Human Rights Activism, Updates

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1. Zeng Jinyan

Zeng Jinyan‘s (曾金燕) blog Liaoliao Yuan came back on March 22, after many months of hibernation:

“Liaoliao Yuan” turned into an important platform to “searching Hu Jia” and to “free Hu Jia”. But to advocate the safety and freedom of defenders of human rights is only part of my work. Under continuously increasing political pressure, to fall “silent” in the public sphere for a long time has been my basic policy. I was silent to avoid interference with my goal of practising what I advocate.

“了了园”长期以来已成为“寻找胡佳”和“释放胡佳”运动的一个重要平台。然而，提倡和保障人权捍卫者的安全自由只是我的工作的一部分。随着不断上升的政治压力，长时间在公共空间“沉默”是我的一项基本策略。沉默是为了身体力行排除干扰实现具体的工作目标。

I went to Hong Kong for half a year, I raised my daughter, focused on research, and I really like the atmosphere of science and research, and the professional support at the University of Hong Kong, but because I was so busy, I had no time to share [the experience] with all of you. Now I want to tell you that I am back, catching up on some scattered old news, and restarting the exchange on academics, life and social movements on online platforms.

赴港半年，抚养女儿，专心研究，我非常喜爱香港大学的学术研究气氛和专业支持，因为忙未能顾得上和大家分享。今天我想说，作为曾金燕，我回来了。补上一些散落各处的旧闻新事，重启基于网络平台的学术、生活和社会运动交流。

Zeng’s March-22 blogpost also contains a list of some past events and articles, and an outlook on activities planned this year.

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2. Liu Xiaobo and Family

Liu Xia‘s (刘霞) brother Liu Hui (刘晖) stood trial at the Huairou District People’s Court in a northern suburb of Beijing on Tuesday, on charges of fraud linked to a property transaction, Radio Free Asia reported, also on Tuesday. Liu Xia is the wife of Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), who is currently imprisoned in Liaoning Province. Liu Xia attended her brother’s trial on Tuesday.

Charges on commercial or economic offenses are frequently suspected to be politically motivated.

In November 2010, Zeng Jinyan, as the manager of Beijing Loving Source, an AIDS support group, had to close down the organization’s operations under a “tax inquiry”. Such inquiries and investigations had become frequent since summer 2009.

However, the tax office in charge apparently stated in August 2012 that it saw no tax illegality in the NGO’s operations from August 1, 2005 to December 31, 2009 – the period that had apparently been under investigation.
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Related

» Liu Xia defiant, Guardian, April 23, 2013
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A Message to “People with Different Political Views”, part 2

Human Rights Watch (HRW) announced the Helman/Hammet awards for 2012 on Thursday. I wasn’t aware that this prize  existed, but learned about it from the Chinese press.

Some context: a People’s Daily editorial (on a different issue, the International Communications Union conference in Dubai) was published on a number of popular Chinese websites on Thursday, without direct mention of this specific award. Huanqiu Shibao, a nationalist newspaper (and nominally, not necessarily by content, a sister paper to the English-language “Global Times”) addresses the prize issue head-on, in a way that may be tailor-made for its (angry, by trend) readership.

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

On the American “Human Rights Watch” list of the 2012 Hellman/Hammett Award winners, 12 out of 41 are Chinese, and there are seven people from China’s Uighur, Mongolian, Tibetan etc. national minorities among them. Nearly all of them have been in prison or are currently in prison. When looking at the organization’s name, and looking at which people are the prize winners, and what this prize is used for, one can expect that the Chinese people can make their guess, too.

美国“人权观察”组织近日宣布2012年“赫尔曼·哈米特奖”获奖者名单，一共41人，竟有12名是中国人，并有7人是中国的维、蒙、藏等少数民族，他们几乎都坐过牢或目前正在狱中。看看发奖的组织名称，再看看获奖者都是哪些人，这个奖是用来干什么的，大概不说中国人也能猜个八九不离十。

During these two years, there have been more and more extreme Chinese dissidents who won “human rights prizes” in the West, and [those dissident's] reputation is going lower and lower. What once bewildered Chinese society has become routine. We all know that there are a few people in this country who oppose the political system and that the West supports them. This has become an established pattern in the game between China and the West.

