The Essence of Big-Power Relations: the Chinese Definition in short

The BBC‘s monitoring service has a Chinese press review on the summit between U.S. president Barack Obama and Chinese party and state chairman Xi Jinping.

The Xinhua review linked by the BBC review actually goes somewhat further than the BBC’s account of it: the summit had designed (or drafted) a roadmap for a new era of Sino-American relations (为新时期中美关系的发展规划了蓝图). That said, two sentences further down, the Xinhua review kind of counterbalances this with a much more vague notion that a consensus between the two leaders on making joint efforts to build a new type of relations between big powers, to show mutual respect, and to cooperate in a mutually beneficial way, thus benefitting the people of their two countries and the people of the world. China and America, facing rapid economic globalization and the objective requirements of countries being in the same boat, should be able to take a road different from the history of great powers – a new road without clashes and antagonism. The Xinhua review the notion that China is the biggest developing country, and America is the biggest developed country. Facts had shown that cooperaton was mutually beneficial. Even if the political systems and development patterns were different, countries could set a good example of  peaceful coexistence and harmonious relations. All the same,

it cannot be denied that differences in terms of societal system, development stage, history, culture and tradition do exist between China and America, which make the relationship between the two countries exceptionally complex. This is exactly why chairman Xi Jinping says that the establishment of a a new type of relations between big powers is unprecedented and for generations to come [this should be the correct translation if 后起来者 is meant - I'm not sure about the actually used term 后启来者].

不可否认，中美之间存在社会制度、发展阶段、历史文化传统等差异和政治经济上的纠纷，使得两国关系具有前所未有的复杂性。正因如此，才如习近平主席所说，中美建设新型大国关系“前无古人、后启来者”。

The talk about unprecedented (tasks) preceded the summit – Chinese ambassador Cui Tiankai was quoted with quite the same wording ahead of the summit.

The People’s Daily editorials or commentaries linked by the BBC can’t be loaded at the moment. However, there seem to bee different opinions among People’s Daily’s editorialists – one suggesting that this was the beginning of a new era, and one (in the overseas edition) suggesting that building a normal relationship among major powers wouldn’t be easy, and one without distrust would be impossible (unless the U.S. changed their ways, that is).

Chinese coverage – before and after the summit – seems to suggest that the summit was a stage in a Chinese initiative to win America over to a constructive role in building a more harmonious world. Obviously, this would mean that a “failed” summit would be a loss of face for Xi Jinping – although there would have been ways to sell this to the Chinese public reasonably successfully, as a failure of the usual American suspects.

What seems to support the perception of the summit as the result of Chinese efforts is that the Chinese side came with a “vision” – Obama came with issues, such as cyber attacks. Chinese core interests (such as Taiwan or the South China Sea) don’t feature prominently. But there would be no American-Chinese summit without such issues – that they aren’t in the headlines for the sake of “atmosphere” does not mean that they were absent in the talks. But at least to the public, they were communicated rather low-key on this occasion.

Hong Kong’s Phoenix/Ifeng television and media company quotes the Beijing News (新京报) as saying that Xi addressed the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) and the South China Sea issues as well as the “Taiwan issue”, cyber security and the Korean nuclear issue. There are excerpts from a press conference (or briefing, 吹风会), too, held by former Chinese foreign minister (until March this year) and current secretary of the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi (Yang apparently made his statements the Hyatt Hotel, where the Chinese side stayed during the summit):

