Herrschaftswissen: Free or not, but “Engineered”

Wikileaks may have been useful in making some of the (Western or Arab) governments’ inside workings a bit more transparent – but it seems to me that what has been published by them doesn’t outweigh what is published by government themselves, or by their advisers, or by the mainstream press. We could have every government archive at our disposal, and would still face the problem of finding out what matters, and the problems of interpretation.

The Genius leads the spectators: engineering of consent in its early stages.

In this post, I will try to describe two examples of Herrschaftswissen, and one (rather old) example of methodology. A talk (not an article) on Wikipedia about enlightenment in Western secular tradition translates Herrschaftswissen as knowledge restricted to the rulers. I’m not sure if this should count as an exact translation, or just as a rough one.

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Example 1: David Cameron’s “Muscular Liberalism”

In February 2011, British prime minister David Cameron addressed the Munich Security Conference, an annual conference on international security policy held in Bavaria’s capital. It is an example of how politics and mainstream media work hand in hand – it was founded by a publisher in 1962, and that publisher was succeeded by a former high-ranking government bureaucrat in 1998.

In his speech, Cameron focused on radicalization among Muslims in many European countries. There isn’t much in the speech itself that I would object to, but what I view critically is the context of the speech.

While Cameron was focused on radical Islamists in Europe, the “Arab Spring” was in full swing. Cameron gave his talk on the eve of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war – a war described by the BBC‘s Jim Muir as a proxy struggle between the US-led western world and al-Qaeda international.

The West’s undertaking could also be described as a struggle to discern moderate and radically Islamist forces among the opposition fordes in Syria – a struggle European governments are facing at home, too. But that’s a problem the West could have spared itself. If Western governments (and their Arab and Turkish allies) succeeded in toppling Syria’s Baath regime and install a “moderate” new regime, chances are that the new regimes human rights record would be no better than that of the Baath party. Governments who encourage and support radicalism in mainly Muslim countries are hardly qualified to encourage moderation among Muslims in their own countries.

A few days ago, the European Union’s Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove told told the BBC that among the estimated 500 European citizens who were currently fighting in Syria, but most likely many of them will be radicalised there, will be trained.

When you want to undermine Islamist radicalization at home, the West’s strategy on Syria doesn’t look too reasonable. Those who Cameron purportedly wants to win over know very well how ambivalent muscular liberalism is about terrorism, when it is about practise, rather than about talk.

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Example 2. Trust in the CCP’s Central Committee

“Unity” is one of the supreme banners of the Chinese Communist Party. The downfall of Chongqing’s party chief Bo Xilai, only eight months ahead of the 18th National Congress of the CCP, came at a sensitive time. But if the power struggle about Bo Xilai was unpleasant or embarrassing already, the “visit” (or rather the tempoary getaway) of Chongqing’s Public Security Bureau head to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in February 2012 should count as a PR disaster for the CCP.

The Chinese press had to pick up the pieces in the guidance of public opinion. Huanqiu Shibao, a CCP-owned but rather popularar Chinese paper, applied a mix of natural science (China’s rapid development is like a living body’s development, and there may always be some particulars we haven’t been familiar with) and orthodoxy (In China’s society of numerous and complicated voices, trust in the party’s central committee has become reason for society in its entirety). There was, Huanqiu elaborated, no contradiction between emancipation of mind and trust in the party’s central committee:

It is exactly for the diversity, for having several options, that we truly discover that trusting the party’s central committee, implementing the party’s road map, is more reliable than any other method other people may teach us, and more able to create the conditions that make the country and the individual develop.

This sounds like muscular socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Both Cameron and Chinese propaganda emphasize unity when it comes to fundamentals. The fundamentals are very different from each other, but the tools they are using to justify and legitimize their dominance are quite similar. However, Camaron’s game is easier to play than the CCP’s. When Chinese media openly bash dissidents, they risk getting unusually unharmonious responses from their recipients. When Cameron addresses radical Islamism, he will get his share of criticism, too, but that is nothing uncharacteristic in the British media.

And despite some inevitable criticism, when a European leader singles out radicalization among Muslims, chances are that the mainstream will respond rather favorably.

The problem for European politicians is that the political class is lacking the high degree of legitimacy – in view of the public – that it (reportedly) used to have. Or, as the Economist‘s Bagehot observed, the pomp of Margaret Thatcher‘s funeral met with shallow public interest. Even Mrs Thatcher’s enemies trusted that her motives were sincere, argues the Economist, but now all politicians are distrusted.

Not just among radical or not so radical Muslims. But if you pick a frequently disliked minority as Cameron does, you may still strike a chord with an increasingly resentful majority.

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3. Engineering of Consent

In 1955, an American public-relations counsel, Edward L. Bernays, wrote an article, summarizing what he referred to as the engineering of consent. Bernays didn’t necessarily invent it, but at the time when he wrote about it, he had probably been among the most successful thinkers about and propagandists and practitioners of the concept for decades. The engineering of consent should under no circumstances [...] supersede or displace the functions of the educational system, either formal or informal, Bernays wrote, in bringing about understanding by the people as a basis for their action. Rather, engineering of consent supplemented the educational process.

But in the previous paragraphs, Bernays had also written that

[..] it is sometimes impossible to reach joint decisions based on an understanding of facts by all the people. The average American adult has only six years of schooling behind him. With pressing crises and decisions to be faced, a leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at an even general understanding. In certain cases, democratic leaders must play their part in leading the public through the engineering of consent to socially constructive goals and values. This role imposes upon them the obligation to use the educational processes, as well as other available techniques, to bring about as complete an understanding as possible.