这两年中国在西方获各种“人权奖”的极端异见人士越来越多，获奖者的名气则不断走低。中国社会如今早已见怪不怪，我们都知道这个国家有一些对抗政治制度的人，西方支持他们，这已经是中西之间博弈的定式之一。

With China’s great scale of development, interaction between Chinese and Western people has also reached an amazing dimension, and the share of these Sino-Western frictions within the interaction is shrinking, and so is the influence of extreme dissidents in China. Frequently, they don’t get as much attention as lawful [or rightful] criticism on the internet does.

由于中国发展的总量很大，中国同西方交往的主体内容也有了惊人规模，中西这种摩擦在双方关系中的占比相对萎缩，极端异见人士在中国的影响萎缩得更快。他们往往还不如互联网上的合法批判者更受关注。

In exact words, extreme dissidents in China have become completely marginalized, and the way the West continues to use them to provoke China is lacking innovation. In fact, the voice of the entire Western discourse has become ever smaller in China, as they are losing to the excitement of the Chinese microblogs.

确切说，极端异见人士在中国已完全边缘化了，西方继续利用他们刺激中国是缺少创新的表现。事实上整个西方舆论的声音也在中国越来越小，它们在输给中国微博上的热闹。

The highest individual amount of prize money of the Hermann Hammett Awards doesn’t reach 10,000 US dollars, and one of its purposes is said to be giving “politically prosecuted” people in different countries some “living allowance”. But maybe they don’t know that this bit of money is pitifully small, [unsafe translation: for lawful critics in China]. China has become “tall and hefty”, and that bit of money and the hopes from the West are just a drop in the bucket.

“赫尔曼·哈米特奖”的最高个人奖金额不到1万美元，它的宗旨之一据说是要给受到各国政府“迫害”的人一些“生活补贴”。但他们或许不知道，这点钱对今天中国的合法批判者们是小得可怜的数目。中国已是“大块头”，西方花的那点钱和他们的愿望相比实在是杯水车薪。

What China and the West are struggling about concerning human rights is not clear. The two sides don’t understand each others words at all. Which is alright. Inside China, you have as many human rights critics in China as you want already, and although they are at times extreme, they are also comparatively specific. Society can thoroughly make sense of their context. Human rights prizes awarded by the West often come with abrupt choices, choosing strange people, and we don’t need to spend too much thought on that.

中国同西方在人权问题上争不清楚，双方相互根本听不懂对方说的话。那就算了。中国国内的人权批评如今已经要多少有多少，它们虽有时偏激，但都比较具体，社会能搞明白来龙去脉。西方发人权奖往往找了突兀的缘由，选了奇怪的人，我们对此不必费太大心思琢磨。

Of course, Western criticism of China’s human rights isn’t completely meaningless. They did move things in Chinese society. Sometimes,confrontation is also a means of interaction. However, objectively speaking, much of Western criticism goes beyond China’s realities, thus causing suspicions among Chinese people about intentions behind Western methods. All this has seriously harmed strategic mutual trust between China and the West, and its negative impact on the 21rst century gretly exceeds its benefits.

西方批评中国人权当然不是毫无正面意义，它们毕竟对中国社会带来过触动。有时对抗也是相互影响的一种方式。然而客观地说，西方的很多批评都超越了中国现实，从而引发了中国人对西方这样做背后用心的高度怀疑。这一切严重破坏了中西之间的战略互信，它带给21世纪的负面损害远远高于正面收益。

Extreme dissidents played an offbeat role of their own in China’s reform and opening, but when their role will be assessed from the distant future, they will definitely not be seen as a mainstream force in advancing China’s progress. If the focus of these Western awards isn’t a prank, it must be caused by a failed analysis of China’s power.

极端异见人士在中国改革开放中扮演了很另类的角色，但即使很久以后回过头再做评价，他们也决不会被看成推动中国前进的主流力量。西方给这些人如此集中地发奖，如果不是西方的恶作剧，就是他们对中国的力量分析发生了本末倒置的偏差。

Pluralization in Chinese society has subtly built changes in the way the country progressed. When the government issued a call in the past, society responded in its multitude. Now it leads to a debate. It has become unlikely that the country makes another grave mistake [This and the previous line seem to allude to the excesses of Maoism], but at the same time, societal efficiency is also declining. China is in the process of finding a new point of balance in these changes. If extreme dissidents who break through the legal system of these social changes and explorations, they create destructive mishap, and will be investigated in accordance with the law.

