Sino-Russian Joint Statement concerning the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era

The following are my takeaways from the  current March 2023 “Sino-Russian Joint Statement concerning the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era”.

Many topics had been touched upon before, in Beijing’s and Moscow’s “joint statement on international relations”, issued in Beijing in February 2022, but that statement had been issued shortly before Russia tried a full invasion of Ukraine.

According to the March 2023 statement, Sino-Russian relations are not similar to military and political alliances of the cold-war era, and not directed against third countries. Beijing and Moscow say they want to build “exemplary major-power relations” – viewing each others as “priority partners”, respecting each other all along, and treating each other as equals.

That’s basically the same model Xi Jinping tried to introduce into Chinese-American relations ten years ago, as described by Xinhua back then in June 2013, and further explained by Yang Jiechi, CPC Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group secretary at the time.

The March 2023 statement then highlights the usual emerging multi-polar world, one where “peace, development, cooperation and win-win are the unstoppable historic trend” (reads as if there had been no international cooperation before 2023), and an increasingly strong position of emerging markets and developing countries and where regional powers (地区大国, Russia? :)))  “resolutely defend their legitimate interests”.

^{Bragging in German, eating humble pie in Chinese: Sputnik/Rossya Segodnya propaganda celebrates first anniversary of full-scale Ukraine invasion as “dawn of a new world order (Febr 24, 2023) and covers Russia’s support for “China’s core interests” (March 22, 2023)}

Economic Cooperation

The two sides “adhere to the principle of mutual benefit” and intend to further deepen cooperation in the fields of modernisation.  A fair and predictable investment environment is to be created, and financial cooperation (with increased use of own currencies) and mutual supplies of agricultural products and food (互输农产品和粮食的多样性和供应量) are also on the agenda. There’s talk about diversity in those supplies, too, so it seems to avoid the question if this is meant to support food security in China, or if it is just meant to make Russian markets more diverse.
Increased use of own currencies isn’t a new topic. Xi Jinping raised the topic in a speech to a Gulf-Cooperation Council audience, too, in December last year, and Putin had advocated it as soon as in 2008. Cooperation on technology and innovation, such as AI, internet of things, 5G, low-carbon economy are also mentioned by the 2023 joint statement.

The remarks about iinvestment also refer to a Sino-Russian Investment Cooperation Planning Outline (中俄投资合作规划纲要), which is part of the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship.  Supply chain stability and security, optimized trade structures and cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises of both sides are to be promoted.

It’s hard to tell from declarations like this one how far it will help Russia to develop its economy, but it does probably throw Moscow an economic lifeline. That, however, goes without saying even without this month’s joint statement. China doesn’t want Putin to go under.

Russian-Ukrainian war

Which leads us to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The two sides express deep concern about comprehensive challenges for international security, express believe that there is a shared fate of all countries and peoples and that no country should achieve its own security at the costs of other countries’ security.
双方对国际安全面临的严峻挑战深表关切，认为各国人民命运与共，任何国家都不应以他国安全为代价实现自身安全。

It hadn’t read much differently in February 2022, a few weeks prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine:

The sides are gravely concerned about serious international security challenges and believe that the fates of all nations are interconnected. No State can or should ensure its own security separately from the security of the rest of the world and at the expense of the security of other States. The international community should actively engage in global governance to ensure universal, comprehensive, indivisible and lasting security.

Less obviously related to the Ukraine war, maybe, but from the 2023 statement, one year on:

The two sides emphasize the significance of the “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races” and reaffirm that “a nuclear war cannot be won or won”.
双方强调《五个核武器国家领导人关于防止核战争与避免军备竞赛的联合声明》的重要意义，重申“核战争打不赢也打不得”。

How reliable this assurance will be, remains to be seen. Russia has toyed with nuclear threats during the past year, and continues to do so.

Multipolar World

In the broadly  and vaguely defined field of “terrorism”, the 2023 statement is more detailed than in that of 2022, demanding “objective, fair and professional” investigation of Nord Stream attack (应对“北溪”管线爆炸事件进行客观、公正、专业的调查) and agreeing to strengthening law enforcement cooperation concerning the “three evils”, including color revolutions, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), transnational organized crime, economic crimes, and drugs trade. Listing ETIM, popular uprisings and organized crime in one go is certainly an intentional step to make the Sino-Russian public (and unknown swathes of international public opinion) get used to this kind of world view.

