Posts tagged ‘South Korea’

Friday, August 11, 2017

Trump Rhetoric against North Korea reveals Need for modernized US Foreign Policy

Donald Trump was born rich. That’s why he’s qualified to serve as US President. You only have to look the other way when he’s making decisions. To talk bullshit to the press (or on Twitter) is a decision, too. This is what he told the press in New Jersey, on Tuesday:

Q: Any comment on the reports about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities?

A: North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen. He has been very threatening beyond a normal state. And as I said, they will be met with fire, fury, and, frankly, power, the likes of which this world has never seen before.

Thank you.

Senator John McCain stated the obvious, still on Tuesday, in a radio interview: “You got to be sure you can do what you say you’re going to do.”

If that’s logical, it’s too logical for President Trump – and for some of his supporters, who refer to McCain as a “traitor” who “sabotaged” their idol. Because, who knows, if everyone would have kept his  mouth shut, Pyongyang might have been very afraid.

Trump is either a madman, or a bigmouth. We may be hopeful, for now, that he’s a bigmouth first. But that doesn’t mean that he can’t do damage. In fact, Washington is heading into a loss of face like the world has never seen. George W. Bush was the first wrecker’s ball operator against American credibility, and Trump is his worthy successor.

But sometimes, when an idiot is running the farm, his operations reveal structural weaknesses that began long before his reign.

It has been said countless times by now that there are “no good options” when it comes to North Korea. That’s easy to say, and when it’s said frequently enough, it begins to sound like an inevitable truth.

But the debate if there are “good” options, or only more or less lousy options, has little to do with North Korea. Instead, it has a lot to do with America. Whenever there’s a debate about foreign policy, it sounds as if America was in full control, and just needed to decide if they want to “take out” this or that dictator.

There would be a fairly good option, concerning North Korea – the only question is if Trump is the president who can do it. Maybe he can – after all, he has no face, and therefore can’t lose face.

Either way: what is the fuss about the impossibility to recognize North Korea as an equal in international relations? Not as an equal in ethical terms, obviously, but as an equal member of the United Nations?

The problem is that both America and China follow the Yang Jiechi doctrine: that [your country] is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.

America is a hegemon in decline. That means that, to maintain its international influence, it will have to modernize its foreign and military policies. It needs to find partners, rather than junior partners. And it needs to understand what constitutes a problem, and what doesn’t. America can no longer afford to exhaust all other options before doing the right thing.

If America can do business with China – a totalitarian country -, there is no plausible reason as to why it shouldn’t do business with North Korea, too. North Korea’s neighbors would hardly object. A policy – or mere rhetoric – that suggests a war on their territory is not popular there. And Pyongyang would be only to happy to reduce its dependence on Beijing.

Therefore, the first step should be to accept North Korea’s status as a nuclear power. If China should have any concerns about that, let it be Beijing’s problem. America may offer some inexpensive assistance, if deemed auspicious, but why should they tackle the main responsibility for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula if Beijing considers North Korea a bargaining chip against Taiwan?

Let’s face it: there is nothing any power on earth can do when Beijing protects the regime in Pyongyang. But there is a lot that can be done to defend South Korea, Japan, and – not least – Taiwan.

Therefore, Washington should reach out to Pyongyang.

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Updates/Related

Moon: Peace a national interest, BBC, Aug 14, 2017

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Thursday, June 29, 2017

RFA Report on a June-4 Commemorative Ham Radio Broadcast

The following blockquote is a translation of an article / news program by Radio Free Asia (RFA). Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

Main Link: RFA, June 5, 2017 – Democracy Movement People in South Korea carry out Commemorative June-4 Broadcast […]

Democracy movement activists in South Korea constructed a shortwave broadcasting station on Sunday [June 4], the 28th anniversary of the June 4 [incident], to broadcast the truth about June 4 to a wide range of Chinese listeners. This way, they evoked peoples’ attention and demanded the political rehabilitation of June 4.

周年的星期天架设短波无线电台,向广大的中国听众广播了六四真相。他们通过这种方式纪念六四,唤起人们的关注,并且要求平反六四。

Democrats led by the Democracy Party of China‘s South Korea branch hold some commemorative activities or meetings on every June 4, or distribute leaflets. However, since last year, they have felt all kinds of restrictions by South Korean police. They can understand the South Korean government and its hope that foreigners wouldn’t carry out anti-Chinese democracy movement activities within South Korea’s borders, but they cannot rule out that these kinds of restrictions may be caused by the Chinese embassy in South Korea.

