Animated Movies from Shijiazhuang: Soft-Power Tools?

Main Link:
Activeley develop Domestic and Foreign High-End Cartoon Industry, “Going out” in Great Strides (积极开拓国内外高端市场动漫产业大步“走出去”)
Links within quotes and blockquotes added during translation.

China needed to build a sound, modern culture market system, the “Culture Document” (or “cultural decision”), approved by the 6th plenary session of the 17th Central Committee, stipulated in October 2011.

The focus must be on the development of books and other publications, digital audio and video products, performing arts and entertainment, television series, cartoons, animation, and [computer] games, and similar markets, for the further perfection of a comprehensive international Chinese platform on fairs and exhibitions, etc.

According to Shijiazhuang News Net (石家庄新闻网), the local cartoon industry is doing just that:

Since 2006 , under the close attention of the CCP municipal committee and the municipal government, our city’s cartoon industry has developed rapidly, and achieved notable results in satisfying the city’s needs of spiritual civilizsation, in spreading advanced culture, in enriching the masses’ lives, promoting the healthy adolescence of the young, and fostering the growth of a new economy. During the past seven years, no matter if established by locals or by companies who came to Shijiazhuang from elsewhere, they have enjoyed all the benefits of Shijiazhuang’s cartoon-industry policies, environment, and prospects. On this foundation, “cartoons made in Shijiazhuang” have gained the courage to display themselves, to develop markets, and with the advantages in branding, high-end orientation and originality, they have drawn widespread attention from industries at home and abroad.

2006年以来， 在市委、市政府的高度重视下，我市动漫产业迅速发展，在满足市民精神文化需求、传播先进文化、丰富群众生活、促进青少年健康成长、培育新的经济增长点方 面，取得了显著成效。7年来，无论是本土动漫企业还是来石创业的动漫公司，都享受到了石家庄动漫产业政策、环境、前景的利与好。 在此基础上，“石家庄原创动漫”勇于展示自我、敢于开拓市场，以品牌化、高端化、原创化的优势，引起了国内外业界的广泛关注。

By Shijiazhuang Newsnet reporter Wang Xin
本报记者王欣

As the saying goes, good wine needs no bush^*). However, this doesn’t apply in today’s increasingly competitive markets. After several years of development and carefully ripening the wine, its sweet smell attracts many investors and company founders. At the same time, cartoonists from Shijiazhuang also seize the opportunities of actively exploring domestic and foreign markets, to take Shijiazhuang cartoons to bigger arenas.

俗话说，酒香不怕巷子深。然而，在市场竞争日趋激烈的今天，好酒也怕巷子深。经过几年的发展，我市动漫产业如同一坛精心酝酿的老酒，持续散发出馨香的气 息，吸引了众多投资者、创业者前来。与此同时，石家庄动漫人也抓住机遇，积极开拓国内国外市场，把石家庄动漫推向更广阔的舞台。

The Shijiazhuang Animation Institute‘s (石家庄动漫协会), that of the beneficial support of the city government and the conducive industrial environment had all become the envy of companies elsewhere, according to Shijiazhuang Newsnet. “Publicity” (宣传) and promotion had made Shijiazhuang’s cartoon industry better known in China and abroad, making people coming to Shijiazhuang to seek cooperation. A Western Australian Film Office (西澳大利亚州政府电影融资发展局 – I’m not familiar with Australia’s film industry or the industry’s official promotional institutes) was currently seeking a cooperation partner with the Shijiazhuang Animation Institute’s assistance, according to the report. The Australians had been impressed with the originality and production levels of Shijiazhuang’s industry and had since visited four times, Shijiazhuang Newsnet quotes a member of the Shijiazhuang Animation Institute, Zhang Maolan (张茂兰).

DeepCG Animation Science and Technology gets a particular mention in the report. The general manager, Wu Yifeng (武义峰), doesn’t seem to be too specific about his company’s current prospects in Europe, but is quoted as saying that South-East Asia was the most promising market for one of his company’s works, a cartoon movie about late Han dynasty general Zhao Yun, given its richness with Chinese culture.

The cartoon’s title seems to translate Zhao Yun and the Clicking Sound of the Box (赵云与咔哒盒子).

It seems to be based on a theme previously used in a Zhao Yun movie (but not a cartoon) made in Hong Kong, in 2010.

Shijiazhuang News Net is the online platform of Shijiazhuang Daily (石家庄日报), an official CCP paper.

In a review of the 17th Central cultural decision in October 2011, David Bandurski of the China Media Project (Hong Kong) appeared to be skeptical of the impact Chinese media and culture could have under political and ideological controls.

It may be time for a first assessment of how things are going for the “cultural industry” in China – especially when it comes to its record abroad. Personally, I have no clue about cartoons, and not even a taste for them. Stuff like Zhao Yun and the Box (a sample video here) should be judged by bloggers or critics who really are into the genre.

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Note

^*) This isn’t an exact translation. The actual Chinese quote or proverb would be 酒香不怕巷子深 – something like the smell of wine isn’t afraid of a deep lane (or alley), meaning that good things will sell even without advertising them.

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Related

» Soft Power starts at Home, Jan 21, 2012
» A Low-Carbon Industry, Dec 2, 2011
» Shijiazhuang Cartoon School, CRI, Aug 20, 2009
» Go-Out Policy, Wikipedia, acc. 20130412
» Private investors, PD English, Aug 20, 2004

Obituary: Stéphane Hessel, 1917 – 2013

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Main Links:

» Stéphane Hessel, gentleman indigné, Le Monde, December 23, 2011 / February 27, 2013
» 《愤怒吧！》： 93岁愤怒战士一夜爆红, Beijing News, April 11, 2011

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

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Hessel was born German, grew up French, and became a French citizen in 1939. He took part in the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and never stopped promoting its values, Le Monde wrote in December 2011 (article updated on February 27, 2013).

He had joined the résistance in 1941. He had been arrested, tortured, and survived the Buchenwald concentration camp.

And his hope was contagious (Le gentleman indigné, dont l’espérance est contagieuse).

