A carefully thought-out and written → article there. Quoting single lines or paragraphs wouldn’t provide an accurate account of James Fallows‘ reflections on U.S. President Barack Obama‘s planned Hiroshima visit.
US President Barack Obama gave NHK an exclusive interview ahead of his arrival in Japan, reports NHK, emphasizing that Obama would be the first sitting US President to visit the atomic-bombed city.
A full account of the interview doesn’t seem to be available online yet. NHK provides a video with excerpts from the interview.
News like this doesn’t make much sense without context. US-Japan relations, frequently dubbed one of the closest alliances worldwide, were contentious in 2009, according to the New York Times. At the time, Japan had just seen its first transition of power from one political party to another, and the Hatoyama government – in short – called for a more equal relationship with the United States, with a number of possible ramifications.
The departure from the usual Liberal-Democrats rule in Japan was only an interlude. And a nation’s foreign policies are usually bi-partisan, or meta-partisan – in Japan, too.
From the Middle East to Ukraine, questions are being asked about the U.S. ability and willingness to maintain peace. If it cannot or will not, who will fill the void?,
the Nikkei Asian Review asked in May 2015.
Japan sees its future more within Asia, the NYT quoted Eswar S. Prasad back then. That, however, doesn’t necessarily benefit Sino-Japanese relations, as suggested by the NYT six years earlier. Rather, Japan appears to be warming to Russia.
Japan and Russia have especially found ample opportunity to conduct a coordinated response to the most recent security crisis in North Korea. Japan and Russia have also sought to increase their economic and financial ties, which are particularly important for the development of the Russian Far East,
Anthony Rinna of the Sino-NK research group noted in March this year. The Russian pivot to the East – possibly with a lot of help from Tokyo – was hampered by two obstacles however, Rinna cautioned: the long-standing dispute over the Kuril Islands, and Japan’s alignment with the West over the Ukraine crisis.
the containment of China remains the primary purpose of the Japan-U.S. defense apparatus, U.S. strategic containment of Russia also continues to be an important factor in the Japan-U.S. alliance, which comprises one key flank of the American strategic posture in Asia,
But being part of an alliance doesn’t mean that Japan would forgo foreign policies of its own. When Obama (reportedly) tried to talk Japanese prime minister Abe out of a meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin, his appeal was unsuccessful.
It’s not only Japan who needs to take existing alliances into consideration. The same is true for Russia – but less so than Japan. Russian obligations toward China can’t be compared to Japan’s obligations toward America. That may not be a general opinion in China, but observers who watch the developments probably wouldn’t be caught by surprise if Russia and Japan were to sign a peace treaty in the not too distant future.
In December 2013, Cui Heng (崔珩) of the East China Normal University’s Russia Research Center in Shanghai, published an opinion on the China Internet Information Center (中国网) website. Titled “Russia won’t keep away from Japan because of Russia-Chinese relations”, Cui’s article pointed out that Russia’s preparedness to be considerate of China was limited, even though Sino-Russian relations were “at their best in history”.
Abe’s generation in particular had, because of their country’s economic successes, developed a sense of national greatness, and were seeking normalization for Japanese statehood. The economic revival after Abe’s taking office [there was a revival indeed, three years ago] had added to this conscience among Japanese politicians, Cui wrote. Ending the official state of war with Russia would be part of normalization. Even if hardly relevant in military terms, the status quo weighed heavily in terms of in terms of symbolism.
By coming to formally peaceful terms with Russia, Japan could also shed its status as a defeated country, Cui argued, and then addressed a factor that made Russia’s perception of Japan different from both China’s, and America’s:
Russia isn’t only prepared to develop beneficial relations with Japan for geopolitical reasons. In Russian historical memory, there isn’t much hate against Japan. During the age of the great empires, Japanese-Russian relations in the Far East were of a competitive nature. Many Russians still talk about the 1905 defeat, but the Far East wasn’t considered a place that would hit Russian nerve as hard as the crushing defeat in the Crimean war. Back then, Japan wasn’t perceived as a threat for Russia, and from another perspective, if there had been anti-Japanese feelings, there wouldn’t have been a revolution. According to perception back then, the  defeat was a result of the Russian government’s incompetence, not [brought about by] a strong adversary. The outstanding achievements of the Soviet Red Army in 1945 led to a great [positive] Russian attitude, but still without considering Japan a great enemy.
