On the Whim of an Idiot

Huawei advertising, 2018 (“2019 becomes big thanks to 6.21 inches display”)

Once in a while, I have to update myself, technically, to stay informed about current affairs. In the beginning of my share in the digital age, I had a website, but noticed that only few people would care to write an e-mail to discuss anything. So I switched to blogging, fifteen years ago. Then there were opportunities to take part in discussions and getting answers to questions – for a while. Then the English-language, China-related “blogosphere died down, and everyone moved on to Twitter and other “social media”. I followed the stream in 2020.

I find Twitter rather scary. My use of it serves its purpose, to stay informed about what keeps people busy, but it isn’t really about what they think, but about what they feel. The world according to Twitter is a jitterbug, and a pretty aggressive one at times. For a few months now, it has also had ownership issues (or Musk issues) which have led to a rather unpredictable future of that platform.

Once I had seen a pretty informative microblog from China hacked and all requests to Twitter to restore it ignored, I understood that the numbers of followers you have don’t matter – or shouldn’t, if you look at it reasonably -, because you can see it reduced to zero on the whim of just one idiot.

As far as I’m concerned, blogging on WordPress remains worthwile. Maybe it wouldn’t if I was looking for traffic, trying to make money on advertising, etc. But when you blog, you think. You study. You read. By reading, you “listen” carefully, often to people and messages you disagree with, but whose information is still useful.

You don’t get that on Twitter. It may give you the impression that it is a nice distraction from the daily grind – you can even abscond to your account there for a minute (or more) at your workplace. But you might as well have a few chocolate bars instead, also within a minute.

It would be about as healthy as tweeting.

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Related

The state of Taiwan, Sept 8, 2022
Radio or the Internet, both or neither, June 9, 2020
My first ten days on Twitter, Jan 30, 2020
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China-GCC Summit: “Let’s be Partners in our Civilizational Rise”

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“The Chinese people see the Arab people as good friends”, then Chief State Councillor Wen Jiabao told his hosts during a visit to the Arab League headquarters in Cairo, thirteen years ago. A few months earlier, then Chinese special representative to the Middle East, Wu Sike, had told a press conference in Beijing that Islamic countries from government to the people, all understand and support the measures the Chinese government took to maintain stability.

To prove that, Xi Jinping held a summit with the Gulf Cooperation Council (in the following: GCC) country leaders in Riyadh on Friday last week. Judging by the faces around the table, only God knows for sure how understanding and supportive the GCC leaders really are, but business is business, and maybe Arab heads of state and govenment never look happy during official appointments anyway. At any rate,

Mohammad Altowaim, a member of the Saudi Chinese Business Council, told the Global Times that he read Xi’s article carefully twice, and the second time he read it to his friends, he read it loud

China’s propaganda usually limits its posts on Twitter to trite feelgood quotes from their great helmsman, but Xi Jinping’s actual “keynote speech” was ambitious. How connective the interfaces of both sides, coined “highly complementary” by Xi, will turn out to be, remains to be seen.  But China’s reference point and litmus test – America – is showing promising signs: Washington is not happy, says CNN.

The following is my translation of Xi Jinping’s keynote speech, given at the China-GCC summit on Friday afternoon local time in Saudi Arabia. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Esteemed Colleagues, Secretary General Nayef, Hello Everyone!
尊敬的各位同事，
纳伊夫秘书长：
大家好！

First of all, let me sincerely express my heartfelt gratitude to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its efforts in holding the first Chinese-Gulf-Cooperation Council countries’ summit. I’m very glad that we are getting together all at once, to discuss the development of Sino-GCC relations together.
首先，我谨对沙特阿拉伯王国为举办首届中国－海湾阿拉伯国家合作委员会峰会作出的努力表示衷心感谢。很高兴同大家齐聚一堂，共商中海关系发展大计。

China and the GCC countries share a history of nearly two-thousand years of friendly contacts. China and the GCC countries have maintained and valued peace, harmony, and sought the real knowledge of “Eastern wisdom”, along the ancient Silk Road. Ever since the GCC was established in 1981, China and the GCC have, for more than fourty years, written a brilliant work of unity and mutual help and win-win cooperation.
中国同海合会国家有近两千年友好交往历史。双方人民秉持重和平、尚和谐、求真知的“东方智慧”，沿着古丝绸之路往来不绝。1981年海合会一成立，中国即同海合会建立联系。40余年来，双方谱写了团结互助、合作共赢的灿烂篇章。

China and the GCC countries relations have, after all, achieved rapid development rooted in deep mutual trust. China and the GCC countries have always supported each others’ sovereignty and independence, respected each others’ paths of development, equality of big and small countries without exception, and firmly maintained multilateralism. Rooted in highly complementary [economies], with China’s vast consumer market and its perfect industrial system and with the GCC’s rich energy resources and increasingly diversified development, the two sides are natural cooperation partners. Rooted in popular sentiment, China and the GCC both belong to the Eastern civilization, with similar civilizational values and its peoples knowing each other well. Rooted in trials and tribulations lived through together, facing the challenges of international and regional instabilities and the financial crisis, the COVID-19 epidemic situation, and major natural disasters, the two sides have been in the same boat, keeping watch over each other.
中海关系之所以实现跨越式发展，归根于深厚互信，中国和海合会国家始终相互支持彼此主权独立，尊重各自发展道路，坚持大小国家一律平等，坚定维护多边主义。归根于高度互补，中国拥有广阔消费市场，工业体系完备；海方能源资源丰富，经济多元化发展方兴未艾，双方是天然合作伙伴。归根于民心相通，中海同属东方文明，文化价值相近，人民相知相亲。归根于患难与共，面对国际和地区风云变幻以及金融危机、新冠肺炎疫情、重大自然灾害等挑战，双方同舟共济，守望相助。