Bernay’s essay leaves it essentially to the adopters how to make use of the toolkit he provided. Given that the tools are highly effective, it is obvious that they aren’t only used when the gap between public understanding and necessity (problem-solving) can’t be bridged in time, but whenever opportunists finds the engineering useful. Or, to put it more catchy: the dumber a policy, the dumber the public needs to be, and all the more, engineering of consent needs to supersede education.

Both democratically-elected and totalitarian politicians appear to be keen adopters, and it would be for the public itself to become more informed, to judge if the actons of politicians are in the public interest, or if they are not.

But the opposite is the case. While many European middlebrows regard the political class and their techniques as ethically rotten or even detest them for the manipulation, they are themselves adopters of spin-doctoring, too. Many blogs,  comments and other expressions of (political) opinion seem to apply the means and methods used by the political class to make their case. There seems to be an ambivalence among the ruled about the desire to belong to the political class, and to refute it.

Not to mention Wikileaks. Wikileaks doesn’t “educate”, either.

In that regard, the average Chinese netizen appears to be more aware of the manipulation he or she is subjected too, than the Western subject to the same PR technology – Chinese awareness states itself in terms like “we’ve been harmonized” [by Chinese authorities or media]. Or, when Huanqiu Shibao wrote in 2012 that opinion poll results published by American Gallup  showed that during the preceding three years, among the five BRIC states’ population, the Brazilians and Chinese had been most satisfied with their living standards, and only the Chinese felt during three successive years that the living standard had continuously improved, a commenter laconically replied that he had been satisfied (in a passive-voice sense) by the Americans. In certain ways, the experience of living under a totalitarian government seems to stimulate clear-sightedness.

Bernays reportedly liked to close his speeches and talks with an invariable summary: And everybody is happy.

There may not be a great future for public happiness. But quite probably, there is one for the engineering of consent.

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Related

» Battle of Opinion, Feb 13, 2013

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Is China Misunderstood? And if Yes, How?

• “People in China have as many freedoms as people in Europe, as long as they don’t organize to challenge CCP rule.”

Not really. Frequently, challenging one bureaucrat amounts to challenging the party. What you can and what you can’t do depends on your connections, and even if you are pretty well connected, no independent court will protect you and the liberties you have taken to do things when the party decides that it has a stake in your case.

• “The Chinese Communist Party has lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty.”

That’s conventional wisdom. But isn’t it the party’s decision to leave more space for  privately-owned business – i. e.  a withdrawal from business administration – which has led to that success?

• “Authors like Mo Yan show that you are quite free to criticize leadership decisions – even if you are formally part of the system.”

Mo Yan spoke up for Liu Xiaobo (with some disclaimers included in his talk), and that was a good decision – but if he wasn’t part of the system, and right in the limelight, such a public statement might have earned him an invitation for a cup of tea at the next public security office – or worse.

What is true is that China is much more of a mixed economy these days, than thirty years ago. What may also be true is that the cadres, too, have become much more affluent. Some leaders, especially top leaders, have become rich.

And this seems to amount to a strange excuse, frequently offered by CCP apologists: because the Communist leaders – and top leaders not least – are so corrupted, their theories can’t be taken seriously anymore. Or rather: even as a democrat, you don’t need to take their theories seriously anymore.

That’s a nice license to do business with the guys. Unfortunately, it’s a faked license.

It is true that what the CCP cadres do has little to do with their original theories. But that only means that their concept of class relations has changed. Contrary to what coverage frequently suggest,  that’s no bashful change. It’s clearly documented, not least in Jiang Zemin‘s Three Represents which are part of the official party theories. All this hasn’t hasn’t changed the CCP’s view of who should rule the country, and how they want to rule.

The CCP claims the function to decide what Chinese culture is, and what isn’t. They are the “standard bearers” and the “developers” of Chinese culture. They have left cultural organizations and individuals more leeway than during the Maoist days, just as they have left businesses more leeway – see above. But all that is revocable. It is part of the party’s development project. Obviously, people make use of the leeway they have – but given that the party has the last word on what will make it, and what won’t, its claim to be the developer is often taken remarkably lightly.

Above all, however, there is one constant: that while the outside world has certain good things to offer, it is, above all, a threat. The concept that an imagined innocence, “cultural” purity, or general well-being of the Chinese people can only be safeguarded by the CCP’s monopoly to power has never changed since the party came to power. A country that swallows the humiliations that come from this power monopoly and ultimately has to blame the outside world for exactly these humiliations can’t be a terribly friendly country.

The Libyan or the Syrian regimes have never been popular among Americans or Europeans. The Chinese regime isn’t, either. There is a lot of fault-seeking going on. Every incident, every blooper, and every corruption case among more senior officials are highlighted in the Western press, as if corruption was something particularly Chinese, or even something particularly CCP. But that seems to be arrogance, and wannabe virtue, rather than objectivity. Just as there was a preparedness to believe that basically, Libyans or Syrians were prepared to tolerate, if not support, their leaders, there is a preparedness to believe the same thing of China and the CCP.

When taking a benevolent view of Western governments and the Western public perception, they were also prepared to believe that at least the Syrian regime would give way to democracy (or theocracy) peacefully, rather than clinging to power by all means. If we may believe Western governments’ statements these days, they are absolutely shocked that, once having shown signs of vulnerability, such regimes aren’t tolerated by their own people anymore. By the same logic, Western governments are even more shocked to learn that such regimes would go “from house to house” to find and slaughter oppositionals, suspected or proven. By the same logic, Western governments and the Western public are outraged to learn that a regime may actually bomb its own cities, at war with many of its own people.

