How the Tiger Roared, and how the Fly Roared Back: “Officials are no Slaves of the Common People”

Astronomically expensive cigarettes and alcoholic drinks, luxurious conferences… all kinds of waste of public funding disrupt the party’s working style, undermine the political atmosphere, and erode the ways of the people, Enorth (Tianjin) quotes a People’s Daily editorial today. To promote a better spirit, more sobriety and more virtue wouldn’t be enough, the editorial says. “Some people” could still stick to their bad ways under the excuse of “work requirements” (工作需要). Only improved measures and effective supervision could rein in on whatever kinds of wasteful mindsets and on “tip of the tongue corruption”(舌尖上的腐败)^*). Measures which were stronger in terms of punctuality, pertinence and operability were apparently needed to punish all kinds of thriftless behavior, muses the editorial. Open information wasn’t enough, as it lacked specification, and as punishment didn’t deter the undesirable behavior. Supervision was the heart of the matter. Discipline inspection and audits were required to dispel excessive consumption.

All departments needed to take the initiative to create open information, to establish platforms of public [or the masses'] scrutiny to achieve these goals, writes the People’s Daily.

» Only if you commit truly grave mistakes…

That calls for some footnotes from the grassroots, and in a timely demonstration of inner-party democracy, an official from Guangzhou adds some practical advice:

“Officials have a right to privacy, too, just as patients have a right to privacy when they get medical treatment. This needs to be protected.” The preparatory meeting for the 11th Guangdong National People’s Congress is carried out today. Guangzhou delegation member Ye Pengzhi believes that combatting corruption and encouraging honesty creates a situation of high pressure within society, under which the corruption-minded won’t dare to be corrupt. As for a system of making officials’ property transparent, he suggests to conduct random checks on public officials’ properties, for example by means of lot numbers.

“官员也有自己的隐私权，就像医生治病，病人的病例是隐私，需要保护。”今天，广东省人大十一届一次会议举行了预备会议。广州团的叶鹏智代表认为，反腐倡廉应该形成社会高压态势，让有腐败想法的人不敢贪。关于官员财产公开制度，他建议采取随机抽检的方式公开官员财产，比如可以采取定期“摇号”的办法。

Ye Pengzhi believes that the discipline inspection departments have all kinds of means to supervise officials, but to make officials’ properties public wasn’t necessarily the best method. “I advocate that assets should be declared to the organization, but not necessarily be made known to the public. The more you do that, the more the public atmosphere will be unconducive to fairness and impartiality. It will prompt people under the banner of “public opinion” to engage in populism.”

叶鹏智认为，纪检部门本身已经有各种手段监督官员，向公众公开官员财产不一定是最佳方式。“我提倡可以向组织申报财产，但不一定对公众公开，越是这样，社会风气越不利于公平公正，要警惕一些人打着‘民意’的旗号搞民粹主义。”

Ye Pengzhi persistently asks: “Is there a legal basis for making officials’ properties public? Did the National People’s Congress promulgate a law for the publication of assets? Officials are people, too, they have a right to privacy, too. Officials are the servants, not the slaves of the common people.”

叶鹏智进一步追问：“要官员公开财产有法律依据吗？全国人大有公布财产公开的法律吗？官员也是人，也有隐私；官员是公仆，不是老百姓的奴隶。”

Lavish parties conferences and meetings at the taxpayers’ expense should not be confused with actual property or assets owned by officials. In that regard, People’s Daily and Ye aren’t addressing exactly the same issue. But in public perception, the difference between acquiring property and inflating operational costs is mainly ignored, as they both blend into corruption.

It’s the season for all kinds of anti-corruption talks. CCP secretary general Xi Jinping spoke at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection a few days ago, and announced that no exception will be made when it comes to party disciplines and law. And no difference was to be made between tigers (老虎) and flies (苍蝇). Foreign media believed that Xi’s speech had once again boosted anti-corruption work (外界认为，习近平这番讲话无疑为反贪工作再次注入强心针), Xinhua wrote in a vague review of the international press. But then, Ye Pengzhi is no part of the foreign press, and too much of a boost could lead to public abuse.

The main difference between Ye and People’s Daily’s editorial seems to lie in the issue of public supervision. At least as far as the People’s Daily editorial – or its rendition by Enorth – goes, the concept of platforms for supervision by the public isn’t too specific, but it is mentioned, and it’s usefulness is acknowledged. Human-flesh searches by netizens are hardly desirable when it comes to the goal of a harmonious (or even just civil) society. That said, no conventional measures have done much to get corruption under control during the past decades – not even close.

Large swathes of the Chinese public can be excessive in their demand for punishment and prosecution of corrupt officials. A scenario where revenge – not only for official corruption, but for power abuses of all kinds – would take control doesn’t look terribly attractive – Ye may have a point there. But if the party doesn’t get its act together, it will be the public’s turn anyway – sooner or later.

A totalitarian system can sweep home-made mortifications under the carpet for a long time, but  it also tends to create the conditions for its own eventual downfall – unless the CCP finds a way to have its cake and eat it, too.

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Note

^*) Apparently a quote from an ancient Indian political theorist, Chanakya: Just as it’s impossible not to taste honey or poison when it’s on the tip of the tongue, so it’s impossible for a government servant not to eat up at least a bit of the king’s revenue.

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Related

» 外媒关注习近平讲话, Xinhua, January 24, 2013
» Public-Vehicle Petitions, Dec 27, 2012

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Jin Yinan: The Fundamental Difference

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1. Translation

Published by People’s Daily Online (人民网) twelve days ago, as part of an interview and discussion series:

People’s Daily Online, January 5, 2013 (Reporter: Huang Zijuan) PLA National Defense University Strategic Research Institute director General, professor Jin Yinan, was recently a guest at People’s Daily Online’s “National Defense Culture Examples” interview series, discussing issues of “strategy cultures and modern defense” with netizens and exchanging views with them.

