Archive for ‘quote’

Monday, January 28, 2013

Song Luzheng: “Those Southern newspaper commentators” and Deutsche Welle

Song Luzheng (宋鲁郑) occasionally revisits the case of Deutsche Welle‘s (Voice of Germany’s) Chinese department. He did so in November 2011, and again this month. Maybe he addressed the issue sometimes in between, too. For sure, he regularly addresses the issue of Western media and freedom of information.

I don’t know if Song is a journalist in the first place. He lives in Paris, is the Paris Culture Salon’s secretary general and the Shandong Provincial Overseas Exchange Council’s executive director.

I didn’t find Song’s article in November 2011 trustworthy, and the one he wrote this month seems to reveal an unpleasant character. That “certain Southern newspaper” he refers to (see blockquote underneath)  is most probably meant to be Southern Weekly, aka “Southern Weekend” (南方周末), and the paper’s staff’s conflict with Guangdong’s propaganda chief Tuo Zhen. His recent article was published by the Shanghai-based Guancha website. In this article, Song praises the four former Deutsche-Welle employees, and curses “those Southern newspaper commentators”.

[...]

It has to be said that Wang Fengbo [and his colleagues] are much more courageous than those so-called commentators at a certain southern newspaper, and stand on a higher moral ground. Because they were removed, in this kid of public-opinion environment, they had no chance to get the understanding or sympathy of German mainstream society. They are without a living, even their subsistence has become a problem. On different occasions, Wang Fengbo has discussed the issues at Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department with many German journalist colleagues and scholars, but most of them believe that what they [Wang and his former Deutsche-Welle colleagues] say is just a story from Arabian Nights, which can’t possibly happen in Germany.
[Song seems to quote one of the former Deutsche-Welle editors, but he doesn't do so explicitly.]
Rather, between the lines, many people believe that we actually had a pro-CCP tendency, or that at least, we didn’t abide the [Deutsche Welle, apparently] leaders, that we were like prickly kids who earned what they deserved, as this lead to getting expelled.
Those gentlemen from some Southern newspaper on the other hand can capitalize on getting praise from Western media and financial aid, they become global celebrities, and their undertakings and lives rise to new heights!

[...]

不得不说的是,王凤波他们应该比南方某报的那些所谓评论员要勇敢得多,更站有道德高地。因为他们一旦被开除,在这样的舆论环境下,根本无法得到德国 主流社会的理解和同情,生活无着,甚至生存都成了问题。王凤波等当事者在不同的场合和不少德国记者同行及学者谈过德国之声中文部的问题,但是他们当中的大 部分人觉得他们说的简直是天方夜谭,在德国不可能发生。相反,很多人话里话外还认为是我们的确有“亲共”的倾向,或者至少不服从领导,爱挑刺闹事儿,是自 作自受,导致被开除。而南方某报诸君,则可以凭此资本得到西方的赏识和大力资助,成为全球知名人士,事业和人生反而更上层楼!

Initially a big story in China, neither the “Zhang-Danhong affair” nor the case of the four members of Deutsche Welle’s Chinese department who lost their jobs since 2010 get into the headlines in China anymore. But they aren’t completely out of the news, either.

Song carefully weaves his message into the general line of CCP propaganda: Western media act in their countries’ national interest, he writes.

This term is used by Chinese editorialists and academics in the context of national interests which include nothing about human rights, in a context of soft power, which helps a country to achieve its strategic goals in its international relationships, and enhances its national interest, but may also be used by Chinese dissidents. He Qinglian, for example, suggests that the CCP propaganda narrative about America using human right criticism as a tool to pursue its national interests was deeply rooted in China now, but that the contrary was the case – America was rather selling benefits in terms of national interest, than earning them.

But what would the German national interest be? In the CCP’s view, and in Song Luzheng’s, too, I guess, Deutsche Welle shouldn’t have dared to expel members of the Chinese department – not out of respect for individual rights, but out of respect “for China”. From a CCP point of view, human rights don’t matter in this context. That’s why their mouthpieces can easily come to the conclusion that human rights don’t matter in other countries’ national interests either.

It all depends what national interest is actually about, and it’s hard to see how the expulsion of Wang Fengbo, Zhu Hong, Qi Li and Wang Xueding should have been in the national interest. No German I know who has looked at the material which is publicly available felt that it was in the interest of a German individual – as a journalist, employee, or what have you – to be treated this way. If a country’s common peoples’ interests are equivalent to its national interest, Deutsche Welle made a number of very bad decisions.

But it may be understandable that Song Luzheng can’t see that.

____________

Related

» When your Employer suspects…, Febr 18, 2012
» For the World to Hear, Aug 3, 2010

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Thursday, January 17, 2013

Jin Yinan: The Fundamental Difference

-

1. Translation

Published by People’s Daily Online (人民网) twelve days ago, as part of an interview and discussion series:

People’s Daily Online, January 5, 2013 (Reporter: Huang Zijuan) PLA National Defense University Strategic Research Institute director General, professor Jin Yinan, was recently a guest at People’s Daily Online’s “National Defense Culture Examples” interview series, discussing issues of “strategy cultures and modern defense” with netizens and exchanging views with them.

人民网北京1月5日电 (记者 黄子娟)近日,国防大学战略研究所所长金一南教授做客人民网“国防文化系列访谈”,就“战略文化与现代国防”的话题与网友交流。

When discussing Sino-American strategic cultural differences, Jin Yinan said that Sino-American strategic cultural differences were very big. Rabindranath Tagore had once said that conflicts and conquest [or subjugation] were quintessential in the spirit of Western nationalism, and its core was definitely not about cooperation. National interest as permanently defined by America was the core of its strategic culture, mainly:
1. safeguarding global freedom of action for America, to go whereever it wanted to, without anyone being in a position to stop them
2. Making sure that major strategic resources and markets would be acquired. This includes oil, natural gas, and all kinds of resources America needs
3. holding back hostile and opposing forces, and controlling key regions.

