The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China”	(Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.”	(We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.”	(Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.”	(Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”.	If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle.	This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it. Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

or the other way round,

Table 2

Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be

because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Xi Jinping’s Heroes (2): Martyrs, Wave upon Wave

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The following is my second instalment of an article gathering notable Xi quotes concerning heroes; part one is there. No excerpts in this second part; every Xi word within the following paragraphs has been faithfully translated. All errors are my own; corrections or suggestions are welcome.

For the particularly pious, there’s “A Daily Word from Xi”,
a regular morning meditation on
China People’s Broadcasting Station (CPBS)

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Main Link: “The Secretary General has talked about Heroes like these”, by Wen Hongyan and Song Jingsi, published on Sept 29

For the beloved motherland of their ideals, countless revolutionary martyrs held high the torch of faith, with an honor that doesn’t look back, they entered the powerful historical torrent of the people’s independence and the people’s liberation. Facing danger without fear and advancing dauntlessly in wave upon wave, they fought a brave, blood-soaked fight despite all setbacks.

为了理想中“可爱的中国”，无数革命先烈高擎信仰的火炬，义无反顾地踏入为了民族独立、人民解放的历史洪流中。他们临危不惧、前赴后继，他们浴血奋战、百折不挠。

On July 24, 2020, secretary general Xi Jinping, ending inspection work in Jilin province, pointed out:

2020年7月24日，习近平总书记在吉林考察工作结束时的重要讲话中指出：

“During the war of resistance against Japan, under extremely vile conditions, General Yang Jingyu led armed forces braved temperatures of minus 40 degrees fighting blood-soaked battles with enemies several times stronger in numbers while having nothing but dry grass, tree bark and cotton wadding in their stomachs. Their achievements were shaking popular feelings.”

“抗日战争时期，在极其恶劣的条件下，杨靖宇将军领导抗日武装冒着零下四十摄氏度的严寒，同数倍于己的敌人浴血奋战，牺牲时胃里全是枯草、树皮、棉絮，没有一粒粮食，其事迹震撼人心。”

On September 18, 1931, Japanese imperialism manufactured the Mukden Incident and began the large-scale invasion and occupation of northeastern China. In 1932, Yang Jingyu was commissioned by the party central committee to organize the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, and led the Northeast military-civilians in a bloody battle at the White Mountain and Black Water . Facing the Japanese army’s frantic pressure, Yang Jingyu was brimming with fighting spirit: “A Revolution is like fire. The snow may be sealing the mountains and hiding the birds’ and animals’ traces, but as long as we carry the spark, we can chase away the bitter winter and bring light and warmth.”

1931年9月18日，日本帝国主义制造九一八事变，开始大举侵占中国东北。1932年，杨靖宇受党中央委托到东北组织抗日联军，率领东北军民与日寇血战于白山黑水之间。面对日军疯狂镇压，杨靖宇充满斗志：“革命就像火一样，任凭大雪封山，鸟兽藏迹，只要我们有火种，就能驱赶严寒，带来光明和温暖。”

In February 1940, Yang Jingyu, in a world of ice and snow and out of ammunition and food, fought a lone fight against a great number of Japanese invaders, and heroically sacrificed his life after fighting for five days and nights, in Mengjiang County (now Jingyu County in Jilin Province).

1940年2月，杨靖宇在冰天雪地、弹尽粮绝的情况下，孤身一人与大量日寇周旋，战斗五昼夜后，在濛江县（今吉林省靖宇县）壮烈牺牲。

In times of difficulty, circumstances create heroes. In this great struggle in the war of resistance against Japan, the sons and daughters of China independently and freely casted their lives, sprinkled warm blood, mothers sent their sons to fight the Japanese invaders, wives sent their young husbands to the battleground, men and women, old and young equally mobilized.

天下艰难际，时势造英雄。在抗日战争这场救亡图存的伟大斗争中，中华儿女为中华民族独立和自由不惜抛头颅、洒热血，母亲送儿打日寇，妻子送郎上战场，男女老少齐动员。

It was Jiawu 2014. In a commemorative ceremony for the whole nation’s war of resistance that had started 77 years earlier, Secretary Xi Jinping, with deep emotion, told a heroic story: a mother from Miyun County in Beijing named Deng Yufen sent her husband and five children to the front, and they all died in battle.