人民网北京1月5日电 （记者 黄子娟）近日，国防大学战略研究所所长金一南教授做客人民网“国防文化系列访谈”，就“战略文化与现代国防”的话题与网友交流。

When discussing Sino-American strategic cultural differences, Jin Yinan said that Sino-American strategic cultural differences were very big. Rabindranath Tagore had once said that conflicts and conquest [or subjugation] were quintessential in the spirit of Western nationalism, and its core was definitely not about cooperation. National interest as permanently defined by America was the core of its strategic culture, mainly:
1. safeguarding global freedom of action for America, to go whereever it wanted to, without anyone being in a position to stop them
2. Making sure that major strategic resources and markets would be acquired. This includes oil, natural gas, and all kinds of resources America needs
3. holding back hostile and opposing forces, and controlling key regions.

在谈到中美战略文化的区别时，金一南表示，中美的战略文化差别很大。泰戈尔曾经说过，冲突与征服是西方民族主义精神的精髓，它的核心绝不是合作。美国界定的永久性的国家利益就是它的战略文化的核心，主要体现为：第一，确保美国的全球的行动自由，想去哪去哪，谁也不能阻挡我；第二，确保获得重要的战略资源和重要的市场。包括石油、天然气以及各种各样美国所需要的资源；第三，阻止敌对力量，控制关键区域。

Jin Yinan said that here, the fundamental strategic interest defined by America had no ideological color, and its defined lasting national interests included nothing about human rights either. The core was America’s interest, whichever way it could be achieved. This was mainly through control, conquest [or subjugation], to talk again if conquest didn’t work, to cooperate, to make unilateral gains when feasible, and to enter win-win when unilateral gains weren’t achievable. This was the biggest difference between China’s and American strategic cultures.

金一南说，这里面，美国界定的根本战略利益追求，没有意识形态的色彩，而且它制定的永久性的国家利益也不包含人权这么一说，核心是美国的利益，这个利益怎么实现，主要是通过控制、征服，征服不了再谈判、合作，能单赢就单赢，实在不能单赢只好双赢，这是中美的战略思维差别很大的地方。

Remarks

Appropriating Rabindranath Tagore in the context of delivering damning assessments of America’s “strategic culture”, and beautifying implications about China’s, may amount to subjugation, too. Here is how Isaiah Berlin  (quoted by Amartya Sen) described Tagore’s view of political liberty:

Tagore stood fast on the narrow causeway, and did not betray his vision of the difficult truth. He condemned romantic overattachment to the past, what he called the tying of India to the past “like a sacrificial goat tethered to a post,” and he accused men who displayed it – they seemed to him reactionary – of not knowing what true political freedom was, pointing out that it is from English thinkers and English books that the very notion of political liberty was derived. But against cosmopolitanism he maintained that the English stood on their own feet, and so must Indians. In 1917 he once more denounced the danger of ‘leaving everything to the unalterable will of the Master,’ be he brahmin or Englishman.

Tagore’s criticism, used by General Jin in his strategy-culture discussion, was part of India’s struggle against British colonialism. But – as Amartya Sen (2001) sees it – while Tagore consistently and growingly sharply criticized British administration over India, his criticism was less noticed than that of other opponents of Britain’s colonial rule:

This point – Tagore’s criticism – is often missed, since he made a special effort to dissociate his criticism of the Raj from any denigration of British—or Western—people and culture.

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Related

» Espionage, not Corruption, NTDTV, Aug 31, 2011
» Discussion leaked, Taipei Times, Aug 30, 2011
» Strategic Culture, Jeffrey S. Lantis via asrudiancenter, Nov 4, 2008

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Nonproliferation as a Matter of Alliances: Australia, Germany, North Korea, and the Nukes

Nuclear umbrella refers to a guarantee by a nuclear weapons state to defend a non-nuclear allied state. Wikipedia offers this definition, plus several existing examples.

The one regionally closest to this blogger is NATO – most European countries, including Germany, are non-nuclear states. Australia looks like an interesting example, too – their then prime minister John Gorton (reportedly) exasperated visiting U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk by telling him that he didn’t trust the Americans to keep their side of the treaty that underpinned Australia’s security, i. e. the ANZUS treaty.

That was in April 1968. At least, Rusk had probably long become used to overseas politicians who wanted to have some nukes of their own. Just to be juche sort of self-reliant.

Six years earlier than Gorton,West German defense minister Franz-Josef Strauss had wanted nukes for his country, too. He seemed to want them so badly that Henry Kissinger, who had talked with Strauss, apparently in May 1961, notified the U.S. government that American nuclear weapons in West Germany needed to be secured, so as to make it physically impossible (“physisch unmöglich”) [for the Germans] to take them, or to use them without U.S. consent. Strauss might simply take them, if he deemed that necessary.

The U.S. forces reacted by fortifying their nuclear bases, Der Spiegel suggested in January this year, drawing on the memory of former U.S. colonel Charles Sanford (now deceased). German greed for them apparently required the measure, in America’s view.

Either way, West German defense minister Franz-Josef Strauss was publicly advocating that the West German Bundeswehr should be given independent access to nuclear weapons, according to excerpts of “The Color of Truth” as published by the New York Times, apparently in 1999.

And one has to admit that Strauss was of great use as a great bogeyman – rightly or wrongly. Nineteen years after Kissinger, in 1980, the German social democrats were still afraid of Strauss.

All that even though Strauss had long since been relieved of his post as defense minister, to become a civil aviator and a math teacher:

I don’t know if Washington was worried by politicians beyond Australia and West Germany. But once you have such worries, you are a superpower.

