South China Sea: Five Questions to a Hegemon

Over the last decade or so, China had stolen a march on the US in Asia, Geoff Dyer wrote in the Financial Times earlier this month: “The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq proved to be a strategic gift for Beijing”. That would be a gift from the Bush jr presidency which the Obama administration appears to be reclaiming now.

You can ring my Belle

And if the officials in Beijing congratulate themselves for the opportunities they had during the past ten years, while the previous administration was busy in Afghanistan and Iraq, they certainly don’t show their happiness in public. On the contrary, China’s leadership is – ostensibly – dropping its illusions, and vocally so, too. If we can believe that their reaction is genuine, they must have reckoned that America’s absence without leave from East Asia was for good.

It seems noteworthy that it was a “leave” during the previous administration’s tenure. America’s return to the Western Pacific suggests that foreign policies follow rules of their own, regardless of the political colors of those who happen to govern in Washington. George W. Bush began his first term by telling Beijing that he would defend Taiwan, “whatever it takes”. He ended his second term on rather friendly terms with the Chinese leadership. The Obama administration began with similarly harmonious policies, but is now returning to a more robust approach in the Far East.

When listening to commanding officer David Lausman of the USS George Washington, stating to Vietnamese dignitaries that

“This great warship is a testament to our country’s resolve and promise that we will always remain throughout all the international waters in the Pacific Rim, trying to help every country together ensuring that it stays a very stable environment”,

you can’t help but think that a pretty big hegemon is holding court there.

Tony Benn, a British Labour Party veteran, has five questions he would ask dictators:

• What powers have you got?
• Where did you get them from?
• In whose interests do you exercise them?
• To whom are you accountable?
• How could we get rid of you?

Try and ask these questions not to a dictator, but to the two – real or perceived – hegemons Vietnam might have to choose from when it comes to South China Sea issues. The first four questions could be interesting enough – feel free to find answers to them by commenting -, but to me, the most striking one when it comes to hegemons would be Question #5.

Vietnam proved decades ago that it can get rid of America – even if at a very bloody price. America can rule the seas, but not Vietnam. On the other hand, and only recently, China reportedly told other Asian countries not to discuss the [South China Sea] issue among themselves. As far as I can see, a Vietnamese choice between China and America as allies can only result in welcoming the American navy.

That said, not only Hanoi, but Washington, too, needs to make choices.

President Barack Obama’s actions to maintain the current Pacific order are a step in the right direction, but he still lacks a strategic “roadmap”,

Thomas Wright, director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs wrote on August 8.

And maybe the American people themselves should ask in whose interest – see Benn’s question #3 – Washington is going to exercise its power there. After all, hegemony can be cheap for those who benefit from it, and costly to the hegemons themselves.

If the balance struck against China’s claims is meant to be sustainable, the division of labor – in terms of regional security – needs to become one based on partnership, and shared responsibilities.

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Related
U.S., South Korea announce Yellow Sea Exercise, US Forces Press Service, Aug. 18, 2010
Good Ganbu: Be no Chess Piece, July 29, 2010

Is Obama’s Taiwan Policy Consistent?

Randy Shriver, assistant secretary of state for East Asia from 2003 to 2005 under the Bush jr administration, worries that Washington may not understand that only the approach of supplying Taiwan with weapons for self-defense had given the country’s leaders the confidence it had taken to go to the negotiating table with Beijing. The approach had paid off, Schriver writes – “see ECFA and other recent developments”. President Ma Ying-jeou, on the other hand, understands this very well and has consistently asked the U.S. to make more modern weapons available to Taiwan.

Shriver voiced his concerns in an article for the conservative Washington Times on July 9. And he is careful not to accuse the Obama administration outright of letting Taiwan down. But apparently, he has no time to pay  attention to local or regional subtleties – not when it comes to politics, anyway.

