Hong Kong Security Secretary: “Terrorism breeding in HK, iron fact”

The following is a translation of an RTHK (Radio Television Hong Kong) report on yesterday’s LegCo security panel session. Translated off the cuff. If you find mistakes, please let me know.

Links within blockquote added during translation.

Police have said that from last year to now there have been 14 cases involving explosives, four cases of genuine arms, and 76 arrested, of who 30 had already been prosecuted. Security Bureau secretary John Lee Ka-chiu said that this illustrated that local terrorism was breeding in Hong Kong. He emphasized that counter-terrorism was a responsibility of the entire population, and called on the public to cooperate in law enforcement. The authorities would strike with the strictest laws.

警方說，去年至今出現14宗涉及爆炸品及4宗真槍的案件，共拘捕76人，30人已被檢控。保安局局長李家超說，顯示本土恐怖主義正在香港滋生，強調反恐是全民責任，呼籲公眾配合執法，當局會以最嚴厲的法律打擊。

At the Legislative Council’s Panel on Security meeting, John Lee Ka-chiu said he believed that in various violent [events] there had been financial funding organizations and assistance, such as supplies of helmets, gas masks, weapons and umbrellas, etc., and there had been cases where such material had been provided from ranks behind to the first lines. John Lee Ka-chiu described great numbers of resources, and a lot of related material left behind on the streets after insurrection. He believed that because of the authorities’ recent effective strikes, and maybe because of decreasing funding from abroad, such equipment had been reduced in recent violent incidents.

在立法會保安事務委員會會議上，李家超說，相信在不同暴力中都有資金提供組織及支援，例如提供頭盔、防毒面罩、武器和雨傘等，亦出現將有關物品由後方提供到前方的情況。李家超形容資源很多，而在暴動過後很多有關物品留在街上，他相信由於當局近期有效打擊，又或者是外來資金減少，近期暴力事件中，有關裝備已減少。

Legislative Council member Claudia Mo Man-ching asked the authorities to provide evidence for the cases mentioned, and asked if the authorities had been part of terrorism in the Yuen Long July 21 incident of last year. John Lee Ka-chiu retorted that the other side should not trivialize the violence and added that evidence would be seen in court, describing this as an iron fact.

議會陣線毛孟靜要求當局就提到的案件提供證據，又詢問當局去年元朗7.21事件是否屬本土恐怖主義。李家超反駁對方不要淡化暴力，又說上到法庭就會見到證物，形容是鐵一般的事實。

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Related

Attendance list, June 2, 2020
Background brief, June 2, 2020
For discussion, June 2, 2020

HK officers in Xinjiang, SCMP, Jan 9, 2019

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Updates/Related

“Riding roughshod,” RTHK, Jul 4, 2020

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Updates: Huawei / Hong Kong / Taiwan

Heading into a few weeks of working at half speed, but while the muse keeps kicking me, I don’t feel like doing long translations yet of, say, the Bulgarian president’s visit to China. But the following two news items – neither of them really new – may remain interesting as summer moves on.

Huawei

Trade conflict between America and China – no blog yet either, but here is a bit of it, by means of a few links.

“2019 will be big (thanks to
a 6.21 in display)” – advertisement at
Bremen Central Station

A public warning by the Czech cyber watchdog is met with some heavy-handed PRC diplomacy,

Sinopsis wrote in December, with some more entries on the same subject following during the first half of this year.

Addressing concerns about a “kill switch” that could be added to Germany’s G5 infrastructure if Huawei were involved, the company’s Germany boss Dennis Zuo said in an interview with German daily Handelsblatt on February 20 that such a practice by Huawei would be technically impossible – only single components were supplied by any company.

Asked how Huawei would react if state or party demanded access, and if they actually had “a chance to say no”, Zuo said that Huawei would say no indeed – Huawei was owned by its staff, not by the Chinese state. Asked if they would go to court against the Chinese state, Zuo said that they wouldn’t do that, but “we would refuse [access] in any case” (“wir würden dies auf jeden Fall ablehnen”).

German Data Protection Commissioner Ulrich Kelber, also in an interview with Handelsblatt, pointed out that “the US itself once made sure that backdoor doors were built into Cisco hardware.”

