Chinese Press Review: Lushan Mourning, Maritime Disputes, Border Disputes, and CPBS Emergency Broadcasts

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1. Offerings to the Spirits of the Dead

On Friday, a ceremony to honor the two earthquake (military) relief workers Yang Bo (杨波) and Li Tangdong (李堂东) was conducted at a funeral parlor in Meishan, Sichuan Province, reports China News Service (中国新闻网, via Huanqiu Shibao). The two are referred to as martyrs who sacrificed their lives in the rescue efforts in Lushan, Sichuan Province, which occurred on April 20.

Yang Bo, a platoon leader (probably around the rank of a lieutenant, with the 13th Army Group) died in an accident when his military vehicle got off a road due to a bursting tire and fell off a cliff.

Li Tangdong, a corporal who drove the vehicle, also died in the crash. Li was from Wuxi County (Chongqing).

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2. Maritime Disputes with Japan

Japan has adopted a five-year blueprint for protecting maritime interests, partly in an effort to counter territorial claims by China and South Korea, reports The Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo). It suggests closer cooperation between Japan’s military and coastguard. Okinotorishima as well as other remote islands on what is defined as Japan’s borders reportedly are to play a role as port facilities according to the five-year plan plan, so as to protect interests in the nation’s exclusive economic zone. Methane hydrate, which could become a next-generation fuel, is among the undersea energy resources in the maritime regions in questions, writes Asahi Shimbun.
China’s Huanqiu Shibao quotes Japan’s Yomiuri Simbun on the same topic. According to Huanqiu (or its possibly rather loose rendition of Yomiuri’s coverage), Japan’s five-year blueprint calls for responsive strategies to Chinese vessels that enter the waters of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese). Rather than port facilities as described by the Asahi Shimbun, Huanqiu Shibao refers the plans for the remote islands as ones for resupply bases or depots (补给站). Okinotorishima is referred to as a “reef” (礁) while the Asahi Shimbun calls it an “island”. According to Huanqiu Shibao, the Japanese government, for wanting to protect its interests in resources, has begun to promote the protection of remote islands and the management of the legalization process [of Japan's claims or rights].

In 2012, a research team from Tokyo University detected large quantities of rare earths beneath the seaground of Minami-Tori-shima‘s adjacent waters. It was then that the Japanese government decided to strengthen the protection of energy sources and natural resources in its exclusive economic zones.

2012年，东京大学研究小组在南鸟岛周边海底发现了大量稀土。以此为契机，日本政府决定加强在保护专属经济海域内能源资源方面的措施。

[...]

Okinotorishima reef is said to be a southern Japanese atoll in the Pacific [don't quote me on this - I'm not sure that this is what Huanqiu really says about the place in Chinese - JR]. In recent years, the Japanese government has spent huge amounts on creating man-made corals at these reefs, thinking of these atolls as “islands”, trying to declare sovereignty on this basis, taking the opportunity to expand their “territorial” waters and the range of the “exclusive economic zones”, to make the development of nearby marine resources more convenient.

据了解，冲之鸟礁是日本南部太平洋海域的一处环礁。近年来，日本政府斥巨资用来在此礁人工养殖珊瑚，并认为该环礁为“岛”，企图以此来宣布主权，借机扩大其“领海”和“专属经济区”范围，为开发附近丰富的海洋资源提供方便。

As for the Okinotorishima reef, China believes that this is a reef, and not an island. Okinotorishima reef provides no base for human habitation, doesn’t sustain economic activity, and there is no basis to establish establish [i. e. claim] any connection between it and the continental shelf. On September 11, 2009, the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf said that a working group under the commission had commenced the handling of an application from Japan concerning the extension of the southern continental shelf into the Pacific.  China has filed objections with the UN.

有关冲之鸟礁问题，中国方面认为冲之鸟是 岩礁而不是岛屿。冲之鸟礁不能供人类居住，也无法维持经济生活，设定大陆架没有任何根据。2009年9月11日，联合国大陆架界限委员会表示，该委员会下 属的一个工作小组已经着手处理日本提出的南太平洋大陆架延伸申请。中国已向联合国正式提交反对意见。

Huanqiu Shibao’s emoticon vote suggests a strong trend of anger among the traditionally nationalist readership – the option “I’m angry” rose from 160 to 181 within about thirty minutes. Clicks for “this is ridiculuous” stayed at 14.
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3. Sino-Indian Border Conflicts

Meantime, Huanqiu Shibao has soothing news from the South:

China News Service, April 26 [published by Huanqiu Shibao on April 27] — Indian foreign minister Salman Khurshid answered questions from Indian media on April 25, concerning the confrontational incident on the Sino-Indian border, and said that the consultation mechanism on border issues had been started. He believed that this mechanism would find a solution for the issue in question, just as it had found solutions in the past.

中新网4月26日电 4月25日，印度外长库尔希德在回答印媒体关于中印边境对峙事件的提问时表示，印中双方已启动边境事务磋商机制，相信该机制能够像过去一样，为此次事件找到解决办法。

Huanqiu Shibao quotes Salman Khurshid as saying that bilateral relations grown over many years shouldn’t break down by overemphasizing small issues and were just like some acne on a face which only required some ointment.

“我期待在下个月访问中国之前，双方能够通过外交渠道结束僵局。”库尔希德说，我们不能因为某个地方发生的小问题而毁掉双方多年来为双边关系付出的投入和心血，正如不能因为脸上有一个小的痤疮就说这张脸不美，所需做的只是敷一点药膏而已。

Kurshid was looking forward to his planned visit to China next month.

