Posts tagged ‘capitalism’

Saturday, December 13, 2014

After Zhou Yongkang’s Arrest: Xi Jinping rules – but how safe will he be in [2013] 2023?

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A regular stream of news from the anti-corruption front keeps flowing to keep the Chinese public happy.

Hammer and Chisel

Hammer and Chisel

Zhang Xinhua (张新华), an industrial manager, sentenced to death on Wednesday, for embezzlement of some 340 Million Yuan RMB, a China News Service (中新网) article republished here by Enorth (Tianjin) reported on that same day.

Li Zhijiang (李志江), a former member of Taiyuan’s CPC city committee‘s standing committee and former head of the party’s organizational department there, has been removed from his posts for violating the spirit of the CCP’s Eight Provisions (中央八项规定精神), neglecting his job (or dereliction of duty, 失职), and other mistakes. This seems to have happened some time ago, a People’s Daily online article, rendered here by Youth Net, wrote this week.

And former development and reform commission deputy director Liu Tienan (刘铁男) goes to jail for life, CCTV reported, also rendered by Youth Net, on Wednesday. Liu had come under scrutiny late in 2012, thanks to the research of an investigative journalist.

Zhou Yongkang (周永康) is no longer a party member, and his arrest was announced on December 5. In its Banyan column, The Economist is critical of how China’s former “security” tsar is being treated by his – also former – comrades:

He has always looked a rather nasty piece of work, and China’s press now tells us just how nasty. Zhou Yongkang is a thief, a bully, a philanderer and a traitor who disclosed state secrets. The spider at the centre of a web of corrupt patronage, he enriched himself, his family, his many mistresses and his cronies at vast cost to the government.

But some delighted Chinese readers might also wonder how Zhou could possibly make it to the top if he was such a thoroughly bad egg.

Basically all the foreign press considers Zhou’s big fall – the biggest fall of the biggest stakeholder ever since the Gang of Four – as proof that CCP secretary general and state chairman Xi Jinping is now in full control at the helm. But The Economist also warns that

[..] Mr Zhou’s case carries a danger for Mr Xi. By advertising the party as motivated by its zeal to combat corruption and as led by those promoted solely on merit, he may raise expectations of transparency and honesty that he will find hard to meet.

There are other big question marks, too. By recent standards – i. e. for the past two decades or so -, there has been an arrangement among China’s top leaders of how they come to power, and how they leave power. Any member of the collective leaderships with Jiang Zemin (until 2002) and Hu Jintao (until 2012) at the core would be a member of the politburo’s standing committee for a maximum of ten years. And no leader after Jiang Zemin would stay in power for more than ten years either.

Jiang and Hu never seem to have tried breaking that rule.

This theory of how succession works in Beijing suggests that Deng Xiaoping, after having had to sack two party secretary-generals,

made an unprecedented move – he simultaneously appointed two generations of successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. One generation had to pass on the leadership to the next after two terms, after 10 years. This arrangement had one advantage, in this way there existed a mutually constraining relationship between two generations of successors; when Jiang’s time was over, he had to pass leadership on to Hu and thus, he would not generate the courage to betray the inflated ego of Deng Xiaoping; after handing the power over, Jiang would automatically come under Hu’s authority and so in order to protect himself, he would avoid a life-and-death struggle between two factions. Hu, on the other hand, had to rely on the legitimacy granted by Deng Xiaoping so as to guarantee that he would actually take over power according to plan and also so as to avoid that he would, like many successors in the past, leave the stage in poverty and misery; hence, he was very much concerned about treating Deng Xiaoping’s ideas as his guiding principles, protecting them with everything he had.

One may wonder if Xi Jinping is going to accept the same arrangement for himself, in 2022/23. It can be hard to be a pensioner in Zhongnanhai.

