Archive for ‘ideology’

Saturday, June 3, 2023

Wu Renhua’s “Day-by-Day Chronicle of the 1989 Tian An Men Incident”

wo_ai_beijing_tiananmen
我爱北京天安门 (I love Beijing Tian An Men) is a children’s song.
It is mostly about Mao Zedong, but still popular – see that video.

The following is an overview of some old translations – Tweets by Professor Wu Renhua (吴仁华), posted from April 15 to June 9, 2011, commemorating the Tian An Massacre, and remembering the months of hopes and ambitions before that. In fact, the emphasis is on how the Democracy Movement started and how it went – it’s the people’s history, not so much the “People’s Liberation Army’s” or its role in killing the people and their hopes.

My translation of it (which may include mistakes) starts with Wu’s April 15 post and ends with the April 25 post. The links within my translations are no longer valid, but there’s a re-post of Professor Wu’s work on “Wenxue City”.

The Weeks before June 4, 1989 Intro
The Weeks before June 4: Wu Renhua’s Introduction Professor Wu
The Weeks before June 4 – a Desire to do Better than in 1987 April 15, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Towards the Sun April 17, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – a Trip to North Korea April 19 – 20, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Asserting Authority April 21, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Hu Yaobang’s Funeral April 22, 1989
The Weeks before June 4 – Role Allocations April 23, 1989
Struggling for the Ideological Switch Stands April 24, 1989
Deng Xiaoping’s remarks and the April-26 Editorial April 25, 1989

If you do a translation yourself, please let me know, and I’ll link there.

Monday, May 22, 2023

Old Folk at the Sun Gate: “China Sincerely Invites Central Asian States into its Development Express Train”

This is a summary of how CCTV’s main evening news “Xinwen Lianbo” presented the Xi’an Summit in its May 19, 19 hours local time, edition. Analysis might follow in another blogpost.

Let’s focus on newsitems #1 and #3.1)

1. Banquet and Show, Thursday, May 18

Chronologically, Xinwen Lianbo’s coverage starts with newsitem #3, giving an account of the welcome banquet in the evening of May 18 in Xi’an, and a silk-road resonating happy-peoples show after that.

In his banquet speech, Xi says that “we sincerely welcome the east-Asian states to get onto China’s development express train” (我们诚挚欢迎中亚国家搭乘中国发展快车).

Newsitem #3 then continues with the First-Ladies’ program of the following day (May 19). Only two central Asian First Ladies are mentioned who joined China’s Peng Liyuan there, Aigul Japarova from Kyrgyzstan and Ziroatkhon Hoshimova (short form: Ziroat Mirziyoyeva) from Uzbekistan.

01_tokayev_arrival
Tokayev’s arrival, May 18

2. The Summit, Friday, May 19

Newsitem #1 starts with the actual summit.

The five Presidents’ arrivals, “one by one” (中亚五国元首相继抵达, not from the plane, as they have attended the welcome banquet the night before).

Xi Jinping’s keynote speech at the May 19 summit is titled “Joining hands to build a Chinese-Central Asian community of common destiny2), by mutual support, joint development, universal security and friendship of many generations” (携手建设守望相助、共同发展、普遍安全、世代友好的中国-中亚命运共同体).

Back to the actual summit on May 19. Right after a referral to the historic “Silk Road”, a topic that also featured prominently in the post-dinner opera the night before, Xi comes back to his proposal ten years earlier of “jointly establishing a comprehensive revival of the Silk road”. It probably matters that he doesn’t refer to China’s proposal here, but to his, Xi’s, in-person advocacy back in 2013.

He then describes Central Asia he wants to see, or, in his now more modest words, the kind of Central Asia that “the world needs”. That’s
• a stable central Asia, i. e. sovereign and independent states with territorial integrity
• a prosperous central Asia
• a harmonious central Asia and
• a connective central Asia.

“Eight Persistences” (四个坚持)
To establish the envisaged Chinese-Central Asian community of common destiny, Xi sees a need for “four persistences”:
• Persistence in keeping watch and defending one another (守望相助), or, in some more detail, to deepen mutual strategic trust, and supporting one another when it comes to matters of core interests, such as sovereignty, independence, national dignity, and long-term development
• Persistence in joint development and marching in the first line of building the “one-belt-one-road”, in advocacy of global development, in unleashing the traditional potential for cooperation, poverty reduction, green and low-carbon growth, etc.
• Persistence in “universal security” (a term that has already been mentioned in the title of Xi’s speech), advocacy of global security, resolute opposition against “external forces'” interference in regional domestic politics (坚决反对外部势力干涉地区国家内政), so as to build a community that stays far away from conflict and always enjoys peace
• Persistence in friendship of many generations, implementation of the global civilization advocacy, exchange of governance experience, intercivilisational reflection, etc..

Trade, “anti-terrorism” measures and the D Pipeline

Xi’s keynote numerology continues with eight proposals.

Xi Jinping emphasized that this summit had built a new platform for China and central Asia and opened new perspectives for cooperation between China and central Asia. China would like to hold this summit as an opportunity to work closely with all parties, and to plan, build and develop cooperation between China and central Asia well.
习近平强调,这次峰会为中国同中亚合作搭建了新平台,开辟了新前景。中方愿以举办这次峰会为契机,同各方密切配合,将中国-中亚合作规划好、建设好、发展好。

Firstly, we will strengthen the building of mechanisms. China has initiated the establishment of conferences and dialog mechanisms in the fields of industry and investment, agriculture, transportation, emergency management, education and political parties etc., so as to create a broad platform for comprehensive and for all sides beneficial cooperation.
一是加强机制建设。中方倡议成立产业与投资、农业、交通、应急管理、教育、政党等领域会晤和对话机制,为各国开展全方位互利合作搭建广泛平台。

Secondly, we will broaden economic and trade relations. China will launch more initiatives to facilitate trade, to improve bilateral investment agreements, to make full use of the “green channel” for smooth bilateral customs clearance of agricultural products and by-products, hold live-stream get-together activities3) between China and central Asia on the topic of central-Asian products.
二是拓展经贸关系。中方将出台更多贸易便利化举措,升级双边投资协定,实现双方边境口岸农副产品快速通关“绿色通道”全覆盖,举办“聚合中亚云品”主题活动,打造大宗商品交易中心。

