Three Approaches to Managing American-Chinese Competition

As China’s ascendance and America’s relative decline continue, the two will continue to compete for geopolitical influence, Minxin Pei (or Pei Minxin, 裴敏欣), writes in an article for The Diplomat on November 28. If 2010 was the year China made a series of strategic and tactical moves to strengthen its position in East Asia, 2011 saw the region – and America – push back. At the East Asia summit in Bali in November,

China was literally ambushed by the United States, which skillfully coordinated a pushback against China’s assertiveness on the South China Sea.  Except for Burma and Cambodia, every other country present at the summit, including Russia, implicitly criticized China’s stance on the South China Sea and called for a multilateral solution, which China has consistently opposed.

China needed to rethink an existing policy of “befriending afar and attacking near” (远交近攻)¹⁾, Pei suggests. Otherwise, territorial disputes would antagonize Japan, Vietnam and India and [make] them eager partners of a potential anti-China coalition.

Minxin Pei’s closing remarks may be read as a purposeful provocation towards Beijing to do better – or as an indication that he sees the partners of a potential anti-China coalition safely on America’s side:

Of course, whether a one party regime known for its political paranoia can pull off a feat of such strategic dexterity and sophistication is anybody’s guess.  It’s up to Beijing to prove its skeptics wrong.

In Chinese – in an article for the BBC‘s Chinese website on Monday -, Pei wrote that in Bali, Beijing had not only lost face, but had been completely isolated by the American-led network’s and other regional powers’ challenge (美国联络盟友和东亚地区的主要大国在南海问题上公开挑战中国政府的立场，使北京不仅丢脸而且十分孤立). Another major development had been that Japan announced that it wanted to join a trans-Pacific free-trade partnership²⁾. Here, too, China appeared to be isolated. Pei also touches upon a recent US-Australian military cooperation agreement, and on secretary of state Hilary Clinton‘s visit to Myanmar. More explicitly than in his Diplomat contribution, Pei states that

Until recently, many strategic observers in the Asian region, but especially Beijing’s political elite, believed that America had fallen into irreversible decline, and that China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region would gradually exceed American influence. It now seems that this judgment was premature.
不久之前，亚洲地区的许多战略观察家，尤其是北京的政治精英，都认为美国已陷入不可逆转的衰落，而中国在亚太地区的影响则将逐渐超过美国。现在看来，这种判断为时过早。

US hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region was based on structural advantages which China did not have. Ever since World War 2, America’s role in the region had been based on its goal not to allow a challenger to its regional hegemony to arise in that region. American interests and all the regional countries’ interests – with the exception of China’s and the former Soviet Union’s – coincided here. While America had been busy in Afghanistan and Iraq, China’s influence in the Asian-Pacific region had grown, not least thanks to its restraint and its smile diplomacy ( literally: smile offensive, 微笑攻势) in South-East Asia. But Beijing’s more recent approach to the South China Sea, the Senkaku / Diaoyutai controversies with Japan, and its lukewarm stance on North Korea’s nuclear provocations (在朝鲜武力挑衅南韩时的不力干预) had changed Asian perceptions of China.

Much of Pei’s advice is identical with his Diplomat article, but here, too, he is more explicit. One approach for China would be to make great concessions in territorial disputes with its neighbors (在领土争端上作出极大让步), and to play an active role in regional security issues. This wasn’t likely to happen, given  the CCP’s firm opposition to such a path.

A second approach amounted to steps to be taken at home, within China – the country needed to democratize. This could permanently end strategic competition with America, and dispel fears among China’s democratic neighbors, Pei believes (一是走民主化道路，这既可永久结束中美的战略竞争，亦可彻底打消周边的民主国家对中国的安全恐惧). Democratization could work in theory, but was in fact very difficult. An authoritarian (or despotic) government’s sense of security (安全感) was rather low, and besides, it lacked sincerity (or integrity, 诚信).

There are only five readers’ reactions so far, three of them from outside China, according to their signatures, and only two of them are sort of “friendly” reactions to Pei’s article, as one of them calls the CCP rogues with lots of money, and the second gives a positive appraisal of America’s role in the region (Well done, America – 美国做得好).

A commenter from Canada thinks of both recommendations as dead-end roads, and recommends a third approach: China should build an alliance with countries which were close to it, drop the principle of non-interference, firmly strike at countries which dared to be enemies, and intensify contradictions and conflicts between South-East Asian nations, so as to profit from the tensions as a third party. (简直是胡说八道，两条都是死路，中国唯一出路只有与亲中国家结盟，放弃不干涉别国内政原则，坚决打击敢与中国为敌的国家，激化东南亚国家之间的矛盾和利益冲突，以收渔人之利！)

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Notes

¹⁾ the 23rd of the 36 Stratagems.

²⁾ Earlier in November, at an APEC summit in Honolulu, Canada, Japan and Mexico expressed interest in joining the project which had until then been under discussion among America, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam, according to the Economist.

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Related

» Who’s Afraid of Jon Huntsman, Nov 27, 2011
» South China Sea: an Introduction, Oct 7, 2011
» Who is Kishore Mahbubani, Dec 18, 2010

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Links: China’s Financial Stability, America’s Asian-Pacific Priorities, and Paul V. Kane’s “Swiftian Satire”

This and the coming week are somewhat busier than originally expected, and I’m also spending some of my time on listening to the news on shortwave, rather than reading online.

But here are some articles and documents I’ve browsed this week…

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1. Financial Stability in China: IMF Recommendations

An IMF Financial System Stability Assessment of China, published this month. It’s not as dramatic as some news stories of the past few weeks would suggest, but it describes several near-term risks for China’s financial sector, and recommends a properly composed and timely implemented set of reforms.