A visit by the Dalai Lama to Taiwan in August 2009 turned into a walk on eggshells for the Taiwanese government – the visit was eventually approved, but one of the Ma government’s – semi-official – negotiators, Strait Exchange Foundation Vice-Chairman and Secretary-General Kao Kung-lian (高孔廉) apparently suggested that a the statement [by the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office concerning the Dalai Lama's visit] didn’t accuse president Ma or the KMT at all, one could understand the mainland position, as its stance concerning “the Dalai” had always been this way (可以理解大陸的立場，因為大陸對達賴的看法一向如此).  Several referrals to the DPP in the statement suggested that Kao Kung-lian saw a Chinese acknowledgment that the invitation to the Dalai Lama to visit Taiwan was just an action by the oppositional DPP (i.e. the bad guys in Taiwan who were trying to sabotage the beautiful honeymoon between Taipei and Beijing).

Frequently since 2008, president Ma’s KMT has appeared to position itself closer to Beijing than to its own people – unless their own people supported the government’s China policies. When oppositionals prepared for a rally against ECFA, KMT lawmakers accused them of “political motives” – just as if Beijing’s approach to the ECFA negotiations was unpolitical. A referendum on ECFA was – more or less elegantly – buried by the relevant review committee early in June, and the ruling KMT kept the review process of ECFA in parliament as lean as possible.

America’s interest in Pacific affairs is hardly fading. It’s latest military moves East of China don’t suggest that at all – moves which may as well be interpreted as an American – and a Japanese – preference for taking care of the regional status quo by themselves, rather than relying on a Taiwanese government that looks anything but confident.

“The U.S. has always set a policy based on singling-out a potential rival, a country that may pose a danger to America from the standpoint of its overall resources”, the Voice of Russia quotes Alexei Fenenko, Associate Professor of Moscow State University, who explains why, in his view, the U.S. has suddenly started offering India broader cooperation in areas where Russia and India have long had strong ties, after 30 years of disregarding the country and refusing to supply advance peaceful nuclear technology. Fenenko adds that

“The strategy of containing China declared by the Clinton Administration and searching a counter balance to China is based on this. Originally, the U.S. tried to use Australia for this purpose but when it became clear that it is a weak player, Washington turned towards India in 2005 considering it as a counterbalance to China and offered to promote cooperation.”

If Australia, a country whose political independence is undisputed, should indeed be seen as a “weak player”, how weak is the Ma administration looking? Does it make sense to provide Taiwan’s administration the weapons it has asked for? The answer may still have to be “Yes” – but this doesn’t go without saying.

Party politics can blind people. It may be unconceivable for Shriver that Barack Obama‘s administration may actually have a clear picture of China’s military build-up against Taiwan. It may be hard for a conservative former politician to understand that the current administration may actually be  continuing a policy started by another  Democrat – Bill Clinton.

Shriver’s role in international business doesn’t necessarily help to assess China and Taiwan in a political light either – his merits in promoting U.S.-Taiwan relations notwithstanding.

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Related
Zhao Nianyu’s Three Taiwan Commandments, June 19, 2010
Tibet: “America’s Consistent Policy”, March 26, 2010

Creative Destruction or Development?

Thomas L. Friedman listened to Tung Chee-hwa (董建華), Hong Kong’s first chief-executive under Chinese sovereignty. Ralph Gomory on the other hand doesn’t want us to listen to Thomas Friedman. That said, all that Tung said (not too long ago, apparently) was that

“China was asleep during the Industrial Revolution. She was just waking during the Information Technology Revolution. She intends to participate fully in the Green Revolution.”

Anyway, Friedman wants innovation for America – “president Obama should seize this moment before the midterms — possibly his last window to put together a majority in the Senate, including some Republicans, for a price on carbon — and put in place a real U.S. engine for clean energy innovation and energy security”.

Friedman’s view is based on some scientific evidence. America is at a strategic inflection point, he writes. Andy S. Grove, a leading IBM manager, describes a strategic inflection point as

“a time in the life of a business when its fundamentals are about to change. That change can mean an opportunity to rise to new heights. But it may just as likely signal the beginning of the end”.

And before you could say something like “gee, that man must be paranoid”, Andy Grove himself confirms that he is. Always been. That’s why Friedman likes reading Grove after all.

