German Press Review: Kim’s Sugarcubes, and the “Battle of Opinion”

The actions of the North Korean regime are not incalculable, writes the Süddeutsche Zeitung‘s (Munich) Reymer Klüver, the paper’s U.S. correspondent until summer last year, and now with the foreign-politics department at Süddeutsche Zeitung. The Kim clan’s provocations were actually quite calculable in its provocations which served only one goal: to show the world and its own people its power. The regime in North Korea doesn’t act incalculably. It acts irresponsibly.

The message is aimed at the Obama administration, believes Klüver, as the test was conducted on the day when the American president delivered the agenda for his second term in office, and at South Korean president-elect Park Geun Hye is about to take office. The reactions, too, were calculable: the US would demand stronger sanctions, China would agree after some hesitation, and basically, the response wouldn’t be different from the one to the previous nuclear test. Even if a bomb of the same explosive power as the previous one was indeed smaller than before, and therefore more suitable to be fitted to a nuclear missile, North Korea remained far from being a threat to America.

What makes the test dangerous all the same would be that Kim might gamble away, and that his provocations could spin out of control. A conflict on the South Korean border could lead to just that kind of scenario. Even worse, non-proliferation might be used to earn some badly needed foreign exchange. There was speculation about North Korean cooperation with Iran on its third test. What would keep a gambler like the dictator in Pyongyang to sell Iran or others his knowledge and even material?

China could influence North Korea, if it wanted to, writes Klüver, but it didn’t want to use it. 90 percent of North Korea’s oil imports depended on China. But China’s calculations could be shifting, Klüver adds: a Peking government paper had mentioned a “high price” that North Korea would have to pay in case of a nuclear test. The Chinese, Klüver recaps, needed to take responsibility for their irresponsible neighbor.

Der Spiegel (Hamburg) chooses the tabloid approach, as far as its choice  of stock photo material is concerned. Underneath a video link photo (from Reuters) that shows Kim Jong-un in flames, the headline is North Korean nuclear power messes with America (Atommacht Nordkorea legt sich mit Amerika an). Der Spiegel’s Andreas Lorenz points out that this could start an arms race, with the US, Japan and North Korea beefing up their missile defense. Xi Jinping acted hardly differently from his predecessor Hu Jintao, Lorenz notes, as he criticizes Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests, but also trying to soften international sanctions. North Korea is an important supplier of commodities to China. And the encapsulated country serves China’s military as a strategic buffer zone between China and the other East Asian states and the US.

Lorenz also quotes the English-language party mouthpiece “Global Times” as suggesting that there was no need for China to placate angry feelings about its role. And Lorenz quotes US expert Siegfried Hecker with concerns that North Korea could sell its atomic-bomb know-how, to Iran, for example.

Die Welt (Berlin) suggests that Kim had thrown the Chinese sugar cubes (i. e. sweetened the third test).

Namely, the third test was preceded by several sessions of North Korean security panels on which Kim ostensibly emphasized the leadership role of his Communist Party. For the first time in the regime’s history, these sessions were made public, writes die Welt’s Torsten Krauel. Kim thus signaled that the third test was controled by the civilian leadership and not, as it had been previously, as an – intransparent to the outside world – decision between an ailing dictator and an incalculable army. (Dem dritten Test gingen nämlich mehrere Sitzungen nordkoreanischer Sicherheitsgremien voraus, auf denen Kim demonstrativ die Führungsrolle seiner Kommunistischen Partei hervorhob. Diese Sitzungen wurden erstmals in der Geschichte des Regimes publik gemacht. Kim Jong-un signalisierte damit, dass der dritte Atomtest unter der Steuerung und Kontrolle der zivilen Führung stattfand und nicht, wie beide Male zuvor, in einer nach außen unklaren Entscheidung zwischen einem kränklichen Diktator und einer unberechenbaren Armee.)

Therefore, Xi Jinping and (theoretically) Barack Obama, too, now had a a definite contact person, believes Krauel.

Alleged North-Korean cooperation with Iran has long been a leitmotif in Die Welt’s coverage, but while more moderate papers like Süddeutsche Zeitung are discussing these allegations too, this week, Die Welt goes one step further and discusses how America could conduct a war on North Korea. However, Krauel concludes that different from Iraq during the years after the Kuwait war, the United Nations weren’t in a state of war with North Korea.

Therefore, it seems to be inevitable to talk with each other in East Asia again, even with a dictator like Kim Jong-un – as unpromising and depressing this prospect may currently look. (Wahrscheinlich führt deshalb tatsächlich kein Weg daran vorbei, in Ostasien wieder miteinander zu reden, sogar mit einem Diktator wie Kim Jong-un – so aussichtslos und bedrückend diese Aussicht derzeit auch erscheinen mag.)

The German mainstream press in general has become much more supportive of militarization of politics than in the past. That is my rough observation, and not backed by statistics. But apparently for the first time, research has been published about how leading German press people – mentioned by name – are interlinked with think tanks, national and international forums, foundations, policy planning groups, etc.. And a presentation of this research also clearly quotes leading press commentators with statements like

Politics must not shun the battle of opinion on the home front if they are convinced of what they purport. [...] The battle for the “hearts and minds” must be conducted among at home, too. (Der Meinungskampf an der Heimatfront darf die Politik nicht scheuen, wenn sie von dem überzeugt ist, was sie vorgibt. [...] Der Kampf um die “hearts and minds” muss auch bei uns geführt werden.)

A newsman’s words, to be clear.

This should not lead to overreaching conclusions. The research does not suggest that everyone is in the boat of an extended security concept (erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff, including energy and financial-industry issues). But among four leading journalists of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit and Die Welt, definitions of security and threat catalogs had been uncritically adopted (unkritisch übernommen).

There are papers with editorial managers not known for relevant networks – the left leaning Tageszeitung (taz) and Frankfurter Rundschau (FR). Some of their articles correspond with views among the elite, some sharply criticize the extended security concept, according to the report.

Here is another observation that disturbs me: My choice of press-review sources – Süddeutsche Zeitung, Spiegel, Die Welt further above in this blogpost was spontaneous. My information sources of choice when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear test were just these papers. No taz, no Frankfurter Rundschau. However, there’s an excuse:

I thought the Rundschau was no longer online, as they filed for bankruptcy on November 12, 2012.

But in fact, they are still here.

____________

Related

» Questions Raised, November 10, 2012

____________

Huanqiu on HK Survey: It’s not as Bad as you Think

The following is a translation of a Huanqiu Shibao article. It is therefore a mainland Chinese reflection of a Hong Kong survey. I haven’t read the survey itself, or coverage on the survey from elsewhere.

