Press Review: Li Keqiang in Germany, and the only Disharmony

Xinhua, via Enorth (Tianjin), May 27, 2013 —

Chief state concillor Li Keqiang met with German president Gauck on Sunday.

国务院总理李克强26日在柏林会见德国总统高克。

Li Keqiang conveyed the cordial greetings and best wishes from chairman Xi Jinping. Li Keqiang said that current Sino-German relations were continuously reaching new developments on a high level, with both countries facing rare opportunities. With Merkel, we have deepened the Sino-German strategic partnership, and we held talks about strengthening cooperation in all kinds of fields. The two sides have issued a press communiqué, clearly stating the key areas and the direction of cooperation for our two countries. China is looking forward to strengthen dialog and exchange with Germany on the principles of respect and equal treatment, to enhancing understanding and mutual trust, to jointly cope with challenges.

李克强转达了习近平主席的亲切问候和良好祝愿。李克强说，当前中德关系在高水平上不断取得新发展，两国合作面临难得机遇。我同默克尔总理就深化中德战略伙 伴关系、加强各领域合作举行了很好的会谈，双方发表联合新闻公报，明确两国重点领域合作方向。中方愿本着相互尊重、平等相待的原则，同德方加强对话交流， 增进了解和互信，共同应对挑战。

Discussing China’s development and domestic situation, Li Keqiang said that all along during the past thirty years, China had moved forward, and the economy had achieved huge successes. Construction of a democratic legal system and the cause of human rights had constantly progressed. As a big developing country with 1.3 billion inhabitants, China’s path towards modernization was still long. We are acting from our own country’s national situation [国情, guóqíng, also translated as national characteristics or national circumstances sometimes], adhere to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and at the same time, we want to draw on the civilizational achievements and experiences to achieve comprehensive development even better.

在谈到中国的发展和国内情况时，李克强表示，中国过去30多年一直在改革开放中不停顿地前行，经济社会发展取得巨大成就，民主法制建设和人权事业不断进步。中国作为一个拥有13亿人口的发展中大国，要实现现代化还有很长的路要走。我们从本国国情出发，将坚持走中国特色社会主义道路，同时愿借鉴人类社会的文明成果和有关发展经验，更好实现全面发展。

Gauck welcomed Li Keqiang to Germany and asked him to convey his cordial greetings to Xi Jinping. Gauck said that Germany and China both had a long history and magnificent cultures, and relations between the two countries had developed fine in recent years. Germany admires the achievements of China’s economic and social development and wants to strengthen cooperation and dialog with China in politics, economics, the humanities and other fields, and to promote further development in the relations of the two countries.

高克欢迎李克强访德，并请转达对习近平主席的亲切问候。高克说，德中都拥有悠久历史和灿烂文化，两国关系近年发展良好。德国钦佩中国经济社会发展取得的成就，愿同中方加强政治、经济、人文等领域的合作与对话，推动两国关系取得新发展。

Li also met with Brandenburg’s minister-president Matthias Platzeck in the regional capital Potsdam, next to Berlin. In Potsdam,visiting Cecilienhof Castle there,

Rheinische Post (RP) onkine, May 26, 2013 —

Li Keqiang re-emphaszized his country’s claim on an uninhabited group of islands in the East China Sea. Japan had to hand the territories back to China. “This was a hard-earned fruit of victory”, Li said, pointing to international post-war agreements. The islands, contested between the two countries, had once been stolen from China by Japan.

Li Keqiang bekräftigte in Potsdam den Anspruch seines Landes auf eine unbewohnte Inselgruppe im Ostchinesischen Meer. Japan müsse die Territorien an China zurückgeben. “Das war die Frucht des Sieges, der hart erkämpft wurde”, sagte Li unter Verweis auf internationale Abkommen der Nachkriegszeit. Die zwischen beiden Ländern seit langem umstrittenen Inseln seien China einst von Japan gestohlen worden.

Märkische Allgemeine, May 26, 2013 —

In front of the castle [Cecilienhof], some flurry arose when two Tibet activists wanted to register a spontaneous demonstration. Security forces stopped the protest “along the route of protocol”, as a police spokesman told the MAZ [Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung].

Vor dem Schloss kam kurz Unruhe auf, als zwei Tibet-Aktivisten eine spontane Demonstration anmelden wollten. Sicherheitskräfte unterbanden jedoch den Protest “entlang der Protokollstrecke”, wie ein Polizeisprecher gegenüber der MAZ sagte.

