Archive for ‘Taiwan’

Sunday, June 19, 2022

Radio Taiwan International (RTI) 2022 Shortwave Transmissions to Europe, from Tamsui, in French and in German

Tamsui transmitters site, NW Taiwan, RTI QSL card 2015

Tamsui transmitters site, NW Taiwan, RTI QSL card 2015

RTI German Service

As is tradition at RTI’s German Service, Radio Taiwan International has scheduled one-hour broadcasts directly from Tamsui, NW Taiwan, to Europe. Those are a great opportunity to listen to a wider range of RTI programs. Usually, outside this special summer season, you only get to hear about half of the gems RTI German has in store for its listeners – the other half can only be listend to online. Also, the usual RTI German broadcasting routine goes through a relay transmitting site in Bulgaria, on 5900 kHz from 19:00 to 19:30 UTC.

There will be test transmissions from Tamsui to Europe on Saturday, June 25, at the following times and on the following frequencies:

Time UTC/GMT Frequency
17:00 – 17:10 11995 kHz
17:30 – 17:40 11995 kHz
19:00 – 19:10 9545 kHz
19:20 – 19:30 7240 kHz
19:40 – 19:50 7250 kHz

Your reception reports will probably matter, because Radio Taiwan International  says they are going to choose the two frequencies that are reported to work best for their one-hour broadcasts in July.

Those July broadcasts are scheduled as follows (time only, for now):

Friday, July 08, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 08, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 08, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Friday, July 15, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 16, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 17, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Friday, July 22, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 23, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 24, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Friday, July 29, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Saturday, July 30, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC
Sunday, July 31, 2022; 17:00 – 18:00 UTC & 19:00 – 20:00 UTC

RTI French Service

For the first time, Radio Taiwan International’s French service also broadcasts directly from Tamsui, Taiwan.

They plan to test the same frequencies as RTI German does, but on Saturday, July 2. The times and frequencies for the test transmissions, also ten minutes each, will be the same as the German service’s tests on June 25.

Here, too, listeners’ reception reports will define the choice of frequencies, according to RTI French. Their one-hour broadcasts are scheduled for August, on every weekend from Fridays through Sundays, i. e. the month following the German weekends, also at 17:00 UTC and 19:00 UTC respectively.

Radio Taiwan International reliably confirms reception reports with QSL cards.

Good DX, and happy listening!

Wednesday, April 20, 2022

You Sikun: Russian-Ukrainian War a “Great Revelation”

The following is a translation of a speech given by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan’s Speaker You Si-kun (游錫堃) on Tuesday, opening the national-day preparatory committee. “National day” refers to Taiwan’s double-ten celebrations.
Main link: National Day preparatory committee established – You Si-kun: strengthen the concept of Taiwan consciousness (國慶籌備會成立 游錫堃:強化台灣主體意識概念發想)

UDN coverage, April 19

UDN coverage, April 19

Legislative Yuan Speaker You Si-kun chaired the national-day celebrations peparatory committee’s opening session this morning. He said that the Russo-Ukrainian war is a great revelation for people worldwide and in Taiwan. This year, the general meeting office and the fireworks office1) are asked to actively plan and strengthen Taiwanese subject consciousness2) and cohesion as well as the will of the people to protect the land.

立法院長游錫堃今上午主持「中華民國各界慶祝111年國慶籌備委員會」成立大會。他在致詞時表示,烏俄戰爭對全球和台灣人民都有很大的啟示。今年的國慶活動,將請大會處及焰火處積極規畫,朝強化台灣主體意識及凝聚國人守土為國意志的概念來發想。

[The following paragraph is about technicalities concerning SARS-COVID prevention – left out here]

You Si-kun said that under last year’s rising changes and challenges, the national-day celebrations, besides improving preventive measures against the pandemic, also carved out high-quality celabratory activities. In addition to inviting the heros of the Olympics and Paralympics, those fighting the pandemic, those who defended Taiwan and stabilized society, were part of a heros’ motorcade to be cheered and thanked by people all over the country for their efforts and hard work for Taiwan.