2014年，岁逢甲午。在纪念全民族抗战爆发七十七周年仪式上，习近平总书记深情讲述了一位英雄母亲的抗战故事：“北京密云县一位名叫邓玉芬的母亲，把丈夫和5个孩子送上前线，他们全部战死沙场。”

Deng Yufen clenched her teeth and stood firm under these blows, smiling less than before but becoming more active in the anti-japanese war and closer to the younger generations of soldiers.

面对沉重的打击，邓玉芬硬是咬牙挺住了。她脸上的笑容少了，但对抗日工作更积极了，对子弟兵更亲了。

In August 1945, the Chinese people finally defeated the Japanese aggressor. Deng Yufen had tears in her eyes, comforting her husband and her sons under the nine springs: we are victorious! Before her death in February 1970, Deng Yufen told her fellow villagers, “bury me next to the roadside, I want to see the children return”.

1945年8月，中国人民终于打败日本侵略者，邓玉芬眼噙泪花，告慰九泉之下的丈夫和儿子们：咱们胜利了！1970年2月临终前，邓玉芬对乡亲们说：“把我埋在大路边，我要看着孩子们回来。”

In the extraordinarily difficult years of the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese people fought against powerful enemies, built a great wall out of blood and flesh, with always another one stepping into the breach to replace the fallen, and wrote a majestic epos, for a shaken world to read and to make even supernatural beings cry²⁾, thus winning the fist war by Chinese against foreign aggressors in modern times³⁾.

在艰苦卓绝的抗日战争中，中国人民以铮铮铁骨战强敌、以血肉之躯筑长城、以前仆后继赴国难，谱写了惊天地、泣鬼神的雄壮史诗，赢得了近代以来中国抗击外敌入侵的第一次完全胜利。

Secretary-general Xi Jinping pointed out on a symposium commemorating the 69th anniversary of the Chinese people’s anti-Japanese war of resistance’s victory and the world’s war against fascism’s victory: “High-ranking officers like Yang Jingyu, Zhao Shangzhi, Zuo Quan, Peng Xuefeng, Tong Linge, Zhao Dengyu, Zhang Zizhong, Dai Anlan and others from numerous heroic entities such as the Eight-Route Army’s ‘Five Heroes on Langya Mountain’, the New Fourth Army’s ‘Liulaozhuang company’, the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army’s eight female warriors, the KMT Army’s ‘eight heroes’, are outstanding representatives of the Chinese people undefiant,self-sacrificing stance.”

习近平总书记在纪念中国人民抗日战争暨世界反法西斯战争胜利69周年座谈会上指出：“杨靖宇、赵尚志、左权、彭雪枫、佟麟阁、赵登禹、张自忠、戴安澜等一批抗日将领，八路军‘狼牙山五壮士’、新四军‘刘老庄连’、东北抗联八位女战士、国民党军‘八百壮士’等众多英雄群体，就是中国人民不畏强暴、以身殉国的杰出代表。”

While fighting the liberation war, the Communist Party of China relied closely on the masses, obtained a power that toppled the mountains and overturned the seas, and ended the KMT’s reactionary rule, establishing a brandnew People’s Republic.

解放战争中，中国共产党紧紧依靠人民群众，获得了排山倒海的力量，结束了国民党的反动统治，建立了崭新的人民共和国。

“With no care for their heads, their warm blood irrigated the country.” To win national independence and the people’s liberation, countless revolutionary martyrs marched forward bravely, building the great wall of steel that rescued the nation in peril and defended the nation’s dignity. According to incomplete statistics, there were 3.7 million martyrs among revolutionary the troops led by the party from 1921 until 1949.

“未惜头颅新故国，甘将热血沃中华。”为争取民族独立和人民解放，无数革命先烈勇往直前以赴之，筑起拯救民族危亡、捍卫民族尊严的钢铁长城。据不完全统计，从1921年到1949年，党领导的革命队伍中，有名可查的烈士就达370多万人。

Secretary-general Xi Jinping emphasized: “The republic is red, and can’t weaken this color.⁴⁾ The blood of countless martyrs gave our flag its color. There is no way that we would not build the republic well that they hoped, fought and sacrificed for.”
“We absolutely must engrave the martyrs’ final wishes and never forget the great ideals they sacrificed their blood for.”