Platzeck, whose heart beats for Dortmund, revealed that the Chinese guest was a soccer fan and that they had talked about the game [between Borussia and Bayern], too. It had turned out that Keqiang had more been in favor of Bayern Munich. That, however, had been the only disharmony between the two politicians, Platzeck assured.

Platzeck, dessen Herz für Dortmund schlug, verriet, dass der chinesische Gast ein Fußball-Fan sei und man auch über das Spiel am Vorabend gesprochen habe. Dabei stellte sich heraus, dass Keqiang eher für den FC Bayern gehalten habe. Dies, so versicherte Platzeck, sei aber die einzige Disharmonie zwischen den beiden Politikern gewesen.

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Related

» Merkel vows, Bloomberg, May 27, 2013
» Industriousness and Wisdom, Jan 9, 2011
» Full of Vitality and Vigor, July 16, 2010

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Xinjiang 4-23 “Terrorist Attack”: Important Instructions from Beijing, Lack of Compassion from Washington

The incident in Bachu County / Selibuya (Kashgar Prefecture) on April 23 which reportedly led to the deaths of 21 people, including 15 police officers and officials, is closely monitored by the central party and state leadership, according to Chinese state media quoted by the BBC‘s Mandarin website on Friday. A Huanqiu Shibao report, also of Friday, is quoted as saying that the CCP central committee attached great importance to the incident and that secretary-general Xi Jinping had issued important instructions and requirements concerning the handling of the case, its aftermath, and the safeguarding of stability in Xinjiang. Six suspects reportedly died, and eight were arrested.

Foreign journalists were allowed to travel to the region but frequently faced intimidation and harassment when attempting to verify news of ethnic rioting or organised violence against government authorities, the BBC’s Beijing correspondent Celia Hatton wrote in a report published last Wednesday, and a report from the BBC’s China correspondent Damian Grammaticas, published on Friday, seems to confirm that local authorities tend to interfere, as Grammaticas and his team were ordered to leave Selibuya.

Tianshan Net, a website run by the propaganda department of the CCP’s Xinjiang branch, and frequently quoted by official and non-official Chinese media in the 4-23 context, reports today that in the wake of the 4-23 [April 23] serious violent terrorist incidents, a ceremony to honor the meritorious was held at the Science and Culture Square Conference Center in Kashgar at noon local time today. Three advanced collectives (including the Selibuya party committee) and 91 advanced individuals had been commended. (天山网喀什讯（记者李敏摄影报道）4月29日上午12:00，自治区处置“4.23”严重暴力恐怖案件有功人员表彰大会在喀什市科技文化广场喀什噶尔会议厅召开。大会对巴楚县色力布亚镇党委等3个先进集体和阿布拉江•克热木、谢武中等91名先进个人予以表彰。) The fifteen party and government comrades who had sacrificed their lives were posthumously awarded titles as outstanding party members and anti-terrorism warriors during the ceremony, writes Tianshan. (自治区党委、政府追授在处置“4.23”严重暴力恐怖案件中牺牲的15名同志为优秀共产党员、反恐勇士称号。) Nur Bekri and other leading regional officials attended the ceremony.

On Friday, Tianshan Net republished a Huanqiu Shibao report criticizing America for showing no compassion in the wake of the incident, quoting a U.S. state department spokesman’s demands for a transparent investigation. The criticism was based on Beijing’s foreign-ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying‘s statement on Thursday, who had stated dissatisfaction with Washington’s lack of compassion (无同情心).

Sina.com (in English) suggested a moral link between the recent Boston Marathon bombings and the incident in Xinjiang, and also quoted Hua Chunying from her Thursday press conference.

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Related

» Due process protections, BBC News, April 25, 2013

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Chinese Press Review: Lushan Mourning, Maritime Disputes, Border Disputes, and CPBS Emergency Broadcasts

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1. Offerings to the Spirits of the Dead

On Friday, a ceremony to honor the two earthquake (military) relief workers Yang Bo (杨波) and Li Tangdong (李堂东) was conducted at a funeral parlor in Meishan, Sichuan Province, reports China News Service (中国新闻网, via Huanqiu Shibao). The two are referred to as martyrs who sacrificed their lives in the rescue efforts in Lushan, Sichuan Province, which occurred on April 20.

Yang Bo, a platoon leader (probably around the rank of a lieutenant, with the 13th Army Group) died in an accident when his military vehicle got off a road due to a bursting tire and fell off a cliff.

