Confucius Institute: State Department Directive “an Untimely End to Chinese Classes”

Main Link: Huanqiu Shibao, May 24, 2012, 03:29.

Translated off the reel, and posted right away. A link to the State-Department directive can be found under footnote 2. Links within blockquote added during translation.
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A notice issued by U.S. State Department officials on May 17, to all Confucius Institutes in America, has caused great controversy. The new notice requires existing Confucius Institutes to apply for American “certification”, to become part of regular courses, and bans Chinese teachers and volunteers to teach in middle and elementary schools. A Hanban responsible, on May 23, expressed “shock” to a Huanqiu Shibao reporter, as no consultations had preceded this notice. Insiders told this reporter that to date, American officials hadn’t explained to whom the Confucius Institutes should turn for certification. U.S. “Higher Education News”¹⁾ wrote on May 21 that the notice would disrupt Confucius Institute teaching activities. “People don’t undersstand the State Department’s sudden notice. Actually, Confucius Institutes have been on American campuses for almost ten years.” An insider told the Global Times reporter on May 23 that currently, Confucius Institutes were highly successful and influential in America, that many Americans learned Chinese, and that America was somewhat worried about this. In addition, it was election year in America, and political consideration could be behind the measures taken.
美国国务院官员签发的一项公告5月17日发往全美孔子学院，引起巨大争议。新公告规定现有孔子学院必须申请美国“认证”，成为正式课程的一部分，且禁止中方教师和志愿者在美国中小学的孔子学堂教学。国家汉办负责人23日向《环球时报》记者表示，对美方在事先没有任何协商的情况下发出这样的公告感到“震惊”。有知情者告诉《环球时报》记者，孔子学院不计学分，不授学位，不具认证的前提，美国官方迄今也从未说明孔子学院应该向谁认证。美国“高等教育新闻”网站21日载文称，国务院这一公告将打乱孔子学院的教学活动。“人们不明白美国国务院为何突然出台此项公告，毕竟，孔子学院在美国校园内已有近十年时间”。一名了解内幕的人士23日向《环球时报》记者介绍，目前孔子学院在美国搞得很成功，影响很大，美国学习汉语的人很多，美方对此有所担心。再加上今年又是美国的大选年，美国出台这些措施可能有政治方面的考量。

The notice was reportedly issued by Robin Lerner, the State Department Deputy Secretary in charge of Educatonal and Cultural Matters and private-sector exchange. The notice says that while Confucius Institutes may be beneficial to promoting cultural exchange, its activities “need to be in accordance with the standards of exchange, and respect the relevant law and regulations”. “Professors, researchers, short-term visiting scholars or institutes, as well as students, were not allowed to teach in primary schools²⁾. [...] The notice also says that “to ensure that the Confucius Institute education corresponds with and maintains suitable regulations and standards, the Institutes must apply for American certification”, “on initial examination, it isn’t clear if the Confucius Institutes will get American certification”. The State Department allows currently teaching Confucius Institute teachers with J-1 visa to continue teaching until the end of the school year in June, but won’t renew their visas. If they wish, they can return to China to apply for appropriate exchange project visas.
据悉，签发这一公告的是美国国务院负责教育和文化事务局私营部门交流的副助理秘书长罗宾•勒纳。公告称，尽管孔子学院可能有益于促进文化交流，但其所从事的活动“必须符合正确的交流规范，遵循相关法规”。“教授、研究学者、短期访问学者或学院、大学学生不允许在公立和私立小、中学教学，否则便与有关交流访问项目法规相违。 [.....] ”公告还称，“为确保孔子学院的教育符合和保持适合的规定标准，孔子学院必须申请美国认证”，“美国国务院的初步审视并不清楚这些孔子学院是否得到美国认证”。美国务院允许目前持有J-1签证的孔子学院教师继续留至2012年6月本学年结束，但不会为他们续签签证。如果他们愿意，可回中国再申办一种合适的交流项目签证。

There are Confucius Institutes at 81 American universities. The notice has caused wide-spread shock, confusion, and incomprehension. Confucius Institutes in all places said that the notice was “surprising” or “unusual”, and there were discussions everywhere as to how to deal [with the situation]. Huanqiu Shibao has learned that J-1 visas are a kind of non-immigration visas, issued to foreigners who participate in “exchange and visitor programs approved by the State Department”. An official survey concerning J-1 visa holders was carried out early this year.
81所美国大学内设有孔子学院。这一公告已引起广泛的震惊、困惑和不解，各地孔子学院均表示此项公告“令人吃惊”、“很不寻常”，都在讨论如何应对。《环球时报》记者了解到，J－1签证是一种非移民签证，签发给来美国参加美国国务院批准的“交流访问者计划”的各类外籍人士。今年年初，美国官方曾对持有J－1签证人员情况进行过调查。

A lady who had taught for Confucius Institutes in America told Huanqiu Shibao on May 23 that teachers sent by China to teach abroad were mainly government-sponsored, or volunteers. They all held visitor J-1 visas. She had been a volunteer, and a visa had been rather easy to obtain.
一名曾在美国孔子学院授课的女士23日向《环球时报》记者介绍，中方派驻国外孔子学院的授课老师主要有公派教师和志愿者两种，他们所持的都是访问学者J-1签证。她当时就是作为志愿者授课的，获得签证比较容易。

What people find most incomprehensible is that American officialdom requires Confucius Institutes to carry out so-called “certification”. Huanqiu Shibao has learned that to date, the State Department has not said where Confucius Institutes should turn for certification. By comparison, nothing has been heard of German Goethe Institutes, French Institutes or other cultural exchange bodies in America having received American certification. People in charge at the first Confucius Institutes established in the U.S., University of Maryland Confucius Institute and George Mason University Confucius Institute, express confusion, and say that the “certification” issue is currently being discussed. The person in charge at the George Mason University Confucius Institute hopes that the notification came without political considerations. After all, Obama’s initiative to have 100,000 students study in China was about encouraging American students to study Chinese.
令人最为不解的是美国官方要求对孔子学院进行所谓“认证”。据《环球时报》记者了解，美国官方迄今从未说明孔子学院应该向谁认证。横向比较一下，从未听说德国的歌德学院、法国的法语联盟等在美文化交流机构须得到美国认证。在接受本报记者采访时，美国第一家孔子学院———马里兰大学孔子学院及乔治•梅森大学孔子学院负责人均表示，对这一公告感到困惑，校方均在就“认证”一事进行讨论与沟通。乔治•梅森大学孔子学院负责人说，希望国务院出台的公告没有政治方面的考虑，毕竟奥巴马推动美国10万学生赴华留学项目也是鼓励美国学生学习中文。