Thirdly, deepening connectivity. China will upgrade cross-border transport capacities, support construction of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, promote the liberalization of the airfreight market, and develop regional logistical networks. It will strengthen the construction of train-consolidation centers within Trans-Eurasia Logistics, encourage superior businesses to establish overseas warehouses and build comprehensive digital service platforms.
三是深化互联互通。中方将全面提升跨境运输过货量,支持跨里海国际运输走廊建设,推进航空运输市场开放,发展地区物流网络。加强中欧班列集结中心建设,鼓励优势企业在中亚国家建设海外仓,构建综合数字服务平台。

Fourthly, expanding energy cooperation. China has initiated the China-central Asia energy partnership, accelerated the China-central Asia D-pipeline consgtruction, expanded the scale of bilateral oil and gas trade, developed cooperation on the complete energy value chain, and strengthened cooperation in the field of new energy and peaceful use of nucelar energy.
四是扩大能源合作。中方倡议建立中国-中亚能源发展伙伴关系,加快推进中国-中亚天然气管道D线建设,扩大双方油气贸易规模,发展能源全产业链合作,加强新能源与和平利用核能合作。

Five, six and seven are about promoting green energy, improving development capabilities, and dialog between civilizations. Item six may be interesting in terms of Chinese financial support for the central Asian states, partly non-repayable (无偿援助). this seems to spell preferential treatment for central Asia, as China has become known as a rather unforgiving creditor worldwide.

And item eight is mostly about East Turkestan. Obviously, neither that name, nor China’s preferred handle for it, “Xinjiang”, appear here, but that’s what it is mostly about. Cyber security and reconstruction of Afghanistan are also mentioned.

China-style modernization (中国式现代化)

Then Xi describes recent political events in China, and issues an invitation again.

Concluding, Xi Jinping pointed out that the CPC’s 20th National Congress has specified the central tasks of comprehensively building a socialist, modern and strong country, to achieve the second centenary goal, to comprehensively carry forward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by means of Chinese-style modernization. We want to strengthen theoretical and practical exchange with central Asian countries about modernization, promote connections of development, and create still more opportunities for cooperation, and joint efforts of our six countries in their modernization processes. Let us work hand in hand, struggle collectively, actively promote common development, common prosperity, and welcome a better future for our six countries together!
习近平最后指出,中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会明确了全面建成社会主义现代化强国、实现第二个百年奋斗目标、以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴的中心任务。我们愿同中亚国家加强现代化理念和实践交流,推进发展战略对接,为合作创造更多机遇,协力推动六国现代化进程。让我们携手并肩,团结奋斗,积极推进共同发展、共同富裕、共同繁荣,共同迎接六国更加美好的明天!

Replies

Then it is the turn of the visiting five.

The five central Asian heads of state, one after another, thanked China for initiating and successfully holding the first China-central Asia summit, and they evaluated the fruitful results of the comprehensive cooperation positively. they said that the central-Asian countries shared a millenium of profound friendship with China, had always helped each other, trusted each other as good neighbors, good friends, and good partners, and the most sincere old friends at the Yang Pass4) in China’s West. Currently, China has become a key force in ensuring global security and stability, and the promotion of technological and economic development. Cooperation with China is an important and essential factor for all countries to achieve sustainable development. Further deepening relations with China is in line with the hopes of the five central Asian countries peoples, and each country’s fundamental and long-term interests. The China-Central Asia Summit will provide a new platform for cooperation between the central Asian countries with China and show the way into the new era of the two sides’ relations. All sides welcome and appreciate china’s policy of friendly cooperation with central Asia, wish to continue to give full play to the heads of states’ diplomatically leading strategic roles, make the mechanisms from the summit bigger and stronger, strengthen top-level design and overall planning, deepen central Asian countries’ comprehensive pragmatic cooperation with China, to bring about more benefits for all the peoples of every country, to help with all countries achieving common development and prosperity, and to make contributions to the promotion of regional security and stability.
中亚五国元首先后发言,感谢中方倡议并成功主办首届中国-中亚峰会,积极评价中亚国家同中国全方位合作取得的丰硕成果。他们表示,中亚国家同中国拥有千年友好和深厚情谊,始终是相互支持、相互信赖的好邻居、好朋友、好伙伴,是中国西出阳关最真挚的故人。当前,中国已经成为保障全球安全稳定和促进科技经济发展的关键力量,同中国合作是各国实现可持续发展不可或缺的重要因素,进一步深化中亚五国同中国的关系符合各国人民共同愿望,符合各国根本和长远利益。中国-中亚峰会为中亚国家同中国合作提供了新平台,引领双方关系进入了新时代。各方欢迎并赞赏中国对中亚友好合作政策,愿继续充分发挥元首外交战略引领作用,做大做强中国-中亚峰会机制,加强顶层设计和统筹规划,深化中亚国家同中国全方位务实合作,为各国人民带来更多福祉,助力各国实现共同发展繁荣,并为促进地区安全稳定作出应有贡献。

The five heads of state said that they firmly supported each others’ choices in line with their own countries national conditions and development paths, firmly defended all countries’ sovereignty, independence, security, territorial integrity and other core interests, and firmly opposed interference in other countries’ domestic politics. They rated highly Chairman Xi Jinping’s concept of a community of common destiny of mankind and global security initiative, global development initiative, global civilizations initiative, and said they would conscientiouyly implement the important consensus and results achieved at this summit. By using the opportunity of the “one-belt-one-road” initiative ten years ago, they would strengthen their respective countries’ develop strategies to the joint building of “one belt one road”, promote regional online communications, deepen trade and investment, agricultural, energy, technological, security etc. pragmatic cooperation, strengthen civilizational exchange, jointly react to challenges, achieve cooperation and win-win, and build a still closer chinese-central Asian community.
五国元首表示,坚定支持彼此选择符合本国国情的发展道路,坚定维护各国主权、独立、安全、领土完整等核心利益,坚决反对干涉他国内政。他们高度评价习近平主席提出的构建人类命运共同体理念以及全球安全倡议、全球发展倡议、全球文明倡议,表示将认真落实此次峰会达成的重要共识和成果,以共建“一带一路”倡议提出十周年为契机,加强各自国家发展战略同共建“一带一路”对接,推进地区互联互通,深化贸易投资、农业、能源、科技、安全等领域务实合作,加强人文交流,共同应对挑战,实现合作共赢,构建更加紧密的中国-中亚命运共同体。

Concluding events

Newsitem #1 ends with a note that a “Xi’an Declaration of the China-Central Asia Sumiit” was signed, and that a “List of Outcomes of the China-central Asian Summit” was adopted. The second summit is scheduled for 2025, in Kazakhstan, and a permanent secretariat to be established in China.