He was also a diplomat. Compromise was hardly something foreign to him. But to react to wrongs seems to have been second nature to him.

On October 20, 2010, on his 93rd birthday, his booklet “Indignez-vous”, Time for Outrage, was published in France, with more than two million copies sold in France, and almost two million more in the rest of the world. He published another edition soon after, describing his admiration for Eleanor and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Indignez-vous was followed by “Engagez-vous”, Get involved, came next.

Counter-espionage was Hessel’s job from 1941, when he followed General de Gaulle to London, a correspondent for Beijing News wrote  from Paris, in April 2011, six months after “Time for Anger” had been published:

In March 1944, he was assigned to organize the resistance network in Paris, and to gather intelligence for the allied troops as they prepared to enter continental Europe. Named “Ge Like”, he secretly entered France, but was soon betrayed and then arrested by the Gestapo. Neither punishment nor lure by promises led to the results [his captors] desired, and Hessel was then transferred to the Buchenwald concentration camp on August 8, 1944, only days before the liberaton of Paris. He later wrote a detailed description of these experiences, in “Danse avec le Siècle”.
1941年，他为追随戴高乐将军来到伦敦，从事反间谍的侦查行动。1944年3月，他受命组织联络巴黎的抵抗网络、为盟军登陆搜集情报，化名“格里科”秘密潜入法国。由于叛徒的出卖，他很快便被盖世太保所捕获。刑逼利诱毫无收获后，8月8日埃塞尔被押解往德国布痕瓦尔德集中营，而这仅仅就是巴黎解放的前几天。之后他在自传《世纪之舞》中对这段经历有着详细的记述。

His narrow escape from death – by obtaining the identity of a fellow inmate who had died of typhus – inspired him.

Just as Hessel said: “this kind of leap from death, back into life makes him the more determined to enter the enthusiasm of global politics” (正如埃塞尔自己所说的：“这种死里逃生经历更加坚定了他介入世界的政治热情”).

The article’s description of Hessel’s post-war life included his co-authorship of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

To help this document of tremendous historic value obtain acknowledgment as [a set of] universal values, Hessel and his colleagues went to great pains to make it suitable for East and West, for ideologies, and the different situations of countries and nations.
为了使这份人类历史上极为重要的文件获得公认的普世价值，为了能使其适应东西方、意识形态、国家种族不同的状况，达成一致的认同，埃塞尔和他的同事们费尽心机，奔走疾呼。

There was nothing new in the novel, “Time to get Angry”, and it provided neither a logical analysis of the problems faced by humankind today, nor practical methodology for dealing with them, the Beijing News author quoted Hessel, in 2011, and added that its fascination was to be found in the emotions it stirred, and the lesson it taught: not to allow evil to repeat itself.

An initially small, unobtrusive book, written without much preparation, of only some thirty pages including footnotes and a postscript, but inevitable content, unexpectedly led to this kind of reading, discussion and dissemination. (Frequently, customers went to a bookstore and bought ten or more copies for their families and friends). While many publishers call this a coincidence, many others explore the reasons for the book’s strong sales. There is this global upheaval, and worried people are seeking some relief. This small book is just right in its simplicity, legibility, its sentiment and excitement, and its catchiness. [...] And secondly, the author’s personal charm adds an envelope of respectability and trustworthiness to this small book. It seems that only with the historical experience and the energetic and passionate involvement of this 93-year-old warrior, a man may be qualified to appeal to public enthusiasm.
一本事先毫不张扬，也无甚精心企划的小书；一本加上注释和后记才三十多页，内容无可避免的略显单薄的小册子，竟然引发了如此的阅读、讨论和传播（经常有顾客到书店一买十多册赠与身边的家人朋友）。在大多出版界人士大呼偶然的同时，也有不少人研究它畅销的必然所致。首先，世界局势的动荡，对未来的担忧让人们急需找到一个释放内心情绪的出口，而这本小册子正好简单、易懂，情绪激昂、朗朗上口。 [...] 其次，作者的个人魅力无疑为这本小书笼罩了一层令人尊敬和信赖的气场。似乎，唯有这种经历过历史，并以自身全部的精力和激情投入其中的长者（93岁的老战士）才有资格以这种语气号召起大众的热情。

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Related

Hessel dies at 95, The Guardian, Febr 27, 2013
A Resistance Hero Fires up the French, NYT, March 9, 2011

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Song Luzheng: “Those Southern newspaper commentators” and Deutsche Welle

Song Luzheng (宋鲁郑) occasionally revisits the case of Deutsche Welle‘s (Voice of Germany’s) Chinese department. He did so in November 2011, and again this month. Maybe he addressed the issue sometimes in between, too. For sure, he regularly addresses the issue of Western media and freedom of information.

I don’t know if Song is a journalist in the first place. He lives in Paris, is the Paris Culture Salon’s secretary general and the Shandong Provincial Overseas Exchange Council’s executive director.

I didn’t find Song’s article in November 2011 trustworthy, and the one he wrote this month seems to reveal an unpleasant character. That “certain Southern newspaper” he refers to (see blockquote underneath)  is most probably meant to be Southern Weekly, aka “Southern Weekend” (南方周末), and the paper’s staff’s conflict with Guangdong’s propaganda chief Tuo Zhen. His recent article was published by the Shanghai-based Guancha website. In this article, Song praises the four former Deutsche-Welle employees, and curses “those Southern newspaper commentators”.

[...]

It has to be said that Wang Fengbo [and his colleagues] are much more courageous than those so-called commentators at a certain southern newspaper, and stand on a higher moral ground. Because they were removed, in this kid of public-opinion environment, they had no chance to get the understanding or sympathy of German mainstream society. They are without a living, even their subsistence has become a problem. On different occasions, Wang Fengbo has discussed the issues at Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department with many German journalist colleagues and scholars, but most of them believe that what they [Wang and his former Deutsche-Welle colleagues] say is just a story from Arabian Nights, which can’t possibly happen in Germany.
[Song seems to quote one of the former Deutsche-Welle editors, but he doesn't do so explicitly.]
Rather, between the lines, many people believe that we actually had a pro-CCP tendency, or that at least, we didn’t abide the [Deutsche Welle, apparently] leaders, that we were like prickly kids who earned what they deserved, as this lead to getting expelled.
Those gentlemen from some Southern newspaper on the other hand can capitalize on getting praise from Western media and financial aid, they become global celebrities, and their undertakings and lives rise to new heights!