Thursday, November 27, 2014

Occupy Central: one Movement, two Pictures

Much of recent weeks’ coverage on Occupy Central has been rather gloomy, as this article by Zachary Keck in The Diplomat on October 15. Keck also mentioned a meeting between Liaison Office of the Central People’s Government in Hong Kong director Zhang Xiaoming (张晓明) and pro-establishment Hong Kong lawmakers on October 14. And a Reuters report stated the obvious, quoting sources: Beijing’s “bottom line” wouldn’t change, and making use of the army to suppress the movement would be a “last resort” – that would be if there was widespread chaos – killing, arson and looting. During the first week in October, the new National Security Commission chaired by President Xi Jinping had reached a position which left Hong Kong’s chief executive Leung Chun-ying with little leeway in dealing with the students.

A China News Service (CNS) article, written by an author named Guo Ping, quoted Zhang Xiaoming in indirect speech, but apparently extensively – it’s at times hard to see where Guo Ping quotes Zhang, and where he uses words of his own.

Since Hong Kong’s return [in 1997], the article says (or quotes), the core of the political dispute had been if or if not the principle of “one country, two systems” were respected, if or if not the governance rights (管治权) of the central authorities in Beijing over Hong Kong were respected, if or if not the constitutional status of Hong Kong’s basic law was respected, all of which concerned the direction of how the principle of “one country, two systems” was put into practice (香港回归以来围绕政制发展问题的争议,核心是要不要尊重“一国”的原则,要不要尊重中央对香港的管治权,要不要尊重基本法的宪制地位,这些是关系到“一 国两制”实践发展方向的大是大非问题。三个“要不要”直接抓住了当前问题的焦点所在).

As is well known, “one country, two systems” is the fundamental policy by which our country achieves peaceful reunification. “One country” points to [the fact that] this happens inside the country, that Hong Kong is an unseparable part of the country, directly belonging to the central government’s local administrative areas. “Two systems” means within “inside one country”, with the principal part carrying out a socialist system, and with Hong Kong and a few other regions carrying out a capitalist system. It can be said that “one country, two systems” isn’t only the great pioneering undertaking of the Chinese people to resolve the issue of national unity, but also a model and a sample for other countries to reference when having to solve similar problems.

In general, either Zhang’s or Guo Ping’s (the author’s) utterances appear to be a (for now) verbal “day of reckoning”, shovelling all “opponents” into one bag and threshing it: Hong Kongers who had opposed the introduction of “national education” (国民教育) and calling it “brainwashing education” (恐吓), Hong Kongers who “threatened and intimidated mainland tourists”, and “clamoring for Hong Kong independence”. All these plus (or including) Occupy Central.

Zhang’s speech to the Hong Kong legislators could be regarded as a speech to all Hong Kongers, Guo Ping concludes

Legislator Kenneth Leung probably wasn’t among Zhang’s audience in October. In a “Letter to Hong Kong” on RTHK on Sunday, he drew a very different picture of the movement’s effects on Central:

Central has become a cleaner, more pleasant and connectable business district for city dwellers. The sharp decrease in local traffic results in the reduction in road side pollution, making the air more breathable and the temperature more bearable. Walking becomes such a pleasant experience that people enjoy strolling during lunch time and evening, stopping occasionally to have a chat or a cigarette. Studies conducted in the States revealed that “walkability” of a community has a direct correlation with the local population’s life quality and health. Also, a recent study conducted by George Washington University on 30 metropolis in the States indicates that a city’s domestic productivity is higher when office and retail space is located in “walkable” communities

With the hindsight of these studies and the recent experience, it is high time for the Government to rethink about re-routing local traffic flow and re-designate most part of Central to become a pedestrian zone.

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Related

» A Chorus of Condemnation, Oct 7, 2014

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Sunday, August 17, 2014

Hong Kong’s “Occupy Central” at the Crossroads

“Whatever Beijing may say in public now, I think it can hardly afford to ignore the voices of 780,000 Hong Kong people”, Anson Chan (陳方安生), former Chief Secretary of both Hong Kong’s colonial and SAR governments and now a leading democratic politician, told CNN earlier this summer. Occupy-Central with Love and Peace (佔領中環) had just held an unofficial referendum, in which 787,767 Hong Kongers voted in support of free elections for the city’s next leader.

