Archive for ‘markets’

Monday, November 13, 2017

Cybercrime Report: “Major targets”

The following is a translation of an article by Xinhua newsagency. The cybercrime report reproduced by Xinhua on November 13 was apparently published nearly two weeks earlier, on November 1, with the keywords online fraud (网络诈骗), pretended moonlighting (虚假兼职), false shopping items (虚假购物), red envelopes (红包), finance (理财), cash returns (现返), and false identities (身份冒充).

While the reporting units are located in Beijing, the statistics refer to cases from all over China. According to the report, Guangdong, Shandong, Sichuan, Jiangsu, Henan, and Zhejiang provinces topped the list with 13.4%, 6.4%, 5.6%, 5.5%, 5.0%, and another 5.0% respectively.

Main Link: Men most easily fooled online, young users as fraudsters’ major targets

Xinhua Tianjin, Nov 13 2017 (Zhou Runjian reporting) — Online fraud reporting website Liewang’s1) “2017 third-quarter report on online fraud research” points out that there are more men than women among the victims of online fraud, especially men born from 1990 to 19992).

新华社天津11月13日电(记者周润健)国内网络诈骗信息举报平台——猎网平台最新发布的《2017年第三季度网络诈骗趋势研究报告》指出,在网络诈骗中,男性受害者占比大大高于女性,90后受害者最多。

The report says that among the accounts that reported cases, 67.4 percent were men, and 32.6 percent were women. However, men reported an average loss of 13.404 Yuan RMB, while women reported an average losso f 17.522 Yuan RMB.

报告指出,从报案用户的性别差异来看,男性受害者占比大大高于女性,分别占67.4%和32.6%;但从人均损失来看,男性为13404元,女性为17522元。

The report’s analysis says that in cyberlife, chances that women would be fooled are much smaller than with men, but that once women do trust a fraudster, they will frequently pay much more.

报告分析说,在网络生活中,女性的上当几率其实要比男性低得多,但女性一旦相信了骗子,往往会比男性付出更大的代价。

The report also points out that there are also significant differences between the occasions on which men and women are cheated. Those cheated in online gaming transactions, gambling, lotteries and establishing contacts, nearly 80 percent of those cheated are men, while most women become victims of refunding fraud and schemes that seem to offer moonlighting opportunities.

报告进一步指出,男性和女性在不同类型的网络诈骗中被骗几率也有明显不同。其中,在网游交易、赌博博彩、交友诈骗中,被骗的几乎80%都是男性,而退款诈骗、虚假兼职类诈骗是女性被骗比例最高的诈骗类型。

It is worth noting that there are also big differences in the ways men and women are cheated. Faked concurrent-job offers are the ones that most women are cheated with (28.3 percent), while the most frequent fraud reported by men is financial fraud (19.4 percent).

值得注意的是,男性和女性在被骗类型方面也有很大的区别。虚假兼职是女性被骗最多的类型,占比28.3%,男性被骗举报数量排名第一的是金融诈骗,占比为19.4%。

The report also says that 42.0 percent of online fraud victims are 1990ers, 29.7 percent are the second largest group with 29.7 percent, and 11.8 percent of the overall number are 1970ers with 11.8 percent. The specific age group focused on by online fraud are those aged between from 18 and to 31.

报告还指出,从被骗网民的年龄上看,90后的网络诈骗受害者占所有受害者总数的42.0%,其次是80后占比为29.7%,再次是70后占比为11.8%;从具体年龄上来看,18岁至31岁的人群是网络诈骗受害者最为集中的年龄段。

The report believes that young people with particular internet skills and extensive online time who, at the same time, lack sufficient social experience, are major targets and victims of online fraud.

报告认为,即具有一定的上网能力,上网时间较长,同时又缺乏足够社会经验的年轻人是网络诈骗的主要对象和主要受害人群。

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Notes

1) “Liewang” (“internet hunt”) is a cybercrime reporting website run by the “Beijing Alliance for Online Security and against Cybercrime”, which in turn is co-run by the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau (PBS) and Qihoo 360, an (apparently privately-owned) online security company.

