Archive for ‘America’

Tuesday, November 24, 2015

Is Britain a “Gateway” to Europe? And whose Gateway?

As noted there in the footnotes, on November 1, Xi Jinping is no less an advocate of British EU membership than what Barack Obama is:

Xi Jinping emphasized that the European Union was China’s partner in a comprehensive strategic partnership. China hoped for a prospering Europe, a united Europe, and for an important EU member country, Great Britain, playing an active and constructive role in promoting and deepening Chinese-European relations.


That was from Xinhua, on October 23.

Now, Yu Jie, a Dahrendorf senior research associate at the London School of Economcis, explains how a Brexit could halt the historic Sino-British strategic partnership in the making.

Maybe the Cameron government should take their time before calling the referendum – after all, if the strategic partnership crashes in the making, or if it becomes historic indeed, remains to be seen. Then again, maybe David Cameron wants to use the honeymoon with the dictators in Beijing – while it lasts – as a point against leaving the EU.

The “Gateway to Europe” term used by Yu in her article is apparently ascribed to Dean Acheson. But it’s a concept that goes far beyond British-Chinese relations. Two weeks ago, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi was only the latest global leader to talk up the merits of Britain’s membership of the European Union before a referendum (Reuters). He’s currently calling on India’s springboard to the world and gateway to the East.

All that said, how you play your role matters, too. The way Cameron and Osborne chummed up to Beijing has done British prestige some damage. And while people in Europe tend to forget very quickly*) – one of Europe’s best-known “China experts” doesn’t even know a great deal about history -, Chinese peoples’ memory is much better.

(We’ll probably find out if this holds true for memorandums of understanding, too.)


*) Talking about history, and the fuzz that has been made about Xi sitting in a golden carriage with the Queen, things could have been worse. They have been, as shown in the video underneath, dating back to 1978:

The Embarrassment-tested Monarch


Taken from Bucharest Life

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

Innovative Guidance of Public Opinion: China Radio International’s “Independent Journalists”

On March 25, 2014, the Chinese Journalists Association held a seminar in the Association’s press room, according to an article published by the organization. Both the 2014 “National People’s Congress” (NPC), China’s alibi parliament, and the “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference”,  had ended about two weeks earlier. The combination of the two is frequently referred to as lianghui (two sessions). The pattern of the seminar didn’t seem to stand out, it was about “implementing the party’s 18th National Congress’ and the 18th Central Committee’s third plenary session’s spirit”, exchanging or sharing experience made with innovative news reporting methods (交流两会新闻报道中的创新经验做法), and with new explorations in increasing the ability or skills of guiding the public (提高舆论引导能力方面所做的新探索).

The beginning was pretty ordinary indeed, if you go by the Chinese Journalists Association account. The deputy director of China Radio International‘s (CRI) central editorial office, Zhang Hui (张晖), provided the participants with lots of statistics:  the “two meetings” had been covered in 55 foreign languages, four national-minority languages, five Han dialects and in standard Chinese, with more than 620 headlines. In form of written pieces or by radio, CRI covered the meetings in 42,000 news items and in 3,800 background reports, using 7,600 photos in the process. Radio reports had been broadcast on shortwave, medium wave, and digital frequencies, covering 160 countries or regions worldwide, in more than fifty foreign languages, Han dialects, and in standard Chinese. According to yet incomplete statistics (by the time of the seminar, that is), CRI had, during the NPC and CPPCC sessions season, received more than 72,000 messages from overseas listeners in more than 160 countries or areas, by letter, telephone, fax, email, and texting.

Many interviews had been recorded, in many languages, with important people, such as the Serbian prime minister, ambassadors from Russia, Mexico, Columbia, Italy, Mongolia and sixteen more states, and foreign parliamentarians and other foreign visitors had conveyed their positive assessments of China’s achievements. A multi-medial approach had been taking all along the way, Zhang told the seminar.

So far, so traditional. And there were tons more of that. Somewhere along the way, Zhang Hui’s shared experience would have sent most foreigners to sleep. But there’s also that magical moment in a Chinese talk, somewhere, when things begin to become more important, and when a Chinese participant would wake up, heeding an intuitive sense of timing, and when he or she really starts listening, at least with one ear.

