Xi Jinping on Youth Day: “Open the Skies for the Young”

Chinese chief of party and state Xi Jinping spoke to outstanding young people from all walks of life at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation‘s (中国航天科技集团公司) China Academy of Space Technology (中国空间技术研究院) on Saturday. Among China’s English-language media, China Daily, sina.com, and the All-China Women’s Federation website cover the event.

Main Link: Xi Jinping holds a forum with outstanding youth representatives from all walks of life (习近平同各界优秀青年代表座谈)
Links within the following blockquotes were added during translation.

Xinhua (via CCTV), May 4, 2013:

On the occasion of Youth Day, CCP Central Committee Secretary General, State Chairman and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping came to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s Academy of Space Technology on May 4 and took part in a community activity under the theme of “Realizing the Chinese Dream, the Young assume their tasks”, talked with representatives of outstanding young people from all walks of life and gave an important speech, and, on behalf of the Central Committee, extended greetings on the occasion of Youth Day.

新华网北京5月4日电 五四青年节到来之际，中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平4日来到中国航天科技集团公司中国空间技术研究院，参加“实现中国梦、青春勇担当”主题团日活动，同各界优秀青年代表座谈并发表重要讲话，代表党中央向全国广大青年致以节日问候。

Xi emphasized that the young are most vigorous and idealistic, that the country rose with the rise of the young, and that the country was strong when the young were strong. The staunch ideals and convictions of the young, their abilities to pass the hardest tests, their courage to innovate and to create, their hard and persevering work, their strong and high-minded characters, their vivid dream of realizing the take-off of the China dream would write a splendid new chapter in the bookof the unremitting struggle in the people’s interest.

习近平强调，青年最富有朝气、最富有梦想，青年兴则国家兴，青年强则国家强。广大青年要坚定理想信念，练就过硬本领，勇于创新创造，矢志艰苦奋斗，锤炼高尚品格，在实现中国梦的生动实践中放飞青春梦想，在为人民利益的不懈奋斗中书写人生华章。

At 9:30 in the morning, Xi Jinping arrived at the China Academy of Space Technology’s exhibition hall and viewed the exhibition of space technology achievements. On seeing that the secretary general had arrived, some of the outstanding young representatives who were also viewing the exhibition gathered around him, and Xi Jinping smiled and shook hands with one of them after another.

上午9时30分许，习近平来到中国空间技术研究院展厅，参观空间技术成就展。看到总书记来了，正在参观的部分优秀青年代表围了过来，习近平微笑着和大家一一握手。

CCTV coverage, with about the same wording as the Xinhua article – click picture for video.

The Xinhua article continues to set the scene for another while, describing how Xi Jinping closely listens to explanatons or introductions in front of the exhibits and having discussions with young technical or academic leaders. The average age of the Chang’e team and the Shenzhou team was 33; that of the Beidou system team was 35;  that of the Dongfang-Hong-4 team [a 1967 project] had been 29; that of a satellite application team was 28, Xi Jinping hears with great pleasure, pointing out that the hope for technological innovation is placed on the young.

The article then lists participants from different places and companies or authorities, from a petrochemical welding pioneer (中国石油第一建设公司第三工程处313工程队电焊技师裴先锋) to a party branch secretary from Inner Mongolia (内蒙古自治区新巴尔虎右旗克尔伦苏木芒来嘎查党支部书记), and military officers.

About 806 out of the article’s 1878 words are reserved for an account of Xi Jinping’s actual speech, basically centering around the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It is carefully crafted and meant to enthuse the youth delegates who are attending. But there is also some space for the interest of the individual:

Xi Jinping pointed out that all along, the party represented the young, won the young over, relied on the young, all along attached great importance to the young, showed care for the young, and trusted the young. Facing the future, leaders and cadres from all levels of the party and the government needed to make further efforts to pay attention to the aspirations of the young, to help the young develop, to support them starting businesses, to open the skies even wider for the galopping ideas of the young (青年驰骋思想) and a still wider platform for their innovative work, more opportunities for shaping their lives, and more favorable conditions.

习近平指出，我们党始终代表青年、赢得青年、依靠青年， 始终重视青年、关怀青年、信任青年。面向未来，各级党委、政府和领导干部要进一步关注青年愿望、帮助青年发展、支持青年创业，为青年驰骋思想打开更浩瀚的 天空，为青年实践创新搭建更广阔的舞台，为青年塑造人生提供更丰富的机会，为青年建功立业创造更有利的条件。

[...]

Prior to the forum, Xi Jinping had a cordial meeting with the participating outstanding youth representatives from all walks of life and had keepsake photos taken with them.