By visiting Hiroshima, Obama appears to make a concession to Tokyo’s desire for “normalization”. Of course, few decisions are made for only one reason – they are part of a network, or hierarchy, of objectives. One objective was stated by Obama himself – that we should continue to strive for a world without nuclear weapons.
There is no great likelihood that Japan would shift away from the alliance with Washington. Japan’s distrust of China probably outweighs even America’s. That’s a stabilizing factor in US-Japanese relations.
But Tokyo is certainly trying to put its relations with America on a more equal footing – not just formally, but by creating diplomatic and economic facts that will help to further this aim.
Russia’s Far East is nothing to disregard, in terms of its economic potential. Japan can do business with Ukraine, and with Russia, and is likely to cooperate with both.
Very few things can be taken for granted. Tsai Ing-wen‘s presidency will have to address issues from pension reform and social issues, to relations with China and efforts for economic-cooperation agreements with countries in the region, beyond Singapore and New Zealand.
From tomorrow, many things will be different from preceding presidencies. But one thing will not change at all: Beijing’s latent aggression against the island democracy will stay around.
Tsai will probably try to avoid anything that would, in the eyes of many Taiwanese people and especially in the eyes of Washington or Tokyo, unnecessarily anger Beijing. That in turn may anger some or many of her supporters.
But in tricky times, Tsai needs loyal supporters, who are prepared to believe that she has the best in mind for her country, and that she has the judgment and strength to make the right choices.
There will be disagreement, and there will be debate, which is essential. But underlying these, there needs to be loyalty within the Democratic Progressive Party.
Probably, there will be no loyal opposition – there are no indications, anyway, that the KMT in its current sectarian shape will constitute that kind of democratic balance.
Distinguishing between blind faith and loyalty will be a challenge for people who support the president elect. But if Tsai’s supporters expect her to perform well, they themselves will have to play their part, too, in terms of judgment, strength, and faith.
An NHK broadcast suddenly went off the air across mainland China on Tuesday morning during a report on the Panama Papers,
reports Radio Japan.
The World Premium channel by Japan’s public broadcaster lost both its video and sound shortly after a newscaster began reporting on offshore firms set up by relatives of current or former leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.
The program was interrupted again when it touched on the efforts of Chinese authorities to rigidly control information about the leaked financial documents.
The authorities appear to be censoring reports on the story by both domestic and foreign media.
The NHK states a CTV-Satellite TV Program Co., Ltd. as an operator in China, with a Beijing area code in its phone number. While Radio Japan, NHK’s foreign broadcasting service, offers programs in Chinese (including shortwave broadcasts), NHK Premium is bilingual (Japanese and English), according to Wikipedia.
North Korea’s “Historical Moment”
On February 7, North Korea launched a missile. Pyongyang referred ot it as a satellite launch, and that’s how they had registered it with the International Maritime Office in London, a few days earlier.
But the world appeared to be in disbelief. One month earlier, on January 6, North Korea had conducted a nuclear test, and given that space rockets’ and ballistic missiles’ technological platforms are quite similar to each other, it is believed that Pyongyang chose the space option (a three-stufen rocket) rather than a (two-stufen) missile so as to circumvent UN Security Council restrictions on its missile program.
Beijing, too, expressed disbelief and “regretted” the satellite launch which, as the foreign ministry spokesperson emphasized, had been based on ballistic-missile technology.
Pyongyang’s claim that it had tested a hydrogen bomb was met with skepticism in the West, in Japan, and South Korea, and at least semi-officially – via the world of Chinese science, as usual – Beijing expressed doubt, too.
He wouldn’t rule out that North Korea mastered a bit of hydrogen-bomb technology already, PLA Academy of Military Science researcher Du Wenlong told CCTV, but the available data “didn’t support a ‘hydrogen-bomb test’”.
There were no such doubts about North Korean television’s wonderweapon: “Heaven and earth are shaking because of the historical moment”, announced Ri Chun-hee, a veteran presenter, re-emerged from retirement for the festive occasion.