游錫堃表示,去年在疫情升溫的變化與挑戰下,慶籌會除了完善防疫措施外,還能同時規畫出優質的各項慶祝活動,除了邀請奧運、帕運、防疫、捍衛台灣、安定社會、護衛國土的台灣英雄,搭上英雄車隊、出席國慶大會、接受全國人民喝采,感謝他們對台灣的付出與辛勞。

This was combined with work for the overseas compatriots, with the Overseas Community Affairs Council taking overseas compatriots to the national day evening banquets and the national-day gathering in front of the presidential palace. They saw the atmosphere of the Kaohsiung fireworks and the exciting events they brought for the Taiwanese. All celebration activities brought the crowds to many places, improving tourism revenues and earning public praise.

同時,還結合僑胞服務工作,由僑務委員會帶著僑胞到新竹市參加國慶晚會,也到總統府前參加國慶大會,再去高雄觀賞國慶焰火,讓大家感受歡樂的國慶氣氛,為國人帶來那麼多精彩的活動內容,各項慶祝活動也確實為各地帶來非常多的人潮,提高了觀光收益,廣獲社會好評。

You Si-kun said that the Russo-Ukrainian war is a great revelation for people worldwide and in Taiwan. This year, the general meeting office and the fireworks office1) are asked to actively plan and strengthen Taiwanese subject consciousness2) and cohesion as well as the will of the people to protect the land. This year’s national day holiday will be three days, from October 8 to October 10. He believed that the people would certainly the national-day events, hoped that everyone would have fun with combined education and entertainment, and that [the national day celebrations] would be activities with ample vitality, cohesion and consensus-building, and participation.

游錫堃說,烏俄戰爭對全球和台灣人民都有很大的啟示。今年的國慶活動,也請大會處及焰火處積極規劃,朝強化臺灣主體意識及凝聚國人守土為國意志的概念來發想。今年國慶日適逢3天的連續假期(10/8至10/10),相信國人一定會很期待國慶系列活動,希望大家能寓教於樂,讓國慶成為充滿活力、凝聚共識、全民參與的活動。

____________

Notes

1) 大會處及焰火處, the genereal meeting office and the fireworks office, both of them offices under the preparatory committee
2) Subject conciousness may not be the perfect equivalent – sociologists would be in a better position than I to judge -, but I found this term in a paper about Korean self-awareness-building, too
Monday, April 18, 2022

Cute Pandas and Lovely Tanks – CRI and CGTN cover Russia’s War in Ukraine

CRI Russian / CGTN Russian war coverage

How is our motherland doing, comrades?
CRI Russian / CGTN Russian war coverage

I don’t speak Russian, but it seems that China Radio International’s (CRI) coverage leaves nothing to be desired when you want to be kept up to date with your country’s war in Ukraine (without too much disturbing news, I suppose). The first 25 minutes of CRI’s Russian program at 17:00 UTC on Sunday were all about Donbas, with a CGTN correspondent reporting from there.

CRI might have dispatched its own correspondents a few years ago, when the station was actually an organization in its own right, and quite a fiefdom at that. CRI’s then director, Wang Gengnian, even delivered his own annual new-year address.

Some adjustments for synergy were called for, and the central committee delivered, early in 2018, by amalgamating CRI, CPBS (domestic radio) and television into a “Central Radio and Television Network” (中央广播电视总台).   Some three years later, many CRI language broadcasts on shortwave were replaced by mere music loops or endless repetitions of always-the-same cultural programs.

Taiwan’s government appeared to have similar plans for Radio Taiwan International (RTI) – not to take them off the airwaves, but to create an tri-medial organization, integrating RTI, Taiwan’s national newsagency CNA, and public television. Instead, RTI got a new director-general, and its Spanish, French and Korean services returned to shortwave from a mere online existence.

Now, questions are occasionally asked which plan for RTI was better – the one devised in 2018 or the one actually implemented in 2019 and onward. In my view, starting an international television channel on the one hand as is done with “Taiwan+” and keeping RTI as a station focused on audiences in different languages looks like a comparatively wise choice.

For one, RTI might provide a pool of foreign-language speakers for television if need be. Also, if I go by my own fondness for radio, “Taiwan+” isn’t for me, and never will be. In fact, it’s nice to be spoken to in my first language by RTI’s German department.