以中国民主党韩国党部为首的韩国民运人士每年在六四都会举办一些纪念活动,或聚会纪念,或散发传单。但是,自从去年开始他们警感觉到韩国警察机构的各种限制。他们可以理解韩国政府,不希望外国人在韩国境内进行反对中国的民运活动,但是,无法排除这种限制受到中国驻韩使馆唆使的可能性。

To free themselves from South Korean police interference, Democrats in South Korea didn’t even give interviews with journalists this year, and secretly built a shortwave transmitter somewhere in South Korea, to broadcast to listeners in China. The broadcast said that “on June 4, 1989, in Beijing and China’s other major cities, repressive measures of unprecedented brutality occurred, with use of tanks and machine guns against defenseless students and patriotic citizens.”

为了摆脱韩国警察的干扰,韩国民运人士今年甚至没有接受记者的采访,以秘密行动的方式,在韩国某处架设无线短波电台,面向中国听众进行了广播。该广播说,“1989年6月4日的中国的北京及各大城市,发生了惨绝人寰的镇压行动,中共军队动用坦克机枪向手无寸铁的学生和爱国民众进行了残酷的镇压。”

Reportedly, the democrats used the popular amateur radio frequency of 7050 kHz to carry out a test transmission and reception tests, and then carried out their broadcast – all these combined took about one hour. The broadcast said that “on this particular day, we have set up a amateur radio station to broadcast the truth to a wide audience.”

据介绍,民运人士利用无线电爱好者最常用的7050千赫(kHz)频率进行广播测试,再经过国内的收听测试,然后进行广播,测试和广播一共进行了约一个小时。该广播说,“在今天这个特别的日子里,我们特设业余电台,向广大的听众播送真相。”

Although 28 years have passed, the democracy activists said that in their opinion, there was a need to commemorate June 4, as this was the starting point of Chinese democracy. Although trottled, the calls for democracy had since strengthened. One should not, because of the Chinese Communist Party’s meticulous concealments, leave the sacrifices for democracy wasted.

虽然已经经过了28个年头,民运人士表示,他们认为仍有必要纪念六四,因为这是中国民主的起始点,虽然遭到扼杀,但是要求民主的呼声却从此日渐壮大。不能因为中共的刻意掩盖,而让呼吁民主的牺牲付诸东流。

They commemorated the June 4 democracy movement and the victims with a broadcast, hoping that a wide range of listeners would be able to learn the truth about June 4, moving a step further in understanding the phony appearance of communist China’s ruling class. The broadcast said that “the lifespan of communist government is nearing its end, young friends, and hopefully, you will stand on the righteous side when the time for its tyranny has come to fall apart.”

他们通过广播纪念六四民运,缅怀六四的牺牲者,希望广大的听众能够了解六四的真相,进一步了解中共统治阶层的虚假面目。该广播说,“共产主义政府的寿数已尽,年轻的朋友们,当暴政崩溃的时候,希望你们能站在正义的一面。”

The broadcast also said that “CCP rulers, CCP accomplices, listen well: sooner or later, you will be exposed and criticized, and pay a bloody price.”

该广播还说,“中共的统治者们,中共的帮凶们,你们听好了,你们早晚要受到清算,你们早晚要付出血的代价。”

According to non-official statistics, there are about 800,000 mainland Chinese people in South Korea. Most of them only hold residence rights and need to keep their criminal records clean to obtain an annual extension of their right of residence. Therefore, although the South Korean branch of the Democracy of China has many members, they aren’t communicated publicly. For the above reasons, democracy activism in South Korea faces restrictions. The June-4 shortwave broadcasts are a courageous breakthrough in a restrictive environment.

据非正式统计,韩国境内约有万来自大陆的中国人。他们大部分只拥有居住权,需要维持无犯罪记录,才能获得每年的居住权延期。所以,中国民主党韩国党部虽然有众多党员,但是不对外公开其人数。由于以上的种种理由,韩国的民运活动受到限制。上述的六四短波广播是在受限的范围内的一次勇敢的突破。

Special correspondent: Liu Shui. Editor: Kou Tianli. Online edition: Guo Du.

特约记者:刘水 责编:寇天力 网编:郭度

Saturday, May 6, 2017

KCNA: North Korea “has contributed to protecting China’s peace and security”

North Korean newsagency KCNA published an article on Wednesday evening this week, criticizing Chinese press coverage and commentary. According to China’s state-owned newspaper Huanqiu Shibao, it is the third article in recent days that criticizes Chinese pundits and media on North Korea, but the first to mention China by name.

Rather than criticizing Pyongyang, Beijing should cherish the long-standing alliance with North Korea, which had benefitted China, rather than causing problems, KCNA wrote, and added:

One must clearly understand that the DPRK’s line of access to nukes for the existence and development of the country can neither be changed nor shaken and that the DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is.