They would quite probably be just as “shocked” if such events occured in China. And then they would start explaining why they did have reasons to believe that the CCP regime was “responsible” and “accountable” to the people, why they did have reasons to believe that the party would put the people first, and put itself next.

And as long as shit doesn’t happen, they’ll tell you how the status quo in China is still better than any conceivable alternative. (That said, many foreign party apologists aren’t that much more interested in trying to imagining alternatives, than the CCP itself.)

People who are using excuses like the ones quoted at the beginning are most probably those who actually “misunderstand” China most fundamentally. But it’s a wishful misunderstanding. A less friendly word for it would be complicity.

That complicity is no crime. Or, if it is, this blogger, too, is complicit. I accept that our governments and businesses need to find compromises with totalitarian dictators, at least for the time being.  What I don’t accept is the beautification of the regime. Whoever justifies its existence needs to be prepared to accept the same standards in his home country – not necessarily as a ruler, but as a subject to such rule. (One problem among Western decision makers is that they themselves can only think of themselves as rulers, not as subjects.) But if you argue that, because of the “circumstances”, this or that has to be good enough for Chinese citizens, this or that has to be good enough for you, too – provided that the “circumstances” (seem to) demand it.

To be clear: this is no suggestion that Western intelligence services should sponsor underground organizations in China. It is a suggestion that people should stop thinking of China as some kind of “democracy”, or a “democratizing country”, only because it makes it easier for us to justify our business with China. The issue isn’t how Westerners could “westernize”, “democratize” or whatever-ize China. It is to make sure that our own values don’t become blurred in the process of interaction.

A paranoid scenario? Up to you. But take a look at the debate between U.S. president Barack Obama and his challenger Mitt Romney on foreign policy. Not a single mention of China’s political system. Rather: long debates on how to “shape” the Middle East.

And all that – my take of it, that is – to flatter power delusions among the American public.

That’s where the circle closes. Power isn’t irrelevant. But without a conscience – an understanding of what we are doing -, it may be wielded in a pretty CCP way: self-flattering, self-serving, and oblivious.

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Related

» Enabling “Democracy in International Relations”, The Peking Duck (guest post), Oct 2, 2012
» Asma Al Assad, the All-Natural Beauty, The Richest People, Febr 23, 2011
» Huang Mengfu: It’s Complicated, Jan 7, 2009

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Information Warfare in the Far and the Middle East (and in Europe)

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

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1) To be Blown Away: Pyongyang continues Dialog with other Means

Xinhua/Enorth, Oct 20 —

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According to a KCNA report on Friday, North Korea’s People’s Army’s Western Front headquarters issued a statement condemning South Korean organizations’ plans to distribute leaflets among North Koreans, saying that once such distribution was detected, military strikes would be conducted right away and without prior warning.

据朝中社19日报道，朝鲜人民军西部前线司令部当天发表公告，谴责韩国团体计划向朝鲜散布传单，表示一旦发现有任何动向散布传单，将不做事先警告立即实施军事打击。

The notice said that YTN Television and other media reported that South Korea would insult North Korea’s supreme dignity and sacred system by disseminating leaflets from Imjingak Park in the city of Paju [in South Korea's northwestern, Gyeonggi Province. They schemed to write slanderous content against the sacred and supremely dignified North Korea on those leaflets, and use more than ten big balloons to fly them into North Korea.

通告说，韩国YTN电视台等新闻媒体报道，韩国将于22日上午11时30分在韩国京畿道坡州市临津阁散布侮辱朝鲜最高尊严和神圣体制的传单。他们图谋在传单上写进诋毁朝鲜神圣最高尊严的内容，并将其放入10多个大型气球向朝鲜地区放飞。

The notice said that this action was a move by South Korean authorities themselves, directed and carried forward by the [South Korean] military. This was an intolerable challenge against the North Korean army and people, a deliberate action to push North-South relations to the worst situation.

通告说，此次散布传单行动由韩国当局亲手策划，并由军方主导推进。这是对朝鲜军民不可容忍的挑战，是故意把北南关系推向最坏局面的行径。

Paju is situated near the Korean peninsula’s demarcation line. The notice said that from now on, Imjingak Park and surrounding areas, as a forthright site for leaflet dissemination, would become a target to be destroyed by North Korean troops. As soon as any dissemination activities from Imjingak Park and surrounding areas were detected, the North Korean People’s Army Western Command headquarters would conduct military strikes right away, mercilessly, and without prior warning.

坡州市临近朝鲜半岛军事分界线。通告说，从现在起，被公开为散布传单地点的韩国京畿道坡州市临津阁及其周边地区将成为朝鲜军队直接瞄准射击摧毁目标。一旦发现临津阁及其周边地区有任何散布传单的动向，朝鲜人民军西部前线部队将不做事先警告，立即实施毫不留情的军事打击。

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KCNA (Japan), Oct 19 —

Pyongyang, October 19 (KCNA) – The Western Front Command of the Korean People’s Army released the following notice Friday:

The Lee Myung Bak group of traitors, keen on escalating confrontation with fellow countrymen, is planning to scatter leaflets slandering the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK, being unaware of its fate on the verge of ruin.

According to YIN and other media of south Korea, leaflets slandering the dignity of the supreme leadership of the DPRK and insulting the noble social system in it will be scattered from Rimjin Pavilion in Phaju City, Kyonggi Province at 11:30 a.m. on October 22.