2) 90后 (1990ers) refers to people born between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999

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Saturday, November 4, 2017

CNA: Zhu Rongji backs Xi Jinping Thoughts in rare public appearance

Main Link: Zhu Rongji backs Xi Jinping Thoughts in rare public appearance, CNA/RTI Taipei, Nov 4, 2017. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

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Former Chinese chief state councillor Zhu Rongji, who has rarely appeared publicly after his retirement, had a meeting with foreign guests on Monday afternoon (Oct 30), when he made a rare mention of politics, backing the Xi Jinping Thoughts, and expressing that this was the program of action in the CCP’s leadership of all of China.

自退休後便極少公開露面的前中國國務院總理朱鎔基10月30日下午會見外賓時,罕見提及政治議題,力挺習近平思想,並表示這是中共帶領全中國的「行動綱領」。

According to the official website of Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management, Zhu Rongji, in his capacity as the first dean who ever lead the school, met members of the School’s advisory board, including Apple CEO Tim Cook.

根據北京清華大學經濟管理學院官網公告,朱鎔基當天以首任院長身分在北京釣魚台國賓館會見蘋果執行長庫克(Tim Cook)在內的北京清華大學經濟管理學院顧問委員會委員。

Zhu Rongji said during the meeting that he had recently attended the CCP’s 19th National Congress. “This time’s congress took place at the stage of determining victory in the comprehensive building of a moderately well-off society. This important congress was held at a defining moment of the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

朱鎔基在會中表示,自己日前作為特邀代表出席中國共產黨第19次全國代表大會。「這次大會是在中國全面建成小康社會決勝階段、中國特色社會主義發展關鍵時期召開的一次重要會議。」

He said that “a string of major achievements” had been made politically, theoretically and practically, that elections had produced “a new generation of central collective leaders with [comrade] Xi Jinping as the core”, and that “Xi Jinping’s major thoughts for a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” had been established.

他表示,大會在政治上、理論上、實踐上取得了「一系列重大成果」,選舉產生了「以習近平同志為核心的新一代中央領導集體;創立了習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想」。

Zhu Rongji also mentioned that “Xi Jinping’s thoughts for the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics are the most recent achievement of sinicization of Marxism, the political propaganda and guiding action principles of our party as it unitedly leads all nationalities into the new era and as it develops socialism with Chinese characteristcs.”

朱鎔基還提到「習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想是馬克思主義中國化的最新成果,是我們黨團結帶領全國各族人民在新時代堅持和發展中國特色社會主義的政治宣言和行動綱領,必須長期堅持和不斷發展。」

Zhu Rongji lives a mostly secluded life after his retirement in 2003, and has made only very few public appearances. Mainland Chinese media also repeatedly reported that after retiring, Zhu Rongji had said that “without office and without planning politics, the most important principle is not to talk about work.” Zhu Rongji’s public discussion of political issues is really a rare sight.

朱鎔基自2003年卸任後便深居簡出,極少公開露面。中國大陸媒體也多次報導,朱鎔基退休後曾明確表示,「不在其位,不謀其政,最大的原則就是不談工作」。朱鎔基這次公開談論政治議題實屬罕見。

It is worth noting that according to a Xinhua newsagency report, CCP secretary general Xi Jinping also met members of the Tsinghua School of Economics and Management advisory board’s overseas members, and Chinese entrepreneurs who are also members, at the Great Hall of the People. Both meetings [with Zhu and Xi] even appeared to be accompanied by almost exactly the same staff.

值得注意的是,據新華社報導,中共總書記習近平當天也在北京人民大會堂會見北京清華經濟管理學院顧問委員會海外委員和中方企業家委員。連陪同會見的人員都幾乎一模一樣。

Among them were Chinese state council vice chief councillor Liu Yandong, Ma Kai, CPPCC vice chairman Chen Yuan, and [central] People’s Bank of China governor Zhou Xiaochuan. Only CCP general office director Ding Xuexiang was an additional participant in the meeting with Xi Jinping.