在谈到中美战略文化的区别时,金一南表示,中美的战略文化差别很大。泰戈尔曾经说过,冲突与征服是西方民族主义精神的精髓,它的核心绝不是合作。美国界定的永久性的国家利益就是它的战略文化的核心,主要体现为:第一,确保美国的全球的行动自由,想去哪去哪,谁也不能阻挡我;第二,确保获得重要的战略资源和重要的市场。包括石油、天然气以及各种各样美国所需要的资源;第三,阻止敌对力量,控制关键区域。

Jin Yinan said that here, the fundamental strategic interest defined by America had no ideological color, and its defined lasting national interests included nothing about human rights either. The core was America’s interest, whichever way it could be achieved. This was mainly through control, conquest [or subjugation], to talk again if conquest didn’t work, to cooperate, to make unilateral gains when feasible, and to enter win-win when unilateral gains weren’t achievable. This was the biggest difference between China’s and American strategic cultures.

金一南说,这里面,美国界定的根本战略利益追求,没有意识形态的色彩,而且它制定的永久性的国家利益也不包含人权这么一说,核心是美国的利益,这个利益怎么实现,主要是通过控制、征服,征服不了再谈判、合作,能单赢就单赢,实在不能单赢只好双赢,这是中美的战略思维差别很大的地方。

Remarks

Appropriating Rabindranath Tagore in the context of delivering damning assessments of America’s “strategic culture”, and beautifying implications about China’s, may amount to subjugation, too. Here is how Isaiah Berlin  (quoted by Amartya Sen) described Tagore’s view of political liberty:

Tagore stood fast on the narrow causeway, and did not betray his vision of the difficult truth. He condemned romantic overattachment to the past, what he called the tying of India to the past “like a sacrificial goat tethered to a post,” and he accused men who displayed it – they seemed to him reactionary – of not knowing what true political freedom was, pointing out that it is from English thinkers and English books that the very notion of political liberty was derived. But against cosmopolitanism he maintained that the English stood on their own feet, and so must Indians. In 1917 he once more denounced the danger of ‘leaving everything to the unalterable will of the Master,’ be he brahmin or Englishman.

Tagore’s criticism, used by General Jin in his strategy-culture discussion, was part of India’s struggle against British colonialism. But – as Amartya Sen (2001) sees it – while Tagore consistently and growingly sharply criticized British administration over India, his criticism was less noticed than that of other opponents of Britain’s colonial rule:

This point – Tagore’s criticism – is often missed, since he made a special effort to dissociate his criticism of the Raj from any denigration of British—or Western—people and culture.

____________

Related

» Espionage, not Corruption, NTDTV, Aug 31, 2011
» Discussion leaked, Taipei Times, Aug 30, 2011
» Strategic Culture, Jeffrey S. Lantis via asrudiancenter, Nov 4, 2008

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Wednesday, January 2, 2013

Former Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing: Stop Showing Off and Get your Act together

Translated off the reel. If the following blockquote contains errors, please let me know – JR.

Li Zhaoxing (李肇星), former Chinese foreign minister, in an interview with Guangzhou Daily (广州日报), republished by Huanqiu Shibao:

Q: Scholars have recently said that China went through a period of “taking beatings” and of  “famine”, but has now entered a period of “getting scolded”. It is also said that in the wake of China’s rise, “shouting” at China from abroad seems to have increased. How do you see this?

最近有学者提出,中国曾经历过“挨打”时期、“挨饿”时期,如今却进入“挨骂”时期。有人说随着中国崛起,国外对中国的“骂声”似乎在增加,您怎么看这种现象?

A: The old saying about “rise” may be one cause for attracting the shouting! Who says that China is rising? What’s the rise? Historically, rise mainly refers to Spain’s, Britain’s, Portugal’s and other historic European colonial powers. As far as that’s concerned, personally, I agree with the Central Committee’s way of putting it: peaceful development. “Rise” implies suddenness, and damaging the interests of others, in a selfish way. China’s development benefits us and others. It may also be a translation issue: the English word “rise” can be translated as 上升, 兴起, etc.. 崛起 isn’t the only possible translation.

老说什么“崛起”,可能就是招来骂声的一个原因!谁说中国崛起了?什么是崛起?在历史上,崛起主要是指西班牙、英国、葡萄牙等历史上的西欧殖民主义 国家。对此,我个人认同中央的提法——和平发展。“崛起”似乎暗含带有突然性,而且还会损害别人利益、损人利己。而中国的发展是利己又利人的。这里也可能 有一个翻译问题:英文的“rise”有“上升”、“兴起”等意思,不一定非译成“崛起”不可。

I believe that some of the international voices that shout at China are incited by others, some are feigned American praise for China, and some people here take that for gospel truth. As a result, this attracts shouting – isn’t this self-inflicted? Sure: bad people curse, and that isn’t necessarily a bad thing. The really bad thing is when good people curse you.

我认为,国际上骂中国的声音,有的是别人挑拨,有的是美国假装表扬中国,而我们有些人却信以为真,结果招来骂声,这不是自找的吗?当然,被坏人骂,不见得是坏事,最怕的是被好人骂。

One can’t say that “China is rising”, that it is no longer a developing country. Let me give you three sets of numbers as examples.

