Obituary: Aaron Swartz, 1986 – 2013

Aaron H. Swartz was an American coder, hacker, and internet activist. His father, Robert Swartz, had developed one of the first IBM operating systems, and Swartz junior seemed to follow his father’s footsteps, even if in a rather new environment and with a distinct civic sense of mission.

Swartz joined Reddit when the company acquired (or merged with) Infogami, a software company founded by Swartz himself.

What got him into conflict with the judicial system, after some earlier and less significant jostles, was breaking into M.I.T. computer networks in 2010 and 2011, to access JSTOR and to download documents from there. It was apparently meant to be a demonstration, to underline his case that documents like JSTOR’s should be freely available. It had long been argued that such documents should be free because they are produced at public expense, writes the New York Times. The NYT has a detailed account of Swartz’ JSTOR activity. The indictment says that JSTOR’s servers were brought down by his action on several occasions, Wired wrote in September 2012.

It’s apparently a Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) which was applied by federal prosecutors. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in limiting reach of the CFAA, said that violations of employee contract agreements and websites’ terms of service – crucial in Swartz’ case, apparently, at least if up to the prosecutors – were better left to civil lawsuits, also according to Wired. But this ruling wasn’t binding for Massachusetts, and the prosecutors insisted that their charges against Swartz should go on. The maximum penalty – potentially – could have amounted to 35 years in prison, and a million USD penalty. The chief prosecutor in charge was Steve Heymann, who had previously brought hacker Albert Gonzales into jail with a 20-year term.

One of the underlying arguments in Swartz’ conflict with the judicial system was about what internet content should be freely available. Another was about what constitutes a violation of terms and conditions (although this may rather be a judicial technicalty than part of the actual conflict). Apparently, the federal prosecutors could have dropped their charges, had they wanted to. German newsmagazine Der Spiegel wonders if the prosecutors were indirectly targeting Bradley Manning, and Wikileaks, and if that would explain their determination to see the case through.

Aaron Swartz hanged himself on Friday, in his Brooklyn apartment.

Court proceedings had been scheduled to begin on April 1 this year.

Swartz reportedly had a history of depression. But in an online statement released on Saturday, his family and his partner, Taren Stinebrickner-Kauffman, wrote that decisions made by officials in the Massachusetts U.S. Attorney’s office and at MIT contributed to his death:

Aaron’s death is not simply a personal tragedy. It is the product of a criminal justice system rife with intimidation and prosecutorial overreach.

Swartz’ ideology possibly seemed extreme, MIT Technology Review wrote in February 2012. The Review wrote that in September 2010, while siphoning the JSTOR database, Swartz was also circulating the first online petition to raise awareness of a controversial anti-piracy law. At the time, Swartz was putting together a website, as he said in an interview with the MIT Review, which ended up becoming Demand Progress.

Aaron Swartz’ funeral will be held on Tuesday, January 15.

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Related

» what brought him here, Lessig Blog, v2, January 12, 2013

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Got a Problem? Have it Banned!

There were 52,447 deliberate and 23,237 accidental non-fatal gunshot injuries in the United States during 2000, notes Wikipedia. The majority of gun-related deaths in the United States are suicides, it says.

In 2008, 12,000 Americans were killed with guns, according to Business Insider, and according to a Violence Policy Center which was apparently published in 2011, more than 30,000 Americans die in gun suicides, homicides, and unintentional shootings.

In 2010, 3,648 human lives were lost in Germany – then the lowest number to date in a year (at least since 1953, the yearof the first statistic). No, people here weren’t shot by guns. They were road-traffic casualties. There are efforts to bring these numbers down further. But as long as these efforts don’t succeed, one has to conclude that more than 3,000 deaths in traffic accidents are apparently deemed an acceptable number.

Stop laughing. Driving a tractor is serious business.

One of my classmates died in a car-related accident. One childhood friend died in a car crash years after leaving school.

I’m not suggesting that America shouldn’t have tighter gun control. I have no clear-cut opinion about gun control in America – it’s not my business. But I can relate to both sides of the argument – to those who want tighter legislation (especially if they lost loved ones), and to those who oppose such changes.

What I dislike is the finger-pointing here in Germany: look at those ludicrous Americans! A right to bear arms! They are completely nuts!

It may depend on what matters to you. Most Germans find a life without a car inconceivable, and especially when they live outside the public-transport networks, they have a number of practical reasons for that. But even within Bremen, most people I know own or co-own a car.

Frequently, I have reason to fear cars – I’m going by bicycle, whenever I can. But don’t want to see cars banned, or car-related taxes be increased. Rather, I’d sometimes wish that car drivers were more considerate. Obviously, that’s mostly a matter of attitude, not of legislation.

I dislike bans and restrictions. We have too many of them already, and they always seem to come with “convincing” reasons. When people place more hope on politics for achieving restrictions, than for achieving a freer society, something seems to be wrong with our concept of politics.

Another “Media Scandal”: Anti-CNN crops Li Qi’s “Deutsche Welle’s China Nightmare”

The following is an article published by April Media (四月网) in October this year, a review of Li Qi‘s “Deutsche Welle’s China Nightmare” (China-Albtraum der Deutschen Welle). Anti-CNN was turned into April Media in 2009.

Links within blockquote added during translation; I added my remarks about the review underneath.

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April Media’s Book Review

2008 was a memorable year. It was a year of a global uproar because of China, and it was a year where, for the first time, Chinese people became collectively excited. The uproar began with the Tibet incident in March that year, with the excitement going against Western media reporting and the way it had created an uproar for no reason. In the West, people took to the streets to protest against China’s “repression” of Tibetans, obstructing the torch ralleye to the Olympic Games which were for the first time held in Beijing. All over the world, Chinese people without an interest in politics also loudly expressed their anger at the West’s one-sided, distorted coverage.

2008是一个令人难忘的年头。那是一个世界因为中国而沸腾的年头，那是一个全世界华人首次全体激动起来的年头。那个沸腾始于是年三月的西藏事件；那个激动始于对西方报导及其引发的西方“无端”沸腾的不满。在西方，人们走上街头抗议中国“镇压”藏族人，阻挠首次在中国举办的奥运会的火炬之行。在世界上，从不关心政治的华人也站起来大声地表达对西方的片面、扭曲的报导的愤怒。

“The Voice of Germany’s China Nightmare” was written by a Chinese with many years of work experience in Western media, and describes what happened at the “Voice of Germany” and other German media from the Tibet incident to the end of 2011. It is a mere description, fully reflecting the predicament of Western media coverage on China with detailed material.

《德国之声的中国梦魇》这本书是一名在西方媒体工作多年的华人记者写的，记述了西藏事件至2011年底发生在“德国之声”和其它德国媒体中的事情。它仅仅是记述，是详尽的资料，但充分反映了西方媒体在中国报导中所处的窘境。这种窘境在20世纪末就已经发生，它至今仍然持续着。

The predicament, to say it clearly, is a kind of phobia against China’s rise. After hundreds of years of habitually reporting objectively, reflected in the law, they turned away from their own law and principles to a great degree. They can’t, for example, dare to mention the good aspects of China, even when the economy is the topic. They still have to involve politics, and within positive coverage, there still needs to be some criticism. Even in international disputes, there is a natural belief that China isn’t good. When it comes to the most recent Diaoyu Islands dispute, for example, Western media mostly use the Japanese name, clearly standing on Japan’s side, leading Western readers to a tendency which is just as clear.