其中包括,中國國務院副總理劉延東、馬凱,全國政協副主席陳元、中國人民銀行行長周小川。習近平會見外賓時只多了中共中央辦公廳主任丁薛祥。

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Friday, April 1, 2016

Media Coverage on Ministry of Education’s (MoE) “Blue Book” on Returning Overseas Students and the Labor Market

The Chinese ministry of education (MoE) published a “blue book”, or a government report, on March 25, concerning overseas Chinese students returning to China, and looking for a job there. If Chinese press and government agency coverage on the report is something to go by, this is what the average academic returnee to the motherland looks like:

he is actually mostly a she (59.16 percent of the returnees are female), aged 23 to 33 (absolute average 27.04 yrs old), a masters student (80.7 percent), a postgraduate (9,49 percent), or an undergraduate / a student with a specialized subject (9.81 percent combined). If a postgraduate, his main fields should mainly be chemistry, material science, economics, electronics and electrical engineering, while the masters fields of study are somewhat more into the direction of finance, accounting, business management, management studies, or international business studies.

Statistics seem to suggest that there have been more returnees recently, than the 1978 to 2015 average numbers. Either way, the MoE’s Overseas Students’ Support Center deputy director Xu Peixiang (徐培祥) is quoted as saying that some 70 to 80 percent of students, in recent years, have returned after their studies abroad.1)

97 percent of those who currently study abroad are doing so at their own expense, which appears plausible when looking at the total numbers. In 2015 alone, 523,700 students reportedly left for studies abroad, and 409,100 job-seeking overseas students returned to China that year. By comparison, 248 students left China for studies abroad in 1978, according to Xinhua newsagency.

Very rough calculations with many unknowns: given that 459,800 Chinese left China to study abroad in 2014, according to this government-agency news report, the average of students leaving in 2014 and 2015 combined would be (459,800 + 523,700)/2 = 491,750, and based on an average duration of 22 months (more precisely 21.47 months) of studies abroad among the 2015 returnees,  this would mean that about 901,542 Chinese students would currently be abroad.

Three percent of these would then not study at their own expense (or that of their parents, relatives, etc.). Some 27,000 of the 901,542 abroad would, based on my shoddy calculation, study with a government grant, a scholarship, etc.. And probably, very few, if any, among the 248 who went abroad in 1978, were self-paying students.

23.85 percent of the 2015 returnees have been looking for a job in state-owned companies, 19.4 percent prefer minban operations2), and foreign-invested enterprises, state institutions and financial institutions rank third, fourth and fifth, respectively, in the returnees search settings. Only 3.32 percent want to establish businesses of their own (one percentage point up, compared to the 2014 returnees).

When it comes to location and company types, the returnees haven’t necessarily followed their ideas of perfect companies and locations, but looked at some hard facts (and regulations), and have therefore looked for jobs that appeared to be closer within their reach. Either way, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are still very popular destinations, with 49.34 percent indicating these goals, but this is said to be eight percentage points less than in 2013. This share is now basically focused on other provincial-capital-level cities.

Being in a position to pay for ones studies abroad doesn’t necessarily translate into perfect (or labour-market-oriented) choices, according to the news coverage. Qi Mo (齐默), head of the returnee office at the MoE, is quoted as stating “a certain blindness” in terms of how students (and their parents) are choosing fields of studies (or majors) and places (cities and universities) abroad. Hence, the MoE was trying to provide candidates for self-paid overseas studies, as well as their families, with information to support their choices, according to Qi.

It isn’t strongly highlighted in the news, but it becomes fairly evident that while Xu Peixiang points out how returning overseas students have become a group that receives great attention at our country’s market of talents, there may be particular challenges for returning overseas students, too. When a Xinhua article mentions measures like bases (or opportunities) for practical work as supportive measures for returnees to integrate into the labor market (this might also be translated as internship opportunities), you might suspect some frustration and trouble there. After all, such “opportunities” are hardly the financial return self-paying students (and their families and networks) would expect on their investment (or borrowings).