不能说“中国崛起”了,中国不再是发展中国家了。我列举三组最基本的数字:

Firstly, within the global GDP of nearly 200 countries, mainland China’s comes second, globally, and last year’s average per-income GDP was 5400 US dollars. That’s position 94, globally. How can you call that a “rise”? (Li Zhaoxing mentions here that he doesn’t like mixing Chinese and English language, and referring to guonei shengchan zongzhi as “GDP.) Two years, mainland Chinese GDP ranked 110th, globally, and America began to hype “China’s rise”. Don’t believe a few Americans.

第一,全球近200个国家中,中国大陆国内生产总值(记者注:说到此事,李肇星提及说他不喜欢中文夹杂英语,不喜欢把国内生产总值说成 “GDP”)位居世界第二,去年人均国内生产总值为5400美元,位列全球第94位,怎么能说崛起?前年,中国大陆人均国内生产总值位居全球110名时, 美国就开始炒作“中国崛起”,千万不能相信美国个别人的话。

Secondly, average Chinese life expectancy is 74.83 years, according to latest statistics. Japan’s is 82 years. In the countries with the highest life expectancy, it’s 88.5 years. China ranks 83rd, globally. How can you call that a rise?

第二,中国人均预期寿命最新公布的数据是74.83岁,而日本为82岁,世界人均预期寿命最高的国家为88.5岁,中国该项排名为世界第83位,怎么能说崛起?

Thirdly, China’s gross university enrollment rate is, what? According to my enquiry to a friend at the ministry of education, the most recent number is 26.2 percent. That’s not even position 40, globally. How can you call that a rise?

第三,中国现在的大学毛入学率是多少?经我向教育部的朋友请教,最新数据是26.2%。世界排名第40多位,怎么能说崛起?

Q: More than ten years ago, you were China’s ambassador in America. Back then, America was tough on China. Has the American attitude towards China changed now? Many American media say that America’s strength is declining or fading. How do you view the changes in American strength during the past ten years?

您10多年前曾在美国任驻美大使,那时美国对中国很强硬。现在美国对华态度是否发生了变化?很多美媒都称,美国的实力在下降或衰落。您怎么看10多年来美国实力的变化?

A: I can’t see that. It’s an American characteristic to “pretend to be poor”, it has a particular sense of getting prepared for unforeseen developments. If we have a characteristic it is that we can’t “pretend to be poor”. Some people actually want to “display wealth”. On certain activities, for example, there’s an excessive fondness of having fireworks and setting off firecrackers.

[...]

Q: Do you believe that Obama, in his second term, will continue to create trouble for China?

那您认为奥巴马第二任期内是否还会继续给中国制造麻烦?

A: No matter if it is Obama, or someone else, each of them is the American president. Don’t care too much about who is elected president. Neither of them represents  China. It’s only us who make China’s benefit the objective of our struggle.

不管奥巴马还是谁上台,都是美国总统。不要太在乎美国选谁不选谁,谁都不代表中国,只有我们才把中国人民的利益作为我们的奋斗目标。

Generally speaking, “Made in China” is globally welcome. And of course, we will make even more efforts to promote “Made in China”.

在世界上,“中国制造”总体上受欢迎。当然,今后我们会更加努力推进“中国制造”。

Guangzhou Daily’s interview with Li Zhaoxing was apparently prompted by Li’s appointment as the first president of a newly-established organization, the China Public Diplomacy Association (中国公共外交协会).

Sunday, December 30, 2012

“Internet Disaster Areas”: Help is on the Way

Two reports published this month came to the same conclusion, reports Enorth (Tianjin): microblogs have become the internet’s disaster areas when it comes to rumors.

Main Link: Enorth, December 30, 2012. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

A survey by Legal Daily online shows that 51.7 percent of rumors emerged online in 2012 came from microblogs, or were mainly spread on microblogs. Forums have been sources and disseminators of substantial numbers of rumors, too. 27.6 percent of online rumors originated from forums or were mainly disseminated on forums.

法制网的调查显示,在2012年出现的网络谣言中,有51.7%是源自微博,或者主要在微博上传播。论坛在网络谣言的发源和传播中也占据着不可忽视的地位,27.6%的网络谣言源自论坛或者主要在论坛中传播。

According to a sample-based statistic on 200 online rumor cases in 2012, conducted by Shanghai Jiaotong University’s New Media and Social Research Center, microblogs accounted for 28 percent of all rumors in the spotlight. Forums accounted for 20 percent, and internet news for 13 percent.

而据上海交通大学新媒体与社会研究中心对2012年200起网络谣言案例的抽样统计,微博为首曝媒体的谣言比例占到样本总体的28%,其次为论坛社区(20%)、网络新闻(13%)。

Only in March 2012, “the authorities in charge” had to “clean” [or "put in order"] more than 210,000 messages or news, according to Enorth.

China University of Political Science and Law professor Ruan Qilin says that because of existing investigation and verification problems, looking into online rumors is difficult to a certain degree, and how to effectively administer and control online rumors has currently become an urgent question.

中国政法大学教授阮齐林说,因为存在查证困难的问题,目前追究网络谣言有一定难度,如何有效监管及遏制网络谣言成了当前亟待解决的问题。

“One important reason for online rumors spreading so easily is that netizens have no more convincing sources”, says Renmin University News faculty assistant professor Weng Changshou. “Officialdom must build public credibility – they must become the first the netizens think of and rely on as information sources whenever they are facing hearsay. Therefore, to deal with the internet age in terms of concepts, style and mechanisms, the asymmetry between official information and netizens’ information, and the antagonism between them, needs to be reduced.”