Correspondingly, only eleven clicks from the readership were made to express anger, while 374 clicks express delight. Still, 46 clicks find the article (or the news) ridiculous. Both the “delight” and the “ridiculous” numbers are increasing quickly. Those readers who take the trouble to comment appear to be less conciliatory though.
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4. Emergency Radio Frequencies (older news)

On Monday, Central People’s Broadcasting Station (中央人民廣播電台, CPBS, now also known as China National Radio, but only the English name changed in 1998) started special emergency broadcasts in the wake of the Lushan earthquake. These were the first broadcasts of this kind, according to CPBS itself. A studio was established in the hardest-hit county of Lushan, broadcasting rescue information, expert interviews, news, psychological support and consolation, and practical information. Frequencies used were 9,800 kHz and 12,000 kHz on shortwave and 92.7 MHz on VHF/FM.

The 6th plenary session of the CCP’s 17th Central Committee^*)  had issued plans for such an emergency broadcasting system, and the plans were then included in the country’s 12th five-year plan, according to CPBS.

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Note

^*) the same plenary session adopted the party’s cultural decision, in October 2011.
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Xi Jinping, out of Town: Huanqiu Shibao quotes “Western Media” (i. e. Deutsche Welle)

China and Russia are most important strategic partners, the BBC quotes CCP secretary general and Chinese state chairman Xi Jinping, who has started a tour of Russia, Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo today. While in Africa, Russia will remain on his agenda on foreign relations, too – Xi will attend the fifth Brics summit from March 26 to 27 in South Africa.

Fenghuang (Hong Kong) coverage of Xi’s arrival in Moscow here »

According to the Voice of Russia (VoR), one of the aims in advancing the two countries’ partnership is to boost mutual trade turnover to 100 billion dollars by 2015. Energy issues, local economic cooperation and social events, including a meeting with students of the Lomonosov State University are on the agenda, according to VoR. According to the broadcaster, China has become Russia’s largest trade partner for the second year in a row.

Xi is scheduled to meet with Russian president Vladimir Putin, prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, Federation Council chairwoman Valentina Matviyenko, Duma (parliament) chairman Sergey Naryshkin “and other leaders”, as well as friends from all ways of life in Russia, writes Xinhua newsagency. He will also deliver a speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, and meet Russian sinologists, according to Xinhua. International affairs aren’t ranking high in the descriptive Xinhua article, but Russian president is quoted from a telephone record with Xi of March 14 as saying that Russian-Chinese relations were among the important factors of safeguarding world peace and stability, and carrying particular significance.

Huanqiu Shibao quotes a Russian deputy foreign minister as describing Xi’s visit to Russia as a “major event” in the two countries’ relationship. The deputy foreign minister added that Moscow had made careful preparations for the visit. Western media said that Xi’s choice of Russia as his first foreign destination was “no surprise” (“不意外”), writes Huanqiu. One after another, Western media believed that the intentions behind China’s arrangements made people wonder.

“Are China and Russia going to sign big energy contracts?” “Is Beijing turning back to the [old] strategic center of gravity with Moscow” to respond to the shift of America’s strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region?” The guesses and speculations by Western analysts, with seven mouths and eight tongues (七嘴八舌), look as if they were x-raying Sino-Russian relations.

俄副外长里亚布科夫21日用“两国交往中的大事件”形容这次访问，并称莫斯科已为迎接习主席做好万全准备。西方媒体大多对中国国家主席上任后首先访俄“不 意外”，同时纷纷认为北京的安排用意极深，耐人琢磨。“中俄要签能源大单？”“北京要用‘战略重心重返莫斯科’回应‘战略重心重返亚太’的美国？”西方分 析家七嘴八舌的猜测就像在给中俄关系做X光检测。

As for Xi Jinping’s visit to Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo, after his stay in Russia, and the “Sino-African approaches” (“中非走近”), following the “Sino-Russian embrace”, have gone hot in Western public opinion. “Westerners are tossing lots of question marks, but essentially, their curiosity is only about one thing. That is how big a country China will be in the next ten years”, says Chinese scholar Jin Canrong.

由于习主席访俄后将访问坦桑尼亚、南非和刚果(布) ，“中非走近”已尾随着“中俄拥抱”在西方舆论中迅速变热。“西方人抛出的问号很多，但实质上他们的好奇只有一个。那就是未来十年，中国会做一个怎样的大国。”中国学者金灿荣说。

In fact, Germany’s former foreign broadcaster and current media platform Deutsche Welle (DW) describes Xi’s visit to Russia as his unsurprising international debut. Deutsche Welle also quotes Gu Xuewu of the University of Bonn with pretty much the remarks about deepening military cooperation in the face of the US “pivot to Asia” that had been noted by Huanqiu Shibao’s “Western media” review.

However, much of what the DW article says is simply not quoteable for Huanqiu Shibao: fair weather friends, unsentimental partnership of convenience, or a trip to Moscow that was was symbolic in nature. Not to mention the demographic development in the Far East, viewed by the Russian side with unease.

And obviously, Huanqiu provides no link to the DW article – nor do they mention the old enemy broadcaster as their online source.

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Related

» VoR Chinese frequencies, swldxbulgaria, March 14, 2013
» CRI Russian frequencies, swldxbulgaria, March 14, 2013
» No Bullying, July 19, 2012
» Now Africa’s largest trading partner, BBC, May 22, 2012
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Vietnamese Spratly Patrol Flights: Let’s Talk about War, but Don’t Get Burned

Vietnam People’s Air Force Sukhoi Su-27 ‘Flankers’ have mounted their first patrols of the disputed Spratly Islands (Link is in Vietnamese) from their base at Phu Cat,

the Base Leg Blog quotes Vietnamese portal Thanh Vien online on Tuesday. Thanh Vien had published the newslet on Saturday.

