as a technocrat, especially with a record in agriculture, he also sought for new “spiritual” foundations for Taiwan’s emancipation from the Republic of China, i. E. the Chiang Dynasty’s China, imposed on Taiwan during the 1940s’ second half.

My active advocacy, he wrote in the late 1990s,

for  the “reform of heart and soul” in recent years is based on my hope to make society leave the old framework, applying new thought, face a new era, stir new vigor, from a transformation of peoples’ hearts. This goes deeper than political reform, and it is a more difficult transformation project, but we are confident that we will, based on the existing foundations of freedom and openness, achieve the building of a new Central Plain.

近年来,我积极倡导“心灵改革”,就是希望从人心的改造做起,让我们的社会走出旧有的框架,用新的思维,面对新的时代,并激发出新的活力。这是一个比政治 改革更加深入、也更为艰巨的改造工程,但是我们有信心,可以在社会自由开放的既有基础上,完成建立“文化新中原”的目标。

Zhongyuan (中原, the central plains) is a term charged with a Chinese sense of mission and civilization – in that context, it may appear surprising that Lee, a “splittist element”, would use the term at all. The way Henan party secretary Xu Guangchun (徐光春) referred to the central plains may give you an idea: The history of Henan Province constitutes half of the Chinese history. Two years earlier, Xu had apparently given a talk in Hong Kong, with a similar message. But this wasn’t necessarily what Lee had on mind, in 1996.
From “Taiwanisation – Its Origin and Politics”, George Tsai Woei, Peter Yu Kien-hong, Singapore, 2001, page 19 – 20 (footnotes omitted):

Another anecdote should also be mentioned here. In 1996, Lee Teng-hui declared his ambition to “manage the great Taiwan, and to construct a new Central Plain”. As is known, Central Plain (zhong-yuan) was, and still is, a term usually reserved to describe cultural China. To “manage the big Taiwan” is something easily understood, but to construct a new “Central Plain” is very controversial, to say the least. Some argued that Lee’s aim was to help rebuild China as a “new” central plain, but with his foot firmly on Taiwan. But others rebutted that what really was in Lee’s minds was to build Taiwan as a new Central Plain so that there was no need to unify, or have connections, with the “old” central plain, China.

But while the Taiwan experience hasn’t become as much part of human heritage as South Africa’s has, Lee power to shape his country’s development was probably much greater than Mandela’s to shape South Africa’s.

Lee had become president in extraordinary times. Opposition groups, and “illegally” founded political parties among them, had demanded the lifting of the decades-old martial law for a long time. And when Lee began his second term as president in 1990, after the two remaining years of what had originally been Chiang Ching-kuo’s term, students occupied what is now Taipei’s Liberty Square. Once Lee had been sworn in again, he received a fifty-students delegation and promised Taiwan’s democratization, less than a year after the Tian An Men massacre in China.

When a man follows the leader, he actually follows the mass, the majority group that the leader so perfectly represents,

Jacques Ellul wrote in the 1960s*), and added:

The leader loses all power when he is separated from his group; no propaganda can emanate from a solitary leader.

Lee understood that. Maybe Chiang Ching-kuo understood it, too. But when he made Lee Vice President in 1984, and therefore his heir-apparent, he probably did not know at all how far the “group” – Taiwan’s complex mixture of “ordinary people”, Taiwanese and Chinese nationalists, and, all among them, the islands Indigenous people – would make Lee Teng-hui go.

Taiwan Presidential Office Spokeswoman Kolas Yotaka remembers Lee Teng-hui – click photo for Tweet

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*) Jacques Ellul: Propaganda, the Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Paris 1962, 2008, New York 1965, S. 97

Friday, July 10, 2020

Ko Wen-je discusses his Chances to be elected President, Cross-Strait Relations

The following is a translation of an article by Radio Taiwan International‘s Chinese service.

The article contains interesting quotes from an interview Ko Wen-je gave Next TV, but leaves out critical comments he reportedly made about Xi Jinping‘s Qin-Shi-Huang kind of actions.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Xi Jinping acting like Qin Shi Huang?

Main link: No great chance to be elected president/ there are currently no cross-strait relations

Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je said in an interview aired on July 9 that concerning the 2024 presidential elections, he was “taking a preparatory look at the issue” but his own view of the odds for him wasn’t promising, there would be new politicians, and the situation would be different.

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的專訪中表示,對於2024總統「照這樣準備」,但自評勝算很低,且到那時會有新的政治人物出現、也沒有連任問題,戰局會不同。

Ko’s interview was broadcast on July 9 by Next TV. Asked by host Chen Yalin about the participation issue in the 2024 presidential elections, Ko declared for the first time that “I am still looking at such preparations, preparing for the presidential elections, just choosing like that, does it work or doesn’t it.”