The Huanqiu article has been republished by many Chinese websites, including Sina‘s edition for Taiwan, Enorth (Tianjin), and many other regional or local websites in China.

Main Link: Only 2.4 percent of Hong Kong’s post-1980s…

In cases where the Cantonese pronounciation of Hong Kongers’ names within the Huanqiu article weren’t easily available online, I used putonghua pronounciation in this translation.

Be more Andy Lau: 让世界知道我们都是中国人 (click picture for video)

Links within blockquote added during translation.

Exchanges between Hong Kong and the hinterland become more and more frequent, but a recent survey finds that Hong Kongers see their “Hong Kong identity” with growing clarity. Among them, young respondents born after 1980 feel most strongly about their “Hong Kong identity”. Some Hong Kong media explain that the findings reflect “resistance against Chinese identity” among part of Hong Kongers, and a “low national identity”. However, Anthony Y. H. Fung [Feng Yingqian], head of the Chinese University’s School of Journalism and Communication, and in charge of the survey, told a “Huanqiu Shibao” reporter on Monday that there was no contradiction between “Hong Kong identity” and “national identity”, that while the survey showed a Hong Kong “awareness of their native land”, it also showed that pride in the national flag, the national anthem or the People’s Liberation Army and other national symbols had also risen.

香港与内地的交流越来越频繁，但一项最新调查发现，香港人的“港人身份认同”越来越明显，其中“80后”的年轻受访者“港人身份认同感”最为强烈。有香港媒体在报道中解读称，调查结果反映部分港人“抗拒中国人的身份”、“国民身份认同感低”。不过，负责调查的香港中文大学新闻与传播学院院长冯应谦12日向《环球时报》记者澄清说，香港人对“港人身份认同”与“国民身份认同”并不存在矛盾，调查显示港人“本土意识”增加的同时，也显示过去十多年来香港人对于国旗、国歌或解放军等国家象征自豪感相对有上升。

According to a Hong Kong’s “Oriental Daily” report on Monday, the Chinese University’s SChool of Communication and a polling agency carried out a telephone survey last month, with 819 Hong Kongers as respondents. One question asked the respondents to tell to which category of people they belonged, with “Chinese people”, “Hong Kong people”, “Hong Kong people, but also Chinese people” and “Chinese people, but also Hong Kong people” to choose from. The survey found that 42 percent of the respondents chose that they were “Hong Kong people, but also Chinese people”, a small drop from two years ago, when the number was 44 percent. 23 percent chose the purely “Hong Kong people” identity. 22 percent said they were “Chinese, but also Hong Kong people”, and 12 percent felt that they were purely “Chinese people”, a new low after Hong Kong’s 1997 return. The survey divided respondents into those who were thirty years old or younger, the “post-1980s”, and those older than that. The results tell that the “post-1980s” don’t greatly identify with the “Chinese people identity”, with only 2.4 percent choosing “Chinese people”, while the share of older respondents identified with the “Chinese people” option by 15.9 percent.

据香港《东方日报》12日报道，香港中文大学传播与民意调查中心于上月中进行民意调查，以电话访问了819名港人，其中一个问题要求受访者回答自己属于哪一类人，四项选择为“中国人”、“香港人”、“香港人，但也是中国人”以及“中国人，但也是香港人”。调查发现，有42%的受访者选择自己是“香港人，但也是中国人”，较两年前进行同样调查时的44%的数据稍降。其次有23%的受访者选择纯粹“香港人”身份，是自2008年以来的新高。另外22%的受访者称自己是“中国人，但也是香港人”；觉得自己纯粹是“中国人”的受访者只有12%，是97回归以来的新低点。此次调查又特别将受访者分成两批，一批为30岁或以下的“80后”，另一批则是“非80后”，结果发现“80后”对“中国人身份”不太认同，选择是“中国人”的只有2.4%，但非“80后”的比例却有15.9%。

[...]

The findings triggered controversy in Hong Kong’s public opinion. Hong Kong SAR’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference member Lew Mon-hung [Liu Mengxiong] said this was related to the SAR government only caring about peoples-livelihood issues and not doing everything to refute “Hong Kong independence” talk. He believes that recently, many determined people repeatedly waved “Union-Jack” flags and seized the opportunity of hyping “Hong Kong independence” thoughts, and the SAR government hadn’t refuted them. This could only lead to further political difficulties. Xu Huajie, Hong Kong United Youth Association advisor and China Im- and Export Chamber of Commerce deputy director, said that if Hong Kong’s young people resisted the hinterland for political reasons, they would lose many opportunities to develop in their working lives. But Basic Law Committee member Liu Naiqiang describes public opinion “as a cloud”, and believfes that it is difficult to rely only on the polls to assess trends in public opinion. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology economic faculty director Francis Lui [雷鼎鸣] says that this survey by the Chinese University “has problems”, because they offered no “Hong Konger, but no Chinese” choice. This would have been necessary to really measure Hong Kongers’ “national identy” identification.

调查结果引发香港舆论的争议。香港特区全国政协委员刘梦熊表示，港人有如此意识，相信与特区政府只顾民生政策，没有全力驳斥“港独”言论有关。他认为，近期不少有心人士多次高举代表港英时期的“米字旗”，乘机炒作“港独”思潮，但特区政府未予以驳斥，这只会令施政进一步困难。兼任香港青联顾问的中华进出口商会副主席许华杰说，若香港青年因政治理由而抗拒内地，将失去很多工作发展机会。但《基本法》委员会委员刘乃强形容“民意如浮云”，他认为很难单靠民调去评估民意趋势。香港科技大学经济学系主任雷鼎鸣表示，此次中大的调查“有问题”，因为他们没有设一个“是香港人，但不是中国人”的选项供受访者选择，只有新增这个选项才能直接测试到港人对“国民身份”认同感的最终态度是什么。

Anthony Y. H. Fung, in charge of the survey, told “Huanqiu Shibao” that there was no contradiction between “Hong Kong identity” and “Chinese identity”. Although the survey had shown the “Hong Kong identity” ever more clearly, it also showed that during the past ten years, Hong Kongers’ feelings of pride for national symbols like the national flag, the national anthem, or the PLA had also risen. From only 30.6 percent of Hong Kongers feeling proud of the national flag in 1996, their share was now 37.6 percent, and while only ten percent felt good about the PLA in 1996, their share was now 21.5 percent.