Hong Kong / Taiwan

And Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam, in June, awarded Taiwan a democracy and rule-of-law prize, although a somewhat embittered one:

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Updates / Related

2019 HK extradition bill, Wikipedia, acc July 4, 2019

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Donald Trump’s Quiztalks

When Donald Trump speaks without a script, it sounds like BBC Radio 4 entertainment – the I’m-sorry-I-haven’t-a-clue style, where people are supposed to talk without repeating a single word, or without mentioning a specific world. Something like …

Host:	Mr. President, you are supposed to speak about clocks for sixty seconds, and you must use the word “clock” only once.
Trump:	I don’t mind clocks. I like those things. I actually love them. We have a great relationship. The only problem with clocks is …
Detector:	BUZZ!!!

Anyway. Why is the president supposed to participate in a game where winning is not important? That’s preposterous.

OPCW: the Place to Investigate a Nerve Agent sample

One can only wish Sergei Skripal and his daughter a good and complete recovery. Skripal once helped a good cause, and suffered for it in the past. He deserves gratitude, and all former agents living under similar circumstances as he does (or did, until March 4), deserve protection. One thing is for sure: Russia’s political culture encourages lawlessness in the name of “patriotism” – suspicions as aired by Britain’s foreign minister Boris Johnson^*) aren’t made up out of thin air. But a plausible narrative is still just a narrative, and even thick air is still only air.

In situations like these, anger and “highly likely” accusations are useless at best, and highly likely, they are damaging for all parties involved.

If Jan von Aken‘s comments in a Deutschlandfunk interview on Thursday are something to go by, there would be no need for the escalation that is under way – at least not yet. The established procedure would be to turn to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to get their assistance in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State Party with the chemical weapons convention. In the Skripal case, Russia would have to answer to the OPCW’s executive committee “as soon as possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after the receipt of the request” to clarify.

What Theresa May said on Wednesday is anything but evidence:

Mr Speaker, on Monday I set out that Mr Skripal and his daughter were poisoned with a Novichok: a military grade nerve agent developed by Russia. Based on this capability, combined with their record of conducting state sponsored assassinations – including against former intelligence officers whom they regard as legitimate targets – the UK Government concluded it was highly likely that Russia was responsible for this reckless and despicable act. And there were only two plausible explanations. Either this was a direct act by the Russian State against our country. Or conceivably, the Russian government could have lost control of a military-grade nerve agent and allowed it to get into the hands of others.

In a conflict, the two immediate parties are rarely the best candidates to sort things out – not, when there is a history of conflict, or when, as the Economist has put it, Britain’s relationship with Russia is poisoned already.

Britain’s ultimatum for an explanation from Moscow had been contemptuously ignored,

writes the Economist. That may be so. Many Russian citizens have their rights ignored, too. But on a day-to-day basis, few people in the West would care. And if I were a Russian, I would probably find the British ultimatum just as comtemptuous – no matter if pro-Putin, anti-Putin or either.

After a first round of escalations, London now seems to be doing the right thing: they have sent (or will send) a sample of the Novichok nerve agent to the OPCW. That looks like a promising first step. The OPCW should also take care of further procedures, if there should be a chance to come to real conclusions.

Van Aken believes that both the British prime minister and the Russian president may have an interest in the current escalation. But May’s chances to rise to the “challenge” don’t look great, and Putin is going to “win the elections” anyway.

Rather, both of them appear to have concluded that they must serve their constituencies with instant certainties.

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Note

^*) “The message is clear: We will find you, we will catch you, we will kill you – and though we will deny it with lip-curling scorn, the world will know beyond doubt that Russia did it.”

People’s Daily: “Little NATO” drawing nearer as Japan and South Korea initial Intelligence Sharing

South Korean parliamentary opposition leader Woo Sang-ho of the main oppositional Minjoo Party said on Monday that they would impeach or dismiss the defense minister if the government went ahead with plans to sign a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

Chinese Communist Party organ People’s Daily wrote on Wednesday or Thursday that if signed, this would be the first military cooperation agreement between the two countries after World War 2, and criticized the tw0 governments’ moves indirectly, by quoting a military expert.