Zhang Hui  – according to the published record, anyway – had arrived at the innovative aspects of CRI’s lianghui coverage:

CRI brought foreign media forces into play, promoted the localization of production, of distribution, and interaction, put the leading role at the front into effect, and reported globally. 1. Localization leads production and broadcasting closer to the audience. During the past years, CRI has leaned on companies to increase the pace of the “go-out policy”. In the main cities of Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Korea, Albania, and other countries, localization in research, production, distribution and in the work processes was achieved. Overseas media clusters played a particular role. An FM broadcaster in Lisbon transmitted a special program (“An ABC of the Sessions”), hot issues, guest interviews, foreign press reviews, etc.. An FM station in Bangkok transmitted the story of the two meetings in unceremonious language.

国 际台调动海外媒体力量,推进本土化制作、发布和互动,实现两会报道阵地前移、报道全球覆盖。1.本土化内容制播贴近受众需求。 近年来,国际台依托公司化运作加快“走出去”步伐,在泰国、老挝、柬埔寨、韩国、阿尔巴尼亚等多个国家的主要城市,实现了本土化采集、制作、发布和运营。 两会报道中,海外媒体集群发挥了独特作用。葡萄牙里斯本调频台播出特别节目《两会ABC》、热点问题、嘉宾访谈、外媒评论等。泰国曼谷调频台在《缤纷世 界》栏目中,以轻松活泼的形式讲述两会故事。

In “Studio 93” and similar programs of the FM station in Vientiane, Laos, officials, experts and academics were invited to a special program, to interpret the content of the two sessions. The program “Current Affairs in Chinese”, broadcast by the Albanian FM station, offered the main issues of the day by the “hot words from the two sessions”. CRI’s broadcasting stations with the CAMG media group in Melbourne, Auckland, Bangkok, Incheon, Colomb0, Kathmandu, Ulaanbataar, and other studios, arranged the news programs about the two sessions, organized the coverage mechanisms, and gave an example of the advantages of localization. The studio in Bangkok, through local hosts, in a familiar and effective fashion, gave explanations on [how] the two meetings [work].

老挝万象调频台在《93 播放室》等栏目中开设两会专 栏,邀请老挝官员、专家学者,解读两会相关内容。阿尔巴尼亚调频台在《时事汉语》节目中,开设“两会热 词”,关注当天热点。国际台环球凯歌公司下属的墨尔本、奥克兰、曼谷、仁川、科伦坡、加德满都、乌兰巴托等节目制作室,提前制定中国两会报道方案,建立健 全报道机制,彰显本土化传播优势。泰国曼谷节目制作室通过《泰中一家亲》栏目,由泰国本土主持人向受众解读中国两会,报道贴心,实效显著。

According to a Reuters report published early this month, CAMG Media is one of three foreign joint ventures co-run by China Radio International, or rather, by a 100 percent CRI subsidiary, Guoguang Century Media. Guoguang, according to Reuters, holds sixty percent in EDI media (North America), GBTimes (Finland), and CAMG Media Group (Melbourne), respectively.

Back to the Journalist Association’s seminar article on Wang Hui’s experience account:

2. International coverage localization operations abide by the broadcasting rules. CRI’s EDI Media in North America, GBTimes in Europe, CAMG Media in Australia, Global Iberia in Portugal, and other overseas companies dispatched nine reporters, in their capacities as [Update 20151117: overseas] independent reporters, to the two sessions, where they were positively active. Louise, Andrew and Michael as well as other reporters from CAMG, IBTimes, and EDI Media respectively, asked five questions [each?], to ministers and delegates, concerning property tax, environmental protection, economic growth etc. and achieved broad attention in domestic and foreign media. The nine reporters reported short commentary, blogs, miscellaneous, hot topics on social networks and photo stories [to their respective local or regional stations] and, speaking as borrowed foreign staff, told the Chinese narrative*) well.

2. 国际化新闻运作遵循传播规律。国际台美国环球东方、欧洲环球时代、澳洲环球凯歌、葡萄牙环球伊比利亚等海外公司,派出9名记者以海外独立媒体记者身份 上会,积极活跃在两会会场内外。环球凯歌、环球时代、环球东方上会记者Louise、Andrew、Michael等分别就房产个税、环保治理、经济增长 等在记者会上向各位部长、人大代表提问达5次,受到中外媒体广泛关注。9名上会记者为海外媒体公司开设的网站和落地电台发回短评、记者博客、每日花絮、社 交媒体热议以及图片新闻等报道,实现了借用外籍员工之口和海外媒体平台讲好中国故事。[…]

The Reuters story of early this month isn’t clear about where the idea of “borrowed boats”, i. e. CRI-invested joint ventures abroad, grew first: if the overseas Chinese media entrepreneurs who partner with CRI or CRI themselves got the idea first. “Borrowed boat”, according to Reuters, is how CRI director general Wang Gengnian refers to the overseas outlets concept. Wang Hui, in her work report to the seminar, used the same term in March 2014. And at least one of CRI’s overseas partners, James Su Yantao, described on a media industry convention in 2008 in China how overseas outlets could offer China’s external propaganda advantages.  According to Reuters, EDI Media was founded in the following year, in 2009.