The newsitem ends with Xi and the five visiting heads of state “meeting journalists” and their planting of six pomeganate trees.

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Notes

1)  Evening newsitems, May 19

  #1 Xi Jinping hosts first Chinese-central Asian summit
  #2 Xi Jinping and the five heads of state meet journalists
  #3 May 18 banquet, May 19 first-ladies’ program
  #4 Short reference to a CCTV editorial on summit
  #5 Li Qiang holds regular state-council meeting
  #6 Li Qiang meets with President of Kyrgyzstan
  #7 Wang Huning meets with delegates from a symposium commemorating the 70th anniversary of founding of the “Islamic Association of China”
  #8 Wang Huning meets with President of Kyrgyzstan
  #9 Li Xi visits places in Fujian for inspection and research
#10 News in brief 

2) also known as “community of shared future”

3)  I wouldn’t have found this translation myself; it’s taken from the official English translation of Xi’s keynote speech, and “live-streaming sales event to further promote Central Asian products” appears to be the translation for ““聚合中亚云品”主题活动” (if it isn’t an earlier or more recent transation)
4) English: “Sun Gate”, as described here by Wikipedia. The Yangguan or Sun Gate also plays a role in Tang poetry.

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Saturday, March 25, 2023

Sino-Russian Joint Statement concerning the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era

The following are my takeaways from the  current March 2023 “Sino-Russian Joint Statement concerning the Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era”.

Many topics had been touched upon before, in Beijing’s and Moscow’s “joint statement on international relations”, issued in Beijing in February 2022, but that statement had been issued shortly before Russia tried a full invasion of Ukraine.

According to the March 2023 statement, Sino-Russian relations are not similar to military and political alliances of the cold-war era, and not directed against third countries. Beijing and Moscow say they want to build “exemplary major-power relations” – viewing each others as “priority partners”, respecting each other all along, and treating each other as equals.

That’s basically the same model Xi Jinping tried to introduce into Chinese-American relations ten years ago, as described by Xinhua back then in June 2013, and further explained by Yang Jiechi, CPC Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group secretary at the time.

The March 2023 statement then highlights the usual emerging multi-polar world, one where “peace, development, cooperation and win-win are the unstoppable historic trend” (reads as if there had been no international cooperation before 2023), and an increasingly strong position of emerging markets and developing countries and where regional powers (地区大国, Russia? :)))  “resolutely defend their legitimate interests”.

sputnik_rt_coverage
Bragging in German, eating humble pie in Chinese: Sputnik/Rossya Segodnya propaganda celebrates first anniversary of full-scale Ukraine invasion as “dawn of a new world order (Febr 24, 2023) and covers Russia’s support for “China’s core interests” (March 22, 2023)

Economic Cooperation

The two sides “adhere to the principle of mutual benefit” and intend to further deepen cooperation in the fields of modernisation.  A fair and predictable investment environment is to be created, and financial cooperation (with increased use of own currencies) and mutual supplies of agricultural products and food (互输农产品和粮食的多样性和供应量) are also on the agenda. There’s talk about diversity in those supplies, too, so it seems to avoid the question if this is meant to support food security in China, or if it is just meant to make Russian markets more diverse.
Increased use of own currencies isn’t a new topic. Xi Jinping raised the topic in a speech to a Gulf-Cooperation Council audience, too, in December last year, and Putin had advocated it as soon as in 2008. Cooperation on technology and innovation, such as AI, internet of things, 5G, low-carbon economy are also mentioned by the 2023 joint statement.

The remarks about iinvestment also refer to a Sino-Russian Investment Cooperation Planning Outline (中俄投资合作规划纲要), which is part of the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship.  Supply chain stability and security, optimized trade structures and cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises of both sides are to be promoted.

It’s hard to tell from declarations like this one how far it will help Russia to develop its economy, but it does probably throw Moscow an economic lifeline. That, however, goes without saying even without this month’s joint statement. China doesn’t want Putin to go under.

Russian-Ukrainian war

Which leads us to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The two sides express deep concern about comprehensive challenges for international security, express believe that there is a shared fate of all countries and peoples and that no country should achieve its own security at the costs of other countries’ security.
双方对国际安全面临的严峻挑战深表关切,认为各国人民命运与共,任何国家都不应以他国安全为代价实现自身安全。

It hadn’t read much differently in February 2022, a few weeks prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine:

The sides are gravely concerned about serious international security challenges and believe that the fates of all nations are interconnected. No State can or should ensure its own security separately from the security of the rest of the world and at the expense of the security of other States. The international community should actively engage in global governance to ensure universal, comprehensive, indivisible and lasting security.

Less obviously related to the Ukraine war, maybe, but from the 2023 statement, one year on:

The two sides emphasize the significance of the “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races” and reaffirm that “a nuclear war cannot be won or won”.
双方强调《五个核武器国家领导人关于防止核战争与避免军备竞赛的联合声明》的重要意义,重申“核战争打不赢也打不得”。

How reliable this assurance will be, remains to be seen. Russia has toyed with nuclear threats during the past year, and continues to do so.

Multipolar World

In the broadly  and vaguely defined field of “terrorism”, the 2023 statement is more detailed than in that of 2022, demanding “objective, fair and professional” investigation of Nord Stream attack (应对“北溪”管线爆炸事件进行客观、公正、专业的调查) and agreeing to strengthening law enforcement cooperation concerning the “three evils”, including color revolutions, East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), transnational organized crime, economic crimes, and drugs trade. Listing ETIM, popular uprisings and organized crime in one go is certainly an intentional step to make the Sino-Russian public (and unknown swathes of international public opinion) get used to this kind of world view.