But above all, developments at Radio Japan and CRI aren’t looking really promising. At Radio Japan, English is only broadcast on shortwave three times a day, and as for the news, that’s only a soundtrack from NHK’s global  English-language television channel. (You won’t even know who’s speaking at times, because obviously, you are missing out on the subtitles.) And while I don’t know what they are talking about in Russian on China’s foreign media, I seem to notice that there is a similar problem with the CGTN correspondent’s contributions that are also used by CRI, i. e. by “Central Radio and Television Network” foreign-radio channel. The correspondent, Kirill Volkov, seems to interview a number of people for his video productions, but as a listener, you can only guess who he is talking to.

It is easy to think that CRI’s German service has lost some of its (not too numerous anyway) German listeners after leaving shortwave, along with many other CRI language services. The German editorial department’s current trimedial attempts at agitating their listeners in China’s favor may be good for a laugh every now and then, but contrary to CRI’s radio productions in the past, these days’ online content is useless.

20220130_dreckskerle_20220126

“Some US politicians behave more and more like
dirty swines!” -CRI German’s
“sharp commentary” online, January 2022

In that regard, one has to wonder why RTI has recently been busy with grandstanding of this kind. Reportedly, what really happened is that the same half-hour Russian program in Russian already in existence for Europe has been rebroadcast for an additional 30-minutes time slot on another frequency.

Stunts like the above seem to suggest that RTI’s directors are worried that the government might cut RTI’s budget.

That shouldn’t happen. If Taiwan’s government wants to raise its country’s “international visibility”, it can’t do without RTI, and it can’t do without shortwave. At least, Taipei better wait how “Taiwan+” develops before making cuts to the foreign-radio budget.

Saturday, January 1, 2022

Fun and Facts in Taiwan

Every year, there’s the fun

and the facts.

President Tsai’s 2022 new year’s remarks are also available in English.
____________

Saturday, December 25, 2021

Russia in the Indo-Pacific

The following is a translation of an introduction by Radio Taiwan International’s (RTI) Mandarin program “Serving the People” (為人民服務), discussing Russia’s role in the region loosely defined as the “Indo-Pacific”.

russian_built_gepard_3_9_frigate_quang_trung

Russian-built Gepard 3.9 frigate Quang Trung,
public domain

Lu Ssu-pin (魯斯濱), a columnist on Russian military affairs, discusses Russia’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific, and especially its ties with ASEAN, in “Serving the People’s” December 23 edition. The discussion can be listened to there (button top right).

No great secrets are revealed there, but while Russia’s business in the region doesn’t go unreported by Western media, it may often be underestimated. This includes areas of conflict with China.

Ssu also touches on the revival of the Russian language in Vietnamese lesson plans. The numbers don’t look overwhelming, but according to Ssu, Russian technology (such as military technology or its Global Navigation Satellite System) can be rather well absorbed by ASEAN countries, and is affordable, while a lot of Western technology isn’t.

Main link:
Russia also gets involved in Indo-Pacific, Russia and China singing different tunes (俄羅斯也插手印太 俄中各唱各的調)

The statement issued on December 12 after the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Liverpool emphasized that the G7 member states wanted to establish an investment and trade circle democracies so as to respond to China’s coercive economic policies more unitedly. Russia was also warned not to rashly use force against Ukraine as [Moscow] would face serious economic costs. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken travelled right on for visits to Southeast Asia, with the clear intention to draw in allies to crowd around China.

12月12日在英國利物浦落幕的G7外長會議發表聲明,強調G7成員國要在民主國家間建立投資圈經貿圈,以便團結應對中國的脅迫性經濟政策,而且還警告俄羅斯不要輕易對烏克蘭動武,否則將面對沉重經濟代價。美國國務卿布林肯在會後更直奔東南亞訪問,拉近盟友圍攏中國的意圖非常明顯。

This G7 foreign ministers’ meeting’s main emphasis appears to be on building a united front in response to China and Russia. However, if the Chinese friendship with Russia is what it appears to be is a different story. Concerning the South China Sea, for example, Russia’s approach is rather indistinct. It does, by no means, support China as imagined by the outside world when it comes to the South China Sea.