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2. Will Business in the Asia-Pacific earn America the Means for a Sustainable Military Presence?

Then there’s U.S. president Barack Obama‘s visit to Australia, and the agreement over American access to Australian military bases, and a major enhancement of military cooperation. An article by Raoul Heinrichs, published by The Diplomat , lists three reasons as to why this makes sense for Washington. And an editorial, also in The Diplomat, suggests that an elimination of U.S. military alliances with countries around the region is not likely to happen.

Headlines from the opposite side of this planet are somewhat unusual in the German media, but news magazine Der Spiegel put the military agreement to the top of its online edition last night.

In Canberra, Obama expressed a hope – that the Asia Pacific would play a critical role in creating jobs and opportunity for the American people -, and made a promise (or threat – mark the expression that describes his statement best to you with a cross, King Tubby), or anyone:

As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.  As a result, reductions in U.S. defense spending will not — I repeat, will not — come at the expense of the Asia Pacific.

In short, while American military power is there to stay in the Asia-Pacific region, and much of America’s economic strength as the foundation of [American]leadership in the world, including [..] in the Asia Pacific, is to be earned right in that region.

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3. Paul V. Kane’s Op-Ed on Taiwan was Just “Swiftian Satire”

Paul V. Kane‘s op-ed for the New York Times on November 11 was to mix serious issues and facts with irony and Swiftian satire to engage readers and make his points.

Obviously, not every op-ed will make sense, not even when published by the New York Times. Thomas Friedman can be very Swiftian, too, with stuff like, essentially, let’s send China the blue-prints and let them pay for those, and we’ll buy cheap high-tech products from them.

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Related

» Clinton: Taiwan “an Important Partner”, RTI, November 12, 2011
» Creative Destruction or Development, March 15, 2010

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“Correcting the Country’s Course”: Paul V. Kane, not Quite the Economist

Paul V. Kane, a former international security fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, advises the Obama administration to “ditch Taiwan”. In an op-ed for the New York Times, he wrote on Friday:

With a single bold act, President Obama could correct the country’s course, help assure his re-election, and preserve our children’s future.

Kane quotes Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as saying that “the most significant threat to our national security is our debt”. Besides, Kane argues,

America has little strategic interest in Taiwan, which is gradually integrating with China economically by investing in and forming joint ventures with mainland Chinese firms.

I’m not trying to judge America’s big or small strategic interest in Taiwan. Besides, I have the vague impression that advanced arms technology delivered to Taiwan may not be too well-protected from Chinese espionage.

But only a clear American decision for isolationism could be a cause for considering  “ditching Taiwan”.

Kane may have felt encouraged by statements like those made by U.S. president Barack Obama,  that the nation he is most interested in building is America itself. But that statement was made in context with Afghanistan (and possibly Iraq, the dumb war). And I haven’t read Mullen saying anything that would suggest that he would want to “ditch Taiwan”. Rather, according to Mullen, America’s military power needed a sound economy as its base – a point Obama, too, made in a speech in 2009.

But neither Mullen’s or Obama’s statements, nor much else in this world, would suggest that there were good reasons to believe that abandoning Taiwan would make the world – including America – any safer.

Probably some time in 2009 or 2010,  Beijing began to refer to the South China Sea as a core interest (核心利益) – a term which had been used to describe Beijing’s claim on Taiwan, but not for the South China Sea until then. In 2009, either a year prior to the South-China-Sea referral or about at the same time, Chinese state councillor Dai Bingguo (戴秉国) defined a – at least apparently – more “conservative” set of three “core interests”:

• the survival of China’s “fundamental system” and national security,
• the safeguarding of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (which in itself is, of course, pretty flexible after all, and may allow for a real lot of “core interests”), and
• continued stable economic growth and social development.

Kane seems to believe that Beijing’s definitions of its own interests are stable. That doesn’t look like reasonable political judgment.

But above all, Kane’s argument makes no sense economically. Ten per cent of American foreign is certainly a huge amount – but it’s existence or non-existence would be no game-changer. Even if Kane started a global auction and found ways to please other creditors than Beijing into forgiving their shares of America’s debts, too (in exchange for similarly immoral offers), this wouldn’t change anything about America’s structural economic problems. Yes, it took America many decades to pile up its current debts – but it wouldn’t take America terribly long to incur debts of a similar dimensions again – not in the state it is in right now.If there is something America needs to worry about is that their leaders don’t seem to act their act together. The debt incurred so far won’t actually kill America.

What would make sense for America is to remind its allies – both formal and informal ones – that American commitment can be no one-way street. This isn’t targeted at Taiwan specifically, because it would seem to me that Washington actually applauded Taipei’s cross-strait policies of recent years. Rather, South Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and other countries who believe that America should strike a balance in China’s neighborhood need to be reminded that they, too, must do their share to keep the region – including Taiwan – safe. The current division of labor in the region – America projecting military power, and everyone else chumming up to Beijing in America’s shadow – is indeed unsustainable.

But if America wants its allies to doubt its commitment to regional security, there could be no better prescription for that, than Kane’s “recommendation”. It’s a safe way to lose credibility.

Apparently, Kane’s op-ed was no put-on, as The Atlantic‘s James Fallows initially  suspected. And anyway, I don’t know who Mr. Kane is, and I’m sure that he isn’t the only person who might come up with such bizarre ideas. What really makes me wonder is that the New York Times actually chose to print this kind of stuff.

Maybe they and Mr. Kane just want another tax break.