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的壹電視專訪中,被主持人陳雅琳問及參選2024總統問題,他首度表態「我還是照這樣準備,準備選總統,就這樣去選,行或不行」。

The host followed up, asking “what is the chance that it would work?”, and Ko answered that if you lean on personal popularity to win, the mobilization abilities of the blue and green camps were both strong, and only if you lead by eight percent from the beginning, “if you ask me at this stage, the chances to get elected would be very low.” “When all media are playing the game like this, it can’t be easy.” Also, there would be new politicians by then, and there wouldn’t be re-election issues, which would make it a different campaign.

主持人追問「你覺得行的比例差不多多少」,柯文哲回應若要靠個人聲望贏,藍綠動員能力強,除非一開始就領先8%,「你問我現階段,選了贏的機會很低」,「所有的媒體這樣打,不容易啦」,且到那時都是新的政治人物、也沒有現在連任的問題,戰局會不同。

Ko Wen-je said that he was in a very calm mood now, with doing his work at the Taipei government, and if it [the presidential opportunities] was there, that would be fine, and otherwise, let it be. There was no need to care.

柯文哲表示現在心情都很輕鬆,正常在北市府開工,行就行、不行就算了,何必那麼在意。

Ko also said that at this stage, there were no cross-strait relations, only a Taiwan issue within the confrontation between China and America, with both China and America having their bottom lines. “Frankly speaking, my conduct and actions wouldn’t differ much from Ying-wen’s [President Tsai].”

柯文哲並表示,現階段沒有兩岸關係,只有中美對抗架構下的台灣問題,中美各有底線,「坦白講,我所作所為跟小英(蔡總統)的做法其實也差不多」。

Asked by the host about the Hong Kong national security law and the cross-strait situation, Ko Wen-je said that China has to reflect on how to deal with the people’s longings for democracy and freedom once arriving at a certain stage of economic development.

主持人問及對香港國安法及兩岸情勢問題,柯文哲表示中國必須思考當經濟發展到一個程度時,該如何處理人民對民主自由的渴望。

Asked what he had to say to China’s chairman Xi Jinping, Ko Wen-je said that [Xi] had better respect Taiwan. Democracy and freedom were the core of Taiwan’s politics, cherished by the Taiwanese, and, more importantly, the Taiwanese would want to retain it. Therefore, [Xi] needed to understand Taiwan’s current situation.

至於對中國國家主席習近平有何話說,柯文哲表示,他還是要尊重台灣。民主自由是台灣政治的核心;台灣人會珍惜它、更重要的是台灣人會去想要保有它,所以他必須了解台灣的現況。

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Updates / Related

Taipei to continue forum with Shanghai (click picture)

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Friday, July 3, 2020

Coverage from Beijing: Hong Kong’s unshrinking Police, Purple Banners, and Jimmy Lai himself

The following is a translation of an article published by Beijing Daily online. Chang’anjie Zhishi (长安街知事), the paper mentioned in this article as the main newsgatherer, is another publication from the same publishing house as Beijing Daily. It’s name may be loosely translated as “Familiar with what’s going on on Chang’an Avenue“.

The term cross-border powers (境外势力), in addition to foreign powers (外国势力) most probably refers to Taiwan, a country not recognized by China as independent. Taiwan has in fact been offered (or threatened with) the “one-country, two-system” arrangement by China.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Main Link: The Police don’t shrink from tough measures!

On the second day of the Hong Kong National Security Law*), the police don’t shrink from tough measures! Chang’anjie Zhishi has noticed that up to today (July 1) at 3 p.m., two people suspected of violating Hong Kong’s national security laws have been arrested, one man and one woman, and in addition, more than thirty people have also been arrested.

香港国安法正式实施的第二天,警方毫不手软!长安街知事注意到,截至今日(1日)下午3时,已有2人涉嫌违反香港国安法被捕,分别为一男一女,此外还有30余人被捕。

All five photos as published by “Beijing Daily” online (click main link for bigger pictures)

In the afternoon shortly before 3 p.m., Hong Kong police discovered a woman displaying a “Hong Kong independence” slogan poster at Causeway Bay’s East Point Road. She was arrested under suspicion of violating Hong Kong’s national security law, and police seized the related items as evidence. The flags of the US and the UK were also fixed to the poster.