According to explanations by a Hanban person in charge, made to Huanqiu Shibao, Hanban has sent a letter to university presidents, to carry out negotiations. The letter says that Confucius Institutes in America were established at American requests, and run in cooperation with Hanban and Chinese institutions of higher education. The Chinese side fully respected the esteemed universities’ powers to make their own decisions (自主权)³⁾, and there had never been special instructions concerning the teaching and cultural-exchange activities carried out by the Institutes. The central office provided help, such as support in that it sent volunteers, as requested by the American side. The letter also says that the Chinese side respects American governmental law and regulations, but that in this process, we do not wish to see that volunteer projects get disrupted, as this would lead to many quickly-developing Chinese-language classes coming to an untimely end, resulting in losses for the schools and students.
据国家汉办负责人23日向《环球时报》记者介绍，该机构已致信下设孔子课堂的美国大学校长，就此事进行交涉。信中表示，美国孔子学院是由美方自愿申请，并与汉办和中方高校合作举办的。中方充分尊重贵校的办学自主权，对孔子学院开设课程和开展文化交流活动及下设孔子课堂，从未有过专门指令。总部向孔子学院提供的包括派遣志愿者在内的所有帮助，均系美方所要求。信中还表示，中方尊重美国政府的法律和规定，但在此过程中，我们不愿意看到因此而造成中断志愿者项目的后果，否则将会导致很多学校蒸蒸日上的中文课程由于教师缺失而被迫夭折，致使这些学校和学生蒙受损失。

The person in charge also said that before volunteers head for America, they get an invitation from the American schools, in accordance with the Sino-American school agreements, and apply for and obtain a visa. From 2005 on, China had developed Chinese language education to help America, and had sent more than 2,100 teachers. The project had always worked smoothly. It had been believed that once teachers received an American invitation, the application would lead to a visa, and that there would be no problems. No consultations had preceded the State Department’s May-17 notice, and this was felt to be very sudden and surprising by those in charge at the Confucius Institutes.
这位负责人还表示，志愿者赴美前，是按照中美双方学校的协议，接受美方学校的邀请，申请并获准签证的。从2005年起，中方为帮助美国发展汉语教学，已派出2100多名教师，项目执行一直很顺利。原以为教师接受美方邀请，申请并获准了赴美签证，就不会产生问题。在事先没有任何协商的情况下，美国国务院5月17日发布公告，作为主管孔子学院的负责人，他感到很突然、很吃惊。

Many presidents [of universities with Confucius Institutes] were disgusted by the State Department notice, and had many objections, as they believed it interfered with their universities’ autonomy³⁾. They currently contacted the State Department and negotiated. Huanqiu Shibao also learned that to address the doubts, a State-Department official was to be sent to Maryland University to have direct talks with people in charge at the university and the Confucius Institute.
美国多所设有孔子学院的大学校长对美国这一公告非常反感，很有意见，认为它干涉了学校的办学自主权，目前正与美国国务院进行联系和交涉。《环球时报》记者还了解到，面对质疑，美国国务院官员23日将赴马里兰大学，与马里兰大学校方、孔子学院负责人一起进行面对面的沟通与交流。

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Notes

¹⁾ This is my translation of 美国“高等教育新闻”网站 – the website’s real name may be different.

²⁾ Quote:

Teaching positions in primary and secondary schools (K-12) are only authorized under the “Teacher” category set forth at 22 CFR 62.24. Teaching primary and secondary school students in public school systems or private schools is not permitted by professors, research scholars, short-term scholars, or college/university students.

(Guidance Directive 2012-06 Exchange Visitor Program – Confucius Institutes)

³⁾ 自主权, which may be translated either as the right to make decisions of one’s own, or autonomy. The term for provincial or territorial autonomy in China, for places like Tibet, would be 自治区 (autonomous regions), and is therefore not exactly the same term.

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Related

» Three Eight-Hundreds, April 19, 2009

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Sovereign Debt Crisis, hence no Conflicts of Interest

Huanqiu Shibao, April 23

French Pesidential Nominees play the China Card, Sarkozy says he Pays Close Attention to Tibetan Issue  (法总统竞选打出中国牌 萨科齐称关注西藏问题)

From our France, Germany, Britain, U.S., Russia correspondents

Huanqiu Shibao reports that an anti-Chinese overseas exile Tibetan website reported on April 21 that during the April 22 presidential elections, Dalai supporters and French paper “Nouvel Observateur” addressed the Tibetan issue. From ten nominees, nine affirmed that they would meet with the Dalai. The report says that Sarkozy told the “Nouvel Observateur that “he frequently addressed the Tibet issue in talks with Chinese leaders”, and that “Tibet is an important topic for the French people, and for me”. Hollande said that the Dalai was a “respected religious personality, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and he abandoned all political roles. Therefore, I have no reason to refuse a meeting with him”.

据4月23日出版的《环球时报》报道，一家海外流亡藏人反华网站21日报道称，法国22日迎来第一轮总统大选，达赖支持者和法国《新观察家报》提出有关西藏问题。10个竞选人有9个证实，他们将会见达赖。报道称，萨科齐对《新观察家报》表示，他经常“向中国领导人提起西藏问题”，还称：“西藏对法国人民和我本人来说是一个重要议题。”奥朗德声称，达赖是一个“受尊敬的宗教人物，诺贝尔奖得主，他已放弃任何政治角色。所以，我没有理由拒绝与其会面。”

A Chinese person living abroad told “Huanqiu Shibao” on April 22 that some countries in Europe have not abandoned “democratic” etc. issues as means of pressure on China, and provocative intentions. However, under the current difficult economic difficulties, some comparatively reasonable politicians could exercise some restraint. China’s tough stance could leave some politicians with no choice but to face the realities. If they were provocative, they would certainly have to pay a price.

一名旅居欧洲的华人22日对《环球时报》说，欧洲一些国家没有放弃在“民主”等问题上对中国施压、挑衅的意图，不过，在当前经济困窘的情况下，一些相对理性的政客可能会选择克制。从之前的事件来看，中国展示强硬立场会让一些政客不得不面对现实，他们如果挑衅，肯定得付出代价。

Beijing Normal University Political Science and International Relations department deputy director Zhang Shengjun told “Huanqiu Shibao” that these presidential elections wouldn’t change French China policies on the whole. Chinese-French relations didn’t show great conflicts of interests, and all of Europe was actively seeking cooperation with China to solve the European sovereign debt crisis.

北京师范大学政治学与国际关系学院副院长张胜军对《环球时报》说，这次总统选举的结果整体上不会改变法国对华政策。中法之间没有较大的利益冲突，整个欧洲都在解决欧债危机上积极与中国寻求合作。

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Le Nouvel Observateur, April 17, 2012

Dalai Lama – what the Candidates say (Ce qu’en disent les candidats)

Question five: Once you are president, will you receive the Dalai Lama? (Question n°5 : Une fois Président, recevrez-vous le dalaï-lama ?)

Nicolas Sarkozy:

I remind you that I’m the only president of the French Republic who talked with the Dalai Lama. That was in 2008. I also had the opportunity on several other occasions to talk about the Tibetan situation with the Chinese president. Of course, I intend to continue doing so. Tibet is an important topic for the French, just as for me. As far as the Dalai Lama is concerned, as a matter of principle, I’m not forbidding myself anything.

