Archive for January, 2011

Sunday, January 23, 2011

Taiwan’s Negotiating Position: a Hyper-Inflated Debate

There seems to be a contrast between international, and Taiwanese coverage on Hu Jintao‘s state visit to America last week. German papers point out that there aren’t great changes in US-Chinese relations perceivable yet (neither for the better, nor for the worse), and that Barack Obama hadn’t forgotten the “humiliations” he suffered at the Copenhagen climate summit, or on his China visit (both events of late in 2009).  Even the National Examiner, “the inside source for everything local”, and a platform which frequently highlights Taiwan’s unresolved international status – the island being by no means an essential “part of China” -, acknowledges that Taiwan enjoys considerable Congressional support, even if the Obama administration sent “mixed signals” to Beijing about Taiwan.

Some Taiwanese media, however, cite concerns that there may be too much convergence between Washington’s and Beijing’s positions, when it comes to Taiwan’s status.

Raymond Burghardt, chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT, Washington’s unofficial embassy in Taipei), was scheduled to arrive in Taiwan for a four-day visit in Taiwan during which he would meet with president Ma Ying-jeou. Taiwan’s foreign ministry reportedly said that Burghardt is there to brief Taiwan officials on the latest developments regarding Chinese President Hu Jintao’s state visit to the United States. Burghardt is now the AIT’s chairman, but not the actual de-facto ambassador. That would be the AIT’s director, William A. Stanton.

It has been argued that the US-China joint statement of November 17, 2009, which stated that the two sides agreed that respecting each other’s core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in US-China relations, marked a setback for Taiwan. This is probably true, although Washington’s definition of what core interests are may differ from Beijing’s definition any time. And the only difference between the 2009 joint statement, and previous administrations’ positions seems to have been that

The United States welcomes the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and develop more positive and stable cross-Strait relations.

The last paragraph, David Huang Wei-feng (黃偉峰), formerly a member of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) with the Chen Shui-bian government, argues, marks a violation of the US Six Assurances (六項保證) made by then US president Ronald Reagan in 1982, which said that the U.S. would not play a mediation role between Taiwan and China. That is how Focus Taiwan renders his views. The Liberty Times quotes him as saying that the wording – the United States encourages all forms of cross-strait dialog*) (美國鼓勵兩岸各種形式的對話), and that it supports ECFA -, could become an issue in Taiwan’s internal elections and policies (這種說法容易轉化為內部選舉政治的操作).

Some punditry is in order. That the DPP dislikes explicit American statements that support the KMT’s, rather than the DPP’s China policies, is also understandable, especially given the risks for Taiwan that agreements and involvement with China may carry.

But Reagan’s Six Assurances mirrored America’s stake in Taiwan’s de-facto independence. What Huang’s criticism of the joint statement amounts to is a demand that America must put Taiwan first in every way. Not only it’s freedom, but the sanctity of its internal affairs, too. That reminds me of a  behavior more frequently seen on the other site of the Taiwan Strait.

Above all, such remarks only highlight the fact that Taiwan wouldn’t be able to defend itself against a Chinese attack, or even against non-military pressure from Beijing. In that light, of course, it will still help if the Obama administration brings itself to sell Taiwan the weapons it asks for. Military  modernization can bolster Taiwan’s negotiation position vis-a-vis China to quite an extent – and this should happen, the sooner, the better.

But even if some nervousness is understandable, Taiwanese hypersensitivities are not helpful. Taiwan’s de-facto independence depends on America’s preparedness – and ability – to defend Taiwan, if need be. And sometimes, solutions can be cheaper than the sales of military imperial regalia as constantly discussed – fighter planes, submarines, etc.. Laser weapons, for example, can’t stop Chinese invaders, but they can help to defend Taiwan against the approximately 1,100 Chinese missiles targeting the island. And laser developments come at comparatively low costs.

Chen Shui-bian, Laura Bush in Costa Rica

There's a hand, my trusty friend.

I believe that the big debate about Taiwan’s negotiating position depending on arms supplies is hyper-inflated. It matters, yes. But compared to the actual balance of power between America and China, it’s a rather small issue.