South Korea’s Reaction
And South Korea’s leadership was steaming with anger. If it was up to the South’s foreign minister, Yun Byung-he, the North Korean leadership would be entering a world of pain:
“I believe it is time for the international community to show zero tolerance to North Korea’s uncontrolled provocations”, he told the Munich Security Conference in Munich on Thursday, and: “it is time now to inflict unbearable pain on Pyongyang, to make them take the right strategic decision, as Iran has done.”
South Korea sees itself affected by Pyongyang’s nuclear test more immediately as other neighbors or opponents taking part in the six-party talks on the Korean peninsula’s denuclearization. Different from the world outside the peninsula, reunification of the two Koreas is on the agenda, even if outside the South Korean government, considerable doubts are expressed concerning the use and feasibility of such unification.
There was a special relationship between South Korea and Germany, because of the painful experience of division, South Korean president Park Geun-hye said during a visit to Berlin, in March 2014.
Her demand that “meticulous preparations” should be made for making Korean unity happen was probably meant seriously then, and still is. Basically, the situation on the Korean peninsula isn’t that different after the North’s fourth nuclear test, anyway: America and China can agree to a common denominator concerning sanctions against Pyongyang, but no sanctions that would call the continuation of the North Korean regime into question.
Besides, flashes of official Korean anger – northern or southern – might be considered a ritual. As German sinologist Oskar Weggel observed decades ago, student protests in [South] Korean cities always took the same shape and followed the same script, while life continued as normal just next to where young people were battling it out with the police. 1)
But for some South Korean companies, life may be anything but normal now. An industrial park jointly run in Kaesong, by North and South Korea, has ceased operation last week. On Thursday, Pyongyang deported all the South Korean employees to the South, after South Korea had stopped production. The South Koreans’ apparent attempt to take their assets and stock across the border to the South reportedly didn’t succeed: according to Radio Japn news on Friday, the North Korean committee for reunification announced that South Korean assets in Kaesong would be frozen, and also on Friday, China Radio International’s Mandarin service reported that the South Koreans had only been allowed to take personal belongings with them. The industrial park had been sealed off as a military zone – chances are that this halt will last longer than a previous one in 2013.
Valued more than 500 million USD in 2015, inter-Korean production in Kaesong may be considered less than decisive, in macro-economic terms. However, according to South Korean broadcaster KBS’ German service, South Korean opposition criticized the production halt in Kaesong as the governing party’s “strategy” for the upcoming parliamentary elections in April. Also according to KBS, Seoul feels compelled to take relief measures for companies invested in Kaesong. All companies residing in the industrial park are granted a moratorium on loan repayments, and companies who took loans from an inter-Korean cooperation fund may also suspend interest payment.
Chinese-North Korean Relations
China had “total control” of North Korea, Donald Trump claimed in a CNN interview – there would be nothing to eat in North Korea without China. If you go by statistics, Trump appears to have a point.
From 2009 to 2011, North Korean exports (imports) to (from) China rose from 348 mn (1.47 bn) USD to 2.5 bn (3.7 bn) USD. In total, North Korea’s exports (imports) reached a value of 3.7 bn (4.3 bn) USD.2) Even after a contraction of North Koran-Chinese trade in 2014 and 2015 to 2.3 bn (2.6 bn) USD by 2015, there’s hardly a way to reject the notion of North Korean dependence on China.
North Korea also depends on China in military terms. An American-led attack on Pyongyang – be it to occupy the North, be it for the sake of “regime change”, is hardly conceivable – directly or indirectly, Beijing’s nuclear umbrella protects the regime.
All the same, it is wrong to believe that Beijing wielded substantial influence over Pyongyang’s behavior. Neither economic nor military support from Beijing has been able to satisfy Pyongyang. Given Chinese reform and opening up “to the West”, or to international markets, since 1978, China’s leaders are considered weaklings by North Korean peers, despite some private-economy tries of their own. To consider oneself an economic or military dwarf, but a giant of ideological purity vis-à-vis China has some tradition in Korea.
That China has joined several initiatives – resolutions and sanctions – against North Korea hasn’t been a confidence-building measure for the neighbor and ally either.
That Pyongyang, under these circumstances, keeps striving for nuclear arms, come what may, is only logical – at least by the regime’s own interest –, and not negotiable, unless the regime falls. There are no conceivable guarantees – be it from Beijing, be it from Washington – that could make the North Korean political class abandon their nuclear goal.