An academic named Long Xingchun and Huanqiu Shibao are currently considering a Chinese nuclear umbrella for a country or for countries who are under threat, but have no nukes.

That’s where the story may become a bit complicated, hence over to Sino-NK.

Rising China, Rotten Diplomacy: No Game-Changer in Sight

Chinese leaders established a China Public Diplomacy Association in Beijing on December 31 last year. English-language party mouthpiece China Daily carried a news article on page 4 one day later, either because of the expected importance the new organization might carry, or because of the relative prominence of at least two participants in the event, foreign minister Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪) and former foreign minister Li Zhaoxing (李肇星, now chairman of the National People’s Congress foreign affairs committee).

What strikes me in the article is that Yang Jiechi isn’t his own party boss in the foreign ministry. His vice minister, Zhang Zhijun, is. Wu Bangguo on the other hand  is both chairman and party secretary of the National People’s Congress (see notes underneath that post). Not sure how many ministers (if any) double as minister and their ministry’s party secretaries. At the ministry of health, it is also the vice minister who doubles as party secretary, while at the ministry of culture, the minister takes both the state and the party function. Minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun, also doubles in both functions. He took both the positions in December.

Does this indicate something about Yang Jiechi, or about the importance of his job as foreign minister – i. e. the importance of irrelevance of diplomacy? Not necessarily. But there are other indicators, too. Yang wasn’t even a member of the 17th politbureau (let alone its standing committee). Late in November, in an article for CNN, Linda Jakobson pointed out that the power status of diplomacy within the Chinese leadership was unlikely to rise.

So, one shouldn’t expect the China Public Diplomacy Association to become a game-changer. It’s nice for the (public) diplomats that the 18th National Congress – referred to by Yang Jiechi as quoted within the article translated below – gave public diplomacy a mention in its report. But if that’s something to celebrate, it sheds a sad light on the discipline as a whole. No wonder that Zhao Qizheng, director of the CPPCCs foreign affairs committee, longs for the good old days of Zhou Enlai‘s “convivial diplomacy” (official, semi-official and people-to-people diplomacy). Zhou, after all, was a member of the politburo’s standing committee – and for the first nine years after the establishment of the PRC, he was also its foreign minister. In the 1970s, foreign relations were still a job for the top, and in February 1979, Deng Xiaoping celebrated the improving Sino-American relations with an attack on Vietnam.

We probably have to see the inaugural session of the China Public Diplomacy Association in the light of those glory days – it’s a contrast that doesn’t make either official or unofficial diplomacy look important these days.

Maybe the new situation, frequently mentioned by Yang in his congratulatory speech, is just that situation. But then again, maybe not.

Form your own opinion if you can.

Source:
Committee for Friendship with Foreign Countries of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Shanghai Committee, January 8, 2013.

Main Link: Tell China’s story well, let China’s voice be heard. China Public Diplomacy Association established, Zhou Taitong attends. (讲好中国故事 发好中国声音 中国公共外交协会成立 周太彤出席)

On December 31, 2012, the China Public Diplomacy Association inaugural meeting was held at Diaoyutai Guest House, with foreign minister Yang Jiechi, foreign ministry party secretary and vice minister Zhang Zhijun and other leaders participating and unveiling the association’s nameplate. Shanghai Municipal People’s Consultative Conference vice chairman and Shanghai Public Diplomacy Association’s vice director Zhou Taitong represented Shanghai’ Public Diplomacy Association at the meeting.

2012年12月31日，中国公共外交协会成立大会在北京钓鱼台国宾馆举行，外交部部长杨洁篪，外交部党组书记、副部长张志军等领导出席并为协会揭牌。上海市政协副主席、上海公共外交协会副会长周太彤代表上海公共外交协会出席会议。

At this first general assembly, the “China Public Diplomacy Association charter (draft) was passed, National People’s Congress foreign affairs committee chairman and former foreign minister Comrade Li Zhaoxing was elected as the association’s first president. [1] Former ambassador to Britain and to the Council on Security Cooperation in Asia and Pacific Region Ma Zhengang; [2] China Museums Association deputy director, China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification director, and [3] Central Research Institute of Culture and History staff member Comrade Shu Yi were elected as deputy presidents, and China Institute of International Studies fellow Song Ronghua was elected secretary-general.

在协会召开的第一次会员大会，通过了《中国公共外交协会章程（草案）》，选举全国人大外事委员会主任委员、前外交部长李肇星同志为首任会长，选举中国前驻英国大使、亚太安全合作理事会中国委员会会长马振岗、中国博物馆学会副会长、中国和平统一促进会理事、中央文史研究馆馆员舒乙同志为副会长，中国国际问题研究所研究员宋荣华为秘书长。

Minister Yang Jiechi delivered the congratulatory speech. He pointed out that public diplomacy, in a new situation, is an objective requirement for perfecting the design of our country’s diplomacy, and important in broadening our country’s diplomatic work. The 18th National Congress report says that “we must sturdily promote public diplomacy and cultural exchanges”. This exacts higher demands on the promotion of public diplomacy under the new situation. In the new situation, promoting public diplomacy and cultural exchanges means putting efforts into mutual knowledge between China and the world, deepening China’s relations with the world, as well as promoting China’s and the world’s benign interaction and common development. We must develop and expand equality and mutual trust, be tolerant of each other and learn from each other in the spirit of win-win cooperation, we must strengthen dialog and exchange with the peoples of the world, promote mutual understanding, trust, friendship, and cooperation. Developing public diplomacy requires ample use of resources from all walks of life and bringing all factors from society into play. We hope that the China Public Diplomacy Association will carry out and implement the spirit of the 18th National Congress, make major contributions to the cause of China’s public diplomacy, and build fine foundations for the public-opinion environment and the will of the people.

