Search Results for “"Wu Jianmin"”

Friday, October 7, 2011

South China Sea: an Introduction (by Huanqiu, Wu Jianmin, Long Tao)

Huanqiu: "To Strike or not to Strike"

Huanqiu: To Strike or not to Strike

The following is a translation of an article by Wu Jianmin (吴建民, a former Chinese diplomat – further details at the end of this post), with a prior introduction to a whole set of opinions, by the publishing paper, Huanqiu Shibao. I’ll confine myself to translating the Introduction, and Wu’s opinion.

Wu’s article was the first in the Huanqiu series, dated June 22, and subscribes to the idea that “striking” at China’s neighbors in the South China Sea dispute is no option. This article belongs to the first section and also contains an interview with Wu, of September 13. The China Media Project (CMP), Hong Kong, translated portions of it into English. (They refer to a QQ re-publication of September 14, but it is the same interview.) The third article within that first – comparatively “dovish”  – section is by Sun Peisong (孙培松), an academic from Wu Jianmin’s native Jiangsu Province.

The second section contains two opinions which subscribe to a position where “action” would be an option if the occasion arose, but keeping to the traditional “principles” (坚持原则,伺机行事) otherwise. One of those opinions was written by Long Tao (龙韬, further details at the end of this post), on June 27, as an answer to Wu Jianmin’s opinion.

The third section contains three opinions, and belongs to the category “Now is the best time for striking” (现在是动武的最好时机). Interestingly, it contains another article by Long Tao, of September 27, three months after his previous one.

Huanqiu arranged the topical collection some time after publishing the initial, or all of the opinions.

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Huanqiu’s Introduction

Introduction: The South China Sea issue isn’t complicated at all. Before the United Nations announced that the South China Sea was rich with oil, it was calm and tranquil. Bordering countries recognized China’s sovereignty over it. But afterwards, neighboring countries claimed sovereignty in droves. According to a “China Youth Daily” report in July, Vietnam has occupied 29 of the islands and reefs, basically controlling the western Nansha waters; the Philippines occupied ten islands or reefs; Malaysia occupied three, and Indonesia announced that it had “sovereignty” over more than 80,000 square kilometers of traditional Chinese coastal and territorial waters. Only nine are controlled by our country: nine by the mainland, and one by Taiwan.

导语:南海问题并不复杂。早在1968年联合国宣称南海拥有丰富石油资源之前,南海一直“风平浪静”,周边各国承认南 海主权属于中国。但在此之后,南海周边国家纷纷提出对南海岛屿的主权要求。据《中国青年报》7月份报道,从上世纪70年代至今,越南占领了南沙29个岛 礁,基本上控制了南沙西部海域;菲律宾侵占了10个岛礁;马来西亚占领了3个岛礁;印度尼西亚宣布对8万多平方公里的中国传统海疆享有“主权”。而我国目 前实际控制岛礁仅9个:大陆8个,台湾1个。

As for the South China Sea disputes, Deng Xiaoping, in the 1980s, put forward the principle of  “sovereignty being ours, putting disputes aside, common exploitation, and China maintaining its peaceful rise”. But Vietnam, the Philippines and others time and again attacked China’s base line. Especially since this year, Vietnam, the Philippines and other neighboring countries kept taking a mile for being given an inch, India, Japan etc. also huddled into the act, made explorations, military exercises with growing arrogance. The situation is growing ever more serious.

对于南海争端,邓小平在上世纪80年代提出“主权在我,搁置争议,共同开发”的原则,中国坚持“和平崛起”。但越南、菲律宾等国则不肯罢休,一再冲击中国的底线。尤其今年以来,越南、菲律宾等南海周边国家在美国的支持下得寸进尺,印度、日本等国也“抱团”横插一脚,搞探测、搞军演,气焰日盛。南海局势日益严峻。

Various voices have emerged in our country, concerning this issue. There are scholars who advocate a continuation of the “peaceful rise”, determined not to strike. But other scholars advocate a resort to armed force, determined to strike back. To strike or not to strike? Let’s see what the scholars say.

对此,国内出现了不同的呼声。有学者主张继续“和平崛起”,坚决不能打。但有的学者则主张应该诉诸武力,坚决反击。打还是不打?看看学者们的说法。

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Wu Jianmin: Chinese Self-Restraint is a Kind of Self-Confidence
吴建民:南海争端,中国克制是种自信

[…]

The Chinese government has shown restraint, and some people are dissatisfied with that. They find this too soft, unfulfilled, and believe that a harder stance should be adopted. Some people even think that [military] strikes were in order. In my opinion, the self-restraint the Chinese government has shown is a kind of self-confidence.

中国政府所表现的克制,国内有些人不大满意。认为太软,不过瘾,应当采取强硬态度,有的人甚至认为应当打。在我看来,中国政府所表现出的克制,是一种自信。

This self-confidence stems from the way the world is changing, above all. The changing times have led to a new situation in international relations. The function of force in solving international disputes has declined. The three wars that began this century – in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, America leading the two former two, [are wars in which] America and western countries have absolute military superiority, and the countries they strike are poor and small countries. The result of these strikes is that America and other countries have gotten into predicaments never seen before. The current Libya war will also confirm this. The South China Sea is an issue inherited from history, and to talk war easily is not advisable. China’s leaders have emphasized that our country upholds the banner of peace, development and cooperation in international relations. This is very reasonable.

这种自信首先源于世界的变化。随着时代的变化,国际关系中出现了一些新的情况。战争在解决国际争端中的作用下降。本世纪所爆发的三场战争———阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争和利比亚战争,前两场战争都是美国带头打,美国和西方国家拥有绝对上的军事优势,打的是穷国、小国。打的结果是使美国等国家陷入前所未有的困境。正在进行的利比亚战争,也必将证明这一点。南海问题是历史遗留下来的问题,轻易言战是不可取的。中国领导人强调,我们中国人在国际关系中要高举和平、发展、合作的旗帜。这是很有道理的。

China’s self-confidence is also based on having held clear policies and guidelines on the South China Sea issue early on. In the 1980s, the guideline Comrade Deng Xiaoping gave us was “putting disputes aside, common exploitation”. The establishment of this guideline took the changing times into account, and was in accordance with the tidal current. It also took into account our fundamental common interests with our bordering neighbors. Despite the difficulties which have emerged in its implementation, history will prove this guideline to be the most sensible one.

