Shortwave Log, Northern Germany, April 2013

If you want to listen to the BBC, Deutsche Welle or the Voice of America on shortwave in central Europe these days, the easiest way to do so is to listen to their broadcasts for Africa. These stations broadcast from places like Ascension Island in the southern Atlantic, and Deutsche Welle has kept one of its formerly five own relay stations abroad in operation, from Kigali, Rwanda. VoA also broadcasts from São Tomé and Príncipe, an island in the Gulf of Guinea.

Shortwave radio continues to be popular in Africa, but not with everyone. Robert Mugabe and his regime aren’t fond of it at all, and reportedly issued a ban on shortwave receivers earlier this year. SW Radio Africa, an independent Zimbabwe radio station broadcasting from London in the United Kingdom (you never know who writes the Wikipedia entries) also rents airtime on shortwave, on 4880 kHz from Meyerton shortwave station in South Africa’s Gauteng Province, and can usually be received easily in central Europe during the evening hours.

Meyerton shortwave station, South Africa, 1986 QSL card.

Shortwave broadcasts from Meyerton started in October 1965, according to Jerome S. Berg‘s Broadcasting on the Short Waves^*). It was soon named after Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd (H. F. Verwoerd SW Station), a prime minister frequently referred to as the architect of Apartheid who was assassinated in 1966.

China might consider providing Harare with some advanced jamming technology, but this would probably complicate relations with other African countries – and maybe this form of development aid would also be a bit too costly.

My log list for April is short – I spent most of my spare time on gardening.

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Recent Logs

International Telecommunication Union letter codes used in the table underneath:
CUB – Cuba; IND – India, MNG – Mongolia;  RUS – Russia.

Languages (“L.”):
C – Chinese; E – English.

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kHz	Station	Ctry	L.	Day	Time GMT	S	I	O
7550	AIR Delhi	IND	E	April 4	20:45	5	5	4
15300	Vo Russia	RUS	C	April 19	10:45	3	5	4
15300	Vo Russia	RUS	C	April 19	11:00	3	5	4
7550	AIR Delhi	IND	E	April 22	18:20	5	5	4
6000	RHC Habana	CUB	E	April 23	04:00	x	x	x
12085	Vo Mongolia	MNG	C	April 24	10:14	3	5	3

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Note

^*) Jerome S. Berg: Broadcasting on the Short Waves, Jefferson NC, 2008, page 171.

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Related

» World Press Freedom Day, UNESCO, 2013
» Previous log, Febr/March 2013, April 1, 2013

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Chinese Press Review: Lushan Mourning, Maritime Disputes, Border Disputes, and CPBS Emergency Broadcasts

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1. Offerings to the Spirits of the Dead

On Friday, a ceremony to honor the two earthquake (military) relief workers Yang Bo (杨波) and Li Tangdong (李堂东) was conducted at a funeral parlor in Meishan, Sichuan Province, reports China News Service (中国新闻网, via Huanqiu Shibao). The two are referred to as martyrs who sacrificed their lives in the rescue efforts in Lushan, Sichuan Province, which occurred on April 20.

Yang Bo, a platoon leader (probably around the rank of a lieutenant, with the 13th Army Group) died in an accident when his military vehicle got off a road due to a bursting tire and fell off a cliff.

Li Tangdong, a corporal who drove the vehicle, also died in the crash. Li was from Wuxi County (Chongqing).

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2. Maritime Disputes with Japan

Japan has adopted a five-year blueprint for protecting maritime interests, partly in an effort to counter territorial claims by China and South Korea, reports The Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo). It suggests closer cooperation between Japan’s military and coastguard. Okinotorishima as well as other remote islands on what is defined as Japan’s borders reportedly are to play a role as port facilities according to the five-year plan plan, so as to protect interests in the nation’s exclusive economic zone. Methane hydrate, which could become a next-generation fuel, is among the undersea energy resources in the maritime regions in questions, writes Asahi Shimbun.
China’s Huanqiu Shibao quotes Japan’s Yomiuri Simbun on the same topic. According to Huanqiu (or its possibly rather loose rendition of Yomiuri’s coverage), Japan’s five-year blueprint calls for responsive strategies to Chinese vessels that enter the waters of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese). Rather than port facilities as described by the Asahi Shimbun, Huanqiu Shibao refers the plans for the remote islands as ones for resupply bases or depots (补给站). Okinotorishima is referred to as a “reef” (礁) while the Asahi Shimbun calls it an “island”. According to Huanqiu Shibao, the Japanese government, for wanting to protect its interests in resources, has begun to promote the protection of remote islands and the management of the legalization process [of Japan's claims or rights].