*) Party and state leader Xi Jinping addressed the issue of telling a good Chinese narrative (讲好中国故事) on a central committee external work meeting on November 29, 2014, i. e. eight months after the China Journalists Association seminar described above. But the term is older; Hu Xijin, chief editor of Huanqiu Shibao, discussed the zhongguo gushi in 2013, and the leadership probably picked the concept from the usual circles of public-diplomacy expertise and academia.



» Borrowed Boats hit the News, Jichang Lulu, Nov 4, 2015
» Beijing’s covert Radio Network, Reuters, Nov 2, 2015
» Rumours about China Radio International, April 13, 2015


Sunday, November 15, 2015

Huanqiu Shibao Editorial: no CRI control over local U.S. broadcasters

Jichang Lulu, who is quoted in a Reuters report on China Radio International‘s (CRI) stake in media companies abroad, wrote a post about CRI’s “borrowed-boat” concept on November 4. The blogger (and book author) also disagrees with Reuters on some points, such as the number of “borrowed boats”. Also differently from Reuters, Jichang states that “localization” of official Chinese content can deviate to quite an extent from the official narrative, if it helps to win more credibility among the respective local audiences. The post also contains a link to a rather circuitous Huanqiu Shibao editorial, which reacts to Reuters’ reports, and also contains a swipe at critics of Confucius Institutes, and asks if China should be worried that Chinese students [Update, completed: … that Chinese students in America, Britain, or continental Europe could be brainwashed].

More to the point, in one line, Huanqiu Shibao also denied that there was CRI control over U.S. broadcasters:

Those local American broadcasting stations are not controlled by CRI, even according to Reuters’ disclosure, it [they?] just broadcasted CRI programs.




» Wang Gengnian’s little Sir Echo, Nov 13, 2015


Friday, November 13, 2015

Borrow a Chicken, Produce an Egg*): Wang Gengnian’s Little Sir Echo

Closing remarks of James Su Yantao, speaking in his capacity as a CEO of a Los Angeles radio station, at the 2008 Radio Development Forum:

During the 59 years since the founding of the state, and especially since the thirty years since the the reform and opening up, huge events have unfolded. The actual strength of China’s economic and social development has increased more and more, the people’s standard of living and degree of culture have become higher and higher, and influence at home and abroad has become bigger and bigger. Especially during the tsunami of the global financial crisis and the depression these days, the “China fever” that is sweeping the world is just unfolding. Under the new circumstances, strengthening and improving China’s external propaganda, to build and advance China’s external image, to make China’s external propaganda and image match China’s economic and social development is undoubtedly necessary. On the continuously deepening foundations of Sino-American broadcasting cooperation, EDI also actively develops Chinese-language broadcasting cooperation with all locations across the globe, we have participated in the global simulcast activities of the Chinese New Year and Mid-Autumn traditional programs, held by China’s Central People’s Broadcasting Station, added this time’s frequency localization cooperation with China Radio International, joint productions with friendly stations, focusing on every [station’s] national and regional special issues, all with good results, and we wholeheartedly hope that in the future, through this cooperative platform of the Radio Development Forum and the Conference on Global Chinese Broadcasting Cooperation, to produce yet more top-quality programs to serve the broad audiences, to advance and enrich Chinese culture.

