Human Rights Activism, Updates

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1. Zeng Jinyan

Zeng Jinyan‘s (曾金燕) blog Liaoliao Yuan came back on March 22, after many months of hibernation:

“Liaoliao Yuan” turned into an important platform to “searching Hu Jia” and to “free Hu Jia”. But to advocate the safety and freedom of defenders of human rights is only part of my work. Under continuously increasing political pressure, to fall “silent” in the public sphere for a long time has been my basic policy. I was silent to avoid interference with my goal of practising what I advocate.

“了了园”长期以来已成为“寻找胡佳”和“释放胡佳”运动的一个重要平台。然而，提倡和保障人权捍卫者的安全自由只是我的工作的一部分。随着不断上升的政治压力，长时间在公共空间“沉默”是我的一项基本策略。沉默是为了身体力行排除干扰实现具体的工作目标。

I went to Hong Kong for half a year, I raised my daughter, focused on research, and I really like the atmosphere of science and research, and the professional support at the University of Hong Kong, but because I was so busy, I had no time to share [the experience] with all of you. Now I want to tell you that I am back, catching up on some scattered old news, and restarting the exchange on academics, life and social movements on online platforms.

赴港半年，抚养女儿，专心研究，我非常喜爱香港大学的学术研究气氛和专业支持，因为忙未能顾得上和大家分享。今天我想说，作为曾金燕，我回来了。补上一些散落各处的旧闻新事，重启基于网络平台的学术、生活和社会运动交流。

Zeng’s March-22 blogpost also contains a list of some past events and articles, and an outlook on activities planned this year.

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2. Liu Xiaobo and Family

Liu Xia‘s (刘霞) brother Liu Hui (刘晖) stood trial at the Huairou District People’s Court in a northern suburb of Beijing on Tuesday, on charges of fraud linked to a property transaction, Radio Free Asia reported, also on Tuesday. Liu Xia is the wife of Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), who is currently imprisoned in Liaoning Province. Liu Xia attended her brother’s trial on Tuesday.

Charges on commercial or economic offenses are frequently suspected to be politically motivated.

In November 2010, Zeng Jinyan, as the manager of Beijing Loving Source, an AIDS support group, had to close down the organization’s operations under a “tax inquiry”. Such inquiries and investigations had become frequent since summer 2009.

However, the tax office in charge apparently stated in August 2012 that it saw no tax illegality in the NGO’s operations from August 1, 2005 to December 31, 2009 – the period that had apparently been under investigation.
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Related

» Liu Xia defiant, Guardian, April 23, 2013
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Herrschaftswissen: Free or not, but “Engineered”

Wikileaks may have been useful in making some of the (Western or Arab) governments’ inside workings a bit more transparent – but it seems to me that what has been published by them doesn’t outweigh what is published by government themselves, or by their advisers, or by the mainstream press. We could have every government archive at our disposal, and would still face the problem of finding out what matters, and the problems of interpretation.

The Genius leads the spectators: engineering of consent in its early stages.

In this post, I will try to describe two examples of Herrschaftswissen, and one (rather old) example of methodology. A talk (not an article) on Wikipedia about enlightenment in Western secular tradition translates Herrschaftswissen as knowledge restricted to the rulers. I’m not sure if this should count as an exact translation, or just as a rough one.

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Example 1: David Cameron’s “Muscular Liberalism”

In February 2011, British prime minister David Cameron addressed the Munich Security Conference, an annual conference on international security policy held in Bavaria’s capital. It is an example of how politics and mainstream media work hand in hand – it was founded by a publisher in 1962, and that publisher was succeeded by a former high-ranking government bureaucrat in 1998.

In his speech, Cameron focused on radicalization among Muslims in many European countries. There isn’t much in the speech itself that I would object to, but what I view critically is the context of the speech.

While Cameron was focused on radical Islamists in Europe, the “Arab Spring” was in full swing. Cameron gave his talk on the eve of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war – a war described by the BBC‘s Jim Muir as a proxy struggle between the US-led western world and al-Qaeda international.

The West’s undertaking could also be described as a struggle to discern moderate and radically Islamist forces among the opposition fordes in Syria – a struggle European governments are facing at home, too. But that’s a problem the West could have spared itself. If Western governments (and their Arab and Turkish allies) succeeded in toppling Syria’s Baath regime and install a “moderate” new regime, chances are that the new regimes human rights record would be no better than that of the Baath party. Governments who encourage and support radicalism in mainly Muslim countries are hardly qualified to encourage moderation among Muslims in their own countries.

A few days ago, the European Union’s Counter-terrorism Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove told told the BBC that among the estimated 500 European citizens who were currently fighting in Syria, but most likely many of them will be radicalised there, will be trained.

When you want to undermine Islamist radicalization at home, the West’s strategy on Syria doesn’t look too reasonable. Those who Cameron purportedly wants to win over know very well how ambivalent muscular liberalism is about terrorism, when it is about practise, rather than about talk.

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Example 2. Trust in the CCP’s Central Committee

“Unity” is one of the supreme banners of the Chinese Communist Party. The downfall of Chongqing’s party chief Bo Xilai, only eight months ahead of the 18th National Congress of the CCP, came at a sensitive time. But if the power struggle about Bo Xilai was unpleasant or embarrassing already, the “visit” (or rather the tempoary getaway) of Chongqing’s Public Security Bureau head to the U.S. consulate in Chengdu in February 2012 should count as a PR disaster for the CCP.