Li Tangdong, a corporal who drove the vehicle, also died in the crash. Li was from Wuxi County (Chongqing).

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2. Maritime Disputes with Japan

Japan has adopted a five-year blueprint for protecting maritime interests, partly in an effort to counter territorial claims by China and South Korea, reports The Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo). It suggests closer cooperation between Japan’s military and coastguard. Okinotorishima as well as other remote islands on what is defined as Japan’s borders reportedly are to play a role as port facilities according to the five-year plan plan, so as to protect interests in the nation’s exclusive economic zone. Methane hydrate, which could become a next-generation fuel, is among the undersea energy resources in the maritime regions in questions, writes Asahi Shimbun.
China’s Huanqiu Shibao quotes Japan’s Yomiuri Simbun on the same topic. According to Huanqiu (or its possibly rather loose rendition of Yomiuri’s coverage), Japan’s five-year blueprint calls for responsive strategies to Chinese vessels that enter the waters of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese). Rather than port facilities as described by the Asahi Shimbun, Huanqiu Shibao refers the plans for the remote islands as ones for resupply bases or depots (补给站). Okinotorishima is referred to as a “reef” (礁) while the Asahi Shimbun calls it an “island”. According to Huanqiu Shibao, the Japanese government, for wanting to protect its interests in resources, has begun to promote the protection of remote islands and the management of the legalization process [of Japan's claims or rights].

In 2012, a research team from Tokyo University detected large quantities of rare earths beneath the seaground of Minami-Tori-shima‘s adjacent waters. It was then that the Japanese government decided to strengthen the protection of energy sources and natural resources in its exclusive economic zones.

2012年，东京大学研究小组在南鸟岛周边海底发现了大量稀土。以此为契机，日本政府决定加强在保护专属经济海域内能源资源方面的措施。

[...]

Okinotorishima reef is said to be a southern Japanese atoll in the Pacific [don't quote me on this - I'm not sure that this is what Huanqiu really says about the place in Chinese - JR]. In recent years, the Japanese government has spent huge amounts on creating man-made corals at these reefs, thinking of these atolls as “islands”, trying to declare sovereignty on this basis, taking the opportunity to expand their “territorial” waters and the range of the “exclusive economic zones”, to make the development of nearby marine resources more convenient.

据了解，冲之鸟礁是日本南部太平洋海域的一处环礁。近年来，日本政府斥巨资用来在此礁人工养殖珊瑚，并认为该环礁为“岛”，企图以此来宣布主权，借机扩大其“领海”和“专属经济区”范围，为开发附近丰富的海洋资源提供方便。

As for the Okinotorishima reef, China believes that this is a reef, and not an island. Okinotorishima reef provides no base for human habitation, doesn’t sustain economic activity, and there is no basis to establish establish [i. e. claim] any connection between it and the continental shelf. On September 11, 2009, the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf said that a working group under the commission had commenced the handling of an application from Japan concerning the extension of the southern continental shelf into the Pacific.  China has filed objections with the UN.

有关冲之鸟礁问题，中国方面认为冲之鸟是 岩礁而不是岛屿。冲之鸟礁不能供人类居住，也无法维持经济生活，设定大陆架没有任何根据。2009年9月11日，联合国大陆架界限委员会表示，该委员会下 属的一个工作小组已经着手处理日本提出的南太平洋大陆架延伸申请。中国已向联合国正式提交反对意见。

Huanqiu Shibao’s emoticon vote suggests a strong trend of anger among the traditionally nationalist readership – the option “I’m angry” rose from 160 to 181 within about thirty minutes. Clicks for “this is ridiculuous” stayed at 14.
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3. Sino-Indian Border Conflicts

Meantime, Huanqiu Shibao has soothing news from the South:

China News Service, April 26 [published by Huanqiu Shibao on April 27] — Indian foreign minister Salman Khurshid answered questions from Indian media on April 25, concerning the confrontational incident on the Sino-Indian border, and said that the consultation mechanism on border issues had been started. He believed that this mechanism would find a solution for the issue in question, just as it had found solutions in the past.

中新网4月26日电 4月25日，印度外长库尔希德在回答印媒体关于中印边境对峙事件的提问时表示，印中双方已启动边境事务磋商机制，相信该机制能够像过去一样，为此次事件找到解决办法。

Huanqiu Shibao quotes Salman Khurshid as saying that bilateral relations grown over many years shouldn’t break down by overemphasizing small issues and were just like some acne on a face which only required some ointment.