“Je vous rappelle que je suis le seul Président de la République française à m’être entretenu avec le dalaï-lama. C’était en 2008. J’ai par ailleurs eu à plusieurs reprises l’occasion de parler de la situation du Tibet avec le Président chinois. Mon intention est bien sûr de continuer à le faire. Le Tibet est un sujet important pour les Français, comme pour moi. S’agissant du dalaï-lama, par principe, je ne m’interdis rien.”

Francois Hollande:

The Dalai Lama is a respected religious personality, and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He has abandoned all political functions. I have no reason to refuse meeting him a priori. This will, of course, depend on the context of the appropriate time.

“Le dalaï-lama est une personnalité religieuse respectée, prix Nobel de la paix. Il a abandonné toute fonction politique. Je n’ai pas de raison de refuser a priori de le rencontrer. Cela dépendra évidemment du contexte le moment venu.”

Francois Bayrou:

If the Dalai Lama wishes to meet me, I will receive him, of course.

“Si le dalaï-lama souhaite me rencontrer je le recevrai naturellement.”

[...]

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Related

The Patriotic Road Abroad, August 15, 2009

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Soft-Power Quote: Right or Wrong

The Senator from Wisconsin cannot frighten me by exclaiming, “My country, right or wrong.” In one sense I say so too. My country; and my country is the great American Republic. My country, right or wrong; if right, to be kept right; and if wrong, to be set right.

Carl Schurz, February 15, 1872

Always with You on Shortwave: the “Firedrake”

There are good reasons to believe that in China, international broadcasters are less listened to – and especially less listened to on shortwave – than two decades ago. However, the habit is still very popular, and many posts and websites run by shortwave listening enthusiasts would also suggest that people don’t simply throw (or store) their radio receivers away, only because of the internet being available in their place. The following is a translation of a Chinese blog post, of March 14, 2012.

Sony ICF 2001 D - enemy broadcasters at your fingertips

I’ve added four footnotes, and some further explanations (“further notes”) underneath the footnotes. You will also find a recording there, with a classical case of jamming.

Main Link: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_7799bbd8010120ah.html

China has a long history of jamming international shortwave broadcasts. I remember how I was frequently puzzled when listening to the radio – why were there those strange noises on some shortwave frequencies? It was different from others. It came through on a given frequency. Come rain or shine, this sound was there. It knew no holiday. I asked my grandmother about this, and she gravely replied: “this is to interfere with enemy broadcasters”. At the time, I didn’t understand what a so-called “enemy broadcaster” is. My grandmother told me that these were stations one must never listen to, that it was bad, and that it was something Uncle Policeman might take you away for¹⁾. Although I was too young to understand what this meant, apart from the frightening chance of being “taken away”, it certainly raised my interest in the mystery of “enemy broadcasters”.

中国干扰国际短波广播的历史由来已久。记得我上小学时听收音机就经常纳闷，为什么在短波的一些频率上会有一些奇怪的杂音呢？它不同于一般的杂音，是有固定频率的。每天到了那个时候必定会出现，保证风雨无阻且节假日绝对不休息，我问奶奶那是怎么回事，奶奶严肃地说：“那是为了干扰‘敌台’。”那时的我还不太明白什么才是所谓的“敌台”。奶奶只是告诉我，那是绝对不能听的电台，是坏的，听了以后会被警察叔叔抓走的。幼小的我虽说不明白这其中的道理，但是除了对“被抓走”的恐惧之外又多了几分对“敌台”神秘感的兴趣。

Only later I understood that those “enemy broadcasters” were VoA, BBC, NHK, and other countries’ international broadcasting stations. As these countries were fundamentally different from China, in terms of ideology and social systems, their broadcasts carried their own countries’ political colors, and were therefore called “enemy broadcasters” by China. It was sort of an extension from the cold-war years. With the reform and opening, and continuous progress of society, the “enemy broadcasters” weren’t mysteries any more, and an unknown share of Chinese people who listened to the radio would also listen to these [international] stations. Of course, after listening, they weren’t found to be as terrible as legend would have it. They were just ordinary radio stations. From listening to international broadcasters, I learned a lot of things that weren’t to be found in the books, and about other countries’ customs and manners, and most importantly, I learned to look at problems from different perspectives, to think independently, rather than to let the media lead my by the nose. I learned from different surces, and drew my own conclusions. Therefore, I believe that international shortwave broadcasting is very helpful and beneficial.

后来长大了才知道，所谓的“敌台”就是指VOA、BBC、NHK等等别的国家的国际广播电台。由于这些国家在意识形态和社会制度上与中国有着根本的区别，他们的广播又带有本国的政治色彩，所以被中国称之为“敌台”。这是当年冷战思维的一种延续。随着改革开放和社会的不断进步，“敌台”已经揭去了他们神秘的面纱，中国大部分听过收音机的人或多或少的也都听过这些电台。当然，听过后才发现，其实他们并没有传说中的那么可怕。而只是一个普通的广播电台而已。从收听国际广播中我学到了不少书本上学不到的知识，也了解了不少别国的风土人情，最重要的是：我学会了换一个角度去看问题，独立的去思考，而不是被媒体牵着鼻子走，从不同的信息渠道获取信息，最后通过思考得出自己的结论。所以，我觉得短波国际广播对一个人还是很有帮助和益处的。

For various reasons however, China has still not lifted the jamming of the “enemy broadcasters”. It deserves attention that the methods of jamming have become more and more “humanized”. Rather than just producing a big noise, Central People’s Radio interfere with the international stations on the same frequency, and this later evolved into the current “folk music” interference. Obviously, as the cause our country’s modernization moves on, our jamming technology has also improved step by step. It is said that the “folk music” system used is military equipment bought at high costs, from a France. From that you can see that the Chinese authorities in charge of jamming “enemy broadcasters” are willing to make great sacrifices, with unyielding vigor.

但是，由于种种原因。中国目前还没有解除对“敌台”的干扰。不过值得一提的是干扰的方式越来越“人性化”。从当年只是单纯的放大功率的杂音，而改变为中央人民广播电台的同频干扰，后来又进化到现在的“民乐”干扰。可见，随着我国现代化事业的逐步推进，我国干扰国际广播的技术也在一步步提高。据说，现在所用的“民乐”干扰系统，是从法国高价购进的军用电台干扰设备，从这一点也可以看出，中国有关部门在干扰“敌台”这一问题上肯下血本、不屈不挠的精神和干劲。

If you aren’t familiar with how this works, let me give you a short introduction.