As much as Taiwan’s dignity counts (most people who belong to a country probably feel that such matters count), it isn’t only the Ma administration which sometimes puts issues of prestige on the backburner in its interaction with the outside world. Those who criticize Ma for matters of protocol or national dignity should remember how previous president Chen Shui-bian accosted, umm, greeted Laura Bush in Costa Rica, in 2006. That was kind of “high-profile”, but it was low.

Sometimes it’s almost easy to understand why Washington is quite happy with the incumbent Taiwanese president. One would wish for a higher Taiwanese international profile now – but a low profile is still better than an ugly one.



*) exact wording:
Both sides underscored the importance of the Taiwan issue in U.S. – China relations. The Chinese side emphasized that the Taiwan issue concerns China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and expressed the hope that the U.S. side will honor its relevant commitments and appreciate and support the Chinese side’s position on this issue. The U.S. side stated that the United States follows its one China policy and abides by the principles of the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués. The United States applauded the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and welcomed the new lines of communications developing between them. The United States supports the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan Strait and looks forward to efforts by both sides to increase dialogues and interactions in economic, political, and other fields, and to develop more positive and stable cross-Strait relations.


Ma Ying-jeou – he said WHAT, May 3, 2010

Saturday, January 22, 2011

Huanqiu Shibao: Reality you can Believe in

The majority of civil servants recruited by central government departments in 2010 were from ordinary families, which stood as proof of China’s efforts to ensure social justice, ChinaNet quoted a senior official at the labor ministry on Saturday. Another government agency joined in:

Party and government organs at all levels last year recruited nearly 800,000 talented people from 14 million examinees, according to a statement released by the State Administration of Civil Service on Wednesday.
“China recruits its civil servants in a fair way, through examination, especially since enacting its first law on civil servants six years ago,” the statement said.

All or much of that good news, apparently, as a reaction to a popular online post of December last year which disclosed that most examinees who passed a recruitment exam for government-affiliated agencies in Huangshan, Anhui province, turned out to be children of local officials.

HuanqiuNet (Huanqiu Shibao online) quotes the State Administration of Civil Service as saying that more than ninety per cent of the candidates finally chosen came from “ordinary families” (九成以上来自普通家庭). It also refers back to previous media coverage about cases where local recruitment practise provided quite a much less favorable picture (without referring to Anhui Province in particular).

Both these pictures [the numbers provided by the civil service administration, nationwide, and the one provided by the media, locally] are probably real,

writes Huanqiu.

They contrast with one another (它们相互映衬), and they negate each other. One can’t easily say that China is such a good place, and one can’t easily say that it’s such a bad place. China is a complicated country, as all kinds of different pictures put together would suggest.

After adding a short referral to a case of astronomic toll charges (without naming the man who had been ordered to pay the amount of 3.68 million Yuan for dodging toll charges for eight months, Shi Jianfeng), Huanqiu calls for more transparency, in the process of which the supervising bodies should repair the country, patch by patch. And while the media should expose evils, they should also cover and report progress in society, to picture China in its reality as closely as possible (宣扬这个社会的每次重要进步,构筑最接近中国原版的真实), to let the Chinese people comprehensively understand their own country, by avoiding the use of homogeneous news to shape the peoples’ views and attitudes high-handedly. This, after all, was the basis of democracy (民主的基础).

The “special recruitment” phenomenon does exist. That the outset for the second rich generation of cadres’ children  (“干部子弟” 及 “富二代”) is higher than that for the children of ordinary people is also true. To let all people have the same rights isn’t only China’s goal, but also the goal for all the countries of the world to move closer to. While the internet helps to dry out injustices, Chinese people should maintain some sobriety, too: while all these things exist, China is gradually becoming a “fairer” country, not an “unfairer” country.

China’s college entrance examination is on of the world’s strictest, and the civil service selection examinations are also progressively becoming the screening system for a “fair recruitment” (“公平门”).

China has no untouchable class like India, and people with money [in China] don’t have the fame of western countries’ money aristocracy (有钱人远不能像西方的贵族阶层那样张扬). China’s officialdom is also different from America’s or Japan’s, where the shares of members of parliament who “inherit” their positions from their parents amount to 17 per cent, or even almost 50 per cent.