Also on Tuesday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei reportedly told a news conference that Vietnam’s recent action was a serious violation of China’s sovereignty.

The spokesman urged Vietnam to strictly abide by the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, avoid actions escalating or complicating the situation, and make efforts to safeguard regional peace and stability,

Sina English quoted Hong Lei.

The declaration Hong referred to was signed in Phnom Penh in November 2002, by China’s special envoy and former vice foreign minister Wang Yi, and by the foreign ministers of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (i. e. between ASEAN and China). Among a number of points, the signatory states reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (3), undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or use of force (4), and undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features (5).

As there is no agreement about whose claims on the South China sea are legitimate, the Declaration basically defines a code of conduct in handling the uncertainties.

In February 2010, Edward Wong wrote in the New York Times that the most vociferous claimants were Vietnam and China. It had also been Vietnam who had been

pushing hard behind the scenes to bring more foreign players into negotiations so that China will have to bargain in a multilateral setting with all Southeast Asian nations that have territorial claims in the South China Sea. This goes against China’s preference, which is to negotiate one on one with each country.

In an interview with the Asahi Shimbun in spring or summer 2010, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Patrick Walsh said that China had started describing the South China Sea as its “core interest” – a term that had until then been reserved for Taiwan and Tibet.

Since then, Chinese officials have kept maintaining that multilateral initiatives, i. e. an internationalized rather than a bilateral approach to resolving the South China Sea disputes, would only complicate the issues. In a comparatively blunt statement, Chinese vice foreign minister Cui Tiankai was quoted by Phoenix Satellite Television (HK) in June 2011 that a few countries were playing with fire, and he hoped that America wouldn’t burn itself.

In July that same year, ASEAN and China drafted another agreement, setting out somewhat more specific guidelines for the implementation of their 2002 declaration, and in October 2011, China’s and Vietnam’s party leaders, Hu Jintao and Nguyen Phu Trong, signed yet another – and bilaterally negotiated – document, the Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues.

War scenarios are only publicly discussed in the Chinese media, but even then, Yin Zhuo (尹卓), a special commentator (not a politician) who provided the public with startegic information on Huanqiu Online Television on Wednesday, expressed hope that

we are both socialist countries, friendly neighbors, and things must not get to such a state [of military conflict]. Of course, China doesn’t work into that direction, but you, the Vietnamese, must not push China into that direction.
但是我们想双方都是社会主义国家，大家是友好邻邦，不要走到这个地步上。当然中国不会向这个方向努力，但是你越南人不要把中国逼到这个位置上去。

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Related

» FMPRC Press Conference Topics, June 15, 2012
» Scarborough Shoal: “Equivalent Action”, South Sea Conversations, May 15, 2012
» Having Fun, China Rises, Sep 5, 2008

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Japan and Vietnam announce Rare-Earths Research Center

Japan and Vietnam have announced the establishment of a rare-earths research and technology transfer center in Hanoi’s Danfeng County, aimed at reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths, reports the BBC‘s Chinese website. The center will train Vietnamese workers on how to extract rare earths. An agreement to this end had been signed in October last year, between Vietnam’s head of government Nguyen Tan Dung and Japanese prime minister Yoshihiko Noda. Vietnam’s Geology and Minerals Department (ministry) statistics are quoted as saying that Vietnam is one of the countries with the biggest (potential) rare earth resources worldwide.

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi gave assurances in October last year that Beijing would remain a “reliable supplier” of the high-tech ores, according to a BBC report back then, possibly under the impression of a WTO ruling of July that year which didn’t apply to the earths in question, but to a similar dispute about other categories of minerals exported (or not exported) by China. But by then, Japanese companies dependent on what seems to constitute a virtual current Chinese monopoly on rare earths had begun to look for suppliers outside China, including Indian suppliers.

Under the (probably correct) impression that China had begun to link bilateral disputes with Japan, and Japan’s dependence on mineral imports from China, the Economist, usually a more mild critic of Beijing, railed against an especially nefarious turn in the Chinese government’s response to Tokyo, as China

apparently suspended its export of rare-earth minerals, which are vital to making electronics components used in everything from handheld gadgets to cars. On September 23rd China emphatically denied that it is blocking exports. And this may be true: there probably isn’t a formal directive. But in a country where informal rules abound, exporters know that it can pay to withhold shipments—in solidarity with a government that is angry at its neighbour.

That was in summer 2010, and Japan had apparently succumbed to Chinese pressure – no charges were brought against a Chinese skipper, Zhan Qixiong, who had originally been accused of  deliberately bashing into two Japanese patrol boats. Apparent Japanese weakness vis-a-vis China was bad, the Economist mused.

China’s worst offense, from the perspective of those who advocate global trust – warranted or unwarrented – in the interest of unlimited international division of labor, had been that it politicized supplier-customer relations in a very sensitive field, i. e. the minerals Japan’s high-tech industries depend on heavily. No wonder that the Economist was angry.

As more ventures like [the Vietnamese-Japanese center] get off the ground, it will be interesting to see if China decides to lower its prices and change its rhetoric, writes The Register. But no such change should keep Japan and other high-tech producing countries from diversifying their supplies further.

Norwegian-Chinese Relations: a Panda is no Polar Bear

China wants to join the Arctic Council as a permanent observer, or in other words, to quote Scott Stearn‘s Voice of America (VoA) blogpost of June 5, “China wants a bigger say in the Arctic, where thinning ice is opening faster trade routes to Asia in a region that could hold 20 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas.”

Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States are permanent members of the council, which is a organization for discussion and research, and “not bound by any treaties”.

Other countries – the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Poland, and Spain – are “permanent observers”, and China has applied to become one in 2013.

But there seems to be a problem. “The political dialogue between Norway and China for the last one and a half years has been at a pretty low level”, Stearn quotes Norway’s foreign minister Jonas Gahr Stoere.

If Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Song Tao were quoted correctly, and if nothing important is left out, Beijing apprently wants to get permanent observers without a need to care about its relations with Norway:

Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Song Tao says Beijing hopes to “cooperate with relevant countries like Sweden and Iceland on issues of peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic.”

That lacks some context. Song apparently made his comments in connection with a visit by Chinese chief state councillor Wen Jiabao to Iceland and Sweden. Norway wasn’t part of Wen’s tour – and not mentioning Norway would be natural under these circumstances.

That Wen didn’t call on Norway, however,  is probably no coincidence. “Ever since the Norwegian Nobel Peace Prize Committee granted the prize to Chinese dissident Liu Ziaobo [sic - i. e. Liu Xiaobo], China has frozen relations with the country”, Barents Observer wrote in April.

Given that the Arctic Council is a rather informal group, China will have access to other international bodies to push its interests concerning the Arctic. But that doesn’t keep Beijing from trying to become a permanent observer.

China isn’t easy to deal with (or no trifle – 不好惹, bùhǎorě), Taiwan News quotes “foreign media” – and apparently prefers to advance no views of its own. Instead, its article is basically a reflection of Stearn’s VoA blogpost.

But while Norwegian-Chinese relations on the political level may be as dead as rotten salmon, the two countries do keep a tradition of long-term, open and friendly cooperation in the field of science going (在科研和合作方面有着长期开放和友好合作的传统), notes Norway’s embassy in China.Oslo University, Bergen University, the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, the Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO), plus some other Norwegian institutions, work with the Chinese Academy of Science’s (CASS) Institute of Atmospheric Physics and the (Beijing) State Key Laboratory of Environmental Chemistry and Ecotoxicology, on six projects concerning climate and environmental resarch.

If you can’t hug the panda itself, try to hug its scientific leg instead. The only problem: how can you bring it home to a panda that it is no polar bear, especially when you can’t talk to its face?

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Related Tag: Liu Xiaobo.

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Sino-Vietnamese Communique on South China Sea: “No Hostile Forces shall destroy our Party and State Relations

China’s and Vietnam’s party leaders – Hu Jintao and Nguyen Phu Trong -  signed a document early this week, the Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues (关于指导解决中越海上问题基本原则协议). It’s a particular bilateral agreement between the two countries, and not the same one as an earlier agreement between ASEAN and China, the Implementation Guidelines for the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, of July this year.

International sources reported on the signing of the Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues as early as on Tuesday. The Chinese media seem to have followed with some delay. On Saturday night, it was CCTV‘s main evening newscast’s, Xinwen Lianbo‘s, turn:

CCTV Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播), October 15, 2011: Li Xiuping (李修平) bares her fangs (click picture for link while it lasts)

CCTV’s rendition was mostly the same as the following one, by Xinhua news agency.

Links within blockquotes inserted during translation – JR.

Xinhua Newsagency Net, Beijing, October 15, by reporters Xiong Zhengyan, Liang Linlin.

新华网北京１０月１５日电（记者熊争艳、梁淋淋）

China’s and Vietnam’s joint statement, issued on October 15, says that the two sides exchanged frank views on maritime issues, and emphasizes the friendly discussion and resolution of disputes, and the political will and determination to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.

中国与越南１５日发表联合声明说，双方就海上问题坦诚交换意见，强调通过友好协商与谈判解决争议、维护南海和平稳定的政治意愿和决心。

The statement believes that this will be in line with the fundamental interest of the two countries, and the aspirations of their people, beneficial for regional peace, cooperation and development. The two party and country leaders will regularly communicate and keep a dialog about maritime issues between their countries, and, from a high political and strategic level, properly handle and solve maritime issues.

声明认为，这符合两国根本利益和两国人民的共同愿望，有利于本地区的和平、合作和发展。两党两国领导人将就中越海上问题保持经常性沟通和对话，从政治和战略高度及时指导海上问题的妥善处理和解决。

The statement says that both sides spoke highly of the “Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues”, and believe that this agreement has great guiding significance for the proper handling and resolution of maritime issues, and will be conscientiously implemented by both sides.

声明说，双方积极评价两国签署《关于指导解决中越海上问题基本原则协议》，认为该协议的签署对妥善处理和解决海上问题具有重要的指导意义，将共同努力认真落实协议。

The statement says that both sides will, in accordance with the two party and country leaders consensus and the “Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues”, intensify talks, seek mutually acceptable basic and lasting approaches to solutions, and actively pursue transitional and temporary approaches which will not affect either side’s respective positions and views, including active exploration and discussion of common development issues.

声明说，双方将根据两党两国领导人共识和《关于指导解决中越海上问题基本原则协议》，加大海上问题的谈判力度，寻求双方均能接受的基本和长久的解决办法，并积极探讨不影响各自立场和主张的过渡性、临时性解决办法，包括积极研究和商谈共同开发问题。

The statement says that the two sides will steadily promote discussion of Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf) sea border issues, and at the same time acively discuss common exploitation issues within these waters. They will actively promote maritime environmental protection, scientifc research, search-and-rescue operations, oil and gas exploration, disaster prevention and other fields of cooperation.