可能不熟悉短波国际广播的朋友还不明白干扰是如何实现的，下面我就简单的介绍一下。

All shortwave radio programs are broadcast from their own countries to the target area. Of course, if the distance is rather long, like from America to China, the signal will certainly lose some strength, and therefore, more distant countries will build relay stations closer to the target area. That’s to say, through their stronger signals, listgeners in the target area country can get a clearer signal.Of course, every broadcasting station has its own frequencies, and depending on atmospheric conditions in summer or winter, these frequencies aren’t always the same. So how does China jam them? That’s quite simple. It only needs to interfere on the same frequency, by noise, or by the current “folk music”. As the interfering stations are definitely domestic, and the international shortwave stations are broadcasting from abroad, the interfering signal is stronger, and this makes it easy to brush the foreign signals out of the door²⁾. (Apart from those, even the signals from Taiwan – the inseparable part of our motherland – can’t escape this calamity.)

所有国家的短波电台都是从本国发射信号到所需要覆盖的地区，当然如果距离较远，比如从美国传输信号到中国肯定由于距离远而会衰减，所以这些距离较远的国家会在广播目的国周围设立一些中转站。也就是说，通过他们加大信号的强度，以便使广播目的国的听众能够清晰的收到信号。当然，每个广播电台都有自己的频率，短波频率由于天气的原因一般夏天和冬天不同，所以并不是永远固定的。那么中国是如何进行干扰的呢？其实很简单，只要在需要被干扰的电台的相同频率放杂音或现在所用的“民乐”就可以了。因为国内干扰广播的发射站肯定都在国内，而国际短波广播电台的发射站一般都设在国外，所以，由于国内的干扰信号强，将“国外的声音”挡在国门外也就不是一件很难的事情了。（除了干扰国外的“敌台”，目前连我们祖国不可分割的一部分——“宝岛台湾”的电台都难逃此厄运。）

According to the International Broadcasting Commission’s³⁾ agreement, no signatory country must interfere with or interfere with other countries’ broadcasts. China also signed this agreement, but has not stopped jamming foreign shortwave frequencies. Therefore, every years, it is met with protests from some countries, but those are of no avail. These years, China spends a lot of money to buy advanced and updated equipment to update its jamming system, which is incomprehensible. However, as this is equipment bought from France, it signed an agreement not to jam Radio France Internationale. Therefore, we can listen to a clear Radio France Internationale signal here in China, without any jamming⁴⁾.

按照国际广播委员会的协议，每个签署的国家都不得干扰或者破坏别国的广播。中国当时也签署了这个协议，但是并没有停止对国外短波广播的干扰。因此，每年都会遭到一些国家的抗议，但似乎这些抗议无济于事。这些年中国反而花大价钱购进法国先进设备更新干扰系统，这不得不让人费解。不过，由于是从法国购进的干扰设备，自然就跟法国签署了只对法国国际广播电台不进行干扰的协议。所以，现在我们在国内能够清晰的收听到完全没有干扰的法国国际广播电台。

It should be said that China doesn’t jam all shortwave broadcasts. Stations without strong political messages, for example, aren’t jammed. Australia’s CVC Chinese programs etc. aren’t jammed.

需要说明的是，中国并不是在干扰所有的短波广播。比如一些政治色彩不浓厚的电台是不进行干扰的。比如澳大利亚的CVC中文广播电台等。

[...]

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Footnotes

¹⁾ Uncle Policeman may not care anymore, but he probably did until 1976. According to a thesis presented to the Faculty of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, by Erping Zhang in 2003, listening to foreign radio stations was considered a capital crime of treason in those days.

²⁾ The challenge isn’t necessarily that small. As Kim Andrew Elliot pointed out in May last year,

Shortwave arguably remains the medium most resistant to interdiction. It is the only medium with a physical resistance to jamming, because radio waves at shortwave frequencies often propagate better over long than short distances.

³⁾ This may refer to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which would more frequently be translated as 国际电讯联盟, though. One of the three ITU divisions is in charge of allocating frequencies – both terrestial and satellite frequencies.

⁴⁾ I can’t verify if there is such an agreement.

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Further Notes

The French company accused of having sold jamming equipment to China, Thales,  stated that “standard short-wave radio broadcasting equipment” sold to China by a former subsidiary in 2002 had been designed for civil purposes.

I’ve uploaded a jamming sample to Soundcloud. The broadcaster is Sound of Hope (希望之声), recorded in Northern Germany on June 17, 2011, between 13:20 and 13:32 GMT. The topic covered is the Zengcheng incident, and you can hear how the station’s signal is  beginning to drown in the jamming station’s carrier signal, before the “folk music” chimes in.

Again, this may not be exactly what listeners in China got to hear on that afternoon or evening – the “Voice of Hope” signal may have still been better there, despite the jamming, or worse, because of the jamming, depending on propagation conditions – see footnote 1 2) above.

A Shortwave America blog post contains some interesting links about Chinese jamming, including a CD quality sample of “Firedrake”, i. e. a jamming tune. The jamming station is supposed to be based on Hainan island.

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Update/Related

北京业余无线电爱好者的故事 – Ham Radio, Beijing hobbyists’ documentary with English subtitles (June 2008)

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Responsibility to Protect: Where’s the Iceberg?

Open civil war in Libya created the vacuum that drew the United Nations in. It was the grim outlook for Benghazi, its militias, and its inhabitants which stirred much of the Arab, European, and probably global public. Whenever you heard a discussion about Libya in everyday life, it was mostly about what was officially referred to as the responsibility to protect, or R2R.

MasasitMati: Beeshou's Nightmares - click picture for video

Every time when military intervention is considered, many supporters of the option suggest that the situation is exceptional, and that it requires exceptional responses. But the frequency of such military interventions – in Yugoslavia in the late 1990s, in Sierra Leone and in East Timor in 2000, in Iraq in 2003, in Lebanon in 2006, in Georgia in 2008, and in Libya in 2011, just to name a few -, hardly suggests that military intervention can still be seen as an exception.

Now, military intervention in Syria appears to become more likely – depending on the sources you read, it may already be in progress -, and one in Iran may be somewhat further down the queue.

Responsibility to protect is a norm, not a law. Even if it were a law, different states with different interests could still disagree if the law applies,or if it doesn’t. When it’s a norm, decisions will depend either on ethics, or on interests, or on a combination of both. What counts in the decision-making process is which laws or rules may serve to make international “norm enforcement” legal.

In Libya’s case humanitarian considerations were only the tip of the iceberg – in global politics, anyway, not necessarily in the press. The need to help the vulnerable – the need to “do something”, as Aidan Hehir referred to this humanitarian urge  in his The responsibility to protect and international law chapter^*) -, seemed to dominate everyday discussions.

What was the actual iceberg about? I don’t know, obviously, but the first step to understand it better should be to look at the document that made military intervention in Libya legal. UN Resolution 1973

[...] Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory [...]

An occupation force isn’t the same thing as ground forces, as far as I can see. The mandate was maxed by the intervening forces, but they weren’t necessarily in breach of it.

Which reasons did the resolution give for what was, after all, an intervention in a sovereign country? Civilian casualties, gross and systematic violation of human rights, the need for unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance, the Arab League’s support for a no-fly zone to be established, concern for the safety of foreign nationals in Libya, and the plight of refugees.