After explaining why China is actually a less complicated country than others, the author concedes that all this should be no reason to allow the “special recruitment” phenomenon to continue. But then, the fact that unfairness was already exposed, the cost of acting in an unfair way were now continuously rising [for those who act unfairly], and the leeway for unfairness was narrowing in China, day by day.


The opening-up of China’s media must bring along a progressive maturity of society –  increasing society’s trust in the country by exposing the evils, and not the other way round. China is improving on a daily basis, it is shaking  heaven and earth on the global stage with its great revival. This, just as the “special recruitment door”, is a reality you can believe in.



特招门 (tè zhāo mén) – “special recruitment door”
相互映衬 (xiānghù yìngchèn) – to contrast with one another
贱民阶层 (jiànmín jiēcéng) – Dalit caste, “Untouchables”


Update / Related

“Chinese Media must Push the Limits”, China Digital Times/CMP, January 20, 2011

Friday, January 21, 2011

Hu Jintao’s U.S. Visit: Vivid Micronisms

[Correction, Jan. 21: micronisms, read microcosms – JR]

Writing about Chinese Chairman Hu Jintao‘s state visit to America, Peter Lee, an Asia Times journalist who writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy, complains about an avalanche of empty verbiage, courtesy of the two governments, their media enablers, the punditocracy, and the blogosphere.  Fortunately, he also finds himself in a position of extracting .. a few useful observations from the rhetoric and visuals surrounding the visit. China’s continuing effort would be to be  recognized by the US as an equal, even the leading partner in North Asian security, thus being in a position to sow fear, uncertainty and doubt in the hearts and policies of the smaller frontline Asian states that place their hopes in America as a reliable, permanent counterweight to Chinese economic and military encroachment.

Frontline Asian states such as Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan, that is – and in its own ways, Taiwan, the country editorialists must not mention in a frontline states context.

These things will matter in the region, and to the American and Chinese leaders, when it comes to international diplomacy, and to international affairs. Another bit – and one much more connected with everyday life in both countries – is business. This matters when Chinese leaders visiting America – or any foreign country for that matter – meet with Chinese nationals, overseas (ethnic) Chinese originating from anywhere (including South East Asia) living in such foreign countries, and non-political stakeholders, especially business people.

That said, business is the most important, but not the only factor in China’s international game. Possibly any people who might contribute to “non-governmental” contacts, including universities and schools, might play a role. These contacts are frequently referred to as 民间 (mínjiān) in Chinese, although it is paradoxical that one could have mere minjian relations with a totalitarian country.

Minjian relations were the vivid microcosms (生动缩影)*) Chairman Hu probably had on his mind when speaking on the last leg of his state visit to America, on Thursday (January 20), in Chicago. As directly or indirectly quoted by Xinhua (via Enorth), from Hu’s speech at a welcome dinner hosted by Chicago’s mayor Richard Daley:

[…] This trip to America has to end tomorrow, but the seeds of friendship and cooperation we are sowing today will certainly take root and sprout, and yield positive results.

Hu Jintao said, on this visit, I and President Obama agreed that both our countries must dedicate their efforts to establish a relationship of cooperation and partnership with mutual respect and mutual benefit.

Hu Jintao emphasized that establishing a relationship of cooperation and partnership was inseparably linked to strong support for mutually beneficial economic cooperation. In recent years, America’s central and western regions have seen rapid development of exchanges and cooperations with China, which have become vivid microcosms of the development of Sino-American relations. China wants to work together with America, unearth the potentials for cooperation in the fields of politics, finance, energy, environment, building of infrastructure, etc. China and America are both great trading countries, both of them are beneficiaries of free trade, and should perfect the system of global trade, promote the Doha Round, and set an example of resisting things such as protectionism.
胡锦涛强调,建设中美合作伙伴关系离不开互利互惠经济合作的有力支撑。近年来,美国中西部地区对华交流合作得到长足发展,成为中美关系发展的生动缩影。中方愿同美方一道努力,深挖财政、金融、能源、环境、基础设施建设等领域合作潜力。中美两国同为贸易大国,都是自由贸易的受益者,应该在建设和完 善全球贸易体制、推动多哈回合谈判、抵制保护主义等方面作出表率。

Hu Jintao pointed out that the building of Sino-American relations depended on the peoples’ of both countries broad support and their active participation. Young people are the future of a country, and the hope of the world. In the final analysis, the bright future of Sino-American relations depended on the young generations who would create it. In the hands of the young, the friendship between China and America would be carried forward and the torch would be passed.