声明说，双方将稳步推进北部湾湾口外海域划界谈判，同时积极商谈该海域的共同开发问题。积极推进海洋环保、海洋科研、海上搜救、油气勘采、减灾防灾等领域的合作。

The statement says that before a final settlement of the maritime issues, both sides will work for the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea, remain cool-headed and self-restrained,  and will take no action that would complicate or aggravate the dispute. They will allow no hostile forces to destroy the relations between the two parties and countries, and will handle emerging issues in a constructive manner, not letting them affect the relations between the two parties and the two countries, or peace and stability in the South China Sea.

声明说，在海上争议最终解决前，双方共同维护南海和平稳定，保持冷静和克制，不采取使争端复杂化、扩大化的行动。不让任何敌对势力破坏两党两国关系，并本着建设性的态度处理出现的问题，不使其影响两党两国关系和南海的和平稳定。

21 China News Net, a southern Chinese subsidiary of China Telecom, republished a Huanqiu Shibao article by Zhang Haiwen (张海文) and  Liu Qing (刘卿)  on Friday. It addresses the (apparently) main item of the party chairmens’ talks right away:

From the talks’ circumstances it can be seen that the leaders of both sides indicated the importance they attach to Sino-Vietnamese relations, and the continuing development of bilateral relations – which produced specific arrangements – has made it clear that the Chinese-Vietnamese relations are not “derailed”.

从会谈情况看，双方领导人都表明了对中越关系的高度重视，也对双边关系下一步的发展作出了具体部署和规划，这表明中越关系并未“脱轨”。

The two sides had shown a pragmatic attitude, the two authors laud the two party leaders, which was in line with Deng Xiaoping‘s “shelving disputes, common development” position (这符合邓小平提出的、我一贯坚持的“搁置争议、共同开发”主张).

Author Zhang Haiwen points out that she had always supported that kind of approach. Apparently, she’s deputy head (or director) of China Institute of Marine Development Strategy under the State Oceanic Administration. Indeed, the China Daily article quoting her in this capacity emphasizes the importance of a “bilateral approach”, even if Zhang herself isn’t quoted that way by China Daily. But in another article, on the issue’s legal aspects, she emphasizes that the  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was no appropriate standard by which the South China Sea issue could be resolved, and that China has always held that the disputes should be resolved through bilateral peaceful negotiations, based on historical facts and international laws, including the UNCLOS.

If Zhang had been part of Huanqiu‘s online collection of views on how to deal with China’s neighbors in the South China Sea dispute, she would have been counted into the “dovish” group there. That, of course, would only be true when taking Chinese domestic positions into account – no Chinese expert would (publicly) deviate from the CCP’s position in principle, anyway, which was declared a core interest some time in 2009 or 2010. A paper published in the Chinese Journal of International Law, written by Raul Pedrozo (a retired US naval officer) as an answer to an earlier paper by Zhang, suggested that

Zhang’s position on the EEZ [exclusive economic zones] exemplifies how Chinese scholars and government officials misuse the law to support China’s anti-access strategy in the maritime domain.

American involvement in the South China Sea disputes, Chinese deputy foreign minister Cui Tiankai said in June, would only made matters more complex.

That said, even if no hostile forces will be allowed to destroy the relations between the two parties and countries (China’s CCP and Vietnam’s CP – see Xinhua article at beginning of post), American aircraft carriers will remain welcome in the region. Vietnam not least will make sure. The issue won’t become a  merely bilateral one any time soon.

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Related

» Arrests after Demonstrations, Aug 22, 2011
» UNCLOS, UN.org, of December 10, 1982

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South China Sea: an Introduction (by Huanqiu, Wu Jianmin, Long Tao)

Huanqiu: To Strike or not to Strike

The following is a translation of an article by Wu Jianmin (吴建民, a former Chinese diplomat – further details at the end of this post), with a prior introduction to a whole set of opinions, by the publishing paper, Huanqiu Shibao. I’ll confine myself to translating the Introduction, and Wu’s opinion.

Wu’s article was the first in the Huanqiu series, dated June 22, and subscribes to the idea that “striking” at China’s neighbors in the South China Sea dispute is no option. This article belongs to the first section and also contains an interview with Wu, of September 13. The China Media Project (CMP), Hong Kong, translated portions of it into English. (They refer to a QQ re-publication of September 14, but it is the same interview.) The third article within that first – comparatively “dovish”  – section is by Sun Peisong (孙培松), an academic from Wu Jianmin’s native Jiangsu Province.

The second section contains two opinions which subscribe to a position where “action” would be an option if the occasion arose, but keeping to the traditional “principles” (坚持原则，伺机行事) otherwise. One of those opinions was written by Long Tao (龙韬, further details at the end of this post), on June 27, as an answer to Wu Jianmin’s opinion.

The third section contains three opinions, and belongs to the category “Now is the best time for striking” (现在是动武的最好时机). Interestingly, it contains another article by Long Tao, of September 27, three months after his previous one.

Huanqiu arranged the topical collection some time after publishing the initial, or all of the opinions.

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Huanqiu’s Introduction

Introduction: The South China Sea issue isn’t complicated at all. Before the United Nations announced that the South China Sea was rich with oil, it was calm and tranquil. Bordering countries recognized China’s sovereignty over it. But afterwards, neighboring countries claimed sovereignty in droves. According to a “China Youth Daily” report in July, Vietnam has occupied 29 of the islands and reefs, basically controlling the western Nansha waters; the Philippines occupied ten islands or reefs; Malaysia occupied three, and Indonesia announced that it had “sovereignty” over more than 80,000 square kilometers of traditional Chinese coastal and territorial waters. Only nine are controlled by our country: nine by the mainland, and one by Taiwan.