习近平总书记强调：“共和国是红色的，不能淡化这个颜色。无数的先烈鲜血染红了我们的旗帜，我们不建设好他们所盼望向往、为之奋斗、为之牺牲的共和国，是绝对不行的。”“我们一定要铭记烈士们的遗愿，永志不忘他们为之流血牺牲的伟大理想。”

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Notes

¹⁾ White Mountain + Heilongjiang = Dongbei
²⁾ Xi Jinping appears to have a particularly strong liking for warm blood “irrigating” the motherland, but also for borrowing from the world on the other side of the cupboard: supernatural beings have played a role in his commemorative speech about the Korean war, too, and – if a verbatim quote of what Xi said back then – in his September 2015 speech.
³⁾ Among Chinese – not among Americans or Taiwanese – “近代” usually seems to refer to the times from around 1912 to 1949. The term is discussed by a Wikipedia article, too.
⁴⁾ xCompare commemorative speech about the Korean war in October with the same phrase: 共和国是红色的，不能淡化这个颜色. Another translation for “weaken” could be “dilute” or “trivialize” its color.
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Great Matters of the State, Educational Tour

CCTV Xinwen Lianbo, June 5, 2021

The following is a newsitem from Xinwen Lianbo (CCTV evening news) on June 5. The term 国之大者 (guózhī dàzhě), coined in recent contexts by party secretary general Xi Jinping, appears to have led to some confusion, without anyone within the propaganda department or any CPC interface with the public to clarify the meaning.

The non-communist public figures, commonly referred to dangwai in Chinese politics, appear to be facing higher expectations to be faithful agents of the Communist Party of China in the pursuit of state affairs, or intensified worshippers of the CPC as it  commermorates its 100th founding anniversary.
The Upenn language blog has done some heroic explanatory work for the term guózhī dàzhě, and as I can’t find anything more convincing online, I’ve decided to translate it as great matters of the state.
Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Celebrating the 100th founding anniversary of the Communist Party of China, officials of all non-communist parties’ central committee members and public figures and representatives with no party affiliations went to Shanghai and to Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province, for visits and studies.

[视频]庆祝中国共产党成立100周年 各民主党派中央负责人和无党派人士代表赴上海 浙江嘉兴参观学习
来源：央视网2021年06月05日 19:18

CCTV online news (Xinwen Lianbo): with permission from the Communist Party of China’s central committee, the Central United Front organized a trip by members of all non-communist parties’ central committee officials and public figures and representatives with no party affiliations to Shanghai and Jiaxing, Zhejiang Province, so as to admire the site of the Communist Party of China’s first congress, and the Nanhu Red Boat. A symposium was also held.

央视网消息（新闻联播）：经中共中央批准，中央统战部组织各民主党派中央负责人和无党派人士代表今天（6月5日）赴上海、浙江嘉兴，瞻仰中共一大会址和嘉兴南湖红船，并举行座谈会。

The one-hundred years of struggle have amply demonstrated that without the Communist Party there would be no New China, that without the Communist Party there would be no socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Chinese people wouldn’t have stood up, wouldn’t have prospered, wouldn’t have become stronger. It is hoped that non-communist democratic party public figure will always cherish “great matters of the state”, thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping’s ideology of New Era socialism with Chinese characteristics, firmly develop party history education, always faithfully maintain the leadership of the Communist Party of China, keep to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, strengthen the joining of forces of party construction, and unite in the common effort of promoting the development of multi-party cooperation, so as to create a beautiful future for the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.