中国社会的多元化造成了国家前进方式的微妙改变。过去政府发出号召，社会一呼百应。现在争论发生了。国家再犯重大错误的几率小了，但同时社会的运行效率也在降低。中国正在这些变化中寻找新的平衡点。极端异见人士突破了社会变化和探索的合法系统，他们制造出破坏性，对他们的依法追究决非这个时代的意外。

Western support for Chinese extreme dissidents seems to become ever closer, but times when this kind of thing found its way into the limelight are gone. They have become as tasteless as chicken ribs, but the West seems to be reluctant to throw them away. Nowadays, Western organizations doing these things look more like astute public-relations industries. Assuming an air of importance. To make themselves look good, they are seeking gimmicks close to China’s rise.

西方对中国极端异见人士的支持看似越来越密，但这种事最出风头的高潮实际已经过去，它对西方渐成食之无味、弃之可惜的鸡肋。如今做这些事的西方组织更像搞商业公关，它们装腔作势，傍着中国崛起找噱头炒作自己。那些所谓的“人权奖”都是绞尽脑汁吸引公众关注的游戏。

Much of the commenting underneath seems to be about unrelated everyday issues (Maybe there are relations which I can’t see, though). One of them which would seem to show some of the desired effects, and also one of the more extensive ones suggests that

Patriotic people don’t need to listen to American and other Western countries’ forces’ anti-China rumors, or be furious about them. Westerners people nowadays lose in the political and economic field and know perfectly well that their own institutions have problems, but won’t change, believing it’s the mother of all systems. Therefore, they will blame anyone except themselves, [...] this is the common fault of Western people, seeing in exasperation how China becomes stronger by the day, moving heaven and earth and racking their wits about how to obstruct China’s development, but to no avail. Instead, China develops even faster. Now they only have the human-rights and democracy card left [...]

爱国之人不要听美国等西方反华势力的谣言，而恼怒，西方人如今政治经济完全失败，明知自己的体制出现问题，可是就是不改，认为自己是体制的老大，而怨天尤人，[气人有笑人无，] 这是西方人的通病，看着中国日益强大而气急败坏，想方设法，绞尽脑汁的妨碍中国的发展，但是都无济于事，反倒使中国发展更快。现在就只有民主这张牌 [...]

It is also one of the comments – if not the comment – in the thread which got the most “support” votes – 267 by 11:00 UTC. The average “support” among the latest thirty-three comments got twenty “support votes” or less.

The People’s Daily editorial – published two days before Huanqiu Shibao’s, and in a different context (the International Telecommunications Union resolution) – could be summed down as follows:

• Those who oppose censorship are a minority (if not outsiders, which is deemed an unfortunate position in a Chinese context)
• America and other (barely mentioned) countries that didn’t agree to the International Telecommunications Union resolution are in a minority
• A free internet is war on vulnerable nations
• China is at the center of the family of nations
• dissidents are isolated.

The message People’s Daily’s and Huanqiu Shibao’s editorials  have in common is that the country grows stronger, and that “Western” standards would be an exception, rather than the norm. In some ways, Huanqiu Shibao’s approach is more subtle than People’s Daily, though. Even “radical minorities” played a certain role, according to its description – and it suggests that there were “lawful” ways to bring about change.  When it comes to banging the drums of nationalism however, there is no room for subtlety in Huanqiu’s case. While People’s Daily merely uses ITU voting results to point out China’s strong position, Huanqiu counts the prize money from Human Rights Watch and provides an assessment (“pitiful”).

The biggest commonality between the two editorials seems to be the message to (“extreme”) dissidents: you are marginalized.

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Related

» Ambassadors Abroad, May 25, 2012
» A Trivial Matter for the Country, Jan 23, 2012
» Party Media Control Capability “Weakening”, Aug 12, 2011
» The “Internet Information Office”, May 6, 2011

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Is China Misunderstood? And if Yes, How?

• “People in China have as many freedoms as people in Europe, as long as they don’t organize to challenge CCP rule.”