“网络谣言能够传播,有一个重要原因是缺乏令网民信服的信息来源。”中国人民大学新闻学院副教授翁昌寿说,“官方必须建立公信力,成为网民在听到传言时首先想到和依靠的消息来源,因此需要在观念、作风、机制上适应网络时代的信息传播环境,减少官方信息与网民信息的不对称性和对抗性。”

Officialdom building credibility would be a fairly long-term goal, of course. But Weng’s suggestion to reduce the “asymmetry” between official and online information seems to point into the right direction, from the legislators’ perspective:

As far as concrete measures are concerned, a number of experts believe that sound legislation, strengthened internet management and raising netizens’ ability to judge and recognize online rumors are important. This time, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee will pass a decision concerning strengthened internet information protection, which is seen as a major official step to curb internet rumors.

在具体措施上,多名受访专家均认为,健全法律、加强网络管理和网友提高对网络谣言的识别能力几方面都很重要。此次,全国人大常委会通过的关于加强网络信息保护的决定,就被视为在遏制网络谣言上,官方迈出的重要步伐。

For good measure, possibly to demonstrate how strongly Chinese “civil society” is involved in “fighting rumors”, Enorth also quotes an NPC delegate from Anhui Province, He Bangxi, who “had, in recent years, begun to call for awareness concerning online rumors”.

It’s not a completely new effort. Only a year ago, administrative tries were made to require real-name registration on what looked like a small scale, but would have affected most microblogs, if it had been seen through according to plans back then. And in summer 2009, Chinese news websites were reportedly required to implement real-name registration.

The 2009 initiative came from the State Council. This seems to be the first time that NPC legislation seems to be planned.

Obviously, there are “human-flesh searches” and similar online activities which threaten individual rights – or even lives.

But then, as netizens noted days before Enorth informed its readers, it’s currently not difficult for officials to track down real identities anyway.

Or, at least, to bust some “illegal internet cafes” which didn’t have subversive visitors register properly with them.

Friday, November 23, 2012

Heimatgefühl, and the Venture into the Public Realm

My following translation will very probably contain errors.

A: [...] If you want me to be frank, I have to say that I’m not interested in the effects when I’m working. (Wenn ich ganz ehrlich sprechen soll, dann muß ich sagen: Wenn ich arbeite, bin ich an Wirkung nicht interessiert.)

Q: And once the work has been completed? (Und wenn die Arbeit fertig ist?)

A: Well, then I have finished with it. You see, what matters to me is this: I need to understand. Writing is part of understanding. Writing belongs in this process of understanding things. (Ja, dann bin ich damit fertig. Wissen Sie, wesentlich ist für mich: Ich muß verstehen. Zu diesem Verstehen gehört bei mir auch das Schreiben. Das Schreiben ist Teil in dem Verstehensprozeß.)

Q: Writing serves your own, further cognition? (Wenn Sie schreiben, so dient es Ihrem eigenen, weiteren Erkennen?)

A: Yes, because now, certain things have been determined. If we had great memory, so that we really kept all our reasoning in mind: I doubt that, because I’m aware of my own laziness, I’d have jotted down everything. What matters to me is the thinking process itself. When I’ve got that, I’m, personally, quite satisfied. When I succeed in expressing this adequately in writing, I’m once again satisfied. – Now, you asked about effects. That’s – if I may be tongue-in-cheek – a male question. Men badly want to be effective, but I’m kind of looking at it from outside. To be effective myself? No, I want to understand. And when other people understand, in the same sense as I did, that gives me satisfaction, like a sense of home. (Ja, weil jetzt bestimmte Dinge festgelegt sind. Nehmen wir an, man hätte ein sehr gutes Gedächtnis, so daß man wirklich alles behält, was man denkt: Ich zweifle sehr daran, da ich meine Faulheit kenne, daß ich irgend etwas notiert hätte. Worauf es mir ankommt, ist der Denkprozeß selber. Wenn ich das habe, bin ich persönlich ganz zufrieden. Wenn es mir dann gelingt, es im Schreiben adäquat auszudrücken, bin ich auch wieder zufrieden. – Jetzt fragen Sie nach der Wirkung. Es ist das – wenn ich ironisch werden darf – eine männliche Frage. Männer wollen immer furchtbar gern wirken; aber ich sehe das gewissermaßen von außen. Ich selber wirken? Nein, ich will verstehen. Und wenn andere Menschen verstehen, im selben Sinne, wie ich verstanden habe – dann gibt mir das eine Befriedigung, wie ein Heimatgefühl.)

[...]

A: My father died early. It all sounds very funny. My grandfather was the liberal congregation’s president and city councillor in Königsberg. I’m from an old Königsberger family. Still – the word “jew” was never mentioned at home, when I was a small child. I was confronted with it by antisemitic remarks – no use in mentioning them – from children in the street. That’s how I became informed, so to speak. (Mein Vater war früh gestorben. Es klingt alles sehr komisch. Mein Großvater war Präsident der liberalen Gemeinde und Stadtverordneter von Königsberg. Ich komme aus einer alten Königsberger Familie. Trotzdem – das Wort “Jude” ist bei uns nie gefallen, als ich ein kleines Kind war. Es wurde mir zum erstenmal entgegengebracht durch antisemitische Bemerkungen – es lohnt sich nicht zu erzählen – von Kindern auf der Straße. Daraufhin wurde ich also sozusagen “aufgeklärt”.)

Q: Was that a shock? (War das für Sie ein Schock?)

A: No. (Nein.)

[...]