The Chinese press had to pick up the pieces in the guidance of public opinion. Huanqiu Shibao, a CCP-owned but rather popularar Chinese paper, applied a mix of natural science (China’s rapid development is like a living body’s development, and there may always be some particulars we haven’t been familiar with) and orthodoxy (In China’s society of numerous and complicated voices, trust in the party’s central committee has become reason for society in its entirety). There was, Huanqiu elaborated, no contradiction between emancipation of mind and trust in the party’s central committee:

It is exactly for the diversity, for having several options, that we truly discover that trusting the party’s central committee, implementing the party’s road map, is more reliable than any other method other people may teach us, and more able to create the conditions that make the country and the individual develop.

This sounds like muscular socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Both Cameron and Chinese propaganda emphasize unity when it comes to fundamentals. The fundamentals are very different from each other, but the tools they are using to justify and legitimize their dominance are quite similar. However, Camaron’s game is easier to play than the CCP’s. When Chinese media openly bash dissidents, they risk getting unusually unharmonious responses from their recipients. When Cameron addresses radical Islamism, he will get his share of criticism, too, but that is nothing uncharacteristic in the British media.

And despite some inevitable criticism, when a European leader singles out radicalization among Muslims, chances are that the mainstream will respond rather favorably.

The problem for European politicians is that the political class is lacking the high degree of legitimacy – in view of the public – that it (reportedly) used to have. Or, as the Economist‘s Bagehot observed, the pomp of Margaret Thatcher‘s funeral met with shallow public interest. Even Mrs Thatcher’s enemies trusted that her motives were sincere, argues the Economist, but now all politicians are distrusted.

Not just among radical or not so radical Muslims. But if you pick a frequently disliked minority as Cameron does, you may still strike a chord with an increasingly resentful majority.

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3. Engineering of Consent

In 1955, an American public-relations counsel, Edward L. Bernays, wrote an article, summarizing what he referred to as the engineering of consent. Bernays didn’t necessarily invent it, but at the time when he wrote about it, he had probably been among the most successful thinkers about and propagandists and practitioners of the concept for decades. The engineering of consent should under no circumstances [...] supersede or displace the functions of the educational system, either formal or informal, Bernays wrote, in bringing about understanding by the people as a basis for their action. Rather, engineering of consent supplemented the educational process.

But in the previous paragraphs, Bernays had also written that

[..] it is sometimes impossible to reach joint decisions based on an understanding of facts by all the people. The average American adult has only six years of schooling behind him. With pressing crises and decisions to be faced, a leader frequently cannot wait for the people to arrive at an even general understanding. In certain cases, democratic leaders must play their part in leading the public through the engineering of consent to socially constructive goals and values. This role imposes upon them the obligation to use the educational processes, as well as other available techniques, to bring about as complete an understanding as possible.

Bernay’s essay leaves it essentially to the adopters how to make use of the toolkit he provided. Given that the tools are highly effective, it is obvious that they aren’t only used when the gap between public understanding and necessity (problem-solving) can’t be bridged in time, but whenever opportunists finds the engineering useful. Or, to put it more catchy: the dumber a policy, the dumber the public needs to be, and all the more, engineering of consent needs to supersede education.

Both democratically-elected and totalitarian politicians appear to be keen adopters, and it would be for the public itself to become more informed, to judge if the actons of politicians are in the public interest, or if they are not.

But the opposite is the case. While many European middlebrows regard the political class and their techniques as ethically rotten or even detest them for the manipulation, they are themselves adopters of spin-doctoring, too. Many blogs,  comments and other expressions of (political) opinion seem to apply the means and methods used by the political class to make their case. There seems to be an ambivalence among the ruled about the desire to belong to the political class, and to refute it.

Not to mention Wikileaks. Wikileaks doesn’t “educate”, either.

In that regard, the average Chinese netizen appears to be more aware of the manipulation he or she is subjected too, than the Western subject to the same PR technology – Chinese awareness states itself in terms like “we’ve been harmonized” [by Chinese authorities or media]. Or, when Huanqiu Shibao wrote in 2012 that opinion poll results published by American Gallup  showed that during the preceding three years, among the five BRIC states’ population, the Brazilians and Chinese had been most satisfied with their living standards, and only the Chinese felt during three successive years that the living standard had continuously improved, a commenter laconically replied that he had been satisfied (in a passive-voice sense) by the Americans. In certain ways, the experience of living under a totalitarian government seems to stimulate clear-sightedness.

Bernays reportedly liked to close his speeches and talks with an invariable summary: And everybody is happy.

There may not be a great future for public happiness. But quite probably, there is one for the engineering of consent.

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Related

» Battle of Opinion, Feb 13, 2013

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Huanqiu Shibao: Why the Retired Pope’s “China Dream” remained unachieved (2) – the British did it, too

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« Previous (first) part of translation, plus some remarks.

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Subtitle: The Vatican’s continues to keep “Diplomatic Relations” with Taiwan and interferes in China’s domestic Catholicism
梵蒂冈与台湾保持“外交关系”，干涉中国国内的天主教

Main Link: Why the Retired Pope’s “China Dream” remained unachieved, Huanqiu Shibao, March 5, 2013

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

After the opium war, foreign missionaries, under the protection of powers’ gunboats and unequal treaties, entered China one after another, built churches and proselytize “freely”. Some of the missionaries, in violation of the rules of the God who had sent them to save “Chinese souls”, acted in full complicity with aggressive powers. Dressed in the coats of religion, they did many bad things, seriously damaging the image of the Christian religion, and giving rise to the Chinese people’s indignation.