负责此次调查的香港中文大学新闻与传播学院院长冯应谦12日接受《环球时报》记者采访时澄清说，香港人对“港人身份认同”与“国民身份认同”并不存在矛盾，虽然调查显示香港人的“港人身份认同”越来越明显，但调查同时也显示，过去十多年来香港人对国旗、国歌或解放军等国家象征自豪感上升，比如，在1996年，只有30.6%的受访者对国旗有自豪感，今年的调查则有37.6%；另外，在1996年，只有10%的受访者对解放军有好感，但今年已增至21.5%。

Fung believes that the stronger “Hong Kong identitification” had grown because of discussions in recent years, having everyone considering their identity issues. As for the “post-1980s” leaning towards “Hong Kong identity”, this was because of the Hong Kong government’s promotion of [unsafe translation: lessons in line with hinterland lessons, encouraging independent thinking, and the young generation wanting to participate in public matters and deliberations about identity issues]. He said: “if the survey was carried out during the Olympics or during National Day, I believe Hong Kongers’ identification with the nation would be stronger”.

冯应谦认为，香港人对“港人身份认同”增强，只因近年相关讨论多了，让大家思考自己的身份问题。至于“80后”较倾向认同“香港人的身份”，是因为近年香港教育推行通识课(相当于内地的社会课)，鼓励独立思考，令年轻一代较愿意参与社会事务及思考身份的问题。他说，“如果调查是在奥运或者国庆期间进行，我相信港人的国民身份认同比例会大大增加。”

As for the talk about “Hong Kong independence”, Fung said that the share of respondents who said they were “Hong Kongers, but also Chinese” showed that support for “Hong Kong independence” was very small. In fact, almost sixty percent of respondents had said that they travelled to mainland China every two months or even more frequently, which reflected that Hong Kongers believed that contact with the hinterland had become an unstoppable trend.

对于近日香港出现“港独”争论，冯应谦表示，调查结果显示，受访港人大多数选择“香港人、但也是中国人”一项，可见支持“港独”只是很少数。事实上，近六成受访者表示“两个月一次或更多地”往返大陆，这反映大部分香港人都认为，与内地接触已是不可阻挡的潮流。

____________

Related

» Patriotic Classes only Optional, BBC, Sep 8, 2012
» A Sense of Affection, July 30, 2012
» If you can’t govern a village, Dec 16, 2011

____________

One (Belated) Question, Mr President: just what would You do with another Four Years?

Taiwan’s president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is said to be a technocrat – he has never been into “inspiring” speeches. But even if he had been: with popularity (or support) rates at less than ten percent (according to the BBC’s Mandarin website), all he can do is to focus on what pains the public most: the economy, and sagging earned incomes.

We are (going to be) the champions.

Ma’s Double-Ten speech wants to suggest that he knows what needs to be done:

Taiwan should become a supplier of key components and precision equipment, as well as a developer of innovative services. In addition to fostering new growth-driver industries, we must also support the efforts of our businesses to develop critical technologies, produce key components, and carry out research and development efforts aimed at creating precision equipment with intelligent functions and unique competitive advantages. This multi-track approach will ensure that our industrial firms will not be easily replaced by, nor be dependent upon, those of other nations. Aside from manufacturing, we must also keep track of market trends and develop innovative business models, so that the service sector will enjoy a greater share in our industry’s output value and exports. In this way, we can transform our service industry into another engine that can drive economic growth and help to raise pay levels. These efforts to adjust our industrial structure that I have just now discussed are underway already.

“Already” could be used to make fun of a president who, after all, took office almost four years and a half ago. However, “already” should probably be blamed on poor translation into English – in Chinese, “already” or 已經 stands for some kind of present perfect, rather than for a triumphantly “early” accomplishment, or – at least – insight.

Ma’s second term hasn’t seen a honeymoon. The public appeared to be nervous even before May this year, with support and satisfaction rates at between 15 and 22 percent respectively. Ma addressed some of the criticism of this year in today’s speech, such as the issue of communication.

But above all, Nanfang Shuo, a political commentator, suggested earlier this year, much of the public’s unease stemmed from an awareness that Ma was now free from pressure as he faced no further elections. Reforms and decisions could therefore be taken arbitrarily.

Apparently, those fears haven’t gone away.

____________

Related

» One Question, Mr President, Economist, Sep 1, 2012

____________

You Be the Judge…

… what’s nicer:

a)	That parrot shitting from a pole, or …
b)	this cute family?

Those who know a thing or two about KT will also know that he doesn’t like cats. He does like fawning animals that do as he says (i. e. dogs), and he has a parrot whom he taught to caw stuff like

KT ten-thousand years! KT knows better! KT is a sex symbol!

To each his own.

To keep this strictly scientific, I’ll try to include one of those WordPress polling functions here:

…

No, I won’t. Too much of a hassle. Just leave your comments, and I’ll count them,  two years on or so.

People’s Daily Online on Economic Sanctions against Japan: “Don’t Hurt the Friends, don’t Please the Enemy”

The following is a translation of an article published by People’s Daily Online (人民网) on September 18, 2012.

Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

The article focuses on two levels of sanctions: government-level (with a very cautious attitude) and “non-governmental boycotts” (with an “understanding” attitude).  In terms of business, the article addresses losses that China would incur in terms of technological progress if it took comprehensive “countermeasures” against Japan. Further down, the article suggests that rare-earth sanctions against Japan had basically backfired, in or since 2010.

Rather than expressing an editorial stance of its own, the article quotes a number of academics. The subtitles within the following translation are not part of the original article.

Main Link: 打经济战 中国承受力定比日本强？ – People’s Daily Online, September 18, 2012
-

Economic Sanctions: Not while Japan maintains its Technological Edge

[...] Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang Zengwei said recently that the so-called “islands purchase” by Japan (Diaoyu Islands) made it hard to avoid negative impacts on Sino-Japanese trade relations.

因日本对中国固有领土钓鱼岛进行所谓“国有化”，中日关系再度降温，由此引发的寒潮在经贸领域已经有首当其冲的显现。商务部副部长姜增伟日前表示，日方的所谓“购岛”（钓鱼岛）行为，难以避免地会对中日经贸关系产生负面影响。

In Chinese public opinion, voices sympathetic to terrorizing Japan by economic sanctions have emerged, which say with certainty that Japan’s economy was more dependent on China than vice versa. Even if economic and trade confrontation had the killing power of weapons on both sides, China’s ability to bear that was far stronger than Japan’s. However, to “play the economic card needed to be done  cautiously, and the two countries’ abilities to bear this be judged by seeking the truth in the facts, and this issue be dealt with rationally and objectively”. Recently, a scholar with a good knowledge of Sino-Japanese economic and trade issues talked with this People’s Daily Online reporter.