As for the world beyond bilateral relations, the multipolar one with the unstoppable historic trends of peace, development, cooperation and win-win, Beijing and Moscow emphasize “the democratization of international relations“, every country’s “right to choose its own path of development (with the likely exceptions of Taiwan and Ukraine, if it is up to China and Russia), and a continued implementation of the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Eurasian Economic Union signed on May 17, 2018.^*)

Taiwan

As mentioned before, “democratization of international relations” isn’t for everyone in the Sino-Russian statements  – not for Ukraine or Taiwan.

Russia reiterates its scrupulous respect of the one-China principle, acknowledges that Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory, opposes any form of “Taiwan independence”, firmly supports China’s actions to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
(俄方重申恪守一个中国原则，承认台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分，反对任何形式的“台独”，坚定支持中方维护本国主权和领土完整的举措。)

Indeed, both issues. Ukraine and Taiwan, are closely related. Both China and Russia intend to annex foreign territory (Russia has already done so, although not to the extent  it would like to, and China, if it wants to attack Taiwan, will have to depend on its Russian hinterland. However, Moscow’s compliance with Beijing’s “one-China” charade is no particular hint into that direction, as it is being played along with by many other countries too, although in varying degrees. All the same, China’s planned aggression of its own, against Taiwan, is one of the reasons why it needs to cultivate relations with Moscow as closely as it does.

Military concerns

China and Russia (apparently) see U.S. in breach of Biological Weapons Convention, and call for institutionalized effective inspection mechanisms. Demands for  were quite likely included at Russia’s particular request. The Ukraine bioweapons conspiracy theory of March 2022 – a year ago – may remain a scarecrow in the Moscow muppet show, and probably works well on parts of the global public. The March 2023 statement deplores a U.S. “cold-war mentality” and the “negative influence” of the Indo-Pacific Strategy” on regional peace and stability in that region.

As far as Beijing and Moscow are concerned, NATO isn’t welcome in the Indo-Pacific either. The statement says that NATO should remain a regional (i. e. European) and defensive alliance. The statement also expresses concern about NATO “undermining” Asia-Pacific “peace & stability”.

Generally speaking, China seems to get more out of the strategic partnershp and the “major-power relationship” than Russia. That becomes obvious, because apart from the EAEU bits, most concerns are rather about China’s than about Russia’s. There are, however, demands that there should be no unilateral sanctions without approval of the United Nations Security Council (not an issue in the 2022), and a note that

the two sides oppose politization of international cultural cooperation, and discrimination against people in the fields of culture, education, science, and sports, based on nationality, language, religion, political or other beliefs, or national or social origin.
双方反对国际人文合作政治化，反对以国籍、语言、宗教、政治或其他信仰、民族或社会出身为由歧视文化、教育、科学、体育界人士。

This may be read as a hint to the “Olympic Committee”, among others.

Covid Pandemic

I’ve left that out here. Both Sino-Russian statements, Febr 2022 and March 2023, are full of it, with the usual complaints and demands, but the world is moving on.

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Note

*)

There needs to be a mention of the institution that are supposed to help bring about the multipolar world, according to Beijing and Moscow. That would be – according both to this month’s and the 2022 statements – the WTO (including remarks that can be read as a Chinese reaction to “discrimination” against it concerning the chip industry), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, G20, and APEC. Accession of the African Union was added to the G20 issue this time, but hadn’t been a year ago.

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Related / Updates

「主要重点是经济方面和高科技领域」, sputnik.cn, Mar 26, 2023
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Xi’s Business Speech: The West has spat into your Porridge

China’s party, military and state leader Xi Jinping spoke to the CPPCC delegates of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce on Monday afternoon local time in Beijing.

One of the takeaways from his speech, probably not surprisingly, was  that he emphasized party leadership over business¹⁾. (Ask Jack Ma if he was surprised.)

^{习近平在看望参加政协会议的民建工商联界委员时强调 正确引导民营经济健康发展高质量发展，新闻联播，2023-03-06}

Maybe somewhat more strikingly, Xi went beyond the usual descriptions of a “difficult” etc. environment for China, and blamed  “containment carried out by Western countries under U.S. leadership” for at least some of the undeniable difficulties China is facing. He combined that with an emphasis on achievements of the past five years, using the phrase of “不易” again – i. e. achievements that hadn’t been easy to come by²⁾

What he did not mention was that no country in the world is obliged to throw first-class technology at China, and that it had been China that tested economic-coercion tools against countries like Australia and Lithuania.