But if the Alliance for the Protection of Universal Suffrage and against Occupy Central (保普选反占中大联盟, shorter: Alliance against Occupy) is right, there are also 1.2 million people in Hong Kong who want to be heard with a different message to the central government. The Alliance against Occupy reportedly claims to have collected 1.2 million signatures, exceeding the 800,000 votes Occupy’s democracy poll got in June. The alliance against Occupy Central is backed by much of the Hong Kong’s establishment, including chief executive Leung Chun-ying (梁振英). And Beijing, or People’s Daily for that matter, certainly didn’t ignore the Alliance-against-Occupy demonstrations of Sunday afternoon.

Mainland Chinese media hadn’t ignored Occupy Central, but issued warning articles, sometimes using foreigners as warners against disruption. Reference News (参考消息), a Xinhua newsagency publication, quoted British media as saying that four global accounting firms in Hong Kong had published a statement opposing Hong Kong’s democracy movement (称“反对”香港的民主运动), and warning that extremist elements carried out street protests and disturbed business, their transnational customers could withdraw from Hong Kong.

Indeed, according to a Financial Times online newsarticle on June 27, the Hong Kong entities of EY, KPMG, Deloitte and PwC said the Occupy Central movement, which is calling for electoral reform in the former British colony, posed a threat to the territory’s rule of law.

Ostensibly, the Alliance against Occupy opposes civil disobedience or, more precisely, disruption of public life. On the other hand, universal suffrage (making Hong Kong’s Chief Executive an elected, rather than an appointed official) can mean a lot of different things – including the model that would preselect the candidates who would be allowed to run for office.

Those Hong Kongers who want real elections will rather trust Occupy Central. But those who put the economy (and therefore business interests) first, will rather trust the Alliance against Occupy. It would be easy to suggest that an unknown share of the claimed 1.2 million signatures against Occupy were coerced from employees, or that demonstrators in today’s anti-Occupy demonstrations had been paid. But there are most probably genuine concerns among “ordinary people”, not only among big business. There also seems to be a dividing line between the old and the young – most Alliance protesters seem to be 50-plus. They aren’t necessarily stupid, and they may be quite aware that the CCP and its business cronies, rather than Hong Kongers, may take control of Hong Kong’s political narratives. But to regain (or maintain) influence, Occupy Central will have to listen to what Hong Kongers actually want. To do that without losing their own way defines be the challenge.

Any kind of street protests or blockades may remind the elderly of the 1967 riots, when most Hong Kongers sided with the colonial government. Occupy Central is a very different movement – but they will have to mind their image among the (yet unknown) majority of Hong Kongers. A vision of 10,000 people blocking traffic in the central business district may not charm the public.

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Related

» World Radio Day, Feb 15, 2014
» Sense of Affection, July 30, 2012
» Szeto Wah, 1931 – 2011, Jan 2, 2011
» Divisive Power, June 21, 2010
» Don’t startle Beijing, Jan 7, 2010

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Saturday, February 15, 2014

World Radio Day, and how did Li Wai-ling get Fired?

February 13 (Thursday) was World Radio Day. That was an adequate day for the Hong Kong Journalists Association to bring Li Wai-ling (or Li Wei-ling, 李慧玲) and the press together. But let’s go through the issues one by one.

The Genius leads the spectators: engineering of consent in its early stages in applauding his works.

If everyone is happy, who needs a free press?

China’s growing economic weight is allowing it to extend its influence over the media in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, writes Reporters without Borders, in their 2014 report, published earlier this week. The BBC added a palpable story on Friday, about the sacking of Li Wei-ling, a radio talk show host at a commercial station in Hong Kong who has been sacked and who, on a press conference on Thursday, accused the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of having put pressure on her employer.