The Council welcomed the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt – tens of thousands of Libyans had fled their country, either to the east or to the west. It wouldn’t have taken too many months until Europe had faced an influx of refugees, too – in fact, Muammar Gaddafi had previously been Europe’s cooperation partner in keeping refugees from all over Africa south of the Mediterranean, and his sons had been welcome guests in Europe.

The first thing to do when judging the need to “do something” is to cool down – or to try, anyway. The beautiful language UN resolutions are wrapped into might as well be put into much more common words. Resolution 1973 became possible because Gaddafi – to various degrees – had become a disturbing factor in the business of all the stakeholders – Arab countries’, China’s, European countries’, and Russia’s.

The need to cool down also applies when it comes to the suspicions against political motivations. Many of these suspicions are certainly called for, but similar to the way many proponents of intervention monger their “morally superior” positions, many of the objections, too, are applied like cluster bombs.

It is probably wrong to think that there was that one overriding motivation (“Libyan oil” would probably be cited the most, when searching angry blog posts). It should  be more accurate to think of goal hierarchies, rather than of single goals that would define the military mission. Among a bundle of goals, the desire to avoid growing flows of refugees was probably among the bigger ones, at least in Arabia and Europe.

But while the UNSC managed to integrate all the stakeholders’ positions in 2011, concerning Libya, interests seem to differ too widely this time, concerning Syria. Besides, even benign powers like Brazil and India distrust interventionism. Brazil seems to put its reservations forward constructively:

In November, Brazil pushed the debate further by circulating a concept paper to all UN members on a new concept: “responsibility while protecting.” While the Council had cited the “responsibility to protect” civilians from mass atrocities over Libya, the Brazilians argued that the Council should develop stronger guidelines for the use of force and procedures “to monitor and assess the manner in which resolution are interpreted and implemented.” Although the Brazilian paper never mentions Libya, the purpose of its recommendations is clear: to set out constraints that would prevent a repeat of NATO’s escalation of the campaign against Gaddafi, which so quickly slipped beyond the Council’s control.

Not that only America, the Arab League, Britain or France were to blame. Practically everything deemed necessary by the authorized member states had been made “legal” by the 1973 resolution – at least in the widest sense. That couldn’t have happened without the UN security council’s agreement.

But while more  or less humanitarian initiatives might fool stakeholders with legitimate interests once, you can’t fool them every time you want.

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Note

^*) Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect, Interrogating theory and practice, ed. Philip Cunliffe, Oxon, New York, 2011, p. 85

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Related

» Sheikh Hassoun interview, Der Spiegel, Aug 11, 2011

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How can we keep Franco-German Relations “Natural”?

nannynews --

The German chancellor held an unprecedented joint TV interview with the embattled French president, and said it was only “natural” to support a fellow conservative,

the Telegraph quotes Angela Merkel. But if that’s so natural, why did no previous German chancellor get involved in French elections?

Gerhard Schröder probably came closest to that kind of brazen interference in French internal affairs when he

pitched into the French domestic debate in 2005, telling French voters that

We will reproach ourselves later if we let slip this historic opportunity to advance Europe [...]  Our children, our children’s children, will reproach us. France and Germany have a very special responsibility for the success of this process.

That, however, was a European topic – a “constitutional treaty” for Europe, frequently referred to as a “constitution”. And if Schröder didn’t damage then French president Jacques Chirac‘s and their common cause, he didn’t really help it either: on May 29, 2005, a majority of voters rejected the treaty anyway.

If  François Hollande, Mr. Sarkozy’s socialist challenger, will win the presidential elections is a big “if” anyway – especially if the Front National’s frontwoman, Marine Le Pen, shouldn’t manage to gather 500 signatures from elected officials. Most of those who would vote for her otherwise are more likely to vote for Sarkozy, if the only alternatives are further to the left.

But if Hollande should win, Merkel will have to work with a new French president – one whom she will have snubbed only months earlier.

Under these somewhat unfortunate circumstances, JR sees no other choice but to throw himself into French internal affairs, too. My advice would be that Mr. Hollande should be generous, and, if he happens to defeat Mr. Sarkozy, dedicate a few lines of his victory speech to the German chancellor, for loosening up what could otherwise be a somewhat cool beginning. He might say something like:

Thank you – thank you all. I would also like to thank Mrs. Merkel, who didn’t fail to contribute to this wonderful election result. I’m looking forward to our cooperation in the coming months and years, which, I’m sure, will be as fruitful and effective as it has been to date. Nothing is lost for Europe, if we continue to work side by side.

Everything else will develop naturally. Hollande may not be exactly as keen as Sarkozy to strangle Greece’s economy into oblivion (or out of the Eurozone), but Eastern Europeans will probably see to  that.

To date, all French and German leaders have found ways to work together – after 1949, anyway. This isn’t going to change, even if the French people should dare to part the current dream team.

“Soft Power”: Comparing China and Europe

The following are perceptions of European “soft-power” policy concepts as reviewed by He Zengke (何增科), a Chinese researcher in an official academic function, in an article published by ChinaReform (中国改革论坛网), on December 23, i. e. last month. The paragraphs from his article translated or described here are focusing on France and Germany, plus some European interaction with UN bodies like UNESCO. He’s  emphasis is on cultural soft power.

Saarländischer Rundfunk, Europawelle Saar (SR-1), QSL, 1980s, featuring the Heusweiler medium wave transmitter of 1936. Click photo for a history of the Heusweiler transmission site.

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Some of He Zengke’s views on America‘s “soft-power” policies or public diplomacy can be found in this previous post/translation.

Different from  that previous post’s arrangement, I’ve put He’s footnotes [in square brackets] to the end of this post, rather than within the translations. There’s only one note of my own in this post, following He Zengke’s.

Main link: http://www.chinareform.org.cn/Explore/perspectives/201112/t20111223_130890.htm

Links within blockquotes added during translation.

France was one of the first countries to understand the role of cultural soft power. Napoleon once said that a pen was equal to 1,000 Mauser rifles^*), and a former French minister of culture said that culture and the economy are one and the same battleground. French people believe that a cultural mission can take the place of a country’s military power.[9] In 1883, France established the Alliance Française to promote French culture. Starting in 1959, France began to define the “First Five-Year Plan for the Expansion of French Cultural Activities”, and afterwards, 25- and 35-year plans etc. were gradually developed. From the total amounts spent and per capita, France belongs to the first-ranking countries worldwide.[10] From that, it can be seen that France attaches great importance to the development and use of soft power.