Colleagues!
各位同事！

Facing a century of turbulent changes, the GCC countries have united in their strife for self-improvement, have overcome the negative epidemic impact and achieved economic growth, actively promoted political solutions for regional hotspots and problems, promoted the GCC to become the Middle Eastern Gulf’s most vital regional organization, which is highly appreciated by China. At a historical crossroads, let’s contintue the good tradition of China-GCC strategic partnership, and substantiate the content of China’s and the GCC’s strategic relationship.
面对百年变局，海合会国家团结自强，克服疫情影响实现经济增长，积极推动地区热点难点问题政治解决，推动海合会成为中东海湾最具活力的地区组织，中方对此高度赞赏。站在历史的十字路口，我们要赓续中海友好传统，以建立中海战略伙伴关系为契机，充实中海关系战略内涵。

Let’s be partners in unity and continuously solidify mutual political trust, let’s firmly support each others’ core interests. Let’s jointly uphold the principle of non-interference, join hands for a genuine practice of multilateralism, and protect the numerous developing countries’ common interests.
——做共促团结的伙伴。我们要不断夯实政治互信，坚定支持彼此核心利益。共同维护不干涉内政原则，携手践行真正的多边主义，维护广大发展中国家共同利益。

Let’s be jointly-planning¹ partners. Let’s strengthen strategic development interfaces, bring complementary advantages into play, and train the kinetic energy of development. China looks forward to cooperating with all parties to promote and implement global development initiatives, to implement the United Nations’ agenda for sustainable development, and to promote regional development and prosperity.
——做共谋发展的伙伴。我们要加强发展战略对接，发挥互补优势，培育发展动能。中方期待同各方一道推进落实全球发展倡议，落实联合国2030年可持续发展议程，促进地区发展繁荣。

Let’s be partners in building security together. China will continue its firm support for GCC countries’ protection of their security, its support for the region’s countries in solving disagreement through dialogue and consultations, and in building a Gulf security framework. GCC countries are welcome to participate in global security initiatives and in upholding regional peace and stability together.
——做共筑安全的伙伴。中国将继续坚定支持海合会国家维护自身安全，支持地区国家通过对话协商化解分歧，构建海湾集体安全架构。欢迎海合会国家参与全球安全倡议，共同维护地区和平稳定。

Let’s be partners in our civilizational rise. We should enhance communication between our peoples, enrich cultural exchanges, learn from each others’ outstanding civilizational products, promote the eastern civilizations’ profound marrows, and make positive contributions to humankind’s civilizational development and progress.
——做共兴文明的伙伴。我们要增进民心相通，丰富人文交流，借鉴彼此优秀文化成果，弘扬东方文明深厚精髓，为人类文明发展进步作出积极贡献。
Colleagues!
各位同事！

During the coming three to five years, China would like to make efforts with the GCC countries in the following major fields of cooperation:
未来3到5年，中国愿同海合会国家在以下重点合作领域作出努力：

Firstly, let’s build a new pattern of three-dimensional energy cooperation. China will continue to import great quanitities of crude oil from GCC countries, broaden its imports of liquified natural gas, strengthen upstream oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and cooperation in engineering services and refining logistics. Full use should be made of Shanghai Petroleum and Natural Gas Exchange, and the settlement of accounts in RMB should be developed. Hydrogen power, energy storage systems, wind and solar energy, intelligent electrical networks and other cooperation on clean and low-carbon energy technology as well as localization of new energy source equipment should be developed. A Sino-GCC forum for the peaceful use of nuclear technology as well as a Sino-GCC demonstration center for nuclear safety should be established, and 300 technical talents from GCC countries be educated in the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
第一，构建能源立体合作新格局。中国将继续从海合会国家持续大量进口原油，扩大进口液化天然气，加强油气上游开发、工程服务、储运炼化合作。充分利用上海石油天然气交易中心平台，开展油气贸易人民币结算。加强氢能、储能、风电光伏、智能电网等清洁低碳能源技术合作和新能源设备本地化生产合作。设立中海和平利用核技术论坛，共建中海核安保示范中心，为海合会国家培养300名和平利用核能与核技术人才。

Secondly, let’s make headway in financial and investment cooperation. China would like to cooperate with GCC countries to develop financial-supervision cooperation, facilitate GCC countries’ access to the Chinese capital market. establish sovereign wealth funds with GCC countries, and launch cooperation in numerous ways. Let’s explore and hold Sino-GCC industrial and investment cooperation forums. Let’s strengthen cooperation in the fields of investment in the digitized economy and in green development, and establish bilateral mechanisms for investment and economic cooperation. Let’s work on the interchangeability of our own currencies, deepen digitized currency cooperation, and promote the multiple central bank digital currency bridge project.
第二，推动金融投资合作新进展。中国愿同海合会国家开展金融监管合作，便利海合会国家企业进入中国资本市场。同海方成立共同投资联合会，支持双方主权财富基金以多种方式开展合作。研究举办中海产业和投资合作论坛。加强数字经济和绿色发展等领域投资合作，建立双边投资和经济合作工作机制。开展本币互换合作，深化数字货币合作，推进多边央行数字货币桥项目。

Thirdly, let’s expand new fields of cooperation on innovative technology. China would like to establish a big-data and cloud-computing center with GCC countries, strengthen 5G and 6G technological cooperation, jointly establish a number of innovation and startup incubators, and ten projects around cross-border e-commerce and communications infrastructure. Let’s establish a cooperation mechanism for meteorological cooperation between China and the GCC and hold research Sino-GCC research forums on climate change.
第三，拓展创新科技合作新领域。中国愿同海合会国家共建大数据和云计算中心，加强5G和6G技术合作，共建一批创新创业孵化器，围绕跨境电商合作和通信网络建设等领域实施10个数字经济项目。建立中海气象科技合作机制，举办中海应对气候变化研讨会。