No matter if there ever was or wasn’t a Western “guarantee” to the former USSR not to expand NATO eastward: a precondition for any feasible arrangement of that kind – in east or west – would be a situation where all parties involved would see themselves in a position to enter a non-aligned status, or to maintain one. There is no way that this could currently be done in East Asia. Even as there is no structure comparable to NATO in East Asia – and South-East Asia, for that matter -, none of China’s neighbors will discard the option to play America and China off against one another, thus increasing its own leeway – neither North Korea as China’s current “ally”, nor any other state within the former Chinese imperial state’s range of influence. And neither America nor China – strategic rivals of one another – would abandon the option to establish or to maintain alliances in Asia, based on partnership or on hegemony.
If the North Korean regime collapsed, there would be no guarantees for China that a North Korean power vacuum wouldn’t be filled by South Korea and the United States. And if China invaded Korea’s north preemptively, it wouldn’t only violate its own attitude of non-interference, but it would risk war, or at least a crash in its economic relations with America and many other countries. Not least, a Chinese invasion would harden an antagonism against China that already exists among former tributary states.
From China’s perspective, there is therefore no convincing alternative to the incumbent North Korean regime. The status quo costs less than any conceivable alternative scenario.
America knows that, too, and a newly lected president Trump would get real very quickly, or America would lose a great deal of influence in the region.
Last week’s developments will be most frustrating for the South Korean government, particularly for president Park. Her public-support rate will hardly depend on national reunification drawing closer, but it will depend on a reasonably relaxed co-existence with the North, including at least a few fields of cooperation, as has been the case in the Kaesong Industrial Park. The South Korean opposition’s accusations against the government to have stopped production carelessly or intentionally, it’s exactly because levelling such accusations can damage the government’s reputation with the electorate.
A phone call between Park and Chinese party and state leader Xi Jinping didn’t provide Park with good news either, let alone progress in her efforts to influence the North through international channels. China was still “not prepared” to change its …. Toward North Korea, an editorialist for South Korea’s Yonhap newsagency stated cautiously, adding a quote from Jonathan Pollack who had emphasized how Park had made efforts for good relations with Beijing, even by attending the Chinese military parade in September, commemorating the end of World War 2.
Pyongyang is hardly at risk to suffer from unbearable pains, as demanded by South Korea’s foreign minister in Munich.
But Beijing, too, can’t be happy with the situation. It offends face-conscious Chinese people to be fooled, on the world stage, by a gang – that’s how many Chinese view North Korea’s “elites”. The effects of North Korea’s behavior also strengthen the hand of the US in the region. Just as Pyongyang helps itself to a Chinese military umbrella without much cost (if any), most other neighbors afford themselves, to varying degrees, an American umbrella. Even Japan and South Korea, facing North Korean nuclear armament, might work to defuse mutual antagonism, as feared by Chinese military professor Zhang Zhaozhong, in 2010. Preparedness to improve Japanese-South Korean relations appears to be on the increase.
Besides the – aggressive indeed – role played by China in the South China sea, North Korea’s attitude remains another strong anchor point for America’s military and political presence in the Far East.
1) Oskar Weggel: “Die Asiaten”, Munich 1989, 1994, 1997 p. 148
2) FAO/WFP Group and Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Rome, Nov 28, 2013, p. 7
From the Memos – you may find identical, but, but also different phrases, in the Chinese (Xinhua) communiqués concerning Xi Jinping’s phone talks with the South Korean (1) and the American (3) presidents, respectively.
1. Telcon Park / Xi, Chinese Communiqué
February 5, 2016, source: Xinhua
2016年02月05日 23:45:52 来源： 新华社
Xinhua, Beijing, February 5 — State Chairman Xi Jinping had a phone conversation with South Korean President Park Geun-hye on February 5. The two leaders exchanged lunar new year compliments and agreed to jointly promote the continuous improvement of Sino-South Korean relations to new levels.
Xi Jinping pointed out that with the efforts of both sides, Sino-South Korean relations had achieved fruitful development. Mutual political trust and exchange and cooperation between the two countries in all areas was becoming closer day by day, the Sino-South Korean fre-trade agreement had officially taken effect and brought the peoples of both countries practical advantages, cultural exchanges were gratifying, both countries were linking their respective development strategies [to each others‘], maintaining close communication and coordination on international and regional issues. I want, together with President Park Geun-hye, continue the joint work to guide Sino-South Korean relations in all areas, to promote the continuous improvement of bilateral relations to new levels.