法国是最早懂得文化软实力的地位和作用的国家之一。拿破仑曾经说过，一支笔等于1000支毛瑟枪。法国前文化部长曾经说过：文化和经济是同一场战斗。 法国人认为，文化使命可以代替国家武力。[9]1883年法国就建立了法语联盟，在世界各地讲授法语，推广法国文化。从1959年起，法国开始制定“关于 在国外扩张和恢复法国文化活动的第一个五年计划”（1959－1963），后来又陆续制定了“二五”、“三五”计划等。法国的国际文化交流支出从总数和人 均来看都居于世界第一的位置。[10]由此可见法国对发展和运用文化软实力的高度重视。

(…)

The state in America is described as a facilitator for cultural management, who mainly takes the role of creating favorable conditions (by tax relief or exemptions, for example), and somewhat similarly, He sees Britain as an indirect-support or state-sponsorship model, or sponsorship at arm’s length (以“一臂间距”的方式 – the government [and parliament] pass the budgets, but expert artists, by anonymous review, make the individual decisions, and box office incomes, private donations and the Arts Council England are major funding sources). France belongs to a third category, in He’s view:

France represents the direct-sponsorship model. The state finances culture through the ministry of culture, the funding decisions are made by government officials, and an artist’s position is decided by direct government funding. As artists’ decisions are respected, the official artistic community enjoys a certain degree of autonomy all the same. [25]

以法国为代表的“直接主办型”。国家通过文化部资助文 化艺术，资助决定由政府官员作出，艺术家的经济地位由政府的直接资助决定。由于尊重艺术家的决定，官方的艺术团体仍享有一定程度的自治。[25]

To complete the menu, He adds a fourth type or model, represented by the former Soviet Union:

All cultural and artistic institutions are owned and run by the state, the political leaders make the funding decisions, and the state only funds cultural product which correspond to the political standards, but doesn’t support the creative process itself.[25]

以前苏联为 代表的“直接操作型”。文化艺术机构全部由国家所有和国家经营，资助决定由政治领导人作出，政府只支持那些符合政治标准的文化艺术产品，而不是支持创造性 过程本身。[25]

In the wake of – or the run-up to – the Commission on Global Governance‘s “Our Global Neighborhood” report and the UNESCO’s “Our Creative Diversity” report in 1995 and 1996, the Council of Europe authored (or commissioned) a report titled “In From the Margins” (从边缘到中心) which emphasized that if culture was ignored, sustainable development would not be possible.

He Zengke’s description of these international processes seems to be correct, at least according to the European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research (take a look at the organizers listed at the beginning):

The themes discussed during the [North South] Conference [in September 1999] on Cultural Research and Development were identified in the Action Plan adopted by UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development in Stockholm, 1998, itself inspired by reports like Our Creative Diversity of the UN/UNESCO World Commission on Culture and Development, to which a Council of Europe Task Force contributed the Report In From the Margins, 1997.

“Creative Europe” (2002) was another step in the process, also mentioned by He.

The “Creative Europe” report, published in 2002, proposed a comprehensive definition of cultural governance, and determined the direction into which public offices [or organizations - 公共部门] , private organizations and volunteering and non-profit organizations should cooperate to promote cultural development. Cultural autonomy, decentralization (分权化), encouragement of creativity, and the turning of broader participation into a part within the cultural governance concept, were to guide the direction of the cultural system’s reform.[26]

2002发表的《创造性的欧洲》的报告为文化治理提出了一个全面的定 义，后者指的是为文化发展确定方向的公共部门、私营机构和自愿∕非赢利性机构相互合作共同推动文化发展。文化自治、分权化、鼓励文化创造性、更大范围的参 与成为文化治理理念所倡导的文化体制改革方向。[26]

He Zengke seems to read the collapse of the USSR and its eastern and central European satellite regimes (that’s obviously not how he refers to them) as the starting point of the global cultural designing process he describes, and he views decentralization and public funding at arm’s length as defining marks of developed countries’ cultural policies. He names Canada, Australia, Britain, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries in this context, but:

[..] it should be pointed out that Germany and France maintain a negative attitude to the “arm’s-length” principle. In Germany, cultural administrative power rests with different levels of government and departments belonging to government, and artistic boards are mainly forums, limited to protecting and supporting artists, and to provide some professional advice. And France hasn’t left any room for cultural administration by boards. The government, through its own cultural administrative departments, formulates the cultural policies, establishes cultural organizations, and makes cultural funding decisions.  National support and protection plays a major role in cultural development. [27]

但需要指出的是，德国和法国对“一臂间隔”原则明显持消极态度。德国对文化的管理权主要还集中在各级政府及其所属行政部门，艺术理事会只是一种论坛性机构仅限于对保护和扶持职业艺术家提供一些专业咨询意见。法国则根本没有为艺术理事会在文化管理中留下一席之地，政府通过自己的文化行政部门制定文化政策，兴办文化机构，作出文化资助决定。国家的扶持和庇护在文化发展中发挥着主要作用。[27]

[...]

France turned its cultural diplomacy into a national strategy. There are clear common goals,  and a clear division of labor between the French government and its quasi-governmental organizations.[41] France took the lead in advocating the principle of “cultural diversity”, and therefore achieved a favorable position internationally, besides America. France established many “Alliance Francaise” and other institutions in other countries, to spread the French language and culture. There are currently 1,040 Alliance-Francaise locations in 136 countries on all five continents, with 460,000 students. The way France spreads its culture and values,  in the process of spreading its language and culture and thus expands its influence on other countries is something to draw lessons from, to some extent.[42]

法国将文化外交上升为国家战略。对外文化交流由法国政府或准政府机构推动，彼此之间有着明确的分工和目标。[41]法国率先提出和倡导“文化多样性”原则，为美国以外各国文化发展争取有利的国际空间。法国在许多国家建立了“法语联盟”等传播法语和法国文化的机构。目前有1040个法语联盟遍布世界五大洲136个国家，拥有学生46万名。法国在全球推广法语和法语文化过程中传播法国文化价值观扩大其国际影响力的做法对其他国家有一定的借鉴作用。[42]

The way Germany shapes its image to raise its soft cultural power has commonalities with other countries, but unique aspects, too. What is unique is the way it shapes its image by historical self-examination. Germany had the dishonorable history of Nazi Germany’s launch of the Second World War and the Holocaust. After the Second World war, German governments made deep reflections on this criminal period in history and made sincere apologies. All governments in succession have insisted on facing history squarely, on reflecting the war with an attitude of profound repentance, and achieved international good will by doing so. The German population also reflected deeply on the war, thus increasing its awareness and reflection of this period. German governments turned international cultural exchange into one of the country’s three pillars of foreign policy, actively carries out foreign cultural exchanges, teaching of the German language, and public diplomacy, thus expanding its cultural influence. The “Voice of Germany” [Deutsche Welle] does its utmost to attract an audience abroad, as a provider of objective, neutral, and balanced news and commentary. Germany’s universities and foundations actively unfold initiatives to attract overseas students and visiting scholars, thus efficiently expanding Germany’s ideological and cultural influence abroad.[43]