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Related

» “A Threat that Doesn’t Exist”, Business Insider, Nov. 11. 2011
» The Costs of Running a Trade Surplus, August 7, 2011
» Creative Destruction or Development, March 15, 2010

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Mekong Security: all Brothers, Big and Small

Xinhua, October 13, 2011

Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao on Thursday summoned diplomatic envoys from Thailand, Laos and Myanmar and urged the three nations to intensify their investigation of a deadly attack on Chinese ships that occurred on the Mekong River.

[...]

Song said China has urged the countries to take effective measures to strengthen the protection of Chinese ships and sailors on the Mekong River and its relevant waters and to avoid similar incidents from happening in the future.

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chinanews.com / Huanqiu Shibao, October 30, 2011

chinanews.com (中新网), Oct 30. According to the Ministry of Public Security’s website, China will hold a conference with Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand, on cooperation in law enforcement and security on the Mekong River basin on October 31. The conference’s purpose was to thoroughly investigate the shootings of 13 Chinese crewmen, to establish a common system of law enforcement and security cooperation on the Mekong River, effectively safeguard maritime security order on the Mekong, and to guarantee the safety of the four countries’ vessels’ and crews’ lives and property.

中新网10月30日电 据公安部网站消息，中国将于10月31日在北京召开中老缅泰湄公河流域执法安全合作会议。此次会议旨在尽快彻底查清中方13名船员在湄公河水域遭枪杀案件，推动建立中老缅泰湄公河执法安全合作机制，有效维护湄公河流域航运安全秩序，确保四国船舶和人员生命财产安全。

Chinese State Councillor and public security minister Meng Jianzhu, Thailand’s vice prime minister [apparently] Chalerm Ubumrung, Laotian vice prime minister and defense minister [apparently] Chansamone Chanyalath, Myanmar’s interior minister [apparently] Ko Ko, heading a delegation separately, will attend the conference.

中国国务委员、公安部部长孟建柱，泰国副总理哥威，老挝副总理兼国防部长隆再，缅甸内政部部长哥哥将分别率团出席会议。

The conference will carry out a set of bilateral and multilateral consultations concerning law enforcement and security cooperation in the Mekong River Basin, and a broad consensus on  more joint law-enforcement patrols, jointly addressing emerging security problems, jointly fighting cross-border crime, and common replies to incidents is expected.

本次会议将就湄公河流域执法安全合作进行一系列双边和多边的磋商，预期将就加强联合巡逻执法、联合整治治安突出问题、联合打击跨国犯罪、共同应对突发事件等议题达成广泛共识。

Reportedly, the conference participants from Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar, will arrive in Beijing separately arrive in Beijing on October 30.

据悉，出席会议的泰国、老挝、缅甸代表团将于30日分别抵京。

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From Huanqiu Shibao’s commenter thread

Great! These countries have become our little brothers! (太好了 这几个国家 已经成为我们的小弟！ – 2011-10-30 14:42)
Myanmar home affairs minister Ge Ge [Ko Ko] – that name suits him nicely. (缅甸内政部部长哥哥 …….. 名字起的真好 -2011-10-30 14:35)^*)
Thai militry implemented American intelligence plans!! To destroy China’s and its neighbors’ relations!! (泰国军方实施，美国情报部门策划！！破坏中国和周边国家关系！！ – 2011-10-30 14:35)

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Notes

^*) Ge Ge implies racketeering (big brother). According to an Irrawaddy article of October 13, Lieutenant-General Ko Ko was a military commander in the Triangle region in the past.

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Related

» 孟建柱会见缅甸内政部部长哥哥, 公安部网站, October 30, 2011
» Hawngleuk militia, “Underground since 2006″, Irrawaddy, Oct 13, 2011

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Sino-Vietnamese Communique on South China Sea: “No Hostile Forces shall destroy our Party and State Relations

China’s and Vietnam’s party leaders – Hu Jintao and Nguyen Phu Trong -  signed a document early this week, the Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues (关于指导解决中越海上问题基本原则协议). It’s a particular bilateral agreement between the two countries, and not the same one as an earlier agreement between ASEAN and China, the Implementation Guidelines for the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, of July this year.

International sources reported on the signing of the Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues as early as on Tuesday. The Chinese media seem to have followed with some delay. On Saturday night, it was CCTV‘s main evening newscast’s, Xinwen Lianbo‘s, turn:

CCTV Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播), October 15, 2011: Li Xiuping (李修平) bares her fangs (click picture for link while it lasts)

CCTV’s rendition was mostly the same as the following one, by Xinhua news agency.

Links within blockquotes inserted during translation – JR.

Xinhua Newsagency Net, Beijing, October 15, by reporters Xiong Zhengyan, Liang Linlin.

新华网北京１０月１５日电（记者熊争艳、梁淋淋）

China’s and Vietnam’s joint statement, issued on October 15, says that the two sides exchanged frank views on maritime issues, and emphasizes the friendly discussion and resolution of disputes, and the political will and determination to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.

中国与越南１５日发表联合声明说，双方就海上问题坦诚交换意见，强调通过友好协商与谈判解决争议、维护南海和平稳定的政治意愿和决心。

The statement believes that this will be in line with the fundamental interest of the two countries, and the aspirations of their people, beneficial for regional peace, cooperation and development. The two party and country leaders will regularly communicate and keep a dialog about maritime issues between their countries, and, from a high political and strategic level, properly handle and solve maritime issues.