Not really. Frequently, challenging one bureaucrat amounts to challenging the party. What you can and what you can’t do depends on your connections, and even if you are pretty well connected, no independent court will protect you and the liberties you have taken to do things when the party decides that it has a stake in your case.

• “The Chinese Communist Party has lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people out of poverty.”

That’s conventional wisdom. But isn’t it the party’s decision to leave more space for  privately-owned business – i. e.  a withdrawal from business administration – which has led to that success?

• “Authors like Mo Yan show that you are quite free to criticize leadership decisions – even if you are formally part of the system.”

Mo Yan spoke up for Liu Xiaobo (with some disclaimers included in his talk), and that was a good decision – but if he wasn’t part of the system, and right in the limelight, such a public statement might have earned him an invitation for a cup of tea at the next public security office – or worse.

What is true is that China is much more of a mixed economy these days, than thirty years ago. What may also be true is that the cadres, too, have become much more affluent. Some leaders, especially top leaders, have become rich.

And this seems to amount to a strange excuse, frequently offered by CCP apologists: because the Communist leaders – and top leaders not least – are so corrupted, their theories can’t be taken seriously anymore. Or rather: even as a democrat, you don’t need to take their theories seriously anymore.

That’s a nice license to do business with the guys. Unfortunately, it’s a faked license.

It is true that what the CCP cadres do has little to do with their original theories. But that only means that their concept of class relations has changed. Contrary to what coverage frequently suggest,  that’s no bashful change. It’s clearly documented, not least in Jiang Zemin‘s Three Represents which are part of the official party theories. All this hasn’t hasn’t changed the CCP’s view of who should rule the country, and how they want to rule.

The CCP claims the function to decide what Chinese culture is, and what isn’t. They are the “standard bearers” and the “developers” of Chinese culture. They have left cultural organizations and individuals more leeway than during the Maoist days, just as they have left businesses more leeway – see above. But all that is revocable. It is part of the party’s development project. Obviously, people make use of the leeway they have – but given that the party has the last word on what will make it, and what won’t, its claim to be the developer is often taken remarkably lightly.

Above all, however, there is one constant: that while the outside world has certain good things to offer, it is, above all, a threat. The concept that an imagined innocence, “cultural” purity, or general well-being of the Chinese people can only be safeguarded by the CCP’s monopoly to power has never changed since the party came to power. A country that swallows the humiliations that come from this power monopoly and ultimately has to blame the outside world for exactly these humiliations can’t be a terribly friendly country.

The Libyan or the Syrian regimes have never been popular among Americans or Europeans. The Chinese regime isn’t, either. There is a lot of fault-seeking going on. Every incident, every blooper, and every corruption case among more senior officials are highlighted in the Western press, as if corruption was something particularly Chinese, or even something particularly CCP. But that seems to be arrogance, and wannabe virtue, rather than objectivity. Just as there was a preparedness to believe that basically, Libyans or Syrians were prepared to tolerate, if not support, their leaders, there is a preparedness to believe the same thing of China and the CCP.

When taking a benevolent view of Western governments and the Western public perception, they were also prepared to believe that at least the Syrian regime would give way to democracy (or theocracy) peacefully, rather than clinging to power by all means. If we may believe Western governments’ statements these days, they are absolutely shocked that, once having shown signs of vulnerability, such regimes aren’t tolerated by their own people anymore. By the same logic, Western governments are even more shocked to learn that such regimes would go “from house to house” to find and slaughter oppositionals, suspected or proven. By the same logic, Western governments and the Western public are outraged to learn that a regime may actually bomb its own cities, at war with many of its own people.

They would quite probably be just as “shocked” if such events occured in China. And then they would start explaining why they did have reasons to believe that the CCP regime was “responsible” and “accountable” to the people, why they did have reasons to believe that the party would put the people first, and put itself next.

And as long as shit doesn’t happen, they’ll tell you how the status quo in China is still better than any conceivable alternative. (That said, many foreign party apologists aren’t that much more interested in trying to imagining alternatives, than the CCP itself.)

People who are using excuses like the ones quoted at the beginning are most probably those who actually “misunderstand” China most fundamentally. But it’s a wishful misunderstanding. A less friendly word for it would be complicity.