Q:		What’s at the core of the new type of big-power relations between China and America? 中美新型大国关系的核心内涵是什么？努力方向是什么？
A:		Yang Jiechi said that the two leaders agree to making joint efforts to build big-power relations of a new type between China and America, with mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation. This is an important consensus reached by both sides, with their minds set on the international situation and the future development of Sino-American relations. This represents [the fact that] the two countries don’t take the road of history, with clashes and antagonism, but initiate a new model of big-power relatoins, a historic undertaking of  political wisdom. 杨洁篪说，两国元首同意，共同努力构建中美新型大国关系，相互尊重、合作共赢。这是双方着眼世情国情以及中美关系未来发展达成的重要共识，体现了中美两国不走历史上大国冲突老路、开创大国关系新模式的政治智慧和历史担当。 Yang Jiechi said that as chairman Xi pointed out, China and America are the world’s most influential countries, and should therefore set an example of how to handle big-power relations. President Obama said that America welcomes China as a great power that continues peaceful development, and that a peaceful, stable and prosperous China isn’t only beneficial for China, but also for America, and for the world. America hopes to maintain strong cooperational relations with China, in an equal partnership. 杨洁篪说，正如习主席指出的，中美都是对世界有重要影响的国家，理应在处理大国关系方面发挥示范作用。奥巴马总统表示，美国欢迎中国作为一个大国继续和平发展；一个和平、稳定、繁荣的中国，不仅对中国有利，对美国、对世界也有利。美国希望同中国保持强有力的合作关系，做平等的伙伴。 Yang Jiechi said that three lines by chairman Xi during the summit provided an incisive summary: 杨洁篪说，关于中美新型大国关系的内涵，习主席在会晤中用三句话作了精辟概括： 1. No clashes, no confrontation. Treat each other’s strategic intentions objectively and reasonably, maintain partnership, not rivalry, handle contradictions and differences by dialog and cooperation, and not by clashes and confrontation. 一是不冲突、不对抗。就是要客观理性看待彼此战略意图，坚持做伙伴、不做对手；通过对话合作、而非对抗冲突的方式，妥善处理矛盾和分歧。 2. Mutual respect. That’s to respect each other’s chosen societal system and development path, each other’s core interests and major concerns, to seek common ground while reserving differences, show tolerance and learn from each other, and make progress together. 二是相互尊重。就是要尊重各自选择的社会制度和发展道路，尊重彼此核心利益和重大关切，求同存异，包容互鉴，共同进步。 3. Mutually beneficial cooperation. That’s to abandon zero-sum concepts, take the other’s benefit into account while seeking your own benefit, advance common development while pursuing your own development, and keep deepening the beneficial integrational pattern. 三是合作共赢。就是要摒弃零和思维，在追求自身利益时兼顾对方利益，在寻求自身发展时促进共同发展，不断深化利益交融格局。 Yang Jiechi said that concerning the implementation of the spirit of the new type of big-power relations, chairman Xi had advanced a four-point proposal: 杨洁篪说，关于如何将新型大国关系的精神贯彻到中美关系的方方面面，习主席提出了四点建议： 1. To raise the level of dialog and mutual trust, multilateral forums such as the G-20 meetings and APEC and all the other more than ninety inter-governmental forums should be used skillfully. 一要提升对话互信新水平，把两国领导人在二十国集团、亚太经合组织等多边场合会晤的做法机制化，用好现有90多个政府间对话沟通机制。 2. New fields of cooperation should be initiated. America should take active measures to ease restrictions on high-tech exports to China, to promote the structures of trade and investment between the two countries into a more balanced direction of development. 二要开创务实合作新局面，美方应在放宽对华高技术产品出口限制等问题上采取积极步骤，推动两国贸易和投资结构朝着更加平衡的方向发展。 3. To establish a new methodology of interaction between big powers, the two sides should maintain close coordination and cooperation on issues like the situation on the Korean peninsula, Afghanistan and other international and regional hotspot issues, and strengthen cooperation in combating sea piracy, transnational crime, peacekeeping, disaster relief and prevention, cybersecurity, climate change, space security and other fields of cooperaton. 三要建立大国互动新模式，双方应在朝鲜半岛局势、阿富汗等国际和地区热点问题上保持密切协调和配合，加强在打击海盗、跨国犯罪、维和、减灾防灾、网络安全、气候变化、太空安全等领域合作。 4. Explore new ways of managing and controlling differences, and actively build a new military relationship that corresponds with the new type of big-power relations. President Obama responded positively and said that America attaches great importance to American-Chinese relations, and that America wants to build a new pattern of cooperation between countries on the foundation of mutual benefit and mutual respect, and to jointly respond to global challenges. 四要探索管控分歧新办法，积极构建与中美新型大国关系相适应的新型军事关系。奥巴马总统对此作出了积极反应，表示美方高度重视美中关系，愿在互利互尊基础上与中方构建国与国之间新的合作模式，并共同应对各种全球性挑战。 Yang Jiechi said that in short, China hopes that China and America will make joint efforts to firmly and unwervingly advance the building of a new type of big-power relations, along the lines designated by the two countries’ leaders. 杨洁篪说，总之，中方希望中美双方共同努力，沿着两国元首指明的方向，坚定不移地推进新型大国关系建设。

Unharmonious First Lady?

Michelle Obama‘s absence from the American-Chinese summit in California was a diplomatic misstep, Daniel W. Drezner, a professor of international politics at  the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, argued on Foreign Policy  (behind a registration wall, possibly). Her absence was an own-goal, Drezner believes, because this was one of the rather few occasions where she could really have  mattered in the world of politics. Too many Chinese might be disappointed that America’s first lady didn’t meet up with China’s first lady, Peng Liyuan.

Reportedly, Mrs Obama wanted to stay in Washington, to celebrate the birthday of one of her daughters.

Isaac Stone Fish disagreed with Drezner’s criticism. He referred to the songs Peng used to sing in full PLA gear, and especially this song, where she pretended to be Tibetan, lauding the PLA for “liberating” Tibet.

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Related

» Domestic Responsibilities, SMH, June 7, 2013
» The only Disharmony, May 27, 2013

June 4, 1989: the Unsinkable Boat of Stone

Tiananmen Square has a meaning to China – not just Beijing – as deep as the Place de la Bastille‘s for Paris, or that of the Alexanderplatz for Berlin. On 400,000 square meters, Tiananmen Square – according to relevant tourist information – provides space for one million people. That’s how the square has been used – for gatherings ordered by the Chinese Communist Party, when Mao Zedong proclaimed the People’s Republic, for Hua Guofeng‘s eulogy on Mao Zedong in 1976, and for military parades celebrating the People’s Republic’s 35th, 50th, and 60th birthday.

In 1997, on Tiananmen Square, a limited number of people celebrated the return of Hong Kong. The limitation had conjecturable reasons – eight years and four weeks earlier, Chinese army and police troops had quashed a student movement – that movement, too, had its public center in Tiananmen Square.

Ever since 1911, Tiananmen Square had been a place for gatherings outside the scripts of the powers that be. The first, probably, was the May-Fourth movement, sparked by the transfer of formerly German possessions in Shandong Province to Japan, rather than to China, in 1919, after World War One. Chinese intellectuals had begun to perceive their country not just as a civilization, but as a nation, interacting with other nations and falling behind internationally. In 1919, there were no celebrations. There were protests.

The May-Fourth movement has since been canonized. CCP historians see the movement as the beginning of progressive processes during the first half of the 20th century, leading to the CCP’s rise to power. But even Hua Guofeng’s eulogy on Mao, in September 1976, had been preceded by expressions of grief months earlier, in April, for the late chief state councillor Zhou Enlai. The more radical followers of Mao Zedong considered that an affront.

Personal impressions from the 1976 “Tian An Men incident” apparently made Wu Renhua, later a dissident, honor Hu Yaobang with a wreath on Tiananmen Square, in April 1989. Hu Yaobang had just passed away, and some points seem to be noteworthy:

When Hu died, he had been removed as the CCP secretary general for more than two years. Apparently, the party leadership had considered him to be too reform-minded. Expressions of grief from the population might be considered an affront by the party leaders, too, and they probably did, even if it took more than six weeks for the party to put an end to the movement of intellectuals and students in  which Wu Renhua had been taking part.