座谈会前，习近平亲切会见了参加座谈会的各界优秀青年代表并合影留念。

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Related

» In space, the possibilities are endless, Ronald Reagan Radio Address, July 21, 1984
» May-4 Youth Day, Wikipedia, acc. 20130505
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Xinjiang 4-23 “Terrorist Attack”: Important Instructions from Beijing, Lack of Compassion from Washington

The incident in Bachu County / Selibuya (Kashgar Prefecture) on April 23 which reportedly led to the deaths of 21 people, including 15 police officers and officials, is closely monitored by the central party and state leadership, according to Chinese state media quoted by the BBC‘s Mandarin website on Friday. A Huanqiu Shibao report, also of Friday, is quoted as saying that the CCP central committee attached great importance to the incident and that secretary-general Xi Jinping had issued important instructions and requirements concerning the handling of the case, its aftermath, and the safeguarding of stability in Xinjiang. Six suspects reportedly died, and eight were arrested.

Foreign journalists were allowed to travel to the region but frequently faced intimidation and harassment when attempting to verify news of ethnic rioting or organised violence against government authorities, the BBC’s Beijing correspondent Celia Hatton wrote in a report published last Wednesday, and a report from the BBC’s China correspondent Damian Grammaticas, published on Friday, seems to confirm that local authorities tend to interfere, as Grammaticas and his team were ordered to leave Selibuya.

Tianshan Net, a website run by the propaganda department of the CCP’s Xinjiang branch, and frequently quoted by official and non-official Chinese media in the 4-23 context, reports today that in the wake of the 4-23 [April 23] serious violent terrorist incidents, a ceremony to honor the meritorious was held at the Science and Culture Square Conference Center in Kashgar at noon local time today. Three advanced collectives (including the Selibuya party committee) and 91 advanced individuals had been commended. (天山网喀什讯（记者李敏摄影报道）4月29日上午12:00，自治区处置“4.23”严重暴力恐怖案件有功人员表彰大会在喀什市科技文化广场喀什噶尔会议厅召开。大会对巴楚县色力布亚镇党委等3个先进集体和阿布拉江•克热木、谢武中等91名先进个人予以表彰。) The fifteen party and government comrades who had sacrificed their lives were posthumously awarded titles as outstanding party members and anti-terrorism warriors during the ceremony, writes Tianshan. (自治区党委、政府追授在处置“4.23”严重暴力恐怖案件中牺牲的15名同志为优秀共产党员、反恐勇士称号。) Nur Bekri and other leading regional officials attended the ceremony.

On Friday, Tianshan Net republished a Huanqiu Shibao report criticizing America for showing no compassion in the wake of the incident, quoting a U.S. state department spokesman’s demands for a transparent investigation. The criticism was based on Beijing’s foreign-ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying‘s statement on Thursday, who had stated dissatisfaction with Washington’s lack of compassion (无同情心).

Sina.com (in English) suggested a moral link between the recent Boston Marathon bombings and the incident in Xinjiang, and also quoted Hua Chunying from her Thursday press conference.

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Related

» Due process protections, BBC News, April 25, 2013

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Herrschaftswissen: Free or not, but “Engineered”

Wikileaks may have been useful in making some of the (Western or Arab) governments’ inside workings a bit more transparent – but it seems to me that what has been published by them doesn’t outweigh what is published by government themselves, or by their advisers, or by the mainstream press. We could have every government archive at our disposal, and would still face the problem of finding out what matters, and the problems of interpretation.

The Genius leads the spectators: engineering of consent in its early stages.

In this post, I will try to describe two examples of Herrschaftswissen, and one (rather old) example of methodology. A talk (not an article) on Wikipedia about enlightenment in Western secular tradition translates Herrschaftswissen as knowledge restricted to the rulers. I’m not sure if this should count as an exact translation, or just as a rough one.

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Example 1: David Cameron’s “Muscular Liberalism”

In February 2011, British prime minister David Cameron addressed the Munich Security Conference, an annual conference on international security policy held in Bavaria’s capital. It is an example of how politics and mainstream media work hand in hand – it was founded by a publisher in 1962, and that publisher was succeeded by a former high-ranking government bureaucrat in 1998.

In his speech, Cameron focused on radicalization among Muslims in many European countries. There isn’t much in the speech itself that I would object to, but what I view critically is the context of the speech.

While Cameron was focused on radical Islamists in Europe, the “Arab Spring” was in full swing. Cameron gave his talk on the eve of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war – a war described by the BBC‘s Jim Muir as a proxy struggle between the US-led western world and al-Qaeda international.