建国59年以来,特别是改革开放30年以来,中国发生了天翻地覆的变化。中国经济和社会发展的实力越来越强,人民的生活水平和文明程度越来越高,国内外的 影响力越来越大。尤其是在全球金融海啸和经济萧条的今天,席卷全球的 “中国热”更是方兴未艾。在新形势下,加强并改进中国的对外宣传,打造并提升中国的对外形象,使中国的对外宣传和对外形象与中国经济和社会的发展相适应、 相匹配,无疑是很有必要的。在不断加深中美广播合作的基础上,鹰龙传媒也积极开展和全球各地华语广播的合作,曾经多次参加过中国中央人民广播电台举办的中 国春节和中秋等传统节日的全球大型联播活动,再加上今次和中国国际广播电台的全频率本土化的合作以及曾经和一些兄弟友台连线制作,针对各自国家和地区专门 议题的专题节目,都取得了良好的效果,衷心希望未来在更多的领域,透过广播发展论坛和全球华语广播协作网这一合作平台,做出更多优质的节目服务广大听众, 弘扬中华文化。

The roots of Chinese culture are in China, and the overseas Chinese media are just branches, and only when the tree is strong and deeply rooted, the branches can grow well and in full blossom. Only when overseas Chinese media establish themselves well, they can play in concert with Chinese mainstream media, as good cultural links and as bridges of friendship. Herein lies the importance and far-reaching significance of this time’s Radio Development Forum and the Conference on Global Chinese Broadcasting Cooperation.


According to a story published by Reuters earlier this month, James Su, in his capacity as president and CEO of a company named G&E Studio Inc, leases airtime on at least fifteen U.S. stations, distributes China Radio International (CRI) programming, and produces and distributes original Beijing-friendly shows from its California studios.

It looks like a pretty secretive operation. Strangely enough, people who take offense from Western propaganda appear to think that there’s nothing wrong with borrowing a chicken to produce an egg (借鸡生蛋), as Guanchazhe (Shanghai) put it ten days ago. Or maybe they do see the problem, and that’s exactly why they try an undercover approach.

Similar airtime arrangements appear to exist in Europe.



*) Or, as Wang Gengnian, China Radio International’s director general, reportedly put it, borrow a boat.



» Earnest Expectations, May 23, 2015
» Skeletons in the Cupboard, Sept 23, 2014
» RSF and Congressman demand Sanctions, Aug 29, 2014
» Global Field Media company, Nov 30, 2013
» Ambassadors abroad, May 25, 2012
» Be more Xinhua, Oct 10, 2009

Friday, November 6, 2015

An Interview on “Huanqiu Shibao”: the too-optimistic Expert

It’s being said time and again, in the Chinese media, that the Ma-Xi meeting in Singapore tomorrow has “milestone significance” (有里程碑式的意义). With neither glorious economic growth rates nor more former colonies’ returns to the motherland to report in the evening news, it seems that the Singapore meeting came almost like a last straw for the great-expectations propaganda.

This interpretation, of course, would be an exaggeration. But the CCP’s publicity behavior sometimes does look desperate. If there’s no countdown to the return to the motherland as was the case with Hong Kong and Macau, try Taiwan, even if you do not know the day or the hour.

And there’s desperation on the other side of the strait, for sure. Not in the DPP headquarters, but at the KMT’s. That’s probably not the only reason for Ma Ying-jeou to meet Xi Jinping. There’s reason to believe that consolidation of a “peace and stability” trend in the bilateral relations is on Ma’s mind. But if the KMT was faring better in the election campaign, maybe there wouldn’t be a meeting of this kind on Saturday.

Huanqiu Shibao published an interview with a retired diplomat, Hu Zhongle (胡中乐), on Wednesday. [Update 20151107 »Ersatzlink] Hu is on the board of an association of particular authors, the Old Diplomatic Service Cadres’ Writing Association (外交部老干部笔会, or in short, 外交笔会). He’s also a blogger.

Hu Zhongle praises former party secretary Hu Jintao who had “lost no time”, after the KMT’s electoral defeat in 2005 [Hu Zhongle seems to confuse the 2005 local elections with some other elections here], and had invited Lien Chan (KMT) and James Soong (PFP, the KMT’s Shining Path), to Beijing, in their capacities as party leaders.

Obviously, it was impossible for Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping to meet as party leaders, as Ma wasn’t the KMT’s chairman. Meeting as “two cross-strait leaders”, rather than with formal titles, would avoid conflict with the “one-China principle”, and help to consolidate the achievements in the cross-strait relations of the past years, said Hu Zhongle.

Asked if Ma’s meeting with Xi would help the KMT in catching up to the DPP, Hu said that the effect would be rather limited. The long-standing military confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait had come to an end, and the concept of “Taiwan independence” had become “history”. When people [in China, that is] heard about the DPP, they associated the party with Taiwanese independence, but the DPP had adjusted its strategy.