By then, the movement had long gone beyond their original motivation of honoring Hu Yaobang. Through anti-corruption protest, it had turned into a movement for democracy.

Also, Wu Renhua, then an about thirty-three years old lecturer from the China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing, was part of the movement, but – according to his own account – rather going along with it, than driving it. His actual confrontational attitude towards the CCP  only built after the massacre – an outrage that he had never seemed to expect from his country’s leaders.

And even if the University of Political Science and Law played an important role in the 1989 movement, the Beijing University, the Beida, had the traditional, leading role.

Rivalries among the 1989 dissidents are nothing unusual today. Frequently, they are personal rather than political, accompanied by allegations that X is self-important, that Y is a CCP collaborator, or that Z is remote-controlled by Falun Gong – somehow unpredictable or dangerous.

June 4 has become an unsolved complex in Chinese history. Whoever studied in a major Chinese city in 1989 will know that complex. “Sure”, a Shanghainese told me in the early 1990s, “we were all protesting.” To her, however, the matter was closed with the end of the movement – ostensibly, anyway. Many Chinese people born after 1989 hardly know about the existence of the movement, and among those who do remember it, at least some consider the crackdown a rather lucky outcome: be it because they don’t think that the students were able to handle politics in 1989, be it because they see a foreign conspiracy against China’s stability and China’s rise behind the former movement.

By 2008, a trend had changed. Many Chinese people who used to feel respect for (Western) democracies had changed their mind. Frequently negative coverage by Western media on the Beijing Olympics certainly played a role here – the negative foreign echo was spread selectively, but broadly by Chinese media. Some overseas Chinese in Germany even organized a silent protest against the biased German media who had failed to spread their patriotic message and who had therefore muzzled them. Add how the mighty had fallen in the financial crisis – China’s period of growth still continued, thanks to state stimulus programs that tried to compensate for falling imports by Western economies. Criticism from abroad – that’s how the Chinese public was informed (frequently correctly) – was an expression of foreign envy. The ideas so vigorously discussed in 1989 have given way to the truculent nationalism of new generations, Isabel Hilton noted in 2009.

In 1990, Yang Lian (楊煉), a Chinese poet in exile, published this:

The darker the sky, you say that the boat is old,
the storms it bore are long gone,
it is for us to erase the Self, let the boat of stone rot away.¹⁾

That, of course, is the last thing a boat of stone will do.

What is the role of the 1989 dissidents today? According to C. A. Yeung, an Australian blogger and human rights activist, hardly any role. Dissidents abroad, above all, appear to be out of touch with many activists inside China. This may also be true for Wei Jingsheng, an exiled Chinese who lives in Washington D.C..

Wei wasn’t part of the 1989 movement. At the time, he had been a political prisoner for some ten years. He was only released in 1993, and soon, he was re-arrested. Since 1997, he has been in America.

It requires a strong – and at times probably dogmatic – personality to resist the pressures Wei faced. No confessions, no concessions to the Chinese authorities through all the years of imprisonment. To people like Wei, “foreign interference” in China’s “internal affairs” is no sacrilege, but necessity. Such “interference” may not create space to live for open dissidents in totalitarian countries, but it does, at times, enable dissidents to survive. In that light, it was only logical that Wei attended a hearing of the German federal parliament’s culture and media committee on December 2008, about the alleged proximity of Germany’s foreign broadcaster’s Chinese department (Deutsche Welle, DW)  to the CCP. DW Staff and program should defend human rights and democracy as a matter of principle, Wei demanded.

It turned out that Wei didn’t actually know the DW programs, jeered Xinhua newsagency.  Wei didn’t disagree: “As a matter of fact, I have said from earlier on that I would not listen to the broadcast of the Deutsche Welle’s Chinese service that has been speaking on the CCP’s behalf.”

Such appearances in foreign parliaments may appear fussy, and near-irrelevant. But in 2002, Dutch author and exile observer Ian Buruma had still believed that Chinese dissidents abroad could play a big role:

Let’s say there are suddenly serious splits in the Chinese government. Things start to move rather quickly. All kinds of things are going to happen. And then, it can be that you suddenly need people who know how to operate in Washington, who know which buttons to press and [who] have contacts in Congress, and so on. And this has happened in the case of Taiwan, for example, where you had dissidents in the 60s and 70s who hung around, languished, were considered to be irrelevant until things began to change in Taiwan politically and suddenly, they were important.²⁾

But maybe, by now, that role has diminuished further – if Buruma’s original observations were correct. Maybe Wei Jingsheng and other dissidents, among them those who had to leave China after June 4, 1989, will play a role similar to the one Wolf Biermann, an East German exile in West Germany, anticipated for himself long before the Berlin Wall came down: at times cheering from the sidelines, providing advice once in a while, but hardly authoritatively. Only on his return to East Germany, Biermann mused, his actual exile would begin, as hardly anyone would recognize him: Dann beginnt erst mein Exil.

The actual historical events of spring 1989 are a different story, however. These days, the CCP neither condemns the events, nor does it condone them. The topic is entirely shunned.

In Hong Kong, people haven’t forgotten. After all, the June-4 crackdown came as a shock for a society that was to return to the motherland eight years and a month later. June 4 is part of tradition there. For many Hong Kong activists who demand more democratic rights for Hong Kongers themselves, solidarity with mainland activists or dissidents is part of their self-image.