下午将近3时,香港警方于铜锣湾东角道发现一名女子正展示写有“港独”口号的标语。其涉嫌违反香港国安法被捕,警方检取了有关物品作证物。该标语上还粘着美国和英国的国旗。

Before that, at about 1:30 p.m., police stopped and checked a black-dressed man with suspicious behavior at Paterson Street, and found that he had a banner with the “Hong Kong independence” slogan with him. That man became the first suspect of violating Hong Kong’s national security law to be arrested.

此前约中午1时30分,警方于百德新街截查一名形迹可疑的黑衣男子,在其身上搜获一幅写有“港独”口号的旗帜。该男子成为首个涉嫌违反香港国安法的被捕人士。

The police have issued a reminder that Hong Kong national security law has gone into effect with clear regulations about four types of crimes: crimes of national splitting, crimes of subverting state power, crimes of terrorist activities, crimes of colluding with foreign or cross-border powers to endanger national security and corresponding criminal responsibilities. Police would firmly enforce the law, so as to protect Hong Kong citizens’ lives and properties as well as every kind of basic rights and liberties they enjoyed in accordance with the law.

警方提醒,香港国安法已经生效,明确规定分裂国家罪、颠覆国家政权罪、恐怖活动罪、勾结外国或者境外势力危害国家安全罪四类犯罪行为和相应的刑事责任,警方将会坚定执法,以保障香港市民的生命财产及依法享有的各项基本权利和自由。

Police also announced that starting from midday, there were assembled crowds in the area of Causeway Bay’s Paterson Street, East Point Road, and Great George Street, hooting, damaging social peace, and even rushing out onto the road, thus blocking traffic.

警方还通报,自中午起,铜锣湾百德新街、东角道及记利佐治街一带有人群集结叫嚣,破坏社会安宁,甚至一度冲出马路,阻塞交通。

Police have taken a rigorous and restrained approach, reminding people that mass assembly constituted a violation of the Public Order Ordinance and Hong Kong National Security Law, and by warning the crowd to disperse and immediately leave, but a share of them still refused to obey.

警方一直采取严谨而克制的态度,多次提醒群众集结行为已违反《公安条例》及香港国安法,并警告人群停止集结,立即离开,但部分人依然拒绝听从。

“Beijing Daily” caption: 警方举紫旗发出警告 (police holds up purple transparent to issue a warning)

Police thereupon took law enforcement action and arrested more than thirty people under suspicion of illegal assembly, violation of Hong Kong’s national security law, preventing police staff from carrying out their duties, carrying offensive weapons, etc. Police also dispatched specialized crowd management vehicles as well as the well-known water-cannon vehicles.

警方遂采取执法行动并拘捕逾30人,其涉嫌非法集结、违反香港国安法、阻碍警务人员执行职务及携带攻击性武器等。警方还出动了人群特别用途管理车辆,即我们熟知的水炮车。

Chang’anjie Zhishi noted that at around noon, the boss of Next Digital, Jimmy Lai himself, appeared at Paterson Street, together with Hong Kong Democratic Party‘s former chairman Albert Ho, Lee Wing-tat, Lam Cheuk-ting, and others. They set up a fundraising street stand.

长安街知事注意到,中午约12时,壹传媒老板黎智英现身百德新街,与香港民主党前主席何俊仁、李永达,议员林卓廷等人一同摆设站点筹款。

“Beijing Daily” caption: 右一为黎智英 图源:香港东网 (first from right: Li Zhiying / Jimmy Lai)

Jimmy Lai stayed there for about an hour and then left the street to go to Hong Kong Shangrila Hotel with Albert Ho and Lam Cheuk-ting, then returning to their homes.

黎智英在现场逗留了大约一小时就离开街头,前往香格里拉大酒店,何俊仁、李永达同行,后于下午约2时回到其住所。

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Note

*) There doesn’t appear to be an official English translation of the “national security law” yet, but the HKFP website offers an unofficial translation in English. Chinese ones can be found everywhere, there included.

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Related

“Terrorism breeding, iron fact,” June 3, 2020
“Pillar of Humiliation,”July 25, 2019
Pointing Fingers, Drawing Feet, May 11, 2019
Liu Xiaobo, 1955 – 2017, July 14, 2017
Szeto Wah, 1931 – 2011, Jan 2, 2011

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Updates / Related

Your stability, my passport, HKFP, July 4, 2020

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Tuesday, June 9, 2020

Radio or the Internet? It’s both or neither

Why are “social media” so successful? Seems to me that the most obvious reason is that they give you a chance to speak out publicly, to make a difference in political ways. You can compliment the actress of your choice (ahem), you can shout at your region’s members of parliament, at top politicians, or at industrial managers.

