Two Difficult Choices: a Festive Barbecue in North Korea, and the Missile Failure’s potential Influence on North Korean Preference Falsification

The Respected Comrade doesn't intend to leave. He is only taking a 90-seconds break.

Main Link: UDN, Singapore

A backup copy will probably remain available on this Australian website (Chinese Newspaper Group), once Zaobao /UDN take their article offline (they usually remove their online articles after a few days).

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The failed launch of a missile spells a blow for North Korea’s new leader, Kim Jong-un, Singapore’s United Morning News (UDN, Lianhe Zaobao) quotes Chinese scholars, but not a big crisis for the regime. However, China was once again facing two difficult choices, concerning North Korea. The leaders in Pyongyang hadn’t invited so many foreign news people merely because they had been absolutely certain that the launch would be successful, the paper quotes Central Party School’s North Korea expert Zhang Liangui (张链瑰 or 张琏瑰). Another motivation had been to have the foreign press gathered in North Korea at Kim Il-sung’s 100th-birthday ballyhoo(or publicity event). The failed launch didn’t make the regime look good on the surface, but the propaganda machine could still explain to the domestic public that objective factors such as weather conditions were the cause to this, they could still solemnly commemorate Kim Sung-il’s 100th birtday, and even announce another nuclear test and similar measures to inspire the masses. The UN security council would not necessarily pass a resolution to condemn and sanction North Korea, but issue a statement by the president of the security council, condemning the launch of a long-range missile, instead, UDN quotes Zhang. But China was once again facing a difficult situation, as the U.S., Japan, South Korea and others would strongly advocate a security council resolution that would condemn and sanction North Korea. The issue of which China was to adopt had moved into the focus, and the North Korean issue was therefore turning into an issue of China’s attitude.

One choice was that China would support a resolution draft from the U.S. and Japan, which would earn Beijing praise from the West, but offend North Korea; the second was to use its veto power, which would, in Western eyes, gradually turn China into a supporter of North Korea’s extreme behavior, and a representative of North Korea’s interest which would add to diplomatic and military pressure on China, thus gradually deteriorating the environment for China’s diplomacy; and thirdly, and most likely,  Beijing could advocate a statement by the president of the security council, which, however, wouldn’t curry favor with either side.

No matter if a resolution or a security-council presidential statement condemned North Korea, Pyongyang could react furiously, and even carry ot another nuclear test.  If China kept to its established North-Korea policy, or make some adjustments, wasn’t just a matter of diplomatic and foreign policy, according to Zhang, but also a domestic issue [in China].

Huanqiu Net (Huanqiu Shibao online) is quoted by UDN as in turn quoting Liaoning Academy of Social Sciences researcher and North and South Korea Research Center director Lü Chaoshuo (吕超说) as saying that North Korea’s missile launch was a mudded provocation [or, depending on translation, trick, or move], and its [technical] failure had been no great surprise. Progress that had previously been made in North Korean and American relations, and to some extent in Pyongyang’s relations with Europe, too, and which had led to some easing in Northeast Asia, had been reset to zero by the missile launch. It [the launch, apparently], hadn’t been worth the loss [of these achievements].

Also, just as North Korea’s new regime had been established and as everything had been waiting to be improved, considerable energy and funding had been used by the regime to launch the missile. Given the technological limits, the failure had been quite likely. This failure could, of course, influence the North Korean citizens negatively, and from that perspective, North Korea had been unwise.  It should rather focus on rebuilding and stabilizing the country and society.

The Lü quote would contradict the North Korean regime’s own priorities, which would be quite the reverse, if an unnamed Yonsei professor indirectly quoted by S. C. Denney in this Sino-NK commenter thread is right:

[H]e said that because appeasing the military and satisfying the people’s demand for food, energy and a stable economy are mutually exclusive, Kim Jong-un’s inability to satisfy the latter will be his biggest problem (and potential downfall) in the short-term.

Denney’s own view – differing from the academic whose views he extensively describes in his post which lead to the commenter thread, is that North Korea isn’t really unstable. But for some (counter)revolutionary scenarios more in general, he  also linked to a mathemetical explanation of how people make up their minds between the status quo, or revolution – and how many of them may have previously feigned preference for the status quo, owing to preference falsification. Obviously, given that neither the numbers of open dissidents nor the share of preference falsification among status-quo supporters can be measured, that is no tool to forecast revolution or change.

On April 10, Huanqiu had quoted Zhang Liangui (the party school professor quoted at the beginning of this post) as asking if China needed to resist North Korea if it chose to Pyongyang indeed launched the missile. The article therefore came three days ahead of the atual launch. China’s diplomacy was to be roasted in the resulting tensions between North Korea and its opponents, Zhang suggested.

That had been a galvanizing article last week, Adam Cathcart, also on Sino-NK, noted on Friday. Zhang had described five scenarios in which China, North Korea and all other stakeholders taking different steps to handle the launch, all of them creating different constellations – but in neither of those, China would escape the barbecue.

Zhang’s five barbies have apparently since – after the launch – boiled down to two difficult choices, if the above UDN article quoted him correctly.

Meantime, South Korean warships have searched the failed missiles’ debris in the Yellow Sea, probably to steal the technology.

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Related

» Vows of Loyalty, ABC News, April 14, 2012
» Obama: Not really good at it, Telegraph, Apr 14, 2012
» Say it through the Papers, Dec 25, 2010

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Taiwan’s Legal Status

If you are discussing Taiwan’s legal status, don’t miss this article by Jerome A. Cohen, first published by the South China Morning Post, and with  a pdf of a China Times translation into Chinese (fantizi).

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Related

» Fully Understood, July 27, 2010
» Reality Check, May 24, 2010

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Delighting in Rain on a Spring Night: Soft Power Starts at Home

The following are an unofficial paper (本站内容未经许可) by a Soft-Power study group at Beijing University (北京大学软实力课题组), published by Renmin Wang (People’s Daily website) on September 16, 2009).

Links within blockquotes added during translation. Main Link: http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/166866/166886/10068388.html

Translated off the reel, and posted right away – if you see inconsistencies or mistakes in the following post, let me know, and we can take another look at the original.

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Low Cultural Development, Lacking Propagation Abroad (文化发展水平低，对外传播不足)

Owing to the low starting point of China’s cultural development, even though it is currently pushed ahead at a faster pace, its attractiveness is still extremely limited.

由于中国文化发展的起点太低，尽管当前推进速度比较快，但是吸引力还是极其有限的。

When it comes to languages, China shows a deficit in its exchange with the West. In 2003, Gordon Brown, Britain’s chancellor of the exchequer at the time, said that while Britain imported electric household appliances, textiles, and other goods from China, this could be balanced with the English language. The value of English teaching as an export item has risen from 6.5 billion British Pounds to 103  10.3 billion [update: within five years], or about one per cent of Britain’s GDP. As for Britain, it is evident that Chinese language education is hardly worth mentioning. Not only can’t it be compared with its exports of goods, but there is no need to talk about it competing with the Export of British English.

在语言方面，中国和西方的交流处于严重逆差状态。2003年，英国当时的财政大臣布朗来中国时说，英国从中国进口的越来越多的家电、服装和其他东西可以用出口的一样东西来平衡，这就是英语。英语教学作为一项出口项目，它的价值在5年里已经从65亿英镑增加到了103亿英镑，大约占英国GDP的1%。可见，对英国来说，中国的语言教学出口甚至根本就不值一提，不仅无法与产品出口相比较，更谈不上与英国的英语出口相竞争。

As for higher education, the quality of Chinese universities is far behind America’s. There is no Chinese university which makes it into the top ranks of global higher education. Even students from Tsinghua University as an institution of higher learning go to American universities as overseas students, and when American universities make their annual rounds through China to present themselves, they are swarmed with visitors.

在高等教育方面，中国的大学质量远远地落后于美国，没有一所大学能够入围世界顶尖高校之列。由于教育水平落后于人，甚至清华北大这些中国顶级学府的学生，都每年成百上千地赴美留学；而美国大学每年来中国巡展，场场都是门庭若市。

As for academic research, no Chinese national within China has won a Nobel Prize today. As the ministry of education’s social-sciences director Yuan Zhengguo (袁振国) pointed out, every year, nearly 20,000 books on philosophy and social sciences and 200,000 papers are published, but only few of them can be introduced to a foreign readership. For many years, our trade in copyrights has run deficits; and exports in this regard only amount to ten per cent of imports. Besides, the major share of these exports is about copyrights concerning gardening and forestry, architecture (or construction), food, textiles, vintage, etc. Our values, culture, philosophical and social-science ideas, thoughts and concepts are hardly exported at all. Books are mainly exported to some other Asian countries and to the Chinese regions of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, European and American exports outperform China’s by more than 100 to 1. China, the country of origin of a more than 5,000-years-old civilization, only exports television sets, but no thoughts and concepts, and it’s no wonder that people say that China is a “hardware factory”.

在学术研究方面，时至今日，没有一个中国人在国内获得诺贝尔奖。教育部社会科学司副司长袁振国指出，现在全国每年出版哲学社会科学专著近2万部，发表专业论文20万篇，但是能够被介绍到国外的很少。多年来，我们的版权贸易一直存在着巨大的逆差，每年出口的版权只有进口版权的十分之一，而且出口的版权绝大部分是园林、建筑、饮食、服装、古董这些东西，我们的价值观、文化、哲学社会科学理念、思想观念的东西几乎没有出口。出口的图书也主要是到一些亚洲国家和中国的港澳台地区，面对欧美的逆差则达100：1以上。作为一个拥有5000多年文明史的文化发源地，中国只出口电视机，不出口思想观念，难怪有人说，中国是个“硬件加工厂”。

When it comes to the performing arts, the situation isn’t too different. From 1999 to 2002, 285 Russian artistic groups came to China to perform here, but only 30 Chinese groups went to Russia to perform – i. e. about one tenth of the Russian number. Moreover, Chinese performances abroad have long been in the low-price segment. As many performances abroad are controlled by foreign managements, and for the lack of presentable brands [on our part], all China has provided over many years is cheap labor. In sharp contrast, the “Three Tenors”, during their performances in China, made sales of hundreds of thousands of US-dollars; European and American four big musicals¹⁾ and the world’s ten big orchestras etc. sell top-price tickets at 5,000 Yuan RMB, and earn huge scales of money. By comparison, China, when it depends on its cultural attractiveness to create economic value, is seriously weakened.