As for the world beyond bilateral relations, the multipolar one with the unstoppable historic trends of peace, development, cooperation and win-win, Beijing and Moscow emphasize “the democratization of international relations“, every country’s “right to choose its own path of development (with the likely exceptions of Taiwan and Ukraine, if it is up to China and Russia), and a continued implementation of the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Eurasian Economic Union signed on May 17, 2018.*)

Taiwan

As mentioned before, “democratization of international relations” isn’t for everyone in the Sino-Russian statements  – not for Ukraine or Taiwan.

Russia reiterates its scrupulous respect of the one-China principle, acknowledges that Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory, opposes any form of “Taiwan independence”, firmly supports China’s actions to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
(俄方重申恪守一个中国原则,承认台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分,反对任何形式的“台独”,坚定支持中方维护本国主权和领土完整的举措。)

Indeed, both issues. Ukraine and Taiwan, are closely related. Both China and Russia intend to annex foreign territory (Russia has already done so, although not to the extent  it would like to, and China, if it wants to attack Taiwan, will have to depend on its Russian hinterland. However, Moscow’s compliance with Beijing’s “one-China” charade is no particular hint into that direction, as it is being played along with by many other countries too, although in varying degrees. All the same, China’s planned aggression of its own, against Taiwan, is one of the reasons why it needs to cultivate relations with Moscow as closely as it does.

Military concerns

China and Russia (apparently) see U.S. in breach of Biological Weapons Convention, and call for institutionalized effective inspection mechanisms. Demands for  were quite likely included at Russia’s particular request. The Ukraine bioweapons conspiracy theory of March 2022 – a year ago – may remain a scarecrow in the Moscow muppet show, and probably works well on parts of the global public. The March 2023 statement deplores a U.S. “cold-war mentality” and the “negative influence” of the Indo-Pacific Strategy” on regional peace and stability in that region.

As far as Beijing and Moscow are concerned, NATO isn’t welcome in the Indo-Pacific either. The statement says that NATO should remain a regional (i. e. European) and defensive alliance. The statement also expresses concern about NATO “undermining” Asia-Pacific “peace & stability”.

Generally speaking, China seems to get more out of the strategic partnershp and the “major-power relationship” than Russia. That becomes obvious, because apart from the EAEU bits, most concerns are rather about China’s than about Russia’s. There are, however, demands that there should be no unilateral sanctions without approval of the United Nations Security Council (not an issue in the 2022), and a note that

the two sides oppose politization of international cultural cooperation, and discrimination against people in the fields of culture, education, science, and sports, based on nationality, language, religion, political or other beliefs, or national or social origin.
双方反对国际人文合作政治化,反对以国籍、语言、宗教、政治或其他信仰、民族或社会出身为由歧视文化、教育、科学、体育界人士。

This may be read as a hint to the “Olympic Committee”, among others.

Covid Pandemic

I’ve left that out here. Both Sino-Russian statements, Febr 2022 and March 2023, are full of it, with the usual complaints and demands, but the world is moving on.

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Note

*)   There needs to be a mention of the institution that are supposed to help bring about the multipolar world, according to Beijing and Moscow. That would be – according both to this month’s and the 2022 statements – the WTO (including remarks that can be read as a Chinese reaction to “discrimination” against it concerning the chip industry), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, G20, and APEC. Accession of the African Union was added to the G20 issue this time, but hadn’t been a year ago.

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Related / Updates

「主要重点是经济方面和高科技领域」, sputnik.cn, Mar 26, 2023
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Friday, March 17, 2023

Xi Jinping: “Immeasurable Splendor, many Tribulations”

The following is an excerpt from Xi Jinping’s acceptance speech on March 13 after his “re-election” as State Chairman of the PRC.

It starts with some pseudo-history: Xi doesn’t explicitly place “semi-colonialism” and “semi-feudalism” into the same number of years or centuries, but whoever would like to take away the impression that everything that went wrong in China was the fault of foreign imperialists is free to do so.

20230313_xi_jinping_on_his_way
Oh-so honored

This has become part of building narratives in Chinese propaganda; Xi took a similar approach when “retelling” the history of the Korean War. in 2020. The guise of innocence in international relations isn’t as much about openly lying, but to leave any aspects out of the stories that might be inconvenient.

Main Link: Speech at the first session of the 14th National People’s Congress (在第十四届全国人民代表大会第一次会议上的讲话)

Delegates!
各位代表:

This assembly has elected me Chairman of the PRC for another term. I would like to express my sincere thanks for the trust all delegates and all the country’s nationalities have placed in me!
这次大会选举我继续担任中华人民共和国主席,我对各位代表和全国各族人民的信任,表示衷心感谢!
This is my third term at the sublime position as State Chairman. The people’s trust is my main motivation for further progress, and also a heavy responsibility to sholder. I will faithfully fulfill my duties as assigned by the constitution, with the needs of the state as my mission, the people’s interests as the criteria, I will work with devotion, wholeheartedly and respectfully, and never betray the great trust of the delegates and all the country’s nationalities!
这是我第三次担任国家主席这一崇高职务。人民的信任,是我前进的最大动力,也是我肩上沉甸甸的责任。我将忠实履行宪法赋予的职责,以国家需要为使命,以人民利益为准绳,恪尽职守,竭诚奉献,绝不辜负各位代表和全国各族人民的重托!

Delegates!
各位代表!