这种窘境，说穿了就是一种对中国崛起的恐惧症。几百年来养成了客观报导的习惯、并将之大写在各种法律里的西方媒体，在很大程度上背离了自己的法律和原则：不能、不敢说中国好的方面，即使是谈经济，也要牵扯政治，在好的报导中也要有所批评。甚至在国际争端中，也自然而然地认定中国不好。比如在最近的钓鱼岛争端中，西方媒体大多用日本的岛名，明显地站在日本一边，导致西方读者也有了明显的倾向。

Within this “China isn’t good” discourse, within this envelope of China “phobia”, also on German television, radio, internet and in- and outside an international broadcaster’s television station – “Voice of Germany” -, a series of scandals occurred. In August 2008, ahead of the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, this station’s Chinese-department’s Zhang Danhong said on German television that China’s overcoming of poverty was a great achievement. It triggered attacks from overseas dissidents and German media. This grew into attacks on the comparatively objective and comprehensive coverage of the Voice of Germany’s Chinese department. Some overseas dissidents, quickly and at will, fabricated a deceptive representation of [Deutsche Welle] Chinese broadcasting and online departments that were “China-friendly” and “CCP-friendly”. Some German journalists and politicians blindly believed those fabrications without checking the accusations. The so-called “German Author Circle of the German Federal Republic” even suggested that the Voice of Germany’s Chinese department should be purged and be comprehensively supervised in its China coverage. A surge of open letters to Germany’s federal parliament emerged, and in a wave of at least ten open letters and several tens of German media reports, the German parliament also became involved. Chinese media surged, too.

在这种中国“不好论”、中国“恐惧症”笼罩下，于是在德国集电视、广播、互联网于一体的国际广播电视台“德国之声”内外，发生了一系列的丑闻。在2008年8月，北京奥运开幕之际，该台中国部张丹红在德国电视台说中国除贫是重大贡献，引起了海外异议人士和德国媒体的围攻。继而扩散到对在西藏事件等方面相对客观地、比较全面地展开报导的德国之声中文部的攻击。一些海外异议人士凭空捏造、随意组合，创建了一个“亲华亲共”的德国之声中文广播和网络部报导的假象。一些德国记者、政治家盲目地相信这些捏造，而根本不去核对那些指责。所谓的“联邦德国作家圈”甚至提出要清洗德国之声中文编辑部、全面监督对华报导。一轮向德国联邦议院发公开信的热潮涌现了，在先后至少十封公开信和几十个德国媒体的报导热潮中，德国联邦议院也插手了。中国媒体在这个热潮冲击下同样汹涌澎湃。

The final examination report shows that the allegations against the Voice of Germany’s Chinese editorial department were completely slanderous. Originally, this matter should have been over by then. But the Voice of Germany’s leaders got trapped in fear, and went into disarray. From early in 2009, this international media unit implemented” the original demands which had been comprehensively repudiated [by the investigation]: it invited people “immune against the CCP” to examine the reporting – in violation of Germany’s constitution, and editors who adhered to the legal principles of objective coverage were put under pressure, up to the expulsion of four editors and reporters.

最后的审核结论表明，对德国之声中文编辑部的指责纯属子虚乌有。本来，这件事情应该过去了。可是，德国之声领导完全陷入了恐慌之中，在胜利中自乱阵脚。从2009年开始，这个国际媒体全面“执行”了本来被它全面推翻了的对方的要求：请“免疫”于共产主义的台外人员对中文节目展开违反德国宪法的新闻检查；对坚持德国法律规定的客观报导原则的编辑、记者实施打压，直到把四名编辑、记者开除出去。

In October 2012, “Deutsche Welle’s China Nightmare” was published by August von Goehte Lieteraturverlag [sic]. It describes, with detailed material, revealing many creepy scandals. Some examples as follows.

2012年10月出版的德语版《德国之声的中国梦魇》（China-Albtraum der Deutschen Welle，出版社：August von Goehte Lieteraturverlag）一书以详实的资料，记述了整个过程，揭露了许多令人毛骨悚然的丑闻。在此举例如下。

I’m not going to translate April Media’s list line by line, but only mention them very roughly here -

• the way dissidents were believed and the inclination to believe them because of their suitable China-isn’t-good narrative;
• how the Deutsche Welle management abandoned “the fruits of victory” (胜利果实);
• how – in the eyes of many listeners and readers, April Media adds -, the station became a voice of dissidents and Falun Gong, etc., thus abandoning Deutsche Welle director’s assertion that they were neither CCP’s, nor of the dissidents’ mouthpiece;
• the “monitor” (Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph), with an emphasis on how he allegedly objected to the term “mainland”, and demanding the use of “China” and “Taiwan” instead;
• inviting a “Tibetan separatist” to comment on the Yushu earthquake, with politicized remarks not related to the earthquake, or referring to Xinjiang as East Turkestan;
• violating the principles of objective journalism, and the German constitution;
• “Lying in court”;
• Falun-Gong guidance on German media and Deutsche Welle, beginning with the Zhang-Danhong affair.

After describing several episodes from “Deutsche Welle’s China Nightmare”, April Media returns to the issue of “sinophobia”. While the book can’t solve problems, it can describe otherwise rather hidden issues, the reviewer suggests. And it “can also help Chinese people to understand the West and Germany more comprehensively”.

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Remarks

First of all, April Media’s review should not be held against Li Qi, in my view – just as the way Chinese media presented Zhang Danhong – a German citizen, btw, according to Li – as a Chinese-motherland-superhero four years ago, should not be held against Zhang.  Li Qi wrote the book, not April Media’s review of it.

The review leaves an important episode out – one that Li himself addresses in his book: Zhang Danhong’s “interview with herself”, i. e. an intern or – rather, according to Li – a newbie in the department asking the questions. Li would go along with the review in that the Deutsche Welle management “abandoned the fruits of victory” without need – but he does see Zhang’s “interview” as the turning point. The following is based on my understanding of Li Qi’s chapter on the issue. I’ll base the following paragraphs on my understanding of that chapter.

Zhang had a dispute with He Qinglian, a dissident living in America. He Qinglian had alleged that Zhang had asked her, in 2005, to write no comments commentaries for the department anymore, but rather to report about China. He Qinglian considered that a request to terminate her assignment with Deutsche Welle, because reporting about China was difficult when living in the U.S.. In an interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, He alleged that the Chinese propaganda department had been involved in the decision.

Li Qi felt that he could relate to the anger of the department managers. After all, they had been targeted by He Qinglian.

But I felt that such remarks weren’t worth a debate. What mattered was that the absurd accusations that we had been red infiltrators had been staved off.

The online department manager suggested to care about more important things when Zhang approached her, asking if an online colleague could do the interview with her. Zhang did it anyway. The release online then apparently followed a misunderstanding about “intranet” and “internet”.

Here is the crux – in my view: the Deutsche Welle management certainly felt that they had done their best to defend the integrity of the Chinese department. They had faced criticism, public uproars, inquiries from politics, and had seen it all through. And there came some small-minded editors with a “the-winner-takes-it-all” mentality who wouldn’t want to spare a single point, when it came to the “enemy”.  To be clear – I’m speculating about the mindsets here.

“Deutsche Welle’s China Nightmare” leaves the impression that Li doesn’t want to criticize the incident – but that he doesn’t want to condone it either.