声明认为，这符合两国根本利益和两国人民的共同愿望，有利于本地区的和平、合作和发展。两党两国领导人将就中越海上问题保持经常性沟通和对话，从政治和战略高度及时指导海上问题的妥善处理和解决。

The statement says that both sides spoke highly of the “Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues”, and believe that this agreement has great guiding significance for the proper handling and resolution of maritime issues, and will be conscientiously implemented by both sides.

声明说，双方积极评价两国签署《关于指导解决中越海上问题基本原则协议》，认为该协议的签署对妥善处理和解决海上问题具有重要的指导意义，将共同努力认真落实协议。

The statement says that both sides will, in accordance with the two party and country leaders consensus and the “Agreement on Basic Principles concerning guidance for the Resolution of Sino-Vietnamese South China Sea Issues”, intensify talks, seek mutually acceptable basic and lasting approaches to solutions, and actively pursue transitional and temporary approaches which will not affect either side’s respective positions and views, including active exploration and discussion of common development issues.

声明说，双方将根据两党两国领导人共识和《关于指导解决中越海上问题基本原则协议》，加大海上问题的谈判力度，寻求双方均能接受的基本和长久的解决办法，并积极探讨不影响各自立场和主张的过渡性、临时性解决办法，包括积极研究和商谈共同开发问题。

The statement says that the two sides will steadily promote discussion of Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Gulf) sea border issues, and at the same time acively discuss common exploitation issues within these waters. They will actively promote maritime environmental protection, scientifc research, search-and-rescue operations, oil and gas exploration, disaster prevention and other fields of cooperation.

声明说，双方将稳步推进北部湾湾口外海域划界谈判，同时积极商谈该海域的共同开发问题。积极推进海洋环保、海洋科研、海上搜救、油气勘采、减灾防灾等领域的合作。

The statement says that before a final settlement of the maritime issues, both sides will work for the maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea, remain cool-headed and self-restrained,  and will take no action that would complicate or aggravate the dispute. They will allow no hostile forces to destroy the relations between the two parties and countries, and will handle emerging issues in a constructive manner, not letting them affect the relations between the two parties and the two countries, or peace and stability in the South China Sea.

声明说，在海上争议最终解决前，双方共同维护南海和平稳定，保持冷静和克制，不采取使争端复杂化、扩大化的行动。不让任何敌对势力破坏两党两国关系，并本着建设性的态度处理出现的问题，不使其影响两党两国关系和南海的和平稳定。

21 China News Net, a southern Chinese subsidiary of China Telecom, republished a Huanqiu Shibao article by Zhang Haiwen (张海文) and  Liu Qing (刘卿)  on Friday. It addresses the (apparently) main item of the party chairmens’ talks right away:

From the talks’ circumstances it can be seen that the leaders of both sides indicated the importance they attach to Sino-Vietnamese relations, and the continuing development of bilateral relations – which produced specific arrangements – has made it clear that the Chinese-Vietnamese relations are not “derailed”.

从会谈情况看，双方领导人都表明了对中越关系的高度重视，也对双边关系下一步的发展作出了具体部署和规划，这表明中越关系并未“脱轨”。

The two sides had shown a pragmatic attitude, the two authors laud the two party leaders, which was in line with Deng Xiaoping‘s “shelving disputes, common development” position (这符合邓小平提出的、我一贯坚持的“搁置争议、共同开发”主张).

Author Zhang Haiwen points out that she had always supported that kind of approach. Apparently, she’s deputy head (or director) of China Institute of Marine Development Strategy under the State Oceanic Administration. Indeed, the China Daily article quoting her in this capacity emphasizes the importance of a “bilateral approach”, even if Zhang herself isn’t quoted that way by China Daily. But in another article, on the issue’s legal aspects, she emphasizes that the  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was no appropriate standard by which the South China Sea issue could be resolved, and that China has always held that the disputes should be resolved through bilateral peaceful negotiations, based on historical facts and international laws, including the UNCLOS.

If Zhang had been part of Huanqiu‘s online collection of views on how to deal with China’s neighbors in the South China Sea dispute, she would have been counted into the “dovish” group there. That, of course, would only be true when taking Chinese domestic positions into account – no Chinese expert would (publicly) deviate from the CCP’s position in principle, anyway, which was declared a core interest some time in 2009 or 2010. A paper published in the Chinese Journal of International Law, written by Raul Pedrozo (a retired US naval officer) as an answer to an earlier paper by Zhang, suggested that

Zhang’s position on the EEZ [exclusive economic zones] exemplifies how Chinese scholars and government officials misuse the law to support China’s anti-access strategy in the maritime domain.

American involvement in the South China Sea disputes, Chinese deputy foreign minister Cui Tiankai said in June, would only made matters more complex.

That said, even if no hostile forces will be allowed to destroy the relations between the two parties and countries (China’s CCP and Vietnam’s CP – see Xinhua article at beginning of post), American aircraft carriers will remain welcome in the region. Vietnam not least will make sure. The issue won’t become a  merely bilateral one any time soon.

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Related

» Arrests after Demonstrations, Aug 22, 2011
» UNCLOS, UN.org, of December 10, 1982

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South China Sea: an Introduction (by Huanqiu, Wu Jianmin, Long Tao)

Huanqiu: To Strike or not to Strike

The following is a translation of an article by Wu Jianmin (吴建民, a former Chinese diplomat – further details at the end of this post), with a prior introduction to a whole set of opinions, by the publishing paper, Huanqiu Shibao. I’ll confine myself to translating the Introduction, and Wu’s opinion.