中国共产党百年奋斗历程充分表明，没有共产党就没有新中国，没有共产党就没有中国特色社会主义，中国人民就不可能站起来、富起来、强起来。希望各民主党派、无党派人士始终胸怀“国之大者”，深入学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想，扎实开展中共党史学习教育，始终不渝坚持中国共产党的领导，走中国特色社会主义道路，加强中国特色社会主义参政党建设，协力推进多党合作事业发展，共同创造中国人民和中华民族的美好未来。

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Related

Political parties in China, Wiki, last edited June 6

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“Age of Awakening” Screenplay Writer Long Pingping faces Heroic Death (at least 20 times)

The following is a translation of a report published by (apparently privately-run) Shanghai news portal “Guanchazhe”, aka “Observer”. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Revolutionary lectures

Main link 1:
page 1

On April 25, the screenwriter of soon-to-be-broadcast “Age of Awakening” and former director of the Party Literature Research Center’s 3rd research department director as well as Tongji University specially appointed professor Long Pingping, and the two young actors Zhang Wanyi and Ma Qiyue who are playing martyr Chen Yannian and martyr Chen Qiaonian, as well as several scores of young Tongji University came to Shanghai Longhua Martyrs’ Cemetery to commemorate and to pay tribute to eternally resting Chen Yannian, Chen Qiaonian, Zhao Shiyan and other revolutionary martyrs, and to learn these martyrs’ saga, and to carry forward the heroic spirit.

4月25日，热播剧《觉醒年代》编剧、原中共中央文献研究室第三编研部主任、同济大学特聘教授龙平平，剧中扮演陈延年烈士、陈乔年烈士的两位青年演员张晚意、马启越，以及数十位同济大学青年学子来到上海龙华烈士陵园，缅怀祭奠长眠于此的陈延年、陈乔年、赵世炎等革命烈士，学习先烈们的英雄事迹、弘扬英烈精神。

Longhua Martyrs’ Cemetery with its green trees full of life is dignified and solemn. The tomb stones of revolutionary martyrs like Chen Yannian and Chen Qiaonian lie quietly in the warm spring sunshine.

龙华烈士陵园树木葱郁、庄重肃穆。陈延年、陈乔年等革命先烈的墓碑静静地躺在春日暖阳中。

The grave-sweeping ceremony begins, everyone stands tall in silence in a tribute to the revolutionary martyrs who saved the Chinese nation from extinction, and gallantly dedicated their lives to the great cause of salvation and survival of the Chinese nation, and the people’s freedom and happiness.

祭扫仪式开始，现场全体人员肃立，向为实现中华民族救亡图存、人民自由幸福的伟大事业而英勇献身的革命先烈们默哀。

Having completed the moment of silence, “Age of Awakening” screenwriter Long Pingping, the two young actors Zhang Wanyi and Ma Qiyue who are playing martyr Chen Yannian and martyr Chen Qiaonian bow one after another and lay flowers, extending their deeply-felt fond memory and sublime respect.

默哀毕，《觉醒年代》编剧龙平平、剧中饰演陈延年、陈乔年的两位青年演员张晚意、马启越依次鞠躬献花，向长眠于此的革命先烈致以深切缅怀和崇高敬意。

After the ceremony, everyone comes to Longhua Martyrs’ Cemetery square for Long Pingping’s vivid party history lesson, reviving the course of the party’s development, giving an account of the two martyrs’ Chen Yannian and Chen Qiaonian heroic feats.

祭扫仪式结束后，大家来到龙华烈士纪念碑广场，龙平平在此给现场的同济青年学子上了一堂生动的党史课，重温党的发展历程，讲述了陈延年、陈乔年两位革命先烈的英雄事迹。

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In 1927, the KMT reactionaries started the “April-12 counter-revolutionary coup d’état in Shanghai, with rivers of blood from Communists and revolutionaries. In the time of peril, Chen Yannian took the post of Jiangsu and Zhejiang regional party secretary, so as to quickly recover the ravaged party and labor union work by working day and night.

1927年，国民党反动派在上海发动“四·一二”反革命政变，共产党人和革命志士血流成河。危亡之际，陈延年接任中共江浙区委书记，为迅速恢复被摧残的党和工会组织日夜奔忙。

On June 26, Chen Yannian was unfortunately arrested and imprisoned when opening a meeting of the provincial party conference. On July 4, less than ten days after his arrest, Chen Yannian was taken to the Longhua execution ground where he was executed.

6月26日，陈延年在召开省委会议时不幸被捕入狱。7月4日，被捕不到10天，陈延年被押赴龙华刑场行刑。

At the execution, the executioner held high a butcher’s knife and, with intense viciousness, ordered: “kneel down!”