→Link

On November 14, South Korea’s and Japan’s initialled a “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”. If officially signed, this would be the first military cooperation agreement after the second world war. Military expert Zhang Junshe said in an interview with People’s Daily online that if the agreement in question was signed, the two countries would bypass America and exchange intelligence directly. This was significant good news for Japan and America, but for South Korea, this was like drinking Zhen poison to quench its thirst, or to allow the wolf into the house. The agreement could damage peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and negatively affect peace and stability in the entire North-East Asian region.

14日，韩国和日本政府草签了《军事情报保护协定》。如该协定正式签署，这将是两国自第二次世界大战结束后签署的首份军事合作协定。军事专家张军社在接受人民网采访时表示，若该协定正式签署，日韩两国将绕过美国直接共享情报，这对日美两国是重大利好消息，但对韩国而言则如同饮鸩止渴、引狼入室。该协定可能破坏朝鲜半岛的和平稳定，对整个东北亚地区的和平稳定也会带来不利影响。

According to a report by South Korea’s “JoongAng Ilbo” on November 15, South Korea hopes to use Japan’s reonnaissance satellites, radar, and other advanced equipment to gather intelligence, while Japan could make use of intelligence gathered by traditional Korean manpower.

据韩国《中央日报》15日报道，韩国希望利用日本的侦察卫星和雷达等尖端装备获取情报；而对日本来说，则可利用韩国传统人工收集的情报。

Currently, there are separate “Military Intelligence Protection Agreements” between South Korea and the US and Japan and the US respectively, but the exchange of military intelligence between South Korea and Japan needs to go through America as a “connecting airport”, with no “direct flight”.

目前，韩美、日美之间分别缔结有《军事情报保护协定》，不过韩日两国交换军事情报需要通过美国这个“中转站”，双方之间并无“直航”。

Zhang Junshe pointed out that Japan had advanced military technology at its disposal and could rely on advanced reconaissance satellites, radar, and other first-class equipment to gather information concerning North Korea’s nuclear tests, missile launches etc., while South Korea, owing to its geographical advantage, could gather first-hand intelligence gathered by agents and spies. If Japan and South Korea signed the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”, the two sides could bypass America and exchange intelligence directly.

张军社指出，日本具有先进的军事科技，可凭借其先进的侦察卫星和雷达等尖端装备获得朝鲜核试验和导弹发射等情报信息，而韩国凭借地理优势，可获得更多由特工、间谍人员等获得的第一手人工情报。日本和韩国一旦签署《军事情报保护协定》，双方将可以绕过美国直接交换军事情报。

Some media reports point out that military cooperation between South Korea and Japan was a sensitive issue, because of the history of Japanese colonial rule over South Korea from 1910 to 1945 on the one hand, and also because of territorial disputes between the two sides. With historical and territorial issues unresolved, the South Korean government has always faced continuous resistance. On June 29, 2012, the South Korean government even brought a signing to an “emergency halt”, right on the scheduled day of signing.

有媒体报道指出，军事合作在韩日两国合作中属敏感范畴，一方面缘于日本1910年至1945年在朝鲜半岛推行殖民统治的历史，另一方面缘于双方现在的领土争议。在历史和领土问题均未解决的情况下，韩国政府推动签署军事情报方面协定一直面临重重阻力。2012年6月29日，韩国政府甚至在原定协定签署日当天“紧急叫停”。

This time, South Korea and Japan have signed the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement” at tremendous speed, and South Korea said that it had only taken about a dozen days to conduct and intitial the agreement. Reportedly, the two sides will also work hard to sign the agreement by the end of November, after completing domestic procedures.

此次日韩两国“火速”草签《军事情报保护协定》，从韩方宣布重启有关协定谈判到协定草签仅用了十几天。据称，双方还将力争在完成国内手续后，于11月底前正式签署协定。

How could a agreement that had been stalled for years be settled in a dozen days? The background factors are providing food for thought.