中国舆论中已出现用经济制裁威慑日本的声音，并言之凿凿：日本经济对中国经济的依存度高于中国对日本。虽然中日经贸对峙对双方都有杀伤力，但中国承受能力远高于日本。然而，“打经济牌必须慎重，要实事求是地评估两国的承受力，理性客观地对待这个问题。”近日，谙熟中日经贸事务的学者如是告诉人民网记者。

Japan’s economy entered a long-term depression in the 1980s, with exports as the main driving force in economic development. Although European and American markets were the main factors in influencing Japan’s economy, China’s influence was no insignificant factor either.

自上世纪80年代中期始，日本经济陷入长期萧条，出口是其经济发展的最主要动力。虽然欧美市场是影响日本经济的最主要因素，但是对日本经济而言，中国因素早已不可忽视。

China is currently Japan’s biggest trading partner and its biggest export market. According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance statistics, Japan’s trade with and its exports to China stand at 19.7 percent and 20.6 percent respectively, in its total amount of foreign trade. After the European Union, America, and ASEAN, Japan is China’s fourth-largest trading partner.

中国是目前日本最大的贸易伙伴和最大出口对象国。据日本财务省统计，2011年日本对华贸易和对华出口将分别占日本外贸总额和出口总额的19.7%和20.6%。而日本在欧盟、美国、东盟之后，是中国的第四大贸易伙伴。

Analysts have pointed out that Japan’s economy is more dependent on China than vice versa. Even if economic and trade confrontation had the killing power of weapons on both sides, China’s ability to bear that was far stronger than Japan’s. Once China started economic and trade sanctions against Japan, this could lead to a Japanese economic crisis.

有分析人士指出，日本经济对中国经济的依存度高于中国对日本。虽然中日经贸对峙对双方都有杀伤力，但中国承受能力远高于日本。一旦中方启动经济制裁，可能引发日本经济危机。

Feng Zhaokui, a researcher with the National Japanese Economic Research Institute, told this People’s Daily Online reporter that taking economic countermeasures against Japan’s economy could have a greater than on China in theory. “However, the so-called ability to bear” is no mere matter of numbers.

而全国日本经济学会研究员冯昭奎则告诉人民网记者，对日本采取经济上的反制措施，理论上日本受到的影响大于中国。“但是所谓的‘承受能力’却不是光用数字就能够衡量的。

Feng Zhaokui says that since 2002, in Sino-Japanese trade, China has always recorded a trade deficit, mainly because much of the trade was in the field of production. The levels of bilateral import and export differed, and the weight of technological content differed. In the industry chain, Japan stood at the high end, and China mainly imported key core technological components from Japan, with high technological content, much added value, and if these imports were affected, the industrial chain would see disrupture, which would damage China’s production. Even as Sino-Japanese trade was gradually transforming from a vertical division of labor to a horizontal pattern, Japan generally was the side with goods of high technological content, high added value and maintained an edge there.

冯昭奎说，自2002年以来，在中日贸易中，中方一直处于逆差状态，主要原因在于中日之间在生产领域内的贸易所占比重较大。中日双方的进出口产品层次不同，技术含量不同。日本处于产业链的高端，中国从日本主要进口关键的核心零部件，技术含量高、附加值高，如果进口受影响，产业链将面临断裂，对中国将产生损害。尽管中日之间的贸易结构正在逐步从垂直分工向水平分工方向转化，但总体来看，日本在技术含量高、附加值高的产品方面仍占优势。

According to surveys, Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in China in 2011 was at 6.35 billion US dollars, an increase of 49.7 percent compared with the previous year. This was abut 40 percentage points more than the increase in what China attracted in overall FDI (9.72 percent). Japanese investment in China supported Japan’s economic recovery and growth; it also contributed to China’s economic development. Hasty economic sanctions against Japan could lead to Japanese companies withdrawal from China.

调查显示，2011年日本对华直接投资实际到位资金63.48亿美元，同比增速高达49.7%，而中国实际吸引外资增幅为9.72%，与此相比整整高出近40个百分点。日本对华投资有力地支持了日本经济的复苏和增长，也对中国经济的发展做出了贡献。如果轻率地对日本使用经济制裁，可能会导致在华日企撤离中国。

“China’s economic growth this year is voluntarily restricted to eight percent, which is to say that we are approaching the lower limit”, says Feng, as China adds twenty million new workforce annually. Our country has entered a period of accelerated promotion of economic transformation, it faces growing pressures from the global economy which complicate the external environment, with growing uncertain factors such as if the economy can maintain needed growth, and the job market may suffer blows. “Therefore, the economic card must be played cautiously, and the two countries’ ability to bear this be judged by seeking the truth in the facts, and this issue be dealt with rationally and objectively”.

“今年中国的经济增长率将自行控制在8%，对我们来说，是接近下线的。”冯昭奎说，而中国每年新增劳动力一两千万。我国已经进入加快推进经济转型的关键时期，面临着世界经济下行压力增大的复杂外部环境，不确定因素增强，如果经济不能保持适当的增速，就业市场就会受到冲击。“所以，打经济牌必须慎重，要实事求是地评估两国的承受力，理性客观地对待这个问题。”

-

The Rare-Earths Card

Among the economic-sanction measures discussed recently, limiting exports of rare earths to Japan has been most frequent. Many people say that when it comes to rare-earths resources, Japan will continue to depend heavily on China in the near future, and therefore, China should play the “rare-earth card”.

在近日经济制裁日本的诸多措施中，限制对日稀土出口是讨论得最多的。不少人士表示，日本在稀土资源近期仍将倚重中国，因此中国可打出“稀土牌”。

According to the Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Japan’s imports of rare earths frm China have fallen by 3007 tons during the first six months of 2012, i. e. 49.3 percent of Japan’s total imports. These imports were reduced by fifty percent within half a year. Before 2009, 90 percent of Japan’s rare-earths imports came from China.

而据《日本经济新闻》报道，2012年1到6月份，日本从中国进口的稀土资源下降到3007吨，仅占全部输入总量的49.3%，半年内减少了50%。而在2009年之前，日本的稀土资源9成以上都需依靠中国进口。

China got a lesson, in terms of economic sanctions”, Feng believes. In 2010, Japan had illegally detained the captain of a Chinese trawler. Although China hadn’t openly acknowledged the use of economic sanctions, practically, China temporarily halted rare-earths exports and created temporary difficulties for Japan at the time. “But in fact, Japan mainly cried out, and had already got prepared. Their inventories were ample.

“在经济制裁方面，中国是有教训的。”冯昭奎认为，2010年，日本非法扣押中国渔船船长。中国虽然没有公开承认使用了经济制裁，但事实上中国暂停了对日稀土出口，当时给日本造成一时困难。“但其实困难主要是日本叫唤出来的，他们早就有备无患，存货很多。”

China holds only one-third of the global rare-earth reserves, but currently supplies some 90 percent of the worldwide quantity. “There are countries rich in rare earths, too, and their technological ability to produce them has increased” Feng Zhaokui says. After China had restricted imports of rare earths in 2010, Japan resumed research of resources policies, and especially decided that it couldn’t depend on only one country for rare minerals and rare metals. These days, Australia, Malaysia and other countries rare-earth projects are developing very smoothly.