The following is a short translated excerpt from Xi’s speech on Monday.

Xi Jinping pointed out that the five years that followed the party’s 19th National Congress have been extremely unusual and outstanding years. Our country’s external environment has suddenly changed. Uncertain factors that are hard to predict have significantly grown, and especially the Western countries under American leadership have carried out comprehensive containment, blockade and suppression, bringing unprecedented, serious challenges to our country. At the same time, we are facing a multitude of difficulties inside our country, such as repeated corona epidemics and growing downward pressure on the economy. We will adhere to the overall main key of seeking progress within stability, we will rise to the challenges, calmly respond, not believe in evil, we will not fear, won’t seek refuge, average GDP will grow by 5.2 percent, we won the fight against poverty as planned, built a society of moderate prosperity, reached the first two-centenary goal, promoted the party’s and nation’s achievements that have found global attention, and promoted our country’s steps into the construction of a new milestone of comprehensive socialist modernization. The successes of the past five years are the fruit of the entire party and the entire people unitedly struggling, showing the essence of the CPPCC representatives’ contributions.
习近平指出，党的十九大以来的5年，是极不寻常、极不平凡的5年。我国发展的外部环境急剧变化，不确定难预料因素显著增多，尤其是以美国为首的西方国家对我实施了全方位的遏制、围堵、打压，给我国发展带来前所未有的严峻挑战。同时国内也面临新冠疫情反复、经济下行压力增大等多重困难。我们坚持稳中求进工作总基调，迎难而上，沉着应对，不信邪、不怕压、不避难，国内生产总值年均增长5.2%，如期打赢脱贫攻坚战，全面建成小康社会，实现第一个百年奋斗目标，推动党和国家事业取得举世瞩目的重大成就，推动我国迈上全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程。5年来的成就，是全党全国人民团结奋斗的结果，也凝聚着广大政协委员的贡献。

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Notes

1)	「要引导民营企业和民营企业家正确理解党中央方针政策，增强信心、轻装上阵、大胆发展，实现民营经济健康发展、高质量发展。」
2)	「我们动态优化调整防控政策措施，较短时间实现了疫情防控平稳转段，新冠病亡率保持在全球最低水平，取得疫情防控重大决定性胜利。我们完整、准确、全面贯彻新发展理念，着力构建新发展格局、推动高质量发展，在全球通胀达到40多年来新高的情况下，我国物价总水平保持平稳，全年经济增长3%，在世界主要经济体中是很高的。这些成绩的取得，实属不易。」 Previously: 来之不易 (not easy to come by).

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Related

China’s “multilateralism” only for big powers, CNN / Landsbergis, March 7, 2023
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China’s Position: Ukraine still hopes for the Best

On February 27, Ukraine issued a rejection of sorts of China’s February 24 position paper “on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. Advisor to the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Mykhailo Podolyak, told “Freedom TV”  that the only effective measure the position paper called for was “immediate cessation of fire.”

“This means that Russia will remain in the occupied territories, we will have a new dividing line, and we will have a slow absorption of Ukraine. That is, the slow death of Ukraine,” the TV station quoted Pdolyak.

The rejection from Zelensky’s office, but only in an unofficial interview, suggests that Kiev doesn’t want to anger Beijing and possibly provoke Chinese lethal-arms supplies to Russia that wouldn’t happen otherwise.

^{中共中央外事工作委员会办公室主任王毅会见乌克兰外长库列巴，慕尼黑，Febr 18, 2023}

In an article published on March 3, “Freedom TV” quotes interviewees as saying that “it is too early to say that China is openly opposing Ukraine”. China’s “global ambitions”, its long common border with Russia, and its dependence on Russian energy supplies as well as the two countries’ traditional alliance are quoted as factors supporting the bilateral relationship, but “Beijing will not sacrifice its own well-being because of Russia, experts are sure”.

Part of China’s “well-beings” is the arable land it owns in Ukraine. It shouldn’t be too difficult to replace, given that Beijing’s investment companies are scouting all continents for farmable land to buy or rent, but it wouldn’t be fun to see the goose being killed by Russia – even if it isn’t quite the “golden” goose.

Besides, at least one of “Voice of America’s” interlocutors, Taiwan International Strategic Study Society director Ching-Sheng Lo (羅慶生), took a rather critical view of China’s food security, a year ago.