一个多年无法的协定如今为何在短短十几天便得以尘埃落定？背后缘由耐人寻味。

According to Zhang Junshe, Japan has, after the end of World War 2, never profoundly reflected on the crimes it committed to the countries of North-East Asia. While America and Japan had made efforts all along to facilitate the signing of the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”, the opposing domestic voices in South Korea had always been very strong. The South Korean masses fear Japanese militarism’s rise from the ashes, so as to trample over the Korean peninsula once again. There are various reasons for Japan and South Korea to rush the initialling of the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”. From South Korea’s perspective, with president Park Geun-hye’s “Choigate” scandal almost inescapable for the government, the country is facing a serious domestic crisis. By signing military cooperation with Japan, domestic sight can be shifted and passed on to the crisis, thus easing the pressure on Park Geun-hye’s government because of “Choigate”. Also, as South Korea’s agreement to the American deoployment of the “THAAD” anti-missile system had led to a deepening of contradictions with China, Russia, and other neighboring countries, South Korea’s choice to deepen previous cooperation with Japan can also, to a certain degree, ease pressure from neighboring countries. In addition, America is very positive about facilitating the Japanese-South Korean signing of the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”. America has always hoped to strengthen military cooperation between its two Asia-Pacific allies, but for historical reasons, Japan and South Korea have, for a long time, given an appearance of unity while being divided in fact. If Japan and South Korea officially sign the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement” at last, this undoubtedly spells an important result for America’s “Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific”, conducive to pulling Japan and South Korea together for the formation of a “small NATO” concept.

据张军社介绍，二战结束以来，日本从未对其在二战期间对东北亚各国所犯下的罪行作出深刻反省。虽然美、日方面一直在努力促成日韩签订《军事情报保护协定》，而韩国国内的反对声音一直十分强烈。韩国民众唯恐日本军国主义死灰复燃，再次践踏朝鲜半岛。此次日韩“火速”草签《军事情报保护协定》，原因是多方面的。从韩国方面看，目前朴槿惠政府深陷“闺蜜门”事件难以自拔，韩国内部面临着严重的政治危机。韩国此时与日本签署军事合作，可以转移国内视线，转嫁危机，减轻“闺蜜门”事件给朴槿惠政府带来的压力。此外，由于韩国同意美国在韩部署“萨德”反导系统，导致韩国与中国、俄罗斯等邻国矛盾加深，所以韩国选择加强与日本之前的合作，某种程度上也能减轻周边国家对其造成的压力。另外，美国对促成日韩签署《军事情报保护协定》非常积极。美国一直希望它的两个亚太盟友加强军事合作，但日韩两国因为历史问题长期貌合神离。若日韩最终正式签署《军事情报保护协定》，无疑是美国“亚太再平衡”战略的重要成果，有利于实现美国拉日韩两国构建东北亚“小北约”的构想。

Ma Yao, special researcher with the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Shanghai International Studies University, told media that for a long time, the main obstacle for building trilateral US-Japanese-South Korean military cooperation had been in South Korea, and the progress in South-Korean-Japanese military cooperation meant that the obstacle for trilateral military cooperation was reduced and might never return. This was a “watershed” in South-Korean-Japanese cooperation in the military field.

上海外国语大学国际关系与公共事务学院特约研究员马尧在接受媒体采访时表示，长期以来，美国构建美日韩三边军事合作的主要障碍在韩国，而韩日军事合作方面的进展意味着三边军事合作的障碍或将不复存在，这是“韩日在军事领域合作的分水岭”。

For Japan and America, it would clearly be significant good news if Japan and South Korea signed the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”.

日韩若签署《军事情报保护协定》，对日本和美国而言，显然都是重大利好消息。

Zhang Junshe pointed out that under the guise of the North Korea crisis, Japan could take advantage of the situation and get involved in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, broaden its right to discourse, thus increasing its influence in Northeast Asian affairs. For America, closer military cooperation between Japan and South Korea is conducive to advancing its control of the two allied countries further, to serve its “Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” strategy, to achieve its goal of controlling North East Asia, and to advance and achieve the protection of its regional hegemony.

张军社指出，日本未来可以以朝鲜危机为幌子，趁机介入朝鲜半岛事务，扩大其在朝鲜半岛事务中的话语权，进而提升其在东北亚局势中的影响力。对美国而言，日韩两国更紧密的军事合作有利于其进一步控制这两个盟国，为其“亚太再平衡”战略服务，实现其控制东亚的目标，进而实现维护其地区霸权的目的。

The next paragraph translation is a stub (or whatever). It apparently refers to undoing the limits put on Japan’s military power after WW2, and the Shinzo Abe government’s goal to “normalize” Japan’s military policies.

You can contribute to a translation.

In March 2016, Japan’s new military legislation was officially implemented, allowing Japan to go from ordinary times to “有事”时, from its own ground to freely using force abroad.