In it’s 5,000 years of civilizational history, the Chinese nation has created immeasurable splendor, and also been through many tribulations. During modernity1), China, step by step, became a semicolonial and semifeudal society, suffering from the great powers’ bullying and humiliation, being partitioned, undergoing the chaos of war, and the bitterness of the people being in terrible situations. The Communist Party of China has, after its foundation, tightly united and led all nationalities and people of the country, gone through a century of struggle, wiped out the national humiliation, the Chinese people has become master of its own destiny, the Chinese people have welcomed the huge leap2) from standing up to getting rich, from getting rich to becoming strong. The Chinese nation has taken an irreversible historical turn.
具有五千多年文明史的中华民族,在历史上创造了无数辉煌,也经历过许多磨难。近代以后,中国逐步成为半殖民地半封建社会,饱受列强欺凌、四分五裂、战乱频繁、生灵涂炭之苦。中国共产党成立之后,紧紧团结带领全国各族人民,经过百年奋斗,洗雪民族耻辱,中国人民成为自己命运的主人,中华民族迎来了从站起来、富起来到强起来的伟大飞跃,中华民族伟大复兴进入了不可逆转的历史进程。

From now on to this mid-century, comprehensively building a strong, modern socialist country and promoting the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the entire party’s, the entire country’s and the entire people’s central duty. The relay baton of building a strong country and of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people has been assigned to us by history. In accordance with the party’s 20th National Congress’s srategic arrangements, we will coordinate and promote the general concept of the “Integration of the Five Dimensions”, coordinate the concept of the “Four Comprehensives”, accelerate the construction of Chinese-style modernization, unite and struggle, pioneer and innovate, and make contributions on the new journey that live up to the era, to history, to the people’s achievements, so as to promote the construction of a strong country and to the national rejuvenation!
从现在起到本世纪中叶,全面建成社会主义现代化强国、全面推进中华民族伟大复兴,是全党全国人民的中心任务。强国建设、民族复兴的接力棒,历史地落在我们这一代人身上。我们要按照党的二十大的战略部署,坚持统筹推进“五位一体”总体布局、协调推进“四个全面”战略布局,加快推进中国式现代化建设,团结奋斗,开拓创新,在新征程上作出无负时代、无负历史、无负人民的业绩,为推进强国建设、民族复兴作出我们这一代人的应有贡献!

[…]

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Notes

1) Seems this could be translated as after modernity, but that wouldn’t make sense to me because 近代 – among Chinese, and not among Americans or Taiwanese – usually refers to the times from around 1912 and 1949. Among the latter, it would be from the late Ming dynasty to 1912.
2) not to be confused with the “great leap forward” (see “Gasps of Admiration”, Xi’s “Resisting U.S., aiding Korea” commemorative speech, 2020)
Sunday, March 5, 2023

CCTV Editorial: “The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference has special points of superiority”

The following is a translation of experpts from an editorial published by China Central Television (CCTV) on Sunday. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

The topic: the “Two Sessions”, i. e. the sessions of China’s rubberstamp “parliament”, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

Main Link: Attentive hearts, massed forces, going on an expedition full of glory and dreams together (凝心聚力,共赴充满光荣和梦想的远征)

liang_hui_national_minorities
From CCTV coverage (see “main link” above picture for source)

[…]
[…] We have constantly deepened our knowledge of the patterns of the development of democratic politics, we have been successfull in shaping whole-process people’s democracy and in promoting whole-process people’s democracy, and, in the 20th National Congress‘s work report, made comprehensive arrangements concerning development of whole-process people’s democracy and concerning the guarantee that the people is the master in its own house. Whole-process people’s democracy has become a major iconic innovative achievement in the field of our country`s democratic policies in the new era. It has greatly strengthened the entire party’s and the entire people’s self-confidence and stamina concerning democratic politics under socialism with Chinese characteristics.
[…..] 我们不断深化对民主政治发展规律的认识,形成全过程人民民主的重大理念,推动全过程人民民主取得历史性成就,并在党的二十大报告中对发展全过程人民民主、保障人民当家作主作出全面部署。全过程人民民主成为新时代我国民主政治领域具有重大创新意义的标志性成果,极大地增强了全党全国人民对中国特色社会主义民主政治的自信和底气。
As an organization of the United Front, a mechanism for multi-party cooperation and political consultation, and an important form of realizing people’s democracy, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference has special points of superiority under many aspects. Secretary general Xi Jinping gives a high level of attention to the CPPCC’s work, has thoroughly described the CPPCC’s mission and tasks in the new era, summarized the requirements to put efforts into key projects, to promote the two big issues of unity and democracy, to adhere to efforts both to advising and aggregating consensus, to effectively bringing into play the CPPCC’s superiorities and purpose, as well as to bring together the broad knowledge and strength of all parties, groups, nationalities, classes and personalities of all walks of life.
人民政协作为统一战线的组织、多党合作和政治协商的机构、人民民主的重要实现形式,具有多方面的独特优势。习近平总书记高度关注政协工作,深刻阐述新时代人民政协工作的使命任务、总体要求、着力重点,推动人民政协坚持团结和民主两大主题,坚持建言资政和凝聚共识双向发力,有效发挥人民政协在国家治理体系中的优势和作用,广泛凝聚起各党派、各团体、各民族、各阶层、各界人士的智慧和力量。
This year’s Two Sessions are following the victorious end of the 20th National Congress. To hold them well is of major significance and to promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with the party’s magnificent blueprint, to transform it, by statutory procedures, into joint people’s action, to bring the superiority of Communist Party of China’s leadership and the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics well into play, and to boost the morale of sons and daughters of China at home and abroad to be of one mind and of the same direction.
今年全国两会是在党的二十大胜利闭幕后召开的换届大会。开好这次大会,把党的二十大擘画的以中国式现代化推进中华民族伟大复兴的宏伟蓝图通过法定程序转化为国家意志和人民共同行动,对于发挥好中国共产党领导的政治优势和中国特色社会主义的制度优势,鼓舞海内外中华儿女心往一处想、劲往一处使,具有重大意义。
A great cause must be promoted step by step, and achieving magnificent goals requires the struggle of one generation after another. The delegates who are starting a new journey with a new term must have two broad pictures on their minds, improve their political stance, conscientiously carry out their duties, and take their own initiative toward success. They must thoroughly study and comprehensively implement Xi Jinping’s ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, make the propaganda of learning the 20th National Congress spirit their most important task, keeping to it during the entire process of their duties. […]
[…]
伟大的事业要一程接一程向前推进,实现宏伟目标需要一代又一代人接续奋斗。步入新征程,新一届全国人大代表、全国政协委员要胸怀两个大局,提高政治站位、认真履职尽责、主动担当作为。要深入学习全面贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想,把学习宣传贯彻党的二十大精神作为首要政治任务,贯穿于履职全过程。[…..]