The DPRK, which has already become one of the most powerful nuclear weapons state, does not feel the need to think over how many options it has now.

KCNA, who provide news and articles in Korean, English, Chinese, Russian, Spanish and Japanese – but no permalinks – wrote as follows (the name “Kim Chol” should probably not be attributed to the country’s former vice minister, or  Kim Jong-un’s murdered elder brother):

Pyongyang, May 3 (KCNA) — Kim Chol released a commentary on Wednesday, urging Chinese newspapers to refrain from making reckless remarks undermining the DPRK-China relations.  Noting that a string of absurd and reckless remarks are now heard from big neighboring countries, perhaps frightened at the U.S. blackmail and war racket, every day only to render the acute situation of the Korean peninsula more strained, the commentary says: 朝中社平壤5月3日电 金哲3日发表题为《不要再做乱砍朝中关系支柱的贸然言行》的评论。文章摘要如下:
或许是因为被最近美国高调的威胁恐吓与轰隆的战争机械动音吓坏了,临近的大国内部连日传来不谙事理、失去分寸的言论,使日趋尖锐的朝鲜半岛局势更加紧张。
The People’s Daily and the Global Times, widely known as media speaking for the official stand of the Chinese party and government, have recently carried commentaries asserting that the DPRK’s access to nukes poses a threat to the national interests of China. They shifted the blame for the deteriorated relations between the DPRK and China onto the DPRK and raised lame excuses for the base acts of dancing to the tune of the U.S. 被人认为代表中国党和政府正式立场的《人民日报》和《环球时报》最近发表几篇评论声称朝鲜拥核威胁中国的国家利益,把朝中关系恶化的责任完全推给朝鲜,同时极力辩解中国对美国随波逐流的卑鄙做法。
  Those commentaries claimed that the DPRK poses a threat to “the security in the northeastern region of China” by conducting nuclear tests less than 100 km away from its border with China. They even talked rubbish that the DPRK strains the situation in Northeast Asia and “offers the U.S. excuses for deploying more strategic assets” in the region.  评论说,“朝鲜在距离中国边界不到一百公里的地方搞核试验,威胁到中国东北的安全”, “朝鲜刺激东北亚局势,给美国加强在这一地区的战略部署提供了借口”。
 Not content with such paradox, the commentaries asserted that to remain averse to the DPRK’s access to nukes is to preserve interests common to the U.S. and China, calling for slapping harsher sanctions against the DPRK in order to avert a war which would bring danger to China.  甚至诡称反对朝鲜发展核导技术是中美两国的共同利益,就是为避免危及自身的战争也得强化对朝制裁。
 The newspapers, even claiming China holds the initiative in handling the DPRK-China relations, made no scruple of letting out a string of provocative remarks urging the DPRK to choose one among such options if it doesn’t want military confrontation with China–“whether to face protracted isolation or to preserve national security by making a U-turn” and whether to break Sino-DPRK friendship or to dismantle its nukes.  更有甚者,悍然放出“中朝关系的主动权掌握在中国的手中”,如果朝鲜不愿与中国军事对立,就要在“长期孤立和另走一条国家安全道路之间”、中朝友谊和弃核之间作出抉择的极为挑衅的妄言。
 This is just a wanton violation of the independent and legitimate rights, dignity and supreme interests of the DPRK and, furthermore, constitutes an undisguised threat to an honest-minded neighboring country which has a long history and tradition of friendship.  这是对朝鲜自主合法的权利、尊严和最高利益的严重侵害,也是具有悠久的友好历史和传统的善良邻国露骨的威胁。
 China is hyping up “damage caused by the DPRK’s nuclear tests” in its three northeastern provinces. This only reveals the ulterior purpose sought by it, being displeased with the DPRK’s rapid development of nukes.  中国有些人大谈东北三省的“核试灾害”,只能暴露出中国不喜欢朝鲜核武高度化的内心。
 As far as “violation of national interests” oft-repeated by politicians and media persons of China is concerned, it is just the issue that the DPRK should rather talk much about.

It is just the DPRK whose strategic interests have been repeatedly violated due to insincerity and betrayal on the part of its partner, not China at all.