Lo Ching-Sheng says: “Having bought that much grain, with storage for a year and a half, there’s nothing to care about – no problem in the short run. If this should turn into an Afghanistan kind of war of twenty years, China’s problems will be very big.”
罗庆生说：“因为中国买了太多粮食的关系，它储存了一年半的粮食，所以一年半之内它不会有事情，所以短期的话没问题。长期的话，如果说变成阿富汗战争那个样子打个20年，那中国的问题就很大了。”

But the Russian hinterland will count more than Ukraine – be it for China’s “global ambitions”, be it for its food security. Beijing took a speaking decision in early February, 2022, a few weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine started. Answer to the unfolding crisis: more grain imports from Russia.

Ukraine’s hopes on China are unreasonably high. As Zongyuan Zoe Liu, a fellow for international political economy at the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote,

The party can survive setbacks in the chip war, but the stakes are much higher in the fight for food security. Failure on the food security front will threaten the survival of the regime.

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Related

Kuleba addresses Asia, March 22, 2022

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EU: “Just protecting the freedom of expression”

All the news that’s fit to blog.

Fri, Febr 24, 2023	One year after the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, China publishes a Confucius-says “position paper”. Originally, it had been advised as a “peace plan” by China’s supreme diplomat Wang Yi, but has since been de-ambitioned. Meantime, China’s foreign-ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin (汪文斌) offers a clue as to why: FMPRC tweet, Febr 24, 2023
Thu, Febr 23, 2023	The central committee of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民進黨) approved a timetable that presidential nominations would be decided by April 12, and Legislative Yuan nominations in May. It appears to be widely accepted among the party’s legislators that, in the light of a poor showing in Taiwan’s “mid-term elections”, i. e. the country’s local elections in November 2022, more time is needed to prepare for the nation-wide presidential and legislative elections next year. Lai Ching-te, the incumbent Tsai administration’s current Vice President, has recently been elected chairman of the DPP, and Chen Jien-jen, Lai’s predecessor as Taiwan’s Vice President from 2016 to 2020, became head of the cabinet in January this year. Source: 央廣 / Radio Taiwan International
Wed, Febr 22, 2023	High-level foreign-policy and defense officials from Japan and China met at Japan’s foreign ministry in Tokyo on Wednesday. It was the first such meeting after an interruption of about four years. Chinese Deputy foreign minister Sun Weidong (孙卫东) was quoted as saying that there was “an important consensus” that neither country posed a threat for the other. However, Sun also said that there were Chinese concerns about Japan’s “strategic documents” issued in 2022, and Japan’s increasing cooperation with “outside forces” (域外力量), and about “negative tendencies” in Taiwan. Source: Radio Japan
Wed, Febr 22, 2023	Russian president Vladimir Putin met China’s chief diplomat Wang Yi in Moscow on Wednesday. The Kremlin published a detailed account of the meeting the same day. Source: Kremlin
Wed, Febr 15, 2023	Pyongyang was said to have gone under a Covid-related lockdown in late January, allegedly lasting from January 25 to 30. But was there a lockdown at all? Source: SinoNK
Tue, Febr 14, 2023	Chen Xuyuan (陈戌源) was – effectively, maybe not nominally yet – fired as chairman of the Chinese Football Association earliert his month, after having been confronted with the usual suspicions of “serious violations of discipline”, which appears to serve as a regular CPC codeword for corruption charges. Chen, a Shanghai native born in 1956, was also the football association’s deputy party secretary. Source: Ifeng
Mo, Febr 13, 2023	“Less then half the world is on the internet”, a BBC documentary broadcast told the audience on February 11, two days ahead of World Radio Day. Source: BBC
Tue, Febr 7, 2023	Critics of the EU’s censorship policy against Russia’s foreign-language service “RT” had a field day early this month, after the EU’s high-representative for for foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, had told a “European Union External Action” (EEAS) conference that by imposing “restrictive measures on the Kremlin’s propaganda machinery and effectively ban them from operating within the European Union”, “we are not attacking the freedom of expression, we are just protecting the freedom of expression”. The EU’s “restrictive measures” aren’t limited to banning RT work from within the EU. Access to RT from EU countries is only possible via VPN. This includes the organization’s German and Chinese services. Main Source: EEAS

No further Orders, Militant Greetings

All the news I’ve learned on Twitter (or elsewhere)