The West’s undertaking could also be described as a struggle to discern moderate and radically Islamist forces among the opposition fordes in Syria – a struggle European governments are facing at home, too. But that’s a problem the West could have spared itself. If Western governments (and their Arab and Turkish allies) succeeded in toppling Syria’s Baath regime and install a “moderate” new regime, chances are that the new regimes human rights record would be no better than that of the Baath party. Governments who encourage and support radicalism in mainly Muslim countries are hardly qualified to encourage moderation among Muslims in their own countries.

A few days ago, the European Union’s Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove told told the BBC that among the estimated 500 European citizens who were currently fighting in Syria, but most likely many of them will be radicalised there, will be trained.

When you want to undermine Islamist radicalization at home, the West’s strategy on Syria doesn’t look too reasonable. Those who Cameron purportedly wants to win over know very well how ambivalent muscular liberalism is about terrorism, when it is about practise, rather than about talk.

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Example 2. Trust in the CCP’s Central Committee

“Unity” is one of the supreme banners of the Chinese Communist Party. The downfall of Chongqing’s party chief Bo Xilai, only eight months ahead of the 18th National Congress of the CCP, came at a sensitive time. But if the power struggle about Bo Xilai was unpleasant or embarrassing already, the “visit” (or rather the tempoary getaway) of Chongqing’s Public Security Bureau head to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in February 2012 should count as a PR disaster for the CCP.

The Chinese press had to pick up the pieces in the guidance of public opinion. Huanqiu Shibao, a CCP-owned but rather popularar Chinese paper, applied a mix of natural science (China’s rapid development is like a living body’s development, and there may always be some particulars we haven’t been familiar with) and orthodoxy (In China’s society of numerous and complicated voices, trust in the party’s central committee has become reason for society in its entirety). There was, Huanqiu elaborated, no contradiction between emancipation of mind and trust in the party’s central committee:

It is exactly for the diversity, for having several options, that we truly discover that trusting the party’s central committee, implementing the party’s road map, is more reliable than any other method other people may teach us, and more able to create the conditions that make the country and the individual develop.

This sounds like muscular socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Both Cameron and Chinese propaganda emphasize unity when it comes to fundamentals. The fundamentals are very different from each other, but the tools they are using to justify and legitimize their dominance are quite similar. However, Camaron’s game is easier to play than the CCP’s. When Chinese media openly bash dissidents, they risk getting unusually unharmonious responses from their recipients. When Cameron addresses radical Islamism, he will get his share of criticism, too, but that is nothing uncharacteristic in the British media.

And despite some inevitable criticism, when a European leader singles out radicalization among Muslims, chances are that the mainstream will respond rather favorably.

The problem for European politicians is that the political class is lacking the high degree of legitimacy – in view of the public – that it (reportedly) used to have. Or, as the Economist‘s Bagehot observed, the pomp of Margaret Thatcher‘s funeral met with shallow public interest. Even Mrs Thatcher’s enemies trusted that her motives were sincere, argues the Economist, but now all politicians are distrusted.

Not just among radical or not so radical Muslims. But if you pick a frequently disliked minority as Cameron does, you may still strike a chord with an increasingly resentful majority.

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3. Engineering of Consent

In 1955, an American public-relations counsel, Edward L. Bernays, wrote an article, summarizing what he referred to as the engineering of consent. Bernays didn’t necessarily invent it, but at the time when he wrote about it, he had probably been among the most successful thinkers about and propagandists and practitioners of the concept for decades. The engineering of consent should under no circumstances [...] supersede or displace the functions of the educational system, either formal or informal, Bernays wrote, in bringing about understanding by the people as a basis for their action. Rather, engineering of consent supplemented the educational process.

But in the previous paragraphs, Bernays had also written that

[..] it is sometimes impossible to reach joint decisions based on an understanding of facts by all the people. The average American adult has only six years of schooling behind him. With pressing crises and decisions to be faced, a leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at an even general understanding. In certain cases, democratic leaders must play their part in leading the public through the engineering of consent to socially constructive goals and values. This role imposes upon them the obligation to use the educational processes, as well as other available techniques, to bring about as complete an understanding as possible.

Bernay’s essay leaves it essentially to the adopters how to make use of the toolkit he provided. Given that the tools are highly effective, it is obvious that they aren’t only used when the gap between public understanding and necessity (problem-solving) can’t be bridged in time, but whenever opportunists finds the engineering useful. Or, to put it more catchy: the dumber a policy, the dumber the public needs to be, and all the more, engineering of consent needs to supersede education.

Both democratically-elected and totalitarian politicians appear to be keen adopters, and it would be for the public itself to become more informed, to judge if the actons of politicians are in the public interest, or if they are not.