The only official evaluation so far: Deng Xiaoping defends his reform policies of economic openness and political repression, June 9, 1989 (click picture for video)

In 1995, Deng Xiaoping‘s daughter Deng Rong suggested in an interview with the New York Times  that only later generations could judge the 1989 events. She didn’t know how people thought about it – but my father at least, in his heart, believed that he had no other way.

It may take years before a re-evaluation of the 1989 movements may begin. Or it may only take months. The CCP could initiate one if it feels strong enough, or the citizenry could initiate one if the party gets weaker.

Nobody inside or outside China knows what is being thought about the movement. And many Chinese may only find out what they think once it becomes a topic – when it gets unearthed, gradually or rapidly, in a controlled or spontaneous process.

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Notes

¹⁾ Yang Lian: Alte Geschichten (I-IV), Der einzige Hafen des Sommers, aus: Masken und Krokodile, Berlin, Weimar 1994, quoted by Joachim Sartorius (Hrsg): Atlas der Neuen Poesie, Reinbek, 1996, S. 67.
天空更加阴暗  你说  这船老了
一生运载的风暴都已走远
该卸下自己了  让石头船舷去腐烂
夏季  是惟一的港口

²⁾ Jatinder Verma: Asian Diasporas, BBC (World Service), Sept 2, 2002

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The Weeks before June 4: Deng Xiaoping’s remarks and the April-26 Editorial

« Previous translation/rendition: Struggling for the Ideological Switch Stands

For all previous instalments, see this table.

Most or all of the party-insider information used by Wu Renhua seems to be based on “Li Peng’s diary”. There seems to be wide-spread agreement that the diary – becoming known in 2010 – was authentic. However, even if it is, one needs to ask if Li’s own account of the run-up to the massacre of June 3/4 1989 is accurate. Probably, these are questions only the party archives could answer – JR

Tuesday, April 25, 1989

Main Link: 1989 年 4 月 24 日 星期日

About 60,000 students at 43 colleges and universities in Beijing continue the strike on lessons. (On April 24, 38 colleges and universities were involved.) At some colleges and universities, wall papers promoting the students’ movement continue to emerge.

At 3 p.m., the Beijing University Preparatory Committee publishes a notice: eight out of the university’s 27 faculties have set up branch committees, and the preparatory committee has conducted re-elections, with Kong Qingdong (孔庆东), Wang Chiying (王池英), Feng Congde (封从德), Wang Dan (王丹), and Shen Tong (沈彤) as new members. “The new preparatory committee will have decision-making authority, and temporarily take the lead of the students union.”

The Beijing University students union has established contact with more than 32 other colleges and universities in Beijing. Chairman Zhou Yongjun says that three demands have been issued to the government:

• official dialog with the state council, based on delegations (or representation)
• a public apology for the Xinhua Gate incident and punishment for the perpetrators
• truthful domestic media coverage about the students movement.

At nine in the morning, at his home, Deng Xiaoping listens to Li Peng’s, Yang Shangkun’s, Qiao Shi’s, Hu Qili’s, Yao Yilin’s, Li Ximing’s, Chen Xitong’s and others’ reports. The meeting ends before 11 a.m.. After the meeting, Yang Shangkun stays with Deng for discussions.

Deng agrees with the politburo standing committee’s and the broader politbureau meetings’ decisions, and requires the central committee and the state council to establish two teams – one to focus on dealing with the unrest, and one to get hold of the routine work. Deng says that before, the talk had been about managing the economic environment, but now, there was a need to manage the political environment.

Deng believes the students movement isn’t a normal agitation (or strike), but a political unrest. Attention needs to be paid to avoiding bloodspills, but it will be hard to avoid it completely. In the end, it could be necessary to arrest a batch of people. The “People’s Daily”, in accordance with the spirit of what Deng said, writes in its editorial on April 26¹⁾ that “we must oppose the unrest with a clear and distinct stand” (more literally: under a bright banner).

On Li Peng’s proposal, Zeng Jianhui (曾建徽) drafts the editorial, and after authorization by Hu Qili and Li Peng, it is decided that the editorial shall be aired this evening at 7 p.m., by Central People’s Broadcasting Station (CPBS) and on CCTV’s main newscast Xinwen Lianbo.

Delegations from all colleges and universities in Beijing discuss the prospects of the students movement at the Autonomous Federation’s meeting, held at the University of Political Science and Law, at 7 p.m.., and determining a draft for a national people’s program. At the time of the meeting, the April-26 editorial is aired, on which countermeasures are discussed. The editorial leads to a tense atmosphere, and one student leader says that the danger is understood, and that the work to defend the dormitories needs to be strengthened.

At about 18:45, some three- to four thousand students of the People’s University (Renmin University) arrive at the China Youth University for Political Sciences, at Beifang Jiaotong University, at the Academy of Nationalities  (i. e. national minorities, 中央民族学院 – frequently referred to as the Minzu University of China), and the Beijing Foreign Studies University (actually: foreign-languages university, formerly an academy, 北京外语学院, now 北京外国语大学) to support the strikes, and also to strongly oppose the April-26 editorial. 21:40, the protesters leave the China Youth University for Political Sciences, originally planning to go to Beijing Normal University, but they are intercepted by nearly 800 police. At 21:02, more two thousand students from the People’s (Renmin) University, the Minzu University of China, and other universities are protesting around the universities, oppose the April-26 editorial, saying that the editorial confuses right and wrong (颠倒是非) and that “action must continue”. Some students are shouting a slogan: “Oppose repressions against the student movement”.

At 23:00, the Capital Autonomous Federation of University Students (北高联) issues a notice: “On April 27, the entire city will demonstrate unitedly and converge on Tian An Men Square”, to oppose the April-26 editorial.