鸦片战争之后，外国传教士在西方列强的炮舰和不平等条约庇护下，纷纷进入中国，建造教堂，“自由”传教。其中有些传教士违背了上帝派他们来拯救中国人民“灵魂”的旨意，充当了列强侵略中国的帮凶。他们披着宗教外衣，做了不少坏事，严重损毁了基督教的形象，引起中国人民愤慨。

After the establishment of the PRC, the Vatican refused recognition and crudely interfered in Chinese internal political affairs. In 1952, China suspended [or broke off - 中断] all official relations with the Vatican, banned Catholic churches, condemning their conspiracy with the forces of imperialism’s attempts to subvert New China. — The Vatican officially recognized Taiwan. The huge number of patriotic Catholics resolutely took the road of the independently and autonomously-run church. Our country established the “Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association“, the “Three-Self Patriotic Movement of the Protestant Churches in China”, and others. These organizations were acknowledged by the government, government-funded, and also accepted governmental administration. Their fundamental purpose is to love religion and to love the country, to obey the law, and “to love both God and the country”.

中华人民共和国成立，梵蒂冈拒不承认并对中国内政进行粗暴干涉。1952年中国中断了与梵蒂冈所有官方关系，取缔了天主教堂，谴责其串通帝国主义势力企图颠覆新中国……梵蒂冈正式承认了台湾。中国广大爱国天主教徒决心走独立自主办教会的道路。我国先后建立了“天主教爱国会”、“基督教三自爱国会”等。这些组织得到政府承认、政府资助、也接受政府的行政管理。其根本宗旨是爱教爱国、遵纪守法，“既爱上帝，也爱国家”。

The “Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association was established in 1958. In 1982, the “Bishops Conference of Catholic Church in China” was established as Chinese Catholic regional leadership institution. Most importantly, the “Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association” has the right to independently appoint bishops. The “Three-Self Patriotic Movement” purpose is: self-governance, self-support and self-propagation, principles of independence and autonomy in its operations, guiding the entire country’s Christians to love religion and to love the country, to glorify God, to abide by the constitution, to carry forward the noble morality and practices, etc.. In fact, as early as during the 1rst World War, British Anglican priest Ài Lún [obviously an English name, but unknown to me], relating to the “New Testament”, called for the independence of churches from all countries, issuing the “Three-Self” position. China is a secular country, all religions have always been administrated in accordance with the law, and received legal protection.

“中国天主教爱国会”于1958年成立。1982年组建“中国天主教主教团”，为中国天主教各教区的领导机构。最重要的是“中国天主教爱国会”有独立任命主教的权力。“基督教三自爱国会”的宗旨是：自治、自养、自传，独立自主自办教会的原则，带领全国基督徒爱国爱教、荣神益人，遵守宪法，弘扬高尚的道德风尚等。实际上，早在一次世界大战期间，英国圣公会教士艾伦就诉诸《新约》而呼吁各国教会独立，提出“三自”主张。中国是一个世俗国家，各种宗教历来都是依法管理，受到法律保护。

Some people may ask: does China have the right to autonomously administer the churches? Yes, of course it has. Anglicanism is the obvious example. England’s rejuvenating and wise Queen Elizabeth I.’s father Henry VIII. (1491 – 1547), dissatisfied with the Roman Pope’s refused permission to divorce his Spanish wife (she didn’t give birth to a child, which could have led to the throne succession rights to his Spanish adversaries), he angrily had England break away from the Roman church and established England’s own national church, the “Church of England” or “Anglican Church”. This is the origin of the Church of England. The English kings and queens were made the top leaders of the church. To this day, the British Queen keeps the title of “Protector of the Christian Faith” [actual title: Defender of the Faith].

有人会问：中国有办理教会的自主权吗？当然可以。英国国教就是明显例证。英国兴国明君—女王伊丽莎白一世的父亲亨利八世（Henry Ⅷ,1491—1547）因为不满罗马教皇不批准他与其西班牙妻子离婚（因为她没有生育，英国王位的继承权可能旁落到其对手西班牙王室的手中），他一气之下，使英国脱离了罗马教会，组建了英国自己的民族教会，即“英格兰圣公会”或“安立甘教会”。这就是英国国教（Church of England）的来历。英国国王把自己封为教会的最高领导人。迄今，英国女王伊丽莎白二世还保留着“基督教保护者”头衔。

The Vatican even hopes to include the religious churches of a country with diplomatic relations into the Vatican’s “Confucian orthodoxy” system, with the Pope [unitarily - 统一] appointing that country’s bishops in all dioceses, and setting the methods by which they should lead and administer [the dioceses]. This leads to contradictions with Chinese Catholicism’s current “three-self” principles which are hard to dispel. The Vatican firmly opposes the “three-self” and acknowledges the Taiwanese government, and excommunicates the Catholic bishops acknowledged by the Chinese government.

而梵蒂冈则更希望将缔交国的天主教会纳入梵蒂冈的“道统”体系，既由教皇统一任命该国各教区的主教，规定其领导和管理方式。这和中国天主教目前的“三自”原则有难以消解的矛盾。梵蒂冈坚决反对“三自”，并承认台湾政府，将获得中国政府承认的主教开除出教会。

To be continued.

Huanqiu Shibao: Why the Retired Pope’s “China Dream” remained unachieved (1)

Catholicism isn’t a big religion in China, but there seem to be several millions of Catholic Christians – organized inside or outside the official “Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association”.

This topic is unchartered territory to me, and mistakes in the following translation(s) are not unlikely. This is a translation of the first chapter of a topical page on Huanqiu Shibao. I haven’t made up my mind yet if I should translate the remaining chapters, too. But it seems to be an attractive topic, also in the light of soft-power issues — JR

[Observation: there seems to be a rather thoughtful - by Huanqiu Shibao commenter standards, that is - discussion going on in the thread underneath the topical page.]

[Links within blockquotes added during translation.]