這次G7外長會議,統一陣線應對中國與俄國,顯然是最大重點。不過,中國與俄羅斯之間是否如表面的友好,又是另當別論。比方在南海,俄羅斯的態度就非常模糊,並不像外界所想像的那樣在南海事務上支持中國。

A confrontation erupted in waters disputed between China and Indonesia not long ago. Beijing accused Indonesia of building exploratory wellheads in oil and gas fields delimited by China. A Russian state-owned energy giant happens to be this oil and gas field’s owner1. Before that, Russia also helped Vietnam with oil and gas extraction work, among them some fields also delimited by China in accordance with its so-called nine-dash line2. This lead to Chinese dissatisfaction.

中國與印尼不久前在南海有爭議水域爆發爭執對峙。北京指責印尼在中國所劃定的海疆線內為一處油氣田區塊開鑿探井。俄羅斯國有能源巨頭恰好是這塊油氣田的所有人。而在印尼之前,俄羅斯也幫越南從事油氣開採,其中的一些油氣田區塊因為同樣位於中國所劃定的所謂「九段線」內而導致中國不滿。

All the same, Russia’s cooperation with Indonesia and Vietnam has continued.

儘管中國不滿,俄國與印尼和越南的能源合作一直在進行中 。

Also, early in December, ASEAN carried out the first joint maritime exercise with Russia. In the southeast Asian region As relations between the southeast Asian region and China continue to intensify, the question against who these may be directed is also up to the outside world’s imagination.

另外,12月初, 東南亞國家協會(ASEAN)也跟俄羅斯舉行了第一次聯合海上軍事演習。在東南亞地區和中國的緊張關係不斷升溫的同時,聯合軍演到底針對誰,也令外界有無限想像空間。

We have asked Lu Ssu-pin to discuss his observations with us.

今天節目我們請魯斯濱談談他的觀察。

____________

Notes

1     Zarubezhneft, according to reports
2     Wikipedia, accessed Dec 24

____________

Related

America, Japan: a more equal Relationship, May 22, 2016
Gas Deal, but no Military Alliance, May 23, 2014
“Like Polar Bears, no bit of humanity”, July 22, 2012
Indonesia-Russia Relations, Wikipedia
Russia-Vietnam Relations, Wikipedia
____________

Saturday, October 23, 2021

North Korean Foreign Ministry Statement on Taiwan

The following press release was published by KCNA on Saturday, in Chinese, English, and probably in other languages, too.
No link from here, because KCNA doesn’t provide permalinks.