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Related

Yang Liwei’s big family, March 21, 2019
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Friday, February 10, 2023

Xi Jinping’s Lecture: “More efficient and Fairer than Capitalism”

The following are translated excerpts from a speech given by Xi Jinping on Tuesday, at the opening ceremony of a “study class” or seminar of leading CPC and other “democratic parties‘” cadres.

Banner: "Study class for the implementation of Xi Jinping's ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and the spirit of the party's 20th national congress"
Banner: “Seminar for the implementation of Xi Jinping’s ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and the spirit of the party’s 20th national congress”

Main Link: Xinwen Lianbo, Febr 7, 2023

Links and footnotes within blockquotes added during translation.

Newly-joined members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and alternate members as well as provincial-level leading cadres studied the implementation of Xi Jinping’s ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and the spirit of the party’s 20th national congress.1) The seminar took place at the Central Party School (aka Chinese Academy of Governance) in the morning of February 7th. CPC Central Committee secretary general, State Chairman and Central Military Commissions’ chairman Xi Jinping gave an important speech there and emphasized that summarizing and deepening the theory of Chinese-style modernization is a major innovation from the 20th national congress of the CPC and the latest fruit of scientific socialism. Chinese-style modernization is a great fruit of a long and difficult search and practice conducted by the people of all nationalities, under the leadership of our party, achieved under great deprivation and at a huge price. We must add to it and cherish it, adhere to it forever and continuously expand and deepen it.

新进中央委员会的委员、候补委员和省部级主要领导干部学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想和党的二十大精神研讨班7日上午在中央党校(国家行政学院)开班。中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平在开班式上发表重要讲话强调,概括提出并深入阐述中国式现代化理论,是党的二十大的一个重大理论创新,是科学社会主义的最新重大成果。中国式现代化是我们党领导全国各族人民在长期探索和实践中历经千辛万苦、付出巨大代价取得的重大成果,我们必须倍加珍惜、始终坚持、不断拓展和深化。

Member of the politburo’s standing committee Li Qiang presided over the class opening ceremony, politburo standing committee members Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi were present.

中共中央政治局常委李强主持开班式,中共中央政治局常委赵乐际、王沪宁、蔡奇、丁薛祥、李希出席。

Xi Jinping pointed out that achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been the common dream of the Chinese people ever since modernity2), and countless people with lofty ideas had struggled for it and tried all kinds of ways, but failed in the end. Historically, the heavy responsibility of China’s modernization fell to the Communist Party of China.
习近平指出,实现中华民族伟大复兴是近代以来中国人民的共同梦想,无数仁人志士为此苦苦求索、进行各种尝试,但都以失败告终。探索中国现代化道路的重任,历史地落在了中国共产党身上。

Xi’s speech continues with a generous appropriation of the northern expedition, the agrarian revolution war, the Sino-Japanese war, and the civil war from 1945 to 1949 – those are all the CPC’s feats, in its own books. The CPC had overthrown the “three big mountains” (三座大山) – imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism3), made the People’s Republic of China “with the people in charge of its own affairs” or “master of their own house” (建立了人民当家作主的中华人民共和国),  achieved national independence (民族独立), people’s liberation (人民解放) so as to create the right conditions for modernization (为实现现代化创造了根本社会条件).

Xi Jinping emphasized that ever since the 18th national congress of the CPC, our party has continued its advance on foundations already laid by itself, continuously bringing about theoretical and practical innovative breakthroughs, successfully promoting and broadening Chinese-style modernization. We have deepened our knowledge, created the ideology of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, brought about the epochally soaring sinicization of Marxism, and new standards to follow in Chinese-style modernization.
习近平强调,党的十八大以来,我们党在已有基础上继续前进,不断实现理论和实践上的创新突破,成功推进和拓展了中国式现代化。我们在认识上不断深化,创立了新时代中国特色社会主义思想,实现了马克思主义中国化时代化新的飞跃,为中国式现代化提供了根本遵循。

[…]

We have continuously perfected our strategies, such as the strategy of relying on science to rejuvenate the nation, the strategy of developing a quality workforce in the new era, and the rural vitalization strategy, thus providing support for Chinese-style modernization.
我们在战略上不断完善,深入实施科教兴国战略、人才强国战略、乡村振兴战略等一系列重大战略,为中国式现代化提供坚实战略支撑。

[…]

Xi Jiinping pointed out that the party’s leadership was directly related to the fundamental direction of Chinese-style modernization, it’s future fate, and the final decision between success and failure. The leadership by the party decides the fundamental quality of Chinese-style modernization. Only if adhering to the party’s leadership without the slightest wavering, Chinese-style modernization will see a shining future and an economic renaissance. Otherwise, it will get off course, lose its soul and even commit subversive mistakes.
习近平指出,党的领导直接关系中国式现代化的根本方向、前途命运、最终成败。党的领导决定中国式现代化的根本性质,只有毫不动摇坚持党的领导,中国式现代化才能前景光明、繁荣兴盛;否则就会偏离航向、丧失灵魂,甚至犯颠覆性错误。

In this context, Xi also mentions five aspects that – in the leadership’s view – characterize a uniquely Chinese path towards modernization. “China Daily” provided an overview of them in English about a year ago, in an article published in March 2022.

Xi’s core message was “brimming with assertiveness”, German correspondent Fabian Kretschmer noted in an article for Germany’s green-leaning “taz” on Wednesday, one day after Xi’s classroom lecture. Also, Xi had described China’s development path as a role model for the Global South. Beijing had been trying for years to export its autocratic model of government.

Indeed,

Practice confirms that Chinese-style modernization is feasible, works in a stable fashion, and is the only correct path for national rejuvenation.