A: I for one don’t think that I ever felt that I was German, in the sense of ethnicity, not in terms of statehood, if I may distinguish the two. I remember discussions around 1930 about that, with [Karl Jaspers], for example. He said, “of course you are German!” I said: “It’s plain that I’m not!” But to me, it didn’t matter. It didn’t spell inferiority to me. Precisely not. And if I may come back to what was special about my family: you see, all Jewish children were confronted with antisemitism. It poisoned the souls of many children. The difference was that my mother always maintained that you must not duck your head. You need to defend yourself. (Ich, zum Beispiel, glaube nicht, daß ich mich je als Deutsche – im Sinne der Volkszugehörigkeit, nicht der Staatsangehörigkeit, wenn ich mal den Unterschied machen darf – betrachtet habe. Ich besinne mich darauf, daß ich so um das Jahr ‘30 herum Diskussionen darüber zum Beispiel mit Jaspers hatte. Er sagte: “Natürlich sind Sie Deutsche!” Ich sagte: “Das sieht man doch, ich bin keine!” Das hat aber für mich keine Rolle gespielt. Ich habe das nicht etwa als Minderwertigkeit empfunden. Das gerade war nicht der Fall. Und wenn ich noch einmal auf das Besondere meines Elternhauses zurückkommen darf: Sehen Sie, der Antisemitismus ist allen jüdischen Kindern begegnet. Und er hat die Seelen vieler Kinder vergiftet. Der Unterschied bei uns war, daß meine Mutter immer auf dem Standpunkt stand: Man darf sich nicht ducken! Man muß sich wehren!)

[...]

Q [quoting Arendt]: “I have never, in all my life, loved a collective, neither the German, the French, nor the American, nor the working class, or whatever else may be there. Indeed, I only love my friends, and am completely uncapable of any other love. But above all, being Jewish myself, I would find this love dubious if it was love to the Jewish.” [...] Aren’t you afraid that your attitude could be politically barren? (Darin heißt es: “Ich habe nie in meinem Leben irgendein Volk oder Kollektiv geliebt, weder das deutsche, noch das französische, noch das amerikanische, noch etwa die Arbeiterklasse oder was es sonst so noch gibt. Ich liebe in der Tat nur meine Freunde und bin zu aller anderen Liebe völlig unfähig. Vor allem aber wäre mir diese Liebe zu den Juden, da ich selbst jüdisch bin, suspekt.” [...] Fürchten Sie nicht, daß Ihre Haltung politisch steril sein könnte?)

A: No, I think the other [attitude] is politically barren. To belong to a group is natural. You always belong to a group, by birth, always. But to belong to a group as you meant it in a second sense, that is to say, to organize – that’s completely different. This kind of organizing always happens by Weltbezug. That is, what those who organize have in common, which is usually called interests. The immediate personal relation, when you can talk about love, does exist, of course, in real love, in its greatest way, and in a certain sense, it exists in friendship. That’s when a person is reached in an immediate way, and independently from Weltbezug. That’s how people who belong to most different organizations may still be friends. But if you confuse these things, if you take them to the negotiation table – to put it in a very mean way -, I believe that’s fatal. (Nein. Ich würde sagen, die andere ist politisch steril. Zu einer Gruppe zu gehören, ist erst einmal eine natürliche Gegebenheit. Sie gehören zu irgendeiner Gruppe durch Geburt, immer. Aber zu einer Gruppe zu gehören, wie Sie es im zweiten Sinne meinen, nämlich sich zu organisieren, das ist etwas ganz anderes. Diese Organisation erfolgt immer unter Weltbezug. Das heißt: Das, was diejenigen miteinander gemeinsam haben, die sich so organisieren, ist, was man gewöhnlich Interessen nennt. Der direkte personale Bezug, in dem man von Liebe sprechen kann, der existiert natürlich in der wirklichen Liebe in der größten Weise, und er existiert in einem gewissen Sinne auch in der Freundschaft. Da wird die Person direkt und unabhängig von dem Weltbezug angesprochen. So können Leute verschiedenster Organisationen immer noch persönlich befreundet sein. Wenn man aber diese Dinge miteinander verwechselt, wenn man also die Liebe an den Verhandlungstisch bringt, um mich einmal ganz böse auszudrücken, so halte ich das für ein sehr großes Verhängnis.)

Q: [...] In a speech on Karl Jaspers you said that “humanity is  never won in loneliness and never by handing ones work over to the public. Only if you take your life and person[ality] into the venture of the public realm, you will reach [humanity].” This “venture into the public realm”, a Jaspers quote again, in which way does it exist for Hannah Arendt? (In einer Festrede auf Jaspers haben Sie gesagt: “Gewonnen wird die Humanität nie in der Einsamkeit und nie dadurch, daß einer sein Werk der Öffentlichkeit übergibt. Nur wer sein Leben und seine Person mit in das Wagnis der Öffentlichkeit nimmt, kann sie erreichen.” Dieses “Wagnis der Öffentlichkeit”, ein Zitat von Jaspers wiederum – worin besteht es für Hannah Arendt?)