[...]

不得不说的是，王凤波他们应该比南方某报的那些所谓评论员要勇敢得多，更站有道德高地。因为他们一旦被开除，在这样的舆论环境下，根本无法得到德国 主流社会的理解和同情，生活无着，甚至生存都成了问题。王凤波等当事者在不同的场合和不少德国记者同行及学者谈过德国之声中文部的问题，但是他们当中的大 部分人觉得他们说的简直是天方夜谭，在德国不可能发生。相反，很多人话里话外还认为是我们的确有“亲共”的倾向，或者至少不服从领导，爱挑刺闹事儿，是自 作自受，导致被开除。而南方某报诸君，则可以凭此资本得到西方的赏识和大力资助，成为全球知名人士，事业和人生反而更上层楼！

Initially a big story in China, neither the “Zhang-Danhong affair” nor the case of the four members of Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department who lost their jobs since 2010 get into the headlines in China anymore. But they aren’t completely out of the news, either.

Song carefully weaves his message into the general line of CCP propaganda: Western media act in their countries’ national interest, he writes.

This term is used by Chinese editorialists and academics in the context of national interests which include nothing about human rights, in a context of soft power, which helps a country to achieve its strategic goals in its international relationships, and enhances its national interest, but may also be used by Chinese dissidents. He Qinglian, for example, suggests that the CCP propaganda narrative about America using human right criticism as a tool to pursue its national interests was deeply rooted in China now, but that the contrary was the case – America was rather selling benefits in terms of national interest, than earning them.

But what would the German national interest be? In the CCP’s view, and in Song Luzheng’s, too, I guess, Deutsche Welle shouldn’t have dared to expel members of the Chinese department – not out of respect for individual rights, but out of respect “for China”. From a CCP point of view, human rights don’t matter in this context. That’s why their mouthpieces can easily come to the conclusion that human rights don’t matter in other countries’ national interests either.

It all depends what national interest is actually about, and it’s hard to see how the expulsion of Wang Fengbo, Zhu Hong, Qi Li and Wang Xueding should have been in the national interest. No German I know who has looked at the material which is publicly available felt that it was in the interest of a German individual – as a journalist, employee, or what have you – to be treated this way. If a country’s common peoples’ interests are equivalent to its national interest, Deutsche Welle made a number of very bad decisions.

But it may be understandable that Song Luzheng can’t see that.

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Related

» When your Employer suspects…, Febr 18, 2012
» For the World to Hear, Aug 3, 2010

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The BoZhu Interviews: Germany’s and Japan’s post-war image -

Tai De about war crimes, popular narratives, foreignness, and soft power

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« Previous Interview: MKL, July 13, 2012

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The following is a spontaneous, unplanned BoZhu interview with Tai De, a civil servant from Verden. It’s actually the second interview with him, after a more general one about his blog, about a year ago.

Tai De studied history. His pattern of thought is that of a historian – but he wants me to write a word of warning in advance: he is no particular “expert” on Japan or on the Far East.

Our interview – originally rather a discussion – came up this afternoon after I listened to the memories of William Shawcross, son of the British chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, on Radio Australia‘s shortwave service this afternoon.

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Q: When listening to Anglo-American media, I’m getting the impression that we (Germans) get away with a much more positive image despite the Nazi crimes and WW2, than them (the Japanese). What’s your impression?

A: Quite so.

Q: Do you have an explanation for that?

A: I don’t think there’s that one explanation which can say it all.

Q: To start with something: do the Americans or British see Germans as part of the family? Sort of distant relatives? Like: “Yes, they committed heinous crimes, but …”

A: The outset after the war was the same after VE day and VA day, in terms of geostrategic interest – America needed West Germany, and America needed Japan. Britain didn’t mind an anti-Soviet bulwark in central or Europe either. I can’t generalize Anglo-American perceptions of either Germans or Japanese people. But as far as my favourite trash history novelist is concerned, …

Q: … Alexander Kent, …

A: … you can sense his attitude towards the Japanese – I think I can, anyway. I may be wrong, of course.

Q: German gentleman criminals, Japanese low-class criminals?

A: Oh, he definitely doesn’t get trapped in that kind of concept. But there’s that Japanese foreignness. And there’s that incredible Japanese brutality against allied prisoners of war – and the brutality of their warfare.

Q: German crimes were no smaller, were they?

A: No, they weren’t smaller. The German war was a war of extermination.  The industrialized annihilation of millions of people. But when it comes to our international image, a lot of that brutal German energy was directed against Germans, not Americans or British people.  The annihilation of Jews in particular, but other minorities, too. And communists, social democrats, also very blanketly.  As far as Alexander Kent is concerned, you also see a clear division of roles, in Germany’s case. The basically good – and very brave – Wehrmacht or navy officer on the one hand, and the coward, brutal, lower-class Gestapo policeman or SS man on the other. You don’t have that difference when it comes to the depiction of Japan. There’s no “Samurai”, no gentleman warrior. And if there was a “Samurai” depiction, it would have to be the kind of perpetrator who’d behead American or British POW from the platform of a truck, just by holding his sword out while passing rows of POWs on their death march.
Mind you, that’s not necessarily an accurate depiction of a Japanese soldier – but it’s become a picture of symbolic power. There were British and American pilots murdered by Germans, too, but not that systematically. And not that – how can I put this? – the war in Europe didn’t become that personal. Not between unoccupied countries and Germans, anyway.

Q: Were Allied prisoners of war traumatized? Did they face more brutality than what they would have expected from the Japanese?