In 2012, a research team from Tokyo University detected large quantities of rare earths beneath the seaground of Minami-Tori-shima‘s adjacent waters. It was then that the Japanese government decided to strengthen the protection of energy sources and natural resources in its exclusive economic zones.

2012年，东京大学研究小组在南鸟岛周边海底发现了大量稀土。以此为契机，日本政府决定加强在保护专属经济海域内能源资源方面的措施。

[...]

Okinotorishima reef is said to be a southern Japanese atoll in the Pacific [don't quote me on this - I'm not sure that this is what Huanqiu really says about the place in Chinese - JR]. In recent years, the Japanese government has spent huge amounts on creating man-made corals at these reefs, thinking of these atolls as “islands”, trying to declare sovereignty on this basis, taking the opportunity to expand their “territorial” waters and the range of the “exclusive economic zones”, to make the development of nearby marine resources more convenient.

据了解，冲之鸟礁是日本南部太平洋海域的一处环礁。近年来，日本政府斥巨资用来在此礁人工养殖珊瑚，并认为该环礁为“岛”，企图以此来宣布主权，借机扩大其“领海”和“专属经济区”范围，为开发附近丰富的海洋资源提供方便。

As for the Okinotorishima reef, China believes that this is a reef, and not an island. Okinotorishima reef provides no base for human habitation, doesn’t sustain economic activity, and there is no basis to establish establish [i. e. claim] any connection between it and the continental shelf. On September 11, 2009, the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf said that a working group under the commission had commenced the handling of an application from Japan concerning the extension of the southern continental shelf into the Pacific.  China has filed objections with the UN.

有关冲之鸟礁问题，中国方面认为冲之鸟是 岩礁而不是岛屿。冲之鸟礁不能供人类居住，也无法维持经济生活，设定大陆架没有任何根据。2009年9月11日，联合国大陆架界限委员会表示，该委员会下 属的一个工作小组已经着手处理日本提出的南太平洋大陆架延伸申请。中国已向联合国正式提交反对意见。

Huanqiu Shibao’s emoticon vote suggests a strong trend of anger among the traditionally nationalist readership – the option “I’m angry” rose from 160 to 181 within about thirty minutes. Clicks for “this is ridiculuous” stayed at 14.
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3. Sino-Indian Border Conflicts

Meantime, Huanqiu Shibao has soothing news from the South:

China News Service, April 26 [published by Huanqiu Shibao on April 27] — Indian foreign minister Salman Khurshid answered questions from Indian media on April 25, concerning the confrontational incident on the Sino-Indian border, and said that the consultation mechanism on border issues had been started. He believed that this mechanism would find a solution for the issue in question, just as it had found solutions in the past.

中新网4月26日电 4月25日，印度外长库尔希德在回答印媒体关于中印边境对峙事件的提问时表示，印中双方已启动边境事务磋商机制，相信该机制能够像过去一样，为此次事件找到解决办法。

Huanqiu Shibao quotes Salman Khurshid as saying that bilateral relations grown over many years shouldn’t break down by overemphasizing small issues and were just like some acne on a face which only required some ointment.

“我期待在下个月访问中国之前，双方能够通过外交渠道结束僵局。”库尔希德说，我们不能因为某个地方发生的小问题而毁掉双方多年来为双边关系付出的投入和心血，正如不能因为脸上有一个小的痤疮就说这张脸不美，所需做的只是敷一点药膏而已。

Kurshid was looking forward to his planned visit to China next month.

Correspondingly, only eleven clicks from the readership were made to express anger, while 374 clicks express delight. Still, 46 clicks find the article (or the news) ridiculous. Both the “delight” and the “ridiculous” numbers are increasing quickly. Those readers who take the trouble to comment appear to be less conciliatory though.
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4. Emergency Radio Frequencies (older news)

On Monday, Central People’s Broadcasting Station (中央人民廣播電台, CPBS, now also known as China National Radio, but only the English name changed in 1998) started special emergency broadcasts in the wake of the Lushan earthquake. These were the first broadcasts of this kind, according to CPBS itself. A studio was established in the hardest-hit county of Lushan, broadcasting rescue information, expert interviews, news, psychological support and consolation, and practical information. Frequencies used were 9,800 kHz and 12,000 kHz on shortwave and 92.7 MHz on VHF/FM.

The 6th plenary session of the CCP’s 17th Central Committee^*)  had issued plans for such an emergency broadcasting system, and the plans were then included in the country’s 12th five-year plan, according to CPBS.