习近平指出，在双方共同努力下，中韩关系发展取得丰硕成果。两国政治互信和各领域交流合作日益密切，中韩自由贸易协定正式生效并给两国人民带来 实实在在的好处，人文交流呈现可喜局面，双方推动各自国家发展战略对接，在重大国际和地区问题上保持密切沟通和协调。我愿继续同总统女士共同指导好中韩关 系各领域工作，推动双边关系不断提高到新水平。
Park Geun-hye said that South Korea attached great importance to South Korean-Chinese relations, working for joint efforts with China, promoting the deepening of South Korean-Chinese cooperation in all areas. It was very important that the two countries‘ leaders maintained frequent contact on issues of mutual concern. South Korea was seriously concerned about North Korea’s recent fourth nuclear test and ist announcement to carry out another missile test. South Korea hoped that the international community would coordinate closely, and that the Security Council would, as quickly as possible, issue a reaction, to respond effectively to the current situation on the [Korean] peninsula.
Xi Jinping emphasized that China would, in any situation, make resolute efforts to achieve the denuclearization of the peninsula, make resolute efforts to safeguard peace and stability on the peninsula, and maintain resolution of issues thourgh dialogue and consultation. This was in line with the fundamental interests of all north-east Asian countries, including China’s and South Korea’s. The peninsula must not have nuclear weapons, and no war or chaos must occur. We hope that all parties concerned will set out from the general situation of maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula, react with cool heads to the current situation, always maintaining the correct path of dialogue and consultations. China wants to maintain communication and coordination with South Korea, concerning the peninsula issue.
习近平强调，中方在任何情况下都坚定致力于实现半岛无核化，坚定致力于维护半岛和平稳定，坚持通过对话协商解决问题。这符合包括中韩在内东北亚 各国的共同利益。半岛不能有核，也不能生战生乱。我们希望有关各方从维护半岛和平稳定大局出发，冷静应对当前形势，始终坚持对话协商的正确方向。中方愿就 半岛问题继续同韩方保持沟通和协调。
Editor in charge: Qian Zhongbin
[责任编辑： 钱中兵 ]
2. Telephone Conversation Park / Xi, Blue House Communiqué
Link: Yonhap (Chinese), February 5 —
According to the South Korean presidential palace, the Blue House, President Park Geun-hye took a phone call from Chinese State Chairman Xi Jinping at 9 p.m., to exchange views about plans for a response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and its “missile launch”, about the situation on the Korean peninsula, the development of ,South Korean-Chinese relations, etc.. In the course of the 45-minutes phone call, Park Geun-hye called on China to provide support for the strong sanctions against North Korea, drafted and adopted by the UN Security Council.
During the phone call, Park emphasized that North Korea’s provocations constituted a threat for the Korean peninsula, north-east Asia, and the whole world. This time, the international community should take take action against North Korea as a strong signal, to make [Pyongyang] change its attitude, as in the UN Security Council’s drafted and adopted strong, practical and effective resolution. Park Geun-hye said as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, and [as a country] with many means at hand to react to the North Korea issue, she hoped that China would play an active role to help the international community to strongly sanction North Korea.
朴槿惠在电话中强调，朝鲜发起的挑衅对韩半岛、东北亚乃至全球和平构成威胁，这次国际社会应该及时采取行动向朝鲜释放强烈信号促使其改变态度，如联合国安 理会制定并通过强而有力、切实有效的制裁决议。朴槿惠说，中国是安理会常任理事国之一，且拥有应对朝鲜问题的多种方法，希望中方积极协助国际社会强力制裁 朝鲜。
According to content bilaterally agreed to by the Korean and Chinese side, the Blue House did not disclose what Xi Jinping said during the phone call. Officials at the Blue House said that according to an understanding between South Korea and China under the current circumstances, both sides would issue statements with their respective own leader’s [communications] as the main content.