中国的自信还来自于我们关于南海问题早就有明确的政策和方针。上世纪80年代,邓小平同志关于南海问题,给我们确立的方针是“搁置争议,共同开发”。这个方针的制定,考虑到时代的变化,符合时代的潮流。同时,也考虑到了我们同周边国家双方的根本利益。虽然执行起来有难度,但历史终将证明,这个方针是最明智的方针。

Our self-confidence also stems from the bigger picture. There are big and small truths in world affairs, and the small ones need to obey to the big ones. These so-called big truths set out from mankind’s overall interests, and the long-term and fundamental interests of the people in the region. The East Asian region is the world’s fastest-growing and most dynamic one. While the developed countries’ economies see a weak recovery, East Asian economic growth maintains vigorous momentum. This doesn’t only matter to the region, but to the world, as well. Also, even as we have these and those kinds of differences between the East Asian countries, the fact that we have common interests which are far greater than our differences must not be overlooked. Our relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries are just like that. In 2010, trade between China and Vietnam amounted to 26 billion US dollars, there were more than 600 Chinese direct investment projects in Vietnam, investment amounts agreed to reached more than two billion US dollars, and more than 2.5 million people crossed the border, either way. In 2010, China’s bilateral trade with the Philippines amounted to 27.7 billion US dollars, financial investment from Chinese companies in the Philippines was at 86 million US dollars. Behind these numbers stand the enormous common interests of  both sides, and these interests continue to grow.

我们的自信还来源于我们的大局观。世界上的事情有大道理和小道理,小道理服从大道理。所谓大道理是从人类的总体利益、本地区人民长远和根本利益出发的。东亚地区是全球经济中增长速度最快,最有活力的地区。今天在发达国家经济复苏乏力的时候,东亚地区经济仍然保持旺盛的增长势头。这不仅对本地区,而且对世界有重要意义。另一方面,我们同东亚地区各国之间,尽管有这样那样的分歧,但一个不容忽视的事实是,我们的共同利益,远远大于我们的分歧。我们与越南、菲律宾等国的关系也正是这样。2010年,中国和越南的贸易额近260亿美元;中国在越南的直接投资项目有600余个,协议投资金额达20多亿美元;双方每年人员往来256万人次。2010年,中国和菲律宾的双边贸易额为277亿美元,中国企业对菲律宾金融类投资达8600万美元。这些数字的后面是双方有着巨大的共同利益,这些共同利益还在继续增长。

With China’s rise, we will see all kinds of problems and challenges arise. This is inevitable and was to be expected. Facing these challenges, we must observe them calmly, and consider them comprehensively. Our feelings must not sway us, or make us act rashly. We must not deal with today’s issues by using the old days’ ideas of war and revolution. By doing so, we would commit an epochal mistake.

随着中国的崛起,我们面临的各种问题和挑战会多起来。这是必然的,也是预料之中的事情。面临这些挑战我们一定要冷静观察,通盘考虑。切忌意气用事,切忌用战争与革命时代的旧思想来处理今天的问题,那样会犯时代错误。

China must maintain the momentum of its development; this is what we have accumulated in a struggle of more than one-hundred years. It will take another thirty or fifty years for China to rise to her feet. This is the Chinese people’s greatest interest in the twenty-first century. To maintain the momentum of development requires us to maintain external cooperation.

中国要保持自己的发展势头,这是我们经过100多年的奋斗所积累和创造的。保持这个势头,中国再有30年、50年就起来了。这是中国人在21世纪最大的利益。保持发展势头必须保持对外合作。

In short, we must include the momentum of cooperation with neighboring countries. The self-restraint shown by the Chinese government is in line with the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the people in the region, with the global tidal currents, and absolutely tenable.

综上所述,包括同周边国家合作的势头。中国政府在南海问题上表现出的克制,是符合中国和本地区各国人们根本利益的,也是符合世界潮流的,是完全站得住脚的。

(The author is a member of the European Academy of Sciences, the European and Asian Academy of Science, and chairman of the Shanghai Center for International Studies.)
(作者是欧洲科学院院士、欧亚科学院院士、上海国际问题研究中心主席。)

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Wu Jianmin also served as China’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva,  and to France. At least one Huanqiu reader remembers the station in his career as the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman: Ma opposes, Wu, too. In September, Huanqiu Shibao published an interview with Wu, which engendered no friendly reception from Huanqiu’s (frequently nationalist) commenters. Portions of the interview were translated into English by the China Media Project (CMP), Hong Kong, as mentioned above.

Wu’s article had been published by Huanqiu on June 22. On June 27, Long Tao (龙韬), a strategist with the China Energy Fund Committee (中华能源基金委员会战略分析师), wrote a reply to the contrary. I’m not going to translate it, but there is an article in English by Long Tao on the Global Times which is to some extent a re-hash of his earlier answer to Wu Jianmin, titled “Time to Teach those around China Sea a Lesson” (September 29).

If someone else translates Long Tao’s reply to Wu Jianmin (or any other of the opinions in the collection), drop me  a line, and I will link to your translations.

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Related

» Strategic Partnership with Vietnam (soundfile), All India Radio, September 19, 2011
» In Tune with the Current Era, June 8, 2011
» 35,000 Yuan for an Obedient Wife, January 30, 2010

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Saturday, January 21, 2012

Delighting in Rain on a Spring Night: Soft Power Starts at Home

The following are an unofficial paper (本站内容未经许可) by a Soft-Power study group at Beijing University (北京大学软实力课题组), published by Renmin Wang (People’s Daily website) on September 16, 2009).

Links within blockquotes added during translation. Main Link: http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/166866/166886/10068388.html

Translated off the reel, and posted right away – if you see inconsistencies or mistakes in the following post, let me know, and we can take another look at the original.