“我期待在下个月访问中国之前，双方能够通过外交渠道结束僵局。”库尔希德说，我们不能因为某个地方发生的小问题而毁掉双方多年来为双边关系付出的投入和心血，正如不能因为脸上有一个小的痤疮就说这张脸不美，所需做的只是敷一点药膏而已。

Kurshid was looking forward to his planned visit to China next month.

Correspondingly, only eleven clicks from the readership were made to express anger, while 374 clicks express delight. Still, 46 clicks find the article (or the news) ridiculous. Both the “delight” and the “ridiculous” numbers are increasing quickly. Those readers who take the trouble to comment appear to be less conciliatory though.
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4. Emergency Radio Frequencies (older news)

On Monday, Central People’s Broadcasting Station (中央人民廣播電台, CPBS, now also known as China National Radio, but only the English name changed in 1998) started special emergency broadcasts in the wake of the Lushan earthquake. These were the first broadcasts of this kind, according to CPBS itself. A studio was established in the hardest-hit county of Lushan, broadcasting rescue information, expert interviews, news, psychological support and consolation, and practical information. Frequencies used were 9,800 kHz and 12,000 kHz on shortwave and 92.7 MHz on VHF/FM.

The 6th plenary session of the CCP’s 17th Central Committee^*)  had issued plans for such an emergency broadcasting system, and the plans were then included in the country’s 12th five-year plan, according to CPBS.

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Note

^*) the same plenary session adopted the party’s cultural decision, in October 2011.
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Herrschaftswissen: Free or not, but “Engineered”

Wikileaks may have been useful in making some of the (Western or Arab) governments’ inside workings a bit more transparent – but it seems to me that what has been published by them doesn’t outweigh what is published by government themselves, or by their advisers, or by the mainstream press. We could have every government archive at our disposal, and would still face the problem of finding out what matters, and the problems of interpretation.

The Genius leads the spectators: engineering of consent in its early stages.

In this post, I will try to describe two examples of Herrschaftswissen, and one (rather old) example of methodology. A talk (not an article) on Wikipedia about enlightenment in Western secular tradition translates Herrschaftswissen as knowledge restricted to the rulers. I’m not sure if this should count as an exact translation, or just as a rough one.

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Example 1: David Cameron’s “Muscular Liberalism”

In February 2011, British prime minister David Cameron addressed the Munich Security Conference, an annual conference on international security policy held in Bavaria’s capital. It is an example of how politics and mainstream media work hand in hand – it was founded by a publisher in 1962, and that publisher was succeeded by a former high-ranking government bureaucrat in 1998.

In his speech, Cameron focused on radicalization among Muslims in many European countries. There isn’t much in the speech itself that I would object to, but what I view critically is the context of the speech.

While Cameron was focused on radical Islamists in Europe, the “Arab Spring” was in full swing. Cameron gave his talk on the eve of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war – a war described by the BBC‘s Jim Muir as a proxy struggle between the US-led western world and al-Qaeda international.

The West’s undertaking could also be described as a struggle to discern moderate and radically Islamist forces among the opposition fordes in Syria – a struggle European governments are facing at home, too. But that’s a problem the West could have spared itself. If Western governments (and their Arab and Turkish allies) succeeded in toppling Syria’s Baath regime and install a “moderate” new regime, chances are that the new regimes human rights record would be no better than that of the Baath party. Governments who encourage and support radicalism in mainly Muslim countries are hardly qualified to encourage moderation among Muslims in their own countries.

A few days ago, the European Union’s Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove told told the BBC that among the estimated 500 European citizens who were currently fighting in Syria, but most likely many of them will be radicalised there, will be trained.

When you want to undermine Islamist radicalization at home, the West’s strategy on Syria doesn’t look too reasonable. Those who Cameron purportedly wants to win over know very well how ambivalent muscular liberalism is about terrorism, when it is about practise, rather than about talk.

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Example 2. Trust in the CCP’s Central Committee

“Unity” is one of the supreme banners of the Chinese Communist Party. The downfall of Chongqing’s party chief Bo Xilai, only eight months ahead of the 18th National Congress of the CCP, came at a sensitive time. But if the power struggle about Bo Xilai was unpleasant or embarrassing already, the “visit” (or rather the tempoary getaway) of Chongqing’s Public Security Bureau head to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in February 2012 should count as a PR disaster for the CCP.