The two leaders had this exchange a month after North Korea’s sixth nuclear test on January 6. This was the first time that Xi Jinping exchanged views, concerning the North Korean nuclear testing and missile launch etc. issues, with a foreign leader. It is also the first phone call between a South Korean and a Chinese leader concerning the series of nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. North Korea had previously conducted nuclear tests in October 2006, May 2009, and February 2013. After these three nuclear tests, South Korean and Chinese leaders hadn‘t made phone calls to discuss relevant issues.
On February 2, North Korea informed the ICAO, the IMO and the ITU about its “satellite-launching” plan, saying that in accordance with national space development plan, it had decided to launch an earth observation satellite named “Shining Star”. The launching date would be some time from February 8 to February 25, at between 7 and 12 a.m. Pyongyang time (6:30 to 11:30 a.m. Beijing time).
On February 5, Lee Seong-hyon, a researcher, portrayed president Park Geun-hye as having been very optimistic about building a successful working partnership with Xi Jinping, even to the point of expecting Chinese support for a Seoul-led unification of the two Koreas. Lee also offered explanations as to why her expectations had been too high.
3. Telephone Conversation Obama / Xi, Chinese Communiqué
February 6, 2016, source: Xinhua
2016年02月06日 01:37:07 来源： 新华社
Xinhua, February 5 — State Chairman Xi Jinping took a telephone call from American President Barack Obama. The two leaders exchanged spring festival compliments.
Xi Jinping pointed out that during the past year, with both sides‘ combined efforts, Sino-American relations had made significant progress. In the current situation, China and America must cooperate, and cooperation is possible on many issues. China wants to work side by side with America, to continue deepening cooperation in all areas, strengthen communication and coordination on international, regional and global issues, and promote the continuation of healthy and stable development of Sino-American relations.
Barack Obama said that he was very happy to talk with Chairman Xi Jinping as Chinese lunar new year was nearing, and hoped that American-Chinese relations would make new progress, that both sides would continue to work together, deepen cooperation, to advance peace, security and prosperity of their two countries and of the international community. America was seriously concerned about North Korea once again conducting a nuclear test and announcing missile test activities, and hoped that the international community would strengthen coordination, promoting the adoption of measures by the United Nations Security Council, to respond effectively to this situation. To this end, America wanted to strengthen cooperation with China.
奥巴马表示，很高兴在中国农历新年即将来临之际同习近平主席通话，希望美中关系取得新的进展，双方继续携手努力，深化合作，共同促进两国和国际 社会和平、安全、繁荣。美方对朝鲜再次进行核试验并宣布将进行发射活动有严重关切，希望国际社会加强协调，推动联合国安理会采取措施，有效应对这一局面。 美方愿就此加强同中方合作。
Xi Jinping emphasized that currently, the situation on the Korean peninsula was complicated and sensitive. China maintained the goal of a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, advocated efforts to solve problems through dialogue and consultations, safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula, which would be in line with every party’s fundamental interests. China endorsed the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the international nuclear non-proliferation system, and wanted to maintain communication and coordination with all parties on this matter, including America.
Editor in charge: Qian Zhongbin
[责任编辑： 钱中兵 ]
4. Telephone Conversation Obama / Xi, White House Communiqué
Link: The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release
February 05, 2016
Readout of the President’s Call with President Xi Jinping of China
The President today spoke by phone with President Xi Jinping of China to coordinate efforts in responding to North Korea’s January 6 nuclear test. Both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Both leaders also conveyed that they will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. They agreed that North Korea’s planned ballistic missile test would contravene multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions and represent another provocative and destabilizing action. Finally, the leaders emphasized the importance of a strong and united international response to North Korea’s provocations, including through an impactful UN Security Council Resolution.
Want more? Continue reading there.
As Chinese economic growth isn’t quite itself these days, the innovation buzzword keeps growing. State chief councillor Li Keqiang‘s Internet Plus action plan, described in some detail on March 5 last year in his work report to the Third Session of the 12th “National People’s Congress”, is being revived as a news item and covered here by the Washington Post. The article describes an internet town near Haikou as a place where little else can be done:
According to the local government, the Internet Town project will cover the entire Shishan township in 2018, with the completion of an online trading platform and an operation center as well as other facilities. The project will be a major engine for local growth, creating a new source of income for farmers along with the tourism industry that features volcanic tours.