Fourthly, let’s achieve new breakthroughs in space cooperation. China would like to carry out a series of cooperation projects concerning remote-sensing and communications satellites, space applications, and space infrastructure. Let’s select the best astronauts² for training. China welcomes GCC austronauts to the Chinese space station, to carry out scientific experiments on flights together with Chinese austronauts. GCC austronauts are welcome to participate in China’s Chang’E, Tianwen, etc. transport cooperation. and in the establishment of a Sino-GCC moon-probing and space-probing center.
第四，实现航天太空合作新突破。中国愿同海合会国家在遥感和通信卫星、空间应用、航天基础设施等领域开展一系列合作项目。开展航天员选拔训练合作，欢迎海合会国家航天员进入中国空间站，同中国航天员联合飞行并进行空间科学实验。欢迎海方参与中国嫦娥和天问等航天任务的搭载合作，研究成立中海联合月球和深空探测中心。

Fifthly, let’s build cooperation highlights in language and cultural cooperation. China is going to cooperate with 300 GCC universities, middle- and elementary schools for Chinese-language education to establish 300 Chinese-language classrooms, to provide 3000 “Chinese Bridge” summer (or winter) camps, establish Chinese Learning and Testing Centers and online Chinese classrooms. Let’s hold Sino-GCC language and cultural forums, build humanities exchange and mutual-learning and bilingual data bases.
第五，打造语言文化合作新亮点。中国将同300所海合会国家大中小学合作开展中文教育，同海合会国家合作设立300个中文智慧教室，提供3000个“汉语桥”夏（冬）令营名额，建立中文学习测试中心和网络中文课堂。举办中海语言文化论坛，共建中海人文交流和互鉴双语文库。

Colleagues!
各位同事！

China and the GCC countries all shoulder their own responsibilities in the mission of rejuvenated national development. The Sino-GCC relations are both old and young. Let’s connect the past and the future, advance hand in hand, and jointly initiate the beautiful future of Sino-GCC relations!
中国和海合会国家各自肩负民族发展振兴的光荣使命，中海关系既古老又年轻。让我们继往开来，携手奋进，共同开创中海关系美好未来！

Thank you all!
谢谢大家！

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Notes

1	共谋 (gòngmóu) is actually a rather negative verb – to scheme, to conspire, etc.. “Jointly plan” is also a possible translation, but by far the nicest one among a rather nasty lot.
2	Chinese-English nomenclature: taikonaut

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Related

How to speak to Pakistan, April 22, 2015

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CPC’s 20th National Congress: “The Party will never degenerate”

2,300 delegates were supposed to attend in February, more precisely, according to Li Keqiang (main link) on Saturday morning, the number was 2,296, plus particular invitees (特邀代表), that would be 2,379 delegates, minus 39 delegates having asked for leave because of illness, i. e. 2,340 delegates present there.

“Major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics to be unfolded in a comprehensive way” was unfolded by Xi Jinping himself in his work report. You should be forgiven if you think that this is about Chinese consuls-general tweeting about how America bombs and China helps Africa, or how their tummies bulged with pride when Xi Jinping told the party’s national congress that Taiwaners had no right to be free when 1.4 million Chinese were not.

But major-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics isn’t a diplomatic market-economy product – it was produced at home in Beijing, by the 19th Central Committee’s Sixth Plenary Session (according to their communiqué in November 2021).

Condensed self-flattery concerning the party’s “zero-Covid” policy (which probably didn’t go down as well with the audience outside the “Great Hall of the People” as other parts of Xi’s speech), and this.

We have kept nailing the nails, thus correcting and punishing the “four winds”, opposed the idea and phenomenon of privileges, stopped some unhealthy trends that hadn’t been brought to a halt for a long time, and investigated and punished obstinate chronic diseases which hadn’t been eliminated for many years. We have fought an unprecedented fight against corruption, and by “offending thousands, and living up to the 1.4 billion” [Chinese people], we have fulfilled our mission to dispel the disease and disorder. The multi-pronged struggle against corruption, by beating the tigers, swatting the flies and hunting the foxes, has achieved an overwhelming victory and overall consolidation, eliminating the serious hidden dangers within the party, the state, and the military. By uncompromising efforts, the party found self-revolution, thus escaping the historical cycle of order and chaos, of rise and fall, for a second time. This has made sure that the party will never degenerate, never change color, never change smell.
我们以钉钉子精神纠治“四风”，反对特权思想和特权现象，刹住了一些长期没有刹住的歪风，纠治了一些多年未除的顽瘴痼疾。我们开展了史无前例的反腐败斗争，以“得罪千百人、不负十四亿”的使命担当祛疴治乱，“打虎”、“拍蝇”、“猎狐”多管齐下，反腐败斗争取得压倒性胜利并全面巩固，消除了党、国家、军队内部存在的严重隐患。经过不懈努力，党找到了自我革命这一跳出治乱兴衰历史周期率的第二个答案，确保党永远不变质、不变色、不变味。

^{No offense meant, miserable failure}

If Bo Xilai had said that, it would have struck people as populism – but then, Bo never made it into the top ranks.
China’s “Communists” have announced many victories in the past. If this one is as decisive as Xi has claimed will be hard to prove or disprove as long as he remains in control of the narrative.

Just these few sidenotes for now.

The State of Taiwan

First of all, let me come clean: like many people I know, I take sides. I believe that Taiwan’s citizens have a right to determine their future, and that China has no legitimate reasons to interfere with Taiwan’s affairs.
However, you may be aware that not everybody sees Taiwan this way. China’s Communist Party (CPC) doesn’t only want to rule Hong Kong, Macau, and “the mainland”, as the People’s Republic is often referred to by mainlanders, Hong Kongers, Macauans, and by many Taiwaners alike. Rather, the CPC wants to rule Taiwan, too.

“Taiwanese are also Chinese, aren’t they?” A tourist from Hong Kong visiting Taiwan on “double-ten” day, in 2009

In the end, China will most probably try to occupy Taiwan, either by laying siege – a naval blockade – to it, or by trying to invade it right away. In either case, China will probably have its way unless Taiwan’s (probably substantial) military resistance gets support from America, and maybe from Australia, Japan, and other countries. So, if lucky, China would gain control over Taiwan by military force, and that would be that (apart from a rather unpredictable Taiwanese population under occupation – Taiwaners could turn out to be rather unruly).