But since then, when Friedman supported his president in 2003, the times have changed. For one, the Iraq war was wrong, or not exactly as right as it first looked. Besides, maybe the French weren’t really that stupid back in 2003. The French prime minister was out drumming up business for French companies in the world’s biggest emerging computer society in India while Friedman and GW Bush were taking care of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction.

But let’s get back to the strategic inflection point.

To succeed at a strategic inflection point, a company (or a country’s industries, as generalized by Friedman) must not only absorb new technologies, or develop them according to emerging or hidden trends in demand, writes Grove.

To put it more fundamentally scientific (as I understand it), America’s strategic choice between catching Osama and contributing to the wave of green technology is about a choice between surviving and growing in a great time of creative destruction, or getting destroyed in the process – economically, not militarily.

Friedman advocates a – by now seemingly established – pattern of international division of labor:

In the process, China is going to make clean power technologies cheaper for itself and everyone else. But even Chinese experts will tell you that it will all happen faster and more effectively if China and America work together — with the U.S. specializing in energy research and innovation, at which China is still weak, as well as in venture investing and servicing of new clean technologies, and with China specializing in mass production.

This could be a nice prelude for a more perfect Doha Round.

There is probably noone who would question the benefits of being a big player in new technologies – green technologies for example. But Ralph Gomory, himself a scientist, took issue with Friedman’s ideas. America can’t avoid the fate of losing productive capacity by trading designs, ideas, and R&D [...]  for the items we need. Gomory argues that while R&D is crucial for manufacturing, it’s share in an economy is clearly less than ten per cent. There is no way to balance the value of manufactured goods with R&D alone. Gomory writes that

[w]e need successful industries and we need to innovate within them to keep them thriving. However, when your trading partner is thinking about GDP rather than profit, and has adopted mercantilist tactics, subsidizing industries, and mispricing its currency, while loaning you the money to buy the underpriced goods, this may simply not be possible.

Nor is there a need to rely on generating nothing but designs, ideas, and R&D anyway. “Cheap labor” as a location factor doesn’t explain why Japan and Germany as high-wage countries are successful in the automotive industry, and it doesn’t explain why semi-conductors as a model of a high investment, low-labor content industry, are mainly made in Asia.

No need to say that JR finds Gomory’s argument more convincing. What only adds to the charme, Gomory offers surprisingly simple numerical evidence for his side of the debate. When you have good designs at hand, you better take them and build something useful and valuable yourself, rather than put it at your competitors’ disposal.

Besides, every country has its share of tinkerers, engineers, farmers, and unskilled workers. There is little space for that argument in economics – but if a trade-surplus country like China or Germany wants to do its share in rebalancing global trade disparities, not-so-bright citizens must find opportunities to earn money, too.

And then, maybe evening school will help a routined machine operator to become an engineer in the process. This would make sense both economically, and in terms of civil society. Long-term unemployed people on the other hand tend to lose interest in further education.

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Related
National Export Initiative,  White House, March 11, 2010
No Global Governance, January 1, 2010
Obituary: Paul Samuelson, December 14, 2009

BJRB: Hegemonists should Harbor no Illusions

The following is a translation of an article by Wang Qing (王卿), originally written for Beijing Ribao, and published online by Tianjin’s Enorth website on Febr 6.

In the Face of International Interests, there is no Space for Illusions

As we are entering the new year, the originally warm Chinese-American relations have suffered “a current of cold air”, “clash”, “cold war” “struggle”, according to all these kinds of headlines. Indeed, the recent Chinese-American focus is on trade disputes, the administration of the internet, arms sales to Taiwan, meetings with the Dalai etc., launching an intensive game of attack and defense, leaving the impression on people that Chinese-American relations were heavily in trouble, and at a new low point.