Low Cultural Development, Lacking Propagation Abroad (文化发展水平低,对外传播不足)

Owing to the low starting point of China’s cultural development, even though it is currently pushed ahead at a faster pace, its attractiveness is still extremely limited.

由于中国文化发展的起点太低,尽管当前推进速度比较快,但是吸引力还是极其有限的。

When it comes to languages, China shows a deficit in its exchange with the West. In 2003, Gordon Brown, Britain’s chancellor of the exchequer at the time, said that while Britain imported electric household appliances, textiles, and other goods from China, this could be balanced with the English language. The value of English teaching as an export item has risen from 6.5 billion British Pounds to 103  10.3 billion [update: within five years], or about one per cent of Britain’s GDP. As for Britain, it is evident that Chinese language education is hardly worth mentioning. Not only can’t it be compared with its exports of goods, but there is no need to talk about it competing with the Export of British English.

在语言方面,中国和西方的交流处于严重逆差状态。2003年,英国当时的财政大臣布朗来中国时说,英国从中国进口的越来越多的家电、服装和其他东西可以用出口的一样东西来平衡,这就是英语。英语教学作为一项出口项目,它的价值在5年里已经从65亿英镑增加到了103亿英镑,大约占英国GDP的1%。可见,对英国来说,中国的语言教学出口甚至根本就不值一提,不仅无法与产品出口相比较,更谈不上与英国的英语出口相竞争。

As for higher education, the quality of Chinese universities is far behind America’s. There is no Chinese university which makes it into the top ranks of global higher education. Even students from Tsinghua University as an institution of higher learning go to American universities as overseas students, and when American universities make their annual rounds through China to present themselves, they are swarmed with visitors.

在高等教育方面,中国的大学质量远远地落后于美国,没有一所大学能够入围世界顶尖高校之列。由于教育水平落后于人,甚至清华北大这些中国顶级学府的学生,都每年成百上千地赴美留学;而美国大学每年来中国巡展,场场都是门庭若市。

As for academic research, no Chinese national within China has won a Nobel Prize today. As the ministry of education’s social-sciences director Yuan Zhengguo (袁振国) pointed out, every year, nearly 20,000 books on philosophy and social sciences and 200,000 papers are published, but only few of them can be introduced to a foreign readership. For many years, our trade in copyrights has run deficits; and exports in this regard only amount to ten per cent of imports. Besides, the major share of these exports is about copyrights concerning gardening and forestry, architecture (or construction), food, textiles, vintage, etc. Our values, culture, philosophical and social-science ideas, thoughts and concepts are hardly exported at all. Books are mainly exported to some other Asian countries and to the Chinese regions of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, European and American exports outperform China’s by more than 100 to 1. China, the country of origin of a more than 5,000-years-old civilization, only exports television sets, but no thoughts and concepts, and it’s no wonder that people say that China is a “hardware factory”.

在学术研究方面,时至今日,没有一个中国人在国内获得诺贝尔奖。教育部社会科学司副司长袁振国指出,现在全国每年出版哲学社会科学专著近2万部,发表专业论文20万篇,但是能够被介绍到国外的很少。多年来,我们的版权贸易一直存在着巨大的逆差,每年出口的版权只有进口版权的十分之一,而且出口的版权绝大部分是园林、建筑、饮食、服装、古董这些东西,我们的价值观、文化、哲学社会科学理念、思想观念的东西几乎没有出口。出口的图书也主要是到一些亚洲国家和中国的港澳台地区,面对欧美的逆差则达100:1以上。作为一个拥有5000多年文明史的文化发源地,中国只出口电视机,不出口思想观念,难怪有人说,中国是个“硬件加工厂”。

When it comes to the performing arts, the situation isn’t too different. From 1999 to 2002, 285 Russian artistic groups came to China to perform here, but only 30 Chinese groups went to Russia to perform – i. e. about one tenth of the Russian number. Moreover, Chinese performances abroad have long been in the low-price segment. As many performances abroad are controlled by foreign managements, and for the lack of presentable brands [on our part], all China has provided over many years is cheap labor. In sharp contrast, the “Three Tenors”, during their performances in China, made sales of hundreds of thousands of US-dollars; European and American four big musicals1) and the world’s ten big orchestras etc. sell top-price tickets at 5,000 Yuan RMB, and earn huge scales of money. By comparison, China, when it depends on its cultural attractiveness to create economic value, is seriously weakened.

文艺演出也有类似状况。从1999年到2002年,仅俄罗斯就有285个文艺团体到中国演出,同期中国到俄罗斯演出的文艺团体只有30个,相差10倍。而且,中国对外演出长期以来都处于廉价交易的状态。由于很多对外演出都由外国经纪人把持,也由于缺少像样的品牌,中外文化交流开展多年,中国提供的都只是廉价劳动力。与此对比强烈的是,“世界三大男高音”来中国演出的出场费动辄数十万美元,欧美四大音乐剧、世界十大交响乐团等来华演出的最高票价卖到5000元,每次演出都赚了个盆盈钵满。相比之下,中国依靠文化吸引力创造经济价值的能力被严重削弱了。

The soft-culture working group deplores that in the field of movies, in shaping musical idols, etc., China even lags behind South Korea and Japan, and that hardly anyone could name a famous or prominent Chinese writer.

In March 2009, chief state councillor Wen Jiabao emphasized the need to have an animated-cartoon industry (动漫产业) of our own: “Sometimes, I find that my grandson likes cartoons, but if animated or not, it’s always someting by Altman (奥特曼)2).

2009年3月,温家宝总理强调我们应该有自己的动漫产业:“我有时看我孙子喜欢看动画片,但是动不动就是奥特曼。”

[…]

In September 2006, the British Foreign Policy Center released a study with numbers collected from a Chinese national “brands” survey. They came to two conclusions: Firstly, despite the attention China got from other countries, its brands were weak, this country wasn’t understood abroad, and secondly, the views Chinese people held of themselves, and of other nations elsewhere in the world respectively, widely differed from each other.