Organizations like Reporters without Borders have their merits. This may be even more true for the Hong Kong Journalists Association who organized Ms Li Wei-ling’s press conference. Reporters, talk show hosts and all the people who are critical and daring in the face of power deserve solidarity.

But this goes for reporters and journalists in Western countries, too. The problem with stories like the BBC’s, served to an American or European audience, seems to be that they blind people for problems at home. Here, too, broadcasters need to apply for frequencies. Here, too, they need to rely on political decisions when they are public broadcasters. On licence fees, or on public budgets. Advertisers, too, may exert influence.

My window on press freedom is small. The case I really looked at rather closely during the last years was that of the Chinese department at Deutsche Welle. I’m looking at these issues as a listener to and reader of the media.

This post might serve as the short version, and here is a longer one. They are about German politics, and the media.

The freedom of the press isn’t necessarily the freedom of a journalist to speak or write his mind, or to publicly highlight whatever scandal he or she may discover. This depends on a reporter’s or journalist’s employer, and frequently, reporters and editors-in-chief in the free world are very aware of when to better censor themselves, so as to keep their jobs.

This tends to be particularly true when a journalist’s contract is non-permanent. You don’t need state authorities to censor journalists when journalists’ employment is as precarious as is frequently the case in Western countries.

There is no point in pitting Chinese journalists against Western journalists, or the other way round. But there is a point in looking at every situation without ideological blinkers. Suppression of freedom from commercial organizations (and, sometimes, public-private networks) may still allow media that offer valid criticism of suppression in totalitarian countries – after all, that’s “them”, not “us”. Media in totalitarian countries can also, at times, provide valid criticism of media in freer countries. It is useful to read and listen to as many different outlets from as many different political systems as you can.

But there is no need or justification to blindly trust either of them. Without a broad global audience that develops criteria to judge press reports, freedom will get under the wheels of authoritarianism, even in – so far – free societies. The internet has become a place where journalists and their listeners and readers should meet, and be as honest with each other as they can. Its also the place where the struggle for freedom on the airwaves has to begin, time and again, whenever powers of whichever color try to weigh in on them.

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Related

» Radio Sparsam, Jan 26, 2014
» Authentic, Feb 16, 2013

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Friday, December 13, 2013

Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour revisited: “three years after the storm”

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From the script of a CCTV “Dialog” (对话) broadcast, either just broadcast or to be broacast shortly, and pre-published by “Guanchazhe” (Shanghai).

[…]

Chen Kaichi
(former chairman of the Guangzhou Consultative Conference and party group secretary):

In the morning of January 1, 1992, at five in the morning, the General Office of the Central Committee of the CCP sent a top-secret telegram to the Guangdong provincial party committee. The telegram was only one-and-a-half lines long and only said that Comrade Xiaoping wanted to come to the South to have a rest, and that the provincial party committee should prepare for a good reception and for security.

It only reached provincial party secretary Comrade Xie Fei after nine a.m., after decryption, and when he saw it, he immediately made a phonecall to ask where I was.

陈开枝(原广州市政协主席、党组书记):1992年元旦的凌晨五点,中共中央办公厅给中共广东省委发了一个绝密电报,这绝密电报只有一行半字,就说中共广东省委小平同志要到南方休息,请你们做好接待,安全工作。

这个电报呢,经过翻译,上午的九点多才送到省委书记谢非同志手上,谢非同志看了电报,就要找我,打电话问我在哪里。
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Chen Weihong
(moderator):

Your position at the time was …

陈伟鸿:您当时担任的职务是。

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Chen Kaichi:

… provincial party committee deputy secretary general. Back then, there were only few secretary-generals, only one secretary general and one deputy, and I said that I was in Shatou Town, Nanhai. He made me understand the situation by saying that “the old man we’ve been waiting for for so long is to come, please come here very quickly to make the arrangements.