The Chinese press had to pick up the pieces in the guidance of public opinion. Huanqiu Shibao, a CCP-owned but rather popularar Chinese paper, applied a mix of natural science (China’s rapid development is like a living body’s development, and there may always be some particulars we haven’t been familiar with) and orthodoxy (In China’s society of numerous and complicated voices, trust in the party’s central committee has become reason for society in its entirety). There was, Huanqiu elaborated, no contradiction between emancipation of mind and trust in the party’s central committee:

It is exactly for the diversity, for having several options, that we truly discover that trusting the party’s central committee, implementing the party’s road map, is more reliable than any other method other people may teach us, and more able to create the conditions that make the country and the individual develop.

This sounds like muscular socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Both Cameron and Chinese propaganda emphasize unity when it comes to fundamentals. The fundamentals are very different from each other, but the tools they are using to justify and legitimize their dominance are quite similar. However, Camaron’s game is easier to play than the CCP’s. When Chinese media openly bash dissidents, they risk getting unusually unharmonious responses from their recipients. When Cameron addresses radical Islamism, he will get his share of criticism, too, but that is nothing uncharacteristic in the British media.

And despite some inevitable criticism, when a European leader singles out radicalization among Muslims, chances are that the mainstream will respond rather favorably.

The problem for European politicians is that the political class is lacking the high degree of legitimacy – in view of the public – that it (reportedly) used to have. Or, as the Economist‘s Bagehot observed, the pomp of Margaret Thatcher‘s funeral met with shallow public interest. Even Mrs Thatcher’s enemies trusted that her motives were sincere, argues the Economist, but now all politicians are distrusted.

Not just among radical or not so radical Muslims. But if you pick a frequently disliked minority as Cameron does, you may still strike a chord with an increasingly resentful majority.

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3. Engineering of Consent

In 1955, an American public-relations counsel, Edward L. Bernays, wrote an article, summarizing what he referred to as the engineering of consent. Bernays didn’t necessarily invent it, but at the time when he wrote about it, he had probably been among the most successful thinkers about and propagandists and practitioners of the concept for decades. The engineering of consent should under no circumstances [...] supersede or displace the functions of the educational system, either formal or informal, Bernays wrote, in bringing about understanding by the people as a basis for their action. Rather, engineering of consent supplemented the educational process.

But in the previous paragraphs, Bernays had also written that

[..] it is sometimes impossible to reach joint decisions based on an understanding of facts by all the people. The average American adult has only six years of schooling behind him. With pressing crises and decisions to be faced, a leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at an even general understanding. In certain cases, democratic leaders must play their part in leading the public through the engineering of consent to socially constructive goals and values. This role imposes upon them the obligation to use the educational processes, as well as other available techniques, to bring about as complete an understanding as possible.

Bernay’s essay leaves it essentially to the adopters how to make use of the toolkit he provided. Given that the tools are highly effective, it is obvious that they aren’t only used when the gap between public understanding and necessity (problem-solving) can’t be bridged in time, but whenever opportunists finds the engineering useful. Or, to put it more catchy: the dumber a policy, the dumber the public needs to be, and all the more, engineering of consent needs to supersede education.

Both democratically-elected and totalitarian politicians appear to be keen adopters, and it would be for the public itself to become more informed, to judge if the actons of politicians are in the public interest, or if they are not.

But the opposite is the case. While many European middlebrows regard the political class and their techniques as ethically rotten or even detest them for the manipulation, they are themselves adopters of spin-doctoring, too. Many blogs,  comments and other expressions of (political) opinion seem to apply the means and methods used by the political class to make their case. There seems to be an ambivalence among the ruled about the desire to belong to the political class, and to refute it.

Not to mention Wikileaks. Wikileaks doesn’t “educate”, either.

In that regard, the average Chinese netizen appears to be more aware of the manipulation he or she is subjected too, than the Western subject to the same PR technology – Chinese awareness states itself in terms like “we’ve been harmonized” [by Chinese authorities or media]. Or, when Huanqiu Shibao wrote in 2012 that opinion poll results published by American Gallup  showed that during the preceding three years, among the five BRIC states’ population, the Brazilians and Chinese had been most satisfied with their living standards, and only the Chinese felt during three successive years that the living standard had continuously improved, a commenter laconically replied that he had been satisfied (in a passive-voice sense) by the Americans. In certain ways, the experience of living under a totalitarian government seems to stimulate clear-sightedness.

Bernays reportedly liked to close his speeches and talks with an invariable summary: And everybody is happy.