But the opposite is the case. While many European middlebrows regard the political class and their techniques as ethically rotten or even detest them for the manipulation, they are themselves adopters of spin-doctoring, too. Many blogs,  comments and other expressions of (political) opinion seem to apply the means and methods used by the political class to make their case. There seems to be an ambivalence among the ruled about the desire to belong to the political class, and to refute it.

Not to mention Wikileaks. Wikileaks doesn’t “educate”, either.

In that regard, the average Chinese netizen appears to be more aware of the manipulation he or she is subjected too, than the Western subject to the same PR technology – Chinese awareness states itself in terms like “we’ve been harmonized” [by Chinese authorities or media]. Or, when Huanqiu Shibao wrote in 2012 that opinion poll results published by American Gallup  showed that during the preceding three years, among the five BRIC states’ population, the Brazilians and Chinese had been most satisfied with their living standards, and only the Chinese felt during three successive years that the living standard had continuously improved, a commenter laconically replied that he had been satisfied (in a passive-voice sense) by the Americans. In certain ways, the experience of living under a totalitarian government seems to stimulate clear-sightedness.

Bernays reportedly liked to close his speeches and talks with an invariable summary: And everybody is happy.

There may not be a great future for public happiness. But quite probably, there is one for the engineering of consent.

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Related

» Battle of Opinion, Feb 13, 2013

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A Punitive Expedition to the Central Party School: Deng Yuwen suspended

Deng Yuwen (邓聿文), deputy editor (associate senior editor of Study Times) of Study Times (学习时报), the journal of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China, wrote an opinion for the Financial Times on February 27 this year, arguing that China should abandon North Korea. Quoting South Korean Chosun Ilbo, the BBC‘s Mandarin website reports that Deng has been suspended from his function as deputy editor for an indefinite period. In a telephone interview with Chosun Ilbo, Deng reportedly said that the foreign ministry had sent a “punitive expedition” (兴师问罪) to the CCP Party School because of his article. He was still on the payroll, but didn’t know when he would be given another post.

It’s doesn’t read like complete ostracism – and it would spell unequal treatment of academics if it turns out to be a real purge. After all, a fortnight earlier than Deng, on February 13, Shen Dingli (沈丁立), director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University, published a much more strongly-worded article with Foreign Policy, and apparently faces no problems as a result. Then again, even if showing off rightful indignation at Pyongyang, Shen had still hedged his bets:

Let’s face it: China has reached a point where it needs to cut its losses and cut North Korea loose.

But:

China likely handles North Korea with kid gloves because it fears what would happen if the regime collapsed. If things turned bad, tens if not hundreds of thousands of refugees could flee across the border, destabilizing parts of northeastern China. North Korea’s eventual reunification with South Korea might lead to a democratic U.S. ally with the potential for tens of thousands of U.S. and Korean troops [...]

You get the picture.

Besides, the Party School may be deemed too close to the center of political power to allow their authors and editors to speak their (individual, maybe) views freely – on sensitive issues, anyway.

When reached by phone on Monday (apparently by the South China Morning Post / SCMP), Deng declined to confirm his suspension.

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Related

» Qiao Xinsheng: Not China’s firewall, Sino-NK, Feb 17, 2013
» Oppose the Scarlet Letters, Sep 5, 2010
» 邓聿文简介, Ifeng/Phoenix, date unspec.

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Updated/Related

» Ohne Fehl und Tadel, dFC, 03.04.13
» Beijing steht zur Brandmauer, dFC, 02.04.13

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Huanqiu Shibao: Why the Retired Pope’s “China Dream” remained unachieved (1)

Catholicism isn’t a big religion in China, but there seem to be several millions of Catholic Christians – organized inside or outside the official “Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association”.

This topic is unchartered territory to me, and mistakes in the following translation(s) are not unlikely. This is a translation of the first chapter of a topical page on Huanqiu Shibao. I haven’t made up my mind yet if I should translate the remaining chapters, too. But it seems to be an attractive topic, also in the light of soft-power issues — JR

[Observation: there seems to be a rather thoughtful - by Huanqiu Shibao commenter standards, that is - discussion going on in the thread underneath the topical page.]

[Links within blockquotes added during translation.]

Main Link: Why the Retired Pope’s “China Dream” remained unachieved – 退位教皇为何没圆“中国梦”, Huanqiu Shibao, March 5, 2013

Introduction: On February 28, 2013, in the evening, Roman Pope Benedict XVI formally relinquished the papal duties, thus becoming the first “retiring” Pope in 600 years. It is also the fifth “retiring” Pope in history. Benedict XVI, during his “reign” of six years, tried to improve Chinese-Vatican relations and to establish diplomatic relations with China, but up to his “retirement”, this hadn’t been achieved. What are the origins of this City of Shang Di‘s relations with China?