Probably, nobody would have had to hit the roof (but Deutsche Welle’s top managers did, according to Li’s book). And the “interview incident” did pose questions about the department’s state of the art – , if nothing else had done that previously.

But the irony is that all this apparently turned into a political purge after all, rather than into continuous improvement (there’s no place where improvement would be unwarranted, is there?). And Li Qi and his colleagues were hardly to blame for the “interview incident”. According to Li, neither of the four online editors sacked in 2010/2011 was really responsible for the “self-interview”.

But April Media’s information – much of it apparently accurate, some of it half-true, and some of it – apparently – a wilful omission – is relevant all the same. It is relevant because it is among the media that cover the issue at all.

[Added:] Book Review: Li Qi’s “Deutsche Welle’s China Nightmare”

“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”, wrote Ludwig Wittgenstein, and that’s true. You get very different comments, depending on the language you use on the internet. I’m realizing that I should have written about Deutsche Welle in German much earlier, say, since 2008. The share of Germans who read English-language blogs is probably much higher than the share of Chinese who do so – because English and German are much more similar to each other than English and Chinese, or because we are culturally closer, etc.. But that doesn’t mean that you can “reach” Germans with English.

That said, you have to find media here who would actually accept posts about Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department. Der Freitag seems to be one.

The following is what I wrote there, in the community section. Think of it as the book review in English I promised on Tuesday.

Public Diplomacy. Qi Li is a German citizen. From 2001 to 2011, he worked at Deutsche Welle. The “expiration of his contract” was a big media topic in China. In Germany, it wasn’t.

When Zhang Danhong, deputy Chinese department manager back then, made controversial remarks about China’s political issues during public appearances more than four years ago, it was well documented by the media. No wonder: 2008 was the year of the Beijing Olympics, and the “China” topic topped the agendas of many German papers and broadcasters.

Not only Zhang’s public-appearance comments, at Kölner Stadtanzeiger (a paper) or Deutschlandfunk (radio) were controversial; Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department became controversial, too. Dissidents who lived in Germany wrote a letter to the German Bundestag (federal parliament) on September 13, 2008:

We believe that Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department – broadcasting mainly in Chinese – is, to a large extent, isolated from German society and functioning like an island. This has led to a striking deviation from Deutsche Welle’s mission statement, to promote democracy and human rights and to explain Germany to the world.

It wasn’t necessarily the first letter from dissidents against an allegedly misguided editorial department. And according to Li Qi, who published his working experience with Deutsche Welle’s Chinese online department (2001 – 2011) last month, it wasn’t that much the open letter written by the dissidents that got Deutsche Welle into hot waters, but a letter by the “Deutscher Autorenkreis” (German authors’ club) ten days later. Li:

I’ve learned through the years that Germans take Germans seriously. The dissidents’ letter didn’t unsettle Deutsche Welle or the Bundestag. They might have been ignored forever, even though many of them have taken German citizenship long ago. And Zhang Danhong, too, was constantly described as “Chinese” by German media, even though that wasn’t correct, in terms of citizenship.

Back then, Deutsche Welle reacted publicly. Zhang Danhong was temporarily suspended from work at the microphone, and lost her position as the Chinese department’s deputy manager. Above all, however, the Chinese department’s work – and that of the online editors in particular – was investigated. A translation agency translated the Chinese articles back into German, and former German ARD (channel-1) correspondent and “Tagesthemen” (a newsshow) editor Ulrich Wickert reviewed them. “You are free to decide about the results. You are completely free in this regard” (Sie entscheiden, was am Ende herauskommt. Sie sind völlig frei), Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Hans Leyendecker quoted Deutsche Welle director Erik Bettermann, months later.

Wickert’s findings: accusations of slanted China coverage were completely unfounded. Wickert didn’t only criticize that politicians had picked up the accusations unchecked, but also that the director, apparently because of public and political pressure … [took personnel decisions] hastily and unjustifiedly. To be clear, this wasn’t about Zhang Danhong’s public-appearance remarks, but about the Chinese editorial department’s work.

Wickert’s report remained unpublished. Different to the original allegations, it gave no rise to headlines. It took an inquiry by the Süddeutsche Zeitung to Bettermann, who reportedly rated Wickert’s report as “very good work – great”. Bettermann didn’t want to publish the report however, so as “not to revive the China debate again”.

When reading Li’s book, you can hardly escape the feeling that Deutsche Welle has been very successful at that.

Four online editors at the China department lost their freelance assignments or jobs respectively, in 2010 and 2011. If and how far the “freelance” assignments amounted to “employee-like” contracts (arbeitnehmerähnlich Beschäftigte), and if and how far the jobs had to count as temporary (befristet) can’t be discussed here. Some of that still seems to be disputed at the labor courts – Wang Fengbo expects his case to be at the federal labor court this month.

More interestingly, Deutsche Welle – despite Wickert’s acquittal – prescribed a “monitor” for the Chinese department, Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph from Ludwigshafen. Officially, he was meant to monitor style and language/expression, and to correct those, if need be. In fact, according to an open letter by the four former employees, he rated how “close” to the CCP (or how distant to it) articles written by the editorial department were.

It was an angry letter, published by the four at the online paper “Neue Rheinische Zeitung” in April 2011, and even just for its length, it was no journalistic masterpiece. But its content is mostly authenticated. Deutsche Welle employees committee member Christian Hoppe, quoted by EPD in May 2011:

Some of the letter’s phrasing had been overboard, said Hoppe, but by and large, the events in the editorial department were described accurately (die Autoren des „offenen Briefs“ seien „mit einigen Formulierungen über das Ziel hinausgeschossen“, würden jedoch “die Vorgänge in der Redaktion insgesamt korrekt wiedergeben”).

According to Li, Wang Fengbo and another colleague met a journalist in Cologne for two hours, in the evening on April 14, 2011. The journalist, himself a freelancer, “wanted to report about it, but didn’t know what his superiors thought” (Li’s account). “In fact, we never heard about a report at his paper.”

But another source did report, as quoted above. Li:

You can’t google the report, though, because it can only be read at “epd medien”. Press agencies like dpa, ap, epd enter their stories into a database. That’s how they make them available to the media.

The book – Li categorizes it as reportage – isn’t above the story. There is bitterness in some of its chapters. But it is a schoolbook for a number of cultural and political issues: “intergration“, suspicions of extremism, public diplomacy (and how it shoots itself in the foot, “politically”), journalism, labor law, and – one begins to suspect – about the despair of superiors who have to execute an agenda which can’t be plausibly explained to any reasonable contemporary.

Not least: about how a public institution (apparently) got into the eddying of a parallel society. That “parallel society” isn’t malign in the way rednecks would have it. It isn’t malign at all. But politics faces it without a clue, unprepared and sort of trigger-happy.

While the Chinese press reported – and someties raged – extensively, there was almost no German coverage. “Is the topic of no interest for German media?”, Li asks towards the end of his book. It’s not only him – Wang Fengbo, too, finds that hard to believe.

They aren’t Eva Herman or Susan Stahnke, obviously. Deutsche Welle may only be known to those Germans who, into the 1990s, took their shortwave receivers to Mallorca, or before travelling the world. But when it is about good journalism – at a public broadcaster (or a public media platform), public interest seems likely. And if one is inclined to believe that a number of Deutsche-Welle employees were wronged, this poses questions about the usual practice in our media: how well (or badly) do we actually want to be informed?

Li Qi: “China-Albtraum der Deutschen Welle”, August-von-Goethe Literaturverlag, Frankfurt a/M, 2012.
Only available in German.

