President’s Double-Ten Speech 2022: Expect no Walk in the Park

Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen looks ahead to her two remaining years in office. The following is an excerpt from her Double-Ten national day speech this morning (Monday), based on the presidential office’s Chinese text, and an English translation by CNA.

^{Double-Ten speech 2022, click picture for video}

…

疫情沒有擊倒我們，反而讓世界看見了臺灣的韌性。我們不只守住了疫情，更把我們往前推進了一步，成為我們心中更好的國家。	Instead of holding us back, the pandemic has helped the world see Taiwan’s resilience. Not only did we manage the spread of COVID-19, we helped Taiwan take a step forward, and made our country a better place.
但正如同棒球比賽一樣，這一局能夠化險為夷，並不代表，我們下一局就會風平浪靜。走過了上階段的疫情風暴，下一個階段我們挑戰更大，更需要我們沉著面對，共同解決。	But just as in baseball, being able to turn one inning around does not mean the next one will be a walk in the park. Having come through the outbreak of the virus, we know that our next challenges will be even greater, requiring a calm and collective response.
疫後的世界秩序，正在劇烈的變化。目前，歐美各國，正苦於通貨膨脹，和隨之而來的經濟衰退；臺灣的通膨，雖然還在可以控制的範圍，但我們仍然必須要因應，全球經濟衰退的變局。	The post-pandemic world order is in a state of rapid change. Countries across Europe and the Americas are suffering from inflation and the resulting economic downturn. While inflation in Taiwan is still at a controllable level, we must nevertheless prepare for the developments that might be triggered by a global economic contraction.
在此同時，全球供應鏈重組，仍在進行當中。臺灣雖然在半導體、以及資通訊軟硬體的領域，已經取得關鍵的地位；但在其他領域也必須要快步跟上，才能立於不敗之地。另外，極端氣候帶來的異常災變，也提醒我們，必須要建立更能夠快速應變的機制。	At the same time, global supply chains are still undergoing restructuring. Though Taiwan already holds a key position in the fields of semiconductors and information and communications technology hardware and software, we must quickly catch up in other fields to ensure our strong footing. In addition, disasters caused by extreme weather events remind us that we must build mechanisms for rapid response.
在經濟局勢的過程當中，我們還要面對的另外一個挑戰，那就是烏俄戰爭持續在進行；中國在南海、東海、以及臺灣海峽的軍事行動，衝擊印太地區的和平穩定。我們絕對不能忽視，軍事的擴張，正在挑戰自由民主的世界秩序。這些變局，都跟臺灣息息相關。	Aside from economic developments, Russia continues its war against Ukraine, while China’s military activity in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait undermines peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. We absolutely cannot ignore the challenge that these military expansions pose to the free and democratic world order. These developments are inextricably connected with Taiwan.
臺灣正處在變局之中。我們不能抱著僥倖的心態。我們必須堅定民主立場，審慎的做出準備，隨時因應瞬息萬變的情勢。	With Taiwan a part of this changing landscape, we cannot leave things to chance. Instead, we must stand up for our democracy, and prepare prudently and sufficiently to respond to any possible contingency.
回顧過去，正是因為臺灣的韌性，我們才能夠度過疫情的挑戰。未來的兩年，在我任期的最後，我們不僅要持續站穩「四個堅持」的立場，更要在經濟產業、在社會安全網、在民主自由體制、在國防戰力，打造更精實的「四大韌性」。	Looking back, we can see that we were able to weather the challenges of the pandemic precisely because of Taiwan’s resilience. Over the remaining two years of my term, we will continue to resolutely uphold our Four Commitments. We will also enhance the resilience of four key areas: our economy and industry, social safety net, free and democratic government system, and national defense.
把中華民國臺灣，打造成為一個更強韌的國家，就是現階段國家發展，最重要的目標。	The work of making the Republic of China (Taiwan) a more resilient country is now our most important national development priority.

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Related

An Economy with new Bones, May 20, 2016
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The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China”	(Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.”	(We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.”	(Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.”	(Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”.	If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle.	This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it. Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

or the other way round,

Table 2

Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be

because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Updates

Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestags, undatiert, acc April 13, 2023

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Fun and Facts in Taiwan

Every year, there’s the fun

and the facts.