导语：南海问题并不复杂。早在1968年联合国宣称南海拥有丰富石油资源之前，南海一直“风平浪静”，周边各国承认南 海主权属于中国。但在此之后，南海周边国家纷纷提出对南海岛屿的主权要求。据《中国青年报》7月份报道，从上世纪70年代至今，越南占领了南沙29个岛 礁，基本上控制了南沙西部海域；菲律宾侵占了10个岛礁；马来西亚占领了3个岛礁；印度尼西亚宣布对8万多平方公里的中国传统海疆享有“主权”。而我国目 前实际控制岛礁仅9个：大陆8个，台湾1个。

As for the South China Sea disputes, Deng Xiaoping, in the 1980s, put forward the principle of  “sovereignty being ours, putting disputes aside, common exploitation, and China maintaining its peaceful rise”. But Vietnam, the Philippines and others time and again attacked China’s base line. Especially since this year, Vietnam, the Philippines and other neighboring countries kept taking a mile for being given an inch, India, Japan etc. also huddled into the act, made explorations, military exercises with growing arrogance. The situation is growing ever more serious.

对于南海争端，邓小平在上世纪80年代提出“主权在我，搁置争议，共同开发”的原则，中国坚持“和平崛起”。但越南、菲律宾等国则不肯罢休，一再冲击中国的底线。尤其今年以来，越南、菲律宾等南海周边国家在美国的支持下得寸进尺，印度、日本等国也“抱团”横插一脚，搞探测、搞军演，气焰日盛。南海局势日益严峻。

Various voices have emerged in our country, concerning this issue. There are scholars who advocate a continuation of the “peaceful rise”, determined not to strike. But other scholars advocate a resort to armed force, determined to strike back. To strike or not to strike? Let’s see what the scholars say.

对此，国内出现了不同的呼声。有学者主张继续“和平崛起”，坚决不能打。但有的学者则主张应该诉诸武力，坚决反击。打还是不打？看看学者们的说法。

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Wu Jianmin: Chinese Self-Restraint is a Kind of Self-Confidence
吴建民：南海争端，中国克制是种自信

[...]

The Chinese government has shown restraint, and some people are dissatisfied with that. They find this too soft, unfulfilled, and believe that a harder stance should be adopted. Some people even think that [military] strikes were in order. In my opinion, the self-restraint the Chinese government has shown is a kind of self-confidence.

中国政府所表现的克制，国内有些人不大满意。认为太软，不过瘾，应当采取强硬态度，有的人甚至认为应当打。在我看来，中国政府所表现出的克制，是一种自信。

This self-confidence stems from the way the world is changing, above all. The changing times have led to a new situation in international relations. The function of force in solving international disputes has declined. The three wars that began this century – in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, America leading the two former two, [are wars in which] America and western countries have absolute military superiority, and the countries they strike are poor and small countries. The result of these strikes is that America and other countries have gotten into predicaments never seen before. The current Libya war will also confirm this. The South China Sea is an issue inherited from history, and to talk war easily is not advisable. China’s leaders have emphasized that our country upholds the banner of peace, development and cooperation in international relations. This is very reasonable.

这种自信首先源于世界的变化。随着时代的变化，国际关系中出现了一些新的情况。战争在解决国际争端中的作用下降。本世纪所爆发的三场战争———阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争和利比亚战争，前两场战争都是美国带头打，美国和西方国家拥有绝对上的军事优势，打的是穷国、小国。打的结果是使美国等国家陷入前所未有的困境。正在进行的利比亚战争，也必将证明这一点。南海问题是历史遗留下来的问题，轻易言战是不可取的。中国领导人强调，我们中国人在国际关系中要高举和平、发展、合作的旗帜。这是很有道理的。

China’s self-confidence is also based on having held clear policies and guidelines on the South China Sea issue early on. In the 1980s, the guideline Comrade Deng Xiaoping gave us was “putting disputes aside, common exploitation”. The establishment of this guideline took the changing times into account, and was in accordance with the tidal current. It also took into account our fundamental common interests with our bordering neighbors. Despite the difficulties which have emerged in its implementation, history will prove this guideline to be the most sensible one.

中国的自信还来自于我们关于南海问题早就有明确的政策和方针。上世纪80年代，邓小平同志关于南海问题，给我们确立的方针是“搁置争议，共同开发”。这个方针的制定，考虑到时代的变化，符合时代的潮流。同时，也考虑到了我们同周边国家双方的根本利益。虽然执行起来有难度，但历史终将证明，这个方针是最明智的方针。

Our self-confidence also stems from the bigger picture. There are big and small truths in world affairs, and the small ones need to obey to the big ones. These so-called big truths set out from mankind’s overall interests, and the long-term and fundamental interests of the people in the region. The East Asian region is the world’s fastest-growing and most dynamic one. While the developed countries’ economies see a weak recovery, East Asian economic growth maintains vigorous momentum. This doesn’t only matter to the region, but to the world, as well. Also, even as we have these and those kinds of differences between the East Asian countries, the fact that we have common interests which are far greater than our differences must not be overlooked. Our relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries are just like that. In 2010, trade between China and Vietnam amounted to 26 billion US dollars, there were more than 600 Chinese direct investment projects in Vietnam, investment amounts agreed to reached more than two billion US dollars, and more than 2.5 million people crossed the border, either way. In 2010, China’s bilateral trade with the Philippines amounted to 27.7 billion US dollars, financial investment from Chinese companies in the Philippines was at 86 million US dollars. Behind these numbers stand the enormous common interests of  both sides, and these interests continue to grow.