Wu’s article was the first in the Huanqiu series, dated June 22, and subscribes to the idea that “striking” at China’s neighbors in the South China Sea dispute is no option. This article belongs to the first section and also contains an interview with Wu, of September 13. The China Media Project (CMP), Hong Kong, translated portions of it into English. (They refer to a QQ re-publication of September 14, but it is the same interview.) The third article within that first – comparatively “dovish”  – section is by Sun Peisong (孙培松), an academic from Wu Jianmin’s native Jiangsu Province.

The second section contains two opinions which subscribe to a position where “action” would be an option if the occasion arose, but keeping to the traditional “principles” (坚持原则，伺机行事) otherwise. One of those opinions was written by Long Tao (龙韬, further details at the end of this post), on June 27, as an answer to Wu Jianmin’s opinion.

The third section contains three opinions, and belongs to the category “Now is the best time for striking” (现在是动武的最好时机). Interestingly, it contains another article by Long Tao, of September 27, three months after his previous one.

Huanqiu arranged the topical collection some time after publishing the initial, or all of the opinions.

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Huanqiu’s Introduction

Introduction: The South China Sea issue isn’t complicated at all. Before the United Nations announced that the South China Sea was rich with oil, it was calm and tranquil. Bordering countries recognized China’s sovereignty over it. But afterwards, neighboring countries claimed sovereignty in droves. According to a “China Youth Daily” report in July, Vietnam has occupied 29 of the islands and reefs, basically controlling the western Nansha waters; the Philippines occupied ten islands or reefs; Malaysia occupied three, and Indonesia announced that it had “sovereignty” over more than 80,000 square kilometers of traditional Chinese coastal and territorial waters. Only nine are controlled by our country: nine by the mainland, and one by Taiwan.

导语：南海问题并不复杂。早在1968年联合国宣称南海拥有丰富石油资源之前，南海一直“风平浪静”，周边各国承认南 海主权属于中国。但在此之后，南海周边国家纷纷提出对南海岛屿的主权要求。据《中国青年报》7月份报道，从上世纪70年代至今，越南占领了南沙29个岛 礁，基本上控制了南沙西部海域；菲律宾侵占了10个岛礁；马来西亚占领了3个岛礁；印度尼西亚宣布对8万多平方公里的中国传统海疆享有“主权”。而我国目 前实际控制岛礁仅9个：大陆8个，台湾1个。

As for the South China Sea disputes, Deng Xiaoping, in the 1980s, put forward the principle of  “sovereignty being ours, putting disputes aside, common exploitation, and China maintaining its peaceful rise”. But Vietnam, the Philippines and others time and again attacked China’s base line. Especially since this year, Vietnam, the Philippines and other neighboring countries kept taking a mile for being given an inch, India, Japan etc. also huddled into the act, made explorations, military exercises with growing arrogance. The situation is growing ever more serious.

对于南海争端，邓小平在上世纪80年代提出“主权在我，搁置争议，共同开发”的原则，中国坚持“和平崛起”。但越南、菲律宾等国则不肯罢休，一再冲击中国的底线。尤其今年以来，越南、菲律宾等南海周边国家在美国的支持下得寸进尺，印度、日本等国也“抱团”横插一脚，搞探测、搞军演，气焰日盛。南海局势日益严峻。

Various voices have emerged in our country, concerning this issue. There are scholars who advocate a continuation of the “peaceful rise”, determined not to strike. But other scholars advocate a resort to armed force, determined to strike back. To strike or not to strike? Let’s see what the scholars say.

对此，国内出现了不同的呼声。有学者主张继续“和平崛起”，坚决不能打。但有的学者则主张应该诉诸武力，坚决反击。打还是不打？看看学者们的说法。

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Wu Jianmin: Chinese Self-Restraint is a Kind of Self-Confidence
吴建民：南海争端，中国克制是种自信

[...]

The Chinese government has shown restraint, and some people are dissatisfied with that. They find this too soft, unfulfilled, and believe that a harder stance should be adopted. Some people even think that [military] strikes were in order. In my opinion, the self-restraint the Chinese government has shown is a kind of self-confidence.

中国政府所表现的克制，国内有些人不大满意。认为太软，不过瘾，应当采取强硬态度，有的人甚至认为应当打。在我看来，中国政府所表现出的克制，是一种自信。

This self-confidence stems from the way the world is changing, above all. The changing times have led to a new situation in international relations. The function of force in solving international disputes has declined. The three wars that began this century – in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, America leading the two former two, [are wars in which] America and western countries have absolute military superiority, and the countries they strike are poor and small countries. The result of these strikes is that America and other countries have gotten into predicaments never seen before. The current Libya war will also confirm this. The South China Sea is an issue inherited from history, and to talk war easily is not advisable. China’s leaders have emphasized that our country upholds the banner of peace, development and cooperation in international relations. This is very reasonable.

这种自信首先源于世界的变化。随着时代的变化，国际关系中出现了一些新的情况。战争在解决国际争端中的作用下降。本世纪所爆发的三场战争———阿富汗战争、伊拉克战争和利比亚战争，前两场战争都是美国带头打，美国和西方国家拥有绝对上的军事优势，打的是穷国、小国。打的结果是使美国等国家陷入前所未有的困境。正在进行的利比亚战争，也必将证明这一点。南海问题是历史遗留下来的问题，轻易言战是不可取的。中国领导人强调，我们中国人在国际关系中要高举和平、发展、合作的旗帜。这是很有道理的。

China’s self-confidence is also based on having held clear policies and guidelines on the South China Sea issue early on. In the 1980s, the guideline Comrade Deng Xiaoping gave us was “putting disputes aside, common exploitation”. The establishment of this guideline took the changing times into account, and was in accordance with the tidal current. It also took into account our fundamental common interests with our bordering neighbors. Despite the difficulties which have emerged in its implementation, history will prove this guideline to be the most sensible one.