There may not be a great future for public happiness. But quite probably, there is one for the engineering of consent.

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Related

» Battle of Opinion, Feb 13, 2013

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Tibetan Music Videos: “Hold on to the Ancestral Land”

High Peaks Pure Earth runs a series of music videos from Tibet, about one per week. This is the most recent one. Every post comes with some background information.

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Related

» Federation of Literary and Art, April 15, 2012

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Jin Yinan: The Fundamental Difference

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1. Translation

Published by People’s Daily Online (人民网) twelve days ago, as part of an interview and discussion series:

People’s Daily Online, January 5, 2013 (Reporter: Huang Zijuan) PLA National Defense University Strategic Research Institute director General, professor Jin Yinan, was recently a guest at People’s Daily Online’s “National Defense Culture Examples” interview series, discussing issues of “strategy cultures and modern defense” with netizens and exchanging views with them.

人民网北京1月5日电 （记者 黄子娟）近日，国防大学战略研究所所长金一南教授做客人民网“国防文化系列访谈”，就“战略文化与现代国防”的话题与网友交流。

When discussing Sino-American strategic cultural differences, Jin Yinan said that Sino-American strategic cultural differences were very big. Rabindranath Tagore had once said that conflicts and conquest [or subjugation] were quintessential in the spirit of Western nationalism, and its core was definitely not about cooperation. National interest as permanently defined by America was the core of its strategic culture, mainly:
1. safeguarding global freedom of action for America, to go whereever it wanted to, without anyone being in a position to stop them
2. Making sure that major strategic resources and markets would be acquired. This includes oil, natural gas, and all kinds of resources America needs
3. holding back hostile and opposing forces, and controlling key regions.

在谈到中美战略文化的区别时，金一南表示，中美的战略文化差别很大。泰戈尔曾经说过，冲突与征服是西方民族主义精神的精髓，它的核心绝不是合作。美国界定的永久性的国家利益就是它的战略文化的核心，主要体现为：第一，确保美国的全球的行动自由，想去哪去哪，谁也不能阻挡我；第二，确保获得重要的战略资源和重要的市场。包括石油、天然气以及各种各样美国所需要的资源；第三，阻止敌对力量，控制关键区域。

Jin Yinan said that here, the fundamental strategic interest defined by America had no ideological color, and its defined lasting national interests included nothing about human rights either. The core was America’s interest, whichever way it could be achieved. This was mainly through control, conquest [or subjugation], to talk again if conquest didn’t work, to cooperate, to make unilateral gains when feasible, and to enter win-win when unilateral gains weren’t achievable. This was the biggest difference between China’s and American strategic cultures.

金一南说，这里面，美国界定的根本战略利益追求，没有意识形态的色彩，而且它制定的永久性的国家利益也不包含人权这么一说，核心是美国的利益，这个利益怎么实现，主要是通过控制、征服，征服不了再谈判、合作，能单赢就单赢，实在不能单赢只好双赢，这是中美的战略思维差别很大的地方。

Remarks

Appropriating Rabindranath Tagore in the context of delivering damning assessments of America’s “strategic culture”, and beautifying implications about China’s, may amount to subjugation, too. Here is how Isaiah Berlin  (quoted by Amartya Sen) described Tagore’s view of political liberty:

Tagore stood fast on the narrow causeway, and did not betray his vision of the difficult truth. He condemned romantic overattachment to the past, what he called the tying of India to the past “like a sacrificial goat tethered to a post,” and he accused men who displayed it – they seemed to him reactionary – of not knowing what true political freedom was, pointing out that it is from English thinkers and English books that the very notion of political liberty was derived. But against cosmopolitanism he maintained that the English stood on their own feet, and so must Indians. In 1917 he once more denounced the danger of ‘leaving everything to the unalterable will of the Master,’ be he brahmin or Englishman.

Tagore’s criticism, used by General Jin in his strategy-culture discussion, was part of India’s struggle against British colonialism. But – as Amartya Sen (2001) sees it – while Tagore consistently and growingly sharply criticized British administration over India, his criticism was less noticed than that of other opponents of Britain’s colonial rule:

This point – Tagore’s criticism – is often missed, since he made a special effort to dissociate his criticism of the Raj from any denigration of British—or Western—people and culture.