President Tsai’s 2022 new year’s remarks are also available in English.
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Trans-Pacific Press Review (TPPR), April 14

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Happy reading …

Date	Item
	—
April 1	Argentina has sought Chinese support in its negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Argentina started with reaching an agreement with the IMF. China is one of Argentina’s biggest trade and investment partners. According to a report by Argentina’s embassy to China, Argentina’s ambassador to China, Sabino Vaca Narvaja, has had meetings with high-level Chinese officials. The purpose was to ask China to support Argentina in its talks to have deadlines extended and interest on debt lowered.
	—
April 9	Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh and a master of innocuous small talk, died last Friday.
	—
April 9	Also on Friday, the world’s biggest Mazu pilgrimage started in Dajia District, Taichung, Taiwan.
	—
April 9	Still on Friday, China’s ambassador to Canada had reassuring news for Michael Spavor‘s and Michael Kovrig‘s fellow citizens: the “vast majority” should not worry about being kidnapped by the police, he reportedly told a Zoom audience Memorial University of St. John’s. (I suppose his wording was a bit different from kidnapped by the police, rather something like “people engage in those criminal activities, whether it’s Canadians or other nationalities”.)
	—
April 12	Gao Fu (高福), head of the Chinese Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, has been quoted as saying that China’s current vaccines  “don’t have very high rates of protection”, but later referred to this statement as a “complete misunderstanding”.
	—
April 14	US climate envoy John Kerry is in China, and two authors on Foreign Policy have some advice for him.
	—
April 14	Also, a US delegation is in Taiwan at President Joe Biden‘s request. President Tsai Ing-wen will reportedly meet with the delegation on Thursday morning.

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Related

Universal topics, Mar 22, 2018
RAE adds Chinese programs, Jun 10, 2013

Ko Wen-je discusses his Chances to be elected President, Cross-Strait Relations

The following is a translation of an article by Radio Taiwan International‘s Chinese service.

The article contains interesting quotes from an interview Ko Wen-je gave Next TV, but leaves out critical comments he reportedly made about Xi Jinping‘s Qin-Shi-Huang kind of actions.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Xi Jinping acting like Qin Shi Huang?

Main link:

No great chance to be elected president/ there are currently no cross-strait relations

Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je said in an interview aired on July 9 that concerning the 2024 presidential elections, he was “taking a preparatory look at the issue” but his own view of the odds for him wasn’t promising, there would be new politicians, and the situation would be different.

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的專訪中表示，對於2024總統「照這樣準備」，但自評勝算很低，且到那時會有新的政治人物出現、也沒有連任問題，戰局會不同。

Ko’s interview was broadcast on July 9 by Next TV. Asked by host Chen Yalin about the participation issue in the 2024 presidential elections, Ko declared for the first time that “I am still looking at such preparations, preparing for the presidential elections, just choosing like that, does it work or doesn’t it.”

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的壹電視專訪中，被主持人陳雅琳問及參選2024總統問題，他首度表態「我還是照這樣準備，準備選總統，就這樣去選，行或不行」。

The host followed up, asking “what is the chance that it would work?”, and Ko answered that if you lean on personal popularity to win, the mobilization abilities of the blue and green camps were both strong, and only if you lead by eight percent from the beginning, “if you ask me at this stage, the chances to get elected would be very low.” “When all media are playing the game like this, it can’t be easy.” Also, there would be new politicians by then, and there wouldn’t be re-election issues, which would make it a different campaign.

主持人追問「你覺得行的比例差不多多少」，柯文哲回應若要靠個人聲望贏，藍綠動員能力強，除非一開始就領先8%，「你問我現階段，選了贏的機會很低」，「所有的媒體這樣打，不容易啦」，且到那時都是新的政治人物、也沒有現在連任的問題，戰局會不同。

Ko Wen-je said that he was in a very calm mood now, with doing his work at the Taipei government, and if it [the presidential opportunities] was there, that would be fine, and otherwise, let it be. There was no need to care.

柯文哲表示現在心情都很輕鬆，正常在北市府開工，行就行、不行就算了，何必那麼在意。

Ko also said that at this stage, there were no cross-strait relations, only a Taiwan issue within the confrontation between China and America, with both China and America having their bottom lines. “Frankly speaking, my conduct and actions wouldn’t differ much from Ying-wen’s [President Tsai].”

柯文哲並表示，現階段沒有兩岸關係，只有中美對抗架構下的台灣問題，中美各有底線，「坦白講，我所作所為跟小英(蔡總統)的做法其實也差不多」。

Asked by the host about the Hong Kong national security law and the cross-strait situation, Ko Wen-je said that China has to reflect on how to deal with the people’s longings for democracy and freedom once arriving at a certain stage of economic development.

主持人問及對香港國安法及兩岸情勢問題，柯文哲表示中國必須思考當經濟發展到一個程度時，該如何處理人民對民主自由的渴望。

Asked what he had to say to China’s chairman Xi Jinping, Ko Wen-je said that [Xi] had better respect Taiwan. Democracy and freedom were the core of Taiwan’s politics, cherished by the Taiwanese, and, more importantly, the Taiwanese would want to retain it. Therefore, [Xi] needed to understand Taiwan’s current situation.