文艺演出也有类似状况。从1999年到2002年，仅俄罗斯就有285个文艺团体到中国演出，同期中国到俄罗斯演出的文艺团体只有30个，相差10倍。而且，中国对外演出长期以来都处于廉价交易的状态。由于很多对外演出都由外国经纪人把持，也由于缺少像样的品牌，中外文化交流开展多年，中国提供的都只是廉价劳动力。与此对比强烈的是，“世界三大男高音”来中国演出的出场费动辄数十万美元，欧美四大音乐剧、世界十大交响乐团等来华演出的最高票价卖到5000元，每次演出都赚了个盆盈钵满。相比之下，中国依靠文化吸引力创造经济价值的能力被严重削弱了。

The soft-culture working group deplores that in the field of movies, in shaping musical idols, etc., China even lags behind South Korea and Japan, and that hardly anyone could name a famous or prominent Chinese writer.

In March 2009, chief state councillor Wen Jiabao emphasized the need to have an animated-cartoon industry (动漫产业) of our own: “Sometimes, I find that my grandson likes cartoons, but if animated or not, it’s always someting by Altman (奥特曼)²⁾.

2009年3月，温家宝总理强调我们应该有自己的动漫产业：“我有时看我孙子喜欢看动画片，但是动不动就是奥特曼。”

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In September 2006, the British Foreign Policy Center released a study with numbers collected from a Chinese national “brands” survey. They came to two conclusions: Firstly, despite the attention China got from other countries, its brands were weak, this country wasn’t understood abroad, and secondly, the views Chinese people held of themselves, and of other nations elsewhere in the world respectively, widely differed from each other.

2006年9月，英国外交政策中心发表了一份研究报告，使用了从中国国家“品牌”调查活动中得到的数据。这次调查得出了两个结论：首先，尽管中国受到各国重视，但其品牌很弱，这个国家不为海外所了解；其次，中国人对自己的看法与世界其他民族对他们的看法有很大差别。

On April 5, 2006, Singapore’s United Morning News (联合早报) wrote in an article titled “China is looking for a new development concept”:
While China grows rapidly in terms of material power, its development of cultural attractiveness or soft power³⁾ hasn’t kept up. (…) A cultural renaissance is an essential condition for turning the dream of a strong country into reality. Without strong cultural power, there will be no great comprehensive national strength. (…) Cultural invigoration is a fundamental [element] in building China’s strategic concept.

2006年4月5日，新加坡《联合早报》的一篇题为《中国寻找新的发展理念》的文章中评论指出：
中国在物质力量高速增长的同时，文化吸引力或者说软力量的建设却没有跟上……文化复兴是实现强国梦的必备条件。没有强大的文化力量，就没有强大的综合国力……文化振兴是中国新战略理念的构建的根基。

In 2007, 中评社⁴⁾ published an article on the international position of China’s culture, and came to a rather comprehensive assessment:
There is no way to suggest that China’s cultural global influence were great. Compared with America’s culture, China’s, in a global context, is insufficient in many ways. Firstly, it hasn’t become a popular culture within the global society. Secondly, it hasn’t turned into a culture of corresponding influence. And thirdly, it hasn’t turned into a culture that would drive global economic development.

2007年，中评社发表社评文章对中国文化的国际地位做出了比较综合的评价：
中国文化在世界的影响力，绝对不可以说是巨大的。与美国文化相比较，中国文化在世界范畴中许多方面都是不足的。一，没有在国际社会成为一种流行的文化。二，没有形成有相当影响力的文化。三，没有成为推动世界经济发展的一股力量文化。

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Lack of Core Values (核心价值观缺失)

During thirty years of reform and opening up, China has been in an era of fastest-developing social transformation, in which society’s traditional value foundations disappeared quickly. At the same time, all kinds of cultures and concepts, good or jumbled, emerged and gradually entered peoples’ lives and minds. By them, people were knowingly or unknowingly influenced. In such a clash between social foundations and new cultures, the absence of core values became evident.

改革开放30年中，我国一直处于变化最快、发展也最快的社会转型时期，传统价值观的社会基础迅速消失；与此同时，各种外来的文化和观念杂乱纷呈，纷纷进入人们的生活和头脑，人们自觉或不自觉地受到了影响。在这种社会基础与新文化的冲击下，核心价值观缺位的问题就出现了。

Beijing University professor Pan Wei believes that lacking core social values are one of the main problems in China’s reality, and that if China wants to rise, this can’t happen without the rebuilding of core values. Humanities and social science associate professor Kuang Xinnian of Tsinghua University also points out that since the 1990s, Chinese social values were lost, that their significance disappeared, and, to use Dong Li’s words, went into a state of nervous breakdown. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ sociologist, playwright, and the “International Social Science Journal’s” Chinese edition’s deputy chief-editor Huang Jisu believes that Chinese society’s polarization had led to social upheaval and the collapse of national virtues.

北京大学教授潘维认为，社会核心价值观缺位是中国现实中最严重的问题之一，中国要崛起，就无法回避重建社会核心价值观。清华大学人文社会科学学院中文系副教授旷新年则指出，上个世纪90年代以来，中国社会价值失落，意义真空，用祝东力先生的话说，处于一种“精神崩溃”的状态。中国社会科学院社会学家、剧作家、《国际社会科学杂志》(中文版)副主编黄纪苏认为，中国社会的两极分化导致了社会震荡和民族道德的崩溃。

During the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference in 2007, the NPC delegates and CPPCC members paid close attention to the issue as to how the Chinese people had gone astray in terms of core values, and voices calling for “intensifying the establishment of a system of core value system” were once again raised. Delegates and members contributed ideas and exerted efforts, aspiring for building value orientation which would have Chinese characteristics and with which the Chinese people would universally identify, thus make social forces coherent, promote social harmony, and the building of the nation. At the 17th party congress, secretary-general Hu Jintao put forward that the need to build a “socialist core value system” was actually a tactful acknowledgment of China’s social core value issues.

2007年两会期间，来自各地的人大代表、政协委员十分关注中国人核心价值迷失的问题，“加紧构建社会核心价值体系”的呼声再度高涨，代表委员们纷纷献计献策，希冀尽快形成具有中国特色的、获得国民普遍认同的价值取向，以凝聚起全社会的力量，促进社会和谐与国家建设。胡锦涛总书记在第十七次党代会上提出，要“建设社会主义核心价值体系”，实际上也是在委婉地承认中国社会核心价值观方面的问题。

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The Cultural Management System’s and Ability’s Backwardness (文化管理体制与能力落后)

In China’s transition from a planned to a market economy, reform of the cultural management system is an important aspect. Given that change takes time, the goals can’t be reached in one step, and therefore, even as the government is working hard on deepening the cultural management system’s reform and even as it is making great achievements, the traditional planning systems do still exist to some extent, and cultural managers can’t fully adapt to the new type of cultural management yet. Therefore, China’s cultural productivity can’t be fully released at once, the needs in the people’s cultural life can’t be fully satisfied, and China’s international cultural competitiveness remains rather weak. Especially when it comes to cultural exports, government guidance constitutes two kinds of harm to China’s cultural attractiveness abroad: on the one hand, it limits China’s cultural productivity, and on the other hand, too much government involvement causes misgivings, concerns and antipathy within the international community. They believe that China’s cultural exports, because of the government being a factor, has political aims, and should therefore be handled with caution. Foreign Affairs University president Wu Jianmin  therefore says:

文化管理体制的改革是中国由计划经济体制向市场经济体制过渡的一个重要方面。由于改革需要时间，不能一蹴而就，所以虽然目前政府正在努力深化文化管理体制改革并已取得巨大的成就，但是传统的计划体制还在一定程度上和一定范围内存在，文化管理者还不能完全适应新型的文化管理方式，从而使得我国的文化生产力难以充分释放，进一步导致人民群众的文化生活需求得不到充分的满足，以及我国文化的国际竞争力相对薄弱。尤其在文化输出上，政府主导对我国文化的对外吸引力构成双重损害：一方面，制约了我国的文化生产力；另一方面，政府过多的介入引起了国际社会的疑虑、担忧和反感——他们认为，中国的文化输出因为政府的作用而具有了政治目的，要谨慎对待。为此，外交学院院长吴建民表示：

The enhancement of China’s soft power, and the promotion of Chinese culture heading to the world, must not be a campaign.⁵⁾ If the significance of propaganda becomes too strong, it can easily evoke the other side’s suspicions and resentment. This would exactly go against the fundamental characteristics of soft power. The promotion of Chinese culture going into the world should resemble the way Du Fu described in his “Delighting in Rain on a Spring Night”:

“It drifts in on the wind, steals in by night,
Its fine drops drench, yet make no sound at all.“

This is the best and most effective way.

提升中国的软实力，推动中华文化走向世界不能搞运动。因为那样宣传意味太浓，容易引起对方的怀疑和反感。这样做，又恰恰违背软实力的基本特点。推动中华文化走向世界要像杜甫那首题为《春夜喜雨》诗中所说的：“随风潜入夜，润物细无声。”这是最好的办法，也是最有效的办法。

Therefore, to increase our country’s cultural productivity, to broaden our country’s culture’s international influence, reform of our cultural system must be carried forward in a firm, rapid, and dependable manner.

因此，为了尽快提高我国的文化生产力，扩大我国文化的国际影响力，我们的文化体制改革必须坚定不移、快速稳妥地向前推进。

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The Political and Economic System is not Perfect (政治与经济制度不够完善)

Usually, when it comes to developing countries, its system is frequently its weak spot, which is a key reason in its lagging behind. China is no exception. Despite its stable and rapid development, and the system’s contribution can’t be ignored, we also have to acknowledge that no matter if we talk about the political or the economic side, the establishment of a perfect system is still a long way off, and there is still much room for modelling and innovation.

一般而言，对于一个发展中国家来说，制度常常是它的软肋，而且是导致它落后的关键原因。这一点在中国也不例外。虽然三十年来中国的稳定和高速发展，制度创新的贡献不容抹煞，但我们还是要承认，无论是政治方面，还是经济方面，中国要建立完善的制度体系都还有很长的路要走，制度模仿和创新的空间都还相当大。

On the political level, China’s large-scale corruption and frequent mass incidents illustrate many problems: excessive concentration of power, with democratic centralism often being a mere formality, sometimes to an extent where once the boss has spoken, the decision has been made; power goes without effective checks and balances, administrative power accroaches legislative power, acting as the country’s or region’s highest organ of power, not letting the people’s congresses play their due role; the judiciary’s impartiality is harmed by executive power; power lacks effective supervision, and the building of responsible “sunshine government” still remains a long way to go, etc..