A: Maybe not before the first atrocities – against non-Asians, I should add – became known. But initially, yes. I can’t tell how familiar they were with the way the Japanese forces treated Asians – but they probably didn’t expect that their service people would be treated similarly – that civilians with their forces would be forced into prostitution, for example.

Q: Japanese brutality spelled foreignness?

A: That’s one side of it, I think. And the other is the decades after the war. I mentioned the Samurai. But there was no such positive Japanese symbol, at least not in the Western narrative. Very different from the way Germany was depicted. And that’s a matter of symbolic gestures. Maybe Japan did make gestures, but not of the kind America, Australia, or Britain would easily understand. Emperor Hirohito looks quite good in some of their narratives, as a man who assumes “responsibility” for Japan’s crimes. But that was immediately after the end of the hostilities. The Japanese were under huge objective pressure then. But later on, after the pressure had eased, they never managed to do something highly symbolic – not in a Western sense, anyway.

Q: Like Willy Brandt dropping to his knees before the Warsaw Ghetto Monument?

A: Exactly. I’m not saying that Willy Brandt changed everything – but he had a huge effect on our national image abroad. For one, he hadn’t been involved – he had actually been underground in Norway during the war. But he was a German. “A symbol for a different Germany”, as they say.
He didn’t do because of his personal record. I don’t know what exactly made him kneel – all I know is that he made an allusion later, when reacting to criticism from the BILD-Zeitung, stuff like “one must only kneel before God”. He only reacted in private, and one of his ministers recalled it in 1992, after Brandt’s death. Brandt said that those journalists had no idea before whom he had kneeled.
But when it comes to Japan…  if there was resistance among the Japanese during the war – and I suppose there was – we may never know about these people.

Talking about Willy Brandt – there was his Neue Ostpolitik, too, for the obvious reason that Germany was divided. The Ostpolitik was a symbol of hope – not only for Germans, by the way, but for all of Europe – and it was really powerful. With really honest intentions – and skills – the social democrats and the liberals in Germany made the best of it. They turned our calamities into moral strength. You write a lot about soft power, don’t you? That was soft power. Brandt was about soft power. Olof Palme, too, in his own way, from Sweden. German partition was a price Germany had to pay – that division of our country. Territorial losses, too. In Asia, it was – and still is – Korea who has to live with partition. Not Japan. That could matter, too.

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Related

» Nanking Massacre, Wikipedia, acc. Dec 14, 2012
» Lev Kopelev: No Easy Solution, April 11, 2009
» All BoZhu Interviews

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Heimatgefühl, and the Venture into the Public Realm

My following translation will very probably contain errors.

A: [...] If you want me to be frank, I have to say that I’m not interested in the effects when I’m working. (Wenn ich ganz ehrlich sprechen soll, dann muß ich sagen: Wenn ich arbeite, bin ich an Wirkung nicht interessiert.)

Q: And once the work has been completed? (Und wenn die Arbeit fertig ist?)

A: Well, then I have finished with it. You see, what matters to me is this: I need to understand. Writing is part of understanding. Writing belongs in this process of understanding things. (Ja, dann bin ich damit fertig. Wissen Sie, wesentlich ist für mich: Ich muß verstehen. Zu diesem Verstehen gehört bei mir auch das Schreiben. Das Schreiben ist Teil in dem Verstehensprozeß.)

Q: Writing serves your own, further cognition? (Wenn Sie schreiben, so dient es Ihrem eigenen, weiteren Erkennen?)

A: Yes, because now, certain things have been determined. If we had great memory, so that we really kept all our reasoning in mind: I doubt that, because I’m aware of my own laziness, I’d have jotted down everything. What matters to me is the thinking process itself. When I’ve got that, I’m, personally, quite satisfied. When I succeed in expressing this adequately in writing, I’m once again satisfied. – Now, you asked about effects. That’s – if I may be tongue-in-cheek – a male question. Men badly want to be effective, but I’m kind of looking at it from outside. To be effective myself? No, I want to understand. And when other people understand, in the same sense as I did, that gives me satisfaction, like a sense of home. (Ja, weil jetzt bestimmte Dinge festgelegt sind. Nehmen wir an, man hätte ein sehr gutes Gedächtnis, so daß man wirklich alles behält, was man denkt: Ich zweifle sehr daran, da ich meine Faulheit kenne, daß ich irgend etwas notiert hätte. Worauf es mir ankommt, ist der Denkprozeß selber. Wenn ich das habe, bin ich persönlich ganz zufrieden. Wenn es mir dann gelingt, es im Schreiben adäquat auszudrücken, bin ich auch wieder zufrieden. – Jetzt fragen Sie nach der Wirkung. Es ist das – wenn ich ironisch werden darf – eine männliche Frage. Männer wollen immer furchtbar gern wirken; aber ich sehe das gewissermaßen von außen. Ich selber wirken? Nein, ich will verstehen. Und wenn andere Menschen verstehen, im selben Sinne, wie ich verstanden habe – dann gibt mir das eine Befriedigung, wie ein Heimatgefühl.)

[...]

A: My father died early. It all sounds very funny. My grandfather was the liberal congregation’s president and city councillor in Königsberg. I’m from an old Königsberger family. Still – the word “jew” was never mentioned at home, when I was a small child. I was confronted with it by antisemitic remarks – no use in mentioning them – from children in the street. That’s how I became informed, so to speak. (Mein Vater war früh gestorben. Es klingt alles sehr komisch. Mein Großvater war Präsident der liberalen Gemeinde und Stadtverordneter von Königsberg. Ich komme aus einer alten Königsberger Familie. Trotzdem – das Wort “Jude” ist bei uns nie gefallen, als ich ein kleines Kind war. Es wurde mir zum erstenmal entgegengebracht durch antisemitische Bemerkungen – es lohnt sich nicht zu erzählen – von Kindern auf der Straße. Daraufhin wurde ich also sozusagen “aufgeklärt”.)

Q: Was that a shock? (War das für Sie ein Schock?)

A: No. (Nein.)