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Note

^*) the same plenary session adopted the party’s cultural decision, in October 2011.
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Jin Yinan: The Fundamental Difference

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1. Translation

Published by People’s Daily Online (人民网) twelve days ago, as part of an interview and discussion series:

People’s Daily Online, January 5, 2013 (Reporter: Huang Zijuan) PLA National Defense University Strategic Research Institute director General, professor Jin Yinan, was recently a guest at People’s Daily Online’s “National Defense Culture Examples” interview series, discussing issues of “strategy cultures and modern defense” with netizens and exchanging views with them.

人民网北京1月5日电 （记者 黄子娟）近日，国防大学战略研究所所长金一南教授做客人民网“国防文化系列访谈”，就“战略文化与现代国防”的话题与网友交流。

When discussing Sino-American strategic cultural differences, Jin Yinan said that Sino-American strategic cultural differences were very big. Rabindranath Tagore had once said that conflicts and conquest [or subjugation] were quintessential in the spirit of Western nationalism, and its core was definitely not about cooperation. National interest as permanently defined by America was the core of its strategic culture, mainly:
1. safeguarding global freedom of action for America, to go whereever it wanted to, without anyone being in a position to stop them
2. Making sure that major strategic resources and markets would be acquired. This includes oil, natural gas, and all kinds of resources America needs
3. holding back hostile and opposing forces, and controlling key regions.

在谈到中美战略文化的区别时，金一南表示，中美的战略文化差别很大。泰戈尔曾经说过，冲突与征服是西方民族主义精神的精髓，它的核心绝不是合作。美国界定的永久性的国家利益就是它的战略文化的核心，主要体现为：第一，确保美国的全球的行动自由，想去哪去哪，谁也不能阻挡我；第二，确保获得重要的战略资源和重要的市场。包括石油、天然气以及各种各样美国所需要的资源；第三，阻止敌对力量，控制关键区域。

Jin Yinan said that here, the fundamental strategic interest defined by America had no ideological color, and its defined lasting national interests included nothing about human rights either. The core was America’s interest, whichever way it could be achieved. This was mainly through control, conquest [or subjugation], to talk again if conquest didn’t work, to cooperate, to make unilateral gains when feasible, and to enter win-win when unilateral gains weren’t achievable. This was the biggest difference between China’s and American strategic cultures.

金一南说，这里面，美国界定的根本战略利益追求，没有意识形态的色彩，而且它制定的永久性的国家利益也不包含人权这么一说，核心是美国的利益，这个利益怎么实现，主要是通过控制、征服，征服不了再谈判、合作，能单赢就单赢，实在不能单赢只好双赢，这是中美的战略思维差别很大的地方。

Remarks

Appropriating Rabindranath Tagore in the context of delivering damning assessments of America’s “strategic culture”, and beautifying implications about China’s, may amount to subjugation, too. Here is how Isaiah Berlin  (quoted by Amartya Sen) described Tagore’s view of political liberty:

Tagore stood fast on the narrow causeway, and did not betray his vision of the difficult truth. He condemned romantic overattachment to the past, what he called the tying of India to the past “like a sacrificial goat tethered to a post,” and he accused men who displayed it – they seemed to him reactionary – of not knowing what true political freedom was, pointing out that it is from English thinkers and English books that the very notion of political liberty was derived. But against cosmopolitanism he maintained that the English stood on their own feet, and so must Indians. In 1917 he once more denounced the danger of ‘leaving everything to the unalterable will of the Master,’ be he brahmin or Englishman.

Tagore’s criticism, used by General Jin in his strategy-culture discussion, was part of India’s struggle against British colonialism. But – as Amartya Sen (2001) sees it – while Tagore consistently and growingly sharply criticized British administration over India, his criticism was less noticed than that of other opponents of Britain’s colonial rule:

This point – Tagore’s criticism – is often missed, since he made a special effort to dissociate his criticism of the Raj from any denigration of British—or Western—people and culture.

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Related

» Espionage, not Corruption, NTDTV, Aug 31, 2011
» Discussion leaked, Taipei Times, Aug 30, 2011
» Strategic Culture, Jeffrey S. Lantis via asrudiancenter, Nov 4, 2008

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Deutsche Welle: Before we go Off Air Forever, tell us how you feel about Sino-Indian Relations

Deutsche Welle‘s (Voice of Germany) Chinese service will reportedly no longer be on the air. Shortwave broadcasts to China are to end soon, reports Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg‘s (RBB) shortwave editor. The winter broadcasting schedule which is going to take effect on October 28 does still include shortwave frequencies for the Chinese service, but these transmissions, relayed from the United Arab Emirates and from Singapore, could be cancelled on short notice.