中国的稀土储量只占世界的三分之一，却承担了目前国际市场上90%的供应量。“国外也有稀土资源丰富的国家，而且有技术，这两年里他们把稀土生产搞上来了。”冯昭奎说，2010年中国限制稀土出口后，日本就重新研究了资源政策，尤其决定稀土及稀有金属不能只依赖一个国家。如今澳大利亚、马来西亚等地的稀土项目，进展得都很顺利。

“As far as our talk about having a monopoly position on rare earths, other countries have caught up, and we haven’t increased our technological content, and we haven’t upgraded the industrial change. Our competitiveness in the field of rare earths has been greatly affected.”

“而我们总说在稀土产量上有垄断地位，但是现在其他国家赶上来了，我们却没有提高技术含量，升级产业链，在稀土产业竞争力方面大受影响。”

Feng believes that rare earths won’t restrain Japan anymore, and that they are no longer a card that could be played. If one wanted to impose economic sanctions, one had to take the rare-earths lessons into account.

冯昭奎认为，稀土已经制约不了日本，不再是一张牌。如果要采取经济制裁措施，一定要吸取稀土教训。

In the wake of the heightened temperatures from the Diaoyu Islands’ issue, another popular surge in “boycotting Japanese goods” and even a low in travels to Japan are inevitable. Information from all travel agencies say that since September, the number of group travels to Japan had gone down drastically, and some travel agencies have stopped Japan travel services altogether. Numbers released by the Chinese automotive industry on September 10 show that compared with last year’s same period, August sales of Japanese cars had dropped by two percent. From August, Japanese goods such as household appliances had also gone down in China.

在钓鱼岛事件升温之际，“抵制日货”的浪潮不可避免地在民众中再次掀起，连带着赴日旅游也遭遇低谷。来自各大旅行社的消息称，进入9月份以来，赴日旅游成团数量急剧减少，有的旅行社则干脆停止赴日旅游业务。中国汽车工业协会9月10日公布数据显示，与上年同期比较，8月日系车销量下降2%。而8月份以来，日系品牌家电在中国销售额也整体大跌。

Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang Zengwei said on a press conference that given Japanese violations of Chinese territory, Chinese consumers had a right to express their position in reasonable manners, and that we should express understanding for that.

商务部副部长姜增伟近日在记者会上表示，针对日方侵犯中国领土主权的行为，中国消费者以理性的方式表达其立场和他们的一些想法，是他们的权利，我们对此应该表示理解。

“Reach for the wine when friends arrive, and reach for the gun when enemies arrive”, China Academy of Social Science Japan Institute director Gao Hong told People’s Daily Online reporter in an interview. The Chinese people have shown patriotic enthusiasm, and spontaneous boycotts of Japanese goods was a right which gave no cause for criticism. “However, we need to distinguish between the non-governmental and the governmental level when it comes to the economic card. At the government level, more economic policies need to be adjusted to each other.”

“朋友来了有好酒，敌人来了有猎枪，”中国社科院日本所副所长高洪在接受人民网记者采访时也如是说，中国人民出于爱国热情，自发地抵制日本产品，是自己的权利，无可厚非。“但是经济牌要有区分，政府层面和民间层面的牌是不一样的，政府层面更多的是进行经济政策的调整。”

Liu Gang, professor at the Okinawa University, pointed out in a number of media that to sanction a country, other countries’ support was frequently required. To mobilize international sanctions against Japan, these needed to be adopted by the United Nations. That’s how so-called sanctions would be legitimate. If one country high-handedly reached for the big stick of economic sanctions, this didn’t only deviate from WTO principles, but also give rise to gossip and a series of other side effects.

日本冲绳大学教授刘刚在此前的媒体评论中分析指出，制裁一个国家，通常应该有其他国家的支持。如若真要动用国际力量制裁日本，有必要提请联合国通过。这样，所谓的制裁行动才具有正当性。如果一国妄自舞起经济制裁大棒，不仅容易偏离WTO原则，更易授人口实，引起一连串的副作用。

“As for economic sanctions, I believe that generally-speaking, it isn’t China’s position that they should be a tool in handling international relations”, Qu Xing, director of the China Institute of International Studies, clearly points out.

“对于经济制裁，我觉得中国一般地讲，不主张把制裁作为处理国际关系的一个手段。”中国国际问题研究所所长曲星明确地指出。

Gao Hong also told the People’s Daily Online reporter that as far as countermeasures were concerned, these were meant to subdue the other side. Countermeasures needed to correspond with the other side’s provocation. If Japan didn’t continuously act provocatively on the economic level, countermeasures on a governmental level could usually not be carried out. After Japan’s so-called “nationalization” [of three of the Senkaku islands - JR], China had announced its points about the Diaoyu territorial seas, institutionalized the dispatch of naval patrol boats, and submitted material and cartography to the United Nations, etc.. These “combined punches” had already hit Japan where it was vulnerable.

高洪也告诉人民网记者，就反制来讲，反制是针对对方进攻所采取的反击制服的斗争手段。反制和挑衅的层次和力度相当。如果日本在经济上没有进一步的挑衅行为，政府层面的经济反制一般不会进行。在日本对钓鱼岛进行所谓“国有化”后，中方随即公布钓鱼岛领海基线基点，派海监船对钓鱼岛实施常态化监测，以及向联合国提交钓鱼岛坐标表和海图等，这一套“组合拳”已经击中日本的要害。

Liu Gang believes that Japan’s established policy of swallowing the Diaoyu Islands is an international problem, and China didn’t need to oblique references to that. The best approach would be tit-for-tat, to confine oneself to the facts, to make representations when needed, and to let strength and actions speak – to learn from Russia meant to use strength as a backup, with less talk and more action.

刘刚认为，吞下钓鱼岛已经是日本的既定方针和国是问题，对此问题，中国没必要再旁敲侧击，又何必冀望于“歪打”迂回，反而最好针锋相对，就事论事，该怎么交涉就怎么交涉，让实力和行动说话。学习俄罗斯，以实力做后盾，少说多做。

The Diaoyu issue is inherited from history, as many experts say. The struggle for the Diaoyu Islands is a long-term one and can’t be done overnight. This is only the first round of the struggle, and the struggle needed long-term preparation. China’s departments in charge also state clearly that they reserve the right to all kinds of action. Since a long-term struggle was needed, strategies needed to be made, orders [of approaches], and sequences of goals. Nothing should be done on the spur of sentiments, and not in a way that would “hurt friends and please the enemies”.