The south Korean group of traitors said that it would use the Association for Promotion of Democracy of North Korea, a collection of riff-raffs, in the operation with the aim to intensify psychological warfare against the DPRK. It is set to send more than 10 huge balloons carrying the leaflets to areas of the DPRK side.

What matters is that the plan was directly invented by the group of traitors and is being engineered by the south Korean military.

This is an unpardonable challenge to the army and people of the DPRK and a deliberate act aimed to push the north-south ties to the lowest ebb.

The Lee regime considers that aggravated north-south ties before the “presidential election” will be favorable for the conservative forces. Human scum under the patronage of the group has common mentality with the group. This resulted in the undisguised operation of scattering the leaflets.

It is the firm will of the army not to overlook any act of provoking the dignity of the supreme leadership of the country and its social system.

The Western Front Command of the KPA issues following notice upon authorization:

1. Rimjin Pavilion in Phaju City, location from where the puppet forces made public they would send leaflets and its surrounding area will become targets of direct firing of the KPA from now.

The location is the origin of provocation which can never be left as it is and a target of physical strike to be immediately blown away.

2. The moment a minor movement for the scattering is captured in Rimjin Pavilion and in its vicinity, merciless military strike by the Western Front will be put into practice without warning.

Scattering of leaflets amounts to an undisguised psychological warfare, breach of the Korean Armistice Agreement and an unpardonable war provocation.

3. South Korean inhabitants at Rimjin Pavilion and its surrounding area are requested to evacuate in anticipation of possible damage.

The KPA never makes an empty talk.

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2) Blatant Violation of TV regulations in Middle East

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Hello, Halab, can you hear us? (Archive)

Jon Williams on Twitter:

BBC World News being deliberately jammed from within Syria. Unclear who responsible, but blatant violation of international TV regulations.

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VoA News, Oct 19 —

The Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees the Voice of America and other U.S.-funded international broadcasters, has joined European public media outlets in condemning the jamming of satellite signals across the Middle East and Europe.

BBG Director Richard Lobo said in a statement Friday that the jamming of U.S. satellite signals and those of other broadcasters is a “blatant violation of international regulations.” He added that the deliberate interference of news and information programs in countries with restrictive media denies millions of people access to information.

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Deutsche Welle Chinese website, Oct 19, 2012

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On Thursday morning (October 18, 2012), Deutsche Welle was first jammed. Deutsche Welle director Eric Bettermann protested against this interference with media freedom. Bettermann said that Deutsche Welle is preparing a resolution, together with other countries’ international broadcasters.

周四早上（2012年10月18日），先是德国之声的广播节目受到干扰。德国之声台长埃里克·贝特曼对这种再次干预媒体自由的行为提出抗议。贝特曼说，德国之声电台正在与其他国家的国际广播电台一起筹备一项联合决议。

Experts suspect Iran to be the mastermind behind the scene. According to media reports, this country has jammed Western broadcasters and television stations several times in recent years, preventing people to listen to some programs.

专家怀疑，伊朗是目前干扰行动的幕后策划者。据媒体报道，该国近年来已多次干扰西方电台和电视台的节目播出，阻止人们收听这些电台的节目。

Experts reckon that recent interference with Western broadcasters is related to European satellite Eutelsat ceased broadcasting 19 Iranian programs.  On Monday (October 15, 2012), the European satellite operator stopped Iranian Television network’s IRIB programs, making it impossible to listen to Iranian radio programs and watching Iranian television programs outside Iran, including international news channel 电视新闻.

据专家估计，最近针对西方电台和电视台节目发出的干扰信号，与欧洲通信卫星公司Eutelsat停止对伊朗19套节目进行转播的决定相关。周一，（2012年10月15日），欧洲通信卫星公司运营商停止了对伊朗广播电视联盟IRIB的节目转播，因此在伊朗境外无法再收听伊朗电台和电视台的节目，其中也包括伊朗的国际新闻频道”电视新闻”栏目。

The satellite operator says that the switch-off was a decision by the Council of the European Union in March. At the time, EU leaders included Iranian radio and television network IRIB in the EU sanctions list. In August 2009 and in December 2011, IRIB broadcasted the trials of people who had confessed after torture, which was in violation of international law.

欧洲通信卫星公司表示，停止转播伊朗电台电视台的节目是欧盟理事会今年3月做出的决定。当时，欧盟领导人将伊朗电台和电视台联盟IRIB的负责人列入了受欧盟制裁者名单。 IRIB曾在2009年8月和2011年12月播放刑讯逼供和公开审判的镜头，此举违反国际法。

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Die Zeit, Oct 19, 2012

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reports that Deutsche Welle suspects that Iran is behind the attack against their program. According to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the broadcaster, together with other foreign broadcasters, prepares a resolution. DW director Erik Bettermann protested against the disruptions.

Wie die FAZ berichtet, vermutet die DW den Iran hinter der Attacke gegen ihr Programm. Laut FAZ bereitet der Sender mit anderen Auslandssendern eine gemeinsame Resolution vor. DW-Intendant Erik Bettermann protestierte gegen die Störungen.

According to the report, Iran had repeatedly disrupted broadcasts from Deutsche Welle and the BBC. The latest infringement would thus be related with the cut-off of Iranian programs on the Hotbird satellite. Eutelsat and the British company Arqiva had switched them off in accordance with EU sanctions against Iran.