Two sweethearts, and the summerwind:
Deutsche Welle Singapore summer frequency, 11965 kHz, …

… and Deutsche Welle United Arab Emirates summer frequency, 17770 kHz.

According to the German Journalists Association (Deutscher Journalisten Verband), Deutsche-Welle spokesman Johannes Hoffmann told EPD Media that shortwave had lost much significance in China, and that according to estimates, the number of users in China who accessed the station’s internet content surpassed the number of shortwave listeners.

A Taiwanese blog, Taipei DXer, wrote on Thursday that neither of the two summer frequencies currently used by Deutsche Welle, 11965 or 17770 kHz, had recently provided great reception. 17770 kHz was S=3 (moderate) at best, and sometimes as bad as SIO=131. Signal quality on the Singapore frequency of 11965 kHz had also  been poor recently, Taipei DXer wrote. The blog didn’t mention the reported closure in that post, and the Chinese-language web in general doesn’t seem to take note of the issue. Apparently, Deutsche Welle itself  hasn’t reacted to the RBB and journalist-association reports yet.

The German Culture Council (Deutscher Kulturrat) criticized the decision to cut all shortwave frequencies in a press release on October 1. Deutsche Welle, which supplied quality journalism and was highly appreciated globally, as an independent source of information, a cultural ambassador and a builder of bridges for intercultural dialog needed appropriate and continuous funding (Der Deutsche Kulturrat setzt sich seit Jahren für eine angemessene und kontinuierliche Finanzierung der Deutschen Welle ein. Die Deutsche Welle liefert Qualitätsjournalismus und ist weltweit als unabhängige Informationsquelle, Kulturbotschafter und Brückenbauer für den interkulturellen Dialog hochgeschätzt).

“Broadcasting freedom (Sendefreiheit) needs shortwave”, says the Cultural Council’s headline, which may or may not refer to the freedom of the airwaves or freedom of radio (Rundfunkfreiheit).

Christian Höppner, who doubles as a member of the Deutsche Welle broadcasting commission (Rundfunkrat) and the Cultural Commission’s vice president, said that

Switching off shortwave is a wrong signal. Other countries have recognized the significance of their foreign broadcasters long ago and are investing much more into their media ambassadors. The German Bundestag [federal parliament] and the federal government need to secure the performance of Deutsche Welle’s public mission for the future, too, by significantly increasing the financial resources, as after the reform process, cost reduction potentials have mostly been exhausted.
(Die Abschaltung der Kurzwelle zur Verbreitung des Programms der Deutsche Welle für den chinesischen Senderaum setzt ein falsches Signal. Andere Länder haben die Bedeutung ihrer Auslandssender längst erkannt und investieren in erheblich höherem Maße in ihre medialen Botschafter. Der Deutsche Bundestag und die Bundesregierung sind gefordert, die Erfüllung des öffentlichen Auftrages der Deutsche Welle durch eine signifikante Erhöhung der finanziellen Mittel auch für die Zukunft sicherzustellen, da nach dem Reformprozess die Einsparmöglichkeiten weitestgehend ausgeschöpft sind.)

Deutsche Welle has certainly done its best to save money: in a listerners’ essay contest launched on September 19 this year, only one I Pod Nano 8 GB was offered for the overall winner. The next five winners would earn themselves one piece of high-quality electronic scrap  – i. e. shortwave receivers – each, probably to listen to China Radio International.

But then, maybe Deutsche Welle itself only learned about the planned closure of their shortwave frequencies some time after mid-September. Or maybe they are still hopeful to retain at least two shortwave frequencies. Or the radio sets had been in the storeroom for decades, and this was Deutsche Welle’s last chance to get rid of them.

Either way, if you aren’t professionally connected with the station and fulfil some other requirements, too, you can still send them your essay (in Chinese) on what Sino-Indian relations mean to you. October 15 will be the closing date.

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Update, Oct 17, 2012

According to Taipei Dxer, a blog also mentioned within the post above, Deutsche Welle announced its winter frequencies on October 13. From October 28, frequencies would be 9,610 kHz from 13:00 – 13:30 GMT, and 11,600 and 13,700 kHz from 13:00 – 14:00 GMT. Apparently, still no announcement from DW about an impending end to shortwave broadcasting in its announcements.