正如近期不少专家学者所说，钓鱼岛问题是历史遗留问题。关于钓鱼岛的斗争是长期的，不能一蹴而就。现在只是斗争的第一回合，要做斗争的长期准备。中国相关部门也明确表示，保留一切行动的权利。既然要做长期斗争，就要讲策略、讲次序、讲阶段性目的，不能意气用事，做令“亲者痛、仇者快”之事。

____________

Related

» Making Patriotism Useful, Sep 17, 2012
» The Nine-Dotted Line, Foarp, Sep 30, 2011
» Collision with Sth Korean Coast Guard, Dec 18, 2010
» A Nefarious Turn, Sep 25, 2010

____________

Book Review: Behind the Red Door – Sex in China

Red doors are about attracting luck, and when you do an online search about red doors in Chinese – hong men or 红门), you will get tons of fengshui and home-decorating commercial offers to that end. Family happiness is probably as universal a catchword in China as is the pursuit of happiness in America. But here lies the difference: in China, family happiness depends on each and every family member. Red doors may be helpful, but if you, a daughter or son, achieve in contributing to your family’s happiness, or if you inflict pain on your family – your parents especially, but on your grandparents and wider family, too -, will usually depend on the family you are going to build yourself, as a Chinese individual in his or her twenties. It will depend on the wife or husband you are going to marry, and the child you are expected to have.

Mr Wang’s REAL life is quite different.

When I started reading Richard Burger‘s debut book, Behind the Red Door – Sex in China, I became aware that I actually knew very little about the topic. I was aware of the pressure on Chinese colleagues of my age to get married and to have children, and I also got impressions on how the terms were being negotiated between children and parents – even marrying a partner from a different province is considered a flaw by some elders. But what makes Burger’s book particularly insightful is a review of how the outer edges of sexual behavior and identity in China “deviate” from family and social norms, and the troubles in coming to terms with these differences – or in living with them without coming to terms with them.

Behind the Red Door begins with a chapter on sex in imperial China, continues with one on dating and marriage (including marriage between Chinese and foreigners), and a chapter on the sex trade. In many ways, the chapter after these, “The Family”, constitutes a hub to everything else. Neither chapter comes without references to the individuals’ families, anyway. Sex workers will rarely let family people know about their business. One may guess that if a family wanted to know, they would know, but that’s not how psychology works. Gays and Lesbians – they are the topic after the chapter on family – rarely come out to their family people. And few transgendered will even apply for a gender-changing operation (let alone get one), because this would leave them without any chance to keep their sexual identities hidden from their families – and those who are looking on, i. e. basically everyone in the wider family, colleagues, the neighborhood, village, or town.

There is one section where Burger interprets the impressions and trends described in the books actual seven chapters: that’s in his parting thoughts, on the last fifteen pages. It’s the weakest part of the book, in that it unintentionally seems to confirm Burger’s own intuition described as early as in the introduction: arriving at a neat conclusion is impossible. But that attempt is an – unintentional, maybe – practical demonstration of just that fact.

The strengths of Behind the Red Door lie in the way it makes China speak from old and contemporary sources. It builds a narration from imperial times, with instances of traditional societal liberalism towards sex that doesn’t only serve procreation but rather seeks pleasure, even among lower classes, to a strongly puritan (Republican, Maoist and Dengist) modernity, and once again to growing relaxation during the most recent decades – even as traditional family values, and party orthodoxy, continue to linger in sometimes unpredictable areas. Behind the Red Door – and this is much more “political” than what I expected to read, discusses links between sexual liberalization and political control, too.

Burger is highly aware of China’s many political and personal realities, and writes in an engaging style. It isn’t only the author himself who speaks to the reader; it’s Chinese individuals just as well – a few out of millions of “ordinary” Chinese men and women of all ages who – willingly or of painful necessity – test the limits of what is “permissible” in terms of sex and in their relationships – people who deal with varying numbers of disintegrating illusions before and after wedlock – and who, in unfortunate cases, arrive at the comprehension that family happiness, “classical” or not, may not come their way.

____________

Behind the Red Door, by Richard Burger, 2012, at Amazon.

CASS Blue Book: Widening Gaps, Modern Metropolitan Agriculture Development

The Beijing Times (京华时报) covered the message from an “urban development blue book” by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) on August 14. Enorth (Tianjin) republished the Beijing Times’ article on August 15:

The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Urban Development and Environmental Research Institute published an Urban blue book, “China Urban Development Report (2012), yesterday. The blue book points out that within the coming twenty years, China will have nearly 500 million farmers who need to become urbanized, and that this will come at a cost of at least 40,000 billion to 50,000 billion Yuan.

昨天，中国社会科学院城市发展与环境研究所发布城市蓝皮书《中国城市发展报告(2012)》。蓝皮书指出，今后20年内，中国将有近5亿农民需要实现市民化，为此至少需要40万亿-50万亿元的成本。

The blue book points out that the transformation from rural to urban society spells singular and major social change.If future urbanization in China push on at a rate of 0.8 to one percentage point in the future, China’s urbanization rate will be at more than 60 percent by 2020. This also means that within the coming twenty years, China will have more than 200,000,000 farmers who will need jobs and places to live in cities and towns, in addition to farmers who came there during recent years and haven’t yet completed urbanization. In future, the country will see 400 million to 500 million farmers who need to achieve urbanization.

蓝皮书指出，从乡村型社会向城市型社会转型是一次重大的社会变革。如果未来中国的城镇化率以每年0.8-1.0个百分点的速度推进，到2020年前后中国的城镇化率将超过60%。这同时意味着，今后20年内，中国将有2亿多农民需要转移到城镇就业和居住，再加上近年来已经进入城镇但还没有完全市民化的农民，未来全国将有4亿-5亿农民需要实现市民化。

According to reliminary calculations, solving social insurance and public services issues alone will cost at least 100,000 Yuan per capita. Within the next twenty years, costs at at least 40,000 billion to 50,000 billion Yuan will arise.

据初步测算，仅解决社会保障和公共服务，农民市民化成本至少人均10万元。在未来20年内，至少需要支付40万亿-50万亿元的成本。

Researcher and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute for Urban and Environmental Studies’ deputy director Wei Houkai said that currently, needs in places far away from the cities were still very different. Seen from the ways of life and living standards, a great number of migrant workers, of farmers who lived in urban outskirts without permanent residence, and the large numbers of farmers who lost their land in the urbanization process, hadn’t really blended into the cities, their ways of life and consumption patterns remained retained the rural ways of life and characteristics, and their degree of urbanization was low.