Dem Bericht zufolge hat der Iran in den vergangenen Jahren wiederholt die Ausstrahlung von DW und BBC gestört. Der jüngste Übergriff stehet demnach im Zusammenhang mit der Abschaltung der Übertragung von 19 iranischen Programmen über den Satelliten Hotbird. Eutelsat und das britische Unternehmen Arqiva waren mit der Abschaltung Sanktionen der EU gegen den Iran nachgekommen.

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IRIB, Oct 20, 2012

[Iranian lawmaker Hojjatollah Souri^*)] added that dozens of Western channels are working in Iran and many of them target the culture and beliefs of Iranians. He continued “But these countries cannot tolerate 19 Iranian international satellite channels and this shows that these 19 channels belonging to the Islamic Republic are more influential than … Western ones.”

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Note

^*) According to UK for Iranians, a man named Hojjatollah Souri is in charge of Evin Prison. The lawmaker quoted above may or not be the same person.

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Related

» Keep Shortwave, for Now, July 24, 2011
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Shortwave Log, Northern Germany, August 2012

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Voice of Korea

The Voice of Korea (VoK), previously known as Radio Pyongyang, is the international broadcasting service of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. When I listened to the station in the 1980s, you got the national anthem at the beginning, and following that, some frequency announcements and the news. Since then, two not-so-collective leaderships, i. e. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, have died, and all VoK programs begin with the national anthem, a song for Kim Il-sung, and another for Kim Jong-il (both military marches). But there’s still space for the news, readings from the works of Kim Il-sung, and a mixture of military marches and folk music (the latter of which is occasionally quite nice, but more frequently kitsch, sometimes with apparent Swiss characteristics).

Radio Pyongyang – renamed Voice of Korea since -, QSL card, 1989.

There is currently no interference on 13760 kHz at 13:00 GMT (click here, or picture above, for a digital recording), but the Chinese program, although more silently than the scheduled English program, can be heard in the background, too. It is probably on the same feeder between the studios and the shortwave transmitters.

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Recent Logs

Thanks to long vacations, it’s a pretty big list for August.

International Telecommunication Union letter codes used in the table underneath:
AFS – South Africa; AIA – Anguilla; ARG – Argentina; ASC – Ascension Island; CHN – China; CLN – Sri Lanka; CUB – Cuba; IND – India; IRN – Iran; ISR – Israel; KRE – North Korea; MNG – Mongolia; PAK – Pakistan; RRW – Rwanda; RUS – Russia; SYR – Syria; THA – Thailand; TIB – Tibet; UAE – United Arab Emirates.

Languages (“L.”):
C – Chinese; E – English; Fa – Farsi; G – German; H – Hebrew; K – Korean; Pa – Pashto; Th – Thai; R – Russian; T – Tibetan.

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kHz	Station	Ctry	L.	Day	Time GMT	S	I	O
5960	PBS Xinjiang	CHN	C	Aug 2	23:00	3	4	3
7240	PBS Tibet	TIB	C	Aug 2	23:13	3	4	3
9330	Radio Damascus	SYR	G	Aug 3	18:00	2	3	2
15700	Voice of Russia	RUS	G	Aug 4	09:30	4	5	4
9430	China Radio International	CHN	C	Aug 4	14:21	4	5	4
6000	RHC Habana	CUB	E	Aug 5	03:00	3	3	3
6090	Caribbean Beacon	AIA	E	Aug 8	00:41	4	5	3
11540	VoA Radio Deewa	CLN	Pa	Aug 8	01:36	3	5	3
15850	Galei Zahal	ISR	H	Aug 8	02:55	3	5	2
6973	Galei Zahal	ISR	H	Aug 8	03:05	3	3	3
13850	KOL Israel	ISR	Fa	Aug 8	13:59	4	4	4
15760	KOL Israel	ISR	Fa	Aug 8	14:35	4	4	4
4920	Tibetan Radio1)	TIB	T	Aug 8	21:58	4	4	4
4800	CNR	CHN	C	Aug 8	22:28	3	4	3
15235	Channel Africa	AFS	E	Aug 9	17:00	3	4	3
11290	Royal Air Force Volmet2)	ASC	E	Aug 9	19:18	4	4	4
9490	Deutsche Welle Kigali	RRW	E	Aug 9	20:27	4	4	4
12010	Voice of Russia	RUS	G	Aug 11	15:55	4	3	3
9855	Radio Australia	UAE	E	Aug 12	23:20	3	4	3
17895	All India Radio	IND	E	Aug 13	10:00	3	4	3
15180	Vo Korea	KRE	E	Aug 14	10:00	3	4	3
17820	Radio Thailand	THA	Th	Aug 14	10:31	4	5	4
15275	Radio Pakistan3)	PAK	E	Aug 14	11:00	?	?	?
9805	CNR	CHN	C	Aug 14	23:00	4	5	4
11710	CNR	CHN	C	Aug 14	23:05	4	5	4
9325	Vo Korea	KRE	K	Aug 15	20:01	4	5	4
15345	RAE Buenos Aires	ARG	G	Aug 15	20:55	4	3	3
9680	Radio Thailand4)	THA	G	Aug 20	20:00	4	4	5
21590	IRIB Tehran 5)	IRN	E	Aug 21	10:28	4	5	3
12085	Vo Mongolia	MGL	C	Aug 23	10:00	2	4	2
9330	Radio Damascus 6)	SYR	R	Aug 23	17:24	3	5	3

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Notes

¹⁾ SIO 444 on parallel frequency 4905 kHz
²⁾ probably Ascension Island
³⁾ SIO = 3, but modulation as bad as usual.
⁴⁾ Interference from 9675 kHz, probably Radio Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), Turkish-language program.
⁵⁾ SIO 454 on parallel frequency 21640 kHz
⁶⁾ Modulation as bad as usual, but the better reception than later in the evening (as usual in August).