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Related Tags

» Deutsche Welle
» shortwave

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Shortwave Log, Northern Germany, August 2012

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Voice of Korea

The Voice of Korea (VoK), previously known as Radio Pyongyang, is the international broadcasting service of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. When I listened to the station in the 1980s, you got the national anthem at the beginning, and following that, some frequency announcements and the news. Since then, two not-so-collective leaderships, i. e. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, have died, and all VoK programs begin with the national anthem, a song for Kim Il-sung, and another for Kim Jong-il (both military marches). But there’s still space for the news, readings from the works of Kim Il-sung, and a mixture of military marches and folk music (the latter of which is occasionally quite nice, but more frequently kitsch, sometimes with apparent Swiss characteristics).

Radio Pyongyang – renamed Voice of Korea since -, QSL card, 1989.

There is currently no interference on 13760 kHz at 13:00 GMT (click here, or picture above, for a digital recording), but the Chinese program, although more silently than the scheduled English program, can be heard in the background, too. It is probably on the same feeder between the studios and the shortwave transmitters.

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Recent Logs

Thanks to long vacations, it’s a pretty big list for August.

International Telecommunication Union letter codes used in the table underneath:
AFS – South Africa; AIA – Anguilla; ARG – Argentina; ASC – Ascension Island; CHN – China; CLN – Sri Lanka; CUB – Cuba; IND – India; IRN – Iran; ISR – Israel; KRE – North Korea; MNG – Mongolia; PAK – Pakistan; RRW – Rwanda; RUS – Russia; SYR – Syria; THA – Thailand; TIB – Tibet; UAE – United Arab Emirates.

Languages (“L.”):
C – Chinese; E – English; Fa – Farsi; G – German; H – Hebrew; K – Korean; Pa – Pashto; Th – Thai; R – Russian; T – Tibetan.

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kHz	Station	Ctry	L.	Day	Time GMT	S	I	O
5960	PBS Xinjiang	CHN	C	Aug 2	23:00	3	4	3
7240	PBS Tibet	TIB	C	Aug 2	23:13	3	4	3
9330	Radio Damascus	SYR	G	Aug 3	18:00	2	3	2
15700	Voice of Russia	RUS	G	Aug 4	09:30	4	5	4
9430	China Radio International	CHN	C	Aug 4	14:21	4	5	4
6000	RHC Habana	CUB	E	Aug 5	03:00	3	3	3
6090	Caribbean Beacon	AIA	E	Aug 8	00:41	4	5	3
11540	VoA Radio Deewa	CLN	Pa	Aug 8	01:36	3	5	3
15850	Galei Zahal	ISR	H	Aug 8	02:55	3	5	2
6973	Galei Zahal	ISR	H	Aug 8	03:05	3	3	3
13850	KOL Israel	ISR	Fa	Aug 8	13:59	4	4	4
15760	KOL Israel	ISR	Fa	Aug 8	14:35	4	4	4
4920	Tibetan Radio1)	TIB	T	Aug 8	21:58	4	4	4
4800	CNR	CHN	C	Aug 8	22:28	3	4	3
15235	Channel Africa	AFS	E	Aug 9	17:00	3	4	3
11290	Royal Air Force Volmet2)	ASC	E	Aug 9	19:18	4	4	4
9490	Deutsche Welle Kigali	RRW	E	Aug 9	20:27	4	4	4
12010	Voice of Russia	RUS	G	Aug 11	15:55	4	3	3
9855	Radio Australia	UAE	E	Aug 12	23:20	3	4	3
17895	All India Radio	IND	E	Aug 13	10:00	3	4	3
15180	Vo Korea	KRE	E	Aug 14	10:00	3	4	3
17820	Radio Thailand	THA	Th	Aug 14	10:31	4	5	4
15275	Radio Pakistan3)	PAK	E	Aug 14	11:00	?	?	?
9805	CNR	CHN	C	Aug 14	23:00	4	5	4
11710	CNR	CHN	C	Aug 14	23:05	4	5	4
9325	Vo Korea	KRE	K	Aug 15	20:01	4	5	4
15345	RAE Buenos Aires	ARG	G	Aug 15	20:55	4	3	3
9680	Radio Thailand4)	THA	G	Aug 20	20:00	4	4	5
21590	IRIB Tehran 5)	IRN	E	Aug 21	10:28	4	5	3
12085	Vo Mongolia	MGL	C	Aug 23	10:00	2	4	2
9330	Radio Damascus 6)	SYR	R	Aug 23	17:24	3	5	3

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Notes

¹⁾ SIO 444 on parallel frequency 4905 kHz
²⁾ probably Ascension Island
³⁾ SIO = 3, but modulation as bad as usual.
⁴⁾ Interference from 9675 kHz, probably Radio Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), Turkish-language program.
⁵⁾ SIO 454 on parallel frequency 21640 kHz
⁶⁾ Modulation as bad as usual, but the better reception than later in the evening (as usual in August).