In fact, there was no Taiwan issue [or Taiwan question, 台湾问题] anymore, said Hu. There should be no ambiguity [on the part of Beijing] concerning the “one-China principle”, said Hu. Citing a CCP management philosophy from the late 1990s (抓大放小, i. e. focusing on the management of big enterprises and decentralizing or macro-controlling small and medium-sized ones), he suggested that on smaller issues, far below the “one-China threshold, Beijing could adopt a constructive stance. Even military cooperation with Taiwan was conceivable, given its strategic position near the South China Sea.

Hu wasn’t terribly precise in what he said, but he added to a feelgood atmosphere. Or might have, if he had talked to a normal newspaper rather than to one that caters to a fairly nationalistic readership.

The verdict of the commentariat – at least if you go by the more recent ones – appears to be near-unanimous:

Intellectuals are too optimistic about the issue. (知识分子,看问题太乐观)

What Mr. Hu says is simply bullshit. (胡中乐先生说的简称“胡说”。)

[A suggestion that the “expertise” came across as dim] (这专家姓胡名扯,字瞎说,号忽悠!)

Blindly optimistic!” [太盲目乐观了!]

and a comment with more detail:

To say that the “Taiwan question is no longer a problem”, I believe an extreme mistake, and harmful talk. The DPP holds on tightly to Taiwan independence, and ruling Ma doesn’t want unification, clinging to the Republic-of-China zombie. clamoring about a sovereign and independent Republic of China. Besides, he sides with Japan to oppose the mainland, serving as America’s and Japan’s running dog. I’m asking you – is this “not a problem”? Are you saying that we need no reunification? [“台海问题已不是问题”,我认为这是极端错误和有害的言论。民进党死抱台独党纲不放,执政的“马不统”死抱中华民国的僵尸不放,叫嚣台湾是主权独立的中华民国,并且,亲美友日反大陆,充美日走狗,请问,这不是问题吗?难道不要国家统一了吗?]

Not least (this could be read as an answer to the management of big and small enterprises, or priorities, as mentioned by Hu Zhongle):

If you don’t solve America, the Taiwan issue will never be solved! [不解决美国,台湾问题就始终是个问题!]

The Huanqiu readership isn’t necessarily representative for the more general Chinese public. But it would be premature to think that the meeting in Singapore would automatically add to the CCP’s publicity capital. It may also increase the publics appetite for yet more patriotic glory, or lead to dangerous disappointment when Taiwan doesn’t play along with the screenplay from Beijing.

Thursday, November 5, 2015

China Radio International, “a very big Client”

In Europe, a Finland-based company produces progarms for China Radio International (CRI), without mentioning the client. In the U.S., CRI proxies reportedly own substantial shares of radio stations. According to the Daily Mail, U.S. law

prohibits foreign governments or their representatives from holding a radio license for a U.S. broadcast station. Under the Communications Act, foreign individuals, governments and corporations are permitted to hold up to 20 percent ownership directly in a station and up to 25 percent in the U.S. parent corporation of a station.


Sunday, November 1, 2015

Angela Merkel’s 8th Visit: another two Days in China

Angela Merkel was to meet Xi Jinping on Thursday, her office’s website wrote earlier this week, referring to the state chairman and party secretary general as “president”. That’s routine in German federal and regional authorities’ contacts with China; party affiliations and roles are mostly ignored.

It was Merkel’s eighth visit to China, Xinhua newsagency informed statistics-obsessed readers. She first visited in August 1997, then as minister for environment protection and nuclear reactor safety. Visits as chancellor followed in May 2006, August 2007, October 2008, July 2010, February 2012, August 2012, and in July 2014.

An End to the “Golden Decade” of German-Chinese Cooperation?

Germany’s press is diverse at first glance, but much of what ends up in regional papers is written by relatively few correspondents or editorialists in Berlin, pooled in news agencies and correspondent’s offices that offer their services to any paper in the market. “Die Krisen reisen mit” (Crises travel along), written by two Deutsche Presseagentur (DPA) correspondents, was published by a number of small or medium-sized regional papers. Sebastian Heilmann, a sinologist, is quoted as saying that London had assumed the leading role in relations with China (this probably refers to the leading role in the European Union).

But the DPA article doesn’t want to leave Heilmann’s remarks uncontested:

That Cameron, all of a sudden, only leers at business doesn’t necessarily suggest convictions and reliability, as can be read from internet users’ sardonic remarks. The chancellor enjoys much greater esteem. But Xi was probably happy to see the human-rights topic basically dropped under the table in London, and the Europeans being split. The [German] federal government takes no stock in this kind of policy changes and remains firm in its critical China policy. Chinese people appreciate reliability. Even the strength of Germany’s industries alone would ensure Germany’s position as China’s “definitely strongest trading partner”, the chancellery believes.