杨洁篪部长在会上致贺辞。指出，公共外交是新形势下完善我国外交布局的客观要求，是我国外交工作的重要开拓方向。党的十八大报告提出，“我们将扎实推进公共外交和人文交流。”对新形势下推进公共外交提出了更高要求。新形势下，推进公共外交和人文交流，就是要着力促进中国与世界的相互认知，深化中国同世界的关系，推动中国与世界的良性互动和共同发展。我们要大力弘扬平等互信、包容互鉴、合作共赢的精神，加强同世界各国人民的对话交流，促进相互了解、信任、友谊与合作。开展公共外交需要充分利用各界资源，发挥全社会的作用，希望中国公共外交协会认真贯彻落实党的十八大精神，为推进中国公共外交事业做出重要贡献，为国家发展和外交工作营造良好的舆论环境和民意基础。

Yang Jiechi emphasized that public diplomacy absolutely needed innovating ways and means, strengthened communication and exchanges with the masses, it needed to draw on the wisdom and the will of the people, domestic and foreign coordination, wholistic planning of the overall domestic and foreign situations, it needed to tell China’s story well and let China’s voice be heard, it needed to explain a real China to the world, and to establish a just and comprehensive view of China.

杨洁篪强调，一定要创新公共外交方式方法，加强对民众的沟通与交流，汲取民智和民意，国内国外相互配合，统筹国内国外两个大局，讲好中国故事，发好中国声音，把一个真实的中国介绍给世界，树立公正全面的中国观。

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Related

» Destined to Fail, The Diplomat, January 7, 2013
» A related discussion, Peking Duck, Jan 7, 2013

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After Suicide: Guangzhou Government Defends Qi Xiaolin’s Name

« Previous coverage (January 9)

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Main Link: secretary of the political and law committee: no Violations of Discipline found (穗政法委书记:未发现祁晓林违法纪)

Links within blockquote added during translation.

Yangcheng Evening Post, reporter Wang Pu. On January 9 at noon, Guangzhou Municipal PSB office’s website “Guangzhou Golden Shield” (广州金盾网) stated: deputy municipal PSB director Qi Xiaolin hanged himself to death.

羊城晚报讯 记者王普报道：1月9日中午，广州市公安局官网“广州金盾网”发布消息：广州市公安局副局长祁晓林自缢身亡。

The notice said: on January 8, 2013, Guangzhou Municipal PSB deputy director Qi Xiaolin hanged himself and died, aged 55. Comrade Qi Xiaolin suffered from depression at his lifetime. Yangcheng Evening Post learned that Qi hanged himself in his office’s rest room inside the Guangzhou PSB building.

消息称：“2013年1月8日18时许，广州市公安局党委副书记、副局长祁晓林自缢身亡，终年55岁。祁晓林同志生前身患疾病，有抑郁症状。”羊城晚报记者了解到，祁晓林是在广州公安局大楼内自己办公室内的洗手间自缢的。

“Qi Xiaolin indeed suffered from depression, but there had been no indication that he would hang himself”, a PSB officer told this reporter. On Tuesday afternoon, there had been a democratic cadre appraisal of mid-level cadres, and these cadres had all voted there in the [PSB building's] auditorium. “At that time, Qi Xiaolin and other leading cadres attended on the rostrum, and while they were checking the votes, he returned to his office. As the counting process took quite a while, nobody noticed that Qi hadn’t returned, or wondered why he didn’t come back.” It is said that Qi’s secretary wanted to ask him back to the meeting and found that he had hanged himself to death. He left no suicide note. Legal medical examinations and procurial organs found no doubts about the cause of death.

“祁晓林的确是有患病，但突然自缢却一点征兆也没有。”一位公安人员告诉记者，1月8日下午，广州市公安局中层干部集体民主评选干部，处以上干部都到公安 局礼堂内投票。“当时，祁晓林副局长与其他局领导在主席台上，验票时他回到了自己办公室。由于验票时间较长，没有人再留意到祁晓林最后没有到场，或者是为 什么没有到场”。据称，验票结束后祁晓林的秘书通知其回到会议上，进入办公室后，才发现祁晓林已自缢身亡。他生前没有留下遗书。经法医、检察机关勘查证 实，死亡原因无疑点。

Qi Xiaolin entered rural ranks after junior high school graduation, then entered police school, initially at Guangzhou Huangpu District PSB branch office, and rose from an ordinary policeman to become the branch office’s deputy political commissar and director, then switched to Fangcun PSB branch office to become its director, and then became Guangzhou Municipal PSB deputy party secretary and deputy director in 2003, ranking third in its hierarchy.

祁晓林1973年初中毕业后到农村插队，之后考入警校，最早在广州市黄埔区公安分局工作，由普通警员升任分局副政委、分局局长，2000年交流至芳村公安分局任局长，2003年升任广州市公安局党委副书记、副局长，在广州市公安局领导中排名第三位。

A senior people’s policeman told this reporter that “Qi Xiaolin was good at investigating criminal cases. During his time at Huangpu and Fangcun Districts, he solved important cases. After becoming deputy PSB director, he was mainly in charge of the traffic police, PSB internal security, the subway and liason with Tianhe District PSB branch office. The last public event he attended was on December 18, 2012, at the “National key internet media Guangdong line – Guangzhou scientific development implementation informative meeting”.

一位资深民警告诉羊城晚报记者：“祁晓林是侦办刑事案件的一把好手，他在黄埔区、芳村区时都曾破获大要案件。”祁晓林任广州市公安局副局长后，分管部门为 交警、内保、保卫、地铁，联系天河区公安分局。祁晓林最后一次出席公开活动是2012年12月18日在“全国重点网络媒体广东行——广州落实科学发展观情 况介绍会”上介绍广州社会治安情况。

There had been beliefs that Qi, having been in charge of traffic police for so long, was linked to corruption cases in this administrative field, but a people’s policeman said: “That’s not too likely. If there was such a link, he wouldn’t have been left in charge of car traffic administration.”