中国社科院城环所副所长魏后凯研究员表示，目前中国离城市型社会的要求还具有较大的差距。从生活方式标准看，大量进城务工的农民工、郊区就地转化的农转非居民以及县改区中存在的大量农民，没有真正融入城市，其生活方式和消费方式仍然保留着农民的习惯和特征，市民化程度低。

The blue book also shows that in 2011, urban population in China was at 691 million, an urbanization rate of 51.27 percent, and that urban population therefore exceeded rural population. That urbanization exceeded 50 percent was a historic change in Chinese societal structure. It showed that China had moved past the era of rural-based society, and had started entering into an era of mainly urban-based society.

蓝皮书还显示，2011年，中国城镇人口达到6.91亿，城镇化率达到51.27%，城镇常住人口超过了农村常住人口。人口城镇化率超过50%，这是中国社会结构的一个历史性变化，表明中国已经结束了以乡村型社会为主体的时代，开始进入到以城市型社会为主体的新的城市时代。

Good luck, city: I’m on my way!

China Daily, a propaganda paper for foreign consumption, quotes the blue book as saying that the ratio of urbanites’ disposable income to rural residents’ net income reached 3.13 last year, but given that about 40 percent of farmers’ net income was used to purchase chemical fertilizer, pesticide, seeds and other means of production [and given that no similar costs arise for urban citizens, apparently], urban income in China was actually about 5.2 times that of the countryside. That income gap figure was about 26 percent higher than that of 1997, notes the report.

Basically in the context of these reports, Liaoning Daily (also republished by Enorth) reports on Dalian’s (Liaoning Province) official reaction to the challenges:

To adhere to a perfect urbanization, the building of new industries (新型工业化), urban wisdom and agricultural modernization, a civilized, modern international city will be built in an overall plan for these “four modernizations”¹⁾, for the improvement of our city’s comprehensive competitiveness. These are the Dalian Municipal Committee’s thoughts on the continuous strengthening of Dalian’s development stamina through an overall plan for coordinated interaction.

本报讯记者刘国华报道“坚持全域城市化、新型工业化、城市智慧化和农业现代化，在‘四化’统筹、协调推进中提升城市综合竞争力，努力建设富庶美丽文明的现代化国际城市。 ”这是近日大连市委提出的通过“四化”统筹、协调互动，进一步增强大连发展后劲的城市发展新思路。

In recent years, Dalian, with scientific development concepts as guidance, firmly grasped the revitalization of the old northeastern industrial bases, and the two-fold opportunities of developing and opening Liaoning’s coastal economy, economic development, opening up to the outside world, and other aspects of achieving comprehensive improvement, rather good effects in raising Liaoning’s leading role in the northeastern region. This year, Dalian, in accordance with the requirements and on the foundations of “seeking progress in stability, and pace within stability”, by means of the soft-environment-building year and other measures, maintained economic and stable and rather rapid growth. During the first half of this year, the entire city achieved a regional total output value of 340.1 billion Yuan [more precisely, 340,090 million] Yuan (a growth by 10.1 percent), public revenues of 37.47 billion yuan (19 percent growth), social consumption products retail sales²⁾ at 104.64 billion Yuan (15.2 percent growth), average disposable incomes per capita of 13,934 Yuan (14.1 percent growth), farmers’ average cash income of 9,262 Yuan (14.8 percent growth), with the main economic indicators achieving a “double-surpassing” of the previous [year-on-year?] half-year.

近年来，大连市以科学发展观为统领，紧紧抓住东北老工业基地振兴和辽宁沿海经济带开发开放双重机遇，经济发展、对外开放等方面均实现了全面提升，较好地起到了辽宁乃至东北地区的龙头带动作用。今年以来，大连市按照“稳中求进、稳中求快”的总基调，通过深入开展软环境建设年活动等多种措施，保持了经济的平稳较快增长。上半年，全市实现地区生产总值3400.9亿元，增长10.1%；公共财政预算收入374.7亿元，增长19%；社会消费品零售总额1046.4亿元，增长15.2%；城市居民人均可支配收入13934元，增长14.1%；农民人均现金收入9262元，增长14.8%。主要经济指标实现“双过半”。

The Dalian Municipal Committee and the city government believe that by now, in competition between developed cities within China, raising their comprehensive competitiveness has become the main direction of impact. To cut new edges in the coming round of fierce competition, if it can solve difficulties, and always maintain a leading position, Dalian needs to cast its sight at the future and to clearly develop new ideas.

大连市委、市政府认为，目前，国内发达城市之间的竞争，都已开始将提升综合竞争力作为主攻方向。面对新一轮的激烈竞争，大连能否争创新优势，破解难题，始终保持相对领先地位，迫切需要着眼未来，明确发展新思路。

In July this year, Dalian city held the Perfect City Chemical Industry congress, and issued the “China Communist Dalian Municipal Committee and Dalian City Government Numerous Opinions concerning Acceleration and Promotion of Perfect Urbanization”, “Dalian City Implementation Plan for the Acceleration and Promotion of Perfect Urbanization, and “the “Dalian City Policies pertaining Acceleration and Promotion of Perfect Urbanization”. Perfection of urbanization and the city and countryside overall improvement plans are are important measures to solve the bottleneck problems. [...] The focus on agricultural modernization is on urban modern agriculture.

今年7月，大连市召开全域城市化工作会议，颁布了《中共大连市委、大连市人民政府关于加快推进全域城市化的若干意见》、《大连市加快推进全域城市化实施方案》、《大连市加快推进全域城市化的相关政策》。全域城市化，统筹城乡全面提升，是解决大连发展瓶颈的重要举措。[在这次会议上，大连市出台了具有突破性的一揽子鼓励政策，涵盖了基础设施、产业发展、土地保障、户籍管理、融资支持、公共服务、社会保障、城镇改革8个方面，力度之大，前所未有；大连市提出的新型工业化就是要建立起结构优化、技术先进、清洁安全、附加值高、吸纳就业能力强的现代产业体系，重点是推进传统产业升级和发展战略性新兴产业，全力以赴用5年左右时间，培育若干千亿级龙头企业和产业集群；城市智慧化系依托新一代信息技术，通过网络普及、智能化管理，构筑信息资源共享、城市运转高效、公共服务便捷、诚信体系完备的品质之城；]农业现代化重点是发展都市型现代农业。

The mutually supportive “four modernizations and coordinated promotion will surely promote Dalian’s economic and social development, and its leap to a new level.

“四化”相互支撑，协调推进，必将推动大连经济社会发展跃升新水平。

____________

Notes

¹⁾ a term based on the original concept of “Four Modernizations” first set out by Zhou Enlai, and again in 1978.