At 23:00, the Beijing University (Students) Preparatory Committee (北大筹委会 / 北大学生筹委会) holds a press conference at the Beijing University No. 1 Teaching Building (北京大学第一教学楼), and Kong Qingdong, who is hosting the conference, announces that “the Beijing University Preparatory Committee is neither anti-party nor anti-constitutional; it is here to promote the progress of democracy [or democratization].” He also spells out three conditions for the students’ return to the classrooms:

1. dialog with the government
2. an accurate explanation of the 4-20 incident [see here, Wang Zhiyong] and
3. a press law.

In a brief meeting at 15:00, Li Peng convenes a brief meeting of the standing committee of the politbureau and communicates Deng Xiaoping’s remarks. Yang Shangkun attends as a non-voting participant. The standing committee believes that Deng Xiaoping’s remarks are absolutely important and should be communicated to the lower ranks right away. It is decided that first, it shall be passed on  within the “system of the big three” (三大系统) – to the central committee, to the state council, and to all cadres above vice-ministerial level in the Beijing municipal government, including the transcript of Deng’s remarks today, and the standing committee’s records from the meeting in the evening on April 24.

Wen Jiabao’s instructions to the General Office of the CCP  to communicate the standing committee’s records from the meeting in the evening on April 24, and to promptly arrange Deng Xiaoping’s remarks, are the foundation of communications. Toward the evening, Wen gives Li Peng a phonecall asking for instructions if some sensitive issues in Deng Xiaoping’s remarks should be kept out of the communication at first. To reduce possible vulnerabilities and to get as many points to ralley the comrades around, Li Peng agrees.

The quantity of propaganda material explaining “the situation in Beijing” is growing. At Fudan University, Tongji University, Jiaotong University, and many other universities and colleges, wall newspapers, photos or leaflets emerge, mainly about “the real story of the 4-20 incident” and “the whole story about the 4-21 demonstrations” , and “100,000 students’ peaceful petition” etc..

The rate of students who show up for classes is diminuishing in Tianjin’s major universities, and about one third of students are on strike. There are calls for supporting the students in Beijing. Eighty-seven young teachers at Nankai University put up slogans: “Support the Students’ Strike!”

In the afternoon, the “Jilin Declaration” from Jilin University emerges, with the full wording: “The fate of our nation is the responsibility of everyone. Beijing University has arisen, so has Nankai University, all students are pleading in the name of the people – how can the people of Jilin University stand by and watch? Arise, people of Jilin University. Political corruption, maldistribution, economic chaos, outmoded education and the nation in peril, when will be the time!

Wall newspapers in some universities in Xi’an, Changsha and other places also refute the “People’s Daily” editorial, calling it “a pack of lies”, as the students’ actions were not a political struggle, but a demand for democracy. Some Xi’an students distribute mimeographed leaflets, calling for a demonstration on Xincheng Square on Sunday.

At the Central South University of Technology (中南工业大学) in Changsha, Hunan Province, the chairpeople of seven faculties who prepared a meeting at 21:00 to adopt measures and to support the students of Beijing to escalate the situation, are stopped by the university’s related departments.

The traffic regulations that had been in effect since the 4-22 riots at Xincheng Square, the center of the riots, were lifted at 00:00 today. Large numbers of armed police are leaving the square, but some police are guarding the entrances of the provincial government. The authorities have also ordered a batch of helmeted troops from the people’s Liberation Army 49 Army from their base, twenty kilometers outside Xi’an, into the square.

According to a “People’s Daily” report, 98 people were arrested in the riots of Changsha in the evening on April 22, among them 32 workers, peasants who work in Changsha as migrant workers, six six self-employed/small-business owners (getihu), 28 socially idle people²⁾, six students (five of them middle school students and one of them a secondary specialized or technical school student).

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Notes

¹⁾ In a partial chronology of 20th century China, Tian’anmen Square TV provides a translation of the April-26 editorial.
²⁾ A stronger translation would be riff-raff.

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To be continued

The Weeks before June 4: Struggling for the Ideological Switch Stands

[Cont. April 23, 1911

Main Link: 1989 年 4 月 24 日 星期日

Li Tieying and Li Ximing both agree with Li Peng that strict measures should be taken against the students' movement. At 8.30 in the evening, Li Peng goes to see Yang Shangkun to analyse the situation. Yang also sees a changing trend and encourages Li Peng to see Deng Xiaoping. Li Peng asks Yang to join him in a visit to Deng, and Yang agrees. During the evening, as Li Peng reads many papers and adds  comments to them, and a flow of public-security bureau, security, education commission staff etc, concerning trends among the students in all places keeps coming in, by phone and cable.

Science and Technology Daily's entering into the forbidden area of coverage receives a great echo, and from the morning on, people call this paper to tell the staff that they had written in fair words. However, vice chief editor Sun Changjiang says that they haven't done something special, and just acted in accordance with professional ethics, in their effort to carry out their duty as the media. Their [Science and Technology Daily] coverage hadn’t been particularly good; rather, he believes, that of some other papers has been particularly bad. The event is authentic, and their attitude is sincere.

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Monday, April 24, 1989

Main Link: 1989 年 4 月 24 日 星期一 (same document)

In the morning, sixty-thousand students from some 38 colleges and universities such as Beijing University, Tsinghua University, People’s University (Renmin University) begin a strike. Some students gather within the universities, conduct sit-ins, demonstrations, put up posters, and others shout slogans like “join the strike quickly”, “no end to the strike without reaching our goals”, and “walk out on lessons and exams, not on learning”.

Some students give lectures on societal issues, put up propaganda sheets, propagate “April 20 massacre”, “crying-and-begging to the non-understanding government” information, and still others take to the streets and lanes, for fund-raising and to call on “all the city’s citizens to become active in strikes”. Students from Beijing University, Tsinghua University and People’s University maintain order, and dissuade students from taking part in lessons. Some university party secretaries point out in reports to the next-upper party level that the current situation, if it lasts, will be absolutely harmful, and that one has to fear that this could take still larger dimensions as May 4 is approaching. They express their hopes that the central committee and the municipal committee issue clear guidelines, policies and instructions to end the strikes as soon as possible.