导语：2013年2月28日晚间，罗马教皇本笃十六世正式卸下教皇职务，成为600年来首个“退位”的教皇，也是历史上第五个“退位”的教皇。教皇宣布辞职后引发的舆论震动一直在全世界激荡。本笃十六世“在位”时曾试图改善中梵关系，与中国建交，但直到“退位”仍未实现。梵蒂冈这个“上帝之城”与中国之间到底是怎样的关系渊源？

In 1582, xx years into the reign of Emperor Ming Wanli, Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci was sent to Macau to learn Chinese. In 1583, he founded a Catholic missionary base in Zhaoqing to introduce mathematics, geometry mechanics and similar science to the Chinese people. He studied China’s “Four Books and Five Classics”, went deep into the study of Chinese traditional culture, wore the Han Chinese clothing and said that to be a missionary, one had “to do as the Romans do”. Ricci came to Beijing in 1601, he was in charge of the construction of the Xuanwumen Church, and died in Beijing in 1610. Ricci was a brilliant man of wide learning, and a pioneer of Chinese-Western cultural exchange.

1582年（明万历10年），意大利人、耶稣会会士利玛窦被派到澳门学习汉语。1583年他在肇庆创立第一个天主教传教点，向中国人介绍数学、几何学和力学等科学知识。他苦读中国的《四书》《五经》，深入研究中国传统文化，穿汉服，提出传教要“入乡随俗”，使用汉语举行宗教仪式，为基督教在中国传播奠定了基础。利玛窦于1601年来到北京，1605年主持建造了宣武门大教堂，1610年死于北京。利玛窦博学多才，是中西文化交流的先驱。

After the introduction of Catholicism into China, the so-called “disputes about the rites” (“礼仪之争”) broke out within Catholicism, with the focus on how to translate the appellation of “God” into Chinese, and how to deal with traditional Chinese traditional custom. Ricci believed that the appelation of “God”, besides using the term “Lord of Heaven/God” (天主), “Heaven” or “Shang Di” were also options, and that Chinese believers could retain traditional ancestoral and religious worship. But the Spanish Dominican missionaries and Franciscan missionaries believed that ancestoral and religious worship was idolatry and violated “biblical” rules. They thus sent people to the Holy See in Rome to complain about Ricci’s Jesuits there.

天主教传入中国之后，天主教内部产生了所谓“礼仪之争”，争论的焦点是如何翻译“神”的称谓和如何对待中国传统习俗。利玛窦认为，对于“神”的称谓，除了用“天主”之外，亦可称“天”或“上帝”并且同意中国信徒保留祭祖和祭孔的传统习俗。而西班牙多明我会传教士和方济各会传教士则认为，祭祖、祭孔属于偶像崇拜，违反《圣经》规定并派人到罗马教廷控告以利玛窦为首的耶稣会。

In 1700 (39 years into the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi), Kangxi entered the rites dispute and declared ancestoral worship (祭祖) and memorial ceremonies of Confucius (祭孔) weren’t parts of traditional Chinese traditional customs, and no religious activities. In 1704, Pope Clement XI publicly ordered the prohibition of ancestoral worship and memorial ceremonies of Confucius among followers of Catholicism, as well as the use of “Shangdi” and “Heaven” as other terms for “Lord of Heaven/God” (天主). He sent an envoy to China for talks. When papal special envoy Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon (铎罗) declared in 1706 that his mission to China was to ban ancestoral worship and memorial ceremonies of Confucius among Chinese Catholics, Emperor Kangxi was furious, believing that this move spelled interference in Chinese customs. He sent people to bring Maillard into a temporary residence in Nanjing and ordered the expulsion of missionaries who opposed Chinese rites, and also sent envoys to Rome for talks. In 1707, Maillard, in disregard of Kangxi’s decree, announced the papal ban. Therefore, Kangxi ordered Maillard to be taken to Macau to be held under house arrest there, and issued a decree: “tell the Westerners (西洋人) that from now on, if they don’t respect Matteo Ricci’s rules, they will not be allowed to reside in China and will be sent home.”