陈开枝:广东省委副秘书长,因为当年那个秘书长很少,只有一正一副,那个我说,我在南海那个沙头镇,他用一名能够听得懂的话跟我说,我们盼望已久的那位老人家要来了,请你赶快来做出安排。

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Chen Weihong:

You knew right away what he [Xie Fei] was talking about.

陈伟鸿:你当时心里一下子就明白,他说的是什么了。

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Chen Kaichi:

[I knew it right away] because we had been depressed during those years, hoping that the old man would would come, and also thinking that he would come, because if he didn’t, China’s problems would not be solved.

陈开枝:因为我们这几年太压抑了,早就希望这个老人家要来了,也想到他一定要来了,不来中国的问题不能解决了。

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Chen Weihong:

Depressed of what, actually?

陈伟鸿:究竟因为什么而压抑?

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Chen Kaichi:

After the 1989 storm, our country was shrouded by a truly dismal atmosphere, when the thoughts from the “left” were comprehensively gaining ground. At that time, people even opposed the introduction of joint ventures, and high-ranking leaders said that joint ventures meant still more capitalism, and they didn’t want it. So, under these circumstances, I didn’t believe the words about “coming to have a rest”.

陈开枝:1989年风波以后,整个我们国家笼罩着一种非常沉闷的气氛,“左”的思想全面抬头,这个时候呢,已经有人连引进三资企业都反对,很高层的领导说多一个三资企业,就多一分资本主义,他说他们不要,所以在这样情况下,说休息,我就绝不相信是来休息的。

[…]

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Friday, March 8, 2013

Conspiracies and Control: no Detailed Plans for Currency War yet, but let’s attack Arrogant Abe

American, European and Japanese efforts to spark growth could devolve into a currency war, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), on Wednesday, interpreted remarks by Gao Xiqing, president of China’s CIC sovereign-wealth fund. Japan should not use its neighbors as a “garbage bin”, Gao was quoted. The WSJ’s Lingling Wei suggests that [t]he focus on Japan and the yen has taken some heat off Beijing, long accused by critics of artificially holding down the value of the yuan, Wei wrote in an additional article on Wednesday. Gao said that [o]ur job is to preserve the value of the hard-earned savings of the Chinese people.

Ever since the establishment of the Bank of England in 1694, behind almost every big global change, there had been the shadow of international finance and capital, Fu Bilan (付碧莲), a regular contributor to (or regularly republished by) People’s Daily online, mused in an article published by PD online on Wednesday:

They master a country’s lifeline and hold a country’s political fate in their hands. By inciting political incidents, inducing economic crisis, they control the flow directions and the distribution of the world’s wealth. It can be said that a history of global finance is the history of a conspiracy of seeking domination over the wealth of humankind.
自1694年英格兰银行成立以来的300多年间,几乎每一场世界重大变故背后,都能看到国际金融资本势力的身影。他们通过左右一国的经济命脉掌握国家的政治命运。通过煽动政治事件、诱发经济危机,控制着世界财富的流向与分配。可以说,一部世界金融史,就是一部谋求主宰人类财富的阴谋史。

China’s central bank is well prepared to react to a currency war, adds Fu. However, a currency war could be avoided. The latest G-20 meeting had drawn a few lines, such as restricting monetary policies to domestic functions. The G-20 meeting had also expressed the hope that monetary policies would not lead to competitive devaluation. But either way, China had taken responsive preparations to meet with any realities of quantative easing (量化宽松) that might occur abroad.

And of course, Fu Bilan hopes for some guiding policy decisions from the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National People’s Congress – both of who are currently holding their annual plenary meetings.

The – pretty long – article is much more technical than what these short excerpts might suggest, but I can’t help feeling that some of its paragraphs were written in celebration of the life of Hugo Chavez. The world of finance is evil, of course – with the exception of China‘s world of finance.

However, there also seems to be a reluctance to discuss what measures China’s monetary-policy planners have in mind to react to a currency war. One of China’s deputy central bank directors, Yi Gang (易纲), was quoted on Sunday with remarks about taking realities of quantative easing on the part of foreign central banks into account, but no details were mentioned then, either.