At 14:40, student committees at Beijing University and other universities hold meetings at the May-4 squares on their campuses, with some eighty percent of students attending. They prepare activities to boycott official May-4 activities and to establish autonomous students unions in Beijing and students unions of national unity all over the country. Some papers report that student delegates from Nankai University,  Nanjing University, Fudan University, Guangzhou University and other universities are also attending. Nearly two-hundred students with red armbands are maintaining order. As several members of students committees publicly push and pull each other on stage in a quarrel twice, more than six-thousand students at the meeting are abuzz. The meeting ends at 16:00 in discord, without having made any decisions. Dozens of foreign reporters have been present and recorded the event. A press conference by the preparatory committee, scheduled for 7 p.m., is subsequently cancelled.

Beijing University posts the “Recommendations to the Preparatory Committee, signed by people from Beijing University” poster, suggesting to redraw the slogans and action principles in order to get public support. The slogans should oppose corruption and bureaucracy, actions should be carried out downtown, at broad daylight, so as to broaden their influence, unified action would be needed between the universities and colleges, preparations be made for a long-term struggle, and extensive contacts be built with people from intellectual and democratic circles.

There is also another poster, under the headline “five points”, about “guaranteeing basic human rights, releasing political criminals, opposing party supremacy, checks and balances by separation of the three powers, defining a democratic constitution” and other political positions.

More than twohundred Beijing University teachers jointly call for maintaining the principles of the thirteen universities to consult the students and to have a dialog with them. A similar call comes from the China University of Political Science and Law [Wu Renhua's university]. The Beijing Students Autonomous Federation (aka Capital Autonomous Federation of University Students) calls on every student to send ten letters to compatriots all over the country. Between two- and threehundred students are to be dispatched to fifteen large cities all over the nation, such as Tianjin, Jinan, Shenyang, Changsha, Chengdu, Xi’an, Lanzhou, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Guangzhou, Taiyuan, Shanghai, Nanjing and Wuhan  to deliver speeches and to make contacts.

A peaceful petition meeting at Tsinghua University started a peaceful demonstration within the campus, at eight in the morning, with about ten thousand students participating. It’s an orderly demonstration with a length reaching two kilometers.

The Tsinghua University Students Council puts forward four principles concerning the students’ strike:

1. to maintain the reasonable struggle and the peaceful petition
2. to maintain unity and the power of all that can be united
3. to adhere to the strike on lessons, not on learning
4. to make sure that cool heads prevail among the younger students.

Educational departments from all over the country give their reactions to the State Education Commission, expressing their hope that the situation at Beijing’s universities and colleges can be stabilized soon, as it would otherwise be difficult to control the situation at universities outside the capital.

In the evening, Ren Wanding, who was responsible for the “Human Rights Alliance” time of the Xidan Democracy Wall, speaks on Tian An Men Square. He says: “the people are destitute, robbers arise from everywhere, prices are soaring, and the national economy is in crisis. If the four cardinal principles don’t vanish from the constitution, they will keep hanging over the people’s interests.”

Ren Wanding has also been to the universities of Beijing to speak there, but without much response, as the students didn’t understand him, and because they felt that his views were radical. When Chen Xiaoping and I watched him speaking in front of the dormitory of the University of Political Science and Law, there was only a sparse audience. Both Chen and I felt saddened.

In the afternoon, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong report to National People’s Congress chairman Wan Li. Wan Li was Beijing’s vice mayor prior to the cultural revolution. He suggests that the politburo’s standing committee should analyse the situation in the evening, chaired by Li Peng.

[According to this account by Wu Renhua, this meeting was held on the evening of April 24. This source seems to suggest that this happened on April 23.]

The standing committee, chaired by Li Peng, believes that a variety of events are indicating that under the control and instigation of very few people,  a planned, organized anti-party, anti-socialist political struggle is arranged before their eyes. The decision is made to form a group tasked with stopping the unrest, and requires Beijing’s party and government to stabilize the situation quickly, by winning over the majority of the masses and by isolating the minority, and by calming down the unrest. Standing committe member Li Peng, Qiao Shi, Hu Qili, Yao Yilin, as well as  – with no voting rights – Yang Shangkun, Wan Li, central party secretary Rui Xingwen, Yan Mingfu, Wen Jiabao, (not standing) politburo members Tian Jiyun, Li Ximing, Song Ping, Ding Guangen as well as people in charge at the relevant departments are attending the meeting.

In the evening, Li Peng receives a phonecall from Deng Xiaoping‘s secretary Wang Ruilin, inviting Li Peng and Yang Shangkun to his home at ten a.m. next day for discussions.

The World Economic Herald, a weekly from Shanghai, normally scheduled to appear today, has six blocks of content from a memorial forum held in cooperation with the New Observer magazine (新观察) on April 19. The 25 participants spoke highly of Hu Yaobang’s humanness, as a person of democratic open-mindedness [or liberalism - 民主开明], and of deep humanity. Science and Technology Daily vice chief editor Sun Changjiang [see above, entering into the forbidden area of coverage], Guangming Daily‘s reporter Dai Qing, and Yan Jiaqi of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences political science institute state more clearly that Hu Yaobang was forced to resign, and that he died while being treated unfairly. 300,000 copies of the World Economic Herald were printed by Saturday, some of it already at the post offices, while the remainder is stored at the printing house. But when Shanghai’s municipal party committee is informed about some of the content, it orders the postal offices to stop the dispatch of the papers, and seals the remaining copies in the printing house off. In the afternoon, the CCP municipal committee has a meeting with World Economic Herald chief editor Qin Benli in the afternoon, telling him that what is said in the account of the forum is correct, but that, as May 4 comes nearer, they fear that this could stirr the students’ emotions, add to the pressure on the government, and express their hope that the more sensitive content will be removed. The World Economic Herald does not agree with the cuts and revisions.