Martin Klingst, German weekly’s Die Zeit correspondent in Washington, believes that Obama managed the balance between political differences, dependence on China as a creditor, and business interest quite well.

But how regional politicians and non-politicians manage the balance in their relations with China will matter, too.  An indirect exchange of arguments between Thomas L. Friedman and Ralph Gomory of last year highlights some strategic choices which actually apply in global trade more generally, beyond America and China.



*) 缩影 (suōyǐng), without 生动 (vivid, colorful – shēngdòng) can be translated as miniature, too. Frequently, parks and gardens are described as miniatures of greater landscapes – or of society. Hu Jintao was apparently in a cultivating mood: with Sino-American relations not at their best, it was time for some work on the grassroots (again).


Zhang Zhaozhong: “Asian Nato” looming, October 15, 2010
China-funded: Three Eight Hundreds, April 19, 2009


Thursday, January 20, 2011

Hunan University: 26 Teaching Staff reach “Point of no Return”

26 teaching staff, including six professors, have apparently been made redundant at Hunan University (湖南大学) in Changsha, for breach of working discipline, reports the Changsha Evening Post (via Enorth). The news article doesn’t explicitly state that their contracts have been severed for good, but refers to the disciplinary action as “off-teaching” notifications (“下课” 通知书). No reason for the notification of the 26 notices is given either, but the report says that new rules and regulations had been applied to improve teaching quality. It was no rare phenomenon that university teachers worked off-campus without authorizaton, or stayed abroad longer than scheduled, writes the Changsha Evening Post.
There are abut 1,300 teaching posts at Changsha University, according to the report. The new rules, established in 2000, prescribe that staff accumulating fifteen days of unauthorized absence would be automatically be put onto a list for removal from duty (列入自动离职处理名单). The action taken at Hunan University is reportedly the biggest of its kind by a Chinese university to date.


Clean Government with Chinese Characteristics, December 30, 2010
Housing Science: “pampered and dignified” Researchers “Spout Nonsense”,  Nov 22, 2010

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Le Temps des Cerises

(French idealism)

Nicolas Sarkozy isn’t an idealist, anyway. Tunisia was considered a safe destination for riot-control gear just as long as Nick’s good friend Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was in control.

This comes sort of late.

Sarkozy never connected easily with the French people, either. Le Temps des Cerises will hardly be his favorite song.

Lyrics in French »

Lyrics in English »

A rendition in French …


… and a few words about revolution and the gentle force of reason, plus the song again, by Wolf Biermann (video above).

Monday, January 17, 2011

Liu Yawei Huanqiu Interview: So Much to Lose

[Update / Correction: Liu Yawei wrote an article published by Huanqiu Shibao – it’s not an interviewJR]

Liu Yawei (刘亚伟), director of the Carter Center’s China Program, wrote an opinion for Huanqiu Shibao, published on Friday, four days ahead of Chinese State Chairman and Party Secretary Hu Jintao‘s visit to the US. The following is my translation of his article.


2010 may have been the most difficult year in Sino-American relations, he writes, but if the problems between the two weren’t solved, this would have an impact on Sino-American and international development which didn’t bear contemplating (不可想象). China’s rise and America’s decline had led to a power imbalance which was difficult to control, which made the meeting between Hu Jintao and Barack Obama all the more important. Without cooperation from America and the West, it would be difficult to complete China’s transformation successfully (没有美国和西方世界的配合,转型也许难以顺利完成).

On the American side, Liu identifies neo-conservatives and some liberals, retired and active military, defense industry spokespeople, and citizens suffering from current economic problems (面临暂时经济困难的普通百 姓) as initiators of the talk about a Chinese threat and alarmist statements about “China’s rise”, “America’s decline”. Liu also sees alarmist warnings about the inevitability of another war, similar to World War 1 between a rising Germany and a declining Britain. His explanation for such statements is that the Republican Party was using these arguments in its struggle to replace the governing Democrats, to accuse the Obama administration of behaving in a servile way, vis-a-vis China, and to advocate a fresh start in Washington’s China policy, plus a renewal of America’s glory.