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Related

» Previous Logs, August 2, 2012

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Bouthaina Shaaban: Opposition Backers invest in Government’s Demise, not in an Alternative Government

Bouthaina Shaaban, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad‘s political and media adviser, met with Chinese foreign Minister Jiang Jiechi in Beijing on Thursday. A purpose of her visit was to give “the Chinese leadership a real picture of what’s going on in Syria” and to coordinate with China to solve the current crisis that has taken thousands of people’s lives, China Daily quotes her.

During the meeting, Yang – as quoted by the Chinese foreign ministry’s (FMPRC) website – said that the Syrian government should take practical measures to satisfy the people’s pursuit of change, and to protect the people’s personal interests and reasonable demands. The wording is similar to that of foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu in October last year, in terms which have frequently been used by the foreign ministry since 2011. Today’s communiqué on the FMPRC website also quotes Yang as saying that China urged both the Syrian government and all other parties involved [in the conflict] that they should implement outgoing UN and Arab-League envoy Kofi Annan‘s six-points proposal.

Huanqiu Shibao conducted an interview with Bouthaina Shaaban on Wednesday, one day after her arrival, at the Syrian embassy in Beijing.

Q: Mrs Shaaban, what are your expectations during this visit as president Assad’s special envoy?
夏班女士此次作为叙利亚总统特使来华访问，对中国有何期待？

A: We are very grateful for China’s principled stance on the Syrian issue, and hope that China will maintain this position, opposing foreign interference, and letting the Syrian people themselves decide their fate and future. We hope to help China understand the real situation in Syria, a situation which is very different from the one described by Western media.
非常感谢中国在叙利亚问题上保持的原则性立场，希望中国坚持这一立场，反对外来势力干涉，让叙利亚人民决定自己的命运和未来。希望通过此行让中国了解叙利亚的真相，那和西方媒体描述的大有不同。

Q: What’s the situation in Syria right now? According to former prime minister Hijab who defected last week and reappeared for the first time on August 14, the Syrian government only controls 30 percent of the country’s territory now, is this the case?
叙利亚当下局势怎样？据传前总理希贾卜上周叛逃，他14日首次露面，称叙利亚仅3成国土处于政府控制之下，实情是否如此？

A: There are battles in many areas in Syria, and nobody in Syria can avoid getting caught in them. What Syria is facing is the goal of foreign forces to attack, which isn’t directed against the president or any individual, it is directed against the Syria and the Syrian people. Hijab is telling lies, and he knows it.
叙利亚多个地区在激战，所有叙利亚人都无可避免地陷入其中。叙利亚面对的是外来势力有目的的攻击，这种攻击不针对总统或某个个人，它旨在对抗叙利亚和叙利亚人民。希贾卜说的是谎话，他自己心知肚明。

Q: According to news, Hijab and two cabinet ministers defected at the same time. It appears that the organs of state power are under growing pressure from assassinations and defections?
当时有消息说，希贾卜和两名内阁部长共同叛逃。似乎，叙利亚政权越来越受到暗杀及叛逃的困扰？

A: Anyone who doesn’t trust the Syrian organs of state power and its system can leave. However, the [issue of] defections [is] clearly exaggerated. One hour after Western media announced that two ministers had defected, the two of them appeared at a cabinet meeting held by the president. That was really amusing. The outside world has frequently attacked the Syrian organs of state power as rotten and ruthless, suggesting that new organs of state power could provide the Syrian people with a better future. Why then would foreign forces tirelessly provide millions of US dollars to entice anyone within the current organs of state power who may feel tempted, rather than to make efforts to support new organs of state power? This certifies that we are still the best.
任何一个不信任叙利亚政权和体系的人都可以离开。不过，叛逃显然被夸大了。西方媒体宣称两名部长叛逃后1小时，两人就出现在总统召开的内阁会议上，这非常好笑。外界曾多次攻击叙利亚政权腐朽、残忍，暗示新政权能给叙利亚人民更好的未来。那么外部势力为什么持续不懈地拿数百万美元诱惑现政权内任何一个可能被诱惑的人，而不是致力于扶持新政权？这证明我们是最好的。

Q: 90 percent of Syria’s military are reportedly Sunni. They can’t be too staunch in fighting the armed opposition, because the latter may be their brothers and sisters, or neighbors. Has Syria already entered civil war?
据称叙利亚军队基层9成是逊尼派士兵，他们无法坚决地和反对派武装对战，因为后者可能是他们的兄弟或者邻居。叙利亚是否已陷入内战？

A: Our troops don’t want to fight against their own people. The armed groups within our borders terrorize the people, take hostages, plant bombs, and what the troops do is that they restore order and peace for society.
我们的军队不愿意和自己的人民战斗，武装团伙在境内恐吓民众、挟持人质、制造爆炸，军队所做的是为社会重建秩序和安宁。

Q: Even after 18 months, the power of the opposition doesn’t seem to be weakening, does it?
可18个月过去了，反对派力量似乎未被削弱？

A: Maybe we can look at it from a different perspective: eighteen months have passed, and all those who kept announcing that the Syrian government would be in total disintegration within a week or a month should eat their lies. I hope there will be a time when the armed organizations and the regional and Western forces behind them will choose dialog, and end the bloodshed and violence.
是否可以换个角度，18个月过去了，那些曾经宣称叙利亚政府会在1周、1个月内土崩瓦解的人该收回谎言了。我想是时候，武装组织及其背后的地区势力和西方势力选择对话、结束流血和暴力。