在政治层面上，中国大面积的腐败和经常发生的群体性事件说明了很多问题：权力过度集中，民主集中制常常流于形式，以至出现完全是“一把手”说了算的“一言堂”现象；权力未得到有效制衡，行政权力僭越立法和司法权力，作为国家和地方最高权力机关的人民代表大会发挥不了应有的作用，司法的公正性受到行政权力的戕害；权力缺乏有效的监督，“阳光政府”建设依然任重道远等等。

When describing the economic level, the paper re-iterated the transition from a planned to a market economy, and especially the corresponding system’s bureaucratic remnants on the local level. The study group noted that the financial system didn’t meet the needs of China’s economy either, especially when it came to the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). An appeal to authority was included, too: “It is exactly for this reason that in September 2007, secretary general Hu Jintao explicitly pointed out the need to attach importance to the financial system’s development and perfection.” In their description of the economic aspects, the authors also cited legal uncertainties concerning property, anti-monopoly measures, and, even more than that, administrative monopolies (行政垄断). Neither cultural differences between China and other countries, nor a lack of united ideological understanding were left out as explanation for a less-than-satisfying legal situation, and inadequate leaning on foreign legal experience was also mentioned as an explanation. But the next line seems to chime in with statements made by state chief councillor Wen Jiabao’s statements two years ago:

Therefore, as a conservative informal system can only look forward to the official system’s innovative lead into the direction of development, the absence of such an official system in turn becomes a particularly serious problem.

因此，保守的非正式制度也只能靠正式制度的创新来引领发展，正式制度的缺位就变成一个尤其严重的问题。

The “Chinese model” had led to nearly thirty years of rapid economic growth, the study group wrote, but had at the same time created problems:

• the income gaps (between industries, i. e. particularly farming and industries, but also regionally), and polarization. Of course, the measures taken by the fifth generation of leadership had achieved some success (第五代领导人上台以来，坚定不移的采取缩小收入差距的政策措施，目前已取得一定的成效)
• environmental pollution and a crisis in terms of resources
• Inadequate social security [or insurance], with undesirable constraints on the building of a harmonious society
• protection of the public’s, or the masses’, rights.
• corruption (with a reference to Tianjin party secretary Zhang Gaoli (张高丽), who had described corruption prevention as a matter of life of death for the party.

It is only here that the paper comes back to international issues, and, concerning economic issues, showing a more defiant attitude than in its previous reference, about soft power and propaganda (including the Du Fu quote):

No matter how the international community understands the Chinese model, and no matter what their attitude towards this model is, China’s development pattern needs to be adjusted. In the face of the international economic crisis, these adjustment become only more urgent. What earned the Chinese model general acknowledgment, and the characteristics which earned it the admiration⁶⁾: strong government leadership, should be moderately extenuated. This is something clear-headed political leaders must recognize. In fact, China’s leaders have understood that the “Chinese model” is still developing.

无论国际社会怎样理解中国模式，无论他们对这一模式抱有何种态度，中国的发展模式都必须进行调整。尤其是在国际经济危机面前，这一调整更显紧迫。像中国模式公认的、也是让这一模式令西方羡慕的一个特点——强有力的政府主导，就需要适度削弱。这是清醒的政治领导人必须认识到的。实际上，中国领导人确实已经认识到，“中国模式”还处于发展之中。

In October 2003, the sixteenth central committee’s third plenary session put forward the concept of scientific development. If conscientiously carried out, it will become a cornerstone in the CCP’s lawful political power. Therefore, it will be a new source of the party’s and even China’s soft power.

2003年10月召开的中国共产党十六届三中全会提出了科学发展观。作为一种符合时代要求的发展观，如果得到切实执行，它将成为中共政权合法性的新基石。因此，它是中共乃至中国软实力的一种新来源。

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The Limits of Diplomacy (外交上的局限)

Over the years, Chinese diplomacy has matured and made huge achievements. This is something no clear-sighted person will deny. But to improve the level of our country’s diplomacy further and to safeguard our national interests still better, there will be a continued need to examine our diplomacy comprehensively, carefully, and thoroughly, identify the shortcomings within, and put it to a still higher level.

这些年来，中国的外交日渐成熟，并取得了巨大的外交成就，这是任何一个明眼人都无法否认的事实。但是，出于进一步提高我国外交水平，更好地维护国家利益的目的，我们仍然需要对我们的外交做全面、细致、深入的审视，发现其中的不足，以使我们的外交更上一层楼。

Our country is guided by Marxist ideology. Historical materialism, and dialectical materialism are not only reflected in our internal development, but also in our diplomatic practice. But given that practice is much more complicated than theory, deviations between practice and theory are hardly avoidable at certain times and in certain situations. When taking a comprehensive look at our diplomatic practice, one will find strong industries but weak culture, the country’s strong international position but also its feeble image, its inherent cultivation but weak external publicity [or propaganda], strong hard power but feeble soft power tendencies which coexist to some extent. For example, international relations depend heavily on economic power. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Africa Research Office’s director He Wenping once said that “when I tell African friends that China remains a developing country, they just begin to laugh”. Their laughter illustrates that in their view, a developing country couldn’t afford undertake the investment and aid China provides in Africa.” In “Charm Offensive – How China’s Soft Power  is Transforming the World”, Joshua Kurlantzick once wrote: “China’s influence comes from its ability to dispense no-questions-asked largesse, and it would decline sharply if China experienced an economic downturn.” Although this opinion is very one-sided, the dependence of our diplomacy on our economic strength does require sufficient attention.

我国是一个以马克思主义为指导思想的国家，历史唯物主义和辩证唯物主义不仅体现在我们的内部建设上，同样也贯彻在我们的外交实践之中。但是，由于实践远比理论来得复杂，在某些时候或某些场合，实践对理论一定程度的偏离是在所难免的。综观我国的外交实践，人们可以看到，一种重经济而轻文化，重国际地位而轻国际形象，重内在修为而轻外部宣传，重硬实力而轻软实力的倾向在一定程度上存在着。例如，国际关系倚重经济实力。中国社会科学院非洲研究室主任贺文萍曾表示，“当我向非洲朋友们解释中国仍是一个发展中国家时，他们就开始笑。”非洲朋友的这一笑充分说明，在他们看来，中国向非洲的投资和援助已经不是一个发展中国家所能承担得起的了。《魅力攻势———中国的软实力是如何改变世界的？》一书的作者柯兰齐克曾说：“中国的影响力来自它派发不加疑问的慷慨，而且如果中国经历经济低迷，它将大幅度下降”。这种说法虽然非常片面，但是我们的外交对于经济实力的依赖性也需要引起足够的重视。

Following the rapid economic development, China’s international position and influence has actually increased rapidly, too. At the same time, the international environment has undergone great changes. Therefore, diplomacy’s domestic and foreign conditions have changed a lot already. In this kind of situation, our country must rethink its diplomatic methods and make adjustments in accordance with the changes in its domestic and foreign environment. Also, to see a continued rise in our country’s international status during the coming years, updates in our leaders’ thoughts about good diplomatic practice in the future are necessary. For example, we may have to re-examine the principles ad positions of our diplomacy, and to fundamentally change our diplomatic strategies.

实际上，随着经济实力的迅速发展，中国的国际地位和国际影响力也在迅速提高。同时，国际环境本身也发生了巨大变化。因此，外交的内外部条件都已经今非昔比。在这种情形下，我国有必要重新考虑自己的外交方式，根据内外部环境的变化做适度的调整。另外，由于未来若干年内，我国的国际地位还会继续迅速上升，这就要求我们的领导人为将来更新的外交做好思想上的准备。例如，我们可能需要重新审视我们的外交原则和立场，从根本上改变我们的外交战略。

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Citizen Quality and Poor Image (国民素质和形象较差)

Our country’s citizen quality has been a soft spot, impeding its image. Notices in the streets of Paris in Chinese, like “please don’t bawl⁷⁾, or notices in Chinese in New York, saying “please don’t jump the queue” are a great embarrassment for Chinese people, and uncivilized behavior of tourists make into the headlines in New York time and again. There are experts who say that “the biggest difference between China and America is in average citizen quality”, and there are other experts who say that “the difference in citizen quality between China and Japan translates into 30 years”. In 2007, the famous travelling website Expedia interviewed 15,000 persons from the European hotel and restaurant industry, and did a rating survey of tourists from different countries. Chinese ranked as the third-worst, after the  French and the Indians. Former Beijing mayor Wang Qishan (王岐山) admitted frankly his greatest fear – that during the 2008 Olympic Games, with five billion people worldwide looking on, Beijing’s citizen’s cultural quality would not pass the test.

我国的国民素质一直是制约我国国家形象的一项软肋。法国巴黎街头“请勿喧哗”的中文标识和美国纽约地铁站“请勿插队”的中文提醒让中国人十分尴尬，不文明的游客现丑的新闻一次次成为报章头条。有专家称“中国与美国的最大差距是国民平均素质的差距”，更有专家称“中国日本国民素质差距有30年”。2007年，著名旅游服务网站Expedia访问了1.5万名欧洲酒店业人士，对各国游客的表现进行了一次调查评比，中国人排名第三差，仅次于法国和印度。北京市前市长王岐山坦言，2008年奥运会，他最担心的就是在世界50亿双眼睛的注视下，市民的文明素质是否经受得起考验。

A country’s culture is the capital the country can apply abroad (外化), plus, perhaps, the traditional nature of cultural products, just as when people talk about Chinese culture, they frequently refer to traditional culture, which is possibly a greater distance to reality. In contrast, citizen quality is a country’s domestic capital, which is close to reality. Here, having a grasp [or clear idea] of that country’s government’s and people’s behavior, there are more significant [material] you can take into consideration, and which warrants closer attention. In this sense, and in the context of building our country’s soft power, improving citizen quality is no less important than the significance of cultural dissemination. Our country’s tendencies in citizen quality influence the level of our country’s soft power, and an important part of building its soft power.