 至于中国政治家和媒体人动辄提到的“侵害国家利益”,反而朝鲜有更多的话要说。由于对方背信弃义的行动,国家战略利益屡遭侵害的不是中国,而是朝鲜。
 Some theorists of China are spouting a load of nonsense that the DPRK’s access to nukes strains the situation in Northeast Asia and offers the U.S. an excuse for beefing up its strategic assets in the region. But the U.S. had activated its strategy for dominating Asia-Pacific long before the DPRK had access to nukes, and its primary target is just China. 中国有人荒唐地主张朝鲜拥核加剧东北亚局势,给美国加强在这一地区的战略部署提供借口,但美国的亚太支配战略早在朝鲜拥核很久以前就开始启动,其主要目标本来就是中国。
China should acknowledge in an honest manner that the DPRK has just contributed to protecting peace and security of China, foiling the U.S. scheme for aggression by waging a hard fight in the frontline of the showdown with the U.S. for more than seven decades, and thank the DPRK for it. 中国倒是应当老实承认长达70多年在反美对抗战的第一线艰苦作战,挫败美国的侵略阴谋,为维护中国大陆的和平与安全做出贡献的到底是谁,先向朝鲜表示感谢才合乎道理。
Some ignorant politicians and media persons of China daringly assert that the traditional relations of the DPRK-China friendship were in line with the interests of each county in the past. They are advised to clearly understand the essence of history before opening their mouth. 悍然胡扯传统的中朝友好关系“当时契合了各国的利益”的愚昧无知的一些中国政治家和媒体人,应首先搞清楚历史的本质后再来理论。
Their call for not only slapping stricter sanctions but also not ruling out a military intervention if the DPRK refuses to abandon its nuclear program is no more than an extremely ego-driven theory based on big-power chauvinism that not only the strategic interests but also the dignity and vital rights of the DPRK should be sacrificed for the interests of China. 只要朝鲜不弃核,不仅加强对朝制裁力度,而且不惜使出军事干涉手段的说法,不过是极为霸道的大国主义逻辑而已,即为了中国的利益,朝鲜的战略利益乃至主权和生存权都要牺牲。
One must clearly understand that the DPRK’s line of access to nukes for the existence and development of the country can neither be changed nor shaken and that the DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program which is as precious as its own life, no matter how valuable the friendship is. 必须明白,不管是谁,决不能改变或摇动朝鲜为国家的存在和发展拥核的路线。无论朝中友谊怎样宝贵,朝鲜也不会拿如同生命的核武来交换或乞求。
The DPRK, which has already become one of the most powerful nuclear weapons state, does not feel the need to think over how many options it has now. 毋庸赘述,朝鲜已是最强的核国家,有很多路可以选择。
China should no longer try to test the limits of the DPRK’s patience but make proper strategic option, facing up to the situation. 中国不要再无谓地企图考验朝鲜的忍耐的界限,而应当冷静看待现实并作出正确的战略选择。
China had better ponder over the grave consequences to be entailed by its reckless act of chopping down the pillar of the DPRK-China relations. -0- 中国要深思,现在乱砍朝中关系支柱的危险妄动可能带来的严重后果。(完)

The wordings in English and Chinese aren’t always identical. For example, according to the English version, People’s Daily and Huanqiu Shibao are widely known as media speaking for the official stand of the Chinese party and government, while in KCNA’s Chinese version, the two publications are believed to represent China’s party’s and government’s official position. And while the English version says that [t]he DPRK, which has already become one of the most powerful nuclear weapons state, does not feel the need to think over how many options it has now, the Chinese translation says that with no need to go into unnecessary details, the DPRK is already the strongest nuclear country and can choose from many roads.

Huanqiu Shibao, one of the two Chinese papers mentioned by KCNA, lost no time to react: an article, written by “Shan Renping” (that would be editor Hu Xijin‘s (胡锡进) pen name, according to Feichang Dao),  appeared in Chinese at 8 a.m. the next day – KCNA’s commentary had been published the evening before. At 10:18 a.m., an English version of the same article followed on the “Global Times” website.

Neither Western nor Chinese media may take a great interest in reproducing the case Pyongyang is trying to make: that doesn’t fit in either America’s nor into China’s interests, as KCNA noted in the Wednesday editorial: […] the commentaries asserted that to remain averse to the DPRK’s access to nukes is to preserve interests common to the U.S. and China, calling for slapping harsher sanctions against the DPRK in order to avert a war which would bring danger to China.

From the official North Korean perspective, America, not North Korea, poses problems – and KCNA adds a warning to Beijing (whose politicians have left it to scholars and media so far to voice discontent with Pyongyang):

Some theorists of China are spouting a load of nonsense that the DPRK’s access to nukes strains the situation in Northeast Asia and offers the U.S. an excuse for beefing up its strategic assets in the region. But the U.S. had activated its strategy for dominating Asia-Pacific long before the DPRK had access to nukes, and its primary target is just China.