That complicity is no crime. Or, if it is, this blogger, too, is complicit. I accept that our governments and businesses need to find compromises with totalitarian dictators, at least for the time being.  What I don’t accept is the beautification of the regime. Whoever justifies its existence needs to be prepared to accept the same standards in his home country – not necessarily as a ruler, but as a subject to such rule. (One problem among Western decision makers is that they themselves can only think of themselves as rulers, not as subjects.) But if you argue that, because of the “circumstances”, this or that has to be good enough for Chinese citizens, this or that has to be good enough for you, too – provided that the “circumstances” (seem to) demand it.

To be clear: this is no suggestion that Western intelligence services should sponsor underground organizations in China. It is a suggestion that people should stop thinking of China as some kind of “democracy”, or a “democratizing country”, only because it makes it easier for us to justify our business with China. The issue isn’t how Westerners could “westernize”, “democratize” or whatever-ize China. It is to make sure that our own values don’t become blurred in the process of interaction.

A paranoid scenario? Up to you. But take a look at the debate between U.S. president Barack Obama and his challenger Mitt Romney on foreign policy. Not a single mention of China’s political system. Rather: long debates on how to “shape” the Middle East.

And all that – my take of it, that is – to flatter power delusions among the American public.

That’s where the circle closes. Power isn’t irrelevant. But without a conscience – an understanding of what we are doing -, it may be wielded in a pretty CCP way: self-flattering, self-serving, and oblivious.

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Related

» Enabling “Democracy in International Relations”, The Peking Duck (guest post), Oct 2, 2012
» Asma Al Assad, the All-Natural Beauty, The Richest People, Febr 23, 2011
» Huang Mengfu: It’s Complicated, Jan 7, 2009

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“A Trivial Matter for the Country”: Huanqiu Shibao wishes Yu Jie “Good Luck”

[...] It may not be the government’s desire to provide these freedoms, but the overall facts are taking shape: it is inevitable that the Internet will bring about open speech for China.

But there is another group, and there’s not many of them, and one could even say there’s very few of them. The books filled with their keenly felt opinions cannot be published in China, and what they say on the Internet is constantly being deleted. There’s also a certain number of others who feel restricted after having experienced the freedom of the outside world. They adopt a hostile attitude towards today’s China, and because of this they have to pay a certain personal price. They don’t deny that they are “antagonistic,” and they demand to the right to remain antagonistic without restriction, and for Chinese law to create a “special zone” for them. But the answer they receive is “no.” [...]

[.....] 但还有一个小群体，他们人数不多，甚至可以说很少。他们痛感想写的书在中国出版不了，想在互联网上说的话总被删掉。甚至有数得过来的个别人，与外界接触的 自由也受到限制。他们对中国现行体制采取了完全敌对的态度，并因此付出了个人人生的一定代价。他们对“敌对”不予否认，而且他们要求有保持敌对而不受任何 限制的权利，中国法律专为他们设一个“特区”。但他们得到的回答是“不”。 [.....]

Translation up to here by China Digital Times

Following paragraphs (my translation – may contain errors):

These [average internet users on the one hand, and the dissidents on the other] are two completely different groups. The former are the main part of modern China, with differing opinions, some doing fine, some full of complaints, but all of them following the development of this country, and moving forward together. For the latter, opposing political power has become their own “occupation”. They believe that this “occupation” will, in the course of China’s social transformation and the Western world’s support, become more and more promising, and they are mentally unprepared for setbacks.

这是完全不同的两个群体。前一个构成了现代中国的主体，他们意见不一，有些处事积极，有些牢骚满腹，但都随这个国家的发展而一起前行。后一个把与政权对抗变成自己的“职业”，他们认为这个“职业”因中国社会的转型和西方世界的支持会越来越有前途，他们对受到挫折缺少思想准备。

Once things become a bit difficult, their moods become suppressed, and not too serious restrictions depress them. For example, they can’t see that their environment has become much more relaxed, compared to what they would have had to face some years earlier. Although there have been ups and downs in the situations of “dissidents” in China, their environment has generally become much more tolerant of them. They lose optimism too easily, become dissatisfied too easily, use extreme language to vent their solitariness, and to attract attention.