2006年9月,英国外交政策中心发表了一份研究报告,使用了从中国国家“品牌”调查活动中得到的数据。这次调查得出了两个结论:首先,尽管中国受到各国重视,但其品牌很弱,这个国家不为海外所了解;其次,中国人对自己的看法与世界其他民族对他们的看法有很大差别。

On April 5, 2006, Singapore’s United Morning News (联合早报) wrote in an article titled “China is looking for a new development concept”:
While China grows rapidly in terms of material power, its development of cultural attractiveness or soft power3) hasn’t kept up. (…) A cultural renaissance is an essential condition for turning the dream of a strong country into reality. Without strong cultural power, there will be no great comprehensive national strength. (…) Cultural invigoration is a fundamental [element] in building China’s strategic concept.

2006年4月5日,新加坡《联合早报》的一篇题为《中国寻找新的发展理念》的文章中评论指出:
中国在物质力量高速增长的同时,文化吸引力或者说软力量的建设却没有跟上……文化复兴是实现强国梦的必备条件。没有强大的文化力量,就没有强大的综合国力……文化振兴是中国新战略理念的构建的根基。

In 2007, 中评社4) published an article on the international position of China’s culture, and came to a rather comprehensive assessment:
There is no way to suggest that China’s cultural global influence were great. Compared with America’s culture, China’s, in a global context, is insufficient in many ways. Firstly, it hasn’t become a popular culture within the global society. Secondly, it hasn’t turned into a culture of corresponding influence. And thirdly, it hasn’t turned into a culture that would drive global economic development.

2007年,中评社发表社评文章对中国文化的国际地位做出了比较综合的评价:
中国文化在世界的影响力,绝对不可以说是巨大的。与美国文化相比较,中国文化在世界范畴中许多方面都是不足的。一,没有在国际社会成为一种流行的文化。二,没有形成有相当影响力的文化。三,没有成为推动世界经济发展的一股力量文化。

Lack of Core Values (核心价值观缺失)

During thirty years of reform and opening up, China has been in an era of fastest-developing social transformation, in which society’s traditional value foundations disappeared quickly. At the same time, all kinds of cultures and concepts, good or jumbled, emerged and gradually entered peoples’ lives and minds. By them, people were knowingly or unknowingly influenced. In such a clash between social foundations and new cultures, the absence of core values became evident.

改革开放30年中,我国一直处于变化最快、发展也最快的社会转型时期,传统价值观的社会基础迅速消失;与此同时,各种外来的文化和观念杂乱纷呈,纷纷进入人们的生活和头脑,人们自觉或不自觉地受到了影响。在这种社会基础与新文化的冲击下,核心价值观缺位的问题就出现了。

Beijing University professor Pan Wei believes that lacking core social values are one of the main problems in China’s reality, and that if China wants to rise, this can’t happen without the rebuilding of core values. Humanities and social science associate professor Kuang Xinnian of Tsinghua University also points out that since the 1990s, Chinese social values were lost, that their significance disappeared, and, to use Dong Li’s words, went into a state of nervous breakdown. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ sociologist, playwright, and the “International Social Science Journal’s” Chinese edition’s deputy chief-editor Huang Jisu believes that Chinese society’s polarization had led to social upheaval and the collapse of national virtues.

北京大学教授潘维认为,社会核心价值观缺位是中国现实中最严重的问题之一,中国要崛起,就无法回避重建社会核心价值观。清华大学人文社会科学学院中文系副教授旷新年则指出,上个世纪90年代以来,中国社会价值失落,意义真空,用祝东力先生的话说,处于一种“精神崩溃”的状态。中国社会科学院社会学家、剧作家、《国际社会科学杂志》(中文版)副主编黄纪苏认为,中国社会的两极分化导致了社会震荡和民族道德的崩溃。

During the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 2007, the NPC delegates and CPPCC members paid close attention to the issue as to how the Chinese people had gone astray in terms of core values, and voices calling for “intensifying the establishment of a system of core value system” were once again raised. Delegates and members contributed ideas and exerted efforts, aspiring for building value orientation which would have Chinese characteristics and with which the Chinese people would universally identify, thus make social forces coherent, promote social harmony, and the building of the nation. At the 17th party congress, secretary-general Hu Jintao put forward that the need to build a “socialist core value system” was actually a tactful acknowledgment of China’s social core value issues.

2007年两会期间,来自各地的人大代表、政协委员十分关注中国人核心价值迷失的问题,“加紧构建社会核心价值体系”的呼声再度高涨,代表委员们纷纷献计献策,希冀尽快形成具有中国特色的、获得国民普遍认同的价值取向,以凝聚起全社会的力量,促进社会和谐与国家建设。胡锦涛总书记在第十七次党代会上提出,要“建设社会主义核心价值体系”,实际上也是在委婉地承认中国社会核心价值观方面的问题。

The Cultural Management System’s and Ability’s Backwardness (文化管理体制与能力落后)

In China’s transition from a planned to a market economy, reform of the cultural management system is an important aspect. Given that change takes time, the goals can’t be reached in one step, and therefore, even as the government is working hard on deepening the cultural management system’s reform and even as it is making great achievements, the traditional planning systems do still exist to some extent, and cultural managers can’t fully adapt to the new type of cultural management yet. Therefore, China’s cultural productivity can’t be fully released at once, the needs in the people’s cultural life can’t be fully satisfied, and China’s international cultural competitiveness remains rather weak. Especially when it comes to cultural exports, government guidance constitutes two kinds of harm to China’s cultural attractiveness abroad: on the one hand, it limits China’s cultural productivity, and on the other hand, too much government involvement causes misgivings, concerns and antipathy within the international community. They believe that China’s cultural exports, because of the government being a factor, has political aims, and should therefore be handled with caution. Foreign Affairs University president Wu Jianmin  therefore says:

文化管理体制的改革是中国由计划经济体制向市场经济体制过渡的一个重要方面。由于改革需要时间,不能一蹴而就,所以虽然目前政府正在努力深化文化管理体制改革并已取得巨大的成就,但是传统的计划体制还在一定程度上和一定范围内存在,文化管理者还不能完全适应新型的文化管理方式,从而使得我国的文化生产力难以充分释放,进一步导致人民群众的文化生活需求得不到充分的满足,以及我国文化的国际竞争力相对薄弱。尤其在文化输出上,政府主导对我国文化的对外吸引力构成双重损害:一方面,制约了我国的文化生产力;另一方面,政府过多的介入引起了国际社会的疑虑、担忧和反感——他们认为,中国的文化输出因为政府的作用而具有了政治目的,要谨慎对待。为此,外交学院院长吴建民表示:

The enhancement of China’s soft power, and the promotion of Chinese culture heading to the world, must not be a campaign.5) If the significance of propaganda becomes too strong, it can easily evoke the other side’s suspicions and resentment. This would exactly go against the fundamental characteristics of soft power. The promotion of Chinese culture going into the world should resemble the way Du Fu described in his “Delighting in Rain on a Spring Night”:

It drifts in on the wind, steals in by night,
Its fine drops drench, yet make no sound at all.

This is the best and most effective way.

提升中国的软实力,推动中华文化走向世界不能搞运动。因为那样宣传意味太浓,容易引起对方的怀疑和反感。这样做,又恰恰违背软实力的基本特点。推动中华文化走向世界要像杜甫那首题为《春夜喜雨》诗中所说的:“随风潜入夜,润物细无声。”这是最好的办法,也是最有效的办法。

Therefore, to increase our country’s cultural productivity, to broaden our country’s culture’s international influence, reform of our cultural system must be carried forward in a firm, rapid, and dependable manner.

因此,为了尽快提高我国的文化生产力,扩大我国文化的国际影响力,我们的文化体制改革必须坚定不移、快速稳妥地向前推进。

The Political and Economic System is not Perfect (政治与经济制度不够完善)

Usually, when it comes to developing countries, its system is frequently its weak spot, which is a key reason in its lagging behind. China is no exception. Despite its stable and rapid development, and the system’s contribution can’t be ignored, we also have to acknowledge that no matter if we talk about the political or the economic side, the establishment of a perfect system is still a long way off, and there is still much room for modelling and innovation.

一般而言,对于一个发展中国家来说,制度常常是它的软肋,而且是导致它落后的关键原因。这一点在中国也不例外。虽然三十年来中国的稳定和高速发展,制度创新的贡献不容抹煞,但我们还是要承认,无论是政治方面,还是经济方面,中国要建立完善的制度体系都还有很长的路要走,制度模仿和创新的空间都还相当大。

On the political level, China’s large-scale corruption and frequent mass incidents illustrate many problems: excessive concentration of power, with democratic centralism often being a mere formality, sometimes to an extent where once the boss has spoken, the decision has been made; power goes without effective checks and balances, administrative power accroaches legislative power, acting as the country’s or region’s highest organ of power, not letting the people’s congresses play their due role; the judiciary’s impartiality is harmed by executive power; power lacks effective supervision, and the building of responsible “sunshine government” still remains a long way to go, etc..

在政治层面上,中国大面积的腐败和经常发生的群体性事件说明了很多问题:权力过度集中,民主集中制常常流于形式,以至出现完全是“一把手”说了算的“一言堂”现象;权力未得到有效制衡,行政权力僭越立法和司法权力,作为国家和地方最高权力机关的人民代表大会发挥不了应有的作用,司法的公正性受到行政权力的戕害;权力缺乏有效的监督,“阳光政府”建设依然任重道远等等。

When describing the economic level, the paper re-iterated the transition from a planned to a market economy, and especially the corresponding system’s bureaucratic remnants on the local level. The study group noted that the financial system didn’t meet the needs of China’s economy either, especially when it came to the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). An appeal to authority was included, too: “It is exactly for this reason that in September 2007, secretary general Hu Jintao explicitly pointed out the need to attach importance to the financial system’s development and perfection.” In their description of the economic aspects, the authors also cited legal uncertainties concerning property, anti-monopoly measures, and, even more than that, administrative monopolies (行政垄断). Neither cultural differences between China and other countries, nor a lack of united ideological understanding were left out as explanation for a less-than-satisfying legal situation, and inadequate leaning on foreign legal experience was also mentioned as an explanation. But the next line seems to chime in with statements made by state chief councillor Wen Jiabao’s statements two years ago:

Therefore, as a conservative informal system can only look forward to the official system’s innovative lead into the direction of development, the absence of such an official system in turn becomes a particularly serious problem.

因此,保守的非正式制度也只能靠正式制度的创新来引领发展,正式制度的缺位就变成一个尤其严重的问题。

The “Chinese model” had led to nearly thirty years of rapid economic growth, the study group wrote, but had at the same time created problems:

  • the income gaps (between industries, i. e. particularly farming and industries, but also regionally), and polarization. Of course, the measures taken by the fifth generation of leadership had achieved some success (第五代领导人上台以来,坚定不移的采取缩小收入差距的政策措施,目前已取得一定的成效)
  • environmental pollution and a crisis in terms of resources
  • Inadequate social security [or insurance], with undesirable constraints on the building of a harmonious society
  • protection of the public’s, or the masses’, rights.
  • corruption (with a reference to Tianjin party secretary Zhang Gaoli (张高丽), who had described corruption prevention as a matter of life of death for the party.

It is only here that the paper comes back to international issues, and, concerning economic issues, showing a more defiant attitude than in its previous reference, about soft power and propaganda (including the Du Fu quote):

No matter how the international community understands the Chinese model, and no matter what their attitude towards this model is, China’s development pattern needs to be adjusted. In the face of the international economic crisis, these adjustment become only more urgent. What earned the Chinese model general acknowledgment, and the characteristics which earned it the admiration6): strong government leadership, should be moderately extenuated. This is something clear-headed political leaders must recognize. In fact, China’s leaders have understood that the “Chinese model” is still developing.