(Those who appoint the managers won’t usually do Facebook or Twitter, though. They may not even bother to hire some ghostwriters.)

Then there may be a need to network. When all people relevant for your career are on Facebook or Twitter, you may have to be there, too. There may be a real need to follow them there, if you want to succeed in your job, or in “smashing the system”, or whatever your mission may be.

If both these motivations – making yourself heard and networking – are important, this could help to explain why “social media” haven’t helped to make our societies more democratic. What they have produced is a crude dialectics, though I’m not sure if there’s a never-ending synthesis, or if synthesis is completely out when sloganeering (with some more or less original variations of peoples’ credos) is the only thing that matters.

Bertolt Brecht doesn’t come across as an optimist. He usually saw the potential in new developments, including radio broadcasting – in 1932 and one year before the Nazis seized control of it. Brecht also knew – or learned – that newly-emerging media wouldn’t necessarily help the cause that he held dear.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but this is a guy who is talking about the Internet, not radio,

writes a headphones guy in California.

Sounds logical, but it isn’t. Just as radio has become a mostly linear medium, so has the internet – at least on its commercial side, i. e. Twitter, Facebook, etc.. Yes, people can voice their opinions there. But I can’t see how they would shape things in a way different from the old days*). No matter if radio or internet, their democratic effectiveness depends on how they are organized, or how people organize themselves while using radio or the internet as their media.

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Note

*) Except for a more intense cultivation of enmity on the internet, maybe.

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Related

My first ten days on Twitter, Jan 30, 2020

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Thursday, May 21, 2020

President Tsai Ing-wen begins her Second Term, Inaugural Speech in full

in Chinese

in English

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Related

A second term, Jan 13, 2020
“We uphold our principles”, Jan 2, 2019
First Double-Ten speech, Oct 11, 2016
Economy with new bones, May 20, 2016
She’s back, April 15, 2015

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Related / Updates

Domestic in Focus, J. A. Cohen, May 21, 2020

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Saturday, March 7, 2020

Taiwan’s Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法): an Attempt to Translate

A word of warning: this is a try to get an understanding of Taiwan’s anti-infiltration law – it seems that there is no English translation of it online yet. However, I am no lawyer, my language skills are far from perfect, and this attempt to translate the Chinese-language original is nothing the reader should rely on.

The same is true for links within blockquotes – they may or may not be accurate either.

Your input will be most welcome. Here goes —

Published on 109-01-151)

公(發)布日期:109-01-15

Content:

Presidential Decree Hua-Tzung 1-Yi No. 10900004161
中華民國一百零九年一月十五日總統華總一義字第 10900004161 號令

Enacted and promulgated full text of twelve articles, to be in effect from day of promulgation.
制定公布全文 12 條;並自公布日施行

Article 1
第 1 條
To guard against infiltration and meddling by enemy forces from outside our borders, to ensure national security and social stability, to protect the Republic of China’s sovereignty and its free democratic constitutional order, this law is specifically formulated.
為防範境外敵對勢力之滲透干預,確保國家安全及社會安定,維護中華民國主權及自由民主憲政秩序,特制定本法。

Article 2
第 2 條
Definition of this law’s wording:
本法用詞定義如下:
1, Enemy forces from outside our borders: refers to countries, political entities or groups at war or in military confrontation with our country.
一、境外敵對勢力:指與我國交戰或武力對峙之國家、政治實體或團體。
This also applies to countries, political entities or groups which advocate the use of non-peaceful means to harm our country’s sovereignty.
主張採取非和平手段危害我國主權之國家、政治實體或團體,亦同。
2, Sources of infiltration:
二、滲透來源:
(1) Enemy forces governments outside our borders and their affiliated organizations, institutions or dispatched persons.
(一)境外敵對勢力之政府及所屬組織、機構或其派遣之人。
(2) Enemy forces political parties or other organizations, groups or dispatched persons making demands for political goals.
(二)境外敵對勢力之政黨或其他訴求政治目的之組織、團體或其派遣之人。
(3) All organizations, institutions and groups which are established or essentially controlled by the organizations, institutions and groups [mentioned] in the two previous items.
(三)前二目各組織、機構、團體所設立或實質控制之各類組織、機構、團體或其派遣之人。

Article 3
第 3 條
No one must receive instructions, be entrusted or receive financial support, be donated to, or have funds provided for referendum-related activities2), from or by infiltration sources.
任何人不得受滲透來源之指示、委託或資助,捐贈政治獻金,或捐贈經費供從事公民投票案之相關活動。
Offenders against these rules will be sentenced to prison terms up to five years and up to 10 million NT$.
違反前項規定者,處五年以下有期徒刑,得併科新臺幣一千萬元以下罰金。