临刑之际，刽子手高举屠刀，恶狠狠地勒令“跪下！”

Chen Yannian held his head high and replied: “Revolutionaries die only while standing and won’t kneel down!”

陈延年昂首回道：“革命者只有站着死，绝不下跪！”

In the end, Chen Yannian died a violent death under the KMT reactionaries’ messy knife, aged 29.

最终，陈延年惨死于国民党反动派乱刀之下，时年29岁。

In 1927, Chen Qiaonian succeeded his elder brother, coming to Shanghai as the Communist Party’s Jiangu and Zhejiang provincial organizational director. He secretly and thoroughly went to factories, places in the countryside, agencies and schools, and contacted comrades to recover and rebuild the party’s grassroot organizations.

1927年冬，陈乔年继承长兄遗志，来到上海，担任中共江苏省委组织部长。他秘密地深入工厂、农村、机关和学校，联络同志，恢复和重建党的基层组织。

On February 16,1928, because of turncoat Tang Ruilin’s betrayal, Chen Qiaonian and other Jiangsu provincial comrades were arrested.

1928年2月16日，由于叛徒唐瑞林出卖，陈乔年等江苏省委机关的负责同志被捕。

After their arrest, Chen Qiaonian’s position was exposed, and he was subjected to all kinds of torture, but didn’t say a word. When he bid farewell to his comrades in prision, Chen Qiaonian said optimistically: “let our offspring, the generations that follow us, enjoy the happiness their forbears who blazed new trails!”

被捕后，陈乔年身份暴露，在狱中受尽种种酷刑，但不发一言。在与狱中同志告别时，陈乔年乐观地说道：“让我们的子孙后代，享受前人披荆斩棘的幸福吧！”

On June 6, 1928, Chen Qiaonian died a martyr’s death, aged 26.

1928年6月6日，陈乔年慷慨就义，年仅26岁。

Talking about the “Age of Awakening” scene where the brothers Chen Yannian and Chen Qiaonian died as martyrs, Long Pingping said that he had seen these fragments for at least twenty times, and every time, he couldn’t stop himself from crying loudly.

谈及《觉醒年代》剧中陈延年陈乔年兄弟两就义的场景，龙平平表示，这个片段自己看了不下20遍，每看一次，就忍不住大哭一次。

He says: These men from 100 years ago are examples for the young people of today. Nobody must forget them. With them as our examples, we must build our country well and fulfill these revolutionary martyrs’ final wishes!”

他说：“100年前的他们，就是今天青年人的楷模和榜样。大家不能忘记他们，要以他们为楷模，把我们这个国家建设好，去实现这些革命烈士的遗愿！”

Long Pingping encouraged today’s young students to continue the martyrs’ fine traditions and fight for the rise of China. He said: “Everyone must surely inherit the martyrs’ spirit, know the importance of truth, display patriotic enthusiasm, and you must contribute your own strengths in our new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics so full of opportunities and vigor.”

龙平平激励当代青年学子要继承先烈的优良传统，为中华之崛起而奋斗。他说道：“大家一定要继承烈士的精神，认识到真理的重要，发挥爱国热情，在我们这样的一个充满着生机和活力的是中国特色社会主义的新时代，贡献出你们自己的力量。”

The students also offered the two martyred heroes hand-painted works jointly signed by young Tongji University representatives, “Socialism will never fail to live up to China” and “A beautiful Era’s Picture Scroll”.

同学们也向两位英烈献上同济青年代表共同签名的“社会主义绝不会辜负中国”和“美好时代画卷”手绘作品，希望以今日之美好生活告慰昨日之牺牲奉献，今后更将继续传承英烈之革命精神，奋进新时代。

After the ceremony and tomb-sweeping activities, makers and staff of “Age of Awakening” came to Guanchazhe Online. Screenplay writer Long Pingping held a lecture titled “‘Age of Awakening’: a rite for the foundations of the great revival.” The two young actors Zhang Wanyi and Ma Qilong also came to the scene and shared the process of thought behind the television play’s production. Guanchazhe Online will bring a detailed report tomorrow.