因此他们稍遇不顺，情绪就变得很压抑，比外界限制本应带给他们的沮丧还要严重。比如，他们完全看不到自己的遭遇，比如果他们早些年做同样对抗所要面对的，要缓和得多。“异见人士”在中国的生存状态虽有起伏，但大环境对他们的宽容总体上在增多。他们很容易失去乐观，焦躁不安，用更极端的言行发泄孤独，吸引注意力。

They rid themselves of their roots, see their individual extreme moods and mistaken illusions as a general Chinese mood, try to force political ideals, copied from Western books, onto Chinese society, and think of themselves as those who represent Chinese society’s standpoint. But actually, they are completely outdated.

他们越来越脱离草根，把个人极端情绪误当成或幻想成中国社会的普遍情绪，他们把从西方书本上抄来的政治理念强行往中国社会上套，并且总想代表中国社会的主张。其实他们完全落伍了。

Just look at how many legal channels there are in China now, to express discontent! While they became restricted, many new opinion leaders have emerged. Sharp ideas have emerged within public opinion, many of which those “old opinion leaders” neither understand, nor would they know how to discuss them. They are completely out.

看看中国社会现在有多少合法表达不满和异见的渠道！在他们受到限制的时候，新的意见领袖一批批层出不穷。舆论中出现大量新的尖锐话题，很多都是他们那些“老意见领袖”不熟悉、也不知道该如何讨论的。他们在出局。

One important reason for Yu Jie and others to leave is that they have been marginalized in China’s public opinion. They may believe that government restrictions caused this marginalization. That may be one of the reasons. But if they provided Chinese social opinion with vitality, they wouldn’t fade away as rapidly and thoroughly  as they are.

余杰等人出走，一个重要原因是他们在中国舆论中已经边缘化。他们会认为是政府的限制造成了他们的边缘化。这大概是原因之一。但如果他们带给中国社会的话题和主张真的有强大生命力，他们的淡出决不会像实际发生的这样快，这样彻底。

China is in the greatest development for at least two centuries. This basic fact and trend is above judgment, and it is obvious that some people have been completely blinded by extreme thought and depression. That is a pity for Chinese society, and even more so for themselves. We hope sincerely that the new environment he “left” for will invigorate him. It’s a trivial matter for the country, but not for him as an individual. We wish him luck.

中国处在至少两个世纪以来最伟大的全面发展中，对这个基本事实和趋势都无法做出判断，可见一些人已被极端思想和情绪完全蒙住了眼睛。这是中国社会的遗憾，更是他们个人的不幸。真心希望“出走”的环境改变能给余杰带来强有力的触动。这对国家的意义已经微不足道，但对他个人则完全不同。祝他好运。

Reactions in the commenter thread appear to be mixed: some commenters add another “American slave” to their counts, or agree with the author that “America can’t be copied”, while others suggest that what Yu Jie actually said should be published, to be judged by the public. More general grievances are aired, too, about money earned by the people’s blood and sweat being squandered by officials who are “more evil than the Japanese devils”.

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Related Posts: Yu Jie
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Deutsche Welle on Yu Jie: a Sudden Flight

The following are excerpts from a Deutsche Welle (Voice of Germany) online article in German, published on Thursday, about Yu Jie’s and his family’s arrival in America.

[...] One event in particular, during spring last year, had led to Yu’s decision to leave China, says Martin-Liao^*): back then, Yu Jie had been abducted by the Chinese security agencies. The officials had pulled a bag over his head, and abducted him to an unknown place. There, Yu had been brutally beaten. The thugs had undressed and photographed him, says Tianchi Martin Liao. They had threatened that if he continued to write articles, he would vanish from this earth. [...]

The critical author has long been anathema to the Chinese authorities. He regularly writes articles critical of the government, for internet blogs, and Hong Kong media. The 38-year-old is a close friend of imprisoned Chinese Nobel Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, and one of the signatories of “Charter 08″, a manifesto for freedom of opinion and democracy in China.

Yu is also active in a Christian underground church. This even led to an encounter with former U.S. president George W. Bush. But above all, Yu became known for his book “China’s Best Actor: Wen Jiabao”. He criticized China’s prime minister forthrightly, thus breaking a taboo in China. The book, published in Hong Kong, is banned in the People’s Republic.

Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department produced Yu’s best-known work as an audio book and offers a free download. In an interview with dw-world.de about his criticism of Wen, Yu Jie said in summer 2010 that “I as a critic, as well as Wen Jiabao, or the Chinese government who are criticized are in a learning process. For me, this means that I have to learn to advance my criticism still more rationally and objectively, and for the government, it means learning how to handle criticism.”

[...]

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Note

^*) Liao Qianqi or Liao Tian Chi (廖天琪), chairwoman of the Chinese Independent Pen Center

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Chen Wei sentenced to Nine Years in Prison

Chen Wei (陈卫), a dissident from Suining, Sichuan Province, was sentenced to nine years in prison earlier today, for “inciting subversion of state power”. He had reportedly been in detention since February 20, and been formally arrested on March 28 this year. In detail, the charges were reportedly about “inciting”^*) online articles.

Chen was one of the 1989 student leaders in Beijing, and a signatory to the Charter 08, in 2008.

Chen’s wife, Wang Xiaoyan (王晓燕), Wang’s older sister and his younger brother watched the  trial in the courtroom at Suining Intermediate Court. Mrs. Wang spoke with the BBC after the verdict. Wang probably won’t appeal, because he expected that the verdict would be decided in advance, and that there was no point in appealing.

Suining was named China’s outstanding tourism city in 2007, the country’s hygiene city of 2008, and a home of Guanyin culture, also in 2008.

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Note

^*) Radio Taiwan International (RTI) quotes the charges as “subverting state power” (顛覆國家政權罪), which would seem to be more serious than incitement “inciting subversion of state power”.

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Related

» “Subversion of State Power”, various posts
» “Information is Life”, Global Times, Nov 16, 2011

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Arrests and Releases: One in, One out

In November last year, Hu Jia‘s wife Zeng Jinyan had reportedly been threatened with arrest, and faced suggestions that her family would be put under strict house arrest once Hu Jia were released. June 26 could be the day when Hu Jia’s prison term ends.

House arrest would amount to something similar to the situation Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚) has been living in ever since he had served a term of several years (apparently four years and three months). Chen’s wife, Yuan Weijing (袁伟静), appears to be under semi-official watch much of the time, as news of April 2009 would suggest.

He Peirong, from Nanjing, reportedly tried to see Chen at his home in Shandong Province last week. Under the Jacaranda translated a Chinese-language account of her effort and its results, which can be found here.

In April this year, Beijing-based human rights lawyer Li Fangping (李方平) was reportedly kidnapped by unidentified individuals outside the offices of the health rights NGO Beijing Yirenping Center. Li was apparently released within days, while another rights lawyer, Li Xiongping, had reportedly “disappeared” since.

Li Fangping was himself detained just as yet another rights lawyer, Teng Biao (滕彪), was released from custody, in a move some called, “One In, One Out”,

the China Digital Times quoted AP on May 4.

Li has legally

represented a number of high-profile victims of political and religious persecution, including, among others, Chen Guangcheng, Yang Chunlin (杨春林), Hu Jia (胡佳), and Zhao Lianhai (赵连海)

in recent years, Chinese Human Rights Defenders wrote in April.

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Related

» Wen Jiabao’s Endgame – neither Law, nor Order, April 21, 2011
» Diluting the Intimidation: the Tea Partisans, March 14, 2010

Update/Related

» A Visit to Chen Guangcheng’s Family, ESWN, March 17, 2009

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Wen Jiabao’s Endgame: neither Law, nor Order

Wen Jiabao at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2008 (Wikicommons, click on this picture for source)

The State Council outlined the main areas of the economic system’s reform for 2011, on a regular meeting on April 20th, chaired by chief state councillor Wen Jiabao. Besides the usual buzzwords – stability, scientific development, and improving the economic system’s ability to react to economic challenges, capital movement and forms of investment (including private investment or 民间投资) were high on the agenda, too, according to Xinhua, as quoted by China National Radio (CNR).

Another prominent issue, though more familiar than capital issues, was the people’s livelihood (民生), in terms of income distribution and social insurance, both in urban and rural areas, and the establishment of an affordable housing system (住房保障体系). All that and more, plus basic public services – a concept that has been mentioned more and more frequently during the past months, mostly in connection with the concept of “social management”.