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A: I for one don’t think that I ever felt that I was German, in the sense of ethnicity, not in terms of statehood, if I may distinguish the two. I remember discussions around 1930 about that, with [Karl Jaspers], for example. He said, “of course you are German!” I said: “It’s plain that I’m not!” But to me, it didn’t matter. It didn’t spell inferiority to me. Precisely not. And if I may come back to what was special about my family: you see, all Jewish children were confronted with antisemitism. It poisoned the souls of many children. The difference was that my mother always maintained that you must not duck your head. You need to defend yourself. (Ich, zum Beispiel, glaube nicht, daß ich mich je als Deutsche – im Sinne der Volkszugehörigkeit, nicht der Staatsangehörigkeit, wenn ich mal den Unterschied machen darf – betrachtet habe. Ich besinne mich darauf, daß ich so um das Jahr ‘30 herum Diskussionen darüber zum Beispiel mit Jaspers hatte. Er sagte: “Natürlich sind Sie Deutsche!” Ich sagte: “Das sieht man doch, ich bin keine!” Das hat aber für mich keine Rolle gespielt. Ich habe das nicht etwa als Minderwertigkeit empfunden. Das gerade war nicht der Fall. Und wenn ich noch einmal auf das Besondere meines Elternhauses zurückkommen darf: Sehen Sie, der Antisemitismus ist allen jüdischen Kindern begegnet. Und er hat die Seelen vieler Kinder vergiftet. Der Unterschied bei uns war, daß meine Mutter immer auf dem Standpunkt stand: Man darf sich nicht ducken! Man muß sich wehren!)

[...]

Q [quoting Arendt]: “I have never, in all my life, loved a collective, neither the German, the French, nor the American, nor the working class, or whatever else may be there. Indeed, I only love my friends, and am completely uncapable of any other love. But above all, being Jewish myself, I would find this love dubious if it was love to the Jewish.” [...] Aren’t you afraid that your attitude could be politically barren? (Darin heißt es: “Ich habe nie in meinem Leben irgendein Volk oder Kollektiv geliebt, weder das deutsche, noch das französische, noch das amerikanische, noch etwa die Arbeiterklasse oder was es sonst so noch gibt. Ich liebe in der Tat nur meine Freunde und bin zu aller anderen Liebe völlig unfähig. Vor allem aber wäre mir diese Liebe zu den Juden, da ich selbst jüdisch bin, suspekt.” [...] Fürchten Sie nicht, daß Ihre Haltung politisch steril sein könnte?)

A: No, I think the other [attitude] is politically barren. To belong to a group is natural. You always belong to a group, by birth, always. But to belong to a group as you meant it in a second sense, that is to say, to organize – that’s completely different. This kind of organizing always happens by Weltbezug. That is, what those who organize have in common, which is usually called interests. The immediate personal relation, when you can talk about love, does exist, of course, in real love, in its greatest way, and in a certain sense, it exists in friendship. That’s when a person is reached in an immediate way, and independently from Weltbezug. That’s how people who belong to most different organizations may still be friends. But if you confuse these things, if you take them to the negotiation table – to put it in a very mean way -, I believe that’s fatal. (Nein. Ich würde sagen, die andere ist politisch steril. Zu einer Gruppe zu gehören, ist erst einmal eine natürliche Gegebenheit. Sie gehören zu irgendeiner Gruppe durch Geburt, immer. Aber zu einer Gruppe zu gehören, wie Sie es im zweiten Sinne meinen, nämlich sich zu organisieren, das ist etwas ganz anderes. Diese Organisation erfolgt immer unter Weltbezug. Das heißt: Das, was diejenigen miteinander gemeinsam haben, die sich so organisieren, ist, was man gewöhnlich Interessen nennt. Der direkte personale Bezug, in dem man von Liebe sprechen kann, der existiert natürlich in der wirklichen Liebe in der größten Weise, und er existiert in einem gewissen Sinne auch in der Freundschaft. Da wird die Person direkt und unabhängig von dem Weltbezug angesprochen. So können Leute verschiedenster Organisationen immer noch persönlich befreundet sein. Wenn man aber diese Dinge miteinander verwechselt, wenn man also die Liebe an den Verhandlungstisch bringt, um mich einmal ganz böse auszudrücken, so halte ich das für ein sehr großes Verhängnis.)

Q: [...] In a speech on Karl Jaspers you said that “humanity is  never won in loneliness and never by handing ones work over to the public. Only if you take your life and person[ality] into the venture of the public realm, you will reach [humanity].” This “venture into the public realm”, a Jaspers quote again, in which way does it exist for Hannah Arendt? (In einer Festrede auf Jaspers haben Sie gesagt: “Gewonnen wird die Humanität nie in der Einsamkeit und nie dadurch, daß einer sein Werk der Öffentlichkeit übergibt. Nur wer sein Leben und seine Person mit in das Wagnis der Öffentlichkeit nimmt, kann sie erreichen.” Dieses “Wagnis der Öffentlichkeit”, ein Zitat von Jaspers wiederum – worin besteht es für Hannah Arendt?)

A: The venture into the public realm appears to be clear to me. You expose yourself in the light of the public, as a person. While I believe that one must not appear publicly and act publicly in a self-conscious way, I still know that all action expresses the person like no other activity. And speaking, too, is a way of action. That’s one thing. The second venture: we commence something, we add our thread into a web of relationships. We never know how it will evolve. We all need to say, Lord, forgive them what they do, because they don’t know what they do. That’s true for all action. Quite practically, because you can’t know. That’s a venture. And I would say that this venture can only be taken as you rely on the human beings. That’s to say, in a – hard to grasp, but basic – trust in the humaneness in all human beings. You can’t do that in another way. (Das Wagnis der Öffentlichkeit scheint mir klar zu sein. Man exponiert sich im Lichte der Öffentlichkeit, und zwar als Person. Wenn ich auch der Meinung bin, daß man nicht auf sich selbst reflektiert in der Öffentlichkeit erscheinen und handeln darf, so weiß ich doch, daß in jedem Handeln die Person in einer Weise zum Ausdruck kommt wie in keiner anderen Tätigkeit. Wobei das Sprechen auch eine Form des Handelns ist. Also das ist das eine. Das zweite Wagnis ist: Wir fangen etwas an; wir schlagen unseren Faden in ein Netz der Beziehungen. Was daraus wird, wissen wir nie. Wir sind alle darauf angewiesen zu sagen: Herr vergib ihnen, was sie tun, denn sie wissen nicht, was sie tun. Das gilt für alles Handeln. Einfach ganz konkret, weil man es nicht wissen kann. Das ist ein Wagnis. Und nun würde ich sagen, daß dieses Wagnis nur möglich ist im Vertrauen auf die Menschen. Das heißt, in einem – schwer genau zu fassenden, aber grundsätzlichen – Vertrauen auf das Menschliche aller Menschen. Anders könnte man es nicht.)