From remembering the Obama administration’s performance during its first year, we can see that in international activities and diplomacy, there was a strategic change in that it appeared to be more humble, the posture softer. Especially, compared to the past, it attached more importance to multilateral mechanisms when dealing with problems hard to deal with on its own, thus highlighting its “smart power” diplomatic concept (巧实力外交理念). Obama visited China during his first year in office, emphasizing consultations and cooperation with China on various occasions, and the relations saw a rather smooth “run-in period”, with the implementation of a smooth transition. On a foundation of strengthening mutual trust, the two countries would lift their relationship to a new level of strategic content with a new pattern. Over the past year, Chinese-American relations tended to be on a rather equal footing in a more stable structure of relations which attracted international attention and even led to assumptions that there was a “G2″ at work. But reality is the best lesson to people, and the recent American punches against China are showing that any sayings about Obama being pro-China (亲华) were wishful thinking.

When looking at relations between countries and international politics, factors of feelings and history may be hard to gainsay, but it is more important to never forget the “law of interests” – in diplomacy, a country must guard its interests at maximum. The reason for Obama to emphasize relations with China, intensifying cooperation with China in all fields, was in America’s own interest. The recent ways in which America played the big protectionist card against China and used the Google incident (谷歌事件) to promote freedom of the internet, the way it sells arms to Taiwan without heeding China’s warnings, threatening (扬言) that there is a need to meet the Dalai, is still based on its own national interests. In the final analysis, in its contacts with China, the Obama administration is the spokesperson and defender of America’s interests, and it can by no means defend China’s interests. When the interests of our country are concerned, we must give up our illusions, and fight with resolve. Some people in our country in particular, who still harbor illusions about Obama, should look clearly at the nature of the problems, and take a firm stand to defend our country’s national interests.

It should be noted that the fact that America revolted against China within a very short period still didn’t happen on the spur of a moment, but was a combination of pre-arranged punches.  When Obama entered the stage, he faced both the pressures from the financial crisis and from the quagmire of war. There was no way not to be warm to the outside world and to create a positive international atmosphere, but after a year of intense strategic readjustment, America is again changing its tune, returning to strongly safeguarding their own interests, and changing the pattern of their diplomacy. Behind this apparent change, there is America’s hegemony with its unscrupulous nature of profitmaking (一如既往的则是美国霸权主义不择手段为己谋利的本性).

After the end of the Cold War, as the world’s only superpower, America defended its hegemonic position with all its forces, beating with ease, contained imaginary enemies, disregarding and sacrificing other countries’ interests (漠视和牺牲他国利益), not hestitating to harm others and benefit itself, breaching trust and abandoning honesty (背信弃义), shifting crisis and unleashing war. In recent years, with the rapid development of the emerging forces and the general trend of democratization of international relations, as the days when the developed countries alone dominated and enjoyed the world’s resources are coming to an end, America’s comprehensive force and global influence is declining. Although America may compromise or concede on some tangible problems, from a fundamental point of view, America can’t be willing to lose its hegemonic position, but will instead mobilize all resources and forces it can to defend its interests. In his recent state-of-the-union address, Obama expressed the resolve never to allow America to be in second position (决不接受美国成为第二) [remark: Obama was referring to jobs and green technology there -- JR], thus amply demonstrating the reluctance to abandon hegemony.

With this background, any belief in smooth relations with America is wishful thinking. Although China and America have a broad range of common interests, and broad space for development, quarrels and frictions are unavoidable and will become more frequent and specific, America can still play big games and tricks on China’s interests. Of course, China is now different from the past, and the great country’s rise can’t be stopped. Nobody should expect that the Chinese would swallow the bitter fruit of damaging their own interests. In this regard, the hegemonists themselves should harbor no illusions either.

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Related
Lee Kuan Yew: America must Strike a Balance, November 7, 2009

Chinese Statistics: American Companies “lose Chinese market” over Taiwan

Raytheon Company (雷神公司) “loses business in China” because of its role in arms sales to Taiwan, according to the official Chinese paper Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) on Monday, quoted by Singapore’s United Morning News on Tuesday. The company is to sell updated Patriot Systems to Taiwan in a contract approved by former U.S. president George W. Bush in 2008, and cleared by the U.S. Department of Defense this month. Huanqiu quoted an unnamed authoritative person as saying that a British Raytheon subsidiary had tried since 2000 to participate in Shanghai-Beijing-Guangzhou air traffic control and in China’s civil aviation system’s radar and air traffic control automization projects, but that all their bids had failed. The article also suggests that Raytheon hadn’t been found in any procurement and bidding records for Chinese radar projects, and that China hadn’t imported any products made by the company since 2004. Raytheon had since withdrawn its representation office from China. Lockheed Martin had also “lost Chinese markets” (失去了在中国的市场), according to the article.