At the time, the World Economic Review’s Beijing office is the meeting point for democratic and liberal personalities. The office director Zhang Weiguo has strong campaigning skills and is broadly connected. Because of having led the [memorial] forum and for other reasons, he will be arrested after the June-4 crackdown.

To be continued
Continued here »

The Weeks before June 4, 1989

May 4 is now behind us – the day when official China remembers how the young stood up for a better and stronger nation. June 4 is ahead – the 24th anniversary of the Tian An Men massacre. I will try to continue a rough translation of an account by Wu Renhua, a former China University of Political Science and Law professor, who tweeted his account in 2011.

Translations so far – dates to the right refer to the day of translation, and not to the day in history:

The Weeks before June 4, 1989	April 17, 2012
The Weeks before June 4: Wu Renhua’s Introduction	April 18, 2012
The Weeks before June 4 – a Desire to do Better than in 1987	April 19, 2012
The Weeks before June 4 – Towards the Sun	April 26, 2012
The Weeks before June 4 – a Trip to North Korea	April 28, 2012
The Weeks before June 4 – Asserting Authority	April 29, 2012
The Weeks before June 4 – Hu Yaobang’s Funeral	April 30, 2012
The Weeks before June 4 – Role Allocations	May 5, 2012

I started translating Wu’s story in 2012. I didn’t manage translating all of Wu’s account (not even close), and I won’t achieve a complete translation this time either. But I’ll deliver some more instalments this year, and maybe another batch in 2014.

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Related

» Xi: Open the Skies for the Young, May 5, 2013

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Continued here »

Xi Jinping on Youth Day: “Open the Skies for the Young”

Chinese chief of party and state Xi Jinping spoke to outstanding young people from all walks of life at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation‘s (中国航天科技集团公司) China Academy of Space Technology (中国空间技术研究院) on Saturday. Among China’s English-language media, China Daily, sina.com, and the All-China Women’s Federation website cover the event.

Main Link: Xi Jinping holds a forum with outstanding youth representatives from all walks of life (习近平同各界优秀青年代表座谈)
Links within the following blockquotes were added during translation.

Xinhua (via CCTV), May 4, 2013:

On the occasion of Youth Day, CCP Central Committee Secretary General, State Chairman and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping came to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation’s Academy of Space Technology on May 4 and took part in a community activity under the theme of “Realizing the Chinese Dream, the Young assume their tasks”, talked with representatives of outstanding young people from all walks of life and gave an important speech, and, on behalf of the Central Committee, extended greetings on the occasion of Youth Day.

新华网北京5月4日电 五四青年节到来之际，中共中央总书记、国家主席、中央军委主席习近平4日来到中国航天科技集团公司中国空间技术研究院，参加“实现中国梦、青春勇担当”主题团日活动，同各界优秀青年代表座谈并发表重要讲话，代表党中央向全国广大青年致以节日问候。

Xi emphasized that the young are most vigorous and idealistic, that the country rose with the rise of the young, and that the country was strong when the young were strong. The staunch ideals and convictions of the young, their abilities to pass the hardest tests, their courage to innovate and to create, their hard and persevering work, their strong and high-minded characters, their vivid dream of realizing the take-off of the China dream would write a splendid new chapter in the bookof the unremitting struggle in the people’s interest.

习近平强调，青年最富有朝气、最富有梦想，青年兴则国家兴，青年强则国家强。广大青年要坚定理想信念，练就过硬本领，勇于创新创造，矢志艰苦奋斗，锤炼高尚品格，在实现中国梦的生动实践中放飞青春梦想，在为人民利益的不懈奋斗中书写人生华章。

At 9:30 in the morning, Xi Jinping arrived at the China Academy of Space Technology’s exhibition hall and viewed the exhibition of space technology achievements. On seeing that the secretary general had arrived, some of the outstanding young representatives who were also viewing the exhibition gathered around him, and Xi Jinping smiled and shook hands with one of them after another.

上午9时30分许，习近平来到中国空间技术研究院展厅，参观空间技术成就展。看到总书记来了，正在参观的部分优秀青年代表围了过来，习近平微笑着和大家一一握手。

CCTV coverage, with about the same wording as the Xinhua article – click picture for video.

The Xinhua article continues to set the scene for another while, describing how Xi Jinping closely listens to explanatons or introductions in front of the exhibits and having discussions with young technical or academic leaders. The average age of the Chang’e team and the Shenzhou team was 33; that of the Beidou system team was 35;  that of the Dongfang-Hong-4 team [a 1967 project] had been 29; that of a satellite application team was 28, Xi Jinping hears with great pleasure, pointing out that the hope for technological innovation is placed on the young.

The article then lists participants from different places and companies or authorities, from a petrochemical welding pioneer (中国石油第一建设公司第三工程处313工程队电焊技师裴先锋) to a party branch secretary from Inner Mongolia (内蒙古自治区新巴尔虎右旗克尔伦苏木芒来嘎查党支部书记), and military officers.

About 806 out of the article’s 1878 words are reserved for an account of Xi Jinping’s actual speech, basically centering around the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. It is carefully crafted and meant to enthuse the youth delegates who are attending. But there is also some space for the interest of the individual:

Xi Jinping pointed out that all along, the party represented the young, won the young over, relied on the young, all along attached great importance to the young, showed care for the young, and trusted the young. Facing the future, leaders and cadres from all levels of the party and the government needed to make further efforts to pay attention to the aspirations of the young, to help the young develop, to support them starting businesses, to open the skies even wider for the galopping ideas of the young (青年驰骋思想) and a still wider platform for their innovative work, more opportunities for shaping their lives, and more favorable conditions.