德国在塑造国家形象提高文化软实力方面的做法与其他国家既有相同之处，又有独特之处。其独特之处在于通过反思历史重塑国家形象。德国曾有过纳粹德国发 动第二次世界大战屠杀犹太人的不光彩历史。二战后，德国政府对这段罪恶的历史进行了深刻的反省和诚挚的道歉，历届德国政府均坚持正视历史、反省战争、深刻 忏悔的态度，从而在国际上赢得了普遍的好感。德国民间也对战争进行了深刻的反思，使民众提高了对这段历史的认识和反省。德国政府将对外文化交流作为本国对 外政策的三大支柱之一，积极开展对外文化交流、德语教学和公共外交，扩大自身文化影响力。 “德语之声”尽量以客观、中立、平衡的新闻报道和评论来吸引国外听众。德国的大学和基金会在吸引留学生和访问学者、开展国际学术交流方面积极主动，有效地 扩大了德国思想文化在海外的影响力。[43]

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He Zengke’s Footnotes

[9] quoting Gong Tieying (龚铁鹰), “A Systematic Analysis of Soft Power” (软权力的系统分析), Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2008, p. 154

[10] ibid, pp. 155 to 157

[25] Zhang Xiaoming (张晓明), “Drawing on Organizational Reform and Policies Useful Experiences Abroad, Stepping up the Promotion of Our Country’s Establishment of Public Cultural System” (吸取国外体制改革和政策创新的有益经验，加快推动我国公共文化服务体系建设), recorded at the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department’s Cultural System Reform and Development Office, and the CCP’s Shenzhen Municipal Propaganda Department’s “Cultural Development Strategy Forum Reader”, volume 2 (文化发展战略论坛文集（二）) – Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2006, pp. 139 to 141.

[26] Guo Lingfeng (郭灵凤), “EU Cultural Policies and Cultural Management”, (欧盟文化政策与文化治理), in: “European Research” (欧洲研究), No. 2, 2007, pp. 64 to 76

[27] Li He (李河),  “Developed Countries’ Contemporary Cultural Policies at a Glance” (发达国家当代文化政策一瞥), China Net (中国网) as quoted by a website which apprently no longer provides the source – http://www.jllib.cn/lecture/ref/20040630.pdf

[41] Zeng Heshan (曾河山), “Looking at the Molding of the Country’s Image from Britan’s, France’s and South Korea’s Cultural Strategies” (从英法韩文化战略看国家形象的塑造), in: “The Great External Dissemination” (对外大传播), No. 2, 2007, pp. 53 to 54.

[42] Zheng Tianzhe (郑天喆), “France’s Experience in and Inspiration from the Establishment the Establishment of Soft Power”, research sub-report, 2009

[43] Lu Lu (鲁路), “Federal Germany’s Policy of Promoting Cultural Soft Power” (联邦德国促进文化软实力的政策), research sub-report, 2009

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Note

^*) The Mauser arms company was established in the 1870s. Chinese history-writing may be rather focused on the Mauser, as the KMT used one of Mausers’ later models (apparently the Mauser Karabiner 98 kurz)during the 1927 Shanghai uprising (see second half of that post). It may also be that Napoleon III, for example, rather than Napoleon I, made this gun-pen comparison after his abdication, or that “Mauser” is a rather free translation by He, for French or German firearms in general.

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Related

» Truthfulness is Everything, April 8, 2011

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“Soft Power”: Comparing America and China

The following is an account of an article by He Zengke, a scholar of politics,  director of the World Developmental Strategy Research Department at the Central Editorial and Translation Office (中央编译局世界发展战略研究部主任), and deputy director at the Beijing University Governmental Innovation Research Center (北京大学中国政府创新研究中心副主任) – see here for further details. It was published by ChinaReform (中国改革论坛网), on December 23 this year.

"Top: Chinese students listening to VOA broadcasts during the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square", "Voice", Oct/Nov 1989, p. 4 (VoA magazine)

He Zengke’s original footnotes are in [square brackets]; mine are in (round brackets). He Zengke’s footnotes are added at the end of every blockquote translation, or within my indirect account of his paragraphs respectively.

Main link: http://www.chinareform.org.cn/Explore/perspectives/201112/t20111223_130890.htm. Links within blockquotes added during translation.

Joseph Nye was the first to suggest the term “soft power” in the studies of international relations. Domestically, the general term currently is “ruǎn shílì”, but it should actually be translated “ruǎn quánlì”. It indicates the legitimacy or legality of the values, political strategies, institutional organization  initiated or pursued by a country, which earn it the other countries’ willingness to identify with these, and which constitute a country’s ability to win other countries’ support in international affairs, without issuing orders or forcing others. Nye suggests that soft power is a kind of assimilating power (co-optive power), in stark contrast to commanding others according to its own wishes, or issuing orders based on hard power, and is in fact a supple kind of international influence.[1] Nye believes that soft assimilating power and hard commanding power are equally important, in defending and promoting ones own country’s interests. The former kind of power obviously meets with less resistance, and comes at lower transaction costs.¹⁾ Nye then suggests that the resources which constitute a country’s soft power are the country’s cultural and ideological appeal, the number of its multi-national companies and their strength, and the degree to which it leads in shaping international bodies’ policies and resources, etc.[2]

美国学者约瑟夫·奈在国际关系研究中率先提出“Soft Power”的概念，国内目前通称“软实力”，其实应译为“软权力”。它是指一国所倡导或奉行的价值理念、政策战略、制度安排的正当性或合法性获得他国的 自愿认同而在国际事务中无须通过命令或强制等方式赢得他国支持与合作的能力。奈指出，软实力是一种同化性权力（co-optive power），它与命令他者按照自己的意志行动的硬权力或指令性权力形成了鲜明的对照，它实际上是一种柔性的国际影响力。[1]奈认为，软性的同化权力与 硬性的指挥权力同等重要，在捍卫和增进自身的国家利益方面，前者显然遇到的抵制更少，实现国家利益的代价更低。奈进而指出，构成一国软实力的权力资源包括 本国的文化和意识形态的吸引力、多国公司的数量和实力、自身主导的国际机制的规则和制度等资源。[2]

[1] Zheng Yongnian has thoroughly researched the limits and insufficiencies of these two methods of soft and hard power. Interested readers may refer to Zheng Yongnian and Zhang Chi, ‘Guoji Zhengzhi zhong de Ruan Liliang Yiji Dui Zhongguo Ruan Liliang de Guancha’, (‘Soft Power in International Politics and an Observation of China’s Soft Power’), chief editor Zai Yutang, Renmin Ribao Publishing House, 2009

[2] See also: Joseph Nye, translated by Men Hong, “Hard Power and Soft Power” (“硬权力与软权力”), Beijing University Publishing House, 2005 (北京大学出版社). This book’s fifth chapter (ruǎn quánlì) centrally reflects his idea of soft power.

Nye’s concept had many international repercussions, writes He, including China’s academia, among which the views of a certain Yu Xintian (俞新天) deserved particular attention.²⁾.  Yu divided soft power into three components:

• ideas, concepts, and principles;
• national and international institutions;
• strategies, policies, development patterns, national image, into which factors such as informational and inter-dependence could be included.