Meantime, the English-language “Global Times” focuses on places where a lot of things that make sense could be done, and where a number of building owners (you can’t say landlord in China) fell for the business concepts of kids whose first profession was to be their daddies’ sons (reportedly, anyway), and who burnt their business war chests rather than using them mindfully. But obviously, the article is generally optimistic about a phoenix [that] will rise from the ashes of the first wave of China’s tech boom.
Chinese innovation may not be exactly what Japan’s industry is waiting for, but Chinese growth is. Ikuo Hirata, a columnist with a number of Japanese papers, suggests that Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe should stop counting on China’s economy as a booster for Abenomics, and that the government should lower its growth target.
Hirata also warns that
[w]hile working to reduce excess capacity in the steel and other traditional sectors, Chinese policymakers are also trying to help high-tech industries, such as robotics, sophisticated machine tools and aerospace, catch up with their rivals in advanced economies. The technological prowess of a country that has a successful manned space mission under its belt should not be underestimated.
» Traditional industries, new bones, April 17, 2015
Japan and the Netherlands have agreed to building a strategic partnership, reports Dutch news website Nu, with ANP material. Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte wound up a two-day visit to Japan on Tuesday. In talks with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, Rutte reportedly expressed support for Japan’s legislative authorization for more military involvement in international conflicts.
Both premiers also emphasized the significance of a “peaceful solution” for the conflict in the East China Sea, where both China and Japan claim possession of the Senkaku Isles. Abe and Rutte “share the concerns that unilateral actions such as display of power and rising tensions could lead to in the region.”*)
Beide premiers benadrukken daanraast het belang van een “vreedzame oplossing” voor het conflict in de Oost-Chinese Zee, waar China en Japan beiden het bezit claimen van de Senkaku-eilanden. Abe en Rutte “delen de zorgen die eenzijdige acties, zoals machtsvertoon, en oplopende spanningen met zich meebrengen in het gebied”.
Rutte also complimented Japan for the progress the country had made in the field of human rights, after the Second World War.
Rutte complimenteerde Japan daarnaast met de vooruitgang die het land sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog heeft geboekt op het gebied van mensenrechten.
In addition, the two leaders discussed a number of global issues, such as the war in Syria, the situation in Ukraine, and the nuclear threat in North Korea.
Daarnaast bespraken beide leiders een aantal globale onderwerpen, zoals de oorlog in Syrië, de situatie in Oekraïne en de nucleaire dreiging in Noord-Korea.
Cooperation between the two countries also covers internet security, agriculture and horticulture, the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo in 2020, and on health- and pension problems with an aging population.
De samenwerking tussen beide landen richt zich ook op internetbeveiliging, land- en tuinbouw, de Olympische en Paralympische Spelen in Tokio in 2020 en op gezondheids- en pensioenproblemen bij een vergrijzende bevolking.
According to Nu, more than 120 companies and research organizations traveled with Rutte’s delegation.
According to a joint statement, published here by Japan’s foreign ministry,
The two leaders share the importance of the rule of law for the international community including the freedom of navigation and overflight over the high seas, and stress the importance to settle disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law. They share concerns caused by any unilateral actions, including the threat or use of force and coercion, that change the status quo and raise tensions in the East and South China Sea. They support the full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the rapid conclusion of the negotiations to establish an effective code of conduct in the South China Sea.
The joint statement also demands that all sides in the Ukraine conflict
fully implement their commitment under the Minsk agreements to solve the conflict in eastern Ukraine peacefully, respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They remain determined never to recognize the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and will continue to support Ukraine to advance its reforms, aimed at strengthening and modernizing Ukraine for the benefit of its citizens. The two leaders reaffirm that those responsible for the downing of flight MH17 must be held to account and that all States should cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability, as demanded by Security Council resolution 2166.
The statement also addresses Syrian and North Korean issues.
Radio Japan reported on Tuesday that [t]he leaders of Japan and the Netherlands have expressed their shared concern about China’s increasing maritime activities.
Radio Japan’s reporting is also quoted by Sina Corp, but apparently only on its Taiwanese website, and drawing on Taiwan’s CNA newsagency:
After holding talks, prime minister Shinzo Abe and visiting Dutch prime minister Rutte issued a joint statement. Although its content doesn’t mention mainland China directly, but is targeted at mainland actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea.
*) For the wording, according to the prime ministers’ joint statement, see para (5) there.