Dass Cameron plötzlich nur noch auf das Geschäft schielt, spricht auch aus chinesischer Sicht nicht unbedingt für Überzeugungen und Verlässlichkeit, wie aus hämischen Kommentaren von Internetnutzern erkennbar wird. Da genießt die Kanzlerin viel größere Wertschätzung. Aber Xi dürfte sich gefreut haben, dass das Thema Menschenrechte in London praktisch unter den Tisch gefallen ist und hier ein Keil zwischen die Europäer getrieben werden konnte. Die Bundesregierung hält von solchen Kurswechseln aber nichts und bleibt in ihrer kritischen China-Politik standhaft. Die Chinesen wissen Zuverlässigkeit zu schätzen. Schon wegen der Stärke der deutschen Industrie werde Deutschland auch “mit Sicherheit der stärkste Handelspartner” der Chinesen  bleiben, glaubt man im Kanzleramt.

Deutsche Welle’s Mandarin service is more elaborate, drawing on a press release from the Mercator Institute for China in Berlin, r rather on the institute’s trade magazine “China Flash”. In an interview with the magazine, Heilmann, the institute’s director, said that Chinese demand for industrial commodities was going down, and at the same time,

there’s a certain disillusionment on the Chinese side, because jointly agreed projects are stagnating: from the Chinese perspective, German industry is too passive in technological cooperation, and the federal government has given too little profile to the issue.

auf chinesischer Seite eine gewisse diplomatische Ernüchterung, weil gemeinsam vereinbarte Projekte stocken: Aus Sicht der Chinesen ist die deutsche Industrie in der Technologiekooperation zu passiv, und die Bundesregierung hat das Thema Innovationspartnerschaft zu niedrig aufgehängt.

As for an action framework for innovation partnership, adopted in Berlin in October 2014, with Chinese chief state councillor Li Keqiang and Merkel in attendance, Merkel would “need to cheer up disappointed interlocutors in Beijing”:

Peking had hoped that German companies would procure Chinese companies with innovative know-how on networked production. However, German companies are understandably skeptical: Industry 4.0 is about fundamental, sensitive future technology. The question if this kind of know-how can be protected in the Chinese context must be answered in the negative, at present.

Peking hatte gehofft, dass deutsche Unternehmen chinesischen Firmen innovatives Wissen zur vernetzten Industrieproduktion beibringen. Doch deutsche Unternehmen sind verständlicher Weise skeptisch: Bei Industrie 4.0 geht es um elementare, sensible Zukunftstechnologien. Und die Frage, ob solches Know-how im chinesischen Kontext geschützt werden kann, muss man derzeit klar verneinen.

In Heilmann’s view, Germany losing its status as an “anchor state” for Chinese engagement in Europe shouldn’t simply be attributed to London’s “fulminant diplomatic campaign”, but to intensifying Chinese interest in international financial markets and tertiary-industry-related know-how.

Meantime, the federal government, in its announcement of Merkel’s visit to China, stated that Berlin’s goal was a balance between economic/technological, and social issues, and to include issues of global order, as well.

Human Rights: “Huanqiu Shibao” pities Merkel

Heilmann doesn’t seem to agree that China’s leaders would appreciate the federal government’s “critical China policy” (see first blockquote). It would be quite possible, Heilmann told “China Flash”, that Chinese government representatives wouldn’t listen to German expostulations “as patiently as they did last year”.

One had to pity Merkel, Huanqiu Shibao wrote in a slightly satirical article, republished here by Guanchazhe (Shanghai) on Thursday:

Today and tomorrow; German chancellor Angela Merkel visits China. So-called human-rights organizations like Amnesty International responded right away, on receipt of the news. This organization, which frequently causes China trouble, as well as the disreputable organizations “World Uyghur Congress” and “International Campaign for Tibet” recently published a joint open letter to Merkel and demanded that she should voice “concern regarding the situation in Chinese judiciary” and to voice her “support for suppressed Uyghur human rights lawyers”.


“Tibetan-independence” and “Xinjiang-independence” organization in Western exile have apparently learned something new, adding new concepts like “situation in Chinese judiciary” and “Uyghur human rights lawyers”. That’s very amusing.