中国的自信还来自于我们关于南海问题早就有明确的政策和方针。上世纪80年代，邓小平同志关于南海问题，给我们确立的方针是“搁置争议，共同开发”。这个方针的制定，考虑到时代的变化，符合时代的潮流。同时，也考虑到了我们同周边国家双方的根本利益。虽然执行起来有难度，但历史终将证明，这个方针是最明智的方针。

Our self-confidence also stems from the bigger picture. There are big and small truths in world affairs, and the small ones need to obey to the big ones. These so-called big truths set out from mankind’s overall interests, and the long-term and fundamental interests of the people in the region. The East Asian region is the world’s fastest-growing and most dynamic one. While the developed countries’ economies see a weak recovery, East Asian economic growth maintains vigorous momentum. This doesn’t only matter to the region, but to the world, as well. Also, even as we have these and those kinds of differences between the East Asian countries, the fact that we have common interests which are far greater than our differences must not be overlooked. Our relations with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries are just like that. In 2010, trade between China and Vietnam amounted to 26 billion US dollars, there were more than 600 Chinese direct investment projects in Vietnam, investment amounts agreed to reached more than two billion US dollars, and more than 2.5 million people crossed the border, either way. In 2010, China’s bilateral trade with the Philippines amounted to 27.7 billion US dollars, financial investment from Chinese companies in the Philippines was at 86 million US dollars. Behind these numbers stand the enormous common interests of  both sides, and these interests continue to grow.

我们的自信还来源于我们的大局观。世界上的事情有大道理和小道理，小道理服从大道理。所谓大道理是从人类的总体利益、本地区人民长远和根本利益出发的。东亚地区是全球经济中增长速度最快，最有活力的地区。今天在发达国家经济复苏乏力的时候，东亚地区经济仍然保持旺盛的增长势头。这不仅对本地区，而且对世界有重要意义。另一方面，我们同东亚地区各国之间，尽管有这样那样的分歧，但一个不容忽视的事实是，我们的共同利益，远远大于我们的分歧。我们与越南、菲律宾等国的关系也正是这样。2010年，中国和越南的贸易额近260亿美元；中国在越南的直接投资项目有600余个，协议投资金额达20多亿美元；双方每年人员往来256万人次。2010年，中国和菲律宾的双边贸易额为277亿美元，中国企业对菲律宾金融类投资达8600万美元。这些数字的后面是双方有着巨大的共同利益，这些共同利益还在继续增长。

With China’s rise, we will see all kinds of problems and challenges arise. This is inevitable and was to be expected. Facing these challenges, we must observe them calmly, and consider them comprehensively. Our feelings must not sway us, or make us act rashly. We must not deal with today’s issues by using the old days’ ideas of war and revolution. By doing so, we would commit an epochal mistake.

随着中国的崛起，我们面临的各种问题和挑战会多起来。这是必然的，也是预料之中的事情。面临这些挑战我们一定要冷静观察，通盘考虑。切忌意气用事，切忌用战争与革命时代的旧思想来处理今天的问题，那样会犯时代错误。

China must maintain the momentum of its development; this is what we have accumulated in a struggle of more than one-hundred years. It will take another thirty or fifty years for China to rise to her feet. This is the Chinese people’s greatest interest in the twenty-first century. To maintain the momentum of development requires us to maintain external cooperation.

中国要保持自己的发展势头，这是我们经过100多年的奋斗所积累和创造的。保持这个势头，中国再有30年、50年就起来了。这是中国人在21世纪最大的利益。保持发展势头必须保持对外合作。

In short, we must include the momentum of cooperation with neighboring countries. The self-restraint shown by the Chinese government is in line with the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the people in the region, with the global tidal currents, and absolutely tenable.

综上所述，包括同周边国家合作的势头。中国政府在南海问题上表现出的克制，是符合中国和本地区各国人们根本利益的，也是符合世界潮流的，是完全站得住脚的。

(The author is a member of the European Academy of Sciences, the European and Asian Academy of Science, and chairman of the Shanghai Center for International Studies.)
（作者是欧洲科学院院士、欧亚科学院院士、上海国际问题研究中心主席。）

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Wu Jianmin also served as China’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva,  and to France. At least one Huanqiu reader remembers the station in his career as the Chinese foreign ministry spokesman: Ma opposes, Wu, too. In September, Huanqiu Shibao published an interview with Wu, which engendered no friendly reception from Huanqiu’s (frequently nationalist) commenters. Portions of the interview were translated into English by the China Media Project (CMP), Hong Kong, as mentioned above.

Wu’s article had been published by Huanqiu on June 22. On June 27, Long Tao (龙韬), a strategist with the China Energy Fund Committee (中华能源基金委员会战略分析师), wrote a reply to the contrary. I’m not going to translate it, but there is an article in English by Long Tao on the Global Times which is to some extent a re-hash of his earlier answer to Wu Jianmin, titled “Time to Teach those around China Sea a Lesson” (September 29).

If someone else translates Long Tao’s reply to Wu Jianmin (or any other of the opinions in the collection), drop me  a line, and I will link to your translations.

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Related

» Strategic Partnership with Vietnam (soundfile), All India Radio, September 19, 2011
» In Tune with the Current Era, June 8, 2011
» 35,000 Yuan for an Obedient Wife, January 30, 2010

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China, Myanmar, WTO: Dependence, Low-End Exports, and Friendly Consultations

The government has suspended work on the controversial Myitsone dam as a result of widespread public protest over its likely environmental and social impact,

reports the Myanmar Times.