As for the Chinese side, he mentions radical nationalists and “groups with vested interests”, talking about one-hundred years of humiliation, and issuing alarmist statements about the America-led Western camp which would never abandon its intentions to destroy China (“以美国为首的西方阵营亡我之心不死”  wáng wǒ zhī xīn bùsǐ), or trying to put yokes on China’s neck with arguments such as exchange rates, [having to buy American] bonds, the trade deficit, climate change, Middle-East anti-terrorism, and using countries –  neighboring China and being wary about China – as a noose [or yoke] against China (中国周边国家对中国的警惕都当作绞索一条). An unbalanced liberalization of China’s media had added to these peoples’ speaking power, and in a period of transition in China’s leadership, this attitude could easily influence the coordinates of China’s policy on America.

All that notwithstanding, the Chinese leadership was in a position to maintain cool heads, writes Liu. They should communicate to the world, and to their own citizens, that China wasn’t and would never become interested in hegemonism, and that it wasn’t able to surpass America. This communication work, however, shouldn’t be only up to the leadership, but needed popular participation.

It was necessary to rid oneself of “America conspiracies”, and Chinese America watchers and American personalities should help to inform the Chinese. The public needed to remember that America had a free press which didn’t necessarily reflect official opinions, that in election campaigns, China was often used to make statements, the power of Congress to legislate which kept changes in America’s policies on China slow, that if America wanted to contain China, it wouldn’t have close economic and financial relations with China, nor would it welcome Chinese students, and that America was still far ahead of China, and that the talk about “American decline” could be viewed as shallow, and even as presumptuous, by the outside world.

Liu acknowledges that there was the potential for friction and even clashes between the two countries, for the differences in their national interests and security concerns. But one should be vigilant about the arguments of people and groups with vested interests, who existed in both countries, he adds.

In his last paragraph, Liu calls for a “Fourth Communiqué which should certify [or guarantee – 保证] the differences in China’s and America’s histories, deal with each others impartially [or fair – 公正], and make the two countries play a historically important role on the international stage.


The last paragraph is either somewhat vague, or I didn’t really grasp it, in this translation.

Many readers outside China would probably agree with some of Liu’s points, but, with some likelihood, also find them incomplete. It is remarkable for an article published by Huanqiu Shibao that Liu sees vested interests in “derailing” Sino-American relations not only in America, but also in China. That said, the nationalists he refers to are a reality, and that China would find it difficult to transform (to whichever end this transformation may have to serve) without Western cooperation is a reality, too. This, I believe, is also the main Chinese motivation – if there is any – to tone domestic extremist utterances down. The article is quite in line with the message Hu Jintao himself had to the American public in recent days, prior to his state visit beginning on Tuesday – that “we both stand to gain from a sound China-U.S. relationship, and lose from confrontation”.

Explaining some of the American political rituals in which China serves as a cudgel, Liu also provides Huanqiu Shibao readership with explanations as to why the Chinese leadership isn’t singing exactly the tunes many nationalists would die to hear.

But given that the publishing paper is Huanqiu Shibao indeed, arguably a paper with one of the country’s most nationalist readership, these explanations and warnings didn’t get a very warm welcome – at least not initially:

Eating that family’s food, he has to think of that family’s interests – no wonder (吃那家的饭,就要为那家着想,不足奇), a commenter wrote on Saturday night.

Once the fenqings had their say, however, it was other commenters’ turn, too. Some even pointed out that differences in values or ideology were actually causing problems in Sino-American relations.


Ma Ying-jeou concerned about Hu’s US visit, Straits Times, Jan 17, 2011
A Model and an Outline, January 4, 2011

Sunday, January 16, 2011

Zeng Jinyan: an Application

The following is a translation of a blog post, written by Zeng Jinyan (曾金燕) on Sunday.


Beijing Municipal Prison;
Beijing Municipal Prison Administration Bureau;
People’s Republic of China Ministry of Justice

I am Beijing citizen Zeng Jinyan. My husband is Hu Jia (胡嘉), commonly named Hu Jia (胡佳), sentenced to three years and six months imprisonment for “inciting subversion of state power” (“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”), currently held at Beijing Municipal Prison with a statutory day of release from prison on June 26, 2011.