A. Image concerns

But success by naked force, however tempting it may be in the eyes of many Chinese citizens, isn’t the preferred means to achieve the goal of what the CPC refers to as „reunification“. That’s true for a number of economic and military (including nuclear) reasons, as even a successful invasion and a rather smooth occupation might come at heavy opportunity costs, imposed by countries that wouldn’t accept China’s annexation of Taiwan.

This is also true for image reasons, While China appears to have abandoned the idea that it could convince the Taiwanese that „reunification“ with China would be in their best interest, it apparently still hopes to achieve the goal of „peaceful reunification“ by coopting Taiwan’s economic and political elites, and by intimidating a sufficient number of Taiwan’s citizens so as to push them over.

But if the need for military action to achieve „reunification“ would arise (from China’s point of view), China would like to justify its military aggression, just as it has tried to justify its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally (hint: the never-ending Taiwan-WHO saga, or pressure on governments of third-party  countries to threaten Taiwan’s economic lifelines.

On Twitter, you are faced with a lot of Chinese propaganda, carried forward by the CPC’s official mouthpieces as well as its useful minions (some of them may be paid by China, others may act out of mere fanatism). Some free samples:

Table 1

“Taiwan is an inseparable part of China”	(Reality shows that this is not the case.)
“If Taiwan declares independence, we / China will go to war right away.”	(We are looking for an excuse – we’ve decided to annex Taiwan anyway.)
“Taiwan has always been a part of China.”	(Only during the Qing era, and only if the Qing cared to say that there was “one China” including Taiwan. They probably didn’t care.
“There is only one China.”	(Yes, and thank God for that.)
“Taiwan is part of China because Taiwan’s official name is “Republic of China”.	If so, which Congo is part of the other? There are two Congos, the “Republic” and the “Democratic Republic”.China’s logic probably prescribes that the Republic must annex the Democratic Republic, because it’s always the democratic countries that get annexed.
You / your country have committed yourselves to the one-China principle.	This is probably the case in a number of bilateral declarations of China and third governments – but by no means in each of them. For example, “one-China” policy basically means that you somehow handle China’s “once-China” principle, not necessarily that you agree with it. Besides, you can always walk away from it – it has happened before.

So, a lot, if not all of the mouthpiece talk on “social media” is hollow words, suitable for propaganda, and maybe not even that. But China has to make do with the excuses it can find to gloss over its aggressiveness.

Did I mention that China applies pressure on third-party governments to deny Taiwan international space? Well, it isn’t just the World Health Organization, or the Nigerian government who accept that pressure, because it comes with good business. Many other third-party countries do likewise, to varying degrees. We’ll have a look at the examples of America and France later on.

But first, let’s take a look at the nomenclature that is flying around when people talk about China-Taiwan relations. To that end, I might use some pseudomath (it isn’t really that scientific).

B. Chinamaths

Table 1

or the other way round,

Table 2

Then there’s that One China – or more than one idea of what that is. But wide swathes of mainland Chinese people, plus uncertain numbers from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, will have this kind of math on their mind:

Table 3

From the CPC’s perspective, it can’t be

because that would imply that Taiwan’s political system would be the emperor of the whole Congo.
Now, when we are talking about Taiwan, we usually refer to everything that is governed from Taipei, not just the island of Taiwan itself, although that’s where Taiwan’s (or the ROC’s, etc.) citizens live.

Table 4

That’s my definition of Taiwan, too – when you read “Taiwan” in this post, this table-4 definition is the definition of it.

C. Taiwan: one country, two positions

Position 1 (pan-Green, more or less)

It may be more than two just as well, but these are the two I can think of.
One is that, when Japan relinquished sovereignty over Taiwan, it didn’t transfer sovereignty to anyone else. Two authors, Michal Thim and Michael Turton, described that position in an article for “The Diplomat” in 2017 – they are themselves supporters of this position, I believe.
Under international law and practice, only an international treaty can settle the status of specific territories, they wrote, adding that the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the Treaty of Taipei between Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan fell under that category. If those two had contradicted one another on the matter of Taiwanese sovereignty, the San Francisco Peace Treaty would have outweighed the Treaty of Taipei, but both treaties were silent on the issue of who owned Taiwan, merely affirming that Japan gave up sovereignty over Taiwan.

Position 2 (pan-blue, more or less)

Another position, also widely spread among Taiwanese citizens (if they care about what might be the legal superstructure of their statehood) is the Republic of China.
Now, there are probably many sub-positions to this one, like Taiwan equals the Republic of China, or that Taiwan can somehow claim mainland China (plus Hong Kong and Macau)  as well (that would be a minority, I guess). There is also a an interpretation of what the RoC is that seeks common ground between the San Francisco Peace Treaty supporters, and the RoC guys. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen adopted (and possibly coined) it when she ran for president for the first time, eleven years ago: the ROC, having lost all its territory in 1949, found shelter on Taiwan.

“Taiwan Independence”

In practical daily life, globally speaking, China and Taiwan are two separate countries. The rest is silly political squabble. But the silly squabble is accompanied by the clouds of war, and that’s why the rest of the world tries to take it into consideraton.
Obviously, wanting to please China (because it might be great business) is another reason to care about the “one-China” noise.

Supporters of the San-Francisco-Peace-Treaty version may argue that Taiwan is independent because Japan gave up sovereignty over it, and because there was nobody entitled to pick it up.

The “Taipei Times”, a paper from Taiwan’s “pan-green” political camp, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), described it this way, in 2017:

Former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) changed the constitutional system and became the nation’s first directly elected president.
By “vesting sovereignty in Taiwanese,” he acknowledged that Taiwan had become an independent state via democratic elections.