一国的文化是该国外化的文化资本，加上文化产品可能的传统性——正如目前人们所谈论的中国文化更多的是指传统文化，它可能离现实更为遥远。相比之下，国民素质是一国内化的文化资本，它与现实更为切近，对于在博弈中把握该国政府和人民的行为可能更有参考意义，因而更为重要，更加得到关注。从这种意义上讲，对于我国软实力的建设而言，国民素质的提高具有不下于文化传播的重要意义。因此，我国低下的国民素质势必显著影响我国的软实力水平，必须作为国家软实力建设的重要一环来抓。

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Lack of Influential NGOs and Individuals (缺少有影响力的民间组织和个人)

From the perspective of building soft power, non-governmental organizations, or social [societal] organizations, NGOs, as well as individuals with strong influence within society (all to be referred to as NGOs hereafter) play a dual role.

从建设软实力的角度看，民间组织——或者说社会组织、NGO——以及拥有强大社会影响力的个人（以下简称民间组织）具有双重作用。

On the one hand, NGOs are important as they assist governments in solving social problems. In the wake of social development, issues of humankind’s sustainable development can’t be  solved by merely depending on government and the market, and NGOs are what it takes to make up for government and market insufficiencies. NGOs are also seen as “pressure reduction valves” for a government, and a “balancer” for public opinion, plus a spiritual function which shouldn’t be ignored either. Therefore, NGOs can help governments to solve social problems, thus eliminating society’s dissatisfaction with government. In this sense, NGOs obviously increase governments’ legitimacy and cohesion within society, and are therefore positive factors in increasing domestic soft power.

一方面，民间组织是帮助政府解决社会问题的重要助手。随着社会的发展，仅仅依靠传统的政府和市场两级还无法解决人类的可持续发展问题，民间组织正为了弥补政府和市场的不足而诞生。民间组织则被认为是政府的“减压阀”和民意的“平衡器”，还有着不可忽视的精神功能。因此，民间组织可以帮助政府解决社会问题，从而消除社会对政府的不满。从这种意义上讲，民间组织显然是提高政府合法性和社会凝聚力的积极因素，因而是提高国内软实力的积极因素。

On the other hand, NGOs have some kind of particular advantage, compared with government: objective neutrality. In general, a government is a representative of a country’s interests, but at times, it is also a representative of self-interest. Words and deeds of a government are therefore always suspected of acting out of interest requirements, which marks an inherent disadvantage. So in a real sense, NGOs have a stronger objective neutrality, and in a certain sense, this is the basis of certain NGOs’ coming into life. Therefore, no matter if you face domestic or international society, NGOs are more likely to earn trust, and information they provide is more persuasive.

另一方面，相比政府，民间组织具有一种独特的优势：客观中立性。一般而言，政府是国家利益的代表，有时候甚至是自身利益的代表。因此，政府的一言一行总要被人怀疑是出于利益的需要，其立场具有先天的劣势。而真正意义上的民间组织则具有更强的客观中立性——实际上，从一定意义上讲，这也正是某些民间组织得以产生的根据。所以，在面对无论国内还是国际社会时，它们更能获得信任，所提供的信息也就更有说服力。

Although NGOs have these important social and political roles to play, it is also known to all that our country lacks such organizations, and there is no need to list statistics. The main source for this situation is that the government is inclined to take some kind of politicized view on the development of NGOs, and maintains some kind of vigilant attitude towards them.

尽管民间组织具有这样重要的社会和政治功能，但众所周知的是，我国的民间组织依然非常缺乏，具体的数据是无须列举的。造成这种情况的根本原因就在于，政府倾向于用一种政治化的眼光来看待民间组织的发展，对民间组织持一种防范心态。

To build a truly harmonious society, and to increase our country’s international influence, our country’s government must change its attitude towards NGOs, eliminate inappropriate sensitivities towards NGOs, and create room for their development by adopting tolerant⁸⁾  policies on them.

为了建设真正的和谐社会，同时也为了进一步扩大我国的国际影响力，我国政府需要转变对民间组织的态度，消除对民间组织的不适当的敏感性，以宽容的政策为民间组织的发展释放空间。

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Notes

¹⁾ I’m not familiar with the big global musicals, but according to Baike.Baidu, Andrew Lloyd Webber‘s “Cats” and “the Phantom of the Opera” would be among the four.
²⁾ Just as with musicals, I don’t know a great deal about cartoons. But Wen’s alleged quote about Altman or 奥特曼 seems to refer to Robert Altman, although I’m not sure if he made animated movies, or rather turned an animated movie into a musical. (Maybe this was part of Wen’s joke.)
³⁾ the Chinese term used here is 软力量 (ruǎn lìliàng), which can be translated as “soft power”. However, it isn’t the term normally used when Chinese academics refer to Joseph Nye‘s soft power concept these days – that would be 软实力 (ruǎn shílì).
⁴⁾ 中评社 seems to refer to ChinaReviewNews.
⁵⁾ There may be other translations for 不能搞运动, too, and these paragraphs should be looked at closely to decide if my translation is adequate. It should also be remembered that this, even though published on the People’s Daily’s (Net) theory pages, this is both an “inofficial” document, and, I believe, one that has since been superseded by the CCP central committee’s “cultural document”.
⁶⁾ or envy – 羡慕, but I seem to understand that this is not necessarily a negative expression in Chinese.
⁷⁾ “请勿喧哗” – another translation could be “noisy”.
⁸⁾ another translation for 宽容 would be tolerant.

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Related

» The Center Forever, March 13, 2011
» Confucianism and Modernity, May 30, 2009

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Paper: Improving Agricultural Production

Three authors – Hu Xiaoping (胡小平), Zhu Ying (朱 颖), and Ge Dangqiao (葛党桥) -, addressed the problems of low efficiency in agricultural production. .

Not only “surplus labor”, but workforce who would actually be needed in the countryside, too, have left China’s rural areas in the wake of reform and industrial development and urbanization, according to their paper, published by Guangming Daily (光明日报), and republished by China National Radio (CNR). The author found that labor shortage in agriculture and an aging workforce were problems that went hand in hand. That the workforce was becoming of age had also led to a situation where “the workers’ quality” (导致了从事农业生产的劳动者质量的下降) was deteriorating.

After stating the obvious – that it is mostly younger people who move into rural  [correction (20120308): urban] areas, and that the elderly tend to stay at home -, the article adds:

In our country, there are big gaps between the countryside and the cities, in terms of the economy, culture, public services, social welfare, etc.. To enjoy their share in the fruits of modern civilization and to pursue good opportunities of development, even though they won’t achieve the levels of income they hoped for there, the younger will still wish to move towards the cities. Once they are there, they won’t return to the countryside, unless they absolutely have to. In the cities, they are raising the second generation of migrant workers, and while they remain rural population in terms of household registration, these have never worked in agricultural fields, and will feel no desire to return to the countryside.

在我国，农村和城市在经济、文化、公共事业、社会福利等方面存在较大差距。为了分享现代文明成果和追求更好的发展机会，即使在城市中无法获得预期收入，农 村大量青壮年劳动力也会源源不断向城市转移。进城以后，他们除非迫不得已，都不会再回到农村。他们在城市养育起来的“农二代”，虽然在户籍意义上仍属于农 民，却从未从事过农业生产，今后也不愿回到农村。

Urban industries demand high skills, argues the article, and competition had driven many of those who left for the cities since the 1980s back into the countryside – but the next young generation was on its way into the cities again.

But age alone didn’t explain the low efficiency in agriculture, as a look at the situation in developed countries’ agricultural sectors showed. High prices on their produce, combined with state subsidies, agricultural efficiency wasn’t low in Europe, the United States or Japan, despite a rural population which had come of age there, too.

A survey in the U.S. in 2007 found that the average age of a farm owner there was 57.1 years, in Japan, in 2009, 61 per cent of those who worked in the agricultural sector were older than 65. This doesn’t explain why the agricultural sector’s efficiency should be comparatively low. Abroad, an aging population is no threat to agricultural production, because they have sound social services and a comparatively high level of mechanization there, which offsets labor shortages.

2007年，美国农业普查结果显示，美国农场主的平均年龄已上升到57.1岁；在日本，2009年农业从业者中65岁以上的人员所占比例为61%。这都不是农业生产比较效益低能够解释的。国外农业劳动力老龄化之所以没有威胁到农业生产，是因为他们有完善的农业社会化服务体系以及较高的农业机械化水平，弥补了农业劳动力的短缺。

The central government had intensified its efforts since 2004, writes the author, with some positive effects on efficiency in the agricultural sector, but not to a degree which would have avoided labor shortages, or migration of the young into the urban areas.

Rather extensive management of arable land was one reason for the shortcomings. Land had been left barren. The older farmers preferred land close to their homes, and abandoned more distant arable land. And where two harvests per year had been the rule before, the frequency had gone down to only one harvest a year. Frequently, they only grew food for their own needs. The central government had defined a red line of 1.8 billion mu of arable land to be kept in use, and the extensive use of arable land was in conflict with that requirement.

Attracting skilled work was another problem. Dual structures of rural and urban environments kept potentially skilled workers in rural urban areas. Modern agriculture required technical and management understanding, mechanical skills, which the existing population with rather low educational levels could hardly provide. The phenomenon that many rural citizens moved to the cities temporarily and kept their land as a lifeline didn’t help to make agricultural use of the land more efficient, either. Each of them kept small fields which left no option to achieve economies of scale.

A third problem – and one people in the cities are only too familiar with, would be rising food prices, given that the supplies were rather inefficient. Even though the share of agricultural products in the consumer price index (CPI) had fallen from 60 per cent in the 1980s, to about 30 per cent in 2011, 60 per cent of this years CPI rise were caused by food prices. Under normal circumstances, one should expect that demand for agricultural products would only rise slowly, and expect little volatility, but the fast price rises suggested that there were serious supply shortages. Rises in pig (or pork) prices would suggest that supply would rise quickly, but older farmers were often neither prepared nor unable to raise pigs.  Here, labor shortage was causing the problem.

The paper (or the Guangming Daily article reflecting it)  makes three proposals:

Firstly, train professional farmers. Focus on attracting highly qualified staff into agricultural production, intensify farmers’ education, and create a beneficial environment for rural talents.
其一，培育职业农民。应着力吸引高素质人才从事农业生产，加大对农民培训的力度，营造留住农村人才的有利环境。

Secondly, improve agricultural mechanization. Encourage and support research and development that leads to mechanical solutions in line with the needs of agricultural production, increase the level of mechanization, and decrease the dependence of agricultural production on human labor. Continue to improve and enhance state subsidies for the purchase of agricultural machinery.