On January 14, 2011, when we met with Hu Jia, he suddenly closed his eyes, his face became pale, his lips turned white, his face started sweating, and asked why, he replied that he had pain in his left abdomen. He was unable to keep sitting and we put him to lie on four chairs. His cold sweat became stronger and stronger. When I opened his collar, I found that his clothes had become wet, the cushioned chair, too, and cellmates helped the prison guard to get him to the prison hospital. With that, our meeting had ended earlier.

Besides cirrhosis, Hu was suggested by a prison doctor to have surgery because of (结石) calculus in the past. As the prison hospital doesn’t have the conditions for such surgery, the matter has been delayed so far.

Before his prison term, Hu Jia had been a cirrhosis patient, and as the conditions in prison didn’t provide the appropriate means for its treatment, Hu Jia’s health has deteriorated further. He doesn’t recover from a perennial cold, and there are frequently abdominal cramps, anguish, diarrhea, loss of appetite, slight fever, and weight loss. His cirrhosis condition is not stable. On March 30, 2010, Hu Jia sustained high fever, diarrhea, an unidentified object of three millimeters diameter on his liver, and he was taken to the central prison administration’s hospital on suspicion of liver cancer. On April 9, Hu Jia was taken back to prision, and the spoken notification was that the examination result was “subclinical hyperthyroidism”. Although Hu Jia and his family people repeatedly asked the prison to provide the medical examination report, the prison verbally declined. Because of this, we are worried.

In May 2009 and on April 5, 2010, I repeatedly applied to Beijing Municipal Prison for medical parole for Hu Jia [apparently in written – 申请书],  which Beijing Municipal Prison declined verbally. To date, we, Hu Jia’s family people, haven’t got the medical report on Hu Jia’s illness in written, and have seen his pain during our meetings, and we are worried about the adverse effects the long delay of his condition may have.

Taking this situation into account, I have two requests:
1. providing all medical reports during his prison term to me and his other family people in written;
2. to provide for medical treatment on parole for Hu Jia, for surgery and treatment to contain the further progress of his illness.

Please reply to my request in written. My postal address is Beijing, Tongzhou District, Bobo Freedom Town,[Ms Zeng’s address and the recipients of her letter’s three copies, see beginning of translation].

Yours sincerely
Hu Jia’s wife Zeng Jinyan
January 16, 2011


Incomplete Medical Examination Report, December 26, 2008

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Indian Army “in Biggest Transformation in Recent History”

Two new infantry mountain divisions and the first battalion of Arunachal Scouts are now virtually in place along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control between India and China, the Times of India reported on Saturday. The Indian army was steadily building its capabilities for offensive mountain warfare with China on mind. The army had adopted a “proactive strategy” which factored in the worst case scenario of grappling with both China and Pakistan simultaneously in a two-front war. With 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers, the two new divisions were to have their HQ in Zakama (Nagaland) and Missamari (Assam), according to the Times of India report.

On Thursday, the Times of India reported that the Indian army

is set for the biggest transformation in its recent history, according to authoritative sources and plan details accessed by TOI. The restructuring could begin as early as March-April.
The proposals include setting up of a Strategic Command, comprising of Army’s offensive capabilities, abandoning many existing administrative structures and thinning down of headquarters at all levels. Taken together, this is said to be the most radical organization change that the Indian Army has seen.

A strategic command would be created for the three Strike Corps, i.e. the 1 Corps, 2 Corps & 21 Corps. The three Strike Corps are

built around a nucleus of a single armored division and two infantry divisions – probably with more mechanized brigades than basic infantry formations – probably with more mechanized brigades than basic infantry formations. Strike corps should be capable of being inserted into operational level battle, either as battle groups or as a whole, to capture or threaten strategic and operational objective(s) with a view to cause destruction of the enemy’s reserves and capture sizeable portions of territory.

On Friday, Huanqiu Shibao reporter Tan Liya (谭利娅) was quoted with an article reproducing Thursday’s Times of India article in Chinese, on the day of the original’s appearance in English.


“Getting above Themselves”, November 24, 2010

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