This, from Taiwan’s pan-green point of view (or the “Taipei Times” rendition of it), means that Taiwan’s independence is the status quo. Taiwan is independent, and the above is the legal reason.

Position 2, the pan-blue one, basically, may be best summarized by what former Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou told an American audience in 2017:

On the question of Taiwanese independence, Ma recalled once being asked by a reporter why the island doesn’t formally declare. “Have you ever heard of a country declaring independence twice?” he replied. “We were an independent country back in 1912 — how can I declare independence again?”

1912 refers to the declaration of the Republic of China in the aftermath of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution. Ma therefore sees Taiwan as an independent state in the continuity of the mainland RoC from 1912 to 1949. That is pretty much in line with the general KMT view.

And if any version of “Taiwan independence” was palatable to the CPC in China, it would be this second one, because it is somehow about “one China”. The official reason for Beijing to be mad at Tsai Ing-wen and her DPP is that they would rather consider Lee Teng-hui the founding father of Taiwan’s sovereignty, than RoC founder Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

They ignore, however, that President Tsai’s position is somewhere between those two positions, and probably leaning towards position 2. It would be hard to ignore the RoC superstructure when you want to become Taiwan’s President – in fact, you are sworn in on the RoC’s constitution, in front of a large picture of Sun Yat-sen. That’s a tradition left behind by the KMT’s dictatorship era when there was only one legal political party on Taiwan anyway – the KMT itself. The RoC had, for many years, been a one-party state.

What is noteworthy is that both positions – pan-green and pan-blue alike – avoid another declaration of independence. What either camp would do if there wasn’t a threat of war from China is a question for another day. China’s reading of Taiwan’s status is that there hasn’t been a Taiwanese declaration of independence (yet).

How does the rest of the world deal with the “one-China” noise (mostly from China, not from Taiwan)? Let’s have a look at two third-party governments that have established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and severed (official) diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (RoC). Some countries either switched official diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing at some point in time, and some others – like the Federal Republic of Germany – hadn’t had diplomatic relations with Taipei anyway, and therefore found it rather easy to establish theirs with Beijing.
The two examples I know a few things about are the American and the French positions concerning Taiwan’s status.

D. Third-government positions

Sample 1: America

The frequently-quoted Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (aka the “Shanghai Communiqué”), issued in February 1972 on a visit by then U.S. President Richard Nixon to China, says that

The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan”, “one China, two governments”, “two Chinas”, an “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined”.

As far as the withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations are concerned, the U.S. appears to have obliged (although there may be varying, and unconfirmed, numbers of U.S. military staff plus equipment in Taiwan from time to time, or permanently, or whatever).

But Washington did not agree with China’s definition of Taiwan’s status – the 1972 Joint Communiqué basically says that the Americans listened to what the Chinese said about it during the talks:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes. The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Nearly seven years later (save one month), Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations. That was accompanied by the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations of January 1, 1979. Here,

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

This is followed by a bilateral reaffirmation of the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué. Also,

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

When you have read some “legal papers” before, you’ll probably think that in the 1979 Joint Communiqué, Washington didn’t accommodate Beijing’s positions any further than in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. I also think so.

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China (1972) only says that Washington understands that Chinese people in China and Taiwan see it that way.

The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China (1979) doesn’t even acknowledge that an unspecified number of Taiwaners (“all Chinese”) sees it that way.

Sample 2: France

France went a step further than America in pleasing China – in 1994, that is, not in 1964 when Paris and Beijing established official diplomatic ties, and when Paris didn’t mention Taiwan at all, according to a piece by France-Info, published in August this year.

In 1994, France stated in another communiqué with China that (my translation)

The French side confirmed that the French government recognizes the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China, and Taiwan as an essential part of Chinese territory.
La partie française a confirmé que le gouvernement français reconnaît le gouvernement de la République Populaire de Chine comme l’unique gouvernement légal de la Chine, et Taïwan comme une partie intégrante du territoire chinois.

Now, I would think that this states explicitly that Taiwan, from France’s point of view, is under China’s jurisdiction. But Antoine Bondaz, a Research Fellow and the Director of both the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), points out that (my translation)

France doesn’t say explicitly that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China, there isn’t any such declaration.
La France ne dit pas explicitement que Taïwan fait partie de la République populaire de Chine, il n’y a eu aucune déclaration.

Sounds like logic applied by a bunch of weasels, but that’s diplomacy. And if this assessment is correct, you can be pretty sure that China’s diplomats knew that, and still didn’t squeeze France to make further concessions (because that would have meant no communiqué at all, I suppose).

E. Some cold hard facts

All this is mostly about superstructure – cream on a cup of coffee that wouldn’t go away even if there was no cream. What remains as a fact is the existence of Taiwan (and its semiconductors, of course), and a Chinese disposition towards violence against Taiwan.
So if there are two Chinas, just as there are two Congos, why would China believe that it has a right to harass, invade and/or annex Taiwan?
Former Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi probably said it best, at the 17th Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, reportedly: “China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact”.

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Note

Thanks to Multiburst who suggested that this topic deserved some more attention than what a few tweets would allow.

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Related

Some people, March 23, 2022
China-Deutschland, “Beijing Rundschau”, Oct 11, 2017

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Updates

Wissenschaftlicher Dienst des Bundestags, undatiert, acc April 13, 2023

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Radio Pravda dlya Rossii (“Truth for Russia”) on Vacation

According to its Twitter account, Radio Truth for Russia / Радио Правда для России (Radio Pravda dlja Rossii) is currently taking a summer break. Not sure if this affects their shortwave transmissions.

Please check their Twitter feed for updates.

Information about times and frequencies of their broadcasts on shortwave – in addition to their youtube channel – vary, but 9670 kHz, 6070 kHz and 13600 kHz are often mentioned.

For a number of reasons (safety, appropriate use of donations, etc.), I wouldn’t expect QSL cards from this broadcaster.