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Related

» Previous Logs, August 2, 2012

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Sino-Korean-German Press Review: Boundless Antipathy

The Empire of Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945. As every schoolkid knows, the defeat of Japan, and the liberation of much of Asia, was invented in China. And on days like these, the Chinese press has a few demands on Japan:

Japan mustn’t go too far in provoking China. Japanese officials should think twice before uttering provocative words. In modern history, all the conflicts between China and Japan were caused by Japanese invasion. Japan has no right to attack China bitterly as it does today. The Chinese public has boundless antipathy toward Japan.

Global Times (English ed.), Aug 27, 2012
H/t to Peking Duck

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And for those dear readers who get no satisfaction from the milksops at the Global Times and their pussyfooting editorials, here is how the North Korean Worker’s Party celebrates its great victory (the Japanese surrender was also invented in North Korea, as every North Korean schoolkid knows):

All facts urgently require all the youth and students in the north and the south to pool their spirit of national independence, patriotism, wisdom and strength to force Japan to settle its past crimes and take the lead in the actions for checking its militarist moves for reinvasion.

Inheriting the indomitable spirit of independence and patriotic enthusiasm of the passionate anti-Japanese martyrs, we will take the lead in the actions to force Japan to make reparation for its past crimes at any cost and decisively frustrate its militarist moves for reinvasion.

KCNA (Japan), August 29, 2012

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Voice of Korea website, September 2, 2012

On International Affairs, the Voice of Korea (VoK)  informs its listeners / readers about Japanese imperialists, blood-thirsty murderers – see picture above. The link doesn’t open (most links on VoK’s website don’t, and may require software downloadable from there), but from Pyongyang’s perpective, it probably doesn’t matter if we live in 1945, or in 2012.

Meantime, Kim Jong-nam is – or was – in Tehran, representing North Korea as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Iran, who took the NAM chairmanship during the summit last week, had actually invited Kim Jong-un, who – “only” – sent North Korea’s parliament president, his namesake Kim Jong-nam., German (right-leaning) daily Die Welt wrote six days ago.

Die Welt knows everything about North Korea and Iran, of course, and had a retired  German defense bureaucrat explain how the two countries might be building a nuclear bomb together – see second half of that post. But they don’t seem to know who Kim Jong-nam is (Kim Jong-il’s eldest son and therefore Kim Jong-un’s elder brother, who hasn’t played a role in North Korea’s Worker’s Party since he tried to enter Japan’s Disneyland using a fake passport).

Anyway – who cares. They are all rogues, are they not?

I’m realizing that I’m growing older. The NAM wasn’t very powerful, and its prestige limited (überschaubar), wrote Die Welt in its article last week. They probably weren’t terribly fond of UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon‘s attendance at the NAM summit.

Which makes me wonder. Iran may not enjoy a great reputation even among the NAM states, but it is hardly outlawed (geächtet), as Die Welt suggests.

Boundless antipathy appears to justify all kinds of historical misrepresentations, be it in China, North Korea, or Germany. The world is becoming smaller, and its media are moving closer together – in their methodology, not in their ideological positions, of course.

Even when I was a child, the NAM was mentioned on the news in Germany every once in a while, and members such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt made – and make – it a movement with quite some prestige.

That hasn’t really changed. But maybe some of Germany’s press has become, umm,  bush-league during the 1990s.

What the Dalai Lama’s (potential) Travels may have to do with Soviet History, Oil Prices, and the South China Sea

The Dalai Lama hopes that the new, coming leadership would be more lenient, according to Reuters. Reuters writes that

[i]n the early 1950s, the Dalai Lama knew Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, one of the most liberal leaders of the Chinese revolution, who was known to have had a less hardline approach to Tibet.

Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋) is said to have opposed the 1989 Tian An Men crackdown, about a year after his retirement in 1988. The article suggesting this stance by Xi Zhongxun also suggests that Xi Jinping himself is the only leader who served in the military. If true, this could mean that he has a more realistic view of the limited use of violent crackdowns. However, according to a Singapure National University document, Xi Jinping’s military role was rather political:

Unlike other frontrunners of the fifth generation leadership, Xi has had some
military service before. Upon his graduation from Qinghua University in 1979, he worked for Geng Biao (耿飚), the then secretary general of the Central Military Commission (CMC), for about three years.