Myitsone Dam under Construction, Wikimedia Commons (click on photo for source)

China News Service (中国新闻网) reported on Sunday (October 2, 2011, 00:41 GMT) that

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei (洪磊) told a press conference today that the Myitsone electric plant project is a joint Sino-Chinese project which went through scientific demonstration and strict examination. The matters concerned should be properly handled through friendly consultations between the two sides.

中国外交部发言人洪磊今天回答记者问时说，密松电站是中缅两国的合资项目，经过了双方的科学论证和严格审查。对项目实施过程中的有关事宜，应由双方通过友好协商妥善处理。

Q: According to reports, Myanmar’s parliament announced on September 30 that during president Thein Sein’s tenure, the Sino-Myanmarnese cooperative  Myitsone electric plant  project will remain shelved. What is the Chinese side’s comment on this?

据报道，9月30日，缅甸联邦议会宣布吴登盛总统在其任期内搁置中缅两国密松电站合作项目。中方对此有何评论？

A: The Chinese government has always supported Chinese companies in developing cooperation with companies abroad, based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, and demanded that Chinese companies should perform in strict accordance with those countries’ law and regulations, to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations, and urges governments in pertaining countries to guarantee the Chinese companies’ legal legitimate rights and interests. The Myitsone power plant is a project jointly invested by China and Myanmar, and went  through the scientific demonstration and strict examination of both sides. The matters concerned should be properly handled through friendly consultations between the two sides.

中国政府一贯支持中国企业本着相互尊重、平等互利原则同其他国家企业开展合作，并要求中国企业严格按照所在国法律法规履行责任和义务，敦促有关国家政府保障中国企业的合法和正当权益。密松电站是中缅两国的合资项目，经过了双方的科学论证和严格审查。对项目实施过程中的有关事宜，应由双方通过友好协商妥善处理。

Also on Sunday (Saturday, 18:07 GMT), People’s Daily‘s Bangkok correspondent Ji Peiyuan (暨佩娟) quoted Myanmar media:

According to Myanmar media reports, Burmese parliament announced on September 30 that during president Thein Sein’s tenure, the Sino-Myanmarnese cooperative  Myitsone electric plant  project will remain shelved. Thein Sein said: “Myanmar’s government is elected by the people, therefore, we have to pay attention to the will of the people. We are obliged to focus on settling the people’s worries and misgivings.”

Thein Sein said that the Myitsone electric plant  project could harm [or destroy, 破坏] the natural landscape, the livelihoods of the local people, the private capital in the cultivation of rubber plantations and crops, and collapsing dams, caused by climate change, could also damage the livelihoods of the people near the Myitsone plant, and further down the river. He also said that the Myanmar government would consult with the Chinese government to avoid harming Sino-Myanmar bilateral relations and friendship.

Myanmar Myitsone hydropower plant is worth 3.6 billion US dollars, and is about 200 kilometers away from Tengchong County in Yunnan Province. and is a major hydropower by the China Power Investment Corporation, in the region of Myanmar’s Irrawaddy River. It’s located in the Kachin mountainous region and to be developed at the 干流河段 section of the Irrawaddy River, with a capacity of six million kilowatts.

The rest of People’s Daily’s report reflects the statement made by Chinese foreign ministry Hong Lei (see this post’s initial paras).

The BBC reported that a letter by president Thein Sein had been read out in parliament, announcing the decision to suspend the project. The project had fuelled fighting between the army and ethnic Kachin rebels. The BBC quotes its South East Asia correspondent Rachel Harvey as saying that the decision appears to be further evidence of the new leadership’s desire to seek legitimacy by being more open to public opinion.

Both continuing the project in the long run (completion was originally scheduled for 2019), and its abandonment, would pose many problems. Continuation would reportedly have a negative impact on biodiversity, as frequently reflected by organizations like the Burma Rivers Network, it may come with side effects as many other mega dams from the Aswan Dam in Egypt to the Three-Gorges dam in China have, and rebel movements in the region could make the Myitsone project vulnerable to sabotage. Besides the mythological weight the river carries, forced relocations, and the loss of means of livelihood also seem to have driven opposition.

But Mynamar may have good reasons to keep consultations with Beijing as friendly as possible. Even if Yangon (or Naypyidaw) flatly refused to pay damages (if legally obliged to do so), business with its powerful neighbor would suffer. China sees itself a s a victim of trade protectionism, and this case, if it becomes a high-profile bone of contention, would add to that.

On the other hand, the further process may also make it clear to Beijing that mere deals with third-world countries’ regimes may not be sustainable. If China’s rulers understand that is a different question. Protectionism and resource nationalism had been on the rise and hampered Chinese business, official Xinhua news agency reported in September, citing an Ernest & Young report. Obviously, China was a “victim” of trade protectionism (贸易保护主义最大受害者).

There is grumbling among China’s academia, too. On the tenth anniversary of China’s accession to the WTO, People’s University (aka Renmin University) professor Gu Genliang (贾根良) questioned China’s foreign trade approach of importing high-end products and exporting low-end products (进口高端产品并出口低端产品).

By exporting hydropower to China, Myanmar would follow a path similar to the one Gu Genliang deems harmful. China, Gu Genliang (and many other Chinese people, academics or not) feel that they are being exploited, especially by America, of course.

[Update, April 11, 2012: the linked website, Utopia, is currently offline.  Apparently, Wu Genliang's article can also be found here.]