Main Link: Why the Retired Pope’s “China Dream” remained unachieved – 退位教皇为何没圆“中国梦”, Huanqiu Shibao, March 5, 2013

Introduction: On February 28, 2013, in the evening, Roman Pope Benedict XVI formally relinquished the papal duties, thus becoming the first “retiring” Pope in 600 years. It is also the fifth “retiring” Pope in history. Benedict XVI, during his “reign” of six years, tried to improve Chinese-Vatican relations and to establish diplomatic relations with China, but up to his “retirement”, this hadn’t been achieved. What are the origins of this City of Shang Di‘s relations with China?

导语：2013年2月28日晚间，罗马教皇本笃十六世正式卸下教皇职务，成为600年来首个“退位”的教皇，也是历史上第五个“退位”的教皇。教皇宣布辞职后引发的舆论震动一直在全世界激荡。本笃十六世“在位”时曾试图改善中梵关系，与中国建交，但直到“退位”仍未实现。梵蒂冈这个“上帝之城”与中国之间到底是怎样的关系渊源？

In 1582, xx years into the reign of Emperor Ming Wanli, Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci was sent to Macau to learn Chinese. In 1583, he founded a Catholic missionary base in Zhaoqing to introduce mathematics, geometry mechanics and similar science to the Chinese people. He studied China’s “Four Books and Five Classics”, went deep into the study of Chinese traditional culture, wore the Han Chinese clothing and said that to be a missionary, one had “to do as the Romans do”. Ricci came to Beijing in 1601, he was in charge of the construction of the Xuanwumen Church, and died in Beijing in 1610. Ricci was a brilliant man of wide learning, and a pioneer of Chinese-Western cultural exchange.

1582年（明万历10年），意大利人、耶稣会会士利玛窦被派到澳门学习汉语。1583年他在肇庆创立第一个天主教传教点，向中国人介绍数学、几何学和力学等科学知识。他苦读中国的《四书》《五经》，深入研究中国传统文化，穿汉服，提出传教要“入乡随俗”，使用汉语举行宗教仪式，为基督教在中国传播奠定了基础。利玛窦于1601年来到北京，1605年主持建造了宣武门大教堂，1610年死于北京。利玛窦博学多才，是中西文化交流的先驱。

After the introduction of Catholicism into China, the so-called “disputes about the rites” (“礼仪之争”) broke out within Catholicism, with the focus on how to translate the appellation of “God” into Chinese, and how to deal with traditional Chinese traditional custom. Ricci believed that the appelation of “God”, besides using the term “Lord of Heaven/God” (天主), “Heaven” or “Shang Di” were also options, and that Chinese believers could retain traditional ancestoral and religious worship. But the Spanish Dominican missionaries and Franciscan missionaries believed that ancestoral and religious worship was idolatry and violated “biblical” rules. They thus sent people to the Holy See in Rome to complain about Ricci’s Jesuits there.

天主教传入中国之后，天主教内部产生了所谓“礼仪之争”，争论的焦点是如何翻译“神”的称谓和如何对待中国传统习俗。利玛窦认为，对于“神”的称谓，除了用“天主”之外，亦可称“天”或“上帝”并且同意中国信徒保留祭祖和祭孔的传统习俗。而西班牙多明我会传教士和方济各会传教士则认为，祭祖、祭孔属于偶像崇拜，违反《圣经》规定并派人到罗马教廷控告以利玛窦为首的耶稣会。

In 1700 (39 years into the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi), Kangxi entered the rites dispute and declared ancestoral worship (祭祖) and memorial ceremonies of Confucius (祭孔) weren’t parts of traditional Chinese traditional customs, and no religious activities. In 1704, Pope Clement XI publicly ordered the prohibition of ancestoral worship and memorial ceremonies of Confucius among followers of Catholicism, as well as the use of “Shangdi” and “Heaven” as other terms for “Lord of Heaven/God” (天主). He sent an envoy to China for talks. When papal special envoy Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon (铎罗) declared in 1706 that his mission to China was to ban ancestoral worship and memorial ceremonies of Confucius among Chinese Catholics, Emperor Kangxi was furious, believing that this move spelled interference in Chinese customs. He sent people to bring Maillard into a temporary residence in Nanjing and ordered the expulsion of missionaries who opposed Chinese rites, and also sent envoys to Rome for talks. In 1707, Maillard, in disregard of Kangxi’s decree, announced the papal ban. Therefore, Kangxi ordered Maillard to be taken to Macau to be held under house arrest there, and issued a decree: “tell the Westerners (西洋人) that from now on, if they don’t respect Matteo Ricci’s rules, they will not be allowed to reside in China and will be sent home.”

1700年（清康熙39年）康熙皇帝介入了礼仪之争，声明祭祖祭孔属于中国传统习俗，不属于宗教活动。1704年教皇克雷芒十一世公然下令，禁止中国教徒举行祭祖、祭孔等活动，禁止把“上帝”和“天”作为“天主”的别称并派特使来华谈判。1706年教皇特使铎罗声言，他来华的使命是禁止中国教徒祭祖、祭孔。康熙皇帝得知后大怒，认为此举属于干涉中国习俗，派人将铎罗送往南京暂住并下令驱逐反对中国礼仪的传教士，同时派使节前往罗马谈判。1707年，铎罗无视康熙的旨意，在南京宣布教皇禁令。于是，康熙下令把铎罗押往澳门软禁并降旨称：“谕众西洋人，自今以后，若不遵利玛窦之规矩，断不准在中国住，必逐回去。”