无论国际社会怎样理解中国模式,无论他们对这一模式抱有何种态度,中国的发展模式都必须进行调整。尤其是在国际经济危机面前,这一调整更显紧迫。像中国模式公认的、也是让这一模式令西方羡慕的一个特点——强有力的政府主导,就需要适度削弱。这是清醒的政治领导人必须认识到的。实际上,中国领导人确实已经认识到,“中国模式”还处于发展之中。

In October 2003, the sixteenth central committee’s third plenary session put forward the concept of scientific development. If conscientiously carried out, it will become a cornerstone in the CCP’s lawful political power. Therefore, it will be a new source of the party’s and even China’s soft power.

2003年10月召开的中国共产党十六届三中全会提出了科学发展观。作为一种符合时代要求的发展观,如果得到切实执行,它将成为中共政权合法性的新基石。因此,它是中共乃至中国软实力的一种新来源。

The Limits of Diplomacy (外交上的局限)

Over the years, Chinese diplomacy has matured and made huge achievements. This is something no clear-sighted person will deny. But to improve the level of our country’s diplomacy further and to safeguard our national interests still better, there will be a continued need to examine our diplomacy comprehensively, carefully, and thoroughly, identify the shortcomings within, and put it to a still higher level.

这些年来,中国的外交日渐成熟,并取得了巨大的外交成就,这是任何一个明眼人都无法否认的事实。但是,出于进一步提高我国外交水平,更好地维护国家利益的目的,我们仍然需要对我们的外交做全面、细致、深入的审视,发现其中的不足,以使我们的外交更上一层楼。

Our country is guided by Marxist ideology. Historical materialism, and dialectical materialism are not only reflected in our internal development, but also in our diplomatic practice. But given that practice is much more complicated than theory, deviations between practice and theory are hardly avoidable at certain times and in certain situations. When taking a comprehensive look at our diplomatic practice, one will find strong industries but weak culture, the country’s strong international position but also its feeble image, its inherent cultivation but weak external publicity [or propaganda], strong hard power but feeble soft power tendencies which coexist to some extent. For example, international relations depend heavily on economic power. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Africa Research Office’s director He Wenping once said that “when I tell African friends that China remains a developing country, they just begin to laugh”. Their laughter illustrates that in their view, a developing country couldn’t afford undertake the investment and aid China provides in Africa.” In “Charm Offensive – How China’s Soft Power  is Transforming the World”, Joshua Kurlantzick once wrote: “China’s influence comes from its ability to dispense no-questions-asked largesse, and it would decline sharply if China experienced an economic downturn.” Although this opinion is very one-sided, the dependence of our diplomacy on our economic strength does require sufficient attention.

我国是一个以马克思主义为指导思想的国家,历史唯物主义和辩证唯物主义不仅体现在我们的内部建设上,同样也贯彻在我们的外交实践之中。但是,由于实践远比理论来得复杂,在某些时候或某些场合,实践对理论一定程度的偏离是在所难免的。综观我国的外交实践,人们可以看到,一种重经济而轻文化,重国际地位而轻国际形象,重内在修为而轻外部宣传,重硬实力而轻软实力的倾向在一定程度上存在着。例如,国际关系倚重经济实力。中国社会科学院非洲研究室主任贺文萍曾表示,“当我向非洲朋友们解释中国仍是一个发展中国家时,他们就开始笑。”非洲朋友的这一笑充分说明,在他们看来,中国向非洲的投资和援助已经不是一个发展中国家所能承担得起的了。《魅力攻势———中国的软实力是如何改变世界的?》一书的作者柯兰齐克曾说:“中国的影响力来自它派发不加疑问的慷慨,而且如果中国经历经济低迷,它将大幅度下降”。这种说法虽然非常片面,但是我们的外交对于经济实力的依赖性也需要引起足够的重视。

Following the rapid economic development, China’s international position and influence has actually increased rapidly, too. At the same time, the international environment has undergone great changes. Therefore, diplomacy’s domestic and foreign conditions have changed a lot already. In this kind of situation, our country must rethink its diplomatic methods and make adjustments in accordance with the changes in its domestic and foreign environment. Also, to see a continued rise in our country’s international status during the coming years, updates in our leaders’ thoughts about good diplomatic practice in the future are necessary. For example, we may have to re-examine the principles ad positions of our diplomacy, and to fundamentally change our diplomatic strategies.

实际上,随着经济实力的迅速发展,中国的国际地位和国际影响力也在迅速提高。同时,国际环境本身也发生了巨大变化。因此,外交的内外部条件都已经今非昔比。在这种情形下,我国有必要重新考虑自己的外交方式,根据内外部环境的变化做适度的调整。另外,由于未来若干年内,我国的国际地位还会继续迅速上升,这就要求我们的领导人为将来更新的外交做好思想上的准备。例如,我们可能需要重新审视我们的外交原则和立场,从根本上改变我们的外交战略。

Citizen Quality and Poor Image (国民素质和形象较差)

Our country’s citizen quality has been a soft spot, impeding its image. Notices in the streets of Paris in Chinese, like “please don’t bawl7), or notices in Chinese in New York, saying “please don’t jump the queue” are a great embarrassment for Chinese people, and uncivilized behavior of tourists make into the headlines in New York time and again. There are experts who say that “the biggest difference between China and America is in average citizen quality”, and there are other experts who say that “the difference in citizen quality between China and Japan translates into 30 years”. In 2007, the famous travelling website Expedia interviewed 15,000 persons from the European hotel and restaurant industry, and did a rating survey of tourists from different countries. Chinese ranked as the third-worst, after the  French and the Indians. Former Beijing mayor Wang Qishan (王岐山) admitted frankly his greatest fear – that during the 2008 Olympic Games, with five billion people worldwide looking on, Beijing’s citizen’s cultural quality would not pass the test.