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Footnotes

1) According to statistics quoted in the Chinese press coverage on the MoE “blue book”, 4.04 million Chinese students have studied abroad from 1978 to 2015. 2.22 million of them have returned so far.

2) minban is a poorly defined term. There are, of course, many ways to find definitions anyway. Dorothy J Solinger, in “China’s Transition from Socialism”, first published in 1993, suggested that

there are three main types: those […] which are supposedly owned and managed by “people” (minyou-minban); those owned by the state but managed by “people” (guanyou-minban); and those jointly operated and owned by the state and the “people” (guanmingongyou).

And in 1999/2000, Guoqiang Tian, now a professor at Texas A & M University and in China, discussed in a paper on Property Rights and the Nature of Chinese Collective Enterprises why collective enterprises, especially township and village enterprises (TVEs) had – those sixteen years ago, anyway – developed more rapidly than privately owned enterprises, in China.

General note: I have no information about survey’s return rate among the former overseas students.

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Tuesday, February 2, 2016

“Internet Plus” Updates

As Chinese economic growth isn’t quite itself these days, the innovation buzzword keeps growing. State chief councillor Li Keqiang‘s Internet Plus action plan, described in some detail on March 5 last year in his work report to the Third Session of the 12th “National People’s Congress”, is being revived as a news item and covered here by the Washington Post. The article describes an internet town near Haikou as a place where little else can be done:

According to the local government, the Internet Town project will cover the entire Shishan township in 2018, with the completion of an online trading platform and an operation center as well as other facilities. The project will be a major engine for local growth, creating a new source of income for farmers along with the tourism industry that features volcanic tours.

Meantime, the English-language “Global Times” focuses on places where a lot of things that make sense could be done, and where a number of building owners (you can’t say landlord in China) fell for the business concepts of kids whose first profession was to be their daddies’ sons (reportedly, anyway), and who burnt their business war chests rather than using them mindfully. But obviously, the article is generally optimistic about a phoenix [that] will rise from the ashes of the first wave of China’s tech boom.

Chinese innovation may not be exactly what Japan’s industry is waiting for, but Chinese growth is. Ikuo Hirata, a columnist with a number of Japanese papers, suggests that Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe should stop counting on China’s economy as a booster for Abenomics, and that the government should lower its growth target.

Hirata also warns that

[w]hile working to reduce excess capacity in the steel and other traditional sectors, Chinese policymakers are also trying to help high-tech industries, such as robotics, sophisticated machine tools and aerospace, catch up with their rivals in advanced economies. The technological prowess of a country that has a successful manned space mission under its belt should not be underestimated.

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Related

» Traditional industries, new bones, April 17, 2015

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Friday, January 8, 2016

Human Rights and Economic Records: Botched Measures and Terrible Occurrences

Before the old (lunar) year leaves and a new comes in, things need to be tidied up in China. However, efforts to calm the stock markets by new management measures appear to have been unsuccessful. And in Hong Kong, where RMB trading, is unrestricted, people pay less for China’s currency, according to the New York Times.

There’s still other bad news, and the indicator in this case, too, is Hong Kong.

“Something terrible has happened. We are all afraid. We are leaving now,” an employee told me a few hours before locking the doors for the foreseeable future.

That’s how the BBC‘s correspondent in the former British colony, Juliana Liu, concluded an entry in the broadcaster’s China blog on Monday, and the topic, of course, is the case of five Hong Kong citizens, all associated with the Causeway Bay Bookstore, who have gone missing since October last year. The latest case is Paul Lee, and he went missing late in December.

Hong Kong’s SCMP, one of East Asia’s leading English-language papers, but one with an uncertain future, reported on Monday the first precept speech by a Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. The guy who’s imitating the late great dictator is, of course, current party secretary general, state chairman, and the central military commissions’ (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping. The speech is seen as part of Xi’s efforts to reform China’s military, but obviously, the – probably intended – signal goes beyond the armed forces project.