1700年（清康熙39年）康熙皇帝介入了礼仪之争，声明祭祖祭孔属于中国传统习俗，不属于宗教活动。1704年教皇克雷芒十一世公然下令，禁止中国教徒举行祭祖、祭孔等活动，禁止把“上帝”和“天”作为“天主”的别称并派特使来华谈判。1706年教皇特使铎罗声言，他来华的使命是禁止中国教徒祭祖、祭孔。康熙皇帝得知后大怒，认为此举属于干涉中国习俗，派人将铎罗送往南京暂住并下令驱逐反对中国礼仪的传教士，同时派使节前往罗马谈判。1707年，铎罗无视康熙的旨意，在南京宣布教皇禁令。于是，康熙下令把铎罗押往澳门软禁并降旨称：“谕众西洋人，自今以后，若不遵利玛窦之规矩，断不准在中国住，必逐回去。”

In 1715, Pope Clement XI reiterated the ban of 1645 – offenders [against the ban] would be punished for heresy (以异端论处). Kangxi was furious, ordering the arrest of the missionaries and a ban on missionizing. In 1719, the Pope sent a delegation to Beijing for talks again, but Kangxi refused a meeting and rebuked them: “You Westerners don’t understand Chinese writing, so how can you discuss the rights or wrongs of Chinese reason” (尔西洋人不解中国文字，如何妄议中国道理之是非) and “in future, Westerners must not proselityze in China, all of which will be prohibited” (以后不必西洋人在中国传教，禁止可也). Kangxi therefore ordered the expulsion of the guests. Rome’s Pope was forced to make concessions, and in 1720, he announced the “Eight Permissions”.^*) [The permissions] agreed to [the legitimacy of] non-religious Chinese rites. Kangxi ordered that only missionaries who were prepared to respect traditonal Chinese rites should reside in China, and banned overt missionary work. It wasn’t before 1939 that the Holy See in Rome revoked all bans on rites, thus bringing the dispute, which had lasted for more than 300 years, to an end. From this, it can be seen that the so-called “disputes about the rites” were completely caused by the Roman Popes’ ignorance of China.

1715年，教皇克雷芒十一世重申1645年的禁令，违者以异端论处。康熙大怒，下令拘捕传教士并禁止传教。1719年，教皇又派使团来北京谈判，康熙拒不接见并斥责说：“尔西洋人不解中国文字，如何妄议中国道理之是非”，“以后不必西洋人在中国传教，禁止可也。”于是康熙下令逐客。罗马教皇被迫让步，于1720年宣布“八项准许”。同意中国信徒举行非宗教性的中国礼仪。康熙下令只准许尊重中国礼仪的传教士居留中国并禁止公开传教。一直到1939年，罗马教廷才撤销了有关礼仪的一切禁令，为这场持续了300多年的争论画上了句号。由此可见，所谓“礼仪之争”，完全是由于罗马教皇对中国的无知造成的。

Continued here »

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Note

^*) According to other versions, it wasn’t the Pope who announced these “eight permissions”, but the delegate, John-Ambrose Mezzabarba. The “Eight Permissions” weren’t long-lived, and apparently overturned by Pope Benedict XIV, in 1742.

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Related

Hao Jinli, 1916 – 2011, March 28, 2011

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Outline of National Tourism and Leisure (2013 – 2020)

Main Link: » 国务院：2020年将落实带薪休假 探索学生春秋假, Febr 18, 2013

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Red Tourism: Don’t be a Maybe (click picture for source).

Enorth (Tianjin) / China News Service (CNS), Febr. 18, 2013 —

To all the Provincial, Autonomous Regions’, and Municipal People’s Governments, to all the Ministries and Commissions of the State Council, and to all Agencies directly under the State Council:
The “Outline of National Tourism and Leisure (2013 – 2020)” has been approved by the State Council and is now printed and distributed to you. Please implement them and carry them out conscientiously.

State Council General Office, February 2, 2013

CNS quotes the China National Tourism Administration‘s (国家旅游局) website with (apparently) the full outline.

The gist, according to CNS:

The outline says that by 2020, the paid annual leave system will have been basically implemented, with substantial increases in the comsumption levels of urban and rural residents.

The outline is meant to meet the continuously growing demands by the people and the masses on holiday and leasure, to promote the healthy development of the tourism industry, to promote the construction of a socialist-with-Chinese-characteristics citizen tourism and leasure system, and in accordance with the Opinions of the State Council on accelerating the development of Tourism (国务院关于加快发展旅游业的意见), document no. 41, 2009.

Besides technical considerations (or ahead of them), the document refers to the Deng Xiaoping Theory, Three Represents (Jiang Zemin), and Scientific Development (Hu Jintao) as its guiding ideologies. Hence, attention is paid to keeping entrance to public museums, memorial halls and patriotism education bases (爱国主义教育示范基地, example here) free of charge. Issues of cheating tour guides etc. are also addressed.

Patriotic enough? The “Monument to the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” (click picture for source).

The authorities are advised to bring “labor unions”, the Communist Youth League of China, the All China Women’s Federation and other mass organizations and trades into play.