On Li Qi’s “China-Albtraum der Deutschen Welle”

My review of Li Qi‘s “China-Albtraum der Deutschen Welle” (Deutsche Welle’s China Nightmare), in German.

A review in English will follow here.

People’s Daily Online on Economic Sanctions against Japan: “Don’t Hurt the Friends, don’t Please the Enemy”

The following is a translation of an article published by People’s Daily Online (人民网) on September 18, 2012.

Links within blockquotes were added during translation.

The article focuses on two levels of sanctions: government-level (with a very cautious attitude) and “non-governmental boycotts” (with an “understanding” attitude).  In terms of business, the article addresses losses that China would incur in terms of technological progress if it took comprehensive “countermeasures” against Japan. Further down, the article suggests that rare-earth sanctions against Japan had basically backfired, in or since 2010.

Rather than expressing an editorial stance of its own, the article quotes a number of academics. The subtitles within the following translation are not part of the original article.

Main Link: 打经济战 中国承受力定比日本强？ – People’s Daily Online, September 18, 2012
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Economic Sanctions: Not while Japan maintains its Technological Edge

[...] Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang Zengwei said recently that the so-called “islands purchase” by Japan (Diaoyu Islands) made it hard to avoid negative impacts on Sino-Japanese trade relations.

因日本对中国固有领土钓鱼岛进行所谓“国有化”，中日关系再度降温，由此引发的寒潮在经贸领域已经有首当其冲的显现。商务部副部长姜增伟日前表示，日方的所谓“购岛”（钓鱼岛）行为，难以避免地会对中日经贸关系产生负面影响。

In Chinese public opinion, voices sympathetic to terrorizing Japan by economic sanctions have emerged, which say with certainty that Japan’s economy was more dependent on China than vice versa. Even if economic and trade confrontation had the killing power of weapons on both sides, China’s ability to bear that was far stronger than Japan’s. However, to “play the economic card needed to be done  cautiously, and the two countries’ abilities to bear this be judged by seeking the truth in the facts, and this issue be dealt with rationally and objectively”. Recently, a scholar with a good knowledge of Sino-Japanese economic and trade issues talked with this People’s Daily Online reporter.

中国舆论中已出现用经济制裁威慑日本的声音，并言之凿凿：日本经济对中国经济的依存度高于中国对日本。虽然中日经贸对峙对双方都有杀伤力，但中国承受能力远高于日本。然而，“打经济牌必须慎重，要实事求是地评估两国的承受力，理性客观地对待这个问题。”近日，谙熟中日经贸事务的学者如是告诉人民网记者。

Japan’s economy entered a long-term depression in the 1980s, with exports as the main driving force in economic development. Although European and American markets were the main factors in influencing Japan’s economy, China’s influence was no insignificant factor either.

自上世纪80年代中期始，日本经济陷入长期萧条，出口是其经济发展的最主要动力。虽然欧美市场是影响日本经济的最主要因素，但是对日本经济而言，中国因素早已不可忽视。

China is currently Japan’s biggest trading partner and its biggest export market. According to Japan’s Ministry of Finance statistics, Japan’s trade with and its exports to China stand at 19.7 percent and 20.6 percent respectively, in its total amount of foreign trade. After the European Union, America, and ASEAN, Japan is China’s fourth-largest trading partner.

中国是目前日本最大的贸易伙伴和最大出口对象国。据日本财务省统计，2011年日本对华贸易和对华出口将分别占日本外贸总额和出口总额的19.7%和20.6%。而日本在欧盟、美国、东盟之后，是中国的第四大贸易伙伴。

Analysts have pointed out that Japan’s economy is more dependent on China than vice versa. Even if economic and trade confrontation had the killing power of weapons on both sides, China’s ability to bear that was far stronger than Japan’s. Once China started economic and trade sanctions against Japan, this could lead to a Japanese economic crisis.

有分析人士指出，日本经济对中国经济的依存度高于中国对日本。虽然中日经贸对峙对双方都有杀伤力，但中国承受能力远高于日本。一旦中方启动经济制裁，可能引发日本经济危机。

Feng Zhaokui, a researcher with the National Japanese Economic Research Institute, told this People’s Daily Online reporter that taking economic countermeasures against Japan’s economy could have a greater than on China in theory. “However, the so-called ability to bear” is no mere matter of numbers.

而全国日本经济学会研究员冯昭奎则告诉人民网记者，对日本采取经济上的反制措施，理论上日本受到的影响大于中国。“但是所谓的‘承受能力’却不是光用数字就能够衡量的。

Feng Zhaokui says that since 2002, in Sino-Japanese trade, China has always recorded a trade deficit, mainly because much of the trade was in the field of production. The levels of bilateral import and export differed, and the weight of technological content differed. In the industry chain, Japan stood at the high end, and China mainly imported key core technological components from Japan, with high technological content, much added value, and if these imports were affected, the industrial chain would see disrupture, which would damage China’s production. Even as Sino-Japanese trade was gradually transforming from a vertical division of labor to a horizontal pattern, Japan generally was the side with goods of high technological content, high added value and maintained an edge there.

冯昭奎说，自2002年以来，在中日贸易中，中方一直处于逆差状态，主要原因在于中日之间在生产领域内的贸易所占比重较大。中日双方的进出口产品层次不同，技术含量不同。日本处于产业链的高端，中国从日本主要进口关键的核心零部件，技术含量高、附加值高，如果进口受影响，产业链将面临断裂，对中国将产生损害。尽管中日之间的贸易结构正在逐步从垂直分工向水平分工方向转化，但总体来看，日本在技术含量高、附加值高的产品方面仍占优势。

According to surveys, Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in China in 2011 was at 6.35 billion US dollars, an increase of 49.7 percent compared with the previous year. This was abut 40 percentage points more than the increase in what China attracted in overall FDI (9.72 percent). Japanese investment in China supported Japan’s economic recovery and growth; it also contributed to China’s economic development. Hasty economic sanctions against Japan could lead to Japanese companies withdrawal from China.

调查显示，2011年日本对华直接投资实际到位资金63.48亿美元，同比增速高达49.7%，而中国实际吸引外资增幅为9.72%，与此相比整整高出近40个百分点。日本对华投资有力地支持了日本经济的复苏和增长，也对中国经济的发展做出了贡献。如果轻率地对日本使用经济制裁，可能会导致在华日企撤离中国。

“China’s economic growth this year is voluntarily restricted to eight percent, which is to say that we are approaching the lower limit”, says Feng, as China adds twenty million new workforce annually. Our country has entered a period of accelerated promotion of economic transformation, it faces growing pressures from the global economy which complicate the external environment, with growing uncertain factors such as if the economy can maintain needed growth, and the job market may suffer blows. “Therefore, the economic card must be played cautiously, and the two countries’ ability to bear this be judged by seeking the truth in the facts, and this issue be dealt with rationally and objectively”.

“今年中国的经济增长率将自行控制在8%，对我们来说，是接近下线的。”冯昭奎说，而中国每年新增劳动力一两千万。我国已经进入加快推进经济转型的关键时期，面临着世界经济下行压力增大的复杂外部环境，不确定因素增强，如果经济不能保持适当的增速，就业市场就会受到冲击。“所以，打经济牌必须慎重，要实事求是地评估两国的承受力，理性客观地对待这个问题。”

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The Rare-Earths Card

Among the economic-sanction measures discussed recently, limiting exports of rare earths to Japan has been most frequent. Many people say that when it comes to rare-earths resources, Japan will continue to depend heavily on China in the near future, and therefore, China should play the “rare-earth card”.