我国的国民素质一直是制约我国国家形象的一项软肋。法国巴黎街头“请勿喧哗”的中文标识和美国纽约地铁站“请勿插队”的中文提醒让中国人十分尴尬,不文明的游客现丑的新闻一次次成为报章头条。有专家称“中国与美国的最大差距是国民平均素质的差距”,更有专家称“中国日本国民素质差距有30年”。2007年,著名旅游服务网站Expedia访问了1.5万名欧洲酒店业人士,对各国游客的表现进行了一次调查评比,中国人排名第三差,仅次于法国和印度。北京市前市长王岐山坦言,2008年奥运会,他最担心的就是在世界50亿双眼睛的注视下,市民的文明素质是否经受得起考验。

A country’s culture is the capital the country can apply abroad (外化), plus, perhaps, the traditional nature of cultural products, just as when people talk about Chinese culture, they frequently refer to traditional culture, which is possibly a greater distance to reality. In contrast, citizen quality is a country’s domestic capital, which is close to reality. Here, having a grasp [or clear idea] of that country’s government’s and people’s behavior, there are more significant [material] you can take into consideration, and which warrants closer attention. In this sense, and in the context of building our country’s soft power, improving citizen quality is no less important than the significance of cultural dissemination. Our country’s tendencies in citizen quality influence the level of our country’s soft power, and an important part of building its soft power.

一国的文化是该国外化的文化资本,加上文化产品可能的传统性——正如目前人们所谈论的中国文化更多的是指传统文化,它可能离现实更为遥远。相比之下,国民素质是一国内化的文化资本,它与现实更为切近,对于在博弈中把握该国政府和人民的行为可能更有参考意义,因而更为重要,更加得到关注。从这种意义上讲,对于我国软实力的建设而言,国民素质的提高具有不下于文化传播的重要意义。因此,我国低下的国民素质势必显著影响我国的软实力水平,必须作为国家软实力建设的重要一环来抓。

Lack of Influential NGOs and Individuals (缺少有影响力的民间组织和个人)

From the perspective of building soft power, non-governmental organizations, or social [societal] organizations, NGOs, as well as individuals with strong influence within society (all to be referred to as NGOs hereafter) play a dual role.

从建设软实力的角度看,民间组织——或者说社会组织、NGO——以及拥有强大社会影响力的个人(以下简称民间组织)具有双重作用。

On the one hand, NGOs are important as they assist governments in solving social problems. In the wake of social development, issues of humankind’s sustainable development can’t be  solved by merely depending on government and the market, and NGOs are what it takes to make up for government and market insufficiencies. NGOs are also seen as “pressure reduction valves” for a government, and a “balancer” for public opinion, plus a spiritual function which shouldn’t be ignored either. Therefore, NGOs can help governments to solve social problems, thus eliminating society’s dissatisfaction with government. In this sense, NGOs obviously increase governments’ legitimacy and cohesion within society, and are therefore positive factors in increasing domestic soft power.

一方面,民间组织是帮助政府解决社会问题的重要助手。随着社会的发展,仅仅依靠传统的政府和市场两级还无法解决人类的可持续发展问题,民间组织正为了弥补政府和市场的不足而诞生。民间组织则被认为是政府的“减压阀”和民意的“平衡器”,还有着不可忽视的精神功能。因此,民间组织可以帮助政府解决社会问题,从而消除社会对政府的不满。从这种意义上讲,民间组织显然是提高政府合法性和社会凝聚力的积极因素,因而是提高国内软实力的积极因素。

On the other hand, NGOs have some kind of particular advantage, compared with government: objective neutrality. In general, a government is a representative of a country’s interests, but at times, it is also a representative of self-interest. Words and deeds of a government are therefore always suspected of acting out of interest requirements, which marks an inherent disadvantage. So in a real sense, NGOs have a stronger objective neutrality, and in a certain sense, this is the basis of certain NGOs’ coming into life. Therefore, no matter if you face domestic or international society, NGOs are more likely to earn trust, and information they provide is more persuasive.

另一方面,相比政府,民间组织具有一种独特的优势:客观中立性。一般而言,政府是国家利益的代表,有时候甚至是自身利益的代表。因此,政府的一言一行总要被人怀疑是出于利益的需要,其立场具有先天的劣势。而真正意义上的民间组织则具有更强的客观中立性——实际上,从一定意义上讲,这也正是某些民间组织得以产生的根据。所以,在面对无论国内还是国际社会时,它们更能获得信任,所提供的信息也就更有说服力。

Although NGOs have these important social and political roles to play, it is also known to all that our country lacks such organizations, and there is no need to list statistics. The main source for this situation is that the government is inclined to take some kind of politicized view on the development of NGOs, and maintains some kind of vigilant attitude towards them.

尽管民间组织具有这样重要的社会和政治功能,但众所周知的是,我国的民间组织依然非常缺乏,具体的数据是无须列举的。造成这种情况的根本原因就在于,政府倾向于用一种政治化的眼光来看待民间组织的发展,对民间组织持一种防范心态。

To build a truly harmonious society, and to increase our country’s international influence, our country’s government must change its attitude towards NGOs, eliminate inappropriate sensitivities towards NGOs, and create room for their development by adopting tolerant8)  policies on them.

为了建设真正的和谐社会,同时也为了进一步扩大我国的国际影响力,我国政府需要转变对民间组织的态度,消除对民间组织的不适当的敏感性,以宽容的政策为民间组织的发展释放空间。

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Notes

1) I’m not familiar with the big global musicals, but according to Baike.Baidu, Andrew Lloyd Webber‘s “Cats” and “the Phantom of the Opera” would be among the four.
2) Just as with musicals, I don’t know a great deal about cartoons. But Wen’s alleged quote about Altman or 奥特曼 seems to refer to Robert Altman, although I’m not sure if he made animated movies, or rather turned an animated movie into a musical. (Maybe this was part of Wen’s joke.)
3) the Chinese term used here is 软力量 (ruǎn lìliàng), which can be translated as “soft power”. However, it isn’t the term normally used when Chinese academics refer to Joseph Nye‘s soft power concept these days – that would be 软实力 (ruǎn shílì).
4) 中评社 seems to refer to ChinaReviewNews.
5) There may be other translations for 不能搞运动, too, and these paragraphs should be looked at closely to decide if my translation is adequate. It should also be remembered that this, even though published on the People’s Daily’s (Net) theory pages, this is both an “inofficial” document, and, I believe, one that has since been superseded by the CCP central committee’s “cultural document”.
6) or envy – 羡慕, but I seem to understand that this is not necessarily a negative expression in Chinese.
7) “请勿喧哗” – another translation could be “noisy”.
8) another translation for 宽容 would be tolerant.