Meantime, Huanqiu Shibao is quoted as having reported on an eleven-day visit by the Dalai Lama to Japan, scheduled for November this year. The article can currently not be found on Huanqiu (only the search results seem to be available at Google). Beifang Net apparently republished the short news article. It closes with quoting the foreign ministry’s standard condemnation:

Concerning the Dalai issue, the FMPRC has expressed many times that Tibetan affairs are China’s internal affairs. The Dalai has for a long time been a political exile under a banner of religion, engaging in anti-China splittist activities. China resolutely opposes any country and any person making use of Tibetan issues to interfere in Chinese internal affairs.

中国外交部就达赖问题多次表态称，西藏事务纯属中国内政。达赖是长期打着宗教旗号从事反华分裂活动的政治流亡者。中方坚决反对坚决反对任何国家、任何人利用涉藏问题干涉中国内政。

Russian president Vladimir Putin told Buddhist citizens on July 31 that the Russian government worked in the direction of inviting the Dalai Lama to Russia. Feng Chuangzhi, a regular congtributor to china.com, a website operated by the state council, wrote in an editorial on August 8 that given many years of friendly cooperation between Putin and Beijing, Chinese reactions to Putin’s comment eight days earlier had been low-key, just its reaction to the Russian shelling of a Chinese fishing boat had not been radical (过激). After a short re-cap of the usual allegations against the Dalai Lama, Feng writes that

under such circumstances, the likelihood of a Dalai visit to Russia as expressed by the Russian president does, of course, hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, and can lead to contradictions emerging between the two sides [China and Russia].

在这种情势下，俄总统发出的为达赖访俄罗斯创造可能性理所当然伤害了中国人的感情，双方的矛盾可能会因此而出现。

However, the ways in which Putin and Western countries invite the Dalai are different. Putin spoke about the possibility, but didn’t make it definite. People know that a so-called possibility is no official decision. It should also be said that he made these remarks in a discussion, saying that “we obviously understand the hopes of our people living here in [the Republic of] Kalmykia that the Dalai Lama comes to them”.

但是，同样说邀请达赖，普京与西方等国邀请达赖的口角就有所不同。普京只是说到创造达赖访俄罗斯的可能，并未把话说死。人们知道，所谓可能性，只是一种预 测，不是正式决定。还应一提的是，所说的邀请达赖来的是在同论坛与会者们交谈时的表示，“我们当然理解我们那些生活在卡尔梅克并期待达赖·喇嘛到来的 人”。

The following lines explain the history of the “so-called Kalmyks” (所谓卡尔梅克人). Feng then returns to the present tense:

Putin promised the Kalmyks to invite the Dalai Lama to alleviate their historical wounds.  One can imagine that for some time, the Kalmyks raised the invitation of the Dalai, and as a Russian politician, [Putin] can’t ignore their wishes, but he also can’t be unaware of the Chinese government’s attitude towards the Dalai, and therefore can’t simply do things that would lead to tensions in Sino-Russian relations. Agence France-Presse said on August 1 that Putin had always acknowledged China’s position concerning the Tibetan issue, and believed that the Dalai was “a politicial personality engaging in secession”, and that the Dalai’s announcement of abandoning the political role had perhaps changed Russia’s traditional approach. “The Australian” said that perhaps, Putin’s remarks on July 31 marked “a turning point in attitude”. There are Western media that say that if Putin, only for a single day, allows the Dalai Lama to visit Kalmykia, it would put Sino-Russian relations to a direct test. Therefore, Putin’s invitation to the Dalai Lama is rather to curry favor with the Kalmyks, and also rather makeshift.

普京面向卡尔梅克人承诺邀达赖访问一事其为平抚卡尔梅克人历史创伤之意。可以想到，一段时间以来，卡尔梅克人早就发出了邀请达赖来访的声音，身为俄罗斯政 治家，不能不顾及卡尔梅克人的意愿，但普京也不可能不知道中国政府对达赖的态度，决不会冒然做令中俄关系紧张的事情。法新社1日说，普京一直认同中国西藏 问题立场，认为达赖是“从事国家分裂的政治人物”，去年达赖宣布放弃政治角色，或能让俄改变传统做法。《澳大利亚人报》称，普京7月31日的发言或是“态 度转变的契机”。有外媒称，普京一旦允许达赖访问卡尔梅克，将“对俄中关系构成直接考验。因此，普京发出邀请达赖访俄更多是讨好卡尔梅克人之意。也就是权 宜之计。