²⁾ Social consumption is a term frequently connected with “ethical consumption” elsewhere – that’s not how it is meant here, and it most probably simply means household consumption. Your expertise is welcome; just use the commenting function for your definitions or explanations.

____________

Related

» Tianjin Municipal Committee, July 20, 2011

____________

Sino-Russian Fishery Incident: An FMPRC Statement and its (apparent) Story

China News Service (CNS, 中新网) / Enorth, July 22, 2012, 07:04 Beijing time –

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said on Saturday evening that the incident of a Russian patrol boat that shelled Chinese trawlers was an isolated case, and expressed the belief that the case could be solved by the two sides in the spirit of Sino-Russian friendship. It was hoped that the people of the two countries would look at the incident objectively and with cool heads.

中国外交部发言人洪磊21日晚就俄罗斯边防巡逻艇炮击中国渔船事件表示，上述事件是突发的、孤立的事件，相信双方能本着中俄友好的精神加以解决。希望两国民众能客观、冷静地看待这一事件。

A reporter asked: A few days ago, a Russian patrol boat fired at Chinese trawlers which [had]  crossed the border into Russia’s exclusive maritime zone, and a collision with a Chinese trawler occured in the process, which resulted in the missing of one Chinese seaman. The Russian Northeastern Federal Security Service border patrol says that the Russian side the pursuit and capture of the Chinese trawlers in Russian maritime territory, that to open fire  was legal, and that a request for prosecution had been made to the Chinese Fishing Ministry. What is the Chinese side’s comment?

有记者问：日前，俄罗斯边防巡逻艇在俄专属经济区向越界捕捞的中国渔船开炮，并在追赶渔船过程中与中方渔船发生碰撞，造成中方1名船员失踪。俄联邦安全局东北边防局称，俄方在俄海域追缉中国渔船时对其开火属合法行为，并已就非法捕捞事对中国渔船船长提起刑事诉讼，中方对此有何评论？

Hong Lei said that China had made representations to the Russian side, concerning one Chinese fisherman going missing in Russian border security authorities’ arrest of Chinese fishermen fishing in the Russian exclusive maritime zone.

洪磊说，俄边防部门抓捕进入俄专属经济区作业的中国渔船造成1名中国船员失踪，中方已就俄边防巡逻艇执法失当向俄方提出交涉。

Hong Lei said that in the next steps, the Chinese side will continue to maintain close communication with the Russian side, and make effots to handle the issue as quickly as possible, and appropriately. The aforementioned incident was an isolated one, and it was believed that the two sides would be able to solve the issue in the spirit of Sino-Russian friendship. It was hoped that the people of the two countries would look at the incident objectively and with cool heads. China was now exploring consultations to establish an emergency and early-warning mechanism with Russia to avoid the occurrence of similar incidents in the future, to avoid [them] affecting the overall picture of friendly relations between the two countries.

洪磊表示，下一步，中方将继续同俄方保持密切沟通，力争尽快妥善处理此事。上述事件是突发的、孤立的事件，相信双方能本着中俄友好的精神加以解决。希望两国民众能客观、冷静地看待这一事件。中方正在研究同俄方协商建立应急预警和合作机制，防止类似事件再次发生，以免影响两国友好关系大局。

The foreign ministry published the same CNS article last night.

So did Huanqiu Shibao; without an opportunity for its readers to comment. On an emoticon board, at the time of writing this post, 58 votes express amazement or shock, 1,402 express anger, 74 express sadness, 21 express joy, and 229 feel that the news is ridiculous.

Two days earlier, on Friday, Huanqiu Shibao had reported that China was dissatisfied (不满) about the shelling, and demanded the release of the fishermen. Chinese vice foreign minister Cheng Guoping (程国平) had expressed this dissatisfaction in an emergency meeting with Russia’s chargé d’affaires in China [apparently Alexander Kozlov]. Russian violent law enforcement (粗暴执法) and use of military force had led to the Chinese crewman going missing.  Chen had demanded that the Russian side should investigate thoroughly, communicate the results to the Chinese side immediately, guarantee the safety of the arrested crews, and treat them in accordance with their legal rights and humanitarian standards. The crews should be released as quickly as possible, and every effort be made to find the missing crewman (合法权益和人道主义待遇，尽快放船放人，全力搜救失踪人员).

Under that article, the commenting function was enabled.

China’s foreign policies are too weak. Even small countries like Vietnam and the Philippines dare to challenge. Of course, Russia doesn’t need to care about China – 中国在对外政策上太过软弱，连越南 菲律宾 这等小国也敢挑衅，俄国当然不会把中国放在眼里,

wrote one commenter, and

Russians are like polar bears – they have no bit of humanity. When interacting with Russia, one shouldn’t regard them as people – 俄罗斯像北极熊，没有一点人性。与俄罗斯打交道，不能把它当作人看待,

suggested another.

But there were efforts to maintain the spirit of friendly relations with Russia, too. Apparently, there had been traitors among the crew who had been bought by America or Japan – [...] 很明显，那些越界捕捞的渔民有被美、日收买利用的嫌疑，或许是被美、日收买利用故意破坏中、朝关系，中、俄关系的特务、汉奸，同时敬请中国渔民自律、自爱，自觉以国家利益为上！不要贪图个人利益而损害国家利  explained a Hidden Star Dragon (伏星龙) who states his birthplace as “Hsinchu, Taiwan Province”.

Huanqiu Shibao is a state-owned paper with a readership which appears to be particularly quick to (nationalist) anger, but Beijing appears to searching for a middle way between the need to maintain friendly reations (or a strategic partnership) with Russia, and to satisfy a nationalist audience at the same time, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP, Hong Kong).

A rather soft statement from the Chinese consulate in Khabarovsk had been posted on the consulate’s website, which basically reflected the Russian side of the story. The consulate also initially stated that noone was reported injured. The Chinese foreign minister confirmed a day later that one fisherman was actually missing, according to the SCMP. This led to vice foreign minister Chen Guoping summoning “a senior Russian diplomat” (apparently Kozlov, see above) on Thursday. FMPRC spokesman Hong Lei’s statement on Saturday evening was only the latest step in the process, and once again a try to de-escalate the issue.

According to Xinhua, the two trawlers hail from Weihai, Shandong Province.

____________

Related

» Beijing criticizes FSB action, Ria Novosti, July 20, 2012
» China “strongly dissatisfied”, Maritime Connector, July 20, 2012
» Unacceptable, China Daily, July 18, 2012
» Greater Japanese Awareness (including a Huanqiu poll), July 15, 2012
» Hit and Tow, June 10, 2011
» FSB sinks Chinese freighter, Febr 19, 2009

____________