The purpose of the article seems to be to back up comments reportedly made by Chinese top military officials that China should take defensive countermeasures against companies which sold weapons to Taiwan, but also wanted to sell aircraft and other goods to China, or that European countries would not dare to risk business with China by selling arms to Taiwan.

Probably also in a reaction to the Taiwan arms deal cleared this month, Xinhua published an unspecified report about a successful test of an emerging Chinese anti-missile system.

The foreign military sales contract with Taiwan totals $1.1 billion, according to Raytheon Company’s website.

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Remotely Related:
Xu Qiliang: “A Blue Sky full of Peace and Hope”, November 6, 2009

Taiwan Arms Sales: “A Fly-Head-Sized Benefit”

The U.S. defense department cleared a contract late on Wednesday to allowing Lockheed Martin Corp to sell an unspecified number of advanced Patriot air defense missiles to Taiwan, Washington’s de facto embassy in Taipei said, according to Reuters News Agency. The package had originally been approved by former US President George W Bush in 2008. Scholars interviewed by Singapore’s United Morning News believe that the Obama administration chose this timing to make it clear to both sides of the Taiwan Strait, i. e. China and Taiwan, that a current brawl between Washington and Taipei on U.S. beef exports to Taiwan, and American arms sales to Taiwan, were two separate issues. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu (姜瑜) immediately denounced the American decision on Thursday’s regular foreign ministry press conference. While the foreign ministry spokeswoman referred to general harm to U.S.-Chinese relations, Chinese Vice Admiral Yang Yi (杨毅) suggested that China should take defensive countermeasures against U.S. companies which sold weapons to Taiwan, but also wanted to sell aircraft and other goods to China, writes Reuters.

A patriotic military Chinese blogger who puts the pen to the front (以笔为锋) quotes a major general, Luo Yuan (罗援) as saying on Phoenix TV on Thursday that while the U.S. announcement harmed only recently-established trust between the American and Chinese military, it didn’t pose a threat towards China, quoting from a Sunzi strategem (小敌之坚，大敌之擒 – the smaller troops would be captured by the larger troops).

Barack Obama‘s supply list for Taiwan could also include design work on diesel-electric submarines, which warranted much more attention than the Patriot missiles, the blogger quotes Luo Yuan, but Luo didn’t believe that Taiwan had the capability of applying the design for building these submarines by itself, while the Netherlands and other countries which were able to build them [America isn't] wouldn’t offend China (得罪中国) for petty profits (蝇头小利 ying tou xiao li, literally a fly head’s benefit) from arms sales to Taiwan.

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Related:
MIM-104 Patriot, PAC-3 upgrade, Wikipedia as of January 8, 2010
German Type 209 diesel-electric submarine, Wikipedia as of January 8, 2010
Lee Kwan Yew: America must strike a Balance, November 7, 2009
Taiwan’s Hai Lung II submarine, Global Security, date unspecified

India, China, Dalai Lama: “Reflecting the Diversity of World Cultures and Civilizations”

The RIC countries’ (Russia, India, China) foreign ministers had their 9th meeting in Bangalore, India, on October 27 and 28, and last night (November 3, 22:05 GMT), All India Radio‘s (AIR) Daily Commentary pointed out that

“on the political front, cooperation between these three global powers will buttress stability, particularly in Asia. Terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, and West Asia, directly impinge on the internal security of these nations. Promoting peace and development in these areas, farming up counter-terrorism strategies, sharing intelligence and launching .. actions against money-laundring and drug-trafficking that feed international terrorism are some of the joint measures envisaged. In a joint statement after the meeting, the three countries sent a strong message to countries like Pakistan to act against terror groups like Jama’at-ud-Da’wah, listed in the UN resolution 1267. They also urge the UN member states to urgently conclude and adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The three countries affirmed that democratization of international relations is imperative to build a multi-polar world order, reflecting diversity of world cultures and civilizations.”