Source: VoK. 75th founding anniversary of the “Korean People’s Army” – see last item of this blog for details
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Sunday, Febr 5, 2023	“While the three major indicators of production, consumption and investment all rose for the second consecutive year, suggesting a recovery in industrial activity, the most recent monthly data suggests otherwise”, KBS World Radio reported last Sunday. The government attributed declines in the most recent industrial output comparison (month-on-month) to “slowing exports and weakened domestic recovery”.
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Sun Febr 5 / Mon 6, 2023	“A presumed weather balloon from North Korea entered South Korean airspace for a few hours” last Sunday (Febr 5), KBS World Radio reported on Monday. “The Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) […] instructed the frontline unit to simply keep a close eye on the balloon after assessing that it was a weather balloon, without giving further orders.”
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Monday, Febr 6, 2023	40 Taiwanese search -and-rescue workers left for Turkey on Monday night (Taiwan standard time). Interior minister Lin Yu-chang (林右昌) and foreign minister Joseph Wu (吳釗燮) said that Taiwan helped in the same spirit in that Turkey had helped during the September 1999 earthquake in Taiwan.
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Tuesday, Febr 7, 2023	Communist Party of China general secretary Xi Jinping (also state chairman and central-military-commissions chairman) gave an opening speech to a Seminar for the implementation of Xi Jinping’s ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and the spirit of the party’s 20th national congress. According to Chinese television’s main evening news on Tuesday night local time, newly-joined members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and alternate members, provincial-level leading cadres as well as comrades from the democratic parties’ central committees, the all-China industrial and trade association, and others took part in the seminar.
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Tuesday, Febr 7, 2023	The Eighth Central Military Commission of North Korea’s ruling “Workers’ Party of Korea” held its fourth expanded meeting on Monday, February 6, South Korea’s foreign radio reported on Tuesday. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un reportedly chaired the meeting and emphasized a need to “react to the current situation” and to “further improve preparedness for war” This was seen as a signal that North Korea was closely following the South Koreas and America’s strengthened extended deterrence, and react to joint South Korean and US miltary exercises, according to the South Korean radio report.
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Wed, Febr 8 / Thu, 9, 2023	North Korea held a nightly military parade on February 8, celebrating “the 75th founding anniversary of the Korean People’s Army, the revolutionary armed forces of the Workers’ Party of Korea”, North Korean foreign radio station “Voice of Korea” reported. Some of the 150 photos published by VoK also featured North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s daughter.  Kim Jong Un sent militant greetings*) to the life guardsmen taking part in the parade, says VoK.

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Notes

^*) 战斗问候 in VoK’s Chinese version
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Wuxiwooshee: Trying to transcribe Major-General Jin Yinan

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That’s Major-General Jin Yinan (金一南), a Chinese Major-General, Professor, author and CPBS radio columnist with peculiar opinions about the Netherlands and Norway (click picture underneath for more info):

Also, I find him difficult to understand.

Here goes:

Question: 欢迎收听一南军事论坛。我是[Zhou Yuting]。 北约军事委员会主席罗伯·鲍尔^*)一月二十八日在接受媒体采访时公开表态说，北约准备与俄罗斯直接对抗。他的这个表态迅速引发国际社会的广泛关注。对此，俄罗斯国家杜马回应称，这种言论正在将整个世界投入和战争。那么北约真的要直接与俄罗斯开战吗？ 和战争的威胁是否离人类越来越近。这些就是今天一南军事论坛要关注的话题。首先欢迎金一南教授。金一南教授，您好！

Jin Yinan: 你好！

Question: 我们都知道自从俄乌开战以来，以美国为首的西方国家在对俄罗斯实施多轮建立制裁的同时，还…不断的向乌克兰提供各种军事援助。那么，北约军事委员会主席罗伯·鲍尔的自谈表态是否意味着北约已经做好准备将直接与俄罗斯开战？

Jin Yinan: 他这种讲话就北约准备与俄罗斯直接对抗－－这种话的份量非常重。不是间接对抗。与俄罗斯直接对抗。几乎就说就让往这个欧洲大战faran中。这是一个非常严重的采取啊。我觉得一辈子两次世界大战see-sai和现在有长效和平的欧洲人应该对鲍尔的话感到非常震惊。 原来北约的整个态度－－谴责俄罗斯，制裁俄罗斯，提供优先的军备－－这个优先军备是什么呢？就wuxiwoosheewooshee现在慢慢转进wuxiwoosheewooshee。现在向乌克兰提供美国的Abrahams坦克，德国的”豹”式坦克等等适于最先进的一种坦克…，那就完全不是wuxiwoosheewooshee了，是wuxiwoosheewooshee。
[…..]