It may be tempting to focus on the issue of human rights violations alone. After all, such violations can most easily – and justifiably – be seen in simple terms. The CCP’s and its propganda agents’ attempts to sell it as something more “complicated” can be easily – and correctly -, be condemned. But sometimes, the question is asked if the current political stagnation will continue beyond the expected change in leadership in 2012 / 2013. To go beyond the obvious – that the CCP’s human rights violations are reasons to worry about our interactions with China -, and to “try to predict the future”, we have to go far beyond statements about how we feel. The past six or seven months have been decisive and should be looked at closely, and frequently.

One should bear in mind if there was anyone among China’s leaders who ever came (remotely) close to being a standard bearer of individual rights as the essential prerequisite for a functioning economy and a stable society, it would be Wen Jiabao – for a month, that is, from September to October 2010. But Wu Bangguo, the National People’s Congress’ (NPC) chairman and party secretary, trashed practically every idea of political reform, in favor of “social management” (see second part of this March 13 blogpost), in his work report to the 4th session of the 11th NPC. A Central Committee session in October 2010 – see next paragraph – had shown him (and Wen) the way.

Wen Jiabao is nearing the end of his second term as chief councillor, and party secretary of the State Council – he will probably step down in March 2013, along with the entire “fourth generation” of top leaders, including Hu Jintao (in his capacity as state chairman. As party chairman, Hu is likely to step down in November 2012). Only a month after Wen Jiabao had mentioned a need for reforms of our political system, People’s Daily hit back, in October last year: the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee had decided to adhere

to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, upholding the party’s leadership, the role of the people as the masters of their country, the organic unity of government work and the rule of law, the active and prudent promotion of political restructuring, and the continuous advancement of the socialist political system, self-improvement, and development (党的十七届五中全会强调：“坚持中国特色社会主义政治发展道路，坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一，积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，不断推进社 会主义政治制度自我完善和发展”).

The editorial citing these central committee findings then interpreted them as an uncompromising adherence to “a hard-earned and efficient political system”. Given that People’s Daily is part of the CCP apparatus, this is exactly the way the central committee (more specifically: the politbureau) does view China’s political system. Wu Bangguo’s work report reflected the Central Committee’s endorsement for the political status quo.

Wen, who had pointed out in September 2010 that

if economic reform doesn’t get the protection that comes from reforming the political system, it won’t be fully successful, and even the achievements made so far could still be lost again,

will spend the remaining twenty-two months of his term as chief councillor on tinkering with the “economic system” alone. That the political system will become an issue once again within less than two years is highly unlikely – the times may be changing fast, but experience tells that CCP’s policies do not. In the light of the months preceding the numerous arrests of dissidents and other shitlisted Chinese citizens – Ai Weiwei is, after all, only one out of many -, one can quite safely predict that there may be more surprises from the CCP’s operational activities and reactions to changing times, but that there will be no more long-term strategic changes.

Bereft of all options to improve political protection for his economic reforms, Wen’s task starts looking depressing. Alright – Tingyi, a major food manufacturer, won’t increase the price for its instant noodles, China’s migrant workers’ most common lunch, writes Felix Lee, in a report for German weekly Die Zeit. This piece of good news about price stability, at least on one item of daily use, is meant to be a signal from the government that there are measures against inflation after all, writes Lee. “Our vigilance” – re inflation – “must never falter”, Wen is quoted by Lee. And to reduce liquidity, and therefore “hot capital” within the market, banks are told to recommend the purchase of gold to its customers, as gold absorbs liquidity without the effects that speculation on property (housing) or food would have.

That’s as much as Wen’s State Council can do for now. “The economic system’s ability to react to economic challenges” will mostly remain a theory, probably even beyond Wen’s last battle.

His most likely successor is Li Keqiang (Hu Jintao reportedly wanted him to become his successor as party and state chairman, but wasn’t able to get him accepted by the collective leadership, and Hu Jintao himself will be succeeded by Xi Jinping, who hails from Jiang Zemin’s political school.

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Related
Human Rights: throw them a Bone, April 16, 2011
China Developers Could Resist Cheap Housing Push, WSJ, April 11, 2011
Seasonal Considerations: Safeguarding “4.9″, February 19, 2011
Inflation: the Emperor’s new Thermometer, February 16, 2011