Hannah Arendt in a television interview, in October 1964

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Related

» In an Unguarded Moment, Sep 29, 2010
» No Easy Solution, April 11, 2009

Is China Misunderstood? And if Yes, How?

• “People in China have as many freedoms as people in Europe, as long as they don’t organize to challenge CCP rule.”

Not really. Frequently, challenging one bureaucrat amounts to challenging the party. What you can and what you can’t do depends on your connections, and even if you are pretty well connected, no independent court will protect you and the liberties you have taken to do things when the party decides that it has a stake in your case.

• “The Chinese Communist Party has lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty.”

That’s conventional wisdom. But isn’t it the party’s decision to leave more space for  privately-owned business – i. e.  a withdrawal from business administration – which has led to that success?

• “Authors like Mo Yan show that you are quite free to criticize leadership decisions – even if you are formally part of the system.”

Mo Yan spoke up for Liu Xiaobo (with some disclaimers included in his talk), and that was a good decision – but if he wasn’t part of the system, and right in the limelight, such a public statement might have earned him an invitation for a cup of tea at the next public security office – or worse.

What is true is that China is much more of a mixed economy these days, than thirty years ago. What may also be true is that the cadres, too, have become much more affluent. Some leaders, especially top leaders, have become rich.

And this seems to amount to a strange excuse, frequently offered by CCP apologists: because the Communist leaders – and top leaders not least – are so corrupted, their theories can’t be taken seriously anymore. Or rather: even as a democrat, you don’t need to take their theories seriously anymore.

That’s a nice license to do business with the guys. Unfortunately, it’s a faked license.

It is true that what the CCP cadres do has little to do with their original theories. But that only means that their concept of class relations has changed. Contrary to what coverage frequently suggest,  that’s no bashful change. It’s clearly documented, not least in Jiang Zemin‘s Three Represents which are part of the official party theories. All this hasn’t hasn’t changed the CCP’s view of who should rule the country, and how they want to rule.

The CCP claims the function to decide what Chinese culture is, and what isn’t. They are the “standard bearers” and the “developers” of Chinese culture. They have left cultural organizations and individuals more leeway than during the Maoist days, just as they have left businesses more leeway – see above. But all that is revocable. It is part of the party’s development project. Obviously, people make use of the leeway they have – but given that the party has the last word on what will make it, and what won’t, its claim to be the developer is often taken remarkably lightly.

Above all, however, there is one constant: that while the outside world has certain good things to offer, it is, above all, a threat. The concept that an imagined innocence, “cultural” purity, or general well-being of the Chinese people can only be safeguarded by the CCP’s monopoly to power has never changed since the party came to power. A country that swallows the humiliations that come from this power monopoly and ultimately has to blame the outside world for exactly these humiliations can’t be a terribly friendly country.

The Libyan or the Syrian regimes have never been popular among Americans or Europeans. The Chinese regime isn’t, either. There is a lot of fault-seeking going on. Every incident, every blooper, and every corruption case among more senior officials are highlighted in the Western press, as if corruption was something particularly Chinese, or even something particularly CCP. But that seems to be arrogance, and wannabe virtue, rather than objectivity. Just as there was a preparedness to believe that basically, Libyans or Syrians were prepared to tolerate, if not support, their leaders, there is a preparedness to believe the same thing of China and the CCP.

When taking a benevolent view of Western governments and the Western public perception, they were also prepared to believe that at least the Syrian regime would give way to democracy (or theocracy) peacefully, rather than clinging to power by all means. If we may believe Western governments’ statements these days, they are absolutely shocked that, once having shown signs of vulnerability, such regimes aren’t tolerated by their own people anymore. By the same logic, Western governments are even more shocked to learn that such regimes would go “from house to house” to find and slaughter oppositionals, suspected or proven. By the same logic, Western governments and the Western public are outraged to learn that a regime may actually bomb its own cities, at war with many of its own people.

They would quite probably be just as “shocked” if such events occured in China. And then they would start explaining why they did have reasons to believe that the CCP regime was “responsible” and “accountable” to the people, why they did have reasons to believe that the party would put the people first, and put itself next.

And as long as shit doesn’t happen, they’ll tell you how the status quo in China is still better than any conceivable alternative. (That said, many foreign party apologists aren’t that much more interested in trying to imagining alternatives, than the CCP itself.)

People who are using excuses like the ones quoted at the beginning are most probably those who actually “misunderstand” China most fundamentally. But it’s a wishful misunderstanding. A less friendly word for it would be complicity.

That complicity is no crime. Or, if it is, this blogger, too, is complicit. I accept that our governments and businesses need to find compromises with totalitarian dictators, at least for the time being.  What I don’t accept is the beautification of the regime. Whoever justifies its existence needs to be prepared to accept the same standards in his home country – not necessarily as a ruler, but as a subject to such rule. (One problem among Western decision makers is that they themselves can only think of themselves as rulers, not as subjects.) But if you argue that, because of the “circumstances”, this or that has to be good enough for Chinese citizens, this or that has to be good enough for you, too – provided that the “circumstances” (seem to) demand it.

To be clear: this is no suggestion that Western intelligence services should sponsor underground organizations in China. It is a suggestion that people should stop thinking of China as some kind of “democracy”, or a “democratizing country”, only because it makes it easier for us to justify our business with China. The issue isn’t how Westerners could “westernize”, “democratize” or whatever-ize China. It is to make sure that our own values don’t become blurred in the process of interaction.