“In a different World”

First of all, don’t worry. The world hasn’t really changed that much, but the above is a quote. As far as I’m concerned, we’ll be in a different world when the Bundestag, Germany’s federal parliament, passes a property tax to finance the rebuilding of our army, the Bundeswehr.

Also, the Chinese foreign minister says that “the cold war has long gone”.

Chinese worries (“Guanchazhe”, Shanghai, Febr 26):
Is the crying man really pro-Kiev,
rather than pro-Russian?
Are the Western media lying again?

But Twitter would be a useless distraction if I didn’t keep an account of what I learn there. So here goes.

February 22	Demonstration in Prague
Thousands of people gather on Prague’s Wenceslas Squareshow their solidarity with the Ukrainian people, Radio Prague, the Czech Republic’s foreign radio station, reports the following day. Ukraine’s ambassador Yevhen Perebyinis thanks them, and says that ” it really means a lot to us because we see that we are not alone.”
–
February 23	“No plans to leave Kiev”
Andreas Umland, a political scientist who has lived in Kiev for about two decades, is currently in Germany, but plans to return to Kiev on Saturday, he says in an interview with Polish foreign radio’s German service, broadcast on February 23. He doesn’t expect an attack on Kiev.
–
February 23	“China is watching us”
Latvia’s defense minister Artis Pabriks tells a TV station that “if we weren’t members of NATO and also of the EU, we would definitely be in the positon of Ukraine now – I can guarantee that,” and that “we have nowhere to retreat, because others are watching us. China is watching us.”
–
February 23	“Nixon’s visit changed the world”
China is certainly watching the U.S. China policy. At 22:05 local time, party-affiliated tabloid “Huanqiu Shibao” publishes an editorial titled “Washington must not fall back from Nixon’s diplomatic legacy”, and quotes Nixon himself as referring to his visit, from February 21 to 28, 1972, as “world-changing”. The editorial speaks about “overall stability” in Sino-U.S. relations despites “ups and downs”, about “mutual benefit”, and “double-win”. 此后50年，中美关系虽然历经风雨但保持了总体稳定，成就了两个大国长达半个世纪的互利共赢。.It wasn’t true, “Huanqiu Shibao” argues, that only the USSR,considered an enemy by both at the time, had made Nixon’s initiative possible, as that alone couldn’t explain the comprehensive and rapid development, nor the amazing vitality that kept erupting once the ice between China and the U.S. had been broken. Those “old stubborns” who had “once opposed Nixon” seemed to be coming back to life, “Huanqiu Shibao” deplores. 当年反对尼克松的老顽固们仿佛纷纷复活了，历史和美国兜了一个大圈子。
–
February 23	Own nukes for South Korea?
Seven out of ten citizens support the idea, reports South Korea’s foreign radio station KBS World, citing a Hankook Research survey. While tensions around Ukraine are rapidly rising in Europe, North Korea, of course, keeps testing missiles which run as a kind of background noise to South Koreans daily routine.Asked froom where they see the greatest threats to South Korea now, most respondent name North Korea,followed by China, Japan, and the U.S.. Asked which country would be the gravest threat in ten years, 56 percent name China.
–
February 24	“Everything suggests that this is a large-scale invasion”
Austrian Radio’s Moscow correspondent states that “everything suggests that this is a large-scale invasion” (“alles deutet auf eine groß angelegte Invasion hin”). Austrian radio’s coverage in general follows this diction.
–
February 24	Czech arms industry prepared to supply Ukraine
The Czech Republic’s arms industry is prepared to supply Ukraine with military material if the Czech government makes a decision in favor of that, Radio Prague’s German service quotes Jiří Hynek, chairman of the country’s arms industry association.
–
February 24	“Pleasantries are no strategy”
Christoph Heusgen, a former foreign-policy and security-policy advisor who served Chancellor Merkel from 2005 to 2017, says that while it had been right to keep channels with Moscow open, they had always underestimated Putin’s brutality and unscrupulousness. That’s how Radio Poland’s German service quotes Heusgen in their daily press review.
–
February 24/25	South Korea and Taiwan will join sanctions
Both South Korea and China announce that they will join international sanctions against Russia. South Korea’s foreign ministry says on Febr 24 that “South Korea, as a responsible member of the international community, will support and participate in international efforts, including economic sanctions, aimed at curbing Russia’s encroachment and resolving the situation peacefully.” On February 25, in a speech at National Cheng Kung University in Tainan, announces Taiwan’s participation in the sanctions, saying that “Taiwan is ready to do anything that might help achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict”.
–
February 24	Finland and Sweden
“It is important for Finland and Sweden to be involved in the Nato meeting, due to the situation in the Baltic Sea region, for example,” Yleisradio’s (Finland) English website quotes its country’s foreign minister, Pekka Haavisto. He reportedly also says that “we consider it important that Nato continues its open-door policy and that we can apply for membership if we wish.”
–
February 24	Taiwanese citizens in Ukraine
There are still 33 Taiwanese citizens in Ukraine, reports Radio Taiwan International’s German service, despites requests from the Taiwan government to leave the country.
–
February 24/25	Vietnam’s reaction
Vietnam’s foreign radio station’s foreign language programs are focused on the development of a strategic partnership with Singapore where state president Nguyen Xuan Phuc is visiting. There is a notice from a spokesperson of Vietnam’s foreign ministry however, on February 24, suggesting that substantial numbers of Vietnamese citizens are in Ukraine, and offering them help if needed.
–

I’ve left the well-known newsitems (SWIFT cuts, arms supplies to Ukraine from other European countries, Nordstream 2 etc. out because they are well known. Think of this blogpost as a diary entry.

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Related

Sweden’s Donation, FoarP, Febr 27, 2022
No Quadriga for Nobody, July 18, 2011

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China’s Hate for the Free Flow of Information: Fascism is the absolute Principle

More than fourty years ago, China started policies of reform and opening up. The latter part is often overlooked, but the Chinese authorities had to find new ways to deal with a greater flow of free information, or, as Deng Xiaoping put it, “when you open the window, you can’t stop the flies and mosquitos from coming in, too”.