我们的自信还来源于我们的大局观。世界上的事情有大道理和小道理，小道理服从大道理。所谓大道理是从人类的总体利益、本地区人民长远和根本利益出发的。东亚地区是全球经济中增长速度最快，最有活力的地区。今天在发达国家经济复苏乏力的时候，东亚地区经济仍然保持旺盛的增长势头。这不仅对本地区，而且对世界有重要意义。另一方面，我们同东亚地区各国之间，尽管有这样那样的分歧，但一个不容忽视的事实是，我们的共同利益，远远大于我们的分歧。我们与越南、菲律宾等国的关系也正是这样。2010年，中国和越南的贸易额近260亿美元；中国在越南的直接投资项目有600余个，协议投资金额达20多亿美元；双方每年人员往来256万人次。2010年，中国和菲律宾的双边贸易额为277亿美元，中国企业对菲律宾金融类投资达8600万美元。这些数字的后面是双方有着巨大的共同利益，这些共同利益还在继续增长。

With China’s rise, we will see all kinds of problems and challenges arise. This is inevitable and was to be expected. Facing these challenges, we must observe them calmly, and consider them comprehensively. Our feelings must not sway us, or make us act rashly. We must not deal with today’s issues by using the old days’ ideas of war and revolution. By doing so, we would commit an epochal mistake.

随着中国的崛起，我们面临的各种问题和挑战会多起来。这是必然的，也是预料之中的事情。面临这些挑战我们一定要冷静观察，通盘考虑。切忌意气用事，切忌用战争与革命时代的旧思想来处理今天的问题，那样会犯时代错误。

China must maintain the momentum of its development; this is what we have accumulated in a struggle of more than one-hundred years. It will take another thirty or fifty years for China to rise to her feet. This is the Chinese people’s greatest interest in the twenty-first century. To maintain the momentum of development requires us to maintain external cooperation.

中国要保持自己的发展势头，这是我们经过100多年的奋斗所积累和创造的。保持这个势头，中国再有30年、50年就起来了。这是中国人在21世纪最大的利益。保持发展势头必须保持对外合作。

In short, we must include the momentum of cooperation with neighboring countries. The self-restraint shown by the Chinese government is in line with the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the people in the region, with the global tidal currents, and absolutely tenable.

综上所述，包括同周边国家合作的势头。中国政府在南海问题上表现出的克制，是符合中国和本地区各国人们根本利益的，也是符合世界潮流的，是完全站得住脚的。

(The author is a member of the European Academy of Sciences, the European and Asian Academy of Science, and chairman of the Shanghai Center for International Studies.)
（作者是欧洲科学院院士、欧亚科学院院士、上海国际问题研究中心主席。）

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Wu Jianmin also served as China’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva,  and to France. At least one Huanqiu reader remembers the station in his career as the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman: Ma opposes, Wu, too. In September, Huanqiu Shibao published an interview with Wu, which engendered no friendly reception from Huanqiu’s (frequently nationalist) commenters. Portions of the interview were translated into English by the China Media Project (CMP), Hong Kong, as mentioned above.

Wu’s article had been published by Huanqiu on June 22. On June 27, Long Tao (龙韬), a strategist with the China Energy Fund Committee (中华能源基金委员会战略分析师), wrote a reply to the contrary. I’m not going to translate it, but there is an article in English by Long Tao on the Global Times which is to some extent a re-hash of his earlier answer to Wu Jianmin, titled “Time to Teach those around China Sea a Lesson” (September 29).

If someone else translates Long Tao’s reply to Wu Jianmin (or any other of the opinions in the collection), drop me  a line, and I will link to your translations.

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Related

» Strategic Partnership with Vietnam (soundfile), All India Radio, September 19, 2011
» In Tune with the Current Era, June 8, 2011
» 35,000 Yuan for an Obedient Wife, January 30, 2010

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China, Myanmar, WTO: Dependence, Low-End Exports, and Friendly Consultations

The government has suspended work on the controversial Myitsone dam as a result of widespread public protest over its likely environmental and social impact,

reports the Myanmar Times.

Myitsone Dam under Construction, Wikimedia Commons (click on photo for source)

China News Service (中国新闻网) reported on Sunday (October 2, 2011, 00:41 GMT) that

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei (洪磊) told a press conference today that the Myitsone electric plant project is a joint Sino-Chinese project which went through scientific demonstration and strict examination. The matters concerned should be properly handled through friendly consultations between the two sides.

中国外交部发言人洪磊今天回答记者问时说，密松电站是中缅两国的合资项目，经过了双方的科学论证和严格审查。对项目实施过程中的有关事宜，应由双方通过友好协商妥善处理。

Q: According to reports, Myanmar’s parliament announced on September 30 that during president Thein Sein’s tenure, the Sino-Myanmarnese cooperative  Myitsone electric plant  project will remain shelved. What is the Chinese side’s comment on this?

据报道，9月30日，缅甸联邦议会宣布吴登盛总统在其任期内搁置中缅两国密松电站合作项目。中方对此有何评论？

A: The Chinese government has always supported Chinese companies in developing cooperation with companies abroad, based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, and demanded that Chinese companies should perform in strict accordance with those countries’ law and regulations, to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations, and urges governments in pertaining countries to guarantee the Chinese companies’ legal legitimate rights and interests. The Myitsone power plant is a project jointly invested by China and Myanmar, and went  through the scientific demonstration and strict examination of both sides. The matters concerned should be properly handled through friendly consultations between the two sides.