On Friday, Taiwan’s Liberty Times quoted a South Korean foreign ministry spokesman as saying that sanctions on the North were showing effects, as demonstrated by North Korea’s reaction. According to the Liberty Times report, US secretary of state had previously revealed that Pyongyang had received a warning from Beijing to either refrain from further nuclear tests, or to face sanctions voluntarily imposed by China.

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Related

Big country, small countries, Wikipedia, last edt. March 19, 2017

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Wednesday, April 5, 2017

Seconds of Fame

Link

Thursday, November 24, 2016

Obituary: Ryu Mi-yong, 1921 – 2016

Ryu Mi-yong, chairwoman of the North Korean “Chondoist Chongu Party”, died of lung cancer on Wednesday, November 23, aged 95, according to North Korean newsagency KCNA (no permalink).

Thanks to the profound trust and love of the great leaders she could make a dramatic U turn in her life and enjoyed a worthwhile life after permanently settling in the DPRK together with her husband Choe Tok Sin,

writes KCNA, referring to the couple’s defection from South to North Korea in 1986. Reportedly, they had moved to the United States, or fled there, ten years prior to their defection. Her husband, late Choe Duck-shin (or Choe Deok-sin, or Choi Duk Shin), had been the Park regime’s foreign minister from 1961 to 1963. From 1963 to 1967, he served as South Korea’s Ambassador to West Germany.

And if KCNA portrays her correctly, like many converts, Ryu Mi-yong was tougher than the rest:

She revered Marshal Kim Jong Un as God of the nation and the sun of salvation of the world and the people and worked heart and soul to bring earlier a new day of unity of all Koreans and country’s reunification till the last moments of her life.

直到生命的最后一刻,敬仰金正恩元帅为民族的上天、救世济民的太阳,为早日迎来全民族的团结和统一的未来献出了一切。

The “party” she chaired apparently draws on a Korean religious movement called Cheondoism.

According to Yonhap Newsagency, South Korea’s reunification ministry, on November 19 granted Ryu’s second son a travel permit to the North, for humanitarian reasons, given that his mother had been terminally ill.

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Updates/Related

“Chondoism, translated into reality”, Pyongyang Times, Sept 29, 2016

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Saturday, November 19, 2016

People’s Daily: “Little NATO” drawing nearer as Japan and South Korea initial Intelligence Sharing

South Korean parliamentary opposition leader Woo Sang-ho of the main oppositional Minjoo Party said on Monday that they would impeach or dismiss the defense minister if the government went ahead with plans to sign a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA).

Chinese Communist Party organ People’s Daily wrote on Wednesday or Thursday that if signed, this would be the first military cooperation agreement between the two countries after World War 2, and criticized the tw0 governments’ moves indirectly, by quoting a military expert.

→Link

On November 14, South Korea’s and Japan’s initialled a “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”. If officially signed, this would be the first military cooperation agreement after the second world war. Military expert Zhang Junshe said in an interview with People’s Daily online that if the agreement in question was signed, the two countries would bypass America and exchange intelligence directly. This was significant good news for Japan and America, but for South Korea, this was like drinking Zhen poison to quench its thirst, or to allow the wolf into the house. The agreement could damage peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and negatively affect peace and stability in the entire North-East Asian region.

14日,韩国和日本政府草签了《军事情报保护协定》。如该协定正式签署,这将是两国自第二次世界大战结束后签署的首份军事合作协定。军事专家张军社在接受人民网采访时表示,若该协定正式签署,日韩两国将绕过美国直接共享情报,这对日美两国是重大利好消息,但对韩国而言则如同饮鸩止渴、引狼入室。该协定可能破坏朝鲜半岛的和平稳定,对整个东北亚地区的和平稳定也会带来不利影响。

According to a report by South Korea’s “JoongAng Ilbo” on November 15, South Korea hopes to use Japan’s reonnaissance satellites, radar, and other advanced equipment to gather intelligence, while Japan could make use of intelligence gathered by traditional Korean manpower.

据韩国《中央日报》15日报道,韩国希望利用日本的侦察卫星和雷达等尖端装备获取情报;而对日本来说,则可利用韩国传统人工收集的情报。

Currently, there are separate “Military Intelligence Protection Agreements” between South Korea and the US and Japan and the US respectively, but the exchange of military intelligence between South Korea and Japan needs to go through America as a “connecting airport”, with no “direct flight”.

目前,韩美、日美之间分别缔结有《军事情报保护协定》,不过韩日两国交换军事情报需要通过美国这个“中转站”,双方之间并无“直航”。

Zhang Junshe pointed out that Japan had advanced military technology at its disposal and could rely on advanced reconaissance satellites, radar, and other first-class equipment to gather information concerning North Korea’s nuclear tests, missile launches etc., while South Korea, owing to its geographical advantage, could gather first-hand intelligence gathered by agents and spies. If Japan and South Korea signed the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”, the two sides could bypass America and exchange intelligence directly.