Saturday's KCNA headlines

Saturday’s KCNA headlines

Pyongyang, October 23 (KCNA) — Pak Myong Ho, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, on Oct. 22 made the following press statement: 朝中社平壤10月23日电 朝鲜民主主义人民共和国外务省副相朴明浩22日发表了谈话。谈话内容如下:
Recently, the U.S. is building up military tension by inciting independence of Taiwan, which is an inseparable territory of China. 近期,美国鼓吹中国不可分割的领土——台湾的独立,正在加剧军事紧张。
This year alone, the U.S. dispatched all kinds of battleships into the Taiwan Straits on the plea of “freedom of navigation” whenever occasion called. Some time ago, it even mobilized a battleship of its ally only to escalate tension in the Taiwan Straits. 仅在今年,美国打着“航行自由”的旗号,频频派遣各种军舰驶入台湾海峡,日前还动员盟国军舰,使台海紧张局势逐步升级。
The U.S. announced its plan for arms sale to Taiwan worth 750 million US$ by putting forth the unlawful “Taiwan Relations Act”, and it is staging large-scale joint military exercise in the waters near Taiwan. Like this, it is increasing all the more its military threats against China. 美国借用非法的“与台湾关系法”,出台价值7.5亿美元的对台军售计划,在台湾周边水域进行大规模联合军演等进一步加大对中国的军事威胁力度。
It is an open secret that the members of the U.S. special forces and the detachment from U.S. Marine Corps have trained the Taiwanese army while stationing in Taiwan for more than one year. 美军特种部队队员和美海军陆战队分遣队一年多时间驻扎在台湾且训练台湾军队,这已经是公开的秘密。
This is an actual proof that the U.S. is using Taiwan as a tool to put pressure on China and an outpost to overpower China in an emergency though it outwardly maintains “One China” policy. 这证实虽然美国表面上声称坚持“一个中国”政策,但实际上把台湾用做反华打压工具、有事时压制中国的前哨基地。
Taiwan is an integral part of China. The Taiwan issue, from A to Z, belongs to the internal affairs of China. 台湾是中国的一部分,台湾问题彻头彻尾是属于中国内政的问题。
The U.S. acts constitute a naked interference in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and cause a grave threat to the international peace and stability. 美国此举是对中华人民共和国的露骨的干涉内政行为,也是对国际和平与稳定的严重威胁。
It is too natural and just demand that the Chinese government has, on several occasions, called for the U.S. to be as good as its word in abiding by the “One China” principle as well as a solemn commitment it made to China, not to have any kind of government-level exchanges with Taiwan, not to send a wrong signal to the separatist forces of Taiwan and to refrain from any action which aggravates the situation of the Taiwan Straits. 中国政府在各个场合敦促美国应以实际行动恪守“一个中国”原则和向中国作出的庄严承诺,不与台湾进行任何形式的官方往来,不要向台湾的分裂势力发出错误信号,不给台海形势制造麻烦,是理所当然的正当主张。
We fully support the Chinese government and people in their stand to defend the national sovereignty and territorial integrity and to realize the unification of the motherland without fail. 我们完全支持中国政府和人民要维护国家主权和领土完整,一定要实现祖国统一的立场。
The situation of Taiwan is, on no account, irrelevant to the situation of the Korean peninsula. 台湾形势与朝鲜半岛局势并非无关。
The indiscreet meddling by the U.S. into the issue of Taiwan entails a potential danger of touching off a delicate situation on the Korean peninsula. 美国在台湾问题上的无端干涉具有可能进一步促进岌岌可危的朝鲜半岛局势紧张的潜在危险。
It is a well-known fact that the U.S. troops and its military bases in south Korea are in use to put pressure on China and that the huge forces of the U.S. and its satellite states, which are being concentrated near Taiwan, can be committed to a military operation targeting the DPRK at any time. 驻南朝鲜美军兵力和军事基地都在用于反华打压工具,集聚在台湾周边的美国及其追随势力的庞大兵力可能随时投入到针对我国的军事作战行动,这是众所周知的事实。
The hostile forces are already speeding up the deployment of their forces from all directions which are aimed at our country and China while making lame assertion, like a guilty party filing the suit first, that the DPRK and PRC can, in cooperation, cause military tension in Taiwan and on the Korean peninsula. This reality proves that the U.S. is in its bid to stifle our country and China, both socialist countries, in order to hold its supremacy. 敌对势力早已采取“恶人先告状”的手法,传出朝中两国可能携手在台湾和朝鲜半岛加剧军事紧张的无赖主张,大举加快针对我国和中国的全防卫性军力部署步伐。这一现实证明,美国为了维持其霸权地位,企图同时扼杀我国和中国这两个社会主义国家。
The U.S. should bear in mind that its reckless interference in internal affairs, its attempt for division and an open act of double standard would only invite tragic consequences of lifting an ax to drop it on its own foot. 美国要搞清楚,其冒险的内政干涉、分裂活动和露骨的双重标准行为只会带来搬起石头砸自己脚的悲惨苦果。
It is in correlation with the situation on the Korean peninsula that we would continue to watch the U.S. very closely in its stance to hold hegemony over the issue of Taiwan. -0- 我们将美国在台湾问题上的霸权主义行为与朝鲜半岛局势联系起来,继续保持警惕予以严密注视。(完)

____________

Related

“development path of their choice”, Sept 28, 2021
____________

Thursday, October 7, 2021

Tendencies: Germany’s next China Policy

China didn’t feature prominently in Germany’s 2021 federal election campaign – at least not at the surface.
Somewhat underneath, and not really overreported in the German media, are donations and sponsorships that benefitted the political parties – or one or two of them – in the run-up to the Bundestag elections on September 26.
The picture, according to statista.de (quoting Germany’s federal parliament administration and only recording donations of more than 50,000 Euros):