其二，提高农业机械化程度。鼓励和支持相关科研机构研发符合农业生产需求的机械设备，提高我国农业生产的机械化程度，降低农业生产对人工的依赖程度。继续完善和提高国家的农机具购置补贴。

Thirdly, strengthen the building and investment in rural social services. Build and perfect social services to be provided before, during and after production [apparently kindergartens and pensioner facilities], accelerate agricultural production, the diffusion of agricultural technology, agricultural information systems, agricultural finance and insurance systems, and reduce the difficulties and risks farmers are facing.

其三，加强对农业社会化服务体系的建设和投入。建立和完善对农业生产提供产前、产中、产后的社会化服务体系，加快在农业生产、农业技术推广、农业信息、农业金融和保险等领域的服务体系建设，减轻农民的务农难度，增强农业抵御风险的能力。

Fourthly, change organizational and management methods in agricultural production. Change the traditional decentralized patterns of agricultural production, encourage the formation of professional guilds, cooperatives, specialized organizations and other forms of specialized economic cooperation, and increase the organizational levels in production. Encourage and support conditions which allow the achievement of appropriate economies of scale, based on reliable foundations of contract household responsibility systems.

其四，改变农业生产的组织经营方式。改变传统的分散经营的农业生产模式，鼓励农民建立专业协会、股份合作社、专业合作社等不同形式的专业合作经济组织，提 高农业生产组织化和产业化程度。支持和鼓励条件允许的地区，在稳定家庭联产承包责任制的基础上推进土地流转，进行农业适度规模经营。

The paper touches upon many related issues in economic, social, and ideological fields which are fairly frequently recorded on this blog. It also reflects existing confines of long-term and more recent restrictions on reform. I will try to build some links between these issues and this blogpost during Christmas.

Published without spell-checks or other corrections.

The BoZhu Interviews: “I’ve Become more Aware of How Easily People Adapt to new Circumstances” -

FOARP about Democracy, Arguments between Memory and Ego, and the End of Reform in China

FOARP (Fear of a Red Planet) is a blogger from Britain who lives and works in Poland. He has also lived in China and Japan, and his first long-distance flight took him to Taiwan, ten years ago. The following interview is all about the past ten years.
His blog’s homepage can be found here.

The interview -

Q:  Most foreign China blogs seem to get started at the beginning of an expat’s stay there, or at some time during their stay. Your first post says, “It’s Good to be Back”, in October 2007, after your return to Britain. Why the delay?

A: Until 2006 I had never even looked at a blog, much less comment on one. I guess like a lot of people I saw such things as a giant time waster (which they are) and as inconsequential (which they may or may not be). The change happened after I started working for Foxconn, where my job consisted of periods of intense activity interspersed with the occasional period of inactivity, in which I turned to reading/commenting on blogs as a way of fighting the boredom.

Q:  Not too long after your return to Europe, you became an expat again, a Briton in Poland. How did you get there? Had you been there before? Do you speak Polish? And does life in Poland have an effect on how you view the world?

A: Actually I left the UK back at the end of 2009, when I travelled to Japan and worked for a patent firm there. I came to Poland at the start of this year to work in-house for a Finnish MNC where I get to use my Chinese, my knowledge of intellectual property, and get to travel a lot. Coming to Poland for the job interview was my first time in the country. My Polish classes are funded by the company – at the moment I can speak some Polish, ale niezbyt dobrze.

I would say that both my experiences in Japan and my experiences in Poland have affected my view on the world. Working in Japan taught me a lot about people, some good, some bad. I made some very good friends, but also worked incredibly long hours, alongside people who basically sacrificed their personal lives on the altar of work. Poland is almost the polar opposite. Perhaps it is the communist inheritance with its emphasis on work-to-rule, but the Polish draw a very solid line between their personal lives and their work lives and clearly distinguish between them.

Living in both these places also put a different perspective on my experiences in China. Japan obviously has many cultural similarities with China (although I think the idea of a genuine ‘Confucian’ world is an incredibly dangerous oversimplification). However, Japan’s cultural inheritance has not cursed it to eternal dictatorship.  Poland’s story as a country which has emerged from dictatorship is also obviously relevant.

Q:  Relevant in which ways?

A: Poland managed to successfully ditch communism without harming economic growth, or even ever suffering a real recession, and without excessive bloodshed after the end of the martial law period. It hasn’t had the same exposition that East Germany experienced due to the activities of the Gauck commission though. Perhaps the ideal post-communist liberation would be economically Polish and politically East German, but then East Germany had the rest of Germany to assist it.

Of course, the experience of Taiwan is perhaps more to the point.

Q: When did you decide to go to China? Did you study the language, along with law, before going there?

A: I graduated with a degree in Physics and Astrophysics and no idea of how I was going to use it to find a job back in the summer of 2001. The one thing I was certain of, however, was that I wanted to see the world and to learn a language that would be useful. It was basically a toss-up between Russian and Chinese, and Chinese won.

Before I arrived in Taiwan in November 2001 I had studied Chinese for about 3 weeks but that was about the limit. Firstly in Taiwan, and then later at a university in Nanjing, I taught English and used the money from that to pay for my studies. It was only after studying Chinese for a few years that I felt confident enough to take on a job in the patenting department at Foxconn at the start of ’06, which was also my first introduction to patenting. After working there for about 18 months I decided that I wanted to try to get some qualifications related to patenting, and so returned to the UK where I studied my master’s in intellectual property as well as a diploma in law. The job market being as it was in ’09, I ended up going back overseas after graduating.

Q:  Did life in China have an effect on how you view the world?

A: Since I was 21 when I went to Taiwan, and 22 when I arrived in Nanjing, it’s kind of hard for me to distinguish between the changes that naturally occur after 21 and the effect that China had. Compared to most of the people I knew back home, though, I would say that I’ve become more cynical, and more aware of how easily people adapt to new circumstances and get used to them.

Some experiences which I had in China which had a big effect on me:

• SARS – my interesting life in China was converted in a very short time into something approaching semi-apocalyptic within a few days of the government switching from cover-up to over-reaction.
• My boss in Nanjing’s attempted murder of his secretary, his subsequent suicide, and the response of party authorities to it.
• Learning the language – a great confidence-booster and something I will use the rest of my life.
• The sight of the hundreds of new recruits who showed up from the countryside every day at the gate underneath my office windows at Foxconn.
• The expat community – put simply, my fellow expats included some really clever, smart people, as well as some real scum-bags. The real shock was discovering that the two were not as mutually exclusive as I had previously thought.
• A friend of mine crying when she described the poverty of her home town. It had never occurred to me before that that people could be that ashamed of a poor background.

Reading the above it sounds like I had a really bad time in China, actually I had a ball, it’s just that I also had to take the rough with the smooth – and in China there’s a lot of both.

Q:  I guess if there was something that would boost my confidence, it would be earning a degree in Physics and in Astrophysics… One of the purposes of your blog, as stated in October 2007, was to keep your Chinese polished. How closely do you follow Chinese and non-Chinese blogs on China respectively? Do you (as a reader) or they (as bloggers) focus on certain, recurring kinds of news and topics?

A: I try to keep up my Chinese by watching the occasional soap-opera and reading news articles, as well as the stuff I translate at work. Chinese bloggers who I follow have dwindled – Song Qiang and Wang Xiaofeng only post about once a month. On the English language side, blogs I’ll look at at least once a day include the Peking Duck, China Geeks, China Law Blog, Imagethief (when he posts) and, of course, Just Recently’s Beautiful Blog.

As a reader I’m not so interested in the business/legal side of things – outside of work, anyway. Politics and history are the things I like to read the most. A couple of new (to me, anyway) blogs I’ve been getting into recently: Sinostand, Seeing Red In China, and Roll, Roll, Run. Why not any with a more positive spin on the Chinese government?  Well, I simply don’t believe such a spin reflects the truth.

Q:  Have you seen big changes in your own blog or blogs, and in the Chinese, or foreign “China blogosphere” since you started blogging yourself?

A: The biggest change happened between 2006 and 2008, with the introduction of comprehensive blocking. Put simply, this destroyed the expat blogosphere in China, since the humorous complaining that had made up 90% of what was posted about life in China became impossible to access without a proxy, thus preventing people finding them by accident the way people did with websites like Talk Talk China. These blogs fed off comments, so without them they withered and died.The growth of the nationalist movement since 2008 and its effect on the Chinese internet has been well enough described elsewhere that I don’t need to go into it.

In my own blog, I’ve found out that the best use for it is as a sort of log book of what I thought about something in particular at a particular time. Nietzsche said something about how, when your memory and your ego argue, it is your memory that eventually gives way. I like to use my blog as a way of counteracting the temptation to unconsciously re-write what you really thought about something at the time. You see this a lot when you ask people if they supported the Iraq war – my friends accuse me of it.

Q:  In your view, has China changed since you started blogging? Has Britain? Has the world? How so?

A: The biggest change in China has been the ditching of reform – combined with the predicted slow-down this could spell big trouble. Or it might not.For the UK, the economic crisis has had a big effect, but I believe in the long term there will be some positive outcome from it. I’m hoping that the crisis in the Eurozone will teach people that they are much better off having their own economic destiny in their own hands, and not decided for them by Frankfurt, Brussels, or Athens. The death of the idea that continuous borrowing on the never-never is an acceptable way of running the country is also something I hope the current crisis will bring about.

For the world in general, I see two changes this year. The first is the re-emergence of democratisation as an engine of change. From 9/11 until this year it seemed that democracy was on the retreat in Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. The Arab Spring will, I hope, change this. The second is the all-enveloping economic crisis has also had an effect, destroying confidence in many of our financial institutions.

Q:  Besides a return to, let’s say, the subsidiarity principle within the EU –is that what you mean? –, would you like to see a smaller role for organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank, too? If so, why?

A: I’m afraid it rather revolves around the current dispute between Mr. Cameron and Mrs. Merkel. Mrs. Merkel’s solution is more Europe, Mr. Cameron’s solution is less. The UK at least signed on to the European Economic Community after a referendum in which it was promised that the EEC would be a trade union first and foremost, you could argue that things have developed from there, but there was never really any mandate given for this change. My hope is that whichever way things go, some reference is made to the people of Europe and what they actually want, preferably through a referendum.

The IMF and the World Bank have something of a mixed record, but a lender capable of imposing conditions is certainly something that is necessary at the moment.