The most likely link that Beijing can draw from the UN security council resolutions the RIC foreign ministers’ communiqué or joint statement refers to is the inclusion of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). The United Nations  added ETIM to its “list of terrorists and terrorist supporters associated with Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network” in September 2002. According to the CDI Terrorism Project, ETIM’s global reach and links to al Qaeda are disputed. Beijing regularly and generously extends the accusation of terrorism from ETIM to other Uyghur organizations it dislikes, such as the World Uyghur Congress.
Russia’s foreign minister, too, will have returned to Moscow happily. In Moscow’s book, the RIC joint communiqué has somehow condemned Chechnyan “terrorists”, and possibly Georgian “terrorists”, too. And New Delhi has screwed Pakistan again. Of course, it’s never enough, but every bit helps to feel good.

The Joint Statement’s para 3, about a multi-polar world order, reflecting diversity of world cultures and civilizations may sound more blurred than paras 8, 12, 14, and 18. But in fact, a multi-polar world is much easier to describe or define than terrorism.
Or is it?

All India Radio’s Daily Commentary of Tuesday again:
 
“The foreign ministers of India and China also met to resolve the differences particularly over the border issue. The meeting, which came closely after the meeting of the heads of India and China in Thailand on the margins of the East Asia Summit, was described as fruitful. It helped India in again clarifying its stand on issues like the boundary question, and sending a message that repeated Chinese incursions into India will be detrimental to regional peace. India also informed China that the Dalai Lama is a spiritual guest in the country and free to visit Arunachal Pradesh, an integral part of India. Closer bilateral relations among the RIC countries will enhance mutual trust and set the stage for deeper trilateral cooperation on political, strategic, and economic issues.”

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Related:
Wanted: Changes on the Global Supply Side, October 12 2009
India shuts out Uighur Matriarch, The Calcutta Telegraph, July 26 2009
Arunachal Pradesh and the “Disingenuous” ADB, June 23 2009
UN SC Resolution 1540 (2004)
Resolution 1373 (2001)
UN SC Resolution 1267 (1999)

Taiwan: Wanted, Hence Unwanted

This is what the secretary-general of Taiwan’s newly-appointed interior minister said yesterday: “For the national security of the country, we forbid Rebiya Kadeer to enter Taiwan.”

Hear, hear.

The minister of the interior himself, Jiang Yi-hua (江宜樺), suggested that Kadeer, head of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) maintained close relations with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is declared a terrorist group by the United States and the United Nations.

That’s what Beijing keeps claiming. And that in turn may be why the WUC secretary general, Dolkun Isa, is “wanted by Interpol”.

“Wanted” is the correct technical term. But the way either a KMT politician, or the China Post, used it today would suggest that Interpol itself actually wants something or someone – which is not the case. Interpol issues arrest warrants on any judiciary’s request, so long as it is the judiciary of an Interpol member state. And that has become a highly politicized instrument. Google “interpol arrest warrants”, and you will find a lot of people wanted, and a lot of lobbyists’ attempts to get their opponents wanted.

Besides, what was traded as an international arrest warrant against Dolkun Isa in the news recently was a “red notice” only months earlier. Maybe it still is.

Then the stuff about Kadeer’s links to terrorist organizations. Does Taipei base its assessment on evidence of its own? Or do they see terrorist links because they have taken orders from Beijing?

If Dolkun Isa was a Falun Gong staffer rather than the WUC’s secretary general, he might have been more lucky in South Korea this month. Interpol doesn’t get involved in cases of a political or religious nature.

But of course, Beijing tried to get Li Hongzhi wanted anyway. And whoever is (not) wanted, Rebiya Kadeer still wouldn’t get a visa for Taiwan.

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Taiwan News, Editorial Abstracts:
“.. allowing her to visit Taiwan would be a provocative political movement that flies in the face of the country’s campaign to nurture the warming ties with Beijing…” (Apple Daily Taiwan)