因祁晓林分管交警多年，有人事后将其自杀与此前广州市车管所腐败窝案联系起来，一位民警认为：“不大可能，如果他与车管窝案有牵连，早就不会让其继续分管交警”。

An old classmate said: “Qi Xia0lin was introverted, not very talkative. He frequently felt pain on his neck, didn’t sleep well, and I’ve heard his family people say that they had learned about his depression”. A people’s policeman said: “Qi Xiaolin was responsible for security work for a long time. There was a lot of pressure.”

祁晓林的一位校友称：“祁晓林性格内向、不愿意将什么事情说出来，他颈椎部位经常有疼痛，一直睡眠不好，听他家人说已发现有抑郁症”。一位民警称：“祁副局长期分管保卫工作，责任、压力较大”。

Yangcheng Evening Post concludes the article with a statement from Wu Sha (吴沙), Guangzhou secretary of the political and law committee (see here for a “Global Times” news article in English). After his statement, Wu expressed his sympathy to Qi’s relatives.

The statement was apparently needed, not necessarily because of Qi Xiaolin as a person, but because of general suspicion against the PSB or public officials. Among those who have commented on Huanqiu Shibao on the story since yesterday, cynicism prevails. There are only six comments now – at least some more have been removed since. None of them is sympathetic, but eleven hours ago, “King Qin’s Warrior” had the last word so far with the only comment at a conflict of sorts with the others: Take severe measures against corruption, so that a prosperious people lives in the country at peace. Let the nation unite, and defend itself against foreign enemies.

According to Yangcheng Evening Post, Qi Xiaolin was born in September 1957, and was a native of Haiyang, Shandong Province.

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Related

» Partytalk, May 19, 2012
» Satisfaction of the People, Aug 16, 2009

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Former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing: Stop Showing Off and Get your Act together

Translated off the reel. If the following blockquote contains errors, please let me know – JR.

Li Zhaoxing (李肇星), former Chinese foreign minister, in an interview with Guangzhou Daily (广州日报), republished by Huanqiu Shibao:

Q: Scholars have recently said that China went through a period of “taking beatings” and of  “famine”, but has now entered a period of “getting scolded”. It is also said that in the wake of China’s rise, “shouting” at China from abroad seems to have increased. How do you see this?

最近有学者提出，中国曾经历过“挨打”时期、“挨饿”时期，如今却进入“挨骂”时期。有人说随着中国崛起，国外对中国的“骂声”似乎在增加，您怎么看这种现象？

A: The old saying about “rise” may be one cause for attracting the shouting! Who says that China is rising? What’s the rise? Historically, rise mainly refers to Spain’s, Britain’s, Portugal’s and other historic European colonial powers. As far as that’s concerned, personally, I agree with the Central Committee’s way of putting it: peaceful development. “Rise” implies suddenness, and damaging the interests of others, in a selfish way. China’s development benefits us and others. It may also be a translation issue: the English word “rise” can be translated as 上升, 兴起, etc.. 崛起 isn’t the only possible translation.

老说什么“崛起”，可能就是招来骂声的一个原因！谁说中国崛起了？什么是崛起？在历史上，崛起主要是指西班牙、英国、葡萄牙等历史上的西欧殖民主义 国家。对此，我个人认同中央的提法——和平发展。“崛起”似乎暗含带有突然性，而且还会损害别人利益、损人利己。而中国的发展是利己又利人的。这里也可能 有一个翻译问题：英文的“rise”有“上升”、“兴起”等意思，不一定非译成“崛起”不可。

I believe that some of the international voices that shout at China are incited by others, some are feigned American praise for China, and some people here take that for gospel truth. As a result, this attracts shouting – isn’t this self-inflicted? Sure: bad people curse, and that isn’t necessarily a bad thing. The really bad thing is when good people curse you.

我认为，国际上骂中国的声音，有的是别人挑拨，有的是美国假装表扬中国，而我们有些人却信以为真，结果招来骂声，这不是自找的吗？当然，被坏人骂，不见得是坏事，最怕的是被好人骂。

One can’t say that “China is rising”, that it is no longer a developing country. Let me give you three sets of numbers as examples.

不能说“中国崛起”了，中国不再是发展中国家了。我列举三组最基本的数字：

Firstly, within the global GDP of nearly 200 countries, mainland China’s comes second, globally, and last year’s average per-income GDP was 5400 US dollars. That’s position 94, globally. How can you call that a “rise”? (Li Zhaoxing mentions here that he doesn’t like mixing Chinese and English language, and referring to guonei shengchan zongzhi as “GDP.) Two years, mainland Chinese GDP ranked 110th, globally, and America began to hype “China’s rise”. Don’t believe a few Americans.

第一，全球近200个国家中，中国大陆国内生产总值（记者注：说到此事，李肇星提及说他不喜欢中文夹杂英语，不喜欢把国内生产总值说成 “GDP”）位居世界第二，去年人均国内生产总值为5400美元，位列全球第94位，怎么能说崛起？前年，中国大陆人均国内生产总值位居全球110名时， 美国就开始炒作“中国崛起”，千万不能相信美国个别人的话。

Secondly, average Chinese life expectancy is 74.83 years, according to latest statistics. Japan’s is 82 years. In the countries with the highest life expectancy, it’s 88.5 years. China ranks 83rd, globally. How can you call that a rise?