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Related

» The Center Forever, March 13, 2011
» Confucianism and Modernity, May 30, 2009

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Saturday, August 27, 2011

Impatience with Diplomacy: Ma opposes, Wu, too

Sheep on a Rainy Day, August 2011

Sheep on a Rainy Day, August 2011

Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu (马朝旭) called the U.S. Pentagon’s annual report on China’s military development “an irresponsible act which does no good to enhance China-U.S. strategic trust” (People’s Daily in English), or, as quoted by Huanqiu Shibao, “this sort of  report, gesticulating at China’s reasonable and legitimate and normal national-defense building with no lack of exaggerated content”  (这样的报告对中国正当、正常的国防建设指指点点, 其中不乏夸大内容). This was “no responsible kind of behavior, and without benefit for the promotion of Sino-American mutual strategic trust, and the Chinese side firmly opposed [the report] (这不是一种负责任的行为,无益于增进中美战略互信,中方坚决反对).

A reporter asked: the American defense department issued a Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China report and appraisal. Do you have a comment?
有记者问:美国国防部发表2011年度《涉华军事与安全发展报告》,对中国的军事发展等作出评价。你有何评论?

Ma Zhaoxu said that the U.S. Department of Defense issued such a report year after year, gesticulating at China’s reasonable and legitimate and normal national-defense building, with no lack of exaggerations concerning China’s actual military power, spreading “Chinese military threat” content. This was no responsible kind of behavior, and without benefit for the promotion of Sino-American mutual strategic trust, and the Chinese side firmly opposed it.
马朝旭表示,美国国防部年复一年发表这样的报告,对中国正当、正常的国防建设指指点点,其中不乏夸大中国军事实力、散布“中国军事威胁论”的内容。这不是一种负责任的行为,无益于增进中美战略互信,我们坚决反对。

Ma Zhaoxu pointed out that China would unswervingly take the path of peaceful development, pursues a defensive defense policy and made efforts to protect and promote peace, stability and prosperity  in the Pacific region and even the world. China’s development of limited military power was to protect national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and posed no threat against any country. No country should have any misgivings about it.
马朝旭指出,中国坚定不移地走和平发展道路,奉行防御性国防政策,致力于维护和促进亚太地区乃至世界的和平、稳定与繁荣。中国发展有限的军事力量完全是为了维护国家独立、主权和领土完整,不对任何国家构成威胁,任何国家都不必对此感到疑虑。

The latest comments in a (probably heavily censored) commenting thread seem to express doubts in the strength of China’s foreign-policy position (or impatience with it), rather than explicit jingoism.

“They only know passive opposition – stupid” (只知道被动的反对,笨), comments one online reader (16:55 local time).

“Wu Jianmin says he firmly opposes” (吴建民说坚决反对), writes another reader with an apparently long memory, at 18:37 local time.

Wu Jianmin served as the foreign ministry’s spokesman from 1991 to 1994.

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Update / Related

» PRC steps up Psychological Warfare targeted at Taiwan, Taipei Times, August 26, 2011

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Sunday, December 5, 2010

JR’s Sunday Sermon: Scrooge’s Transformation

Scrooge's Transformation: Redressing the Evils of the Past

Scrooge's Transformation: Redressing the Evils of the Past (1978)

During British prime minister David Cameron‘s trip to China in November, John Humphrys, host of the BBC‘s Today program, asked Wu Jianmin (吴建民), former president of the China Foreign Affairs University, a rather simple question about Liu Xiaobo:

What did he do? What did that Nobel Peace Prize winner do ?

Wu Jianmin’s reply:

I’m not a jurist. I don’t know – maybe you can talk to some Chinese who are informed about that. I’m not informed about his case. I didn’t look at his case.

At first glance, Wu looks ill-prepared for the question. If a former China Foreign Affairs University president isn’t informed about a case which creates a lot of international (and not only ‘”Western”) attention, what is he informed about at all? At what of kinds of cases would he look at in his spare time?

But the fact is that Wu didn’t need to look for a better answer to questions like Humprhys’. In cases that involve “national security”, no Chinese jurist needs to look for better answers either, unless he’s a defender. And even if a defender does have better answers, it won’t matter, if the CCP wants to see a defendant in jail.

National security was reportedly cited as a reason to bar Mo Shaoping (莫少平), Liu Xiaobo’s defender before he was reportedly disqualified, from travelling to Britain in November, apparently on the day or one day after Wu Jianmin referred the BBC to more informed Chinese sources than himself. The Telegraph:

The heavy-handed response confirmed the worst fears of diplomats that the prime minister’s trade visit to China would be derailed by concerns over China’s human rights record.
Some delegates [there were 43 business leaders travelling with Cameron, according to the BBC] have privately voiced their fears that the visit, which is the first by a Western leader since Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel prize in October, could end in disaster at a time when the British government is desperately trying to improve trade relations with China.

There was no reason to worry. Business comes first.

The BBC’s interview with Wu centered around business conflicts, and business conflicts only. You’ll need to listen to “communists” these days – outside China – to be provided with a different view.

While South Africa’s governing ANC emphasizes the need for good relations with Beijing, the Congress of South African Trade Unions’ (COSATU) take is that an injury to one is an injury to all.

Scrooge's Transformation: Broiler Industry Efficiency

Scrooge's Transformation: How Breeding Companies Help Improve Broiler Industry Efficiency (2010)

Business is legitimate – but there needs to be the primacy of politics when dealing with other countries which put politics first themselves. If  you want  real win-win situations, don’t rely on business people from your country.

Too many of them only become principled about judicial miscarriages when they affect them, rather than Chinese people.

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Related
Business Dispute: Just a little Bit Longer, June 16, 2010
The Primacy of Politics, June 13, 2010
German Presidency: Politician wanted, May 31, 2010
“Reluctant to Face a Stronger China”, July 29, 2009

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