In 1715, Pope Clement XI reiterated the ban of 1645 – offenders [against the ban] would be punished for heresy (以异端论处). Kangxi was furious, ordering the arrest of the missionaries and a ban on missionizing. In 1719, the Pope sent a delegation to Beijing for talks again, but Kangxi refused a meeting and rebuked them: “You Westerners don’t understand Chinese writing, so how can you discuss the rights or wrongs of Chinese reason” (尔西洋人不解中国文字，如何妄议中国道理之是非) and “in future, Westerners must not proselityze in China, all of which will be prohibited” (以后不必西洋人在中国传教，禁止可也). Kangxi therefore ordered the expulsion of the guests. Rome’s Pope was forced to make concessions, and in 1720, he announced the “Eight Permissions”.^*) [The permissions] agreed to [the legitimacy of] non-religious Chinese rites. Kangxi ordered that only missionaries who were prepared to respect traditonal Chinese rites should reside in China, and banned overt missionary work. It wasn’t before 1939 that the Holy See in Rome revoked all bans on rites, thus bringing the dispute, which had lasted for more than 300 years, to an end. From this, it can be seen that the so-called “disputes about the rites” were completely caused by the Roman Popes’ ignorance of China.

1715年，教皇克雷芒十一世重申1645年的禁令，违者以异端论处。康熙大怒，下令拘捕传教士并禁止传教。1719年，教皇又派使团来北京谈判，康熙拒不接见并斥责说：“尔西洋人不解中国文字，如何妄议中国道理之是非”，“以后不必西洋人在中国传教，禁止可也。”于是康熙下令逐客。罗马教皇被迫让步，于1720年宣布“八项准许”。同意中国信徒举行非宗教性的中国礼仪。康熙下令只准许尊重中国礼仪的传教士居留中国并禁止公开传教。一直到1939年，罗马教廷才撤销了有关礼仪的一切禁令，为这场持续了300多年的争论画上了句号。由此可见，所谓“礼仪之争”，完全是由于罗马教皇对中国的无知造成的。

Continued here »

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Note

^*) According to other versions, it wasn’t the Pope who announced these “eight permissions”, but the delegate, John-Ambrose Mezzabarba. The “Eight Permissions” weren’t long-lived, and apparently overturned by Pope Benedict XIV, in 1742.

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Related

Hao Jinli, 1916 – 2011, March 28, 2011

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Cordial Conversations: Volunteering on Lei-Feng-Day

Shijiazhuang Daily (石家庄日报) is a paper from Hebei Province’s capital. It is the organ of Shijiazhuang’s CCP party committee and was established on November 18, 1947, six days after the the “People’s Liberation Army” had taken the city. Shijiazhuang Daily also runs a website which is clearly committed to the paper’s heritage. Shijiazhuang Daily and its online platform (Shijiazhuang News Net) aren’t unrivalled in their ideological orthodoxy, but they do live up to the former administrative region’s name of Chili, which, until 1928, included Hebei.

(CCTV cross-regional coverage, March 5, 2013)

Main Link:

Our City Focuses on Carrying out Various Kinds of Voluntary Services – 我市集中开展多形式志愿服务活动

Shijiazhuang News Net, March 6, 2013 —

Yesterday was the 51rst Learning-from-Lei-Feng commemoration day, and it was also fifty years ago that Mao Zedong made his “Learn From Comrade Lei Feng” speech. Yesterday morning, our city held various Lei Feng volunteering service activities.

昨日是第51个学雷锋纪念日，也是毛泽东发表题词“向雷锋同志学习”50周年。昨天上午，我市开展了多种形式的学雷锋志愿服务活动。

Own report (Wang Geng reporting). Yesterday Yesterday was the 51rst Learning-from-Lei-Feng commemoration day,and it was also fifty years ago that Mao Zedong made his “Learn From Comrade Lei Feng” speech. Yesterday morning, our city held various Lei Feng volunteering service activities. Permanent Provincial Party Committee member propaganda director Ai Wenli and municipal committee propaganda department director Sun Wanyong came to our city’s Times Park to participate in some voluntary tree-planting and other volunteer activities, gave the city a “Lei Feng Diary”, “Benefitting Hebei Province) and other books as gifts, advocated volunteer service and promoted the spirit of Lei Feng.

本报讯 （记者 王 更）昨日是第51个学雷锋纪念日，也是毛泽东发表题词“向雷锋同志学习”50周年。昨天上午，我市开展了多种形式的学雷锋志愿服务活动。省委常委、宣传部长艾文礼，市委常委、宣传部长孙万勇来到我市时光公园，参加了在此开展的义务植树等志愿活动，并向市民赠送了《雷锋日记》、《善行河北》等书籍，倡导志愿服务，宣扬雷锋精神。

Ai Wenli and his entourage first came to the park’s plaza to learn about the activities. More than twenty volunteer service groups were on the plaza, carrying out dental services, eyesight tests, Chinese massage, haircut and shaving, legal advice, car, mobile-phone and household appliances repairs, all in all nearly thirty volunteering activities. Ai Wenli had cordial converstations with the participants and Shijiazhuang citizens, asking them about their views and feelings about the Learning-from-Lei-Feng activities. In the park’s rockery, Ai Wenli took part in the task of planting trees and encouraged the volunteers who were with him: “there are more and more young people learning from Lei Feng who are born after the 1980s or 1990s, just like you. Lei Feng’s spirit will never go out of fashion and Lei Feng’s spirit must be inherited and developed ever further.”