结束龙华陵园的祭扫活动后，《觉醒年代》主创人员一行来到观察者网。编剧龙平平老师举办了主题为“《觉醒年代》：伟大复兴奠基礼”的讲座，张晚意、马启越两位青年演员也来到现场，和观众分享电视剧创作背后的心路历程。详细报道观察者网将于明日发布。

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Related

The CCP’s 2021 Propaganda Blueprint, China Media Project, April 18, 2021

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Lee Teng-hui, 1923 – 2020

Lee Teng-hui and Nelson Mandela met twice: in 1993, when Mandela visited Taiwan, and in 1994, when Lee attended his inauguration as South Africa’s first democratically-elected president.

台湾的主张， 台湾，1999，p. 103

They were two 20th-century giants of democracy, and there were a number of experiences they had in common – struggles for emancipation, more or less intensive tries at Communism, and a crucial role in the democratization of their countries, respectively. But while Mandela led a long open struggle, spending many decades of it in jail, Lee rose through the ranks of the nationalist KMT, supported and promoted by Chiang Ching-kuo during the 1970s and 1980s.

Lee probably owed much of his career to Chiang’s intention to co-opt native Taiwanese citizens into the KMT – a party which Lee actually (and secretly) hated. In the end, he owed his presidency to Chiang, to those in the KMT who threw their weight behind him after Chiang’s death in January 1988, and his own skills as a politician and a technocrat.

Lee’s career came full circle after his presidency had ended in 2000. The KMT revoked his membership in 2001, citing violation of party rules, not least their former president’s and chairman’s close contacts with the Taiwan Solidarity Union.

The KMT had been a vehicle on which Lee pushed forward Taiwan’s democratization, and the re-emergence of Taiwan’s own identity. This rediscovery is still an ongoing process.

While Mandela’s successes and limits in democratizing South Africa were a matter of wide global concern, attention and respect, Lee’s achievements and setbacks mostly took place in the shadows. The likeliest situations that would make the global public look towards the island was when it was threatened by China, with words or military exercises.

Delivering a lecture to an audience at his American alma mater, Cornell University, in 1995, Lee described Taiwan’s situation this way:

When a president carefully listens to his people, the hardest things to bear are the unfulfilled yearnings he hears. Taiwan has peacefully transformed itself into a de­mocracy. At the same time, its international economic ac­tivities have exerted a significant influence on its relations with nations with which it has no diplomatic ties. These are no minor accomplishments for any nation, yet, the Repub­lic of China on Taiwan does not enjoy the diplomatic rec­ognition that is due from the international community. This has caused many to underestimate the international dimen­sion of the Taiwan Experience.

When Lee retired, he essentially moved from the “pan-blue” (KMT-dominated) political camp into the “pan-green” (DPP-dominated) one. He supported both President Chen Shui-bian, and then current President Tsai Ing-wen. And he was prosecuted by the KMT after Ma Ying-jeou had taken office as president in 2008. Lee apparently wasn’t accused of unjustified enrichment, but of “diverting funds and money-laundering”. In November 2013, he was acquitted.

While Lee was known as a technocrat, especially with a record in agriculture, he also sought for new “spiritual” foundations for Taiwan’s emancipation from the Republic of China, i. E. the Chiang Dynasty’s China, imposed on Taiwan during the 1940s’ second half.

My active advocacy, he wrote in the late 1990s,

for  the “reform of heart and soul” in recent years is based on my hope to make society leave the old framework, applying new thought, face a new era, stir new vigor, from a transformation of peoples’ hearts. This goes deeper than political reform, and it is a more difficult transformation project, but we are confident that we will, based on the existing foundations of freedom and openness, achieve the building of a new Central Plain.