A: The venture into the public realm appears to be clear to me. You expose yourself in the light of the public, as a person. While I believe that one must not appear publicly and act publicly in a self-conscious way, I still know that all action expresses the person like no other activity. And speaking, too, is a way of action. That’s one thing. The second venture: we commence something, we add our thread into a web of relationships. We never know how it will evolve. We all need to say, Lord, forgive them what they do, because they don’t know what they do. That’s true for all action. Quite practically, because you can’t know. That’s a venture. And I would say that this venture can only be taken as you rely on the human beings. That’s to say, in a – hard to grasp, but basic – trust in the humaneness in all human beings. You can’t do that in another way. (Das Wagnis der Öffentlichkeit scheint mir klar zu sein. Man exponiert sich im Lichte der Öffentlichkeit, und zwar als Person. Wenn ich auch der Meinung bin, daß man nicht auf sich selbst reflektiert in der Öffentlichkeit erscheinen und handeln darf, so weiß ich doch, daß in jedem Handeln die Person in einer Weise zum Ausdruck kommt wie in keiner anderen Tätigkeit. Wobei das Sprechen auch eine Form des Handelns ist. Also das ist das eine. Das zweite Wagnis ist: Wir fangen etwas an; wir schlagen unseren Faden in ein Netz der Beziehungen. Was daraus wird, wissen wir nie. Wir sind alle darauf angewiesen zu sagen: Herr vergib ihnen, was sie tun, denn sie wissen nicht, was sie tun. Das gilt für alles Handeln. Einfach ganz konkret, weil man es nicht wissen kann. Das ist ein Wagnis. Und nun würde ich sagen, daß dieses Wagnis nur möglich ist im Vertrauen auf die Menschen. Das heißt, in einem – schwer genau zu fassenden, aber grundsätzlichen – Vertrauen auf das Menschliche aller Menschen. Anders könnte man es nicht.)

Hannah Arendt in a television interview, in October 1964

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Related

» In an Unguarded Moment, Sep 29, 2010
» No Easy Solution, April 11, 2009

Friday, November 16, 2012

Ma, Hu, Xi: Great Rejuvenation

Can’t tell if “sending telegrams” should be taken literally. Technically, the procedure  should still be feasible.

Xinhua Net, Beijing, November 15, 2012 —

China KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou separately sent telegrams to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping saying that Hu Jintao had made major contributions to improved cross-strait relations, and congratulating Xi Jinping for his election as CCP secretary general. Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping expressed their thanks in separate replies.

新华网北京11月15日电 中国国民党主席马英九15日分别致电胡锦涛、习近平,表示胡锦涛为改善发展两岸关系作出重大贡献,祝贺习近平当选中共中央总书记。胡锦涛、习近平分别复电表示感谢。

In his reply, Hu Jintao said that in recent years, under the common efforts of both parties, the peaceful development of cross-strait relations achieved a number of imortant positive results. I sincerely hope that our two parties, will persist in strenghthening cooperation, in further consolidating and deepening the situation of peaceful cross-strait relations, for the happiness of the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

胡锦涛在复电中表示,近年来,在贵我两党共同努力下,两岸关系和平发展取得一系列重要积极成果。诚挚希望贵我两党再接再厉,加强合作,进一步巩固和深化两岸关系和平发展局面,为两岸同胞谋福祉,为中华民族谋复兴。

Xi Jinping said in his reply that the current cross-strait relations were in a good situation of peaceful development. It is my heartfelt hope that our two parties will grasp the historical opportunity, deepen mutual trust, solidify the policies of peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and the economic, cultural and societal foundations, that they will promote the achievement of ever-new results from the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and together create a wonderful future for the Chinese nation.

习近平在复电中表示,当前两岸关系呈现和平发展的良好局面。由衷期望贵我两党把握历史机遇,深化互信,筑牢两岸关系和平发展的政治、经济、文化、社会基础,推动两岸关系和平发展不断取得新成果,共同开创中华民族美好未来。

In his telegrams to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, Ma Ying-jeou said that during the past ten years, the two parties had adhered to the “92 Consensus”, maintained the basic stability across the Taiwan Strait, and the Taiwan Strait had achieved the greatest peace and stability during the past sixty years. As these parties forge ahead, I hope our parties, on a good foundation, will continue to bring about broadened and deepened exchanges and common institutions to mutual significant results. When looking to the future, with the great cause of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on the rise, there is particularly strengthened mutual trust, sincere cooperation, for the benefit of the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

马英九在致胡锦涛、习近平的来电中表示,过去10年来,贵我两党坚持“九二共识”, 维持了台海基本稳定,台海地区达到60年来最和平稳定的状态。值此贵党继往开来之际,期待贵我两党在既有良好基础上,继续促成两岸双方在扩大、深化交流及 互设机构等重大事务上获致更显著的成果。展望未来,中华民族复兴大业方兴未艾,两岸之间有待强化互信、真诚合作,造福两岸人民。

On the same day, the China KMT honorary chairmen Lien Chan and Wu Poh-hsiung also separatelz sent telegrams to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping separately replied to express their thanks.

同日,中国国民党荣誉主席连战、吴伯雄也分别向胡锦涛、习近平致电,胡锦涛、习近平分别复电表示感谢。

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Related

» Hardtalk in 2006, June 20, 2008

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Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Huanqiu on HK Survey: It’s not as Bad as you Think

The following is a translation of a Huanqiu Shibao article. It is therefore a mainland Chinese reflection of a Hong Kong survey. I haven’t read the survey itself, or coverage on the survey from elsewhere.

The Huanqiu article has been republished by many Chinese websites, including Sina‘s edition for Taiwan, Enorth (Tianjin), and many other regional or local websites in China.

Main Link: Only 2.4 percent of Hong Kong’s post-1980s…

In cases where the Cantonese pronounciation of Hong Kongers’ names within the Huanqiu article weren’t easily available online, I used putonghua pronounciation in this translation.

Be more Liu Dehua: 让世界知道我们都是中国人

Be more Andy Lau: 让世界知道我们都是中国人 (click picture for video)

Links within blockquote added during translation.