在近日经济制裁日本的诸多措施中，限制对日稀土出口是讨论得最多的。不少人士表示，日本在稀土资源近期仍将倚重中国，因此中国可打出“稀土牌”。

According to the Nihon Kezai Shimbun, Japan’s imports of rare earths frm China have fallen by 3007 tons during the first six months of 2012, i. e. 49.3 percent of Japan’s total imports. These imports were reduced by fifty percent within half a year. Before 2009, 90 percent of Japan’s rare-earths imports came from China.

而据《日本经济新闻》报道，2012年1到6月份，日本从中国进口的稀土资源下降到3007吨，仅占全部输入总量的49.3%，半年内减少了50%。而在2009年之前，日本的稀土资源9成以上都需依靠中国进口。

China got a lesson, in terms of economic sanctions”, Feng believes. In 2010, Japan had illegally detained the captain of a Chinese trawler. Although China hadn’t openly acknowledged the use of economic sanctions, practically, China temporarily halted rare-earths exports and created temporary difficulties for Japan at the time. “But in fact, Japan mainly cried out, and had already got prepared. Their inventories were ample.

“在经济制裁方面，中国是有教训的。”冯昭奎认为，2010年，日本非法扣押中国渔船船长。中国虽然没有公开承认使用了经济制裁，但事实上中国暂停了对日稀土出口，当时给日本造成一时困难。“但其实困难主要是日本叫唤出来的，他们早就有备无患，存货很多。”

China holds only one-third of the global rare-earth reserves, but currently supplies some 90 percent of the worldwide quantity. “There are countries rich in rare earths, too, and their technological ability to produce them has increased” Feng Zhaokui says. After China had restricted imports of rare earths in 2010, Japan resumed research of resources policies, and especially decided that it couldn’t depend on only one country for rare minerals and rare metals. These days, Australia, Malaysia and other countries rare-earth projects are developing very smoothly.

中国的稀土储量只占世界的三分之一，却承担了目前国际市场上90%的供应量。“国外也有稀土资源丰富的国家，而且有技术，这两年里他们把稀土生产搞上来了。”冯昭奎说，2010年中国限制稀土出口后，日本就重新研究了资源政策，尤其决定稀土及稀有金属不能只依赖一个国家。如今澳大利亚、马来西亚等地的稀土项目，进展得都很顺利。

“As far as our talk about having a monopoly position on rare earths, other countries have caught up, and we haven’t increased our technological content, and we haven’t upgraded the industrial change. Our competitiveness in the field of rare earths has been greatly affected.”

“而我们总说在稀土产量上有垄断地位，但是现在其他国家赶上来了，我们却没有提高技术含量，升级产业链，在稀土产业竞争力方面大受影响。”

Feng believes that rare earths won’t restrain Japan anymore, and that they are no longer a card that could be played. If one wanted to impose economic sanctions, one had to take the rare-earths lessons into account.

冯昭奎认为，稀土已经制约不了日本，不再是一张牌。如果要采取经济制裁措施，一定要吸取稀土教训。

In the wake of the heightened temperatures from the Diaoyu Islands’ issue, another popular surge in “boycotting Japanese goods” and even a low in travels to Japan are inevitable. Information from all travel agencies say that since September, the number of group travels to Japan had gone down drastically, and some travel agencies have stopped Japan travel services altogether. Numbers released by the Chinese automotive industry on September 10 show that compared with last year’s same period, August sales of Japanese cars had dropped by two percent. From August, Japanese goods such as household appliances had also gone down in China.

在钓鱼岛事件升温之际，“抵制日货”的浪潮不可避免地在民众中再次掀起，连带着赴日旅游也遭遇低谷。来自各大旅行社的消息称，进入9月份以来，赴日旅游成团数量急剧减少，有的旅行社则干脆停止赴日旅游业务。中国汽车工业协会9月10日公布数据显示，与上年同期比较，8月日系车销量下降2%。而8月份以来，日系品牌家电在中国销售额也整体大跌。

Vice Minister of Commerce Jiang Zengwei said on a press conference that given Japanese violations of Chinese territory, Chinese consumers had a right to express their position in reasonable manners, and that we should express understanding for that.

商务部副部长姜增伟近日在记者会上表示，针对日方侵犯中国领土主权的行为，中国消费者以理性的方式表达其立场和他们的一些想法，是他们的权利，我们对此应该表示理解。

“Reach for the wine when friends arrive, and reach for the gun when enemies arrive”, China Academy of Social Science Japan Institute director Gao Hong told People’s Daily Online reporter in an interview. The Chinese people have shown patriotic enthusiasm, and spontaneous boycotts of Japanese goods was a right which gave no cause for criticism. “However, we need to distinguish between the non-governmental and the governmental level when it comes to the economic card. At the government level, more economic policies need to be adjusted to each other.”

“朋友来了有好酒，敌人来了有猎枪，”中国社科院日本所副所长高洪在接受人民网记者采访时也如是说，中国人民出于爱国热情，自发地抵制日本产品，是自己的权利，无可厚非。“但是经济牌要有区分，政府层面和民间层面的牌是不一样的，政府层面更多的是进行经济政策的调整。”

Liu Gang, professor at the Okinawa University, pointed out in a number of media that to sanction a country, other countries’ support was frequently required. To mobilize international sanctions against Japan, these needed to be adopted by the United Nations. That’s how so-called sanctions would be legitimate. If one country high-handedly reached for the big stick of economic sanctions, this didn’t only deviate from WTO principles, but also give rise to gossip and a series of other side effects.

日本冲绳大学教授刘刚在此前的媒体评论中分析指出，制裁一个国家，通常应该有其他国家的支持。如若真要动用国际力量制裁日本，有必要提请联合国通过。这样，所谓的制裁行动才具有正当性。如果一国妄自舞起经济制裁大棒，不仅容易偏离WTO原则，更易授人口实，引起一连串的副作用。

“As for economic sanctions, I believe that generally-speaking, it isn’t China’s position that they should be a tool in handling international relations”, Qu Xing, director of the China Institute of International Studies, clearly points out.

“对于经济制裁，我觉得中国一般地讲，不主张把制裁作为处理国际关系的一个手段。”中国国际问题研究所所长曲星明确地指出。

Gao Hong also told the People’s Daily Online reporter that as far as countermeasures were concerned, these were meant to subdue the other side. Countermeasures needed to correspond with the other side’s provocation. If Japan didn’t continuously act provocatively on the economic level, countermeasures on a governmental level could usually not be carried out. After Japan’s so-called “nationalization” [of three of the Senkaku islands - JR], China had announced its points about the Diaoyu territorial seas, institutionalized the dispatch of naval patrol boats, and submitted material and cartography to the United Nations, etc.. These “combined punches” had already hit Japan where it was vulnerable.

高洪也告诉人民网记者，就反制来讲，反制是针对对方进攻所采取的反击制服的斗争手段。反制和挑衅的层次和力度相当。如果日本在经济上没有进一步的挑衅行为，政府层面的经济反制一般不会进行。在日本对钓鱼岛进行所谓“国有化”后，中方随即公布钓鱼岛领海基线基点，派海监船对钓鱼岛实施常态化监测，以及向联合国提交钓鱼岛坐标表和海图等，这一套“组合拳”已经击中日本的要害。

Liu Gang believes that Japan’s established policy of swallowing the Diaoyu Islands is an international problem, and China didn’t need to oblique references to that. The best approach would be tit-for-tat, to confine oneself to the facts, to make representations when needed, and to let strength and actions speak – to learn from Russia meant to use strength as a backup, with less talk and more action.