A paranoid scenario? Up to you. But take a look at the debate between U.S. president Barack Obama and his challenger Mitt Romney on foreign policy. Not a single mention of China’s political system. Rather: long debates on how to “shape” the Middle East.

And all that – my take of it, that is – to flatter power delusions among the American public.

That’s where the circle closes. Power isn’t irrelevant. But without a conscience – an understanding of what we are doing -, it may be wielded in a pretty CCP way: self-flattering, self-serving, and oblivious.

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Related

» Enabling “Democracy in International Relations”, The Peking Duck (guest post), Oct 2, 2012
» Asma Al Assad, the All-Natural Beauty, The Richest People, Febr 23, 2011
» Huang Mengfu: It’s Complicated, Jan 7, 2009

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Obituary: Wang Tung-yi, 1975 – 2012

Wang Tung-yi (王同義) was born on April 1, 1975. He served as a R.O.C. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel at the No. 499 Squadron at the Air Force Base in Hsinchu, northern Taiwan. Wang took part in a training operation in France, from the Luxeuil-les-Bains airfield. His training was part of an arms sales package in which Taiwan purchased 60 Mirage 2000-5s from France in 1992.

Wang’s fighter jet crashed into a forest near the village of Froideconche, on Wednesday, October 3 at about 9:45 a.m.. Le Pays reported on Wednesday that Wang probably didn’t eject in time, so as to keep the aircraft clear from a residential area.

According to a CNA/RTI report on Saturday, Wang’s family will allowed to see Wang’s remains on Monday, in what is an exception from the general rules after a crash. They would also visit the crash site, probably on Tuesday.

The report quotes prosecutor Jean-Francois Parietti from Vesoul as saying that the main motive for the arrangement is to show respect for Wang, who sacrificed his life to save lives on the ground.

Comprehensive judgment would follow after an analysis of the black box.

Wang is survived by his wife and his five-months old daughter.

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Related

» Codenamed Tango, Taipei Times, Feb 7, 2012

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Chinese Press Review: New York Times (reportedly) Watered Down Chen Guangbiao’s Diaoyu Islands ad

Main Link: Ren Min Net (Renmin Ribao), September 7, 2012

Chen Guangbiao‘s (陈光标) ad, referred to by Aomen [Macau] Daily and Ren Min Net respectively, was bilingual. My translation is from the Ren Min Net article in Chinese, and doesn’t account for the ad’s actual wording in English. China Smack has a screenshot of the ad, and quotes excerpts from it.

Links within blockquotes added during translation – JR

An editorial by “Aomen Daily” on September 6 says that Chinese entrepreneur Chen Guangbiao, in his recent ad in the “New York Times” on the Diaoyu islands, also asked: “If Japan announced that Hawaii was Japanese territory, how would Americans feel about that? This line is very good. It’s easy to see that Japan denies its aggressive history and its war responsibilities, and America can’t encourage this unhealthy tendency to run wild. Although Japan is currently under America’s leadership and strictly follows it, who can tell when [Japan] may turn hostile, thus making America shoot its own feet?

《澳门日报》6日发表社论说，中国企业家陈光标最近在美国《纽约时报》上刊登保钓广告，他在广告中问道：“如果日本宣布夏威夷是日本领土，美国人民会有什么感受？陈光标这一问问得好。不难看出，日本否认侵略历史和战争责任，美国不能助长这一股歪风邪气横行。别看日本现在对美国马首是瞻言听计从，说不定哪一天翻脸不认人，到那时美国可不是搬起石头砸自己的脚？

The following are excerpts from the [Aomen Daily] article.

文章摘编如下：

Chinese entrepreneur Chen Guangbiao recently published an ad on the Diaoyu islands in the “New York Times” and also asked: “If Japan announced that Hawaii was Japanese territory, how would Americans feel about that? What action would the American government take?” Chen Guangbiao asks a good question, as it calls on the American government and people from all walks of life to condemn Japan’s provocative behavior, and reminds them that the scars and pains from the Second World War must not be forgotten.

中国企业家陈光标最近在美国《纽约时报》上刊登保钓广告，他在广告中问道：“如果日本宣布夏威夷是日本领土，美国人民会有什么感受？美国政府会有什么举动？”陈光标这一问问得好，既呼吁美国政府和各界人士谴责日本的挑衅行为，也提醒他们不要忘记二战历史好了伤疤忘了痛。

In the continuously heatening Diaoyu islands dispute, Chen Guangbiao published a half-page ad in Chinese and English in the “New York Times”, in Chinese and English, stating to the world: “Japanese right-wing elements are violating Chinese Diaoyu islands”, “the Diaoyu islands have since ancient times been Chinese territory”. It is said that in the ad originally designed by Chen Guangbiao, part of the question was “If Japan declared Pearl Harbor to be Japanese territory, how would Americans feel about that?” But on the newspaper, “Pearl Harbor” had changed into “Hawaii”. The “New York Times” had said that the Pearl Harbor attack would be too offensive [or psychologically stimulating] for American readers. Chen Guangbiao had asked back that if this was how the American people and government felt about the Pearl Harbor attack, shouldn’t they also understand how we, the Chinese, feel when seeing how Japan’s flag is put on the Diaoyu islands?