Article 4
第 4 條
No one must receive instructions, be entrusted or receive financial support from or by infiltration sources, for activities covered by article 43 of the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election and Recall Act, or article 45 of the Civil Servants Election And Recall Act.
任何人不得受滲透來源之指示、委託或資助,為總統副總統選舉罷免法第四十三條或公職人員選舉罷免法第四十五條各款行為。
Offenders against the aforementioned rules will be sentenced to prison terms up to five years and up to 10 million NT$.
違反前項規定者,處五年以下有期徒刑,得併科新臺幣一千萬元以下罰金。

Article 5
第 5 條
No one must receive instructions, be entrusted or receive financial support from or by infiltration forces to carry out activities as under article two of the Lobbying Act.
任何人不得受滲透來源之指示、委託或資助,進行遊說法第二條所定之遊說行為。
Offenders against the aforementioned rules will be sentenced to fines of more than 500,000, and up to five million NT$.
違反前項規定者,處新臺幣五十萬元以上五百萬元以下罰鍰。
Offenders against the first rule3), lobbying on issues concerning defense, diplomacy and mainland affairs and national security or state secrets, will be sentenced to up to three years in prison and a NT$ 5 million fine.
違反第一項規定,就國防、外交及大陸事務涉及國家安全或國家機密進行遊說者,處三年以下有期徒刑,得併科新臺幣五百萬元以下罰金。
Fines concerning the second rule are in correspondence with article 19 of the Lobbying Act.
第二項所定之罰鍰,由遊說法第二十九條規定之機關處罰之。

Article 6
第 6 條
Any person receiving instructions, being entrusted or receiving financial support from or by infiltration sources to contravene Criminal Code article 149 to 153, or the Assembly and Parade Act’s articles 31 shall have his sentence increased by one half.
任何人受滲透來源之指示、委託或資助,而犯刑法第一百四十九條至第一百五十三條或集會遊行法第三十一條之罪者,加重其刑至二分之一。

Article 7
第 7 條
Offenders who receive instructions, being entrusted or receiving financial support from or by infiltration forces and contravene Presidential and Vice Presidential Election and Recall Act Chapter 5 or Civil Servants Election And Recall Act Chapter 5, shall have their sentences increased by one half.
受滲透來源之指示、委託或資助,而犯總統副總統選舉罷免法第五章、公職人員選舉罷免法第五章或公民投票法第五章之罪者,加重其刑至二分之一。

Article 8
第 8 條
Legal persons, groups or other institutions in contravention of articles 3 to 7, will have the persons in charge be punished, and these legal persons, groups or institutions will be fined with amounts as stipulated by the respective articles.
法人、團體或其他機構違反第三條至第七條規定者,處罰其行為負責人;對該法人、團體或其他機構,並科以各條所定之罰金或處以罰鍰。

Article 9
第 9 條
Infiltration sources handling activities as of articles 3 to 7 or which instruct, entrust or financially support others to contravene articles 3 to 7 will be cut off based on the respective articles.
滲透來源從事第三條至第七條之行為,或指示、委託或資助他人從事違反第三條至第七條之行為,依各該條規定處斷之。
This also applies to any person receiving infiltration sources’ instructions, who are entrusted or financially aided by them, or who pass such instructions, missions or financial aids on to others.
任何人受滲透來源指示、委託或資助而再轉指示、委託或資助者,亦同。

Article 10
第 10 條
Offenders who turn themselves in or who confess during investigations or court hearings, shall have their punishment reduced. Those who turn themselves in and prevent major damage to national security or interests shall be exempted from punishment.
犯本法之罪自首或於偵查或審判中自白者,得減輕或免除其刑;自首並因而防止國家安全或利益受到重大危害情事者,免除其刑。

Article 11
第 11 條
All levels of government organs with cases contravening articles 3 to 9 should actively transfer their cases to, or inform, the prosecutors office, or police and justice administration, for investigation.
各級政府機關知有違反第三條至第九條之情事者,應主動移送或函送檢察機關或司法警察機關偵辦。

Article 12
第 12 條
This law comes into effect on the day of its promulgation.
本法自公布日施行。

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Notes

1) Year 109, i. e. 1911 (the year of the Wuchang Uprising): 1911 + 109 = 2020.
2) I’m not sure if this is about referendums, or about other votes, too.
3) Apparently the two rules following each other within the Lobbying Act, Article 2.
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Related

Anti-infiltration Act, Wiki, last edit March 3

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Sunday, January 19, 2020

“A Hong Konger, too”

BBC, Nov 27, 2019

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