实践证明,中国式现代化走得通、行得稳,是强国建设、民族复兴的唯一正确道路。

[…]

Xi Jinping pointed out that Chinese-style modernization was deeply rooted in China’s excellent traditional culture, embodied the advanced quality of scientific socialism, drew on all of mankind’s excellent civilizational fruits, represented a civilizational development direction for mankind, unfolded a mental picture different from Western modernization, was a completely new type of human civilization. Chinese-style modernization had broken the myth that “modernization = westernization, unfolded another mental picture of modernization, broadened the choices of developing countries towards modernization, and provided a Chinese plan for searching a better human society system.
习近平指出,中国式现代化,深深植根于中华优秀传统文化,体现科学社会主义的先进本质,借鉴吸收一切人类优秀文明成果,代表人类文明进步的发展方向,展现了不同于西方现代化模式的新图景,是一种全新的人类文明形态。中国式现代化,打破了“现代化=西方化”的迷思,展现了现代化的另一幅图景,拓展了发展中国家走向现代化的路径选择,为人类对更好社会制度的探索提供了中国方案。中国式现代化蕴含的独特世界观、价值观、历史观、文明观、民主观、生态观等及其伟大实践,是对世界现代化理论和实践的重大创新。中国式现代化为广大发展中国家独立自主迈向现代化树立了典范,为其提供了全新选择。

If you forecast cadres’ working plans based on this rendition of Xi’s speech, the central-committee members and candidates as well as the “provincial-level cadres” are going to face difficult tasks:

Both [of these goals] are important: to create greater efficiency than in capitalism, and more efficient protection of social fairness, a better balance between efficiency and fairness at the same time – both of them promoting each other, and both of them integrating with each other.
既要创造比资本主义更高的效率,又要更有效地维护社会公平,更好实现效率与公平相兼顾、相促进、相统一。

In addition to that, Xi demands “continuously broadening high-level opening up” (不断扩大高水平对外开放), and “thorough participation in global division of labor and cooperation” (深度参与全球产业分工和合作) so as to create more room for “Chinese-style modernization”.  How far this spells cooperation with, say, America, the Netherlands or Taiwan, or rather with the “Global South”, remains to be seen. The speech is careful enough not to mention potential cooperation partners explicitly, as not all of them may be happily available for the “great rejuvenation”.

________________

Notes

1) Only the last lines of the article mentions another group of participants: dangwais (党外 or 党外人士). In this case, i. e. the Tuesday morning study class, this referred to “comrades from the democratic parties’ central committees, the all-China industrial and trade association, and others” (各民主党派中央、全国工商联及有关方面负责同志列席开班式).
2)  “Modernity” may not be the best choice to translate 近代 – jìndài may refer to modern times, recent history, or the years since the establishment of the PRC in 1949.
3)  官僚资本主义, translated “crony capitalism” by Baike-Baidu:
“bureaucrat-capitalism, also described as crony capitalism (裙带资本主义), clique capitalism (朋党资本主义), bigwigs capitalism (权贵资本主义), close-friends capitalism (密友资本主义) or relationship capitalism (关系资本主义), describes an economy where success in business depends on close relationships between entrepreneurs, business people, and government officials. […]”

Related

“Personal experience”, Jan 5, 2013

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Thursday, December 1, 2022

Protests: Don’t stirr Trouble, Comrade Jiang

The party leadership might be concerned that Jiang Zemin’s death could lead from public mourning to an idolization of the deceased leader, and to more protests from there (rhymes with “past leaders were better than you guys at the top”).

Also, the party may want to serve a reminder of what it can do if it considers its rule threatened (rhymes with June 4, 1989).

While the current protests are heavily censored, June 4, 1989 was mentioned in yesterday’s main evening news, in a read-out Jiang Zemin obituary, even if n ot as “liu-si”, but rather as ījiǔbājiǔ nián chūn xià zhī jiāo:

As mayor and as municipal party secretary of Shanghai, Comrade Jiang Zemin led the cadres and masses in Shanghai to raise their spirits and to daring exploration, promoting great breakthroughs in Shanghai’s opening-up and its socialist modernization. The development and opening-up of Pudong was taking shape, he promoted party-building, and the building of spiritual civilization and of society saw major progress. As spring passed into summer in 1989, serious political crisis occurred in our country. Comrade Jiang Zemin supported and carried out the Party Central Commission’s correct decision to take a clear-cut stand and to fight against turmoil, and the correct decision to defend socialist state power, to protect the fundamental interests of the people, and to closely rely on the numerous party members, cadres and masses to vigorously protect Shanghai’s stability.
一九八五年,江泽民同志任上海市市长、中共上海市委副书记。一九八七年,江泽民同志在党的十三届一中全会上当选为中共中央政治局委员,并任中共上海市委书记。担任上海市长、市委书记期间,江泽民同志带领上海广大干部群众振奋精神、勇于探索,推动上海改革开放和社会主义现代化建设取得重大突破,浦东开发开放蓄势谋篇,推动党的建设、精神文明建设、社会建设取得重大进步。一九八九年春夏之交我国发生严重政治风波,江泽民同志拥护和执行党中央关于旗帜鲜明反对动乱、捍卫社会主义国家政权、维护人民根本利益的正确决策,紧紧依靠广大党员、干部、群众,有力维护上海稳定。
In 1989, at the 13th Central Committee’s fourth plenary session, Comrade Jiang Zemin was elected into the politburo’s standing committee, and the central committee’s general secretary. The same year, the 13th central committee’s fifth plenary session made  Jiang Zemin should become chairman of the party’s central military commission.  In 1990, at the 7th National People’s Congress’ third session, he was elected chairman of the People’s Republic of China’s central military commission.
一九八九年,在党的十三届四中全会上,江泽民同志当选为中共中央政治局常委、中央委员会总书记。同年,党的十三届五中全会决定江泽民同志为中共中央军事委员会主席。一九九〇年,在七届全国人大三次会议上当选为中华人民共和国中央军事委员会主席。

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Related

王丹:就算江執政 中國也不會有民主, RTI, Dec 01, 2022
Popular History Reader, July 31, 2012
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Wednesday, November 30, 2022

Jiang Zemin, 1926 – 2022

Source: Wikimedia Commons - click picture for source

Wikimedia Commons – click picture for source

Jiang Zemin (江泽民), one of the CCP leadership’s many trained engineers, the man who invented the socialist market economy and the three represents, … Relatively untarnished by the June-4 crackdowns, he became the CCP’s chairman (or secretary general) in June 1989, by means of what official Chinese sources usually refer to as an “election”, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth CPC Central Committee.  Jiang had spent some time abroad, as a trainee at the Stalin Automobile Works in Moscow in 1955, and later worked in leading technical and party functions in trades as different as the automotive and soap-manfucaturing industries. His work turned more administrative and governmental some time after 1980.