近年来，我积极倡导“心灵改革”，就是希望从人心的改造做起，让我们的社会走出旧有的框架，用新的思维，面对新的时代，并激发出新的活力。这是一个比政治 改革更加深入、也更为艰巨的改造工程，但是我们有信心，可以在社会自由开放的既有基础上，完成建立“文化新中原”的目标。

Zhongyuan (中原, the central plains) is a term charged with a Chinese sense of mission and civilization – in that context, it may appear surprising that Lee, a “splittist element”, would use the term at all. The way Henan party secretary Xu Guangchun (徐光春) referred to the central plains may give you an idea: The history of Henan Province constitutes half of the Chinese history. Two years earlier, Xu had apparently given a talk in Hong Kong, with a similar message. But this wasn’t necessarily what Lee had on mind, in 1996.
From “Taiwanisation – Its Origin and Politics”, George Tsai Woei, Peter Yu Kien-hong, Singapore, 2001, page 19 – 20 (footnotes omitted):

Another anecdote should also be mentioned here. In 1996, Lee Teng-hui declared his ambition to “manage the great Taiwan, and to construct a new Central Plain”. As is known, Central Plain (zhong-yuan) was, and still is, a term usually reserved to describe cultural China. To “manage the big Taiwan” is something easily understood, but to construct a new “Central Plain” is very controversial, to say the least. Some argued that Lee’s aim was to help rebuild China as a “new” central plain, but with his foot firmly on Taiwan. But others rebutted that what really was in Lee’s minds was to build Taiwan as a new Central Plain so that there was no need to unify, or have connections, with the “old” central plain, China.

But while the Taiwan experience hasn’t become as much part of human heritage as South Africa’s has, Lee power to shape his country’s development was probably much greater than Mandela’s to shape South Africa’s.

Lee had become president in extraordinary times. Opposition groups, and “illegally” founded political parties among them, had demanded the lifting of the decades-old martial law for a long time. And when Lee began his second term as president in 1990, after the two remaining years of what had originally been Chiang Ching-kuo’s term, students occupied what is now Taipei’s Liberty Square. Once Lee had been sworn in again, he received a fifty-students delegation and promised Taiwan’s democratization, less than a year after the Tian An Men massacre in China.

When a man follows the leader, he actually follows the mass, the majority group that the leader so perfectly represents,

Jacques Ellul wrote in the 1960s^*), and added:

The leader loses all power when he is separated from his group; no propaganda can emanate from a solitary leader.

Lee understood that. Maybe Chiang Ching-kuo understood it, too. But when he made Lee Vice President in 1984, and therefore his heir-apparent, he probably did not know at all how far the “group” – Taiwan’s complex mixture of “ordinary people”, Taiwanese and Chinese nationalists, and, all among them, the islands Indigenous people – would make Lee Teng-hui go.

Taiwan Presidential Office Spokeswoman Kolas Yotaka remembers Lee Teng-hui – click photo for Tweet

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^*) Jacques Ellul: Propaganda, the Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Paris 1962, 2008, New York 1965, S. 97

Ko Wen-je discusses his Chances to be elected President, Cross-Strait Relations

The following is a translation of an article by Radio Taiwan International‘s Chinese service.

The article contains interesting quotes from an interview Ko Wen-je gave Next TV, but leaves out critical comments he reportedly made about Xi Jinping‘s Qin-Shi-Huang kind of actions.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Xi Jinping acting like Qin Shi Huang?

Main link:

No great chance to be elected president/ there are currently no cross-strait relations

Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je said in an interview aired on July 9 that concerning the 2024 presidential elections, he was “taking a preparatory look at the issue” but his own view of the odds for him wasn’t promising, there would be new politicians, and the situation would be different.

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的專訪中表示，對於2024總統「照這樣準備」，但自評勝算很低，且到那時會有新的政治人物出現、也沒有連任問題，戰局會不同。

Ko’s interview was broadcast on July 9 by Next TV. Asked by host Chen Yalin about the participation issue in the 2024 presidential elections, Ko declared for the first time that “I am still looking at such preparations, preparing for the presidential elections, just choosing like that, does it work or doesn’t it.”

台北市長柯文哲於9日播出的壹電視專訪中，被主持人陳雅琳問及參選2024總統問題，他首度表態「我還是照這樣準備，準備選總統，就這樣去選，行或不行」。

The host followed up, asking “what is the chance that it would work?”, and Ko answered that if you lean on personal popularity to win, the mobilization abilities of the blue and green camps were both strong, and only if you lead by eight percent from the beginning, “if you ask me at this stage, the chances to get elected would be very low.” “When all media are playing the game like this, it can’t be easy.” Also, there would be new politicians by then, and there wouldn’t be re-election issues, which would make it a different campaign.