Given that no other former CMC chairman, from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, had given a military precept, an associate professor at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law concludes that Xi’s power and authority is even higher than them.

This may or may not be true. If  Wang Qishan, rather than Li Keqiang, ranks second in terms of power or influence within the party, the assessement may be correct. But then, maybe Deng Xiaoping, who faced open ideological competition at times by more conservative party veterans like Chen Yun, simply didn’t need to show off his autority by admonishing the military.

Back then, too, the party was corrupted. But that was at a time when – or that’s how it felt, anyway – everyone had a chance to become rich. Now, there’s a two-fold challenge of corruption and slowing growth.

This could mean that Xi has powers because potential rivals do not want to challenge him, so as not to rock the not-so-stable boat.

If China’s regime manages the switch from an export-led economy to a more services-oriented economy successfully, the doubts in Beijing’s macro-economic control of the economy won’t persist – some disappeared people, in China or elsewhere, have never been a great concern to business.

All the Xidadamania aside however, confidence in mainland China, in Hong Kong, and abroad, appears to be slipping, at least currently.

In an interview with German national radio on Thursday, Markus Taube, a professor at a university in Germany’s Ruhr region, stated “a massive loss of confidence” in China:

What we see in China at the moment, definitely, is a massive loss of confidence. All market actors can see that the CCP has clearly lost its former control capacity. Until now, the Chinese market was always a very [unreadable] […]. Now, this ability to lead isn’t in place and that the state has failed several times, on its own promises.

Das, was wir in China momentan definitiv sehen ist ein massiver Vertrauensverlust. Alle Marktakteure sehen, dass die Kommunistische Partei offensichtlich ihre frühere Steuerungskapazität verloren hat. Bislang war der chinesische Markt immer ein sehr [unreadable] … Fundamentaldaten haben da kaum eine Rolle gespielt, und es war das Vertrauen einfach da, dass die Partei, der Staat, im Endeffekt die Richtung vorgibt [unreadable]. Jetzt ist es so, dass diese Führungsfunktion fehlt und dass der Staat mehrfach versagt hat, auf seine eigenen Versprechen hin.

Not least, Taube said, the “anti-corruption campaign” has discouraged Chinese decisionmakers in charge of approving (or delaying) investment projects.

Given that Chinese control mechanisms – concerning the financial markets – are out of order, Taube, with an audible sigh, introduces an old friend from the 2009 tool cabinet:

It sounds unorthodox, but probably, in the current situation, it would be more appropriate to issue another stimulus package, in that the state, again, to a great extent, pumps money into the economy. A classical Keynesian stimulus package to create state-induced demand so as to restore the economic dynamics on a basic level.

Es klingt sehr unorthodox, aber wahrscheinlich ist es in der momentanen Situation tatsächlich eher angesagt, ein klassisches Konjunkturpaket wieder aufzusetzen, einen Stimulus, in dem der Staat einfach in großem Maße wieder Geld in die Volkswirtschaft hineinpumpt. Also ein klassisches keynesianisches Konjunkturprogramm, in dem einfach staatlich induziert Nachfrage geschaffen wird, und damit einfach die volkswirtschaftliche Dynamik auf einem grundlegenden Level wieder stabilisiert wird.

That said, Taube doesn’t judge the situation by standards of five-year plans, or by taking the long view, as recommended by the Lord of the Confucius Institutes. Taube advocates a stimulus because the methods tried more recently haven’t worked and wouldn’t turn the tide for the coming six months.

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Updates/Related

» Executives Disappearing, HP, Jan 8, 2016

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Saturday, December 19, 2015

2015 Review (2): China Radio International sheds ten Subsidiaries after 2014 Inspection

According to reports published in China’s online press on May 6, 2015, the “4th inspection team”, one out of at least thirteen inspection teams coordinated by Wang Qishan‘s central leading group for inspection work ( 中央巡视工作领导小组), conducted an inspection at China Radio International (CRI) from November 27, to December 26, 2014, i. e. a year ago. Apparently, the inspection wasn’t designed to kill, but rather to rectify or cut back on some particularly thriving business within the CRI empire. Either way, no criminal offenses were mentioned in the May-6 reports. The 4th inspection team provided CRI’s party branch with feedback on February 5, 2015, making recommendations for stronger financial management and control, and enhanced budget supervision and reporting systems.

According to the same reports or bulletins, the Guoguang company, CRI’s investment vehicle, closed (撤销) four of CRI’s subsidiary companies and withdrew (退出) from another six companies, in what appears to be the consequences of the inspection. Guoguang also caught Reuters‘ attention in an unrelated report published in November this year.

China Radio International postal envelope

According to World of Radio in spring 2015, Keith Perron, a broadcasting entrepreneur from Taiwan, suggested that a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference  committee was looking

into the effectiveness of shortwave as a [unreadable] platform for China Radio International.

This may or may not have been the case, but apparently, rumors during spring, ahead of the “4th inspection team’s” feedback session with the CRI party officials, were surfacing, and suggested that in one or another way, CRI’s nerves were being tested.

CRI director Wang Gengnian ‘s (王庚年) position apparently hasn’t been affected by the inspection or its results. On Thursday, he signed a cooperation agreement on behalf of CRI, with an organization  named MKP Media (or MKR Media?), represented by Ivan Polyakov of the Russian-Chinese business council (俄中双边企业家理事会), if this report describes CRI’s new Russian partners correctly. China’s chief state councillor Li Keqiang and Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev were present at the signing ceremony.

According to CRI’s German service, the CRI-MKP/MKR cooperation is meant to strengthen cooperation within the framework of the “Chinese-Russian Year of Media Exchange, 2016 – 2017”.

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Related

» Links concerning MKP Media, Jichang Lulu, Dec 21, 2015
» Media Exchange Year, Xinhua, Oct 9/10, 2015

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Sunday, October 25, 2015

“Foreign Marxists”: the Virtues of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

The following is a translation from a People’s Daily article, published online on July 27, and by the paper’s printed edition on July 24 this year. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

There’s a great likelihood that this translation contains errors. The translator, i. e. this blogger, has no idea about the concepts involved here.

In the wake of China’s great economic and social achievements, some foreign Marxist scholars’ research focuses on socialism with Chinese characteristics. Most of them praise China’s great achievements and hold an affirmative attitude towards China’s path, China’s theory, and China’s system. Some also researched the causes for China’s successes in depth, as you can improve by accepting experience from elsewhere1). To develop 21rst-century China’s Marxism, we should pay attention to foreign Marxist scholars’ China research, and from this, we should absorb and learn what is useful, while keeping the initiative ourselves in making use of it.

随着我国经济社会发展取得巨大成就,一些国外马克思主义学者将研究聚焦于中国特色社会主义。他们大多赞赏中国取得的巨大成就,对中国道路、中国理论、中国制度持肯定态度,有的还深入研究了中国成功的原因。他山之石,可以攻玉。发展21世纪中国的马克思主义,应关注国外马克思主义学者对中国的研究,从中吸收和借鉴有益的东西,以我为主、为我所用。

Adhere to the road that is in accordance with China’s national condition, the road that provides socialism with Chinese characteristics. The road that is meant to solve the major issues of the fate of the country’s perspectives, the fate of the nation, and the well-being of the people, is to develop 21rst-century China’s Marxism. Nottingham University’s tenured professor and National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute director Zheng Yongnian2) believes that the successes after New China‘s establishment and particularly during the more than 30 years of reform and opening up, are the results of China taking a road in accordance with its national situation, a road in possession of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This road of development has distinct Chinese characteristics, and can be referred to as the Chinese model. The Chinese model is a combination product [?] of international optimal experience [?] and China’s own practice, showing both global and Chinese qualities. The initiator of the “Beijing Consensus”, renowned American China issues expert Joshua Cooper Ramo, believes that through hard work, own-initiative innovation and bold practice, figured out a development model in accordance with its own country’s national condition, a model clearly superior to the already embattled Latin American model.3) Renowned foreign Marxist scholar Samir Amin believes that China’s path has innovated from the beginnings of the PRC’s establishment, and that if China does not adhere to socialism with Chinese characteristics, the only result would be mere capitalism, and the fate of many countries bears testimony that this could only be a tragedy. Member of the Japanese Communist Party’s politburo standing committee, Fang Jingfu4), also said that the Chinese model is a matter that is still under development. It substance is socialism built through the market, coexisting with capitalism, a path found from competition, a new, peaceful road.