第二，中国人均预期寿命最新公布的数据是74.83岁，而日本为82岁，世界人均预期寿命最高的国家为88.5岁，中国该项排名为世界第83位，怎么能说崛起？

Thirdly, China’s gross university enrollment rate is, what? According to my enquiry to a friend at the ministry of education, the most recent number is 26.2 percent. That’s not even position 40, globally. How can you call that a rise?

第三，中国现在的大学毛入学率是多少？经我向教育部的朋友请教，最新数据是26.2%。世界排名第40多位，怎么能说崛起？

Q: More than ten years ago, you were China’s ambassador in America. Back then, America was tough on China. Has the American attitude towards China changed now? Many American media say that America’s strength is declining or fading. How do you view the changes in American strength during the past ten years?

您10多年前曾在美国任驻美大使，那时美国对中国很强硬。现在美国对华态度是否发生了变化？很多美媒都称，美国的实力在下降或衰落。您怎么看10多年来美国实力的变化？

A: I can’t see that. It’s an American characteristic to “pretend to be poor”, it has a particular sense of getting prepared for unforeseen developments. If we have a characteristic it is that we can’t “pretend to be poor”. Some people actually want to “display wealth”. On certain activities, for example, there’s an excessive fondness of having fireworks and setting off firecrackers.

[...]

Q: Do you believe that Obama, in his second term, will continue to create trouble for China?

那您认为奥巴马第二任期内是否还会继续给中国制造麻烦？

A: No matter if it is Obama, or someone else, each of them is the American president. Don’t care too much about who is elected president. Neither of them represents  China. It’s only us who make China’s benefit the objective of our struggle.

不管奥巴马还是谁上台，都是美国总统。不要太在乎美国选谁不选谁，谁都不代表中国，只有我们才把中国人民的利益作为我们的奋斗目标。

Generally speaking, “Made in China” is globally welcome. And of course, we will make even more efforts to promote “Made in China”.

在世界上，“中国制造”总体上受欢迎。当然，今后我们会更加努力推进“中国制造”。

Guangzhou Daily’s interview with Li Zhaoxing was apparently prompted by Li’s appointment as the first president of a newly-established organization, the China Public Diplomacy Association (中国公共外交协会).

The Life of Xi Jinping: how they cried

Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily (深圳特区报) recently – possibly today – carried a long story about Xi Jinping – republished today by Enorth (Tianjin). The main ideological content of the article is nothing new – rather, it emphasizes continuity (and how Xi has been instrumental in bringing the current ideological status about, but it also points out Xi Jinping’s particularly “cordial ways”. All that along with a number of photos to underline the latter point. The following are excerpts from the article.

Main Link: “Xi Jinping chose the name Mingze for his daugher”

Xi Jinping has always regarded the people’s dream as his own dream. 43 years ago, he was sent to a village in northern Shaanxi as part of the educated youth sent to the countryside, being involved there for seven years. His first “official title” was that of a secretary of a “party cell” in a rural brigade. In 2007, experienced and toughened by many years of grassroots work and local work, he became a permanent member of the standing committee of the politburo, in charge of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, and also director of the party school. Soon afterwards, he became the vice chairman of the People’s Republic of China, and deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission. During the past five years, he has been part of the decisionmaking of the party and the state, and the decisionmaking, organizing and implementation of major policies.

习近平始终把人民的梦想作为自己的梦想。43年前，他曾作为知青到陕北农村插队，一干就是7年，他的第一个“官衔”，是构成中共组织体系“细胞”的大队 (行政村)党支部书记。2007年，经过多年基层和地方工作历练的习近平，当选中共中央政治局常委，担任中央书记处书记，兼任中央党校校长。他随后担任了 中华人民共和国副主席和中央军委副主席。5年来，他直接参与党和国家大政方针的研究制定，参与中央重大决策部署的组织实施。

[...]

He repeatedly emphasized that the party must manage the party, and rule it strictly. On November 17, on the first study meeting of the 18th Politburo, he profoundly pointed out that “things must not get rotten to get infested by worms. A multitude of facts are telling us: if corruption becomes more and more intense, it will, in the end, make the party and the country perhish! We must be vigilant!

他反复强调要坚持党要管党、从严治党。11月17日，他在十八届中共中央政治局第一次集体学习时深刻指出，“‘物必先腐，而后虫生。’大量事实告诉我们：腐败问题越演越烈，最终必然会亡党亡国！我们要警醒啊！”

[...]

There is an indissoluble bond between Xi Jinping and the troops. Early on, he worked at the General Office of the Central Military Commission for three years, and feelings between him and the troops remained deep afterwards. When he served [as a cadre, party secretary etc.] in the regions [and provinces], he served as the country armed forces first political commissar, municipal (regional) military committee first party secretary, the Provincial artillery Reserve Division first commissar, the Party committee of province military region first secretary and and the military region’s Military national defense mobilization committee, and he therefore fully understands the situation of the troops. He supports the army [literally: holds it in his arms], loves the military, and actively helps the troops to solve many practical problems. Having served as the deputy Central Military Commission’s chairman, he actively participated in the leadership work of building the military. At the 18th plenary session of the CCP’s Central Committee, he assumed the chairmanship of the CCP Central Military Commission.

习近平和军队有着不解之缘。早年他曾在中央军委办公厅工作过3年，与军队结下了深厚感情；在地方任职时，他先后担任过县人民武装部第一政委、市(地)军分 区党委第一书记、省高炮预备役师第一政委、省军区党委第一书记和大军区国防动员委员会领导等军队职务，十分熟悉军队情况。他拥军、爱军，积极帮助军队解决 了许多实际困难。出任中央军委副主席后，他积极参与国防和军队建设的领导工作。在中共十八届一中全会上，他接任中共中央军委主席。

“The People’s Liberation Army is the School of the Mao Zedong Thought”, cultural revolution poster. Fair-use Wikimedia Commons, click link for description.