CDU/CSU (center-right): 3,340,860 Euros
FDP (neoliberal): 2,055,454 Euros
Greens (ecological): 1,790,548 Euros
AFD (right-wing, neoliberal): 100,000 Euros
SPD (social democrats): 50,000 Euros

This is not the full picture, of course. Donations from 10,000 to 50,000 Euros will probably only appear in the political parties’ annual accounts, likely to be published around a year and a half after they happen.
Also, [Update, Oct 8: committed event] “sponsoring” [of party congresses, for example] amounts don’t need to be published in detail – there is no way of knowing who donated, and which amounts.
Still, the above-50,000 statistics give us an idea: the social democrats were considered dead in the water. That, at least, was a general belief into August this year, and that’s as far as the statistics go. Some corporations and lobby organizations may have tried to make up for their negligence when the SPD began to soar in the opinion polls.
Before we get to the China issues, let’s take a look at the 50,000-plus donations in relation to the actual votes for the parties.

Blue: donations >50,000
Red: actual votes
(relations, no numbers)

This doesn’t mean that the SPD wouldn’t like to get donations, and grassroot donations can make a difference too, but it is obvious that the industry didn’t bet on the social democrats and the left party.

China issues in the campaign

Hong Kong’s political activist Ray Wong, now living in German exile, German sinologist David Missal and other activists and human rights groups put a “China elections check” online for those who were interested in the party’s positions concerning China.
They asked each political party represented in Germany’s incumbent federal parliament, the Bundestag, eight questions, and according to the organizers, only the AFD didn’t respond.
That said, the CDU/CSU were “neutral” on seven out of the eight statements.
All eight statements can be considered a demand Missal, Wong and the organizations supporting the project would subscribe to.

The parties’ positions in detail

Statement 1


Statement 2


Statement 3


Statement 4


Statement 5


Statement 6


Statement 7


Statement 8


Political parties by rates of agreement, neutrality or disagreement with / towards the statements, in descending order (respectively)

Party / party group agrees with the statements (pro)

The Greens 6
SPD 4
FDP 3
The Left 3
CDU/CSU 0

Party neither agrees nor disagrees with the statements (neutral)

CDU/CSU 7
FDP 5
SPD 1
The Left 0
The Greens 0

Party / group doesn’t agree with the statements (opposed)

The Left 5
SPD 3
FDP 0*)
The Greens 2
CDU/CSU 1
________
*) corrected (Oct 8), down from 3

Outlook

At least for now, the CDU/CSU’s chances of heading (or even just joining) a government coalition have deminished, as both the FDP and the Greens are currently moving closer to the SPD, with some unfriendly noise especially from the CSU, the CDU’s Bavarian sister party.
This would mean that exactly the three parties that find most common ground with the Wong/Missal statements would be in government.
The picture would become much friendlier for pro-China lobbyists if the tide turned again,in favor of the CDU/CSU.
The proof of the pudding is the eating, and the industry will almost certainly become more generous with its donations to the Social Democrats, but for those who want to see a government with clear-cut positions on Chinese crimes against human rights, the trend isn’t looking bad.
The CDU/CSU didn’t really care, and documented that publicly.
____________

Related

Germany after the federal elections, Sept 27, 2021
Guanchazhe flatters Austrian Supernova, April 7, 2018
____________

Wednesday, July 28, 2021

Special two-hour transmissions by Radio Taiwan International in German

As custom at Radio Taiwan international‘s (RTI) German service, there will be a number shortwave broadcasts directly from Taiwan this summer, as announced here.

qsl_card_2019_national_radio_museum_minxiong_taiwan

Weekday Dates
Friday July 30, August 6, August 13, August 20.
Saturday July 31, August 7, August 14, August 21.
Sunday August 1, August 8, August 15, August 22.

On each of the above days, there will be a broadcast on 11705 kHz from 17:00 to 18:00 hours UTC and one on 9545 kHz from 18:00 to 19:00 hours UTC.

We can probably expect one hour of different program items per day, at 17:00, repeated at 18:00 UTC. RTI’s German program output per day is about sixty minutes, but routinely, only half of it is aired on shortwave, as regular broadcasts via the Kostinbrod relay in Bulgaria are only 30 minutes long. The remaining half is provided online.

%d bloggers like this: