Archive for ‘markets’

Friday, April 1, 2016

Media Coverage on Ministry of Education’s (MoE) “Blue Book” on Returning Overseas Students and the Labor Market

The Chinese ministry of education (MoE) published a “blue book”, or a government report, on March 25, concerning overseas Chinese students returning to China, and looking for a job there. If Chinese press and government agency coverage on the report is something to go by, this is what the average academic returnee to the motherland looks like:

he is actually mostly a she (59.16 percent of the returnees are female), aged 23 to 33 (absolute average 27.04 yrs old), a masters student (80.7 percent), a postgraduate (9,49 percent), or an undergraduate / a student with a specialized subject (9.81 percent combined). If a postgraduate, his main fields should mainly be chemistry, material science, economics, electronics and electrical engineering, while the masters fields of study are somewhat more into the direction of finance, accounting, business management, management studies, or international business studies.

Statistics seem to suggest that there have been more returnees recently, than the 1978 to 2015 average numbers. Either way, the MoE’s Overseas Students’ Support Center deputy director Xu Peixiang (徐培祥) is quoted as saying that some 70 to 80 percent of students, in recent years, have returned after their studies abroad.1)

97 percent of those who currently study abroad are doing so at their own expense, which appears plausible when looking at the total numbers. In 2015 alone, 523,700 students reportedly left for studies abroad, and 409,100 job-seeking overseas students returned to China that year. By comparison, 248 students left China for studies abroad in 1978, according to Xinhua newsagency.

Very rough calculations with many unknowns: given that 459,800 Chinese left China to study abroad in 2014, according to this government-agency news report, the average of students leaving in 2014 and 2015 combined would be (459,800 + 523,700)/2 = 491,750, and based on an average duration of 22 months (more precisely 21.47 months) of studies abroad among the 2015 returnees,  this would mean that about 901,542 Chinese students would currently be abroad.

Three percent of these would then not study at their own expense (or that of their parents, relatives, etc.). Some 27,000 of the 901,542 abroad would, based on my shoddy calculation, study with a government grant, a scholarship, etc.. And probably, very few, if any, among the 248 who went abroad in 1978, were self-paying students.

23.85 percent of the 2015 returnees have been looking for a job in state-owned companies, 19.4 percent prefer minban operations2), and foreign-invested enterprises, state institutions and financial institutions rank third, fourth and fifth, respectively, in the returnees search settings. Only 3.32 percent want to establish businesses of their own (one percentage point up, compared to the 2014 returnees).

When it comes to location and company types, the returnees haven’t necessarily followed their ideas of perfect companies and locations, but looked at some hard facts (and regulations), and have therefore looked for jobs that appeared to be closer within their reach. Either way, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are still very popular destinations, with 49.34 percent indicating these goals, but this is said to be eight percentage points less than in 2013. This share is now basically focused on other provincial-capital-level cities.

Being in a position to pay for ones studies abroad doesn’t necessarily translate into perfect (or labour-market-oriented) choices, according to the news coverage. Qi Mo (齐默), head of the returnee office at the MoE, is quoted as stating “a certain blindness” in terms of how students (and their parents) are choosing fields of studies (or majors) and places (cities and universities) abroad. Hence, the MoE was trying to provide candidates for self-paid overseas studies, as well as their families, with information to support their choices, according to Qi.

It isn’t strongly highlighted in the news, but it becomes fairly evident that while Xu Peixiang points out how returning overseas students have become a group that receives great attention at our country’s market of talents, there may be particular challenges for returning overseas students, too. When a Xinhua article mentions measures like bases (or opportunities) for practical work as supportive measures for returnees to integrate into the labor market (this might also be translated as internship opportunities), you might suspect some frustration and trouble there. After all, such “opportunities” are hardly the financial return self-paying students (and their families and networks) would expect on their investment (or borrowings).

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Footnotes

1) According to statistics quoted in the Chinese press coverage on the MoE “blue book”, 4.04 million Chinese students have studied abroad from 1978 to 2015. 2.22 million of them have returned so far.

2) minban is a poorly defined term. There are, of course, many ways to find definitions anyway. Dorothy J Solinger, in “China’s Transition from Socialism”, first published in 1993, suggested that

there are three main types: those […] which are supposedly owned and managed by “people” (minyou-minban); those owned by the state but managed by “people” (guanyou-minban); and those jointly operated and owned by the state and the “people” (guanmingongyou).

And in 1999/2000, Guoqiang Tian, now a professor at Texas A & M University and in China, discussed in a paper on Property Rights and the Nature of Chinese Collective Enterprises why collective enterprises, especially township and village enterprises (TVEs) had – those sixteen years ago, anyway – developed more rapidly than privately owned enterprises, in China.

General note: I have no information about survey’s return rate among the former overseas students.

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Tuesday, February 2, 2016

“Internet Plus” Updates

As Chinese economic growth isn’t quite itself these days, the innovation buzzword keeps growing. State chief councillor Li Keqiang‘s Internet Plus action plan, described in some detail on March 5 last year in his work report to the Third Session of the 12th “National People’s Congress”, is being revived as a news item and covered here by the Washington Post. The article describes an internet town near Haikou as a place where little else can be done:

According to the local government, the Internet Town project will cover the entire Shishan township in 2018, with the completion of an online trading platform and an operation center as well as other facilities. The project will be a major engine for local growth, creating a new source of income for farmers along with the tourism industry that features volcanic tours.

Meantime, the English-language “Global Times” focuses on places where a lot of things that make sense could be done, and where a number of building owners (you can’t say landlord in China) fell for the business concepts of kids whose first profession was to be their daddies’ sons (reportedly, anyway), and who burnt their business war chests rather than using them mindfully. But obviously, the article is generally optimistic about a phoenix [that] will rise from the ashes of the first wave of China’s tech boom.

Chinese innovation may not be exactly what Japan’s industry is waiting for, but Chinese growth is. Ikuo Hirata, a columnist with a number of Japanese papers, suggests that Japan’s prime minister Shinzo Abe should stop counting on China’s economy as a booster for Abenomics, and that the government should lower its growth target.

Hirata also warns that

[w]hile working to reduce excess capacity in the steel and other traditional sectors, Chinese policymakers are also trying to help high-tech industries, such as robotics, sophisticated machine tools and aerospace, catch up with their rivals in advanced economies. The technological prowess of a country that has a successful manned space mission under its belt should not be underestimated.

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Related

» Traditional industries, new bones, April 17, 2015

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Friday, January 8, 2016

Human Rights and Economic Records: Botched Measures and Terrible Occurrences

Before the old (lunar) year leaves and a new comes in, things need to be tidied up in China. However, efforts to calm the stock markets by new management measures appear to have been unsuccessful. And in Hong Kong, where RMB trading, is unrestricted, people pay less for China’s currency, according to the New York Times.

There’s still other bad news, and the indicator in this case, too, is Hong Kong.

“Something terrible has happened. We are all afraid. We are leaving now,” an employee told me a few hours before locking the doors for the foreseeable future.

That’s how the BBC‘s correspondent in the former British colony, Juliana Liu, concluded an entry in the broadcaster’s China blog on Monday, and the topic, of course, is the case of five Hong Kong citizens, all associated with the Causeway Bay Bookstore, who have gone missing since October last year. The latest case is Paul Lee, and he went missing late in December.

Hong Kong’s SCMP, one of East Asia’s leading English-language papers, but one with an uncertain future, reported on Monday the first precept speech by a Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. The guy who’s imitating the late great dictator is, of course, current party secretary general, state chairman, and the central military commissions’ (CMC) chairman Xi Jinping. The speech is seen as part of Xi’s efforts to reform China’s military, but obviously, the – probably intended – signal goes beyond the armed forces project.

Given that no other former CMC chairman, from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, had given a military precept, an associate professor at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law concludes that Xi’s power and authority is even higher than them.

This may or may not be true. If  Wang Qishan, rather than Li Keqiang, ranks second in terms of power or influence within the party, the assessement may be correct. But then, maybe Deng Xiaoping, who faced open ideological competition at times by more conservative party veterans like Chen Yun, simply didn’t need to show off his autority by admonishing the military.

Back then, too, the party was corrupted. But that was at a time when – or that’s how it felt, anyway – everyone had a chance to become rich. Now, there’s a two-fold challenge of corruption and slowing growth.

This could mean that Xi has powers because potential rivals do not want to challenge him, so as not to rock the not-so-stable boat.

If China’s regime manages the switch from an export-led economy to a more services-oriented economy successfully, the doubts in Beijing’s macro-economic control of the economy won’t persist – some disappeared people, in China or elsewhere, have never been a great concern to business.

All the Xidadamania aside however, confidence in mainland China, in Hong Kong, and abroad, appears to be slipping, at least currently.

In an interview with German national radio on Thursday, Markus Taube, a professor at a university in Germany’s Ruhr region, stated “a massive loss of confidence” in China:

What we see in China at the moment, definitely, is a massive loss of confidence. All market actors can see that the CCP has clearly lost its former control capacity. Until now, the Chinese market was always a very [unreadable] […]. Now, this ability to lead isn’t in place and that the state has failed several times, on its own promises.

Das, was wir in China momentan definitiv sehen ist ein massiver Vertrauensverlust. Alle Marktakteure sehen, dass die Kommunistische Partei offensichtlich ihre frühere Steuerungskapazität verloren hat. Bislang war der chinesische Markt immer ein sehr [unreadable] … Fundamentaldaten haben da kaum eine Rolle gespielt, und es war das Vertrauen einfach da, dass die Partei, der Staat, im Endeffekt die Richtung vorgibt [unreadable]. Jetzt ist es so, dass diese Führungsfunktion fehlt und dass der Staat mehrfach versagt hat, auf seine eigenen Versprechen hin.

Not least, Taube said, the “anti-corruption campaign” has discouraged Chinese decisionmakers in charge of approving (or delaying) investment projects.

Given that Chinese control mechanisms – concerning the financial markets – are out of order, Taube, with an audible sigh, introduces an old friend from the 2009 tool cabinet:

It sounds unorthodox, but probably, in the current situation, it would be more appropriate to issue another stimulus package, in that the state, again, to a great extent, pumps money into the economy. A classical Keynesian stimulus package to create state-induced demand so as to restore the economic dynamics on a basic level.

Es klingt sehr unorthodox, aber wahrscheinlich ist es in der momentanen Situation tatsächlich eher angesagt, ein klassisches Konjunkturpaket wieder aufzusetzen, einen Stimulus, in dem der Staat einfach in großem Maße wieder Geld in die Volkswirtschaft hineinpumpt. Also ein klassisches keynesianisches Konjunkturprogramm, in dem einfach staatlich induziert Nachfrage geschaffen wird, und damit einfach die volkswirtschaftliche Dynamik auf einem grundlegenden Level wieder stabilisiert wird.

That said, Taube doesn’t judge the situation by standards of five-year plans, or by taking the long view, as recommended by the Lord of the Confucius Institutes. Taube advocates a stimulus because the methods tried more recently haven’t worked and wouldn’t turn the tide for the coming six months.

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Updates/Related

» Executives Disappearing, HP, Jan 8, 2016

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Saturday, December 19, 2015

2015 Review (2): China Radio International sheds ten Subsidiaries after 2014 Inspection

According to reports published in China’s online press on May 6, 2015, the “4th inspection team”, one out of at least thirteen inspection teams coordinated by Wang Qishan‘s central leading group for inspection work ( 中央巡视工作领导小组), conducted an inspection at China Radio International (CRI) from November 27, to December 26, 2014, i. e. a year ago. Apparently, the inspection wasn’t designed to kill, but rather to rectify or cut back on some particularly thriving business within the CRI empire. Either way, no criminal offenses were mentioned in the May-6 reports. The 4th inspection team provided CRI’s party branch with feedback on February 5, 2015, making recommendations for stronger financial management and control, and enhanced budget supervision and reporting systems.

According to the same reports or bulletins, the Guoguang company, CRI’s investment vehicle, closed (撤销) four of CRI’s subsidiary companies and withdrew (退出) from another six companies, in what appears to be the consequences of the inspection. Guoguang also caught Reuters‘ attention in an unrelated report published in November this year.

China Radio International postal envelope

According to World of Radio in spring 2015, Keith Perron, a broadcasting entrepreneur from Taiwan, suggested that a Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference  committee was looking

into the effectiveness of shortwave as a [unreadable] platform for China Radio International.

This may or may not have been the case, but apparently, rumors during spring, ahead of the “4th inspection team’s” feedback session with the CRI party officials, were surfacing, and suggested that in one or another way, CRI’s nerves were being tested.

CRI director Wang Gengnian ‘s (王庚年) position apparently hasn’t been affected by the inspection or its results. On Thursday, he signed a cooperation agreement on behalf of CRI, with an organization  named MKP Media (or MKR Media?), represented by Ivan Polyakov of the Russian-Chinese business council (俄中双边企业家理事会), if this report describes CRI’s new Russian partners correctly. China’s chief state councillor Li Keqiang and Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev were present at the signing ceremony.

According to CRI’s German service, the CRI-MKP/MKR cooperation is meant to strengthen cooperation within the framework of the “Chinese-Russian Year of Media Exchange, 2016 – 2017”.

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Related

» Links concerning MKP Media, Jichang Lulu, Dec 21, 2015
» Media Exchange Year, Xinhua, Oct 9/10, 2015

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Sunday, October 25, 2015

“Foreign Marxists”: the Virtues of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

The following is a translation from a People’s Daily article, published online on July 27, and by the paper’s printed edition on July 24 this year. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

There’s a great likelihood that this translation contains errors. The translator, i. e. this blogger, has no idea about the concepts involved here.

In the wake of China’s great economic and social achievements, some foreign Marxist scholars’ research focuses on socialism with Chinese characteristics. Most of them praise China’s great achievements and hold an affirmative attitude towards China’s path, China’s theory, and China’s system. Some also researched the causes for China’s successes in depth, as you can improve by accepting experience from elsewhere1). To develop 21rst-century China’s Marxism, we should pay attention to foreign Marxist scholars’ China research, and from this, we should absorb and learn what is useful, while keeping the initiative ourselves in making use of it.

随着我国经济社会发展取得巨大成就,一些国外马克思主义学者将研究聚焦于中国特色社会主义。他们大多赞赏中国取得的巨大成就,对中国道路、中国理论、中国制度持肯定态度,有的还深入研究了中国成功的原因。他山之石,可以攻玉。发展21世纪中国的马克思主义,应关注国外马克思主义学者对中国的研究,从中吸收和借鉴有益的东西,以我为主、为我所用。

Adhere to the road that is in accordance with China’s national condition, the road that provides socialism with Chinese characteristics. The road that is meant to solve the major issues of the fate of the country’s perspectives, the fate of the nation, and the well-being of the people, is to develop 21rst-century China’s Marxism. Nottingham University’s tenured professor and National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute director Zheng Yongnian2) believes that the successes after New China‘s establishment and particularly during the more than 30 years of reform and opening up, are the results of China taking a road in accordance with its national situation, a road in possession of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This road of development has distinct Chinese characteristics, and can be referred to as the Chinese model. The Chinese model is a combination product [?] of international optimal experience [?] and China’s own practice, showing both global and Chinese qualities. The initiator of the “Beijing Consensus”, renowned American China issues expert Joshua Cooper Ramo, believes that through hard work, own-initiative innovation and bold practice, figured out a development model in accordance with its own country’s national condition, a model clearly superior to the already embattled Latin American model.3) Renowned foreign Marxist scholar Samir Amin believes that China’s path has innovated from the beginnings of the PRC’s establishment, and that if China does not adhere to socialism with Chinese characteristics, the only result would be mere capitalism, and the fate of many countries bears testimony that this could only be a tragedy. Member of the Japanese Communist Party’s politburo standing committee, Fang Jingfu4), also said that the Chinese model is a matter that is still under development. It substance is socialism built through the market, coexisting with capitalism, a path found from competition, a new, peaceful road.

坚持走符合中国国情、具有中国特色的社会主义道路。道路关乎国家前途、民族命运、人民幸福,是发展21世纪中国的马克思主义要解决的首要问题。英国诺丁汉大学终身教授、新加坡国立大学东亚研究所所长郑永年认为,新中国成立后尤其是改革开放30多年来取得的成就,是中国走了一条符合中国国情、具有中国特色的社会主义道路的结果。这种发展道路具有鲜明的中国特色,可以称之为中国模式。中国模式是国际最优经验和中国本身实践相结合的产物,既有世界性,也有中国性。“北京共识”的首倡者、美国著名中国问题专家乔舒亚·库珀·雷默认为,中国通过艰苦努力、主动创新和大胆实践,摸索出一条适合本国国情的发展模式,这种模式显然优于已经陷入危机的拉美模式。著名国外马克思主义学者萨米尔·阿明认为,中国道路从中华人民共和国建立开始就已经是独创性的,如果中国不坚持社会主义道路,其结局就只能是纯粹的资本主义,许多其他国家的命运已经证明这只会是悲剧。日本共产党中央政治局常委绪方靖夫也提出,中国模式是一个还在形成发展过程中的事物,其实质就是通过市场建设社会主义,是一条在与资本主义并存、竞争中寻找到的道路,是一条新的和平之路。

Setting out from a perspective beyond capitalism and adhering to, and developing, the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the latest result from the sinicisation of Marxism. To adhere to and to develop the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the central proposition of developing 21rst-century China’s Marxism. University of Tokyo emeritus professor Makoto Itoh believes that what constitutes socialism with Chinese characteristics is mainly state ownership of the land, the concept of “state ownership of means of production as the main feature” and “diversification of management”, a “consultative type of industrial relations” [or labor-capital relations], etc.. He also points out that the foundations of an economy developed by a theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics will be a market economy with public ownership as the mainstay, with a greater significance of China’s economic system in the 21rst century. Arif Dirlik, a longtime left-wing scholar researching Chinese issues, believes that socialism with Chinese characteristics has some sort of inherent perspective beyond capitalism, and a particular urge to avoid a return to capitalism. The theoretical value of socialism with Chinese characteristics isn’t in current importance for the globalizing economy, but in its efforts to provide some kind of alternative experience to the global capitalist system.

从超越资本主义的视界出发坚持和发展中国特色社会主义理论体系。中国特色社会主义理论体系是马克思主义中国化的最新成果。坚持和发展中国特色社会主义理论体系,是发展21世纪中国的马克思主义的核心命题。东京大学名誉教授伊藤诚认为,中国特色社会主义理论的构成主要有“土地国有”“生产手段的公有为主体与经营管理的多样化”“协商型的劳资关系”等。他还指出,中国特色社会主义理论未来发展的经济基础是以公有制为主体的市场经济,中国经济体制在21世纪将具有更重要的意义。长期研究中国问题的左翼学者阿里夫·德里克则认为,中国特色社会主义具有一种内在超越资本主义的视界,并具有寻求避免回到资本主义的特质。中国特色社会主义的理论价值,不在于它目前在全球经济中的重要性,而在于它正努力为资本主义世界体系提供一种替代经验。

Keeping an eye on the manifestation of socialism’s unrivaled superiority, adhere to and bring to perfection the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the essential institutional warrant for progress in contemporary China’s development. To adhere to and to perfect the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is an important task for the development of 21rst-century development of Chinese Marxism. Vladimir Popov, an international economic researcher at the Russian State Economics Institute5), says that “China’s institutional abilities” or socialist system guaranteed that China, during the global economic crisis, maintained a superb expressive power. A major Global system theory representative, Giovanni Arrighi, believes that there are three main systemic reasons for China’s many successes in achieving more than thirty years of rapid economic growth: reform and opening up, unhampered accumulation and deep societal roots. French scholar Tony Andreani points out that the system of socialist market economy represents China’s national condition and systemic advantages. One was China’s status in the primary stage of socialism which was to continue for at least another fifty years. A second advantage was that the economic characteristic of this primary stage of socialism was that public ownership would maintain a dominant position in the economy, with a leading role to play. And a third was that China China would retain state planning and governmental macro-economic control, the role of which, even while exercised by indirect tools, was very powerful. And fourthly, China needed to take the national condition of the country into consideration, with its socialism needing Chinese characteristics.

着眼于彰显社会主义的优越性坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度。中国特色社会主义制度是当代中国发展进步的根本制度保障。坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度,是发展21世纪中国的马克思主义的重大课题。俄罗斯国家经济学院国际经济研究生院院长弗拉基米尔·波波夫说,中国“国家的制度能力”即社会主义制度,保证了中国在经历世界经济危机的时候依然可以有出色的表现力。世界体系理论的主要代表人物乔万尼·阿里吉认为,中国30多年成功实现经济高速增长的制度原因主要有三个方面:改革开放、无剥夺的积累与深刻的社会根源。法国学者托尼·安德烈阿尼指出,社会主义市场经济体制体现了中国的国情和制度优势:一是中国当前仍处于社会主义初级阶段,这个初级阶段至少要延续半个世纪。二是中国社会主义初级阶段的经济特点是公有制在经济中占主体地位、发挥主导作用。三是中国仍然保留国家计划和政府的宏观调控,只不过是通过间接手段进行,但其作用十分强大。四是中国必须考虑本国的特殊国情,其社会主义的发展需具有中国的特点。

The discussions of China’s path, China’s theory, and China’s system by foreign Marxists are mostly friendly, objective, and also of enlightening significance. In the development of 21rst-century Chinese Marxism, these views and points of view can be used as a reference system, to continuously strengthen confidence in the path, theories and system, absorb the rationalization proposals they contain, adhere to and broaden the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, adhere to and develop the theoretical system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, adhere to and bring to perfection the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and constantly broaden the range of sinicisation of Marxism.

国外马克思主义学者关于中国道路、中国理论、中国制度的这些论述,大都是友善的、客观的,也是有启示意义的。发展21世纪中国的马克思主义,可以把这些看法和观点作为一个参考系,进一步坚定道路自信、理论自信、制度自信,吸收其中包含的合理化建议,坚持和拓展中国特色社会主义道路、坚持和发展中国特色社会主义理论体系、坚持和完善中国特色社会主义制度,不断开拓马克思主义中国化新境界。

(Authoring unit: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Research Center for the Theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics)

(作者单位:中国社会科学院中国特色社会主义理论体系研究中心)

People’s Daily, July 24, page 7

《 人民日报 》( 2015年07月24日 07 版)

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Notes

1) Literally: taking stones from someone else’s mountain to polish the jade.
2) I can’t judge if this is an accurate account of what Zheng said or says.
3) This seems to refer to the Washington Consensus, in this original sense.
4) Chinese transliteration – I didn’t find his Japanese name online.
5) The institute’s or university’s real name (in English) is probably different.

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Sunday, October 18, 2015

The Tories and the CCP

Update, Oct 22: a try with a ballpen

Update, Oct 22: a try with a ballpen

Let’s stick together to make Britain China’s best partner in the West.

Gee. I’m not young anymore, and I think I’ve seen a bit of the world, but probably nothing as big as this slime trace. Seems to remind me of the old fairytale: if you can’t throw a frog against the wall anymore, start kissing his ass.

Sunday, October 11, 2015

This Week (1): If you are Chinese today, can you win a Nobel Peace Prize?

… and one part to the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses.

Alfred Nobel, 1895, defining the scope of the Nobel Peace Prize

====================

A book  – What Nobel really wanted – was

the elephant in the room that official Norway – politicians, most media, academics – are adamant not to see,

Fredrik S. Heffermehl, a humanist and lawyer, wrote in 2010. His campaign probably gained traction in 2010, given that the 2010 winner of the Prize was Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, who reportedly, to this day, this day remains in custody, either in prison, or in a labor camp, and given that China’s authorities have taken a great interest in anything that helps to question the legitimacy of the prize. The book became available in Chinese in 2011, published by the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing.

Publicity helps – even if it comes from a totalitarian regime. When European institutions become unable to perform their acutal duties, any help should be welcome, CCP support included. But it’s a fine line, and a reasonable citizen should try to weigh and understand the factors in power games as carefully and comprehensively as he can.

Kristian Harpviken, director of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (and not directly associated with the committee itself) made a pretty candid statement in an al-Jazeera discussion published on youtube last Wednesday, highlighting Beijing’s influence in Norwegian politics and on the Nobel Committee’s decisions.

Moderator: Do you think if you are Chinese today, you have a chance of winning a Nobel Peace Prize?

Harpviken: Yes, but I think there is one thing that [not readable] against any non-Chinese candidacy at the moment, and that is that the 2010 prize to Liu Xiaobo was so deeply contested by the Chinese government that for the Nobel committee, it is virtually unthinkable to give a prize that would be consistent with the government’s plans and politics, but it is equally inconceivable to give a prize to another dissident in this particular situation …

[Remaining answer unreadable, as it was cut short by moderator]

That, and what follows in a European context, makes it clear that the image of an independent committee, carrying out Alfred Nobel‘s will, is a pretty shaky and highly theoretical concept.

But a list of alternative Nobel Peace laureates, as published by the Nobel Peace Prize Watch, looks no less shaky. For one, it mainly lauds activists who target Western militarism or Western secrecy. The real world isn’t quite that uni-polar.

And there’s another problem. The list explained by its authors, at the bottom of the page, and along with several entries:

Above is the list – based on extensive research – of those who are nominated AND qualified, 
either 1) by direct work for the global disarmament plan Nobel had in mind, or (under a wide understanding of the purpose of Nobel)
 2) by peace work with high utility and relevance to realizing the “fraternity of (disarmed) nations,” or
 3) by new ideas and research, developing new methods for civilized, non-violent interrelation between peoples that enables a demilitarization of international relations.

Heffermehl’s point – as I understand it – has so far been that the committee deviates from Alfred Nobel’s will. But then, someone who wants to provide an alternative to the current committee’s practice, should interpret Nobel closely, not with a wide understanding of the purpose of Nobel. Edward Snowden would be a particular case in point. The desire to support and encourage him is a good thing. But Snowden is hardly a pacifist, or a peace activist, if you go by this Guardian account of February 2014. Even if we take into account that Snowden, under huge US prosecution (or persecution, for that matter), can’t speak his mind openly enough to convey a full picture of his views and intentions, he should rather be in the alternative list’s waiting list for now.

You can’t have your cake and eat it. It’s either a choice in accordance with Nobel’s will, or it’s an interpretation. If it’s an interpretation, the acting Nobel committee can’t be as wrong as first reported.

Once again: trying to turn public attention to an elephant – even if already in the room – is a difficult undertaking, when deemed undesirable by the establishment. It is also a fine line in terms of ethical standards, and I’m beginning to believe that it is an impossible mission, if undertaken without compromising.

Besides, there’s a predicament any institution – and opposing movement – will face: a too narrow choice of candidates, (nearly) unknown to the public, may not achieve much publicity. But without publicity, even the most sincere political plans and objectives are doomed.

Even if biased, a public list of Nobel Peace Prize candidates as published by Heffermehl and Magnusson, that provides a platform for public debate about possible Nobel Peace Prize candidates, is a good step. One can only hope that – better sooner than later – the acting committee in Oslo will understand this, and follow the example.

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Related

» National Dialogue Quartet, BBC, Oct 9, 2015
» Appeasing China, May 1, 2014
» A Panda is no Polar Bear, June 6, 2012
» Liu Xiaobo, Dec 28, 2010

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Tuesday, October 6, 2015

Emphasizing District-Level Cooperation and Mass Work: Xinhua reviews Xi Jinping’s State Visit

The following is a translation of an article published by Xinhua news agency on Tuesday. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Chairman Xi Jinping’s first [update/correction: state] visit to America has been successfully concluded. It hasn’t only brought the nervous talk about qualitative changes in Sino-American relations to an end, but it also provided the global economy with positive expectations, successfully managed differences and risks, and to the Asia-Pacific and even to the world’s peace and stability, it has brought positive energy.

习近平主席对美首次国事访问圆满落下帷幕,不仅给半年来沸沸扬扬的中美关系质变论画上了句号,也给全球经济带来正面预期,并成功管控分歧与危机,给亚太乃至世界和平稳定带来满满的正能量。

This shows once again that the new type of big-power relations between China and America are possible, feasible, and projectable. On the road of building [these relations], some indications can be found:

这再次表明,中美新型大国关系可能、可行、可期,其建立之道,由此也可见端倪:

— From the bottom to the top. America’s elites, particularly its strategic elites, are worried about China, talk negatively about the direction of Sino-American relations, while the the district levels and common people are less affected by ideological and national-security interference, with a positive development for Sino-American relations. As for American diplomacy, Chairman Xi therefore particularly emphasized regional and local cooperation and doing mass work, to explore how the roads of the Chinese dream and the American dream are interlinked.

——以下博上。美国的精英,尤其战略精英,对华忧虑重重,存在唱衰中美关系倾向,而州及民众层面较少受意识形态、国家安全等问题干扰,发展对华关系积极。习主席对美国外交故而特别强调省州合作与做民众工作,探索中国梦与美国梦相通之道

— Adding to the existing quantities. Bilateral Sino-American trade is at an annual average of six-hundred billion US dollars, and Chinese investment in America is expected to rise to 200 billion US dollars by 2020. American diplomacy constantly digs into the potentials of economic cooperation, [no translation found]. The Sino-American Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is considered important by both sides.

——以存量博增量。中美双边贸易额年均达6000多亿美元,预计到2020年中国在美投资规模达2000亿美元。对美外交,就是不断深挖经贸合作潜力,做大压舱石。中美投资协定谈判(BIT)因而为各方所看重。

— Shelving smaller differences from common ground. China and America are the world’s leading powers, and interest conficts are inevitable. What matters is mutual respect, to follow the principles of no clashes and no confrontation [or antagonism], to strive for common ground while setting small aside differences. For example, in the previous stir about internet hacking issues, the theft of trade secrets was a small [legal] case, while the common ground is about rules for an open internet, with great peace and security. Having grasped this trend, through the U.S.-China Internet Industry Forum and other activities, and the promotion of network cooperation, had become a highlight of Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to America. Arriving at consensus concerning the joint statement on climate change and other issues, and having built a solid foundation for the United Nations Climate Change Conference to be held in Paris at the end of this year, are commended by the world.

——以大同存小异。中美都是世界首屈一指的大国,利益分歧在所难免,关键是相互尊重,遵循不冲突、不对抗的原则,求大同、存小异。比如此前炒得沸沸扬扬的网络黑客问题,异的是窃取商业秘密的小案件,同的是网络的开放、和平与安全大的规则。把握这一趋势,通过举办中美互联网论坛等活动,推动网络合作成为习主席访美成果亮点之一;通过达成中美气候声明等共识,为年底在巴黎召开的联合国气候变化大会成功奠定坚实基础,为世界所称道。

[Global order issues / One-Belt-one-Road initiative / U.S. concerns alleviated]

[global governance]

The Chinese and American path of establishing new-type big-power relations is constantly explored further. Chairman Xi Jinping’s visit to America has provided an example for this kind of exploration, directing the focus on the future development of Sino-American relations, and an example for the new-type big-power relations of the 21rst century.

中美建立新型大国关系之道,是不断探索的。习近平主席访美,是这种探索的成功之举,引领中美关系的未来发展,也为21世纪新型国际关系的建立做出了表率。

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Related

» Safe for democracy, Wikipedia, acc. Oct 6, 2015
» Safe for authoritarianism, FP, June 4, 2015
» No meeting without substance,Oct 2, 2015
» Your sea is our sea, July 16, 2015

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