Despite the ostentatious nonchalance, the party made great efforts to keep the flies out anyway. Really inquisitive international press was only available in international hotels or airports, and shortwave broadcasts from the outside world remained heavily jammed. And to this day, “Uncle Policeman” will take care of the rest of the flies.

Uncensored info, hence harmful
–

Shut up, we don’t care

What the CPC may not have hoped to achieve though was a fairly successful immunization program against flies. They achieved it anyway. This vaccine’s effect is that it makes most Chinese people ignorant – or nearly ignorant – of information deemed undesirable by the party. Around 2008, “Anti-CNN” propaganda rose – at least partly, it seems – from the Chinese grassroots. On the eve of the Beijing Olympic Games, Chinese people appeared to be simply fed up with bad news about Tibet or Xinjiang, no matter if true or not, and any lapse in any overseas picture editorial room was gladly taken as proof that news about uprisings in China’s Tibetan or Turkic colonies were fake news.

But the real sources for the willful ignorance lie deeper. For one, there’s a natural desire of people to be proud of their country, even if there is little reason for that, and that seems to be a particularly strong desire in some East Asian countries.

Then there was an actual source of pride: China’s rising economic and political power, and a series of economic crises in the West. In the minds of many, might made right if only it led to even more might for the motherland.

Not all Chinese nationalists deny that Tibetans or Turkics are going through hell. Rather, they believe that they deserve no better, and that “those guys” had been pampered by their Han rulers for too long.

Obviously, that kind of news isn’t fit to print or be broadcast by China’s “Global Times”, or CCTV. It is enough that people know that their party’s “toughness” on “terrorism” knows no limits, and that resistance is futile.
The latter bit is immportant, too, because Han people, too, have grievances. They must not even dream of getting a verdict in their favor, when the party says “no”. The brutal message from the top is targeting “national minorities” for now, but as Rebiya Kadeer said in 2018, “Uighurs’ today is the Han Chinese peoples’ tomorrow”.

For the more general public inside China – the news has to be more subtle.
While the faces of many of the cadres “interviewed” by CCTV about their “ethnic work” speak volumes, the message itself is that the loving care of the party for the masses earns itself enthusiastic reactions.
The essence of these domestic news: resistance is futile, but then, there’s no reason for resistance, anyway, is there? Our cultural massacres are a beautiful garden.

And for audiences outside China, plain denial is the only possible answer – if that turns out unsuccessful, you can still try to sell the camps in East Turkestan as “vocational schools”.
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Shut up and join us – you are part of the United Front

What strikes me most is the wide-spread preparedness among overseas Chinese people to take part in Beijing’s disinformation work.
A desire to be proud of the motherland may be one motivation for that, just as it has been among Chinese at home and abroad since 2008.
Intimidation may be another. As Joanna Chiu noted in a recent article for the “Toronto Star”,

Beijing leaders truly feel anyone of Chinese descent is fair game and they have a right to curtail their freedom of speech years or even generations after they settled abroad.

What Joanna Chiu wouldn’t write either, but what has to be said, is that “socialism with Chinese characteristics” isn’t socialism. It’s full-blown fascism.
Let me apply some of Matthew Lyons definition (the link will take you to more paragraphs):

Fascism is a form of extreme right-wing ideology that celebrates the nation or the race as an organic community transcending all other loyalties. It emphasizes a myth of national or racial rebirth after a period of decline or destruction. To this end, fascism calls for a “spiritual revolution” against signs of moral decay such as individualism and materialism, and seeks to purge “alien” forces and groups that threaten the organic community. Fascism tends to celebrate masculinity, youth, mystical unity, and the regenerative power of violence. Often, but not always, it promotes racial superiority doctrines, ethnic persecution, imperialist expansion, and genocide. At the same time, fascists may embrace a form of internationalism based on either racial or ideological solidarity across national boundaries. Usually fascism espouses open male supremacy, though sometimes it may also promote female solidarity and new opportunities for women of the privileged nation or race.

When you encounter people on Twitter who dedicate many hours of their days to support Beijing’s disinformation work, they won’t necessarily be paid by Beijing. To think that to be the only explanation underestimates Beijing’s success in immunizing its underlings against unwelcome information. You aren’t necessarily dealing with troll factory products. You may be dealing with real-life fascists.
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Shut up – you are doing it, too

To enter discussions beyond a few tweets with them may or may not be worth the trouble. In my view, it can be instructive to debate with them when you are aware that “your” side – the West, Japan, India or what have you – are no foreigners to disinformation either. But you won’t get much out of debates with fascists when you can’t stand justified criticism of racism, injustice or other deficits of the society you belong to (or feel you belong to).

On the other hand, you shouldn’t feel discouraged by such expedient “criticism”. When a reported million of Uyghurs is or was in internment camps, some individual stories that emerge internationally may indeed be fake news. China is “re-educating” its nationalities – Han included – on a massive scale, so obviously, some editor will pick the wrong photo or the wrong person.
What you should be aware of is Beijing’s nihilistic script. “You do it too, so even if we did commit atrocities (which we don’t, it’s all fake news), it would be nothing worth to be reported.”
It’s not the West that is running a massive brainwashing program against its own people, it is China that does so. It isn’t the West that is threatening war on its neighbors; it is China.

And while there are places in the West and elsewhere in the world that are rife with racism and bigotry, those aren’t usually run by the state as they are in China. Even most of the “pro-China” guys you meet on Twitter, whitewashing China’s crimes against human rights, would choose a life as a black person in the U.S., rather than an Uyghur’s life in East Turkestan, if they had to choose.

But they can’t admit that. After “a century of humiliation”, they feel that it is time for some fun. After all, they are consumers, too, and “me, me, me & now” is the absolute principle.