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Related

» Linking Cultural Industries to National Economy, Jan 14, 2012

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German Press Review: Kim’s Sugarcubes, and the “Battle of Opinion”

The actions of the North Korean regime are not incalculable, writes the Süddeutsche Zeitung‘s (Munich) Reymer Klüver, the paper’s U.S. correspondent until summer last year, and now with the foreign-politics department at Süddeutsche Zeitung. The Kim clan’s provocations were actually quite calculable in its provocations which served only one goal: to show the world and its own people its power. The regime in North Korea doesn’t act incalculably. It acts irresponsibly.

The message is aimed at the Obama administration, believes Klüver, as the test was conducted on the day when the American president delivered the agenda for his second term in office, and at South Korean president-elect Park Geun Hye is about to take office. The reactions, too, were calculable: the US would demand stronger sanctions, China would agree after some hesitation, and basically, the response wouldn’t be different from the one to the previous nuclear test. Even if a bomb of the same explosive power as the previous one was indeed smaller than before, and therefore more suitable to be fitted to a nuclear missile, North Korea remained far from being a threat to America.

What makes the test dangerous all the same would be that Kim might gamble away, and that his provocations could spin out of control. A conflict on the South Korean border could lead to just that kind of scenario. Even worse, non-proliferation might be used to earn some badly needed foreign exchange. There was speculation about North Korean cooperation with Iran on its third test. What would keep a gambler like the dictator in Pyongyang to sell Iran or others his knowledge and even material?

China could influence North Korea, if it wanted to, writes Klüver, but it didn’t want to use it. 90 percent of North Korea’s oil imports depended on China. But China’s calculations could be shifting, Klüver adds: a Peking government paper had mentioned a “high price” that North Korea would have to pay in case of a nuclear test. The Chinese, Klüver recaps, needed to take responsibility for their irresponsible neighbor.

Der Spiegel (Hamburg) chooses the tabloid approach, as far as its choice  of stock photo material is concerned. Underneath a video link photo (from Reuters) that shows Kim Jong-un in flames, the headline is North Korean nuclear power messes with America (Atommacht Nordkorea legt sich mit Amerika an). Der Spiegel’s Andreas Lorenz points out that this could start an arms race, with the US, Japan and North Korea beefing up their missile defense. Xi Jinping acted hardly differently from his predecessor Hu Jintao, Lorenz notes, as he criticizes Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests, but also trying to soften international sanctions. North Korea is an important supplier of commodities to China. And the encapsulated country serves China’s military as a strategic buffer zone between China and the other East Asian states and the US.

Lorenz also quotes the English-language party mouthpiece “Global Times” as suggesting that there was no need for China to placate angry feelings about its role. And Lorenz quotes US expert Siegfried Hecker with concerns that North Korea could sell its atomic-bomb know-how, to Iran, for example.

Die Welt (Berlin) suggests that Kim had thrown the Chinese sugar cubes (i. e. sweetened the third test).

Namely, the third test was preceded by several sessions of North Korean security panels on which Kim ostensibly emphasized the leadership role of his Communist Party. For the first time in the regime’s history, these sessions were made public, writes die Welt’s Torsten Krauel. Kim thus signaled that the third test was controled by the civilian leadership and not, as it had been previously, as an – intransparent to the outside world – decision between an ailing dictator and an incalculable army. (Dem dritten Test gingen nämlich mehrere Sitzungen nordkoreanischer Sicherheitsgremien voraus, auf denen Kim demonstrativ die Führungsrolle seiner Kommunistischen Partei hervorhob. Diese Sitzungen wurden erstmals in der Geschichte des Regimes publik gemacht. Kim Jong-un signalisierte damit, dass der dritte Atomtest unter der Steuerung und Kontrolle der zivilen Führung stattfand und nicht, wie beide Male zuvor, in einer nach außen unklaren Entscheidung zwischen einem kränklichen Diktator und einer unberechenbaren Armee.)

Therefore, Xi Jinping and (theoretically) Barack Obama, too, now had a a definite contact person, believes Krauel.

Alleged North-Korean cooperation with Iran has long been a leitmotif in Die Welt’s coverage, but while more moderate papers like Süddeutsche Zeitung are discussing these allegations too, this week, Die Welt goes one step further and discusses how America could conduct a war on North Korea. However, Krauel concludes that different from Iraq during the years after the Kuwait war, the United Nations weren’t in a state of war with North Korea.

Therefore, it seems to be inevitable to talk with each other in East Asia again, even with a dictator like Kim Jong-un – as unpromising and depressing this prospect may currently look. (Wahrscheinlich führt deshalb tatsächlich kein Weg daran vorbei, in Ostasien wieder miteinander zu reden, sogar mit einem Diktator wie Kim Jong-un – so aussichtslos und bedrückend diese Aussicht derzeit auch erscheinen mag.)