In October 1992, he told the 14th CCP party congress that

To establish a socialist market economy we must do the following important and interrelated tasks.  First, we must change the way in which state-owned enterprises operate, especially the large and medium-sized ones, and push them into the market so as to increase their vitality and efficiency. This is the key to establishing a socialist market economy, consolidating the socialist system and demonstrating its superiority.

Based on Deng Xiaoping‘s concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义), the socialist market economy (社会主义市场经济) focused on growth – something Deng kept emphasizing, sometimes against opposition from more conservative party leaders such as Chen Yun. Even Jiang is said to have come fully behind Deng’s all-out advocacy of growth once the paramount elder had made his inspection tour to the south (i. e. Shenzhen), garnering local support for his reform agenda, and proving that he was still China’s most powerful man, even if (mostly) from backstage.

Unlike his mentor Deng Xiaoping, he was no revolutionary veteran, and therefore lacked some or much of the traditional authority to head the party’s central military commission at the time. He led the commission anyway, and worked to make it clear that he was no mere civilian business promoter, according to a short news notice by German newsmagazine Der Spiegel in January 1995:

Those who criticize me for raising glasses with Western leaders must understand that this is tactics,

he told PLA officers in Chengdu, according to a central committee document the Spiegel said it had on hand.

I’m aware that the West remains our main enemy.

Socialism with Chinese characteristics has remained one of the CCP’s slogans, even as Jiang’s (and Deng’s) propensity to growth lost favor among the fourth generation of party leadership, i. e. the previous (Hu-Wen led) politbureau. The term socialist market economy has become less frequently used. In June 2011, China Daily hailed the concept as evidence for the wisdom of the CPC and its able leadership of the Chinese people in their endeavor to build a prosperous, civilized, democratic and harmonious modern socialist state and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation only in June 2011, but left no doubt that the Deng-Jiang approach had been second stage in a three-stage development strategy, and that

Now we are striding forward toward the strategic objective of the third stage. From now to the mid-21st century, China will be in a period of in-depth development of industrialization, informatization, urbanization, marketization and internationalization, an important period of strategic opportunities for economic and social development, but also a period with prominent social contradictions.

The three-staged approach referred to by the above China-Daily article of June 2011 had been spelled out by Jiang Zemin’s predecessor Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), in 1987. Jiang was to replace Zhao two years later, after Zhao had been ousted in the process of the June-4 crackdown. Li Peng (李鹏), state council chairman at the time of the crackdown, and the Standing Committee of the “National People’s Congress” afterwards, referred to the third stage as a the one where

we will catch up with medium-level developed countries in terms of per capita GNP by the middle of this century, achieve modernisation by and large and turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic and culturally advanced socialist country,

in January 2001, speaking to an audience in India.

The Hong Kong handover in 1997 added to the glorious picture of growth, this time in terms of political power. But appointing the former British colony’s tycoon Tung Chee-hwa (董建華) as the chief executive of the newly-created special administrative region (or having him “elected”) was probably one of Jiang’s leadership’s less lucky choices. In October 2000, enraged by Hong Kong journalists’ questions about if the CCP supported Tung’s candidacy for a second term, and if so, how that support could play a role, if Tung was really to be elected, Jiang told the questioners that they were “too simple, sometimes nayifu”. Tung, deeply embarrassed (by his fellow Hong Kongers, his boss, or both sides), was laughing in the background.

In his angry lecture, Jiang also advised the Hong Kong press people to learn from Mike Wallace, an American anchorman who had interviewed him about a month earlier, in the seaside resort of Beidaihe. It had been an unusual  interview, by CCP leadership standards, one that Jiang had visibly enjoyed, and one that had probably gone very well for him, in terms of public relations. Compared to his successor, he came across as a cosmopolitan, with a certain command of several foreign languages, including English, Russian, and arguably some German. When Spiegel journalists met with Jiang in 2002, they were greeted in German, with no accent.

Jiang had stated the need to deepen the reform of the system of distribution and the system of social security, in his 14th CCP party congress speech of October 1992, but that was basically that. If in essence, the objective of socialism was to liberate and develop the productive forces, to eliminate exploitation and polarization, and ultimately to achieve common prosperity, liberating the productive forces certainly came first. Growing divides between rich and poor didn’t appear to trouble either Jiang, or Zhu Rongji‘s (朱镕基) state council.

Another trend however did – the growing influence of a qigong-related, or buddhism-related religious organization, Falun Gong. In reaction to an incident in Tianjin, a massive silent protest involving over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners or supporters was organised in Beijing on April 25, 1999. The CCP leadership declared Falun Gong an “evil cult” in July, 1999, and started a lasting crackdown, initially supplemented with extended evening news propaganda featuring allegations against the organization which were hardly more “scientific” than the “evil cult” itself. Here, too, Hong Kong’s unfortunate chief executive Tung Chee-hwa was walking on eggshells, trying to please both his superiors in Beijing, and the public in Hong Kong.

When Jiang stepped down as the CCP’s secretary general in November 2002, he had held the post for more than thirteen years. He relinquished state chairmanship in March 2003, and the party’s central military commission chairmanship in September 2004.

Jiang Zemin was born in Yangzhou, Jiangsu Province, in 1926. He is survived by his wife Wang Yeping (王冶坪, also born in Yangzhou), and by two sons, Jiang Mianheng (江绵恒) and Jiang Miankang (江绵康).

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Related
» Jiang Zemin’s Health Matters, July 8, 2011
» Tiger on the Brink, New York Times, about 1998

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Most headlines in during Jiang’s life after retirement came from Falun-Gong affiliated media. The close interest from these quarters was no coincidence.

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