在钓鱼岛争议不断升温之际，陈光标8月31日在美国《纽约时报》上注销半版中英双语广告，向世界声明：“日本右翼分子正在侵犯中国钓鱼岛”，“钓鱼岛自古以来就是中国的领土。”据说陈光标自己设计的广告中，提问部分原本是“如果日本宣珍珠港是日本领土，美国人民会有什么感受？”但到报纸上“珍珠港”变成了“夏威夷”。《纽约时报》对这处修改的解释说“偷袭珍珠港”事件对美国读者心理刺激太大。陈光标反问道，如果美国人民、美国政府能感受到“偷袭珍珠港”的刺激，也应该能理解我们中国人看到日本国旗插在钓鱼岛上的感受。

The following paragraph mainly deplores the finding of Chen Guangcheng that more than 95 per cent of Americans didn’t know “the truth” about the Senkaku (Chinese: Diaoyu) islands. All the more, America and the world needed be told that the islands were China’s. Chen was, in his own words, practicing a patriotic entrepreneur’s responsibility. (陈光标做广告前在美国花了10天时间，先后在纽约、波士顿、旧金山等大城市的街头做了上千份调查问卷。他发现“至少95%以上的美国人民并不知道钓鱼岛真相”，这更加坚定了他一定要在美国媒体上刊登钓鱼岛广告的信念，他要“告诉美国民众、告诉全世界：钓鱼岛是中国的”。陈光标说，没有通过谩骂、攻击，而是刊登报纸广告来文明、严肃地表达爱国思想、来阐述中国人民的立场、来向对钓鱼岛争端鲜有概念的美国人民普及常识是一种非常理性、睿智、文明的表达方式，也践行了一名爱国企业家的责任。)

It’s not surprising that the average American citizen doesn’t know the truth about the Diaoyu islands. Whatis surprising is that the American government doesn’t know where the Diaoyu islands belong, and on the one hand says that it “doesn’t take sides”, and on the other say that [the islands] are covered by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. Didn’t America’s leaders want to give the Ryukyu islands to China, during the Second World War? [The last sentence seems to suggest that if that was so, there could be no doubt where the Senkaku islands belonged, as those were under "Chinese Taiwan's Yilan County's jurisdiction. If you read Chinese, you can look the line up in the Chinese article's paragraph which follows this one.]

如今的美国平民百姓不清楚钓鱼岛真相并不奇怪，奇怪的是今日的美国政府竟然不知道钓鱼岛究竟谁属。还要一面说“不采取立场”，一面却宣称钓鱼岛适用于《美日安保条约》。二战时，美国的领导人不是有意要将琉球群岛交给中国吗？更何况与琉球毫无从属关系而是中国台湾省宜兰县管辖的钓鱼岛，怎么就跑到日本那边去了？

In the old days, there was a documentary movie called “Teutonic Sword in Action” [could be this one], a careful and detailed analysis of pre-war European indulgence which helped the devil (姑息养奸), allowing the painful history of growing German fascism. Just as in today’s Japan, the extreme-right ideology is spreading, with the government adding fuel to the flames. Government and people, superiors and subordinates, [the economy and domestic politics] dispute neighboring countries’ territory, deny the history of comfort women, and do all they can to expand military power. It is easy to see that Japan denies its aggressive history and war responsibilities just to get rid of the restricitons the international community imposed after the Second World War, to return to its militarist ways. America must not act as if it doesn’t see this, let alone encourage this unhealthy tendency to run wild. Although Japan is currently under America’s leadership and strictly follows it, who can tell when [Japan] may turn hostile, thus making America shoot its own feet?

旧时有一部叫做《条顿剑在行动》的纪录片，条分缕析战前欧洲姑息养奸、让德国法西斯坐大的惨痛历史。如今的日本，极右民族主义情绪正在蔓延，政府也在推波助澜。朝野上下抛开经济、内政跟邻国争领土，否认慰安妇存在的事实，千方百计扩张军力。不难看出，日本否认侵略历史和战争责任，就是要摆脱战后国际社会对它的束缚，要走回军国主义的老路。美国不能对此视若不见，更不能助长这一股歪风邪气横行。别看日本现在对美国马首是瞻言听计从，说不定哪一天翻脸不认人，到那时美国可不是搬起石头砸自己的脚？

In fact, since WW2, America and Japan have had a special relationship. Chen Guangbiao hopes that America’s politicians and people will gradually understand the fundamental fact that the Diaoyu islands are China’s, respect China’s sovereignty, condemn Japan’s provocative behavior, put pressure on Japan’s extreme right, and play its role as the world’s superpower and maintain stability and security in the West pacific.

America’s position, although ambiguous in its own view, is in fact very clear at its core; it supports Japan’s opposition against China’s ownership of the Diaoyu islands. This is a very dangerous position, and not at all advantageous for stability in the western Pacific. People have to worry that America’s strong intervention and support for Japan on the Diaoyu islands issue will harden Japan’s government’s tough stance and encourages its right-wing forces’ arrogance, which will be extremely harmful to security and stability in the western Pacific.

美国的“钓鱼岛立场”虽然存在自相矛盾之处，但是实质上，它的核心内容又是明确的、清晰的，即支持日本在钓鱼岛领土归属问题上对抗中国。美国的“钓鱼岛立场”是十分危险的，于亚太地区的安全与稳定十分不利。人们不能不担心，美国在钓鱼岛问题上的强势介入和执意为日本撑腰，将会强化日本政府的强硬态度以及助长日本右翼势力的嚣张，而这又极其有损于东亚乃至整个亚太地区的安全与稳定。

The Obama administration’s “return to the pacific strategy” intends to suppress China’s rise, to keep [China] from challenging America’s position. This kind of cold-war ideology goes against the tide of the times, against peaceful development. An editorial published by America’s “Wall Street Journal” points out that currently, America’s strategy’s biggest problem is that it is blurred and without a clear outlook. That can’t solve the Asia-Pacific problems, and even, because of excessive commitments, exacerbate regional uncertainties. China doesn’t intend to compete with America about whatever position, it only hopes that America will do more to help regional peace and stability. As for the Diaoyu islands problem, America should follow through on having no certain position.

奥巴马政府的“重返亚太战略”意在压制中国崛起、避免挑战美国的地位，这种冷战思维是违背和平发展这一时代潮流的。美国《华尔街日报》发表的评论文章指出，目前，美国战略重心转移的第一大问题就是它模糊且预期不明，这不会解决亚太的问题，甚至还会因为承诺过度、实践不足而增加该地区的不确定性。中方无意与美国争什么地位，只是希望美方多做有利于地区和平稳定的事。在钓鱼岛主权归属问题上，美方理应切实体现不持立场的态度。