坚持走符合中国国情、具有中国特色的社会主义道路。道路关乎国家前途、民族命运、人民幸福,是发展21世纪中国的马克思主义要解决的首要问题。英国诺丁汉大学终身教授、新加坡国立大学东亚研究所所长郑永年认为,新中国成立后尤其是改革开放30多年来取得的成就,是中国走了一条符合中国国情、具有中国特色的社会主义道路的结果。这种发展道路具有鲜明的中国特色,可以称之为中国模式。中国模式是国际最优经验和中国本身实践相结合的产物,既有世界性,也有中国性。“北京共识”的首倡者、美国著名中国问题专家乔舒亚·库珀·雷默认为,中国通过艰苦努力、主动创新和大胆实践,摸索出一条适合本国国情的发展模式,这种模式显然优于已经陷入危机的拉美模式。著名国外马克思主义学者萨米尔·阿明认为,中国道路从中华人民共和国建立开始就已经是独创性的,如果中国不坚持社会主义道路,其结局就只能是纯粹的资本主义,许多其他国家的命运已经证明这只会是悲剧。日本共产党中央政治局常委绪方靖夫也提出,中国模式是一个还在形成发展过程中的事物,其实质就是通过市场建设社会主义,是一条在与资本主义并存、竞争中寻找到的道路,是一条新的和平之路。

Setting out from a perspective beyond capitalism and adhering to, and developing, the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the latest result from the sinicisation of Marxism. To adhere to and to develop the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the central proposition of developing 21rst-century China’s Marxism. University of Tokyo emeritus professor Makoto Itoh believes that what constitutes socialism with Chinese characteristics is mainly state ownership of the land, the concept of “state ownership of means of production as the main feature” and “diversification of management”, a “consultative type of industrial relations” [or labor-capital relations], etc.. He also points out that the foundations of an economy developed by a theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics will be a market economy with public ownership as the mainstay, with a greater significance of China’s economic system in the 21rst century. Arif Dirlik, a longtime left-wing scholar researching Chinese issues, believes that socialism with Chinese characteristics has some sort of inherent perspective beyond capitalism, and a particular urge to avoid a return to capitalism. The theoretical value of socialism with Chinese characteristics isn’t in current importance for the globalizing economy, but in its efforts to provide some kind of alternative experience to the global capitalist system.

从超越资本主义的视界出发坚持和发展中国特色社会主义理论体系。中国特色社会主义理论体系是马克思主义中国化的最新成果。坚持和发展中国特色社会主义理论体系,是发展21世纪中国的马克思主义的核心命题。东京大学名誉教授伊藤诚认为,中国特色社会主义理论的构成主要有“土地国有”“生产手段的公有为主体与经营管理的多样化”“协商型的劳资关系”等。他还指出,中国特色社会主义理论未来发展的经济基础是以公有制为主体的市场经济,中国经济体制在21世纪将具有更重要的意义。长期研究中国问题的左翼学者阿里夫·德里克则认为,中国特色社会主义具有一种内在超越资本主义的视界,并具有寻求避免回到资本主义的特质。中国特色社会主义的理论价值,不在于它目前在全球经济中的重要性,而在于它正努力为资本主义世界体系提供一种替代经验。