张军社指出,日本具有先进的军事科技,可凭借其先进的侦察卫星和雷达等尖端装备获得朝鲜核试验和导弹发射等情报信息,而韩国凭借地理优势,可获得更多由特工、间谍人员等获得的第一手人工情报。日本和韩国一旦签署《军事情报保护协定》,双方将可以绕过美国直接交换军事情报。

Some media reports point out that military cooperation between South Korea and Japan was a sensitive issue, because of the history of Japanese colonial rule over South Korea from 1910 to 1945 on the one hand, and also because of territorial disputes between the two sides. With historical and territorial issues unresolved, the South Korean government has always faced continuous resistance. On June 29, 2012, the South Korean government even brought a signing to an “emergency halt”, right on the scheduled day of signing.

有媒体报道指出,军事合作在韩日两国合作中属敏感范畴,一方面缘于日本1910年至1945年在朝鲜半岛推行殖民统治的历史,另一方面缘于双方现在的领土争议。在历史和领土问题均未解决的情况下,韩国政府推动签署军事情报方面协定一直面临重重阻力。2012年6月29日,韩国政府甚至在原定协定签署日当天“紧急叫停”。

This time, South Korea and Japan have signed the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement” at tremendous speed, and South Korea said that it had only taken about a dozen days to conduct and intitial the agreement. Reportedly, the two sides will also work hard to sign the agreement by the end of November, after completing domestic procedures.

此次日韩两国“火速”草签《军事情报保护协定》,从韩方宣布重启有关协定谈判到协定草签仅用了十几天。据称,双方还将力争在完成国内手续后,于11月底前正式签署协定。

How could a agreement that had been stalled for years be settled in a dozen days? The background factors are providing food for thought.

一个多年无法的协定如今为何在短短十几天便得以尘埃落定?背后缘由耐人寻味。

According to Zhang Junshe, Japan has, after the end of World War 2, never profoundly reflected on the crimes it committed to the countries of North-East Asia. While America and Japan had made efforts all along to facilitate the signing of the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”, the opposing domestic voices in South Korea had always been very strong. The South Korean masses fear Japanese militarism’s rise from the ashes, so as to trample over the Korean peninsula once again. There are various reasons for Japan and South Korea to rush the initialling of the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”. From South Korea’s perspective, with president Park Geun-hye’s “Choigate” scandal almost inescapable for the government, the country is facing a serious domestic crisis. By signing military cooperation with Japan, domestic sight can be shifted and passed on to the crisis, thus easing the pressure on Park Geun-hye’s government because of “Choigate”. Also, as South Korea’s agreement to the American deoployment of the “THAAD” anti-missile system had led to a deepening of contradictions with China, Russia, and other neighboring countries, South Korea’s choice to deepen previous cooperation with Japan can also, to a certain degree, ease pressure from neighboring countries. In addition, America is very positive about facilitating the Japanese-South Korean signing of the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”. America has always hoped to strengthen military cooperation between its two Asia-Pacific allies, but for historical reasons, Japan and South Korea have, for a long time, given an appearance of unity while being divided in fact. If Japan and South Korea officially sign the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement” at last, this undoubtedly spells an important result for America’s “Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific”, conducive to pulling Japan and South Korea together for the formation of a “small NATO” concept.

据张军社介绍,二战结束以来,日本从未对其在二战期间对东北亚各国所犯下的罪行作出深刻反省。虽然美、日方面一直在努力促成日韩签订《军事情报保护协定》,而韩国国内的反对声音一直十分强烈。韩国民众唯恐日本军国主义死灰复燃,再次践踏朝鲜半岛。此次日韩“火速”草签《军事情报保护协定》,原因是多方面的。从韩国方面看,目前朴槿惠政府深陷“闺蜜门”事件难以自拔,韩国内部面临着严重的政治危机。韩国此时与日本签署军事合作,可以转移国内视线,转嫁危机,减轻“闺蜜门”事件给朴槿惠政府带来的压力。此外,由于韩国同意美国在韩部署“萨德”反导系统,导致韩国与中国、俄罗斯等邻国矛盾加深,所以韩国选择加强与日本之前的合作,某种程度上也能减轻周边国家对其造成的压力。另外,美国对促成日韩签署《军事情报保护协定》非常积极。美国一直希望它的两个亚太盟友加强军事合作,但日韩两国因为历史问题长期貌合神离。若日韩最终正式签署《军事情报保护协定》,无疑是美国“亚太再平衡”战略的重要成果,有利于实现美国拉日韩两国构建东北亚“小北约”的构想。

Ma Yao, special researcher with the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Shanghai International Studies University, told media that for a long time, the main obstacle for building trilateral US-Japanese-South Korean military cooperation had been in South Korea, and the progress in South-Korean-Japanese military cooperation meant that the obstacle for trilateral military cooperation was reduced and might never return. This was a “watershed” in South-Korean-Japanese cooperation in the military field.