Gu also fears foreign blackmail:

We are mired in heavy dependence on foreign resources and on on our own cheap exports. Large-scale low-end exports consume a lot of energy and natural resources, which led to our country’s dependence on foreign energy and resources which not only made the prices for these sources explode, which transferred the fruits of our people’s hard work into the hands of energy-exporting countries, but also has the potential of making us suffer from foreign countries’ embargos, thus carrying a huge security risk. At the same time, while our country is so reliant on foreign resources, it is ridiculous that we are exporting large quantities of rare earths and minerals coal, etc. at low prices.

第五，深陷对外部资源的严重依赖和本国资源廉价出口的陷阱。低端产品的大量出口是以大量消耗能源和自然资源为基础的，这导致了我国对外能源和资源的高度依赖，这种高度依赖不仅导致了能源和资源的价格暴涨把我国人民辛苦劳动的成果转移到资源出口国手中，而且潜伏着遭遇外国对我国实施资源禁运的巨大经济安全风险。同时，令人感到荒谬的是，在我国深陷对外部资源的严重依赖的同时，我国的大量资源如稀土、煤炭等却被大量地廉价出口。

The WTO ruled in July that Chinese export restrictions on certain raw minerals violated global rules

Gu spells out the conditions under which China’s WTO membership could still be useful – or those under which it should consider leaving the organization.

Myanmar is still a long way from even joining.

But maybe, at least, it will stop exploiting China’s dependence on energy, and pull the plug on the Myitsone project for good.

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Related

» The Government had little Choice, Asia Times, Oct 4, 2011
» Vietnam: Under Threat of Invasion, April 29, 2009

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Updates / Related

» Aung San Suu Kyi Cautious, BBC, Oct 3, 2011

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Arrests in Vietnam after South-China-Sea Demonstrations: Huanqiu Shibao quotes Phil Robinson

Huanqiu coverage, August 22

The following is a translation from Huanqiu Shibao (环球时报), the older (Chinese-language) sister of the (English-language) Global Times. The beginning of the article (“according to a report by Huanqiu Shibao”) seems to refer to Huanqiu’s printed edition. I haven’t checked the authenticity of the reports and statements as quoted by the article’s author Wei Fang (魏 芳). The article will probably have invited some unwelcome comments from the online readers, and such comments are frequently removed.

Main Link: http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2011-08/1933657.html

By special correspondent Wei Fang

According to a report by Huanqiu Shibao of August 22, Vietnamese police dispersed an anti-Chinese (一场反华示威) demonstration in Hanoi on Sunday, and arrested several dozen participants (拘捕数十名参与者). This has been the 11th protest against China in three months, concerning the “South China Sea sovereignty” issue. It is noteworthy that prior to that, the Vietnamese government had issued a ban on anti-Chinese demonstrations.

Reuters quotes “witnesses” as saying that at least forty Vietnamese people had been on the streets to protest against “China’s intrusions into the South China Sea”. Since June this year, there have been people organizing gatherings on the streets of Hanoi to protest against China, concerning the South China Sea. At first, there were some 300 participants. Later, the number gradually went down to fifty to sixty.

Agence France-Presse says that only a few minutes after the beginning of the protest [on Sunday], plain-cloth police pushed some forty protesters onto a bus waiting next to the scene, and drove them to a different location. Associated Press says that the authorities had apparently sent “a strong police force” which put some fifteen protesters into police cars which drove away from the scene. The report also says that Vietnamese police had strengthened protection for China’s embassy, deployed police on the street in front of it, and sealed that road off completely.

Western human rights organizations once again expressed dissatisfaction with the Vietnamese authorities’ approach. On August 21 [Sunday], Reuters quoted “Human Rights Watch’s” (“人权观察”) Asia Division deputy director Phil Robinson (菲尔·罗宾逊) as saying: “We are concerned about the arrests of these people after demonstrating, and call on the authorities to release them as soon as possible”. Robsinson also said that the arrests showed an “over-reaction” by the Vietnamese government”, as the protesters goal had been “to protect Vietnam’s unity, and had done no wrong”.

In fact, Vietnam had issued a ban on anti-Chinese demonstrations last week. The Vietnamese government is worried that some people (一些人) could use the gatherings to stir dissenting views which would eventually oppose the government. Hanoi’s People’s Committee issued a statement on August 18, saying that some oppositional elements at home and abroad (越南国内外的一些反对派分子) were using the anti-China demonstrations to oppose the Vietnamese government, to “damage Vietnamese unity and Vietnamese-Chinese relations”. The statement warned that the police would take action against people who defied the ban.

Official newspaper “New Hanoi News” believes that the authorities must take “the necessary measures” against illegal gatherings. The BBC said on August 21 that several gatherings and demonstrations had made the Vietnamese government aware that there were people who tried to use the rallies to incite the masses to oppose the communist party’s political power, and that it had therefore issued this kind of ban.

Reuters says that before the ban, 25 Vietnamese representatives from the intelligentsia (知识界代表) had signed a petition to the authorities, demanding that the government revoke the ban, and stating the belief that this approach was “unconstitutional”. The petition was also published on the internet.

“trundle on trundle on trundle on, human rights groups are just garbage in the future the west won’t rule the world your game will be over soon” (滚滚滚滚，人权组织就是个垃圾将来西方不统治世界了你们也就一块玩完了, 17:07 local time), comments a reader, and another: “What this bunch of beasts (or brutes) is most afraid of is that their rice bowls [i. e. their jobs - apparently targeted at human rights campaigners] won’t be safe” (这帮畜生最怕的事情就是他们饭碗不保, 17:11 local time).

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Related

» Press Review: India, Philippines, Vietnam, Aug 20, 2011
» Don’t Manufacture Low-Class Nationalism, June 12, 2011
» Human Rights Watch website
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