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Notes

Clues:	防御性的武器 — 进攻性的武器
*)	Robert Bauer
—	Want to try yourselves? Give it a go there (starts at 19′ 45”)

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China is wary of new China Strategies – of course

German-Chinese relations are under review by Germany’s federal government – Beijing is worried

I actually wanted to ignore the visit to Taiwan by “Free Democrat” (FDP) members of Germany’s federal parliament. The FDP  would drop Taiwan like a hot potato if Xi Jinping put China’s state-owned enterprises up for international privatization. It is understandable that Taiwan welcomes foreign visits, this one included, but forget that talk about “friendship”.

That said, China’s ambassador to Germany, Wu Ken, makes sure that the German visit to Taiwan can’t be ignored – he’s making another fuss of it, in Germany’s business-friendly “Handelsblatt”, warning German politics “not to play with fire and not to test China’s red lines”. He is also worried that the German “traffic-light coalition”, consisting of Social Democrats, Greens, and the FDP (whose trademark color is yellow) would entirely follow America’s China policy.

The government’s colors

Nils Schmid, the Social Democrat parliament group’s spokesman on foreign affairs, says that he is “somewhat surprised” by Wu’s criticism. “The SPD parliamentary group demanded an adjustment of China policy, and the coalition agreement contains unambigious statements.”

The Chinese embassy has certainly laid its hands on one or several drafts of Berlin’s strategy papers. However, Schmid suggests that it must be a version that is several months old, and says that there is no final version yet. He adds that “contrary to China, where the state-controlled media certainly wouldn’t publish a similar criticism by foreign ambassadors, the Chinese ambassador has the opportunity to do so without being censored, around here.” This showed that there was systemic competition between China and democratic states after all.

Gyde Jensen, deputy chair of the FDP’s parliament group, says that Wu Ken’s answers show how fundamentally differently China interprets guiding liberal principles (“liberale Leitprinzipien”) and “bereaves them of their core concept, such as free markets, entrepreneurial freedom, human rights and multilateralism”. That alone was enough to explain why Germany needed a comprehensive China strategy, “for the record for everyone, China not least, to show how we see these principles and concepts and which action or rules we derive from them.” This included Germany’s interpretation of the “One-China policy”, concerning Taiwan.

China’s ambassador to Germany probably chose the “Handelsblatt” as an interlocutor not least because of its business-friendly position. However, by far not all German business is as involved in business with China as he appears to believe.

If it was up to Beijing, the Communist Party of China would determine China’s policy on Western countries, and business would continue to determine the West’s China policies. That was, of course, an extremely profitable arrangement for China, and it’s not really surprising that Beijing would like to keep it in place.

But every relationship, economically and politically, has to be in its stakeholders’ mutual interest (to borrow a Chinese slogan). Germany’s China policy will still be partly business-driven: if German business had got the “access” to Chinese markets it has long dreamed of, a tougher German policy on China would be almost inconceivable.

In that light, there is no reason to sing the praise of either Germany’s, America’s or any country’s government and their sudden attention for human rights et al. But there is reason to welcome their “tougher” policies. Depending on the “last versions” and their implementation, they may be in the national interest of our countries – at last.
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Related

“The Ukraine crisis it has triggered”, “China Daily”, Jan 10, 2023
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Some Porridge, some Rice: China’s New Normal?

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Xi Jinping’s new year address for 2023 has been flowery as usual, but it also comes with some frugal characteristics. If it is such great news that China has maintained its position as the world’s second-largest economy, times must be tough indeed, especially when you take into consideration that (according to China’s propaganda) the world’s biggest economy, i. e. America, has gone to hell in a basket. If they are still bigger than China now, where is China?

According to the great helmsman, China has “blown the trumpet to signal the brave beginning of a new journey” (吹响了奋进新征程的时代号角), with “stable and steady economic development” (stable and steady probably referring to the lowest growth numbers since the last years of Mao Zedong’s reign), a 19th consecutive bumper harvest this year (十九连丰), and “the consolidation of achievements made in shedding poverty”  (我们巩固脱贫攻坚成果). —Corrections, Jan 27^*)

How green is our motherland? (Source: Beijing News, Dec 31, 2022)

With the Scarce Resources always on your Mind

Generally, Chinese propaganda points out that its 19th bumper harvest in a row has been achieved while the world had been facing a food crisis. That’s not a big deal when you consider that Russia hasn’t blocked China’s northeastern provinces from the rest of the country, but it may be considered an invitation to the Chinese public to cherish self-sufficiency.