上海外国语大学国际关系与公共事务学院特约研究员马尧在接受媒体采访时表示,长期以来,美国构建美日韩三边军事合作的主要障碍在韩国,而韩日军事合作方面的进展意味着三边军事合作的障碍或将不复存在,这是“韩日在军事领域合作的分水岭”。

For Japan and America, it would clearly be significant good news if Japan and South Korea signed the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”.

日韩若签署《军事情报保护协定》,对日本和美国而言,显然都是重大利好消息。

Zhang Junshe pointed out that under the guise of the North Korea crisis, Japan could take advantage of the situation and get involved in the affairs of the Korean peninsula, broaden its right to discourse, thus increasing its influence in Northeast Asian affairs. For America, closer military cooperation between Japan and South Korea is conducive to advancing its control of the two allied countries further, to serve its “Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific” strategy, to achieve its goal of controlling North East Asia, and to advance and achieve the protection of its regional hegemony.

张军社指出,日本未来可以以朝鲜危机为幌子,趁机介入朝鲜半岛事务,扩大其在朝鲜半岛事务中的话语权,进而提升其在东北亚局势中的影响力。对美国而言,日韩两国更紧密的军事合作有利于其进一步控制这两个盟国,为其“亚太再平衡”战略服务,实现其控制东亚的目标,进而实现维护其地区霸权的目的。

The next paragraph translation is a stub (or whatever). It apparently refers to undoing the limits put on Japan’s military power after WW2, and the Shinzo Abe government’s goal to “normalize” Japan’s military policies.

You can contribute to a translation.

In March 2016, Japan’s new military legislation was officially implemented, allowing Japan to go from ordinary times to “有事”时, from its own ground to freely using force abroad.

2016年3月,日本新安保法正式实施,使日本获得了从平时到“有事”时、从本土到周边再到全球自由对外使用武力的权限,从而使日本绕过和平宪法束缚,初步实现长期追求的“军事正常化”目标。

If Japan and South Korea sign the “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement”, this will open a channel for Japan to get involved in matters of the Korean peninsula. For South Korea, this undoubtedly means  drinking Zhen poison as a thirst quencher and allowing the wolf into the house, turning South Korea into the biggest victim. Zhang Junshe says that South Korea’s government, in order to shift the pressure from “Choigate” and to respond to America’s call, to resist China’s and Russia’s resistance against the “THAAD” deployment in South Korea, and to involve Japan, presents itself, on the surface, as retaliation against North Korea, it actually helps America to form a military alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, and provides the conditions for Japan to step into the Korean peninsula.

若日韩签订《军事情报保护协定》,“则为日本介入朝鲜半岛事务打开了一个通道,这对韩国而言无异于饮鸩止渴、引狼入室,韩国将成为最大的受害者。”张军社如是说,韩国政府为了转移“闺蜜门”事件的压力,同时响应美国的号召,抵抗中国和俄罗斯对“萨德”入韩的反对,将日本拉拢过来,表面看是为了对付朝鲜,实际上是在帮助美国在亚太构建军事同盟体系,为日本插足朝鲜半岛提供条件。

Zhang Junshe also said that the main goal of the Japanese-South Korean “Military Intelligence Protection Agreement” was to strengthen shared intelligence about North Korea, and that this kind of military alliance directed against third countries was an expression of cold-war mentality that would cause fierce reactions from North Korea. It could damage peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and negatively affect peace and stability in the entire North East Asian region. As North Korea’s closest neighbor, China could therefore also face more security threats.

张军社还说,日韩《军事情报保护协定》主要目的就是要加强有关朝鲜情报的共享,这种针对第三国的军事同盟是冷战思维的表现,必然引起朝鲜方面的激烈反应,可能破坏朝鲜半岛的和平稳定,对整个东北亚地区的和平稳定也会带来不利影响。中国作为朝鲜半岛的近邻,也可能因此面临更多安全威胁。

South Korean Arriang News TV reported on Friday that the agreement could become effective without parliamentary approval in South Korea (where the government lost its majority in April this year). However, 59 percent of the public disapproved of the agreement.