至於對中國國家主席習近平有何話說，柯文哲表示，他還是要尊重台灣。民主自由是台灣政治的核心；台灣人會珍惜它、更重要的是台灣人會去想要保有它，所以他必須了解台灣的現況。

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Updates / Related

Taipei to continue forum with Shanghai (click picture)

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President Tsai Ing-wen begins her Second Term, Inaugural Speech in full

in Chinese

in English

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Related

A second term, Jan 13, 2020
“We uphold our principles”, Jan 2, 2019
First Double-Ten speech, Oct 11, 2016
Economy with new bones, May 20, 2016
She’s back, April 15, 2015

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Related / Updates

Domestic in Focus, J. A. Cohen, May 21, 2020

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US support for Taiwan’s diplomatic alliances “uncompromisingly opposed” by FMPRC

The following is a translation of a newslet from China News Service (CNS, 中国新闻),the country’s second-largest newsagency after Xinhua.

“An Act to express United States support
for Taiwan’s diplomatic alliances
around the world”

Main link: China’s foreign ministry reacts to America’s signing of legislation concerning Taiwan, strongly urges America to correct mistake (中国外交部回应美方签署涉台法案：强烈敦促美方纠正错误)

CNS, Beijing, March 27 — (Huang Yuqin reporting)  Countering America signing the negative bill concerning Taiwan, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said on a regular press conference on Friday that China strongly urged America to correct its mistake and not to implement that legislation, and not to obstruct any country’s development of ties with China. Otherwise, it would inevitably be met with a resolute Chinese counterattack.

中新社北京3月27日电 (黄钰钦)针对美方签署涉台消极法案，中国外交部发言人耿爽27日在例行记者会上表示，中方强烈敦促美方纠正错误，不得实施该法，不得阻挠各国同中国发展关系。否则，必将遭到中方坚决反击。

A reporter asked, the American president signed the “Taiwan Friendship International Protection and Strengthening Initiative” bill [into legislation]. How does China comment on this?

有记者提问，美国总统签署了“台湾友邦国际保护及加强倡议法案”。中方对此有何评论？

Geng Shuang replied that America’s so-called “Taipei bill” seriously violated the one-China principle and the rules of the Sino-American Three Communiqués, goes against international law and the fundamental standards of international relations, and interfered in domestic Chinese politics. China expressed intense resentment and uncompromising opposition against this.

耿爽回应称，美方所谓“2019年台北法案”严重违反一个中国原则和中美三个联合公报规定，违背国际法和国际关系基本准则，干涉中国内政。中方对此表示强烈不满和坚决反对。

He pointed out that worldwide, 180 countries had established diplomatic relations with China, with America having established diplomatic relations with China on the basis of the one-China policy as early as 41 years ago. The above-mentioned bill demands the obstruction of other countries sovereign countries’ developing normal national relations. This is undisguised hegemonial logic.

他指出，世界上已有180个国家同中国建交，美国自己早在41年前就在一个中国原则基础上同中国建交，上述法案却要求阻挠其他主权国家同中国发展正常国家关系，这是赤裸裸的霸权主义逻辑。

Geng Shuang emphasized that the Taiwan issue concerns China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and China’s core interests. China’s government and people determination and volition to defend their core interests is rock-solid. We strongly urge America to correct its mistake and not to implement that legislation, and not to obstruct any country’s development of ties with China. Otherwise, it would inevitably be met with a resolute Chinese counterattack. (end)

耿爽强调，台湾问题事关中国主权和领土完整，事关中国核心利益。中国政府和人民捍卫核心利益的决心和意志坚如磐石。我们强烈敦促美方纠正错误，不得实施该法，不得阻挠各国同中国发展关系。否则，必将遭到中方坚决反击。(完)

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Related

Led by Nancy Pelosi, J. Smith, Mar 27, 2020
Senate and House bill, Jan 3, 2020
China’s rising aggression, Jan 28, 2017

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A second Term for President Tsai Ing-wen

我也要向大家保證，絕對不會因為勝利，就忘記了反省。過去這四年，我們有成績，但是也有不足的地方。台灣人民願意再給我們四年，我們會把做不夠的、來不及做的，做得更好、做得更多。

I promise that I will not stop reflecting and improving after winning this election. We have made progress over the past four years, but we also have our shortcomings. Now that the Taiwanese people have given us four more years, we will do more and be better, to make up for areas where we fell short or have not yet finished our work.

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Related

Re-elected, not just for being tough in China, NY Times, Jan 12, 2020
Written English version, CNA (Focus Taiwan), January 11, 2020