刘刚认为，吞下钓鱼岛已经是日本的既定方针和国是问题，对此问题，中国没必要再旁敲侧击，又何必冀望于“歪打”迂回，反而最好针锋相对，就事论事，该怎么交涉就怎么交涉，让实力和行动说话。学习俄罗斯，以实力做后盾，少说多做。

The Diaoyu issue is inherited from history, as many experts say. The struggle for the Diaoyu Islands is a long-term one and can’t be done overnight. This is only the first round of the struggle, and the struggle needed long-term preparation. China’s departments in charge also state clearly that they reserve the right to all kinds of action. Since a long-term struggle was needed, strategies needed to be made, orders [of approaches], and sequences of goals. Nothing should be done on the spur of sentiments, and not in a way that would “hurt friends and please the enemies”.

正如近期不少专家学者所说，钓鱼岛问题是历史遗留问题。关于钓鱼岛的斗争是长期的，不能一蹴而就。现在只是斗争的第一回合，要做斗争的长期准备。中国相关部门也明确表示，保留一切行动的权利。既然要做长期斗争，就要讲策略、讲次序、讲阶段性目的，不能意气用事，做令“亲者痛、仇者快”之事。

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Related

» Making Patriotism Useful, Sep 17, 2012
» The Nine-Dotted Line, Foarp, Sep 30, 2011
» Collision with Sth Korean Coast Guard, Dec 18, 2010
» A Nefarious Turn, Sep 25, 2010

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Chinese Press Review: New York Times (reportedly) Watered Down Chen Guangbiao’s Diaoyu Islands ad

Main Link: Ren Min Net (Renmin Ribao), September 7, 2012

Chen Guangbiao‘s (陈光标) ad, referred to by Aomen [Macau] Daily and Ren Min Net respectively, was bilingual. My translation is from the Ren Min Net article in Chinese, and doesn’t account for the ad’s actual wording in English. China Smack has a screenshot of the ad, and quotes excerpts from it.

Links within blockquotes added during translation – JR

An editorial by “Aomen Daily” on September 6 says that Chinese entrepreneur Chen Guangbiao, in his recent ad in the “New York Times” on the Diaoyu islands, also asked: “If Japan announced that Hawaii was Japanese territory, how would Americans feel about that? This line is very good. It’s easy to see that Japan denies its aggressive history and its war responsibilities, and America can’t encourage this unhealthy tendency to run wild. Although Japan is currently under America’s leadership and strictly follows it, who can tell when [Japan] may turn hostile, thus making America shoot its own feet?

《澳门日报》6日发表社论说，中国企业家陈光标最近在美国《纽约时报》上刊登保钓广告，他在广告中问道：“如果日本宣布夏威夷是日本领土，美国人民会有什么感受？陈光标这一问问得好。不难看出，日本否认侵略历史和战争责任，美国不能助长这一股歪风邪气横行。别看日本现在对美国马首是瞻言听计从，说不定哪一天翻脸不认人，到那时美国可不是搬起石头砸自己的脚？

The following are excerpts from the [Aomen Daily] article.

文章摘编如下：

Chinese entrepreneur Chen Guangbiao recently published an ad on the Diaoyu islands in the “New York Times” and also asked: “If Japan announced that Hawaii was Japanese territory, how would Americans feel about that? What action would the American government take?” Chen Guangbiao asks a good question, as it calls on the American government and people from all walks of life to condemn Japan’s provocative behavior, and reminds them that the scars and pains from the Second World War must not be forgotten.

中国企业家陈光标最近在美国《纽约时报》上刊登保钓广告，他在广告中问道：“如果日本宣布夏威夷是日本领土，美国人民会有什么感受？美国政府会有什么举动？”陈光标这一问问得好，既呼吁美国政府和各界人士谴责日本的挑衅行为，也提醒他们不要忘记二战历史好了伤疤忘了痛。

In the continuously heatening Diaoyu islands dispute, Chen Guangbiao published a half-page ad in Chinese and English in the “New York Times”, in Chinese and English, stating to the world: “Japanese right-wing elements are violating Chinese Diaoyu islands”, “the Diaoyu islands have since ancient times been Chinese territory”. It is said that in the ad originally designed by Chen Guangbiao, part of the question was “If Japan declared Pearl Harbor to be Japanese territory, how would Americans feel about that?” But on the newspaper, “Pearl Harbor” had changed into “Hawaii”. The “New York Times” had said that the Pearl Harbor attack would be too offensive [or psychologically stimulating] for American readers. Chen Guangbiao had asked back that if this was how the American people and government felt about the Pearl Harbor attack, shouldn’t they also understand how we, the Chinese, feel when seeing how Japan’s flag is put on the Diaoyu islands?

在钓鱼岛争议不断升温之际，陈光标8月31日在美国《纽约时报》上注销半版中英双语广告，向世界声明：“日本右翼分子正在侵犯中国钓鱼岛”，“钓鱼岛自古以来就是中国的领土。”据说陈光标自己设计的广告中，提问部分原本是“如果日本宣珍珠港是日本领土，美国人民会有什么感受？”但到报纸上“珍珠港”变成了“夏威夷”。《纽约时报》对这处修改的解释说“偷袭珍珠港”事件对美国读者心理刺激太大。陈光标反问道，如果美国人民、美国政府能感受到“偷袭珍珠港”的刺激，也应该能理解我们中国人看到日本国旗插在钓鱼岛上的感受。

The following paragraph mainly deplores the finding of Chen Guangcheng that more than 95 per cent of Americans didn’t know “the truth” about the Senkaku (Chinese: Diaoyu) islands. All the more, America and the world needed be told that the islands were China’s. Chen was, in his own words, practicing a patriotic entrepreneur’s responsibility. (陈光标做广告前在美国花了10天时间，先后在纽约、波士顿、旧金山等大城市的街头做了上千份调查问卷。他发现“至少95%以上的美国人民并不知道钓鱼岛真相”，这更加坚定了他一定要在美国媒体上刊登钓鱼岛广告的信念，他要“告诉美国民众、告诉全世界：钓鱼岛是中国的”。陈光标说，没有通过谩骂、攻击，而是刊登报纸广告来文明、严肃地表达爱国思想、来阐述中国人民的立场、来向对钓鱼岛争端鲜有概念的美国人民普及常识是一种非常理性、睿智、文明的表达方式，也践行了一名爱国企业家的责任。)

It’s not surprising that the average American citizen doesn’t know the truth about the Diaoyu islands. Whatis surprising is that the American government doesn’t know where the Diaoyu islands belong, and on the one hand says that it “doesn’t take sides”, and on the other say that [the islands] are covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Didn’t America’s leaders want to give the Ryukyu islands to China, during the Second World War? [The last sentence seems to suggest that if that was so, there could be no doubt where the Senkaku islands belonged, as those were under "Chinese Taiwan's Yilan County's jurisdiction. If you read Chinese, you can look the line up in the Chinese article's paragraph which follows this one.]