Wolf Warrior Diplomacy on Vacation, while Party expects Returns on Investment

Twitter can be fun, but would be a waste of time if all the information you can get passes by without some reflection on it. Learning by repetition. Here goes.

China’s recent diplomacy has been referred to as wolf warrior diplomacy (戰狼外交) in recent months – or in fact for years (as Sweden can tell) -, but it has become a much more frequently used term with the COVID-19 crisis.

As Washington and Beijing traded accusations and conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 origins during the first half of 2020, Beijing’s propaganda machine continuously switched gears between angry statements and more or less funny cartoons on “social media” platforms like Twitter, depicting Trump administration officials as dorks or hypocrites. Chinese foreign ministry (FMPRC) spokesman and communications director Zhao Lijian as well as Chinese media outlets like CCTV-English, People’s Daily in English, Xinhua news agency etc. took leading roles in “anti-American” (反美) enunciations.

But wolf warrior diplomacy apparently didn’t lead to results that would have satisfied Beijing after all. On Tuesday (August 4), China’s ambassador to the US, Cui Tiankai, told an NBC anchor and a wider online public that

The normalization of relations between our two countries and the growth of this relationship over the decades has served the interests of both countries and the world very well. It’s quite clear to all of us are still enjoying the positive outcome, the benefit of this growth of relationship. Nobody can really deny this.

Societal differences should provide opportunities for mutual learning, Cui suggested.

Cui himself didn’t have to make a u-turn to emphasize the “positive outcomes” of Sino-US relations – he had never been a wolf warrior diplomat anyway, and Washington wouldn’t have been the place to test these fruits of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era / Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy anyway. And when he made the essential swipe – there needs to be one in every Chinese representation to Americans these days, to show that the speaker is not afraid of his audience -, he smiled as if he wanted to apologize for what he was saying.

Click picture for video

His boss, foreign minister Wang Yi, didn’t have to turn everything upside down either. But to show that Xi has always been a great supporter of dialogue, he inaugurated a Research Center for the Guiding Role of Xi Jinping’s diplomatic Thought at the FMPRC on July 20.

According to “Radio Free Asia” (apparently not safely verified), fifty-centers have been told to switch their messages from “anti-American” to “double-win” (click picture for details)

Thusly illuminated, foreign minister Wang addressed an online forum of American and Chinese think tanks (including Henry Kissinger and Kevin Rudd, apparently) on July 9, Germany’s foreign minister Heiko Maas in a video conference on July 24 (not without informing his colleague in Berlin that the problems in Chinese-American relations are all created by America), and, most recently, the readers of Communist Party organ “People’s Daily”.

Chances are that US secretary of state Pompeo and his network have struck the right note in communication with Beijing during the past months, and distancing from China could become a bipartisan American policy. However, the Trump administration may not be able to take traditional allies as far along in their cause as they would like to.

Australian foreign minister Marise Payne told a press conference with US secretary of state Michael Pompeo that “we make our own decisions and we use our own language”, and that “the relationship with China is important and we have no intention of injuring it”.

Sydney Morning Herald correspondents wrote on August 1 that Joe Biden, the US Democrats’ presidential nominee, was

expected to be closer to what Australia is trying to do: transition to a multipolar region where Beijing is accommodated but counterbalanced by regional powers including Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam and the US.

At times, Trump and Pompeo’s approach seems to be an attempt to maintain the US as regional hegemon – something Canberra quietly gave up on a few years ago.

[Lowy Institute executive director] Fullilove says in some ways a Biden administration would be tougher on China and may make requests of Australia which are harder to refuse.

The correspondents also pointed out that both Japan and New Zealand, while basically following the US / Australia lines, had kept a rather low profile, thus protecting their trade interests with China.

Germany wasn’t exactly the first country either to throw a gauntlet at Beijing, or to publicly take note of China’s internment policies in East Turkestan, or its breach of international law by imposing its “national security law” on Hong Kong. Berlin’s position was further complicated as Germany’s leadership currently chairs the EU in a rotational arrangement, having to find as much common ground among Beijing-leaning EU member states and more resilient members.

Only when Hong Kong’s government announced a “postponement” of Legislative Council elections by a year, ostensibly because of the special administrative region’s COVID-19 crisis, Germany joined other countries and suspended its extradition treaty with Hong Kong. On August 3, French foreign ministry sharply criticized Beijing’s “national security law”, and halted ratification of its extradition treaty with Hong Kong, which had been in process since 2017.

A few days earlier, and five days after his conversation with Germany’s foreign minister, Wang Yi had been on the phone with his French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian,

Austrian public radio ORF‘s China correspondent Josef Dollinger arguably provided one of the more succinct summaries of European policies. Asked on July 29, the morning when the EU governments presented their agreed reaction to Beijing’s Hong Kong policy, if Washington’s chances of isolating Beijing could be successful, he said that conflicts with China could not be painless, and that while

you can ride a tiger gone wild without getting bucked off – difficult as that may be -, you shouldn’t keep shouting “I’ve got him, I’ve got him.”

Man kann zwar auf einem wild gewordenen Tiger reiten, ohne abgeworfen zu werden – auch wenn’s schwierig ist -, aber man sollte dabei nicht ständig rufen, “ich hab’ ihn, ich hab’ ihn”.

In the EU, disappointment about stalling talks on a comprehensive investment treaty with China have likely added to a hardening position.

And while America’s allies have resisted Pompeo’s calls to join them on the warpath, it does appear that China underestimated the impact of its Hong Kong policies, at least in democratic countries.

All the more, Wang Yi himself, too, tries to stick to a script that would paint China as the natural and predetermined victor to emerge from the beginning struggle. Among some double-win promises, he also threatened America with history’s pillar of shame (恥辱柱).

No matter how much, or little, pressure China may feel as a whole, Beijing’s diplomats are having a tough time of it. It is one thing to open a Xi-Jinping shrine at the FMPRC. To deliver on hard issues is another. The leadership and its personality core have significantly raised investment in diplomacy. They will expect more than just damage control in return.

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