It wasn’t clear if Putin also “played the Dalai card” to put pressure on China in negotiations about the price for Russian oil, where there was disagreement between the two sides, writes Feng, and also gives Russia’s alliance with Vietnam a mention. Feng doesn’t describe Russia as a foe, but uses quotes instead to whip up  readers’ paranoia. Referring to Cam Ranh Bay, among other recent issues in the news, Feng quotes analysts:

Russia’s president Putin wants to tie China down and weaken it by inviting the Dalai. It wants to slow Chinese action against Vietnam down, thus giving Russia the opportunity to arm and support Vietnam, and to build military bases in Vietnam.

俄罗斯总统普京想通过达赖来牵制削弱中国，企图通过捏中国的痛处，迫使中国放慢对越南动手的脚步，使俄罗斯能够有机会武装、援助越南，并且有时间在越南建立军事基地。

China and Russia are friendly neighbors, and to promote Sino-Russian friendship is the mainstream volition of the people on both sides. The most important thing in their relations is to respect territorial sovereignty and integrity, and each others core interests. If core interests are involved, contradictions will arise. This author [Feng] believes that both countries’ politicians, facing a complicated international situation, will handle sensitive issues, including those of  the “Dalai Lama card” type, appropriately. Floating clouds won’t blind them, and they will maintain and promote the general situation of Sino-Russian friendship.

中俄是友好邻邦，促进中俄友好是两国的主流民意。两国关系最重要是尊重领土主权完整，尊重双方的核心利益。一旦涉及核心利益，矛盾就会萌生。笔者相信，面对复杂的国际形势，中俄两国政治家会妥善处理包括打“达赖牌”之类的敏感问题，不被浮云遮望眼，保持和推进中俄友好大局。

I’ve sometimes wondered what it may feel like, for the Dalai Lama’s emissaries, to “negotiate” with Chinese cadres. Articles like Feng’s seem to give me a vague idea.

(CRN) CNR Interference with Voice of Mongolia

When listening to 12,085 kHz shortwave this morning^*), some time after 10:30 Greenwich Mean Time, I initially thought that the Voice of Mongolia (VoM) had expanded its broadcast in Chinese at 10:00 hours GMT, from thirty to sixty minutes. In fact, it was China National Radio (CNR) on shortwave which obliterated the Voice of Mongolia’s half-hour broadcast in English, which starts at 10:30 GMT.

When trying to listen to Taiwanese shortwave stations, I usually happen on CNR, too – they seem to “accidentally” broadcast on the same frequencies, and the reason may be – just my guess – that they consider this somewhat more “polite” than the outright jamming that occurs on the frequencies used by stations like Sound of Hope (Xiwang zhi Sheng), or the BBC, or the Voice of America. After all, relations with Taiwan have “warmed”, according to Beijing’s, Ma Ying-jeou’s, and many international news agencies. Fighting harmful information from Taiwan with the “firedrake” may therefore be deemed inappropriate by Beijing’s protocol. The protocol doesn’t count however when it’s Sound of Hope which broadcasts from Taiwan. The Voice of Hope broadcasting site appears to be Tamsui (aka Tanshui).

But it is hard to tell if the CNR broadcast on 12,085 kHz, interfering with the VoM, is really intentional jamming. VoM’s Chinese-language broadcast which precedes the English program (and which I also listened to) apparently wasn’t impaired by Chinese broadcasts this morning, at least not in the beginning.

Interference on 12,085 kHz, Mr Soumya / Youtube (click picture for source)

Either way, Mr Soumya, a YouTube user, is angry. Voice of Mongolia’s English language transmission blocked by strong QRM from China Narional Radio (CNR1) August 2012 1040UTC+, he wrote on Monday, and: Curse the Chinese!!

That said, he uses a Tecsun receiver.

I searched for “Voice of Mongolia” and “jamming” once I noticed that what I heard after 10:30 wasn’t really the Voice of Mongolia anymore.

Anyway, dear reader: next time you listen to China Radio International (CRI) – on shortwave or on FM from your local provider – spend a moment on thinking of those whose broadcasters you are allowed to hear, but who won’t be allowed to listen to your country’s broadcasts.

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Note

^*) India seems to be a much better location to listen to the Voice of Mongolia’s GMT-”morning” broadcasts, than Northern Germany. You can find my own recordings of the broadcasts here (10:00 GMT) and here (10:50 GMT).

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