2016年3月，日本新安保法正式实施，使日本获得了从平时到“有事”时、从本土到周边再到全球自由对外使用武力的权限，从而使日本绕过和平宪法束缚，初步实现长期追求的“军事正常化”目标。

If Japan and South Korea sign the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”, this will open a channel for Japan to get involved in matters of the Korean peninsula. For South Korea, this undoubtedly means  drinking Zhen poison as a thirst quencher and allowing the wolf into the house, turning South Korea into the biggest victim. Zhang Junshe says that South Korea’s government, in order to shift the pressure from “Choigate” and to respond to America’s call, to resist China’s and Russia’s resistance against the “THAAD” deployment in South Korea, and to involve Japan, presents itself, on the surface, as retaliation against North Korea, it actually helps America to form a military alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, and provides the conditions for Japan to step into the Korean peninsula.

若日韩签订《军事情报保护协定》，“则为日本介入朝鲜半岛事务打开了一个通道，这对韩国而言无异于饮鸩止渴、引狼入室，韩国将成为最大的受害者。”张军社如是说，韩国政府为了转移“闺蜜门”事件的压力，同时响应美国的号召，抵抗中国和俄罗斯对“萨德”入韩的反对，将日本拉拢过来，表面看是为了对付朝鲜，实际上是在帮助美国在亚太构建军事同盟体系，为日本插足朝鲜半岛提供条件。

Zhang Junshe also said that the main goal of the Japanese-South Korean “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement” was to strengthen shared intelligence about North Korea, and that this kind of military alliance directed against third countries was an expression of cold-war mentality that would cause fierce reactions from North Korea. It could damage peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and negatively affect peace and stability in the entire North East Asian region. As North Korea’s closest neighbor, China could therefore also face more security threats.

张军社还说，日韩《军事情报保护协定》主要目的就是要加强有关朝鲜情报的共享，这种针对第三国的军事同盟是冷战思维的表现，必然引起朝鲜方面的激烈反应，可能破坏朝鲜半岛的和平稳定，对整个东北亚地区的和平稳定也会带来不利影响。中国作为朝鲜半岛的近邻，也可能因此面临更多安全威胁。

South Korean Arriang News TV reported on Friday that the agreement could become effective without parliamentary approval in South Korea (where the government lost its majority in April this year). However, 59 percent of the public disapproved of the agreement.

Societal Governance: Falling Growth, Rising Vigilance

The Chinese economy grew by 7.7 percent in 2013, 0.2 percent more than the central government’s target of 7.5 percent, but marking a 14-year low, according to the BBC. The story doesn’t explicitly say that there will be a further slowdown, but suggests that more growth would hardly be investment-led (as it was in the past), quoting an economist as saying that the government’s moves to curb shadow banking and local government debt will cap the growth of investment.

What may be rising further are “public-security” budgets. In November, party and state leader Xi Jinping had announced the establishment of a national security committee, and Chinese media were frank in announcements or interpretations right away. Tasks and challenges had become more complicated in the fields of national security, and the coordination and standardization (or unification, 协调和统一), innovative societal governance (社会治理), innovation of effective systems to defuse contradictions in society were needed, and it was easy to see that the new security committee needed to have both internal and external functions to react to both internal and external challenges.

A report by Central People’s Broadcasting  Station System (CPBS, aka China National Radio) pointed out that processes like these were going on not only in China, but in the United States, Japan, France, and other countries, too. Not least, the report quoted Ruan Zongze (阮宗泽),  a researcher and diplomat, the creation of a national security committee indicated the growing dynamics of Chinese diplomacy.

Such growing dynamics can certainly be visited in the German press. The home minister of the Free State of Bavaria, Joachim Herrmann, announced in a press release in March 2013 that China and Bavaria would cooperate yet more strongly in combatting international terrorism and drug trafficking. Herrmann issued the release after meeting Guo Shengkun, who had become minister for public security in December 2012, i. e. three months earlier.

Early this month, People’s Daily (online) published an article by Guo, which describes public-security work as safeguarding political security, security of state power, issues that relate to the ruling position of the party (事关党的执政地位) as well as national core interests mattered in Guo’s article, emphasizing several times that his position was based on prior speeches of party secretary general Xi Jinping, which indicated the party’s new height in understanding of how to maintain national security and social stability (我们党对维护国家安全和社会稳定规律特点的认识达到了一个新高度).