For the time being, the wargames, at least in the press, seem to focus on multinational institutions, and the obvious target, again, is Japan:

Japan’s prime minister Abe shamelessly delcared that a Japanese national should routinely be appointed as the post of the Asian Development Bank’s first director. China should team up with ASEAN and other countries to smash their fond dream.
日本首相安倍大言不惭,宣称亚行行长一职应按惯例由日本人续任,中国应该联合东盟及其他国家打破其美梦。

China’s nationalist Huanqiu Shibao didn’t even have to think this latest little conspiracy in international finance up – they are quoting “The Sun” (太陽報) from Hong Kong.

Patriotism won’t provide you with detailed plans for a currency war. But it helps to kill time until it arrives.

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Generosity and Truthfulness: 12th CPPCC 1rst Session opens in Beijing

The first Session of the 12th Chinese “Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference” (CPPCC, 中国人民政治协商会议) opened in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing at 7 a.m. GMT this morning, reports the BBC‘s Mandarin service. Member of the permanent committee of the politburo Yu Zhengsheng presides (正声将), and outgoing chairman Jia Qinglin (贾庆林) delivered his last work report. Yu Zhengsheng, formerly party secretary in Shanghai, is expected to succeed Jia Qinglin as CPPCC chairman. The BBC’s reporter Sha Lei (沙磊, apparently John Sudworth) as saying that some measures had been taken to reflect new CCP secretary general Xi Jinping‘s emphasis on thriftiness during the CPPCC sesson as well as during the “National People’s Congress” session which takes place simultaneously. Among other things, less roads than during previous CPPCC and NPC meetings are expected to be sealed off. The BBC also refers to a People’s Daily editorial published on Sunday.

Sohu republished the editorial from People’s Daily, also on Sunday. People’s Daily’s editorial headline  was unity is strength, only democracy is vitality. Sohu’s version carries To govern, the party needs to be generous; CPPCC delegates need to speak the truth as the headline.

Some of the editorial’s remarks are actually Xi Jinping quotes, possibly made on several occasions, but certainly on February 6, when meeting people from all democratic parties’ central committees, old and new leaders from the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and personalities without party membership to celebrate Spring Festival together.

People’s Daily online Sohu also displays emoticons for readers to express their feelings, but during the past six or seven hours, only 24 netizens (apparently) cared to “vote”.

The Feelings of the Masses

The Feelings of the Masses

On Sohu, a netizen (If I’m translating the emotes correctly) may choose to be moved (感动 – 0), surprised (惊讶 – 9), in awe/supportive? (给力 – 8), mad (抓狂 – 4), or pondering (思考 – 3).

However, more than two-thousand comments appear to have been made, and those found on the latest page are either supportive, or stating conventional words of wisdom about generosity and truthfulness.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Obituary: Stéphane Hessel, 1917 – 2013

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Main Links:

» Stéphane Hessel, gentleman indigné, Le Monde, December 23, 2011 / February 27, 2013
» 《愤怒吧!》: 93岁愤怒战士一夜爆红, Beijing News, April 11, 2011

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

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Hessel was born German, grew up French, and became a French citizen in 1939. He took part in the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, and never stopped promoting its values, Le Monde wrote in December 2011 (article updated on February 27, 2013).

He had joined the résistance in 1941. He had been arrested, tortured, and survived the Buchenwald concentration camp.

And his hope was contagious (Le gentleman indigné, dont l’espérance est contagieuse).

He was also a diplomat. Compromise was hardly something foreign to him. But to react to wrongs seems to have been second nature to him.

On October 20, 2010, on his 93rd birthday, his booklet “Indignez-vous”, Time for Outrage, was published in France, with more than two million copies sold in France, and almost two million more in the rest of the world. He published another edition soon after, describing his admiration for Eleanor and Franklin D. Roosevelt. Indignez-vous was followed by “Engagez-vous”, Get involved, came next.