艾文礼一行首先来到公园广场，了解志愿服务活动开展情况。在公园广场上，有超过20支志愿者队伍，正在为市民开展口腔义诊、视力检查、中医按摩、理发剃须、法律咨询、汽车手机家电维修等近30项志愿服务。艾文礼与正在这里参加活动的志愿者和市民亲切交谈，询问他们对学雷锋的看法和感想。在公园假山上，艾文礼参加了义务植树并勉励身旁的志愿者：“现在你们这样80后、90后学雷锋的年轻人越来越多。雷锋精神永远不过时，一定要把雷锋精神传承弘扬下去。”

Yesterday morning, at the New Railway Station’s entrance, waiting hall, ticketing hall and inquiry counters, at West King Bus Station and at the main traffic crossroads, etc., one could see young peoples’ silhouettes wearing red caps to attract attention, helping to keep the traffic orderly, showing people the way, advocating standing in line, carrying out civilizational guidance, etc.. They were young volunteers from the provincial capital’s [i. e. Shijuazhuang's] colleges and universities. Shijiazhuang Vocational Technology Institute‘s volunteering student Tian Yudui told this reporter: “being a student, to do some duties in your spare time can help everyone to do something meaningful, something helpful. This is fulfilling and makes you feel that you are valuable.”

昨天上午，在新火车站的进出站口、候车大厅、售票大厅和咨询台，在西王客运站、主要交通路口等地，都能看到一个个年轻的身影，他们头上戴着的一顶顶小红帽格外引人注目，他们在帮助交警维持交通秩序、义务指路、倡导排队、进行文明引导等，他们是来自省会高校的青年志愿者。石家庄职业技术学院志愿者田宇对记者说：“作为一名学生，课余时间闲下来的时候做些义务劳动，能为大家做一点有意义、有帮助的事，这样很充实，觉得自己很有价值。”

Volunteers^*) were active in all community areas, some tidying and cleaning the places, some giving advice to older empty-nesters, some using their expertise to carry out useful services. Han Wei does repair work in some household appliance shop in the provincial capital. Yesterday, in the Zhuoda Rose Garden Park’s community area, he offered some voluntary household-appliance repair work. “Usually, after the [spring festival] holidays, when you come to these small community areas and help everyone reparing and maintaining their household appliances, it’s a service which is really welcomed. After helping others, you feel particularly good yourself, and really happy.”

在各个社区，也活跃着社区志愿者的身影，他们有的整治社区环境卫生，有的慰问空巢老人，有的利用自己的特长开展便民服务。韩伟是省会某家电卖场的维修工，昨天在卓达玫瑰园社区开展家电维修志愿服务活动。“平时过节假日，就到小区里面，帮助大家维修保养各种家电，还挺受欢迎的。帮助了别人之后，自己心情感到特别好，挺高兴的。”

According to provincial civilizational statistics, this city carried out various Lei-Feng activities yesterday, with fourty volunteer groups, nearly two-hundred volunteering organizations, about seven-thousand volunteers in the streets, entering schools, vilages, community areas to popularize knowledge about civilized manners, public civilizational guidance, legal advice, service on the three rural issues, medical services, convenience services, environmental cleaning and maintenance, tree-planting and greening activities, showing care and love for vulnerable groups and other Lei-Feng volunteering activities. Action with a red cap spells the “spirit of Lei Feng”.

据省会文明办统计，昨天，我市广泛开展了多种形式的学雷锋志愿服务活动，全市共有40个志愿服务支队、近200个志愿服务组织、约7000名志愿者，走上街头，深入学校、农村、社区，开展了普及文明礼仪知识、公共文明引导、法律咨询、服务三农、医疗义诊、便民服务、环境清洁、植树绿化、关爱弱势群体等学雷锋志愿服务活动。一顶顶“小红帽”用行动诠释了“雷锋精神”。

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Footnote

^*) Here, too, only “silhouettes” were seen. This may be meant to depict a certain atmosphere, or to make all the goodwill appear countless and collective. When it comes to traffic regulation, the silhouette talk could make a lot of real sense, though.

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Related

» How Lei Feng Embodies China’s Political Advantage, Febr 26, 2012
» The Good and Respectable Market Stall Operator, Nov 14, 2011
» Propaganda will set you Free, Aug 9, 2009

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Obituary: Stéphane Hessel, 1917 – 2013

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Main Links:

» Stéphane Hessel, gentleman indigné, Le Monde, December 23, 2011 / February 27, 2013
» 《愤怒吧！》： 93岁愤怒战士一夜爆红, Beijing News, April 11, 2011

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

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Hessel was born German, grew up French, and became a French citizen in 1939. He took part in the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and never stopped promoting its values, Le Monde wrote in December 2011 (article updated on February 27, 2013).

He had joined the résistance in 1941. He had been arrested, tortured, and survived the Buchenwald concentration camp.

And his hope was contagious (Le gentleman indigné, dont l’espérance est contagieuse).

He was also a diplomat. Compromise was hardly something foreign to him. But to react to wrongs seems to have been second nature to him.

On October 20, 2010, on his 93rd birthday, his booklet “Indignez-vous”, Time for Outrage, was published in France, with more than two million copies sold in France, and almost two million more in the rest of the world. He published another edition soon after, describing his admiration for Eleanor and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Indignez-vous was followed by “Engagez-vous”, Get involved, came next.