Friday, April 1, 2016

Media Coverage on Ministry of Education’s (MoE) “Blue Book” on Returning Overseas Students and the Labor Market

The Chinese ministry of education (MoE) published a “blue book”, or a government report, on March 25, concerning overseas Chinese students returning to China, and looking for a job there. If Chinese press and government agency coverage on the report is something to go by, this is what the average academic returnee to the motherland looks like:

he is actually mostly a she (59.16 percent of the returnees are female), aged 23 to 33 (absolute average 27.04 yrs old), a masters student (80.7 percent), a postgraduate (9,49 percent), or an undergraduate / a student with a specialized subject (9.81 percent combined). If a postgraduate, his main fields should mainly be chemistry, material science, economics, electronics and electrical engineering, while the masters fields of study are somewhat more into the direction of finance, accounting, business management, management studies, or international business studies.

Statistics seem to suggest that there have been more returnees recently, than the 1978 to 2015 average numbers. Either way, the MoE’s Overseas Students’ Support Center deputy director Xu Peixiang (徐培祥) is quoted as saying that some 70 to 80 percent of students, in recent years, have returned after their studies abroad.1)

97 percent of those who currently study abroad are doing so at their own expense, which appears plausible when looking at the total numbers. In 2015 alone, 523,700 students reportedly left for studies abroad, and 409,100 job-seeking overseas students returned to China that year. By comparison, 248 students left China for studies abroad in 1978, according to Xinhua newsagency.

Very rough calculations with many unknowns: given that 459,800 Chinese left China to study abroad in 2014, according to this government-agency news report, the average of students leaving in 2014 and 2015 combined would be (459,800 + 523,700)/2 = 491,750, and based on an average duration of 22 months (more precisely 21.47 months) of studies abroad among the 2015 returnees,  this would mean that about 901,542 Chinese students would currently be abroad.

Three percent of these would then not study at their own expense (or that of their parents, relatives, etc.). Some 27,000 of the 901,542 abroad would, based on my shoddy calculation, study with a government grant, a scholarship, etc.. And probably, very few, if any, among the 248 who went abroad in 1978, were self-paying students.

23.85 percent of the 2015 returnees have been looking for a job in state-owned companies, 19.4 percent prefer minban operations2), and foreign-invested enterprises, state institutions and financial institutions rank third, fourth and fifth, respectively, in the returnees search settings. Only 3.32 percent want to establish businesses of their own (one percentage point up, compared to the 2014 returnees).

When it comes to location and company types, the returnees haven’t necessarily followed their ideas of perfect companies and locations, but looked at some hard facts (and regulations), and have therefore looked for jobs that appeared to be closer within their reach. Either way, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are still very popular destinations, with 49.34 percent indicating these goals, but this is said to be eight percentage points less than in 2013. This share is now basically focused on other provincial-capital-level cities.

Being in a position to pay for ones studies abroad doesn’t necessarily translate into perfect (or labour-market-oriented) choices, according to the news coverage. Qi Mo (齐默), head of the returnee office at the MoE, is quoted as stating “a certain blindness” in terms of how students (and their parents) are choosing fields of studies (or majors) and places (cities and universities) abroad. Hence, the MoE was trying to provide candidates for self-paid overseas studies, as well as their families, with information to support their choices, according to Qi.

It isn’t strongly highlighted in the news, but it becomes fairly evident that while Xu Peixiang points out how returning overseas students have become a group that receives great attention at our country’s market of talents, there may be particular challenges for returning overseas students, too. When a Xinhua article mentions measures like bases (or opportunities) for practical work as supportive measures for returnees to integrate into the labor market (this might also be translated as internship opportunities), you might suspect some frustration and trouble there. After all, such “opportunities” are hardly the financial return self-paying students (and their families and networks) would expect on their investment (or borrowings).

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Footnotes

1) According to statistics quoted in the Chinese press coverage on the MoE “blue book”, 4.04 million Chinese students have studied abroad from 1978 to 2015. 2.22 million of them have returned so far.

2) minban is a poorly defined term. There are, of course, many ways to find definitions anyway. Dorothy J Solinger, in “China’s Transition from Socialism”, first published in 1993, suggested that

there are three main types: those […] which are supposedly owned and managed by “people” (minyou-minban); those owned by the state but managed by “people” (guanyou-minban); and those jointly operated and owned by the state and the “people” (guanmingongyou).

And in 1999/2000, Guoqiang Tian, now a professor at Texas A & M University and in China, discussed in a paper on Property Rights and the Nature of Chinese Collective Enterprises why collective enterprises, especially township and village enterprises (TVEs) had – those sixteen years ago, anyway – developed more rapidly than privately owned enterprises, in China.

General note: I have no information about survey’s return rate among the former overseas students.

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