Xi Jinping is tied to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Aomen. Seventeen years of working experience in Fujian Province have led him to deeply understand Taiwan and cross-strait relations. Under his watch, Xiamen built the first mainland [literally: hinterland, 内地] Taiwan trading guild hall, Fuzhou built the first industrial village with mainly Taiwan-invested companies. He did great things in removing worries and problems of Taiwanese compatriots, and many Taiwanese compatriots regard him as a good friend.

习近平心系台港澳。17年的福建工作经历，使他深入了解了台湾及两岸关系。在他任上，厦门设立了内地首家台商会馆，福州建立了第一个以台资企业为主的工业村。他为台湾同胞做了大量排忧解难的事情，许多台湾同胞都把他视为好朋友。

Besides linking Xi to every ideological decision of the past decades, the article also tries to emphasize roles he played in most or every major event of the past decades, including the Olympic Games in Beijing, farming, or biogas promotion.

And, as has to be the case with any model soldier or cadre, villagers accompanied their educated-youth champion when he left the countryside in 1975, after his six rural years, with “very many of them in tears” (很多人不舍地哭了). Xi had been recommended to Tsinghua University to study there.

That’s only from the first page of the article, and by no means a full translation or account of it. The article reads as if a third person had written Xi’s cv and an application letter to the people, for Xi to assume the top posts in the party and the state. And of course, Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Daily has an additional reason to sing Xi Jinping’s praise. After all, his first inspection tour in his new capacity as the CCP’s general secretary took him to Shenzhen.

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Related

» The Latest about Xi Jinping Pingping, Dec 14, 2012
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A Message to “People with Different Political Views”, part 2

Human Rights Watch (HRW) announced the Helman/Hammet awards for 2012 on Thursday. I wasn’t aware that this prize  existed, but learned about it from the Chinese press.

Some context: a People’s Daily editorial (on a different issue, the International Communications Union conference in Dubai) was published on a number of popular Chinese websites on Thursday, without direct mention of this specific award. Huanqiu Shibao, a nationalist newspaper (and nominally, not necessarily by content, a sister paper to the English-language “Global Times”) addresses the prize issue head-on, in a way that may be tailor-made for its (angry, by trend) readership.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

On the American “Human Rights Watch” list of the 2012 Hellman/Hammett Award winners, 12 out of 41 are Chinese, and there are seven people from China’s Uighur, Mongolian, Tibetan etc. national minorities among them. Nearly all of them have been in prison or are currently in prison. When looking at the organization’s name, and looking at which people are the prize winners, and what this prize is used for, one can expect that the Chinese people can make their guess, too.

美国“人权观察”组织近日宣布2012年“赫尔曼·哈米特奖”获奖者名单，一共41人，竟有12名是中国人，并有7人是中国的维、蒙、藏等少数民族，他们几乎都坐过牢或目前正在狱中。看看发奖的组织名称，再看看获奖者都是哪些人，这个奖是用来干什么的，大概不说中国人也能猜个八九不离十。

During these two years, there have been more and more extreme Chinese dissidents who won “human rights prizes” in the West, and [those dissident's] reputation is going lower and lower. What once bewildered Chinese society has become routine. We all know that there are a few people in this country who oppose the political system and that the West supports them. This has become an established pattern in the game between China and the West.

这两年中国在西方获各种“人权奖”的极端异见人士越来越多，获奖者的名气则不断走低。中国社会如今早已见怪不怪，我们都知道这个国家有一些对抗政治制度的人，西方支持他们，这已经是中西之间博弈的定式之一。

With China’s great scale of development, interaction between Chinese and Western people has also reached an amazing dimension, and the share of these Sino-Western frictions within the interaction is shrinking, and so is the influence of extreme dissidents in China. Frequently, they don’t get as much attention as lawful [or rightful] criticism on the internet does.

由于中国发展的总量很大，中国同西方交往的主体内容也有了惊人规模，中西这种摩擦在双方关系中的占比相对萎缩，极端异见人士在中国的影响萎缩得更快。他们往往还不如互联网上的合法批判者更受关注。

In exact words, extreme dissidents in China have become completely marginalized, and the way the West continues to use them to provoke China is lacking innovation. In fact, the voice of the entire Western discourse has become ever smaller in China, as they are losing to the excitement of the Chinese microblogs.

确切说，极端异见人士在中国已完全边缘化了，西方继续利用他们刺激中国是缺少创新的表现。事实上整个西方舆论的声音也在中国越来越小，它们在输给中国微博上的热闹。

The highest individual amount of prize money of the Hermann Hammett Awards doesn’t reach 10,000 US dollars, and one of its purposes is said to be giving “politically prosecuted” people in different countries some “living allowance”. But maybe they don’t know that this bit of money is pitifully small, [unsafe translation: for lawful critics in China]. China has become “tall and hefty”, and that bit of money and the hopes from the West are just a drop in the bucket.

“赫尔曼·哈米特奖”的最高个人奖金额不到1万美元，它的宗旨之一据说是要给受到各国政府“迫害”的人一些“生活补贴”。但他们或许不知道，这点钱对今天中国的合法批判者们是小得可怜的数目。中国已是“大块头”，西方花的那点钱和他们的愿望相比实在是杯水车薪。

What China and the West are struggling about concerning human rights is not clear. The two sides don’t understand each others words at all. Which is alright. Inside China, you have as many human rights critics in China as you want already, and although they are at times extreme, they are also comparatively specific. Society can thoroughly make sense of their context. Human rights prizes awarded by the West often come with abrupt choices, choosing strange people, and we don’t need to spend too much thought on that.