中国政府一贯支持中国企业本着相互尊重、平等互利原则同其他国家企业开展合作，并要求中国企业严格按照所在国法律法规履行责任和义务，敦促有关国家政府保障中国企业的合法和正当权益。密松电站是中缅两国的合资项目，经过了双方的科学论证和严格审查。对项目实施过程中的有关事宜，应由双方通过友好协商妥善处理。

Also on Sunday (Saturday, 18:07 GMT), People’s Daily‘s Bangkok correspondent Ji Peiyuan (暨佩娟) quoted Myanmar media:

According to Myanmar media reports, Burmese parliament announced on September 30 that during president Thein Sein’s tenure, the Sino-Myanmarnese cooperative  Myitsone electric plant  project will remain shelved. Thein Sein said: “Myanmar’s government is elected by the people, therefore, we have to pay attention to the will of the people. We are obliged to focus on settling the people’s worries and misgivings.”

Thein Sein said that the Myitsone electric plant  project could harm [or destroy, 破坏] the natural landscape, the livelihoods of the local people, the private capital in the cultivation of rubber plantations and crops, and collapsing dams, caused by climate change, could also damage the livelihoods of the people near the Myitsone plant, and further down the river. He also said that the Myanmar government would consult with the Chinese government to avoid harming Sino-Myanmar bilateral relations and friendship.

Myanmar Myitsone hydropower plant is worth 3.6 billion US dollars, and is about 200 kilometers away from Tengchong County in Yunnan Province. and is a major hydropower by the China Power Investment Corporation, in the region of Myanmar’s Irrawaddy River. It’s located in the Kachin mountainous region and to be developed at the 干流河段 section of the Irrawaddy River, with a capacity of six million kilowatts.

The rest of People’s Daily’s report reflects the statement made by Chinese foreign ministry Hong Lei (see this post’s initial paras).

The BBC reported that a letter by president Thein Sein had been read out in parliament, announcing the decision to suspend the project. The project had fuelled fighting between the army and ethnic Kachin rebels. The BBC quotes its South East Asia correspondent Rachel Harvey as saying that the decision appears to be further evidence of the new leadership’s desire to seek legitimacy by being more open to public opinion.

Both continuing the project in the long run (completion was originally scheduled for 2019), and its abandonment, would pose many problems. Continuation would reportedly have a negative impact on biodiversity, as frequently reflected by organizations like the Burma Rivers Network, it may come with side effects as many other mega dams from the Aswan Dam in Egypt to the Three-Gorges dam in China have, and rebel movements in the region could make the Myitsone project vulnerable to sabotage. Besides the mythological weight the river carries, forced relocations, and the loss of means of livelihood also seem to have driven opposition.

But Mynamar may have good reasons to keep consultations with Beijing as friendly as possible. Even if Yangon (or Naypyidaw) flatly refused to pay damages (if legally obliged to do so), business with its powerful neighbor would suffer. China sees itself a s a victim of trade protectionism, and this case, if it becomes a high-profile bone of contention, would add to that.

On the other hand, the further process may also make it clear to Beijing that mere deals with third-world countries’ regimes may not be sustainable. If China’s rulers understand that is a different question. Protectionism and resource nationalism had been on the rise and hampered Chinese business, official Xinhua news agency reported in September, citing an Ernest & Young report. Obviously, China was a “victim” of trade protectionism (贸易保护主义最大受害者).

There is grumbling among China’s academia, too. On the tenth anniversary of China’s accession to the WTO, People’s University (aka Renmin University) professor Gu Genliang (贾根良) questioned China’s foreign trade approach of importing high-end products and exporting low-end products (进口高端产品并出口低端产品).

By exporting hydropower to China, Myanmar would follow a path similar to the one Gu Genliang deems harmful. China, Gu Genliang (and many other Chinese people, academics or not) feel that they are being exploited, especially by America, of course.

[Update, April 11, 2012: the linked website, Utopia, is currently offline.  Apparently, Wu Genliang's article can also be found here.]

Gu also fears foreign blackmail:

We are mired in heavy dependence on foreign resources and on on our own cheap exports. Large-scale low-end exports consume a lot of energy and natural resources, which led to our country’s dependence on foreign energy and resources which not only made the prices for these sources explode, which transferred the fruits of our people’s hard work into the hands of energy-exporting countries, but also has the potential of making us suffer from foreign countries’ embargos, thus carrying a huge security risk. At the same time, while our country is so reliant on foreign resources, it is ridiculous that we are exporting large quantities of rare earths and minerals coal, etc. at low prices.

第五，深陷对外部资源的严重依赖和本国资源廉价出口的陷阱。低端产品的大量出口是以大量消耗能源和自然资源为基础的，这导致了我国对外能源和资源的高度依赖，这种高度依赖不仅导致了能源和资源的价格暴涨把我国人民辛苦劳动的成果转移到资源出口国手中，而且潜伏着遭遇外国对我国实施资源禁运的巨大经济安全风险。同时，令人感到荒谬的是，在我国深陷对外部资源的严重依赖的同时，我国的大量资源如稀土、煤炭等却被大量地廉价出口。

The WTO ruled in July that Chinese export restrictions on certain raw minerals violated global rules

Gu spells out the conditions under which China’s WTO membership could still be useful – or those under which it should consider leaving the organization.

Myanmar is still a long way from even joining.

But maybe, at least, it will stop exploiting China’s dependence on energy, and pull the plug on the Myitsone project for good.

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Related

» The Government had little Choice, Asia Times, Oct 4, 2011
» Vietnam: Under Threat of Invasion, April 29, 2009

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Updates / Related

» Aung San Suu Kyi Cautious, BBC, Oct 3, 2011

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