习近平指出，我们党始终代表青年、赢得青年、依靠青年， 始终重视青年、关怀青年、信任青年。面向未来，各级党委、政府和领导干部要进一步关注青年愿望、帮助青年发展、支持青年创业，为青年驰骋思想打开更浩瀚的 天空，为青年实践创新搭建更广阔的舞台，为青年塑造人生提供更丰富的机会，为青年建功立业创造更有利的条件。

[...]

Prior to the forum, Xi Jinping had a cordial meeting with the participating outstanding youth representatives from all walks of life and had keepsake photos taken with them.

座谈会前，习近平亲切会见了参加座谈会的各界优秀青年代表并合影留念。

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Related

» In space, the possibilities are endless, Ronald Reagan Radio Address, July 21, 1984
» May-4 Youth Day, Wikipedia, acc. 20130505
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No “Troublemaker”: Ma meets Búcaro, advocates Conflict Resolution

Leonel Búcaro, president of the Central American Parliament (Parlacen), met with Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou on Tuesday. Radio Taiwan International (RTI) quotes Ma as saying that he had always advocated peaceful resolution of international conflicts, no matter if cross-strait relations (i. e. relations with China), or a fisheries agreement with Japan, was the issue. He would continue to promote international peace and cooperation under the the premise of putting aside disagreements and creating mutual benefit (擱置爭議、共創雙贏).  It had been this attitude which had turned the Taiwan Strait, once a point of conflict, into a road of peace and prosperity, and a place very different from the Korean peninsula’s current status, Ma said.

President Ma also referred to a proposal he said he had issued last year in August, suggesting that mainland China, Japan and Taiwan could have separate bilateral consultations to lower tensions and promote common development of resources in the East China Sea. Ma cited the Japanese-Taiwanese fisheries agreement of earlier this month as an example of how to make sure that fishing vessels from both sides wouldn’t interfere with each other, without affacting either side’s sovereignty.

He also expressed great gratitude and admiration (非常感佩) for the Central American Parliament’s support for his East China Sea initiative (a resolution passed in February), and support for Taiwanese participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization (a resolution passed in March), in activities of the UN United Nations Framework Convention on Climate, and Taiwanese participation in international affairs in general.

Búcaro and his delegation arrived in Taiwan on April 28 for a six-day visit, according to Taiwan’s state newsagency CNA. He is a member of El Salvadors left-wing FMLN party and was elected last October for a one-year term. The Central American Parliament was established in Guatemala-City in 1991. According to Parlacen, its twenty direct representatives are directly elected from Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Panama and the Dominican Republic, and the former presidents and vice presidents of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and the Dominican Republic are also members. It is yet to achieve the goals it would take to make it a real parliament; its objective is to realize the integration of the Central American countries. [...] The parliamentary groups reflect the ideological lines of the members of the Central American Parliament and are organized according to the political orientation of their parties.

Búcaro’s delegation includes members from all six Parlacen member states. They were also scheduled to meet Taiwanese foreign ministry officials including deputy foreign minister Simon Ko (柯森耀), legislative-yuan speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平), environmental protection officials, and other officials.

El Salvador is one of currently 22 UN member states (plus the Vatican state) who maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taiwan, along with Mexico, Venezuela, and Puerto Rico, is an observation state to Parlacen.

Taiwan’s military academy (Republic of China Military Academy, ROCMA) trains military from diplomatic allies. In 2010, this included trainees from El Salvador.  Such exchange programs play a contributing role in cementing diplomatic ties with our allies, Taiwan Today, a ministry of foreign affairs magazine, quoted then ROCMA superintendent Chuan Tzu-jui (全子瑞) in October 2010. Michael E. Allison, a researcher of Central American affairs, didn’t come across much about the Salvadorian-Taiwanese military relationship at the time, but noticed that [i]t doesn’t appear that El Salvador’s relationship with Taiwan (rather than China) has caused any trouble within the FMLN (i. e. Búcaro’s party), which has been in government in El Salvador since 2009.

Not much can be found online about Taiwan’s role in El Salvador’s civil war either, but if Taipei clearly took sides at the time (which doesn’t seem unlikely),  even at home, the incumbent president reportedly disavowed any plans to judge his party’s enemies from the country’s civil war. Either way, political allegiance at home doesn’t seem to define dedication to foreign allies. When Ma Ying-jeou visited El Salvador in summer 2009 to attend the FMLN president-elect Mauricio Funes‘ inauguration, he also met with outgoing president Antonio Saca who is a member of the ARENA party, a party founded by a death-squad leader, Roberto d’Aubuisson. Saca was reportedly late for his meeting with Ma, and cut the scheduled meeting short. According to the Taipei Times, Saca had been close to former president Chen Shui-bian.

On Monday, president Ma, at an event to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the “Wang-Koo summit”, vowed [..] that his government would not seek or promote independence from the mainland, according to the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

“We will not push for ‘two Chinas, one China, one Taiwan’, or Taiwan’s independence, within or outside” Taiwan, he said at an event in Taipei marking the 20th anniversary of the “Wang-Koo summit”.

In an interview with the BBC‘s Rachel Harvey, in 2011, Ma said that we do not want to be a troublemaker. We want to be an enabler of peace. It seems that this has remained his constant tune in meetings with foreigners, officials or not.
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Related

» Advocate medical parole for Chen Shui-bian, Carribean News Now, April 30, 2013
» 萨尔瓦多外交部竟三次称“台湾共和国”, Huanqiu Shibao, June 2, 2009

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