Keeping an eye on the manifestation of socialism’s unrivaled superiority, adhere to and bring to perfection the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the essential institutional warrant for progress in contemporary China’s development. To adhere to and to perfect the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is an important task for the development of 21rst-century development of Chinese Marxism. Vladimir Popov, an international economic researcher at the Russian State Economics Institute5), says that “China’s institutional abilities” or socialist system guaranteed that China, during the global economic crisis, maintained a superb expressive power. A major Global system theory representative, Giovanni Arrighi, believes that there are three main systemic reasons for China’s many successes in achieving more than thirty years of rapid economic growth: reform and opening up, unhampered accumulation and deep societal roots. French scholar Tony Andreani points out that the system of socialist market economy represents China’s national condition and systemic advantages. One was China’s status in the primary stage of socialism which was to continue for at least another fifty years. A second advantage was that the economic characteristic of this primary stage of socialism was that public ownership would maintain a dominant position in the economy, with a leading role to play. And a third was that China China would retain state planning and governmental macro-economic control, the role of which, even while exercised by indirect tools, was very powerful. And fourthly, China needed to take the national condition of the country into consideration, with its socialism needing Chinese characteristics.

着眼于彰显社会主义的优越性坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度。中国特色社会主义制度是当代中国发展进步的根本制度保障。坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度,是发展21世纪中国的马克思主义的重大课题。俄罗斯国家经济学院国际经济研究生院院长弗拉基米尔·波波夫说,中国“国家的制度能力”即社会主义制度,保证了中国在经历世界经济危机的时候依然可以有出色的表现力。世界体系理论的主要代表人物乔万尼·阿里吉认为,中国30多年成功实现经济高速增长的制度原因主要有三个方面:改革开放、无剥夺的积累与深刻的社会根源。法国学者托尼·安德烈阿尼指出,社会主义市场经济体制体现了中国的国情和制度优势:一是中国当前仍处于社会主义初级阶段,这个初级阶段至少要延续半个世纪。二是中国社会主义初级阶段的经济特点是公有制在经济中占主体地位、发挥主导作用。三是中国仍然保留国家计划和政府的宏观调控,只不过是通过间接手段进行,但其作用十分强大。四是中国必须考虑本国的特殊国情,其社会主义的发展需具有中国的特点。

The discussions of China’s path, China’s theory, and China’s system by foreign Marxists are mostly friendly, objective, and also of enlightening significance. In the development of 21rst-century Chinese Marxism, these views and points of view can be used as a reference system, to continuously strengthen confidence in the path, theories and system, absorb the rationalization proposals they contain, adhere to and broaden the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, adhere to and develop the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, adhere to and bring to perfection the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and constantly broaden the range of sinicisation of Marxism.

国外马克思主义学者关于中国道路、中国理论、中国制度的这些论述,大都是友善的、客观的,也是有启示意义的。发展21世纪中国的马克思主义,可以把这些看法和观点作为一个参考系,进一步坚定道路自信、理论自信、制度自信,吸收其中包含的合理化建议,坚持和拓展中国特色社会主义道路、坚持和发展中国特色社会主义理论体系、坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度,不断开拓马克思主义中国化新境界。

(Authoring unit: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center for the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics)

(作者单位:中国社会科学院中国特色社会主义理论体系研究中心)

People’s Daily, July 24, page 7

《 人民日报 》( 2015年07月24日 07 版)

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Notes

1) Literally: taking stones from someone else’s mountain to polish the jade.
2) I can’t judge if this is an accurate account of what Zheng said or says.
3) This seems to refer to the Washington Consensus, in this original sense.
4) Chinese transliteration – I didn’t find his Japanese name online.
5) The institute’s or university’s real name (in English) is probably different.

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Sunday, October 18, 2015

The Tories and the CCP

Update, Oct 22: a try with a ballpen

Update, Oct 22: a try with a ballpen

Let’s stick together to make Britain China’s best partner in the West.

Gee. I’m not young anymore, and I think I’ve seen a bit of the world, but probably nothing as big as this slime trace. Seems to remind me of the old fairytale: if you can’t throw a frog against the wall anymore, start kissing his ass.

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