Counter-espionage was Hessel’s job from 1941, when he followed General de Gaulle to London, a correspondent for Beijing News wrote  from Paris, in April 2011, six months after “Time for Anger” had been published:

In March 1944, he was assigned to organize the resistance network in Paris, and to gather intelligence for the allied troops as they prepared to enter continental Europe. Named “Ge Like”, he secretly entered France, but was soon betrayed and then arrested by the Gestapo. Neither punishment nor lure by promises led to the results [his captors] desired, and Hessel was then transferred to the Buchenwald concentration camp on August 8, 1944, only days before the liberaton of Paris. He later wrote a detailed description of these experiences, in “Danse avec le Siècle”.
1941年,他为追随戴高乐将军来到伦敦,从事反间谍的侦查行动。1944年3月,他受命组织联络巴黎的抵抗网络、为盟军登陆搜集情报,化名“格里科”秘密潜入法国。由于叛徒的出卖,他很快便被盖世太保所捕获。刑逼利诱毫无收获后,8月8日埃塞尔被押解往德国布痕瓦尔德集中营,而这仅仅就是巴黎解放的前几天。之后他在自传《世纪之舞》中对这段经历有着详细的记述。

His narrow escape from death – by obtaining the identity of a fellow inmate who had died of typhus – inspired him.

Just as Hessel said: “this kind of leap from death, back into life makes him the more determined to enter the enthusiasm of global politics” (正如埃塞尔自己所说的:“这种死里逃生经历更加坚定了他介入世界的政治热情”).

The article’s description of Hessel’s post-war life included his co-authorship of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

To help this document of tremendous historic value obtain acknowledgment as [a set of] universal values, Hessel and his colleagues went to great pains to make it suitable for East and West, for ideologies, and the different situations of countries and nations.
为了使这份人类历史上极为重要的文件获得公认的普世价值,为了能使其适应东西方、意识形态、国家种族不同的状况,达成一致的认同,埃塞尔和他的同事们费尽心机,奔走疾呼。

There was nothing new in the novel, “Time to get Angry”, and it provided neither a logical analysis of the problems faced by humankind today, nor practical methodology for dealing with them, the Beijing News author quoted Hessel, in 2011, and added that its fascination was to be found in the emotions it stirred, and the lesson it taught: not to allow evil to repeat itself.

An initially small, unobtrusive book, written without much preparation, of only some thirty pages including footnotes and a postscript, but inevitable content, unexpectedly led to this kind of reading, discussion and dissemination. (Frequently, customers went to a bookstore and bought ten or more copies for their families and friends). While many publishers call this a coincidence, many others explore the reasons for the book’s strong sales. There is this global upheaval, and worried people are seeking some relief. This small book is just right in its simplicity, legibility, its sentiment and excitement, and its catchiness. […] And secondly, the author’s personal charm adds an envelope of respectability and trustworthiness to this small book. It seems that only with the historical experience and the energetic and passionate involvement of this 93-year-old warrior, a man may be qualified to appeal to public enthusiasm.
一本事先毫不张扬,也无甚精心企划的小书;一本加上注释和后记才三十多页,内容无可避免的略显单薄的小册子,竟然引发了如此的阅读、讨论和传播(经常有顾客到书店一买十多册赠与身边的家人朋友)。在大多出版界人士大呼偶然的同时,也有不少人研究它畅销的必然所致。首先,世界局势的动荡,对未来的担忧让人们急需找到一个释放内心情绪的出口,而这本小册子正好简单、易懂,情绪激昂、朗朗上口。 […] 其次,作者的个人魅力无疑为这本小书笼罩了一层令人尊敬和信赖的气场。似乎,唯有这种经历过历史,并以自身全部的精力和激情投入其中的长者(93岁的老战士)才有资格以这种语气号召起大众的热情。

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Related

Hessel dies at 95, The Guardian, Febr 27, 2013
A Resistance Hero Fires up the French, NYT, March 9, 2011

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