Q:  Have you ever stopped reading blogs because you felt they were becoming boring, or because they angered you?

A: Never because they angered me – I even still read Hidden Harmonies. Some blogs that used to be good have gone downhill however – Danwei being an example.

Q:  What’s the worst online article or post you have ever read about China (that you remember)? And what’s the worst online article about Britain that you remember?

A: China – well, there’s so many. It’s really a toss-up between Shaun Rein’s “Real poverty is pretty much gone” piece, his piece proposing that the Nobel prize be given to Deng Xiaoping, and Paul V. Kane’s piece suggesting that the US sell-out Taiwan in the NYT last week.

Britain? Well, there was a lot of stupid rubbish written in the US about “imperial decline” after the 2007 Iranian hostage crisis, but that’s the only thing that comes to mind. I guess you can also include the nonsense Mark Stein used to peddle about Europe (and Britain in particular) turning into “Eurabia” because of Muslim immigration – something with no statistical basis.

Q:  That’s to say, you don’t believe in that life-cycle – rise, decline and fall of empires?

A: Well, very few countries admit to being empires any more, do they? But any theory of history based on things being cyclical overcomplicates the point – things change, except when they don’t, and that’s it.

Q:  An interview about your blog wouldn’t be complete without a question about your online brawl with Chris Devonshire-Ellis. In November 2008, you wrote a post stating that Chris Devonshire-Ellis wasn’t a lawyer, and that it annoyed you that he was treated as an expert by people who ought to know better. Were you the first blogger to make that statement? Wang Jianshuo, a Chinese blogger, wrote in December 2009 that he had previously run into Mr. Devonshire-Ellis, too (also online, and not in real life). Did you expect what followed – i. e. this kind of correspondence? This followed almost two and a half years after your actual post, and it probably caused you some trouble. Would you have written the post anyway, knowing the aftermath? Why, or why not?

A: Actually someone left a comment on a thread on Wang Jianshuo’s blog outing him as early as 2006, and people knew about it before even that. It’s just that he had managed to silence them through intimidating tactics such as those Wang Jianshuo (and also Ryan McLaughlin) describe on their blogs. People were also discussing his disreputable tactics – particularly giving out that he was a legal professional when he had not even finished his A-levels – on various defunct expat blogs back in 2006, which is where I first heard of him. I checked out his story myself after I got back to the UK, and after hearing from some more people who had been hassled by him, I decided to write a post on him to encourage those who were being hassled to stand up to him by showing that there was actually nothing, legally speaking, that he could do to stop them telling the truth about him.

Do I regret outing him? Absolutely not! Yes, the old boy certainly knows how to hold a grudge, but as far as I’m concerned, he can go and whistle for all I care. I’m in the right, and he’s in the wrong. It’s that simple.

Even having my real identity outed by him, to me, was not such a problem. For years I had been planning to out myself  but the correct moment never seemed to present itself. He solved the problem for me. The negative consequences of being outed have so far been precisely zero.

I would, however, like to give a shout-out to everyone who wrote comments on my blog supporting me.

Q:  Your most beautiful post, you said when it was your turn in a blog-nomination-snowball initiative in August this year, was one about Taiwan. At the same time, it seems, you like to tease Taiwanese nationalists, once in a while. Why is that? Does your sympathy for Taiwanese (or expat-Taiwanese feelings) depend on the way they are expressed?

A: When I lived in Taiwan I had a lot of sympathy for the pan-greens. I still do. It’s just that sympathy does not extend to uncritically swallowing scare-stories about a KMT-CCP conspiracy to annex Taiwan to China over the heads of the Taiwanese electorate without evidence. It’s also striking how Taiwanese independence is the lens through which some of these bloggers see everything. They’ve become far more committed to Taiwanese independence than the average Taiwanese person, and far more committed to the pan-greens than the average Taiwanese voter, a commitment not unlike certain US officials and the former South Vietnam – which is why my first post on this was entitled “Taiwan Expats and the Saigon Syndrome“.

Also having followed the last ten years, it’s become obvious that for some people war is always just around the corner, and they always write accordingly. The Chinese invasion is always in the next election year, the KMT is always trying to fix a deal (for which there’s no evidence) , the CCP is always carrying forward its plans etc. etc. etc. Sure, “the boy who cried wolf” and all that, but there’s a difference between warning people to maintain vigilance, and essentially trying to sell scare stories on the basis of rumours.

The goal of demonising the KMT is to de-legitimise them as a political party. Any vote they win is put down to dirty tricks. Their manifesto is portrayed as a tissue of lies. The idea that, by de-legitimising one half of Taiwan’s democratic balance, they are also delegitimising Taiwan’s political system, does not seem to occur to the purveyors  of such propaganda. It does not matter that propaganda from the other side has the same effect.

I’ve kind of mellowed on the Taiwan blogs, though, firstly because the DPP has changed it’s policies over the past few years – particularly since Tsai Ing-wen become leader – and a lot of the blogs have followed their lead. I’m certain that the CCP will try to paint her as an extremist – it’s what they do to everyone – but this is neither here nor there. I just hope that, if she loses, she, or someone like her, gets another chance.

Q:  Is there an unasked question you’d like to reply to?

A: I’ve been asked a lot how I ever could have worked for Foxconn. The answer is that I joined them before the major scandals came out. Actually, for me, it was quite a positive experience. I know I’ve been critical of people who have worked for outlets like Global Times and it may look like I’m applying a double-standard, but to me it does not seem that way.

Q: Foarp, thanks a lot for this interview.

The interview was conducted by an exchange of e-mails.

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The BoZhu Interviews: “Social Media Provide a Common Virtual Space” -

an interview with Catherine Yeung

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Catherine Yeung runs the blog Under the Jacaranda Tree,

a public forum with a personal aspiration: to fulfil a longstanding wish, shared by several friends, to provide a cyberspace venue for some overdue open and honest discussions about the internal conditions of the People’s Republic of China and their effects upon the international community and the Earth.

Under the same virtual tree,  Catherine’s co-blogger Ned Kelly (or his re-incarnation, for that matter) runs his virtual pub, not necessarily, or not exclusively, with China-related topics.

The Interview:

Q: I’m feeling tempted to call this interview “blogs, and what became of them” – there has been one post Under the Jaracanda this month so far, and the previous post is from April. During the first two years after you and Ned Kelly started the blog, your average number of posts per month was exactly thirteen. Why the slowdown?

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A: I didn’t slow down at all. I’m actually blogging much more often than before. It’s just that I’ve been doing it at other places, rather than at the Under the Jacaranda Tree Blog. I started my Twitter account in 2009, and so far I have posted 13,450 tweets. My Sina Weibo venture commenced about a year ago. And I am also in the process of migrating from Facebook to Google+.  My co-blogger Ned is doing more or less the same thing. The only difference is that Ned has moved on to writing about Australian and American politics, while my focus is still on China.

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Q: Could you share some links?

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A: My Twitter name: WLYeung;  my Google+ Profile: https://profiles.google.com/u/0/106435663716662310692.

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Q: How would you usually introduce yourself, when meeting people, and asked for a few words about yourself?

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A: This is Catherine Yeung from Under the Jacaranda Tree Blog. I write about China.

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Q: You are Australian, and of Chinese ancestry. You read both Australian and Chinese media. Which are the three worst Australian news article about China you can remember – and vice versa? Which are your favorite information sources, be it on the internet, or elsewhere?

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A: In my opinion, Australian journalists have, by and large, done a decent job reporting about China. The best among them are: John Garnaut, who writes for the Fairfax News Group; Stephen McDonell, ABC’s China Correspondent; and the very talented Jane Hutcheon.

For me, the worst media reports on China ever written by an Australian are in fact not published in Australian newspapers.  And they are not even written by a journalist. I’m referring to two articles by the ever illusive “former Australian diplomat to Russia” Gregory Clark: “The Tiananmen Square massacre myth” published on 15 September 2004 in Japan Times, and “Black info and media gullibility: creation of the Tiananmen myth” published on 1 July 2011 by the same news service. To cut the long story short, back in 2004, Mr Clark claimed that the Tiananmen Massacre was a western media fabrication. He has recently upgraded his allegations and is now adamant that the entire incident was some kind of gray propaganda concocted by British intelligence.

My co-blogger Ned wants to add a note here about worst Australian news report on China. Ned says, “Any media publication that bears the title “China’s Rise” is bad, period.” His remark reminds me of an Australian politician, the self-proclaimed father of Australia’s republican movement Malcolm Turnball MP. Mr Turnball is now running a regular column for the Fairfax news group promoting China trade. I have a distinct impression that Mr Turnball is the Kissinger Sino-US PR team’s latest recruit. But I may be wrong. Only time can tell …

My blog roll represents a significant part of my information sources. I also receive first-hand information from media contacts I have established via Twitter.

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Q: If Australian papers or correspondents are more informed about China, could it be for the relative proximity between the two countries? And does professional reporting, in your view, amount to a more informed public in Australia, than in Europe or North America, for example? Or is there no great difference in quality between coverage from the three continents, anyway?

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A: I didn’t say Australian journalists are “more informed” about China. I am just suggesting that most of them are “as informed” or “as professional” as many first class journalists from other developed countries. Those three Aussie journalists in particular are not just professionally qualified, they also have good language skills. John Garnaut speaks Mandarin and is a human rights lawyer by training. Stephen McDonell speaks fluent Mandarin and Spanish. Jane Hutcheon speaks fluent French and Mandarin, and has acquired near-native proficiency in Cantonese.

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Q: Under the Jacaranda Tree is meant to be a place for people to meet online and to discuss China-related issues. What motivated you to start it?

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A: Under the Jacaranda Tree Blog was started as a celebration of my co-blogger Ned Kelly’s completion of his sojourn in China. It’s meant to be a continuation of a dialogue we had been conducting on and off for many years via letters and emails. It is also a tool for us to reach out to the world. As you know, Western Australia is, by all accounts, a rather remote part of the world (and here we are not just referring to its physical location).

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Q: How closely do you follow Chinese and non-Chinese blogs respectively? Do you (as a reader) or they (as bloggers) focus on certain, recurring kinds of news and topics?