Exchanges between Hong Kong and the hinterland become more and more frequent, but a recent survey finds that Hong Kongers see their “Hong Kong identity” with growing clarity. Among them, young respondents born after 1980 feel most strongly about their “Hong Kong identity”. Some Hong Kong media explain that the findings reflect “resistance against Chinese identity” among part of Hong Kongers, and a “low national identity”. However, Anthony Y. H. Fung [Feng Yingqian], head of the Chinese University’s School of Journalism and Communication, and in charge of the survey, told a “Huanqiu Shibao” reporter on Monday that there was no contradiction between “Hong Kong identity” and “national identity”, that while the survey showed a Hong Kong “awareness of their native land”, it also showed that pride in the national flag, the national anthem or the People’s Liberation Army and other national symbols had also risen.

香港与内地的交流越来越频繁,但一项最新调查发现,香港人的“港人身份认同”越来越明显,其中“80后”的年轻受访者“港人身份认同感”最为强烈。有香港媒体在报道中解读称,调查结果反映部分港人“抗拒中国人的身份”、“国民身份认同感低”。不过,负责调查的香港中文大学新闻与传播学院院长冯应谦12日向《环球时报》记者澄清说,香港人对“港人身份认同”与“国民身份认同”并不存在矛盾,调查显示港人“本土意识”增加的同时,也显示过去十多年来香港人对于国旗、国歌或解放军等国家象征自豪感相对有上升。

According to a Hong Kong’s “Oriental Daily” report on Monday, the Chinese University’s SChool of Communication and a polling agency carried out a telephone survey last month, with 819 Hong Kongers as respondents. One question asked the respondents to tell to which category of people they belonged, with “Chinese people”, “Hong Kong people”, “Hong Kong people, but also Chinese people” and “Chinese people, but also Hong Kong people” to choose from. The survey found that 42 percent of the respondents chose that they were “Hong Kong people, but also Chinese people”, a small drop from two years ago, when the number was 44 percent. 23 percent chose the purely “Hong Kong people” identity. 22 percent said they were “Chinese, but also Hong Kong people”, and 12 percent felt that they were purely “Chinese people”, a new low after Hong Kong’s 1997 return. The survey divided respondents into those who were thirty years old or younger, the “post-1980s”, and those older than that. The results tell that the “post-1980s” don’t greatly identify with the “Chinese people identity”, with only 2.4 percent choosing “Chinese people”, while the share of older respondents identified with the “Chinese people” option by 15.9 percent.

据香港《东方日报》12日报道,香港中文大学传播与民意调查中心于上月中进行民意调查,以电话访问了819名港人,其中一个问题要求受访者回答自己属于哪一类人,四项选择为“中国人”、“香港人”、“香港人,但也是中国人”以及“中国人,但也是香港人”。调查发现,有42%的受访者选择自己是“香港人,但也是中国人”,较两年前进行同样调查时的44%的数据稍降。其次有23%的受访者选择纯粹“香港人”身份,是自2008年以来的新高。另外22%的受访者称自己是“中国人,但也是香港人”;觉得自己纯粹是“中国人”的受访者只有12%,是97回归以来的新低点。此次调查又特别将受访者分成两批,一批为30岁或以下的“80后”,另一批则是“非80后”,结果发现“80后”对“中国人身份”不太认同,选择是“中国人”的只有2.4%,但非“80后”的比例却有15.9%。

[...]

The findings triggered controversy in Hong Kong’s public opinion. Hong Kong SAR’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference member Lew Mon-hung [Liu Mengxiong] said this was related to the SAR government only caring about peoples-livelihood issues and not doing everything to refute “Hong Kong independence” talk. He believes that recently, many determined people repeatedly waved “Union-Jack” flags and seized the opportunity of hyping “Hong Kong independence” thoughts, and the SAR government hadn’t refuted them. This could only lead to further political difficulties. Xu Huajie, Hong Kong United Youth Association advisor and China Im- and Export Chamber of Commerce deputy director, said that if Hong Kong’s young people resisted the hinterland for political reasons, they would lose many opportunities to develop in their working lives. But Basic Law Committee member Liu Naiqiang describes public opinion “as a cloud”, and believfes that it is difficult to rely only on the polls to assess trends in public opinion. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology economic faculty director Francis Lui [雷鼎鸣] says that this survey by the Chinese University “has problems”, because they offered no “Hong Konger, but no Chinese” choice. This would have been necessary to really measure Hong Kongers’ “national identy” identification.

调查结果引发香港舆论的争议。香港特区全国政协委员刘梦熊表示,港人有如此意识,相信与特区政府只顾民生政策,没有全力驳斥“港独”言论有关。他认为,近期不少有心人士多次高举代表港英时期的“米字旗”,乘机炒作“港独”思潮,但特区政府未予以驳斥,这只会令施政进一步困难。兼任香港青联顾问的中华进出口商会副主席许华杰说,若香港青年因政治理由而抗拒内地,将失去很多工作发展机会。但《基本法》委员会委员刘乃强形容“民意如浮云”,他认为很难单靠民调去评估民意趋势。香港科技大学经济学系主任雷鼎鸣表示,此次中大的调查“有问题”,因为他们没有设一个“是香港人,但不是中国人”的选项供受访者选择,只有新增这个选项才能直接测试到港人对“国民身份”认同感的最终态度是什么。

Anthony Y. H. Fung, in charge of the survey, told “Huanqiu Shibao” that there was no contradiction between “Hong Kong identity” and “Chinese identity”. Although the survey had shown the “Hong Kong identity” ever more clearly, it also showed that during the past ten years, Hong Kongers’ feelings of pride for national symbols like the national flag, the national anthem, or the PLA had also risen. From only 30.6 percent of Hong Kongers feeling proud of the national flag in 1996, their share was now 37.6 percent, and while only ten percent felt good about the PLA in 1996, their share was now 21.5 percent.