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Related

» Espionage, not Corruption, NTDTV, Aug 31, 2011
» Discussion leaked, Taipei Times, Aug 30, 2011
» Strategic Culture, Jeffrey S. Lantis via asrudiancenter, Nov 4, 2008

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Former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing: Stop Showing Off and Get your Act together

Translated off the reel. If the following blockquote contains errors, please let me know – JR.

Li Zhaoxing (李肇星), former Chinese foreign minister, in an interview with Guangzhou Daily (广州日报), republished by Huanqiu Shibao:

Q: Scholars have recently said that China went through a period of “taking beatings” and of  “famine”, but has now entered a period of “getting scolded”. It is also said that in the wake of China’s rise, “shouting” at China from abroad seems to have increased. How do you see this?

最近有学者提出，中国曾经历过“挨打”时期、“挨饿”时期，如今却进入“挨骂”时期。有人说随着中国崛起，国外对中国的“骂声”似乎在增加，您怎么看这种现象？

A: The old saying about “rise” may be one cause for attracting the shouting! Who says that China is rising? What’s the rise? Historically, rise mainly refers to Spain’s, Britain’s, Portugal’s and other historic European colonial powers. As far as that’s concerned, personally, I agree with the Central Committee’s way of putting it: peaceful development. “Rise” implies suddenness, and damaging the interests of others, in a selfish way. China’s development benefits us and others. It may also be a translation issue: the English word “rise” can be translated as 上升, 兴起, etc.. 崛起 isn’t the only possible translation.

老说什么“崛起”，可能就是招来骂声的一个原因！谁说中国崛起了？什么是崛起？在历史上，崛起主要是指西班牙、英国、葡萄牙等历史上的西欧殖民主义 国家。对此，我个人认同中央的提法——和平发展。“崛起”似乎暗含带有突然性，而且还会损害别人利益、损人利己。而中国的发展是利己又利人的。这里也可能 有一个翻译问题：英文的“rise”有“上升”、“兴起”等意思，不一定非译成“崛起”不可。

I believe that some of the international voices that shout at China are incited by others, some are feigned American praise for China, and some people here take that for gospel truth. As a result, this attracts shouting – isn’t this self-inflicted? Sure: bad people curse, and that isn’t necessarily a bad thing. The really bad thing is when good people curse you.

我认为，国际上骂中国的声音，有的是别人挑拨，有的是美国假装表扬中国，而我们有些人却信以为真，结果招来骂声，这不是自找的吗？当然，被坏人骂，不见得是坏事，最怕的是被好人骂。

One can’t say that “China is rising”, that it is no longer a developing country. Let me give you three sets of numbers as examples.

不能说“中国崛起”了，中国不再是发展中国家了。我列举三组最基本的数字：

Firstly, within the global GDP of nearly 200 countries, mainland China’s comes second, globally, and last year’s average per-income GDP was 5400 US dollars. That’s position 94, globally. How can you call that a “rise”? (Li Zhaoxing mentions here that he doesn’t like mixing Chinese and English language, and referring to guonei shengchan zongzhi as “GDP.) Two years, mainland Chinese GDP ranked 110th, globally, and America began to hype “China’s rise”. Don’t believe a few Americans.

第一，全球近200个国家中，中国大陆国内生产总值（记者注：说到此事，李肇星提及说他不喜欢中文夹杂英语，不喜欢把国内生产总值说成 “GDP”）位居世界第二，去年人均国内生产总值为5400美元，位列全球第94位，怎么能说崛起？前年，中国大陆人均国内生产总值位居全球110名时， 美国就开始炒作“中国崛起”，千万不能相信美国个别人的话。

Secondly, average Chinese life expectancy is 74.83 years, according to latest statistics. Japan’s is 82 years. In the countries with the highest life expectancy, it’s 88.5 years. China ranks 83rd, globally. How can you call that a rise?

第二，中国人均预期寿命最新公布的数据是74.83岁，而日本为82岁，世界人均预期寿命最高的国家为88.5岁，中国该项排名为世界第83位，怎么能说崛起？

Thirdly, China’s gross university enrollment rate is, what? According to my enquiry to a friend at the ministry of education, the most recent number is 26.2 percent. That’s not even position 40, globally. How can you call that a rise?

第三，中国现在的大学毛入学率是多少？经我向教育部的朋友请教，最新数据是26.2%。世界排名第40多位，怎么能说崛起？

Q: More than ten years ago, you were China’s ambassador in America. Back then, America was tough on China. Has the American attitude towards China changed now? Many American media say that America’s strength is declining or fading. How do you view the changes in American strength during the past ten years?