主持人追問「你覺得行的比例差不多多少」，柯文哲回應若要靠個人聲望贏，藍綠動員能力強，除非一開始就領先8%，「你問我現階段，選了贏的機會很低」，「所有的媒體這樣打，不容易啦」，且到那時都是新的政治人物、也沒有現在連任的問題，戰局會不同。

Ko Wen-je said that he was in a very calm mood now, with doing his work at the Taipei government, and if it [the presidential opportunities] was there, that would be fine, and otherwise, let it be. There was no need to care.

柯文哲表示現在心情都很輕鬆，正常在北市府開工，行就行、不行就算了，何必那麼在意。

Ko also said that at this stage, there were no cross-strait relations, only a Taiwan issue within the confrontation between China and America, with both China and America having their bottom lines. “Frankly speaking, my conduct and actions wouldn’t differ much from Ying-wen’s [President Tsai].”

柯文哲並表示，現階段沒有兩岸關係，只有中美對抗架構下的台灣問題，中美各有底線，「坦白講，我所作所為跟小英(蔡總統)的做法其實也差不多」。

Asked by the host about the Hong Kong national security law and the cross-strait situation, Ko Wen-je said that China has to reflect on how to deal with the people’s longings for democracy and freedom once arriving at a certain stage of economic development.

主持人問及對香港國安法及兩岸情勢問題，柯文哲表示中國必須思考當經濟發展到一個程度時，該如何處理人民對民主自由的渴望。

Asked what he had to say to China’s chairman Xi Jinping, Ko Wen-je said that [Xi] had better respect Taiwan. Democracy and freedom were the core of Taiwan’s politics, cherished by the Taiwanese, and, more importantly, the Taiwanese would want to retain it. Therefore, [Xi] needed to understand Taiwan’s current situation.

至於對中國國家主席習近平有何話說，柯文哲表示，他還是要尊重台灣。民主自由是台灣政治的核心；台灣人會珍惜它、更重要的是台灣人會去想要保有它，所以他必須了解台灣的現況。

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Updates / Related

Taipei to continue forum with Shanghai (click picture)

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Presidential Elections 2nd Debate

A video showing yesterday’s (December 25, 2019) second round of the presidential elections debate between President Tsai Ing-wen (DPP), the KMT’s nominee and Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu, and James Soong Chu-yu (PFP). (The design doesn’t seem to suggest that the rebroadcaster would be entirely above party lines. Indeed, according to Wikipedia, Sanlih Entertainment Television (SET) “leans heavily to the Pan-Green Coalition.”)

There’s also a transcript on Facebook. – a great chance for us learners of the Chinese language to read along.

No warranty for the completeness and accuracy of either source.

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Update

A third debate is scheduled for December 27 at 7 p.m. Taiwan standard time (that should be 11 a.m. UTC), to be broadcast by Taiwan Television (TTV).

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Related / more Updates

“Real debate” on Dec 29, Taiwan News, Dec 27, 2019

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Double-Ten 2019: Tsai’s speech, Han’s white paper

–

1. President’s speech

President Tsai Ing-wen’s national day speech is available

• • in Chinese and
  • in English

Among other issues, she rejected the “one country, two systems” concept advocated by Beijing.

Former president Ma Ying-jeou (2008 – 2016) and former vice president Lü Hsiu-lien (Anette Lü, 2000 – 2008) attended the event.

–

Han Kuo Yu’s white paper

KMT presidential candidate (and Kaohsiung mayor) Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) gave a speech at a flag-raising ceremony in Kaohsiung on October 9.

Han has also announced a white paper concerning relations with mainland China. The KMT’s “92 consensus” (九二共識) is believed to feature prominently in Han’s policies (as it has in former president Ma Ying-jeou’s), and the paper is also excpected to state “the defense of the Republic of China’s sovereignty”, “under the precondition of “one China with different interpretations” (一中各表).

While the “92 consensus” has long been disputed in Taiwan anyway (including the question if Beijing actually ever recognized such a consensus, or if it has been a KMT fantasy all along), Beijing’s more recent demands – “one country, two systems” to include Taiwan – mean that either way, a KMT president would be at odds with Beijing, just as is the current Tsai administration.