Counter-espionage was Hessel’s job from 1941, when he followed General de Gaulle to London, a correspondent for Beijing News wrote  from Paris, in April 2011, six months after “Time for Anger” had been published:

In March 1944, he was assigned to organize the resistance network in Paris, and to gather intelligence for the allied troops as they prepared to enter continental Europe. Named “Ge Like”, he secretly entered France, but was soon betrayed and then arrested by the Gestapo. Neither punishment nor lure by promises led to the results [his captors] desired, and Hessel was then transferred to the Buchenwald concentration camp on August 8, 1944, only days before the liberaton of Paris. He later wrote a detailed description of these experiences, in “Danse avec le Siècle”.
1941年，他为追随戴高乐将军来到伦敦，从事反间谍的侦查行动。1944年3月，他受命组织联络巴黎的抵抗网络、为盟军登陆搜集情报，化名“格里科”秘密潜入法国。由于叛徒的出卖，他很快便被盖世太保所捕获。刑逼利诱毫无收获后，8月8日埃塞尔被押解往德国布痕瓦尔德集中营，而这仅仅就是巴黎解放的前几天。之后他在自传《世纪之舞》中对这段经历有着详细的记述。

His narrow escape from death – by obtaining the identity of a fellow inmate who had died of typhus – inspired him.

Just as Hessel said: “this kind of leap from death, back into life makes him the more determined to enter the enthusiasm of global politics” (正如埃塞尔自己所说的：“这种死里逃生经历更加坚定了他介入世界的政治热情”).

The article’s description of Hessel’s post-war life included his co-authorship of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

To help this document of tremendous historic value obtain acknowledgment as [a set of] universal values, Hessel and his colleagues went to great pains to make it suitable for East and West, for ideologies, and the different situations of countries and nations.
为了使这份人类历史上极为重要的文件获得公认的普世价值，为了能使其适应东西方、意识形态、国家种族不同的状况，达成一致的认同，埃塞尔和他的同事们费尽心机，奔走疾呼。

There was nothing new in the novel, “Time to get Angry”, and it provided neither a logical analysis of the problems faced by humankind today, nor practical methodology for dealing with them, the Beijing News author quoted Hessel, in 2011, and added that its fascination was to be found in the emotions it stirred, and the lesson it taught: not to allow evil to repeat itself.

An initially small, unobtrusive book, written without much preparation, of only some thirty pages including footnotes and a postscript, but inevitable content, unexpectedly led to this kind of reading, discussion and dissemination. (Frequently, customers went to a bookstore and bought ten or more copies for their families and friends). While many publishers call this a coincidence, many others explore the reasons for the book’s strong sales. There is this global upheaval, and worried people are seeking some relief. This small book is just right in its simplicity, legibility, its sentiment and excitement, and its catchiness. [...] And secondly, the author’s personal charm adds an envelope of respectability and trustworthiness to this small book. It seems that only with the historical experience and the energetic and passionate involvement of this 93-year-old warrior, a man may be qualified to appeal to public enthusiasm.
一本事先毫不张扬，也无甚精心企划的小书；一本加上注释和后记才三十多页，内容无可避免的略显单薄的小册子，竟然引发了如此的阅读、讨论和传播（经常有顾客到书店一买十多册赠与身边的家人朋友）。在大多出版界人士大呼偶然的同时，也有不少人研究它畅销的必然所致。首先，世界局势的动荡，对未来的担忧让人们急需找到一个释放内心情绪的出口，而这本小册子正好简单、易懂，情绪激昂、朗朗上口。 [...] 其次，作者的个人魅力无疑为这本小书笼罩了一层令人尊敬和信赖的气场。似乎，唯有这种经历过历史，并以自身全部的精力和激情投入其中的长者（93岁的老战士）才有资格以这种语气号召起大众的热情。

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Related

Hessel dies at 95, The Guardian, Febr 27, 2013
A Resistance Hero Fires up the French, NYT, March 9, 2011

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German Press Review: Kim’s Sugarcubes, and the “Battle of Opinion”

The actions of the North Korean regime are not incalculable, writes the Süddeutsche Zeitung‘s (Munich) Reymer Klüver, the paper’s U.S. correspondent until summer last year, and now with the foreign-politics department at Süddeutsche Zeitung. The Kim clan’s provocations were actually quite calculable in its provocations which served only one goal: to show the world and its own people its power. The regime in North Korea doesn’t act incalculably. It acts irresponsibly.

The message is aimed at the Obama administration, believes Klüver, as the test was conducted on the day when the American president delivered the agenda for his second term in office, and at South Korean president-elect Park Geun Hye is about to take office. The reactions, too, were calculable: the US would demand stronger sanctions, China would agree after some hesitation, and basically, the response wouldn’t be different from the one to the previous nuclear test. Even if a bomb of the same explosive power as the previous one was indeed smaller than before, and therefore more suitable to be fitted to a nuclear missile, North Korea remained far from being a threat to America.

What makes the test dangerous all the same would be that Kim might gamble away, and that his provocations could spin out of control. A conflict on the South Korean border could lead to just that kind of scenario. Even worse, non-proliferation might be used to earn some badly needed foreign exchange. There was speculation about North Korean cooperation with Iran on its third test. What would keep a gambler like the dictator in Pyongyang to sell Iran or others his knowledge and even material?

China could influence North Korea, if it wanted to, writes Klüver, but it didn’t want to use it. 90 percent of North Korea’s oil imports depended on China. But China’s calculations could be shifting, Klüver adds: a Peking government paper had mentioned a “high price” that North Korea would have to pay in case of a nuclear test. The Chinese, Klüver recaps, needed to take responsibility for their irresponsible neighbor.

Der Spiegel (Hamburg) chooses the tabloid approach, as far as its choice  of stock photo material is concerned. Underneath a video link photo (from Reuters) that shows Kim Jong-un in flames, the headline is North Korean nuclear power messes with America (Atommacht Nordkorea legt sich mit Amerika an). Der Spiegel’s Andreas Lorenz points out that this could start an arms race, with the US, Japan and North Korea beefing up their missile defense. Xi Jinping acted hardly differently from his predecessor Hu Jintao, Lorenz notes, as he criticizes Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests, but also trying to soften international sanctions. North Korea is an important supplier of commodities to China. And the encapsulated country serves China’s military as a strategic buffer zone between China and the other East Asian states and the US.