As for the “new phase of pandemic prevention and control now entered” by China, Xi doesn’t wade into the details, and just sees the light – or the dawn of a new era – ahead (目前，疫情防控进入新阶段，仍是吃劲的时候，大家都在坚忍不拔努力，曙光就在前头).
The lines closest to Xi’s heart – if the communist faith he’s wearing on his sleeves is real – are probably these:

After the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party I and other colleagues went to Yan’an together, to renew what we had learned about the magnificent years when the Party’s Central Committee prevailed over difficulties rarely seen over generations and to appreciate the spiritual strength of the old generation of communists. I frequently say that difficulties and deprivation only perfect the jade. The Communist Party of China’s past one-hundred years have been hard work in the open regardless of the weather, cutting their way through thistles and thorns,  – how difficult and great the journey has been. We want to advance further, keep struggling, and make tomorrow’s China even better.
党的二十大后我和同事们一起去了延安，重温党中央在延安时期战胜世所罕见困难的光辉岁月，感悟老一辈共产党人的精神力量。我常说，艰难困苦，玉汝于成。中国共产党百年栉风沐雨、披荆斩棘，历程何其艰辛又何其伟大。我们要一往无前、顽强拼搏，让明天的中国更美好。

Both China’s economic plans and its “great-power diplomacy” appear to be in some trouble. As for China’s economy, it would take a real lot of innovation to catch up with the ageing of society. And China’s “great-power diplomacy” (大国外交), although re-iterated by Xi in another new-year address one day ealier, to a meeting of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference on December 30th, appears to have fed its wolf-warriors some chalk. For now, that is.

There is no reason to believe that China has given up on “replacing” America, or on other major goals, “core interests” and what have you. But the CPC leaders are revisiting and reassessing the foundations of their power. The emphasis on food security suggests that self-sufficiency in that field will always be a priority – China doesn’t only distrust the sealanes, it also distrusts its immediate neighbors. And if America’s restrictions on chip and chip-manufacturing equipment supplies to China find international support and cooperation, China’s growth plans will probably need to be postponed.

When enumerating China’s moderate successes to Chinese People’s Consultative Conference members, Xi emphasized that those successes hadn’t been “easy to achieve” or “easy to come by” (来之不易). That term is linked to a proverb about man’s most basic needs, i. e. food and clothing. My try at a translation:

Some porridge and rice aren’t easy to come by,half a silk or cotton thread, permanently bear in mind how scarce are your resources.
一粥一饭，当思来处不易；半丝半缕，恒念物力维艰

That’s also where China’s grassroot propaganda – in the shape of newspapers more prominent than, say, “People’s Daily” – is taking us as it picks up Xi’s reference to the latest bumper harvest: to the countryside. Here, too, none of the bumper harvests has been “easy to come by”. The proverb didn’t feature prominently in politics articles before the end of December, while it was popular in all other kinds of (less basic-need-related) online articles or comments. Now, it is represents the flavor of the new era.

To help the readers understand the significance of this year’s output, his attention is drawn to a number of natural disasters.

Delicious Meat then, Tough Bones now

How planned are China’s readjustments? The new “cold war” China keeps warning us of may not have been intended by Beijing, but it was provoked by Beijing.

Either way, tough times have occasionally been predicted by China’s propaganda before, and by its supreme mouth not least. In February 2014, Xi Jinping told Russian television that

After 30 years of reform, China has entered the deep water [or blue water], and all the pleasant reforms have been completed. The delicious meat has been eaten, and what is still on the dishes are rather tough bones. This requires our courage, and steady moves. Courage means to push reform even when it is difficult, and to prove worthy, to tackle the hard bones, and to enter dangerous shoals. Steadiness is about keeping to the accurate direction, driving steadily, and, above all, to avoid disruptive mistakes.

The Russians must have been an understanding audience. Now, eight years later, Xi needs to find out how understanding the Chinese are.
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Notes

^*) Corrected – previous text:
… and “the consolidation of hard-earned achievements made in previous difficult missions” (我们巩固脱贫攻坚成果)
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