中国同西方在人权问题上争不清楚，双方相互根本听不懂对方说的话。那就算了。中国国内的人权批评如今已经要多少有多少，它们虽有时偏激，但都比较具体，社会能搞明白来龙去脉。西方发人权奖往往找了突兀的缘由，选了奇怪的人，我们对此不必费太大心思琢磨。

Of course, Western criticism of China’s human rights isn’t completely meaningless. They did move things in Chinese society. Sometimes,confrontation is also a means of interaction. However, objectively speaking, much of Western criticism goes beyond China’s realities, thus causing suspicions among Chinese people about intentions behind Western methods. All this has seriously harmed strategic mutual trust between China and the West, and its negative impact on the 21rst century gretly exceeds its benefits.

西方批评中国人权当然不是毫无正面意义，它们毕竟对中国社会带来过触动。有时对抗也是相互影响的一种方式。然而客观地说，西方的很多批评都超越了中国现实，从而引发了中国人对西方这样做背后用心的高度怀疑。这一切严重破坏了中西之间的战略互信，它带给21世纪的负面损害远远高于正面收益。

Extreme dissidents played an offbeat role of their own in China’s reform and opening, but when their role will be assessed from the distant future, they will definitely not be seen as a mainstream force in advancing China’s progress. If the focus of these Western awards isn’t a prank, it must be caused by a failed analysis of China’s power.

极端异见人士在中国改革开放中扮演了很另类的角色，但即使很久以后回过头再做评价，他们也决不会被看成推动中国前进的主流力量。西方给这些人如此集中地发奖，如果不是西方的恶作剧，就是他们对中国的力量分析发生了本末倒置的偏差。

Pluralization in Chinese society has subtly built changes in the way the country progressed. When the government issued a call in the past, society responded in its multitude. Now it leads to a debate. It has become unlikely that the country makes another grave mistake [This and the previous line seem to allude to the excesses of Maoism], but at the same time, societal efficiency is also declining. China is in the process of finding a new point of balance in these changes. If extreme dissidents who break through the legal system of these social changes and explorations, they create destructive mishap, and will be investigated in accordance with the law.

中国社会的多元化造成了国家前进方式的微妙改变。过去政府发出号召，社会一呼百应。现在争论发生了。国家再犯重大错误的几率小了，但同时社会的运行效率也在降低。中国正在这些变化中寻找新的平衡点。极端异见人士突破了社会变化和探索的合法系统，他们制造出破坏性，对他们的依法追究决非这个时代的意外。

Western support for Chinese extreme dissidents seems to become ever closer, but times when this kind of thing found its way into the limelight are gone. They have become as tasteless as chicken ribs, but the West seems to be reluctant to throw them away. Nowadays, Western organizations doing these things look more like astute public-relations industries. Assuming an air of importance. To make themselves look good, they are seeking gimmicks close to China’s rise.

西方对中国极端异见人士的支持看似越来越密，但这种事最出风头的高潮实际已经过去，它对西方渐成食之无味、弃之可惜的鸡肋。如今做这些事的西方组织更像搞商业公关，它们装腔作势，傍着中国崛起找噱头炒作自己。那些所谓的“人权奖”都是绞尽脑汁吸引公众关注的游戏。

Much of the commenting underneath seems to be about unrelated everyday issues (Maybe there are relations which I can’t see, though). One of them which would seem to show some of the desired effects, and also one of the more extensive ones suggests that

Patriotic people don’t need to listen to American and other Western countries’ forces’ anti-China rumors, or be furious about them. Westerners people nowadays lose in the political and economic field and know perfectly well that their own institutions have problems, but won’t change, believing it’s the mother of all systems. Therefore, they will blame anyone except themselves, [...] this is the common fault of Western people, seeing in exasperation how China becomes stronger by the day, moving heaven and earth and racking their wits about how to obstruct China’s development, but to no avail. Instead, China develops even faster. Now they only have the human-rights and democracy card left [...]

爱国之人不要听美国等西方反华势力的谣言，而恼怒，西方人如今政治经济完全失败，明知自己的体制出现问题，可是就是不改，认为自己是体制的老大，而怨天尤人，[气人有笑人无，] 这是西方人的通病，看着中国日益强大而气急败坏，想方设法，绞尽脑汁的妨碍中国的发展，但是都无济于事，反倒使中国发展更快。现在就只有民主这张牌 [...]

It is also one of the comments – if not the comment – in the thread which got the most “support” votes – 267 by 11:00 UTC. The average “support” among the latest thirty-three comments got twenty “support votes” or less.

The People’s Daily editorial – published two days before Huanqiu Shibao’s, and in a different context (the International Telecommunications Union resolution) – could be summed down as follows:

• Those who oppose censorship are a minority (if not outsiders, which is deemed an unfortunate position in a Chinese context)
• America and other (barely mentioned) countries that didn’t agree to the International Telecommunications Union resolution are in a minority
• A free internet is war on vulnerable nations
• China is at the center of the family of nations
• dissidents are isolated.

The message People’s Daily’s and Huanqiu Shibao’s editorials  have in common is that the country grows stronger, and that “Western” standards would be an exception, rather than the norm. In some ways, Huanqiu Shibao’s approach is more subtle than People’s Daily, though. Even “radical minorities” played a certain role, according to its description – and it suggests that there were “lawful” ways to bring about change.  When it comes to banging the drums of nationalism however, there is no room for subtlety in Huanqiu’s case. While People’s Daily merely uses ITU voting results to point out China’s strong position, Huanqiu counts the prize money from Human Rights Watch and provides an assessment (“pitiful”).

The biggest commonality between the two editorials seems to be the message to (“extreme”) dissidents: you are marginalized.

____________

Related

» Ambassadors Abroad, May 25, 2012
» A Trivial Matter for the Country, Jan 23, 2012
» Party Media Control Capability “Weakening”, Aug 12, 2011
» The “Internet Information Office”, May 6, 2011

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