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A: I subscribe to more than 70 online publications, some in Chinese, some in English. They include blogs, newspapers and journals. I am following more than 400 Twitter users and 80 odd Weibo users. Among them there are Chinese dissidents, academics, media workers as well as China-based foreign correspondents. I’m also a part of the HK InMedia network. It is my intention to read as widely as possible. But it seems the topics that constantly catch my eyes are: media censorship, mass incidents, corruption, rule of law (or the lack of it) and religious freedom.

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Q: Have you seen big changes in your own blog or blogs, and in the Chinese, or foreign “China blogosphere” since you started blogging yourself?

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A: Yes indeed. However, I see those changes as a reflection of similar changes in the entire China blogosphere. They are mostly propelled by the discovering of new social media. Nowadays, I’ll use Twitter for a quick exchange of information, Google + for sharing video clips or posting detailed analysis of current affairs, and conventional blogging for longer pieces of translation or for advocating a certain course of action. I hope I can integrate all these into a single platform. But unfortunately the WordPress template I’m using for my blog does not have the best tools for such endeavour. I am still searching, and will be grateful if technologically savvy readers can give me some suggestions.

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Q: In your view, has China changed since you started blogging? Has the overseas Chinese community changed? Or has the world changed? How so?

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A: I’ve seen many changes, but they are not all good news. The space for freedom of speech in China has dramatically contracted in the last 2 years, particularly among the dissident community. The Chinese censors’ effort is closely matched by the CCP propaganda department’s much improved strategy at selling China’s soft power. Meanwhile, the so-called pro-democracy faction among overseas Chinese community worldwide has been more or less discredited. The world is now more eager to see a stable China than before the 2008 financial meltdown, to the extent that many world leaders are willing to overlook some rather obvious human rights violations that are happening in China.

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Q: Being a bilingual blogger, you seem to follow both Chinese- and English-language blogs, and blog posts from Chinese and from foreigners alike. Do you see anything they would have in common? And what makes them different from each other?

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A: They are very different. The difference is not just confined to the topics they picked. Let us take the Wenzhou train crash as an example. Most English-language bloggers wrote about how the news was censored. There were some discussions on possible implications for the Chinese government, but they are not in great details. Many Chinese bloggers who wrote about this incident, however, seemed to be more interested in the way the rescue was handled. They were also eager to ascertain whether there were signs of a cover-up.

Ultimately it comes down to a different reason for blogging. English-language bloggers who write about China are doing so mostly as observers. Most of them want to use their blogs as a forum to provoke discussions. For many Chinese bloggers, particularly those who are living in China, the blogosphere is a virtual space for them to gather, to exchange information, to gossip, to monitor the authorities and to plot the kind of actions that they cannot otherwise have contemplated in the real world.

The good news is: the difference between the two groups of bloggers can be bridged. From what I can see, social media, such as Twitter and Google +, or even the Weibo, have provided a common virtual space for the two bloggers’ groups to converge. The exchange of minds is made possible by bilingual bloggers (or “bridges”, as my friend Isaac Mao calls them). With the number of bilingual bloggers and online projects growing, I am confident that the gap will be gradually narrowed.

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Q: Weibo is often portrayed as a social or political game-changer in China. Would you agree with that? How do you feel about Weibo?

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A: I’m still feeling my way through Weibo. So I may be able to shed more lights at a later stage. But my first impression is that it’s a bit of an exaggeration to call it a game-changer. However, as mentioned above, I believe social media such as Weibo can provide a common space for some meaningful cultural exchanges. So I strongly urge those of you in the English-language China blogosphere to go over there and have a look. A friend of mine, who is doing a Japanese major in university and doesn’t speak any Chinese, has recently set himself up at Sina Weibo with the help of Google Translate. He says he is having fun and is thoroughly enjoying the experience. So why don’t you have a go too.

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Q: Have you ever stopped reading blogs because you felt they were becoming boring, or because they angered you?

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A: So far only one blog has this kind of effect on me. And of course you won’t be surprised if I mention the name “the Fool’s Mountain” ….

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Q: You are an active campaigner for human rights. Do you feel that global reactions to human rights violations are usually disappointing? Why should people with a vested economic interest in China care about human rights, and speak up for people who are persecuted, even as they may harm their business by doing so?

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A: No, I don’t find global reaction disappointing. I just find world leaders’ presumptuous attitude unsettling. As a matter of fact, pressure from the international community and human rights organisations has proven to be very effective in putting a check on human rights abuses in China. Ai Weiwei’s release from illegal detention, among a few other cases, is a good example.

For Australian businesses who say they don’t care about human rights in China, as long as business keeps going, I have a word of warning for them: those who allow evil to conquer the world will suffer from its consequences. If human rights abuses are acceptable in China, there is no categorical reason why they are not acceptable in other parts of the world, including Australia.

A note from Ned: “JR, I am referring you to Kant’s categorical imperative.”

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Q: You said before that the pro-democracy faction had discredited itself. Was it for leaders being presumptuous? In which ways? Or is it for misinterpreting the status quo, or for  the American and European economic setbacks of the past three years?

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A: As far as I know, the overseas dissident community has always been fragmented and there are rather serious internal power struggles among key members. It’s possible that there are personality clashes. But I’m more inclined to believe that agents from CCP’s United Front Work Department have infiltrated the community. Many of these overseas dissidents have been away from China for too long and their views on current issues are out of date. Consequently, activists in the PRC find it difficult to take them seriously. For many PRC-based Chinese netizens, the title “民主斗士“, or democracy fighters, is considered a derogatory term.

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Q: Is there an unasked question to which you would like to reply to all the same?

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A: Just one: Which flavour chocolate you like best? White, milk or dark?

Answer: All of them.

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Q: Catherine, thank you very much for this interview.

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The interview was conducted by an exchange of e-mails.

Concerning Catherine’s suggestion that I should give Sina Weibo a go, I’ve actually done that a few months ago. I’m only occasionally reading there, so far.

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» All BoZhu Interviews
» Jacaranda, Wikipedia

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17th CC 6th Plenary Session: “Reinforcing and Updating Party’s Guidance on Cultural Activities”

A one-liner from Xinhua news agency is quoted by Huanqiu Shibao:

The Party’s 17th Central Committee’s sixth plenary session has passed the CCP’s Resolution Concerning the Deepening of Cultural Reform and the Promotion of the Development of Socialist Culture and several other Issues.

To go somewhat more into detail, Huanqiu, in another report, quotes a Japanese online article, published by Sankei Shimbun:

Huanqiu Web’s Zhao Wenjie. According to a report by Japan’s “Sankei Shimbun” on October 18, the Chinese Communist Party’s 17th Central Committee’s sixth plenary session with cultural reform as its main topic ended on October 18. According to the communique, China will, by cartoon movies, films, and other methods,  invigorate China’s soft power, and thus strengthen expectations for its international competitiveness and influence.

环球网记者赵文杰报道，据日本《产经新闻》10月18日报道，以文化体制改革为主要议题的中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第六次全体会议于18日闭幕。根据全会公报上的信息，中国表达出通过动画片、电影等手段振兴文化提高中国的软实力，并以此强化国际竞争力和影响力的期望。

“Sankei Shimbun” comments that measured by GDP, China as an economic entity is second only to America, and that China’s “hard power” had increased rapidly in recent years. But within the international community, speculation about a “China threat” had continued. Therefore, China had understood that it was necessary to strengthen the country’s culture and propagation capabilities, to enhance its international image.

《产经新闻》评论说，作为GDP仅次于美国的世界第二大经济体，中国的“硬实力”近年来快速提高。但在国际社会上，“中国威胁论”却不断被炒作。因此，中国明白，有必要加强本国文化的对外传播能力，从而提升自己的国际形象。

The report also notes that the session also decided to open the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party will be held during the second half of 2012.

报道还注意到，本次会议还决定在2012年下半年召开中国共产党的第十八次党代表大会。

In its first paragraph, Sankei Shimbun also seems to refer to domestic ideological tightening, and the internet – maybe a Japanese-speaking reader can help to translate this paragraph:

Update, October 26, 2011: Changmi has provided an English translation:

The 6th Plenary Session of the 17th CC, which emphasized “reform of cultural systems,” concluded on the 18th, according to an official communique. The policy is to boost China’s “soft power” through promotion of cultural elements like animation and movies and thus raise China’s global competitiveness and influence, while tightening ideological discipline domestically as the internet-using population continues to increase. [end of update]

「文化体制改革」を主要議題にした中国共産党の第１７期中央委員会第６回総会（６中総会）が１８日閉幕し、コミュニケを発表。アニメや映画など文化振興で中国の「ソフトパワー」を高め、国際的な競争力と影響力強化を図る一方で、インターネット人口が増加する中、国内の思想引き締めを強める方針だ。

The Chinese government’s (i. e. the CCP’s) official website (in English), on Tuesday, quoted the central committee’s decision or statement as follows:

The country will work to improve Chinese citizens’ sense of identity and confidence in Chinese culture, according to a statement issued after the session.

Culture is emerging as an important part of the country’s comprehensive competitiveness in today’s world, the statement said.

China is facing a difficult task in protecting “cultural security” and feeling the urgency of enhancing its soft power and the international influence of its own culture, the statement said.

[...]

The statement noted that, as a major form of support for national unity and a source of creativity, China’s cultural industry will play a more critical part in the country’s economic and social development.

The country should not only provide its people with an ample material life, but also a healthy and rich cultural life, the statement said.

The statement said the government will devote more resources to boosting public cultural services and speed up the reform of the cultural industry.

According to Asahi Shimbun (not to be confused with Sankei Shimbun, see above),

The statement also called for tighter control of information. It called for the need to “step up and improve actions toward the media and public opinions” and to “develop a more healthy Internet culture.” To do so, “the party’s guidance on cultural activities should be reinforced and updated,” the statement said.

Zambia’s The Citizen is full of quotation marks and quotes former SCMP China editor Willy Wo-Lap Lam as saying that

The reform of the cultural system has to do with ensuring that the media, publications, movies, Internet, et cetera serve the party’s goal of galvanising patriotic and nationalistic sentiments. [...] This will mean even tighter control over people’s freedom of expression, especially on the Internet.

The author is Goh Chai Hin, a China correspondent who apparently works for several different news agencies. Zambia itself is an example of lacking Chinese influence. In September,

Michael Sata, a 74-year-old veteran politician who had whipped up not-so-subtle anti-Chinese sentiment (China runs several big mines in Zambia), handily won the presidency [...],

the New York Times reported last month.