Q: President Assad has called for dialog on different occasions, but the opposition says it has no confidence and resolutely declined. Why is that?
巴沙尔总统曾在不同场合呼吁对话，但反对派对此表示不信任，坚决拒绝，为什么？

A: The oppositional armed organizations aren’t united; they belong to different factions. They get funding from different sources. They have been instructed to refuse dialog, because the target of those who fund them is Syria.
反对派武装组织并非一体，他们分属不同派别，每个背后都有不同的资助者，他们接到的指示是拒绝对话，资助者的目标是叙利亚。

Q: Some countries have held three “Friends of Syria” sessions. Last week, Iran took the lead in organizing a conrary axis, supporting the Syrian government. Do you believe that Russia, Iran and other powers will support the Syrian government militarily if political means show no effect? And at the moment of crisis, would the Syrian army use biological or chemical weapons?
一些国家开了3届“叙利亚之友”大会，上周伊朗牵头组织反抗轴心，支持叙政府，您认为俄伊等大国是否会在政治手段无效的情况下，军事支持叙政府？到危急时刻，叙军有没有可能使用生化武器？

A: Those you mentioned first are the “Enemies of Syria”. If outsiders intervene militarily, we hope that Russia, Iran and China will help Syria to find a solution. If the Russian and Chinese adherance to dialog and avoidance of bloodshed gets unanimous approval from the international community, it shouldn’t be too difficult to find a solution. The Syrian government is responsible and maintains the proscription of weapons of mass destruction’s proliferation in the Middle East. It isn’t president Assad’s determination to fight to the last; it is the Syrian people who make the decision.
前者是“叙利亚之敌”。外界若军事介入，希望俄罗斯、伊朗、中国帮叙利亚找到解决之道。如果俄中秉承的对话与不流血能够得到国际社会一致认同，解决之道不会太难。叙利亚政府是一个负责任的、坚持抵制大规模杀伤性武器在中东扩散的政府。不是总统巴沙尔决意战斗到最后，做决定的是叙利亚人民。

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Related

» At a lesser frequency and scale, Independent, Aug 15, 2012

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What Syria and the South China Sea may have in Common

China’s foreign ministry summoned the U.S. Embassy’s deputy chief of mission, Robert Wang, to make “serious representations” about remarks by the US State Department raising concerns over tensions in the disputed South China Sea. The statement by the State Department had been published on Friday, and was authored by Patrick Ventrell at the office of press relations.

Lin Zexu says

While urging all parties to take steps to lower tensions in keeping with the spirit of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea and the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the press release does, in its criticism of recent developments, emphasize China’s upgrading of the administrative level of Sansha City and establishment of a new military garrison there “in particular”. The statement doesn’t include remarks about the passage of a Vietnamese law earlier this summer, declaring sovereignty over areas of the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to come into effect at the beginning of next year, or the initiation of Vietnamese patrol flights in June this year, for example.

We do not take a position on competing territorial claims over land features and have no territorial ambitions in the South China Sea, says the State Department’s press release of Friday, however, [...]

It’s a pretty elaborate However.

More to the point, the statement does also urge all parties to clarify and pursue their territorial and maritime claims in accordance with international law, including the Law of the Sea Convention.

With the statement, the U.S. positions itself on Vietnam’s side – hence Beijing’s representations -, but stops short of committing itself to practical or military measures that would support Vietnam.

It would help if all claimants were prepared to accept a verdict from the  International Tribunal For the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) – and Xinhua happily points out that not only China is cherry-picking when it comes to international law. If the case was brought to the court by all parties involved, however, and if all parties were prepared to accept the court’s verdict, the judges could hardly refuse to accept the case.

And the mention of international law by the State Department is crucial: after all,  Beijing wants to negotiate with every single claimant, one by one. It wants to control the process not only bilaterally, but in effect unilaterally.

Is it wise for the U.S. to position itself as clearly as the Ventrell statement does? That’s no easy question – and the answer would need to include hints to an American ability not to “disappoint” Hanoi, as this would probably damage the limited and informal alliance with Vietnam.

But anyone who demands or welcomes steps towards democratization in international relations should – logically – welcome both China’s and Russia’s role at the UN when it comes to Syria, and America’s role in the South China Sea.

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Related

» China doesn’t object to Hegemonism, July 13, 2012
» Vietnam’s Contributions, Greatly Appreciated, State Department, July 10, 2012

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Syria: Annan resigns, Beijing hedges its Bets

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The Syrian government and opposition reacted to UN and Arab League special envoy Kofi Annan‘s announcement that he would end his work by the end of the month, reports Xinhua:

In a statement published on August 2, the Syrian foreign ministry expressed deep regret. The statement emphasized that the Syrian government had always worked for the implementation of Annan’s six-point resolution plan for the Syrian crisis, to solve the crisis by political means and dialog.

叙利亚外交部２日发表声明称，对于安南辞去特使职务，叙方深表遗憾。声明强调，叙政府一直致力于执行安南提出的解决叙利亚危机的六点和平建议，通过政治对话的方式解决叙利亚危机。

The statement says that the Syrian government had always maintained good cooperation with the UN monitoring mission. But some countries, despite verbal promises to support Annan’s peace proposals, had in fact acted to the contrary. The statement also points out that the Syrian government would continue to  combat terrorism within the Syrian borders, and protect the safety of civilians and property.