The German mainstream press in general has become much more supportive of militarization of politics than in the past. That is my rough observation, and not backed by statistics. But apparently for the first time, research has been published about how leading German press people – mentioned by name – are interlinked with think tanks, national and international forums, foundations, policy planning groups, etc.. And a presentation of this research also clearly quotes leading press commentators with statements like

Politics must not shun the battle of opinion on the home front if they are convinced of what they purport. [...] The battle for the “hearts and minds” must be conducted among at home, too. (Der Meinungskampf an der Heimatfront darf die Politik nicht scheuen, wenn sie von dem überzeugt ist, was sie vorgibt. [...] Der Kampf um die “hearts and minds” muss auch bei uns geführt werden.)

A newsman’s words, to be clear.

This should not lead to overreaching conclusions. The research does not suggest that everyone is in the boat of an extended security concept (erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff, including energy and financial-industry issues). But among four leading journalists of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit and Die Welt, definitions of security and threat catalogs had been uncritically adopted (unkritisch übernommen).

There are papers with editorial managers not known for relevant networks – the left leaning Tageszeitung (taz) and Frankfurter Rundschau (FR). Some of their articles correspond with views among the elite, some sharply criticize the extended security concept, according to the report.

Here is another observation that disturbs me: My choice of press-review sources – Süddeutsche Zeitung, Spiegel, Die Welt further above in this blogpost was spontaneous. My information sources of choice when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear test were just these papers. No taz, no Frankfurter Rundschau. However, there’s an excuse:

I thought the Rundschau was no longer online, as they filed for bankruptcy on November 12, 2012.

But in fact, they are still here.

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Related

» Questions Raised, November 10, 2012

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Obituary: Aaron Swartz, 1986 – 2013

Aaron H. Swartz was an American coder, hacker, and internet activist. His father, Robert Swartz, had developed one of the first IBM operating systems, and Swartz junior seemed to follow his father’s footsteps, even if in a rather new environment and with a distinct civic sense of mission.

Swartz joined Reddit when the company acquired (or merged with) Infogami, a software company founded by Swartz himself.

What got him into conflict with the judicial system, after some earlier and less significant jostles, was breaking into M.I.T. computer networks in 2010 and 2011, to access JSTOR and to download documents from there. It was apparently meant to be a demonstration, to underline his case that documents like JSTOR’s should be freely available. It had long been argued that such documents should be free because they are produced at public expense, writes the New York Times. The NYT has a detailed account of Swartz’ JSTOR activity. The indictment says that JSTOR’s servers were brought down by his action on several occasions, Wired wrote in September 2012.

It’s apparently a Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) which was applied by federal prosecutors. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in limiting reach of the CFAA, said that violations of employee contract agreements and websites’ terms of service – crucial in Swartz’ case, apparently, at least if up to the prosecutors – were better left to civil lawsuits, also according to Wired. But this ruling wasn’t binding for Massachusetts, and the prosecutors insisted that their charges against Swartz should go on. The maximum penalty – potentially – could have amounted to 35 years in prison, and a million USD penalty. The chief prosecutor in charge was Steve Heymann, who had previously brought hacker Albert Gonzales into jail with a 20-year term.

One of the underlying arguments in Swartz’ conflict with the judicial system was about what internet content should be freely available. Another was about what constitutes a violation of terms and conditions (although this may rather be a judicial technicalty than part of the actual conflict). Apparently, the federal prosecutors could have dropped their charges, had they wanted to. German newsmagazine Der Spiegel wonders if the prosecutors were indirectly targeting Bradley Manning, and Wikileaks, and if that would explain their determination to see the case through.

Aaron Swartz hanged himself on Friday, in his Brooklyn apartment.

Court proceedings had been scheduled to begin on April 1 this year.

Swartz reportedly had a history of depression. But in an online statement released on Saturday, his family and his partner, Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman, wrote that decisions made by officials in the Massachusetts U.S. Attorney’s office and at MIT contributed to his death:

Aaron’s death is not simply a personal tragedy. It is the product of a criminal justice system rife with intimidation and prosecutorial overreach.

Swartz’ ideology possibly seemed extreme, MIT Technology Review wrote in February 2012. The Review wrote that in September 2010, while siphoning the JSTOR database, Swartz was also circulating the first online petition to raise awareness of a controversial anti-piracy law. At the time, Swartz was putting together a website, as he said in an interview with the MIT Review, which ended up becoming Demand Progress.

Aaron Swartz’ funeral will be held on Tuesday, January 15.

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Related

» what brought him here, Lessig Blog, v2, January 12, 2013

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