Lorenz also quotes the English-language party mouthpiece “Global Times” as suggesting that there was no need for China to placate angry feelings about its role. And Lorenz quotes US expert Siegfried Hecker with concerns that North Korea could sell its atomic-bomb know-how, to Iran, for example.

Die Welt (Berlin) suggests that Kim had thrown the Chinese sugar cubes (i. e. sweetened the third test).

Namely, the third test was preceded by several sessions of North Korean security panels on which Kim ostensibly emphasized the leadership role of his Communist Party. For the first time in the regime’s history, these sessions were made public, writes die Welt’s Torsten Krauel. Kim thus signaled that the third test was controled by the civilian leadership and not, as it had been previously, as an – intransparent to the outside world – decision between an ailing dictator and an incalculable army. (Dem dritten Test gingen nämlich mehrere Sitzungen nordkoreanischer Sicherheitsgremien voraus, auf denen Kim demonstrativ die Führungsrolle seiner Kommunistischen Partei hervorhob. Diese Sitzungen wurden erstmals in der Geschichte des Regimes publik gemacht. Kim Jong-un signalisierte damit, dass der dritte Atomtest unter der Steuerung und Kontrolle der zivilen Führung stattfand und nicht, wie beide Male zuvor, in einer nach außen unklaren Entscheidung zwischen einem kränklichen Diktator und einer unberechenbaren Armee.)

Therefore, Xi Jinping and (theoretically) Barack Obama, too, now had a a definite contact person, believes Krauel.

Alleged North-Korean cooperation with Iran has long been a leitmotif in Die Welt’s coverage, but while more moderate papers like Süddeutsche Zeitung are discussing these allegations too, this week, Die Welt goes one step further and discusses how America could conduct a war on North Korea. However, Krauel concludes that different from Iraq during the years after the Kuwait war, the United Nations weren’t in a state of war with North Korea.

Therefore, it seems to be inevitable to talk with each other in East Asia again, even with a dictator like Kim Jong-un – as unpromising and depressing this prospect may currently look. (Wahrscheinlich führt deshalb tatsächlich kein Weg daran vorbei, in Ostasien wieder miteinander zu reden, sogar mit einem Diktator wie Kim Jong-un – so aussichtslos und bedrückend diese Aussicht derzeit auch erscheinen mag.)

The German mainstream press in general has become much more supportive of militarization of politics than in the past. That is my rough observation, and not backed by statistics. But apparently for the first time, research has been published about how leading German press people – mentioned by name – are interlinked with think tanks, national and international forums, foundations, policy planning groups, etc.. And a presentation of this research also clearly quotes leading press commentators with statements like

Politics must not shun the battle of opinion on the home front if they are convinced of what they purport. [...] The battle for the “hearts and minds” must be conducted among at home, too. (Der Meinungskampf an der Heimatfront darf die Politik nicht scheuen, wenn sie von dem überzeugt ist, was sie vorgibt. [...] Der Kampf um die “hearts and minds” muss auch bei uns geführt werden.)

A newsman’s words, to be clear.

This should not lead to overreaching conclusions. The research does not suggest that everyone is in the boat of an extended security concept (erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff, including energy and financial-industry issues). But among four leading journalists of Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit and Die Welt, definitions of security and threat catalogs had been uncritically adopted (unkritisch übernommen).

There are papers with editorial managers not known for relevant networks – the left leaning Tageszeitung (taz) and Frankfurter Rundschau (FR). Some of their articles correspond with views among the elite, some sharply criticize the extended security concept, according to the report.

Here is another observation that disturbs me: My choice of press-review sources – Süddeutsche Zeitung, Spiegel, Die Welt further above in this blogpost was spontaneous. My information sources of choice when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear test were just these papers. No taz, no Frankfurter Rundschau. However, there’s an excuse:

I thought the Rundschau was no longer online, as they filed for bankruptcy on November 12, 2012.

But in fact, they are still here.

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Related

» Questions Raised, November 10, 2012

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Lots of Snowfall, Slowing Blogging Output

Eight years ago, I felt unhappy. I found it hard to make up my mind – should I stay focused on China, or should I return to Germany for good? It didn’t even look like a either-or decision. I only knew at hindsight that it was a – probably – final decision.

I sleepwalked into a loving relationship in 2006. It was just another try, during the first hours of us getting to know each other, in 2006. Gradually, it became evident that it was probably for life. It’s that kind of experience which is probably neither universal, nor exceptional. It happens frequently, to many people, but not to everyone. It isn’t unique, but I’m beginning to understand that it is a privilege all the same. For the first time in my life, I’m feeling long-standing gratitude.

This has kept me here in Germany. There’s family, there are old friends, but all that might not have kept me here. Now, there is this sense of belonging. It has grown for a while, and now it’s here.

I’m wondering – what does China mean to me, in this “new situation”? Does it still make sense to “blog about China”?

I’m probably not going to make a conscious decision about that either. It’s not such a big thing, to blog or not to blog, even though more than 1,900 posts and countless hours of reading and translating stuff about current affairs spell some kind of commitment which one wouldn’t easily throw away.

What might happen is that I’ll slow down. In recent years, I blogged more frequently than every second day. My goal now will probably be to stay up-to-date, not to lose track about current affairs surrounding China. As far as I feel that it makes sense, I’ll continue to read and to blog.

Thinking about it, I have probably moved past a somewhat belated midlife crisis. I’m beginning to learn where I belong. That means that some things are probably going to change, and I’m curious about the changes.