声明说，叙政府一直同联合国叙利亚监督团保持良好的合作。但一些国家虽然口头承诺支持安南的和平建议，实际行动恰恰相反。声明还指出，叙利亚政府将继续打击境内的恐怖主义，保护平民与财产安全。

At the same time, Hassan Abdel Azim, general coordinator of Syria’s biggest opposition party, the “Syrian National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change”, told a Xinhua reporter that Annan’s departure meant that the peace proposals had failed, the main reason of which was that the armed conflict between the Syrian government’s and the oppositional forces had never stopped. He said that hopes for a peaceful resolution were now very distant, and Syria would fall into full civil war.

另一方面，叙国内最大的反对派政党联合组织“叙利亚全国民主变革力量民族协调机构”总协调员哈桑·阿卜杜·阿济姆对新华社记者说，安南的离任意味着和平建议宣告失败，其主要原因是叙利亚政府与反对派武装之间一直冲突不断。他说，政治解决叙利亚危机的希望已经非常渺茫，叙利亚将陷入全面的内战。

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Huanqiu Shibao:

According to RIA Novosti, a leading Syrian oppositional believes that the international community is responsible for Annan resignaton as the UN and Arab-League special envoy.

据俄新社8月3日消息，叙利亚反对派一名领导人日前对安南辞去联合国-阿盟联合特使职位发表看法，他认为，导致安南使命失败的责任在国际社会。

One of the “National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change” leaders, Hassan Abdel Azim, said that “Annan was the United Nations’ and the Arab League’s special envoy, but didn’t get the support the international community should have given him”. He believed that on the one hand, Russia and China hadn’t exerted pressure on the Assad regime, and on the other, America, the West, Turkey, and some Arab countries hadn’t put pressure on the armed opposition, and therefore hadn’t been able to to get the crisis onto a political track.

叙利亚反对派团体“全国民主变革力量民族协调机构”领导人之一哈桑•阿卜杜•阿济姆说：“安南是联合国和阿盟的联合特使，却没有获得国际社会的应有支持。”他认为，一方面，俄罗斯和中国未向巴沙尔政权施压，另一方面，美国、西方、土耳其和一些阿拉伯国家未向反对派武装施压，未能将危机转入政治轨道。

[...] He said: “military confrontation within Syria will decide the outcome. The winner will be decided in the violence between the government and the armed opposition”.

[.....] 他说：“叙利亚的命运将取决于国内军事对立的结果，将在当局的暴力和反对派武装的反暴力中决出胜者。”

Reading Chinese media leaves the impression that the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change is the opposition group Beijing believes it can do business with (to use the old Thatcher quote), if the need arises.

National Coordination Committee members visited Beijing in February this year and had words of praise for China’s just position on Middle East affairs at the time. An informal or – just as possible – semi-official blogger suggested in February that Beijing had previously lost ground in Libya for its cool relations with Gaddafi’s opponents, and had become smarter by the Libyan experience.

Hassan Abdel Azim (apparently also referred to as Hussein Abdel Azim) is seen as a Nasserist, i. e. an Arab nationalist and socialist, rather than an Islamist.

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Related

» UN General Assembly passes Resolution, RIA Novosti, Aug 3, 2012

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Shortwave Log, Northern Germany, July 2012

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Radio Damascus (9330 kHz)

Radio Damascus suspended its broadcasts on shortwave for some time in July¹⁾, but the signal is now back, with varying signal strength. Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg‘s (RBB) shortwave editor notes that reportedly, the station’s technicians couldn’t reach the transmission site in Adra, east of Damascus, because of fightings on the route there. The RBB notice cites no source; maybe it was an announcement by Radio Damascus itself.

Last night (August 1), both the German and the English-language broadcasts, at 18:05 and 20:10 GMT respectively, were affected by complete signal failings, especially during the German-language broadcast. Signal strength during the first twenty minutes or so after 18:00 UTC was about O=2, i.e. barely readable at times, and O=3 (readable, except during the blackouts) after 20:05 UTC.

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Radio Damascus shortwave QSL, 1980s)

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============

Recent Logs

International Telecommunication Union letter codes used in the table underneath:
ARG – Argentina; F – France; IRN – Iran; RRW – Rwanda; SYR – Syria.

Languages (“L.”):
C – Chinese; E – English; F – French; G – German.

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kHz	Station	Ctry	L.	Day	Time GMT	S	I	O
21780	Deutsche Welle (Kigali)	RRW	F	July 23	12:02	4	4	4
11700	RFI Paris	F	F	July 29	07:14	5	4	4
21650	IRIB Tehran	IRN	C	July 29	12:00	4	5	4
93302)	Radio Damascus	SYR	E	July 31	20:57	2	4	2
15345	RAE Buenos Aires	ARG	G	July 31	21:18	3	3	3

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Note

¹⁾ The absence from shortwave seems to have lasted for much of July’s second half. Last time I heard the shortwave broadcast before it was suspended was on June 27, but I only tried again on July 31 (see above) anyway. According to RBB on July 22, Radio Damascus was scheduled to resume its 9330 kHz broadcasts on July 29.

²⁾ From 4’40” on my recording on July 31 (see second-last entry in table above), the signal fails several times – arguably because of power failures.
[Update, December 23, 2012: now removed. If you are interested in the soundfile, please contact me by email or comment.]

Radio Damascus (or a fan club) provides podcasts with a pretty good sound quality here – usually uploaded within hours or days after the actual broadcast, and downloadable for about a week.

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Related

» Previous Logs, July 1, 2012
» Where’s the Iceberg, Febr 11, 2012

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