如今的美国平民百姓不清楚钓鱼岛真相并不奇怪，奇怪的是今日的美国政府竟然不知道钓鱼岛究竟谁属。还要一面说“不采取立场”，一面却宣称钓鱼岛适用于《美日安保条约》。二战时，美国的领导人不是有意要将琉球群岛交给中国吗？更何况与琉球毫无从属关系而是中国台湾省宜兰县管辖的钓鱼岛，怎么就跑到日本那边去了？

In the old days, there was a documentary movie called “Teutonic Sword in Action” [could be this one], a careful and detailed analysis of pre-war European indulgence which helped the devil (姑息养奸), allowing the painful history of growing German fascism. Just as in today’s Japan, the extreme-right ideology is spreading, with the government adding fuel to the flames. Government and people, superiors and subordinates, [the economy and domestic politics] dispute neighboring countries’ territory, deny the history of comfort women, and do all they can to expand military power. It is easy to see that Japan denies its aggressive history and war responsibilities just to get rid of the restricitons the international community imposed after the Second World War, to return to its militarist ways. America must not act as if it doesn’t see this, let alone encourage this unhealthy tendency to run wild. Although Japan is currently under America’s leadership and strictly follows it, who can tell when [Japan] may turn hostile, thus making America shoot its own feet?

旧时有一部叫做《条顿剑在行动》的纪录片，条分缕析战前欧洲姑息养奸、让德国法西斯坐大的惨痛历史。如今的日本，极右民族主义情绪正在蔓延，政府也在推波助澜。朝野上下抛开经济、内政跟邻国争领土，否认慰安妇存在的事实，千方百计扩张军力。不难看出，日本否认侵略历史和战争责任，就是要摆脱战后国际社会对它的束缚，要走回军国主义的老路。美国不能对此视若不见，更不能助长这一股歪风邪气横行。别看日本现在对美国马首是瞻言听计从，说不定哪一天翻脸不认人，到那时美国可不是搬起石头砸自己的脚？

In fact, since WW2, America and Japan have had a special relationship. Chen Guangbiao hopes that America’s politicians and people will gradually understand the fundamental fact that the Diaoyu islands are China’s, respect China’s sovereignty, condemn Japan’s provocative behavior, put pressure on Japan’s extreme right, and play its role as the world’s superpower and maintain stability and security in the West pacific.

America’s position, although ambiguous in its own view, is in fact very clear at its core; it supports Japan’s opposition against China’s ownership of the Diaoyu islands. This is a very dangerous position, and not at all advantageous for stability in the western Pacific. People have to worry that America’s strong intervention and support for Japan on the Diaoyu islands issue will harden Japan’s government’s tough stance and encourages its right-wing forces’ arrogance, which will be extremely harmful to security and stability in the western Pacific.

美国的“钓鱼岛立场”虽然存在自相矛盾之处，但是实质上，它的核心内容又是明确的、清晰的，即支持日本在钓鱼岛领土归属问题上对抗中国。美国的“钓鱼岛立场”是十分危险的，于亚太地区的安全与稳定十分不利。人们不能不担心，美国在钓鱼岛问题上的强势介入和执意为日本撑腰，将会强化日本政府的强硬态度以及助长日本右翼势力的嚣张，而这又极其有损于东亚乃至整个亚太地区的安全与稳定。

The Obama administration’s “return to the pacific strategy” intends to suppress China’s rise, to keep [China] from challenging America’s position. This kind of cold-war ideology goes against the tide of the times, against peaceful development. An editorial published by America’s “Wall Street Journal” points out that currently, America’s strategy’s biggest problem is that it is blurred and without a clear outlook. That can’t solve the Asia-Pacific problems, and even, because of excessive commitments, exacerbate regional uncertainties. China doesn’t intend to compete with America about whatever position, it only hopes that America will do more to help regional peace and stability. As for the Diaoyu islands problem, America should follow through on having no certain position.

奥巴马政府的“重返亚太战略”意在压制中国崛起、避免挑战美国的地位，这种冷战思维是违背和平发展这一时代潮流的。美国《华尔街日报》发表的评论文章指出，目前，美国战略重心转移的第一大问题就是它模糊且预期不明，这不会解决亚太的问题，甚至还会因为承诺过度、实践不足而增加该地区的不确定性。中方无意与美国争什么地位，只是希望美方多做有利于地区和平稳定的事。在钓鱼岛主权归属问题上，美方理应切实体现不持立场的态度。

International Press Review: Merkel’s China Trip and Germany’s Submissive Bosses

translations from Chinese and German by JR. Links within blockquotes added during translation

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Xinwen Lianbo, CCTV, August 31, 2012

Beijing Youthnet (北青网), August 31, 2012, 0715 local time (China)

Contrary to Thursday, which was packed with a political agenda, Friday is the day which is about “cultural tourism” and “economic cooperation trips”. Although this is Merkel’s sixth visit to China, this is the first time that she visits the Forbidden City. The scheduled fourty minutes of sightseeing let this German chancellor learn about Chinese history and culture first-hand, and deepen her comprehensive understanding of China.

与30日在北京密集的“政治日程”安排相比，默克尔今天的行程可以说是“文化之旅”和“经济合作之旅”。看点很多，可以用三个“首次”概括。今天上午温家宝总理将陪同默克尔一起参观故宫。虽然默克尔已经六次访问中国，这还是她首次到访故宫，预定40分钟的参观时间将让这位德国总理亲身领略中国历史和文化，加深她对中国的全面了解。

After the visit to the Forbidden City, Chief State Councillor Wen Jiabao personally accompanies Merkel on her trip to Tianjin, on the high-speed Beijing-Tianjin railway, which is the first time for Merkel to travel on a Chinese high-speed train. Concerning this, Merkel, herself from a great country of high-speed trains, says that this trip lets her experience China’s rapid development.

结束对故宫的访问之后，温家宝总理将亲自陪同默克尔乘坐京津高铁赴天津访问，这将是默克尔首次乘坐中国的高铁。对于来自高铁技术大国的默克尔来说，这次中国的高铁之旅相信可以让她感受到中国的快速发展。

The third “first”: this is Merkel’s first visit to Tianjin. Before, Merkel visited several Chinese cities, including Nanjing, Xi’an, and Guangzhou, but she is going to Tianjin for the first time. Tianjin is also Wen Jiabao’s hometown. During yesterday’s meeting with Merkel, Wen said that these Sino-German government consultations would be the last during the tenure of the current Chinese government. This means that if nothing extraordinary happens, this visit by Merkel will be the last one during which Wen will greet her in his capacity as Chief State Councillor. Merkel says that her stay as a guest in Wen’s hometown will be a memorable visit for her.

第三个“首次”：这是默克尔第一次到访天津。之前，默克尔已经访问过包括南京、西安、广州在内的多个中国城市，但天津还是头一回去，而且天津也是温家宝总理的故乡。昨天，温总理在与默克尔会面时就表示，这次中德政府磋商将是本届中国政府任内最后一次了。这意味着如果没有特殊情况出现的话，默克尔本次访华将是温家宝作为总理最后一次接待她访华。在这样一次访问中，默克尔到温总理的家乡做客对于她来说将是一次值得回忆的访问。

An important reason for Merkel to visit Tianjin is that Tianjin has become a focus of German companies in northern China. According to statistics, until July this year, 334 German-invested companies have been approved in Tianjin, and accumulated contractual investment is at more than 2.1 billion US dollars. Germany has also become the European country with the most companies investing in Tianjin.