Last year, Chinese managers opened fire on protesters at a huge coal mine in southern Zambia, and though the Zambian government initially indicated that the Chinese managers would be punished, the charges were quietly dropped. The shootings outraged many Zambians who resent China’s enormous economic influence over their country, where most people live on less than $5 a day, and the episode seemed to feed straight into Mr. Sata’s political campaign.

No doubt: China will expand its propagation capabilities (see Huanqiu Shibao’s quotes from Sankei Shimbun above) in Africa, too.

If China Radio International‘s (CRI) existing service for Western countries is anything to go by, broadcasts for Zambia will discuss matters like these:

“Among all the courses you’ve taken in school, which one was your favorite?” Or: “Do you usually sleep well?”

Using an icebreaker should be the best way to make stubborn miners talk.  Ask questions first, shoot later.

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Related

» 17th CC 6th Plenary Session, October 15, 2011
» More Budget Cuts for BBC Foreign Coverage, Shortwave Central, Oct 10, 2011
» Quote: Makuwerere Bwititi, January 15, 2010
» Go, tell it from Global Local Sticks TV, Oct 22, 2009
» Three Eight Hundreds, April 19, 2009

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Lee Teng-hui’s new Central Plains: “The Rising Winds and Scudding Clouds of Modern Thought”

The following is a quotation from “Taiwan’s Position”  (台湾的主张), a book written by former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), first published on June 11, 1999, pages 36 – 38.

The book was sold in Hong Kong and in many places outside China, and somewhat surprisingly, Hong Kong bookshops had copies with simplified characters (简体字) on offer – the way they are usually written in China (minus Hong Kong and Macau, where traditional characters prevail), and in Singapore. Traditional characters are standard in Taiwan.

Links and highlighting within the following blockquote added during translation – JR.

Although I received Japanese education from an early age and loved Japanese culture, I did a lot of desultory reading of Chinese literature, too. The May 4th movement in particular, and the rising winds and scudding clouds of modern thought, left a deep impression on me.

虽然我自幼接受日本教育，受过日本文化的熏陶，但对中国文学与思想，也曾多所涉猎。特别是五四运动之后，风起云涌的现代思潮，更对我有很深的影响。

Chinese people have always been proud of their long history. But it is hard to deny that under its long-lasting feudal system, traditional culture was twisted, and produced chronic social ills.

中国人一向以拥有悠久的历史而自傲。然而不容否认的是，中国长期处于封建体制之下，传统文化受到扭曲，也使社会产生了许多积习难改的弊病。

In 1928, Hu Shih published “Virtue” [or Norm, 名教 - JR] in the New Moon Magazine, a painful criticism of China’s blind worship for catch phrases and slogans. He pointed out that Chinese people didn’t believe in religion, but held a superstitious belief in their own singularity, in having a long tradition of virtue, and that they correspondingly “idolized everything that had been written”. Therefore, they paid no attention to reality and sought for inner fulfillment through slogans, with the result that not only problems remained unsolved, but that values became confused, too. So he urged those in power : Government isn’t about catch phrases and slogans – once something needs to be done, go and do it.¹⁾

一九二八年，胡适在《新月杂志》上发表的〈名教〉，就对中国社会迷信标语、口号的现象痛加批判。他指出，中国人不信仰宗教，却迷信自己独有、且具有悠久传 统的“名教”，即“崇拜所写文字的宗教”。因此，做事不重实际，只以口号、标语来求心理的满足，结果不但没能解决问题，反而造成价值的颠倒错乱。他因而奉劝当时的主政者：“治国不在口号标语，顾力行何如耳”。

Lu Xun‘s “True Story of Ah Q” and other of his stories, in a taunting way, ridiculed the Chinese culture of loving face, and struck a chord with many people. He believed that whenever a thing crops up, and Chinese people can’t think  of a way to solve the problem, they only seek to placate themselves and to save face – that had made Chinese society come to a standstill and was the main reason for its inability to make headway.

鲁迅的《阿q正传》等著作，以嘲讽的手法，深刻描绘中国人爱面子的文化，也引起许多人的共鸣。他认为，中国人遇事不思解决，只求自我安慰、保住面子的心态，是使中国社会陷于停滞，无法进步的主要原因。

In his research of ancient history, Guo Moruo criticized the harm that stemmed from the feudalist system, and encouraged young people to rise to reforms. In his “Book of Ten Criticisms”, “Bronze Age”, and other books, by assessing pre-Qin personalities and thoughts, he praised early Confucian [scholar] Mencius and the importance Mencius attached to people-oriented thought. He denounced Han Fei’s “legalist”, “monarch-oriented” views and and Qin Shi-huang’s “totalitarianism”²⁾, etc., advocated the idea of “the people as the foundation”³⁾, believing that only if China freed itself of tradition’s constraints, reason to hope for development would be there.

而郭沫若以考古及历史研究的角度，批判封建制度之害，更鼓励了许多年轻人，起而改革。他的《十批判书》与《青铜时代》等书，借着对先秦人物与思想的评论， 如推崇早期儒家孔孟的重视民本思想，贬斥韩非的“法术”、“君主本位”，和秦始皇的“极权主义”等，宣扬“以民为本”的思想，认为中国只有摆脱传统的束 缚，才有发展的希望。

These theorists, who criticized the social ills of Chinese tradition, had a resounding effect among knowledgeable young people. I was only 29 years old at the time, but I had also read these books carefully, and explored the issues of Chinese culture. I believe that China’s greatest problem is that its feudal system brought development to a halt. It really looks like the soy vat referred to by Bo Yang, distorting peoples’ words and deeds.

这些批判中国传统社会弊病的论着，在知识青年群中，引起很大的回响。当时才二十几岁的我，也曾经详加研读这些书，并深加思索中国文化的问题。我认为，中国最大的问题，是在封建制度下所导致的发展停滞。就像作家柏杨所说的“大酱缸”，使人的思想言行产生扭曲。

Up until today, I admire these thinkers’ views. It’s a pity that China’s social development still hasn’t reached a mature stage. Therefore, even as the Chinese thoroughly criticize the society and the system, they haven’t been able to produce feasible methods to solve problems. Even if young people generally hold revolutionary ideals, they are still unable to grasp a direction or method with certainty.

直到今天，我仍然对当时那些思想家的看法，相当佩服。可惜的是，当时中国社会的发展，尚未进入成熟阶段。因此，尽管他们对社会与制度有很深刻的批判，却无法提出可行的解决方法。而一般年轻人虽然也怀抱革命的理想，却仍无法掌握确实的方向与作法。

From this perspective, it can be said that Taiwan’s successes stem from the actual implementation of these reformist currents of thought. Over the years, on the foundation of stable economic and social development, we have gradually freed ourselves from the shackles of tradition, set out anew, and concerning political reform and social transformation, we have been very successful. Obviously, to reach the ideal status may require still more efforts. But we believe that the direction we have taken is correct. What we have done has also brought new hope for the restructuring of Chinese culture.

就此一角度而言，今天台湾所缔造的成就，也可以说是当年这些改革思潮具体实践的成果。这些年来，我们在经济和社会稳定发展的基础上，逐渐摆脱传统的束缚， 重新出发，在政治改革和社会改造方面，都取得了很大的成就。当然，要达到理想的境界，可能还需要更多的努力。但是，我相信，我们的方向是正确的。而我们所 做的这一切，也都为中国文化的再造，带来了新的希望。

My active advocacy for  the “reform of heart and soul” in recent years is based on my hope to make society leave the old framework, applying new thought, face a new era, stir new vigor, from a transformation of peoples’ hearts. This goes deeper than political reform, and it is a more difficult transformation project, but we are confident that we will, based on the existing foundations of freedom and openness, achieve the building of a new Central Plain.⁴

近年来，我积极倡导“心灵改革”，就是希望从人心的改造做起，让我们的社会走出旧有的框架，用新的思维，面对新的时代，并激发出新的活力。这是一个比政治 改革更加深入、也更为艰巨的改造工程，但是我们有信心，可以在社会自由开放的既有基础上，完成建立“文化新中原”的目标。

A trial is scheduled to begin at Taipei District Court on Friday. Lee is accused of embezzling state funds. The charges reportedly date back to a period around 1994.

"Taiwan's Position", page 226: 李登辉是从《蒋经国学校》学会如何当一名政治家的 ("Lee Teng-hui learned from the "Chiang Ching-kuo school" how to be a politician").

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Notes

¹⁾In full: 為政者不在多言，顧力行何如耳, or 为治者不在多言，顾力行何如耳. Once something needs to be done, go and do it isn’t a very faithful translation.

²⁾ I’m not sure if “totalitarianism” is the adequate translation of 极权主义 – it may also be something like “despotism”. However, totalitarianism seems to be the term most frequently offered by dictionaries.

³ or “the people at the center”, “people-oriented”

⁴ Zhongyuan (中原, the central plains) is a term charged with a Chinese sense of mission and civilization – in that context, it may appear surprising that Lee, a “splittist element”, would use the term at all. The way Henan party secretary Xu Guangchun (徐光春) referred to the central plains may give you an idea: The history of Henan Province constitutes half of the Chinese history. Two years earlier, Xu had apparently given a talk in Hong Kong, with a similar message.  But this wasn’t necessarily what Lee had on mind, in 1996.
From “Taiwanisation – Its Origin and Politics”, George Tsai Woei, Peter Yu Kien-hong, Singapore, 2001, page 19 – 20 (footnotes omitted):

Another anecdote should also be mentioned here. In 1996, Lee Teng-hui declared his ambition to “manage the great Taiwan, and to construct a new Central Plain”. As is known, Central Plain (zhong-yuan) was, and still is, a term usually reserved to describe cultural China. To “manage the big Taiwan” is something easily understood, but to construct a new “Central Plain” is very controversial, to say the least. Some argued that Lee’s aim was to help rebuild China as a “new” central plain, but with his foot firmly on Taiwan. But others rebutted that what really was in Lee’s minds was to build Taiwan as a new Central Plain so that there was no need to unify, or have connections, with the “old” central plain, China.

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Related

» Who’s afraid of an ICAC, July 2, 2011
» Taiwan’s Unbelievable Justice, September 12, 2009
» “Always in My Heart”, Olin Lecture, June 9, 1995
» Audio archive: CBS coverage on Olin lecture, June 9, 1995
» “Guo Moruo worships Confucius”, A Glossary, HK, 1995, p. 346
» Lee Teng-hui, Wikipedia

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