负责此次调查的香港中文大学新闻与传播学院院长冯应谦12日接受《环球时报》记者采访时澄清说,香港人对“港人身份认同”与“国民身份认同”并不存在矛盾,虽然调查显示香港人的“港人身份认同”越来越明显,但调查同时也显示,过去十多年来香港人对国旗、国歌或解放军等国家象征自豪感上升,比如,在1996年,只有30.6%的受访者对国旗有自豪感,今年的调查则有37.6%;另外,在1996年,只有10%的受访者对解放军有好感,但今年已增至21.5%。

Fung believes that the stronger “Hong Kong identitification” had grown because of discussions in recent years, having everyone considering their identity issues. As for the “post-1980s” leaning towards “Hong Kong identity”, this was because of the Hong Kong government’s promotion of [unsafe translation: lessons in line with hinterland lessons, encouraging independent thinking, and the young generation wanting to participate in public matters and deliberations about identity issues]. He said: “if the survey was carried out during the Olympics or during National Day, I believe Hong Kongers’ identification with the nation would be stronger”.

冯应谦认为,香港人对“港人身份认同”增强,只因近年相关讨论多了,让大家思考自己的身份问题。至于“80后”较倾向认同“香港人的身份”,是因为近年香港教育推行通识课(相当于内地的社会课),鼓励独立思考,令年轻一代较愿意参与社会事务及思考身份的问题。他说,“如果调查是在奥运或者国庆期间进行,我相信港人的国民身份认同比例会大大增加。”

As for the talk about “Hong Kong independence”, Fung said that the share of respondents who said they were “Hong Kongers, but also Chinese” showed that support for “Hong Kong independence” was very small. In fact, almost sixty percent of respondents had said that they travelled to mainland China every two months or even more frequently, which reflected that Hong Kongers believed that contact with the hinterland had become an unstoppable trend.

对于近日香港出现“港独”争论,冯应谦表示,调查结果显示,受访港人大多数选择“香港人、但也是中国人”一项,可见支持“港独”只是很少数。事实上,近六成受访者表示“两个月一次或更多地”往返大陆,这反映大部分香港人都认为,与内地接触已是不可阻挡的潮流。

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Related

» Patriotic Classes only Optional, BBC, Sep 8, 2012
» A Sense of Affection, July 30, 2012
» If you can’t govern a village, Dec 16, 2011

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Thursday, November 1, 2012

Former Deutsche Welle director (in 2001): “no Subservience”

Erik Bettermann became director of Deutsche Welle in May 2001. German (conservative) daily Die Welt on May 11, 2001:

In a hurriedly arranged press conference, Betterman missed no opportunity to highlight the maximum [separation between the state and] Deutsche Welle which needed to be defended against the covetousness of political parties, too. “I’m nobody’s auxiliary person”, the studied social education worker, who turned 57 on Tuesday,  protested against dogged office grapevine.

In einer eiligen anberaumten Pressekonferenz ließ Bettermann keine Gelegenheit aus, auf die möglichst große “Staatsferne” der DW hinzuweisen, die es auch gegen alle Begehrlichkeiten der Parteien zu verteidigen gelte. “Ich bin kein Erfüllungsgehilfe von irgendjemand”, verwahrte sich der studierte Sozialpädagoge, der am vergangenen Dienstag 57 Jahre alt wurde, gegen den hartnäckigen Flurfunk.

Three months earlier, Bettermann’s predecessor, Dieter Weirich, had told Die Welt in an interview that the most commanding soap-box speakers on the subject of freedom of the air waves were also the greatest enemies of the concept.

Former DW director Dieter Weirich. Source: Jennings / Wikimedia. Click picture for source.

Weirich left his post as DW director at the end of March, 2001, rather than when his term officially ended, on November 30, 2001. As a christian democrat, he stood no chance to be re-elected as the station’s director, and besides, Die Welt described his working relations with then Federal Commissioner for Culture and Media, Michael Naumann*), as first-class emnity (eine Feindschaft erster Güte). Weirich didn’t protest, and suggested that then Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder should be happy about his performance – after all, Schröder had recommended that Germans should show no subservience (Untertanengeist). He himself had never given in to attempts from members of his own party, the christian democrats, to make the Welle the federal [governments] subordinate. His concept of the Deutsche Welle directorship had always been politically neutral.

Die Welt: There were advances from [federal commissioner] Naumann’s office last year, to reduce the responsibilities of the [DW] director, and to broaden the influence of political parties.

Weirich: Freedom of the airwaves is schoolbook content in this country. The most commanding soap-box speakers on the subject of freedom of the air waves are also the greatest enemies of the concept. That’s nothing new.

Die Welt: Aus der Naumann­Behörde gab es vergangenes Jahr Vorstöße, die Verantwortung des Intendanten zu reduzieren und den Einfluss der Politik zu erweitern.

Weirich: Rundfunkfreiheit steht hierzulande in Schulbüchern. Die imposantesten Sonntagsredner zur Rundfunkfreiheit sind ihre größten Gegner. Das ist nicht neu.

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Notes

*) Michael Naumann had by then left the federal commissioner office. His successor was a fellow social democrat, Julian Nida-Rümelin.

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Related

» Wang Fengbo, January 26, 2012
» Anticipatory Obedience, June 10, 2011

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