默克尔之所以要访问天津，有一个重要原因是天津目前已成为德国企业在中国北方的主要聚集区。据统计，截至今年7月，天津累计批准德国投资企业334家，累计合同外资额超过21亿美元。德国也成为欧洲国家中在天津投资企业数量最多的国家。

During the time in Tianjin, Chief State Councillor Wen and Merkel held an hour of talks with Chinese and German entrepreneurs. This arrangement had been made during several of Merkel’s previous visits to China, too. In July 2010 and in February this year, when Merkel visited China, Wen held talks with Chinese and German entrepreneurs in Xi’an and Guangzhou, together with Merkel. This reflects the importance the two [heads of government] attach to listening to the comments and suggestions from entrepreneurs from both sides, concerning the development of Sino-German economic and trade cooperation. As for Merkel’s visit to China this time, an important goal is to further strengthen economic and trade cooperation with China. There are not only many entrepreneurs accompanying Merkel, but on Thursday, after the Sino-German government consultations, the two countries signed 13 agreemens concerning electric vehicles, biotechnology, climate protecton and other areas. The value of cooperation for the companies reached nearly seven billion US dollars.

在天津期间，温总理将和默克尔一同与中德企业家举行历时1个小时的座谈，这样的安排在以往默克尔的访华行程中多次出现。2010年7月和今年2月默克尔访华期间，温总理就曾与她一起在西安和广州同中德企业家座谈，这体现出两国总理非常重视听取双方企业界人士有关中德经贸合作发展的意见和建议。而默克尔本次访华的一个重要目的，就是着眼于继续加强与中国的经贸合作。随同默克尔来访的不仅有多位企业家，而且在30日中德政府磋商之后，两国签署了涉及电动汽车、生物技术、气候保护等领域合作的13项协议文本，有关企业、公司则达成的商业合作总金额接近70亿美元。

There is an important item on Chief State Councillor Wen’s and Chancellor Merkel’s agenda in Tianjin; they take part in Airbus Tianjin Company‘s ceremony, as the 100th A320 plane is completed. The Airbus assembly line in Tianjin is the first comprehensive one of this aircraft company outside Europe, a product of Airbus cooperation with Chinese companies. Both [heads of government] are witnessing the moment when the 100th plane since August 2008 leaves the assembly line.

在天津期间，温总理和默克尔总理有一项重要的日程安排是共同出席空客天津公司第100架A320飞机的下线仪式。空中客车在天津的这条总装线是空客公司在欧洲以外的第一条飞机总装线，是空客和中国企业合作的产物。从2008年8月开始组装首架飞机，到今年8月正好赶上第100架飞机下线，两国总理将共同见证这一时刻。

This production line is a win-win product for China and Europe. Airbus Tianjin Assembly Line general manager Shang Luguo said in an interview before that one of this projects biggest successes has been that it trained more than 400 Chinese technicians to master the world’s most advanced aircraft production technology. At the same time, it promoted China’s aviation industry’s development. China is currently conducting its own big-aircraft development program, and is learning from aircraft-building peers’ experience. This was very important for China, and this assembly line [in Tianjin] provided China with an opportunity to learn, which showed its importance.

这条生产线对于中欧来说是互利双赢的产物。空客天津总装线总经理尚鲁国之前在接受采访时就曾表示，这个项目取得最为重要的成就之一就是培养了400多名掌握世界最先进的飞机总装技术的中国员工，同时，推动了中国航空制造产业的发展。中国目前正在进行自己的大飞机研制计划，向同行学习飞机制造经验对于中国来说十分重要，而这条生产线为中国提供了一个学习的机会，可见它的重要性。

Also, China and Germany signed the “second-term Airbus China Assembly Line agreement”, and a purchasing agreement about 50 A320 aircraft at 3.5 billion US dollars. Wen and Merkel witnessed the signing of the contracts. Earlier, there were reports saying that Airbus expected purchases of 100 planes, but in fact, China bought only 50.

另外，昨天中德双方昨天还签署了《空客中国总装线二期框架协议》，以及价值35亿美元的50架A320飞机采购协议，温家宝和默克尔见证了协议的签署。之前，有报道说，空客方面预计中方订购的飞机是100架，而实际上中方购买的数量是50架。
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Reuters, August 31, 2012

The European Commission has until next Friday to decide whether to launch an investigation into a complaint brought by European solar firms and people familiar with the case believe it may well go ahead and do so.

On Thursday, Merkel told reporters after talks with Wen that she favoured negotiations over confrontation in the matter, comments that were welcomed by the Chinese premier but stoked concern in the European industry.

But on Friday she appeared to row back on her conciliatory tone, saying Chinese solar firms needed to recognise that subsidies, such as bottom-rate bank loans, distorted competition and violated European law.
“We are not out of the woods yet,” she said. “My plea is that everyone be transparent, that they lay their cards on the table about how they produce.”
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Der Spiegel, international online edition, August 31, 2012

The chancellor’s course on China, in fact, has slowly come to resemble the business-first policies pursued by her predecessor Gerhard Schröder. He almost surely approves of the lovely images of her visiting the Airbus plant in Tianjin, where she made a stop just before flying back to Berlin. The factory visit took place a day after a contract was signed for 50 new planes ordered by the Chinese.

[...]

Merkel, in fact, seems to have become almost completely domesticated by the economic gains made by the Asian superpower. She still, of course, addresses points of bilateral contention — during a press conference with her host Premier Wen Jiabao she requested that German press correspondents be treated better following repeated incidents of hassling. Beyond that, however, Merkel appeared overly considerate of a single-party dictatorship that pays little mind to human rights, neither at home in China nor elsewhere in the world.
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Financial Times Deutschland, August 31, 2012, 1720 local time (Germany): Germany’s Submissive Bosses (Deutschlands devote Chefs)

When it comes to lobbying during the German-Chinese economic forum in Tianjin, it was Wen Jiabao and Angela Merkel who taught Peter Löscher and a few others some lessons. “Are there deficits in equal treatment for foreign companies in China?”, Wen followed up on Löscher’s vague opening statement, on which [Löscher] only goody-goody said: “I see it as a sign of trust that we can bring these issues forward with you personally.”

In Sachen Interessensvertretung waren es beim deutsch-chinesischen Wirtschaftsforum in Tianjin Wen Jiabao und Angela Merkel, die Peter Löscher und anderen ein paar Lektionen erteilten. “Gibt es in China denn auch Mängel in Sachen Gleichbehandlung für ausländische Unternehmen?”, hakte Wen nach Löschers vagem Eingangsstatement nach. Woraufhin der nur artig sagte: “Ich sehe es als Zeichen des Vertrauens, dass wir diese Themen bei Ihnen persönlich vorbringen können.”

It wasn’t the only moment when Wen or Merkel were compelled to actively encourage the top managers to complain. [...]

Es war nicht der einzige Moment, in dem Wen oder Merkel die Topmanager aktiv zu Klagen ermutigen mussten. [...]
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Handelsblatt, August 31, 2012

[China's] market may be the world’s biggest one – but the Chinese government continues to hamper investors. In the chancellor’s presence, German company bosses vented their furustrations. There are many reasons to complain.

Der Markt mag der größte der Welt sein – doch die chinesische Regierung stellt Investoren weiterhin Hürden. In Anwesenheit der Kanzlerin machten deutsche Firmenchefs ihrem Unmut Luft. Anlässe zur Klage gibt es viele.

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Related

» Independent Innovation, May 29, 2012
» Industriousness and Wisdom, January 9, 2011

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