Guo’s article mentioned lots of ideological ingredients for these new heights of insight, but little or no recognizable threats. It doesn’t seem far-fetched however that incidents like these are among those on Guo’s mind.

Sina Weibo, according to reports, is losing users – the BBC links the decline to a crackdown on “online rumors”. It remains to be seen if innovation will come from Chinese media – “social” or other. Earlier this month, in a review of China’s media landscape of 2013, or China’s political discourse in 2013, Qian Gang, a contributor to the China Media Project, found a trend which in his view, went from some kind of constitutionalism to the two must not rejects. The two must not speaks as a term

summed up a new political position emerging from the Party leadership, that “the historical period after economic reforms [in 1978] must not be used to reject the historical period before economic reforms; and the historical period before economic reforms must not be used to reject the historical period after economic reforms.”

A number of terms in the media were checked by Qian, suggesting that terms associated with constitutionalism and democracy were reaching new lows. And while Qian considers the term “Chinese Dream” mainly motivational, he believes that media reference to “Mao Zedong’s Thought” is a measuring stick that can be used to look at Chinese politics.

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Related

» Edward Bernays, NYT obituary, March 10, 1995

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Update/Related

» Fresh Cash, Jan 21, 2014

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Journalism under Attack

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Glenn Greenwald talking to the Socialism Conference in Chicago on June 29.

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Transcript there.

From the introduction (not part of Greenwald’s talk):

There are people in our society who have remained consistent under Democrats and Republicans, who put principle over partisanship, who have committed to being the same people that they are, whether a Democrat is in office, or a Republican is in office.

Snowden Press Review – VoA Chinese: a Super-Charged Stink Bomb / “Global Times”: no Face-Losing Outcome for China

Several hundred Hong Kongers held demonstrations during the weekend, demanding that Edward Snowden should not be extradited, and that the SAR government should protect him, Xinhua reports. (The South China Morning Post, SCMP, reported on Saturday that members of the League of Social Democrats marched from the HSBC headquarters to the U.S. consulate on Friday, and Xinhua’s report may refer to this demonstration.) According to opinion polls quoted by Xinhua (via SCMP), half of Hong Kongers opposed the idea of repatriating (遣返) Snowden, and only 17.6 percent supported the idea. A Ming Pao editorial of June 16 is quoted as calling on America to account to Hong Kong.

The Ming Pao article is behind a paywall, but the teaser refers to Snowden’s interview where he had said that the University of Hong Kong, officials, business people and even students had been targeted. Given that Hong Kong was not considered an enemy of the United States, and that it was no base area for sheltering terrorist elements, the SAR government had good reasons to lodge a protest with the American government and to make solemn representations. The American government must account to Hong Kong’s relevant parties, concerning the intrusions into Hong Kong computers.

Xinhua quotes the Voice of America (VoA) as saying that Snwoden had exploded a super-charged stink bomb (爆炸力超强的臭气弹), tainting Western companies, governments and officials with with a foul smell that would be hard to remove.

The main damage, the actual VoA online article (published on Friday) says, is political – so far, the NSA director, president Barack Obama, and congressional supporters of the existing laws and regulatons from both political parties hadn’t found a convincing response to the critics.

According to Xinhua, sympathy for Snowdon in the American media is declining rapidly – he was being criticized there for harming the national interest, and for having no professional integrity (批评其危害国家利益、没有职业道德的声音激增).

It’s a different story in Hong Kong, writes Xinhua, quoting “a page-spanning” SCMP headline  on Sunday, saying that according to opinion polls, Hong Kongers don’t want to hand Snowden over to America (民调显示，香港人不愿把斯诺登交给美方). 49.9 percent of those polled opposed or strongly opposed the idea. The survey had also found that 33 percent of the polled found that Snowden was a hero. This seems to be an accurate rendition of the actual SCMP article.

Xinhua’s press review is much longer than these excerpts, but at least in its first paragraphs, there seems to be no twist in its account.

The English-language “Global Times”, owned by the China-Daily Group, writes that extraditing Snowden would be a face-losing outcome for both the Hong Kong SAR government and the Chinese Central government. It would also be a disappointment for expectations around the world. The image of Hong Kong would be forever tarnished.