From the perspective of the large public in mainland China, Western leaders who sing the praise of human rights every time when visiting China, come across as somewhat strange. Above all, what they mean by human rights is often different from what Chinese the common people mean. For example, Chinese people are above all concerned by social justice, with educational justice and fair access to medical treatment, home ownership, care for the elderly, etc..


Chinese people also want rule by law, they hope for unrestricted freedom of speech, and more democratic government. As far as these [issues] are concerned, the country has a diversity in practice, keeps summing up experiences, and indeed, there are problems on government level that need to be solved. Concepts like democracy and rule by law have found their way into socialist core values. In fact, Chinese society, more than any external force, is more concerned with doing this well, and engages in exploring these issues.


When foreigners talk to China about human rights, this frequently refers to the tiny minority of people who are in jail for challenging China’s political system, defined by the constitution and rules, in a way that  is relevant under criminal law. Our strong impression is that they [foreign visitors] aren’t concerned about Chinese human rights which are constantly improving, that they aren’t concerned for the growing prosperity of a majority of Chinese people, but that they [my translation for the rest of this line may be rather vague or inaccurate – JR]  want to help those who seek confrontation with the Chinese system. By this, they want to cause China trouble and force China to adopt government methods that don’t fit this country.

外国人向中国一谈人权,指的往往是为挑战中国宪法规定 的政治制度而触犯刑法,并因此坐了监狱的极少数人。给我们的强烈印象是,他们不是关心中国人权基本面 的不断改善,不是关心绝大多数中国人的福祉,而是要帮助能数得过来的与中国体制搞对抗的人,他们是要以这种方式找中国麻烦,逼中国采取不适合自己的国家治 理方式。

 Many people from the West say that they are sincerely concerned about human rights and that they can’t ignore the arrests of “dissidents”. But apparently, they don’t understand what those “dissidents” did, that they weren’t seized for “differing opinions”, but for doing things, because of their “different opinion”, that are banned by Chinese law.1)

One had to understand that China frequently gave cause to misunderstandings, Huanqiu Shibao wrote. After all, this was a big world, and far-away China was therefore not easy to understand. However, Western people with strong views about intervention in China should know how to behave in delicate situations. This wasn’t the era of the eight-nation alliance, and China wasn’t in the [weak] position anymore to beg for capital or technology.

Self-confident as Chinese society is today, people know that there are individual Western leaders who visit China with the tic of discussing “human rights”. Therefore, [Chinese people] feel a bit sorry and pity visitors who need to grit their teeth and shoulder the task of discussing “human rights”, so as to report to their superiors at home afterwards. Apparently, Chinese society is more generous than societies that exert pressure on their leaders, and are at times understanding.


If the Western societies didn’t know how rotten the game in question was, remained unknown, wrote, Huanqiu Shibao. But if the window speeches absolutely had to continue, China would be of help.

“People’s Daily”: Japan should learn from Germany, and from Britain, too

If the Sino-British era is to become about as successful as the preceding Sino-German tandem, remains to be seen. Either way, much seems to suggest that human rights issues are now considered useless obstacles for relations with China.

Hua Yiwen (华益文), an author for the party’s central newspaper People’s Daily, thinks that both sides, Beijing and London, have given a sincere representation of Sino-British relations, with a strategic positioning and a harmonic diversity that made the Chinese public’s positive view of Britain rocket upwards.2)

That said, Hua isn’t as dissatisfied about Germany either. The really bad guys are the Japanese. If one saw how actively both Britain and Germany developed their ties with China, one couldn’t help but think of Japan. Different from Germany, Japan hadn’t dealt with its history, and that was affecting Sino-Japanese relations. And while London’s policies were marked by strategic far-sightedness and political courage, the Abe government had decided “to join the US and to bang the gong of a ‘Chinese threat’, thus paving the way for a Japanese military security policy of its own, and thus adding a complication factor to Sino-japanese relations.

Human Rights: Merkel meets Activists

Angela Merkel reportedly held a private meeting with nine activists at the German embassy in Beijing on Thursday evening, risking host’s ire.

The risk of the CCP leadership’s ire is exaggerated: after all, this isn’t the first meeting of this kind, and if China’s leaders had seriously objected, and considered it worth the price, they could have barred all nine activists from the meeting, as Mo Shaoping, who was invited to such a meeting in February 2012, can tell from his own experience.