您10多年前曾在美国任驻美大使，那时美国对中国很强硬。现在美国对华态度是否发生了变化？很多美媒都称，美国的实力在下降或衰落。您怎么看10多年来美国实力的变化？

A: I can’t see that. It’s an American characteristic to “pretend to be poor”, it has a particular sense of getting prepared for unforeseen developments. If we have a characteristic it is that we can’t “pretend to be poor”. Some people actually want to “display wealth”. On certain activities, for example, there’s an excessive fondness of having fireworks and setting off firecrackers.

[...]

Q: Do you believe that Obama, in his second term, will continue to create trouble for China?

那您认为奥巴马第二任期内是否还会继续给中国制造麻烦？

A: No matter if it is Obama, or someone else, each of them is the American president. Don’t care too much about who is elected president. Neither of them represents  China. It’s only us who make China’s benefit the objective of our struggle.

不管奥巴马还是谁上台，都是美国总统。不要太在乎美国选谁不选谁，谁都不代表中国，只有我们才把中国人民的利益作为我们的奋斗目标。

Generally speaking, “Made in China” is globally welcome. And of course, we will make even more efforts to promote “Made in China”.

在世界上，“中国制造”总体上受欢迎。当然，今后我们会更加努力推进“中国制造”。

Guangzhou Daily’s interview with Li Zhaoxing was apparently prompted by Li’s appointment as the first president of a newly-established organization, the China Public Diplomacy Association (中国公共外交协会).

Diplomatic Relations: Boring Dogs, Casual Oppression, and Poor Career Decisions

Japan’s new ambassador to China, Masato Kitera (木寺昌人), will watch China’s Japan policies closely, Huanqiu Shibao quotes China Radio International online (国际在线, CRI) – which in turn had quoted Kyodo News, from an interview on Thursday. No matter which shape Japan’s next government would take, diplomatic relations with China would be important. There was nothing supernatural in the world of diplomacy, and problems in politics could only be solved with by perseverance. An emergence of new problems couldn’t be ruled out, but he would then have to address and explain them in good faith.

Japanese analysts had close contacts with Japan’s governing Democratic Party, and given his rank as assistent chief cabinet secretary, the government’s decision to appoint him as the country’s ambassador to China showed some kind of importance attached to relations with China, and serious efforts to break the current confrontative deadlock. However, Huanqiu also quotes views that the Noda government was approaching a defeat in the coming elections, and a new government could make it difficult for Kitera to be influential in its policies towards China.

According to the usual Huanqiu emoticons underneath the article, eighteen reader-voters find the article (or the news it contains boring, and thirteen find it ridiculous. Only one is “angry”.

A commenter finds it tiresome to see that meaningless (or boring) Japanese dog again. It should leave and pick up one of the bones from its American daddy instead, the commenter suggests. Another expresses hope that some day, there would be no need to attach importance to Japan which was just a dog (what else). “Let’s strengthen ourselves, and casually oppress Japan.”

But generally, the boredom appears to be genuine: there were only five comments during the first hour (if not two hours) the article had been online.

Masato Kitera was chosen as ambassador in early October this year. According to the South China Morning Post (SCMP) on October 6, he is a career diplomat with little Chinese experience, but renowned for his mediating skills.

In contrast to CRI/Huanqiu’s comparatively optimistic news article today, the SCMP article in October quoted Zhou Yongsheng (周永生), a Japanese affairs expert at China Foreign Affairs University, as saying that [n]aming someone who has no China experience simply tells us that Tokyo does not pay much attention to Sino-Japanese ties.

Zhou Yongsheng had appeared to be more sanguine in July this year. When Japan’s current ambassador, Uichiro Niwa, left Beijing for a brief return to Tokyo to report on Chinese actions concerning the Senkaku Islands, Zhou suggested that the Japanese government wanted to gain first-hand information about China’s attitude concerning the Diaoyu Islands. And [t]he Japanese government has become aware of the trend of ever-stronger Chinese reactions concerning the Diaoyu Islands, and the need to attach importance to Chinese reactions and trends, Zhou believed back then.

Shanghaiist, also in October, kind of agreed with Zhou’s second thoughts: Kitera was [...] a man who has never served in any important roles related to China and (by taking this post) clearly makes poor career decisions.

Kitera will reportedly be posted in Beijing on December 25.

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Related

» Too Complex to keep the Peace, Sep 18, 2012
» Fully Understood, July 27, 2010

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