Next in the visitors’ line is French president Francois Hollande, scheduled to arrive in Beijing on November 2. State council foreign-language website quotes Zhou Yongsheng (周永胜) of the Chinese University for Foreign Affairs. interprets the visits, closely following each other, as “illustrating the growing influence and the position of power held by China, as acknowledged and appreciated by numerous great countries”.



1) Probably, the Chinese dissident who is most prominent abroad should be Liu Xiaobo. (He’s hardly known or remembered within China.) He has been under arrest continuously since December 2008, and was sentenced in December 2009, for “inciting subversion of state power”. As far as I can tell, there were no clear-cut reasons given for the judgment. A conjecturable motive for seizing Liu Xiaobo could be the Charter 08, co-authored by Liu and about to be published at the time.

2) How sustainable “the Chinese public’s benevolence” and the foundations of the “British-Chinese Golden Decade” can be will also depend on a factor that could sound familiar to a message London received from Washington nearly three years ago. Back then, US president Barack Obama had informed David Cameron that he valued a strong UK in a strong European Union. Same message from Xi Jinping, according to Xinhua last week:

Xi Jinping emphasized that the European Union was China’s partner in a comprehensive strategic partnership. China hoped for a prospering Europe, a united Europe, and for an important EU member country, Great Britain, playing an active and constructive role in promoting and deepening Chinese-European relations.




» Internet Revolution, Chinese concept, April 17, 2015
» Hometown Diplomacy, China Daily, Oct 30, 2015


Sunday, October 11, 2015

This Week (2): If you are Chinese today, can you become Taiwan’s President?

Probably not. But then, especially in Taiwanese politics, everything depends on definitions. If you think – and publicly state – that there is one China with different interpretations (一中各表), and if you add that this means that China is in fact the Republic of China (RoC), and that the constitution doesn’t permit a concept of two Chinas, that might work for a president, or for a presidential candidate, especially when your opponents are in disarray. That was the case with the (governing) DPP when Ma Ying-jeou himself was elected RoC president, in 2008. Back then, and in an article that didn’t necessarily describe Taiwan’s legal status accurately, the Washington Post referred to the president-elect as a smooth Harvard law graduate.

There’s a problem with Chineseness in Taiwan however when your opponents are well-organized and pretty much in tune with the majority of the country. And there’s a problem when you, as a candidate, are anything but smooth. Her Hong Hsiu-chu‘s political career was, but apparently, she owed that to herself, friends, and her wider family, rather than to her party, the KMT. And she is said to be very outspoken – that makes for a difficult relationship with a party that is hardly known for non-conformism.

There’s also a problem with Chineseness in Taiwan when you create the impression that you can’t wait for Taiwan’s “reunification with the mainland”, with mottos like one China, one interpretation (一中同表). Yes, you can afford some non-starters when there is no real opponent, as was the case for Ma Ying-jeou from about 2005 to 2010. All the same, telling an international audience via CNN that Taiwan would never ask the American to fight for Taiwan was too smooth to become acceptable.

Tsai Ing-wen, the oppositional Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) nominee, has managed to convince much of the centrist political spectrum in Taiwan that she is not, like former president Chen Shui-bian, a “troublemaker”. In 2011, during her first candidacy for presidency, then against incumbent Ma Ying-jeou, she acknowledged the Republic of China’s significance for Taiwan, even if Taiwan had its own history. That was on October 10, Taiwan’s national day. This year, she agreed to an invitation by legislative speaker Wang Jin-pyng to attend the official “double-ten” celebrations.

In this context, Hung Hsiu-hong became the actual “radical” in the election campaigns, and her apparent closeness to China only helped Tsai.

Just how much the KMT is in disarray can be seen from this well-meant, but delirious advice as from the KMT-leaning China Post in summer this year:

The Taiwanization faction is wrong. Hung’s China policy can be a weapon with which she can fight Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of the DPP who bears its standard. Tsai is far outdistancing Hung, according to polls conducted by pro-Taiwan independence think tanks. Instead of attempting to copy the DPP’s pro-Taiwanization stance, Hung can try to narrow Tsai’s lead by telling eligible voters that her policy is to build a roadmap to eventual Chinese unification. She has to only explain it is a Chinese version of the Commonwealth that is an evolutionary outgrowth of the British Empire and that relations between the Republic of China in Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China would be like those between the United Kingdom and Canada or Australia or New Zealand.

This read as if Kang Youwei had been at work again.

To cut a long, miserable story short: yes, you can (become Taiwan’s President if you are Chinese today). But not if you are too Chinese.


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