He goes on to say that the core of soft power is culture, and that what matters most are the ideas or concepts, thoughts, and principles the core cultural values, institutions, strategies, and institutions this core depended upon, and that the latter [three] therefore not only constituted power in terms of resources (“资源性实力”), but also operational [or procedural] power or strength (“操作性实力”). With a third footnote [3], He refers to an article by Yu Xintian: “ruǎn shílì jiànshè yǔ zhōngguó duìwài zhànlüè” (Soft Power and China’s Foreign Strategy), “guójì wèntí yánjiū” (International Studies), second issue 2008, pp 15 to 20.

Cultural soft power is treated as a sub-concept (子概念) of cultural power in general here, winning over recipients at home and abroad by generating culture, by cultural exchanges, cultural education and communication, by guidance and operation of cultural ideals. The core of cultural soft power is based on core-values thoughts, concepts and principles, cultural products are its carriers, cultural exchange activities, cultural education and dissemination media. Cultural soft power is a kind of relational power, and a country earns influence on other countries by thoughts, knowledge, and values which are worshiped and generally acknowledged in those other countries.  The country’s own ideology, concepts and principles reflect and safeguard its own interests, and earn the international community’s general recognition and acceptance, thus influencing other countries’ conduct in international affairs, diminishes resistance or obstruction it may otherwise face, and therefore helps a country to achieve its strategic goals in its international relationships, and enhances its national interest. It is because of this direct relationship between a country’s strong or weak cultural soft power with a country’s international competitiveness and its ability to safeguard the realization of its own national interest and to achieve its strategic goals that the international community in general attaches great importance to create some good methods and practice in increasing the cultural soft power of their respective countries. This deserves to be conscientiously summarized.

文化软实力的核心是思想、观念、原则等价值理念，它的载体是文化产品、文化交流活动、文化教育和信息传播媒介。文化软实力是一种关系性权力，一国在国际交往中因其所崇奉的思想、知识和价值得到普遍认同而获得了影响他国行为的能力。体现和维护本国国家利益的思想、观念和原则得到国际社会的普遍认同和广泛接受，可以影响他国在国际事务中的行为，减少自己的对外政策实施中遇到的抵制和阻力，从而有助于一国在国际交往中实现自己的战略目标，增进自己的国家利益。正因为文化软实力的强弱直接关系到一个国家的国际竞争力，关系到一个国家维护自身国家利益实现自己战略目标的能力，国际社会普遍重视提高本国的文化软实力并在提高自己软实力过程中创造出了一些好的做法和经验，值得认真总结。

He Zengke’s summary contains several – theoretical or practical – guidelines for building / exercising soft power:

1. A [soft-power] buildup needs to be included into a country’s security strategy or its national development strategy, and should be coordinated, planned and implemented from a high national strategic level
2. Culture needs to be seen as a value-adding asset in creative industries, combine all forces to develop a country’s cultural industries, strengthen the international competitiveness of its cultural industries, and its international influence
3. Attention should be paid to ideological, conceptual and principled production and dissemination, support for the country’s humanities (人文) and sociological research (社会科学研究) and development of its relevant ideological think tanks (思想库), and the work to turn the country into an international producer and disseminator of new thoughts, concepts, and principles.
4. Bringing a management [or administrational] concept into the reform of the cultural system, carrying out a strategy of decentralization, with members of governments, markets and societal forces making combined efforts to promote their country’s cultural development.
5. Implementing a multi-culturalism³⁾ policy, safeguarding cultural civil rights, seeking “unity in diversity” (多样性中的一致性), and strengthening the country’s internal cohesion.
6. Actively and voluntarily engage in the development of selling cultural products abroad, in cultural exchange, and information transmission (信息传播), in modelling a good national image (塑造良好的国家形象), and in raising ones own country’s cultural influence within the international community.

America had developed soft power on a global scale since the 1990s, promoting democratic values, writes He, under his first guideline. This had become an essential road to make America and its values safer (成为维护美国价值观安全和使美国变得更安全的必由之路). The U.S. National Security Council, directly under the president, paid close attention to the exercise of soft power and the protection of America’s cultural values as a particular means to protect America’s national security. The “National Security Strategy Report” of September 2002⁴⁾ had emphasized the importance of spreading the American way of life and promoting democracy, in order to influence  countries which were of strategic importance to America. A footnote [5] refers to a book by Zhang Baoguo (张玉国), “National Interest and Culture Policies” (国家利益与文化政策), Guangdong People’s Publishing House, 2005, pp. 103 to 104. The “Homeland Security” agency determined four strategies: (1) Promoting and fostering cultural production to manifest the great freedoms and power which served the nation; (2) to guide and to recommend to the leaders and managers within the cultural spheres to join us in this field of combating terrorism, to use the broad influence and strength of cultural production to propagate to people at home and abroad that America is the greatest country on earth; and (4) to supervise, restrict, and at times when necessary, to close cultural organizations or companies who had contacts with terrorist organizations or which could harm to national security. Related footnotes [6] and [7] refer to the National Security Council’s website [the above link leads to the White House's website - JR], as quoted by Zhang Baoguo, same book as footnote [5], page 106, and the “Homeland Security” website, also quoted there, pp. 106 to 107.

Those responsbile at the U.S. Information Agency (美国新闻署, in charge of stations such as VoA or Radio Free Asia (RFA) [The USIA is now defunct and its duties have been referred to the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the State Department - JR] are described as in charge of the strategic development of public diplomacy, thus safeguarding U.S. national security (实施美国对外文化战略开展公众外交以维护美国国家安全), and propagandize American cultural values and foreign policies, to influence public debate in other countries, thus maintaining the long-term interests of American policies. Gong Tieying (龚铁鹰), “A Systematic Analysis of Soft Power” (软权力的系统分析), Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2008, pp. 157 to 165, is quoted here – He Zengke’s footnote [8].

America had been the first country that realized how culture and industries could be linked with each other, thus creating a leap to the position of an industrial superpower. After the 1990s, cultural production had become America’s most dynamic industry, with enormous economic benefits. [Statistics there, guideline 2 ("（二）将文化视为一种创造财富增加价值的创造性产业") - JR.] He quotes from Li He (李河),  “Developed Countries’ Contemporary Cultural Policies at a Glance” (发达国家当代文化政策一瞥), China Net (中国网) as quoted by a website which apprently no longer provides the source – http://www.jllib.cn/lecture/ref/20040630.pdf; He Zengke’s footnote [15]. An excerpt of Li He Zengke‘s apparent paper or article can be found here. From his sources, He also reads diversity in terms of investors in  and funding of the cultural industry, encouraging migration by outstanding cultural workers into America, market mechanisms, fiscal tools such as tax exemptions and relief, and political and economic support for the position of cultural goods on the international markets – He Zengke’s footnote [16], Dong Weimin (董为民), “Foreign Cultural Products’ Current Status – Practice and Measures taken for their Development” (国外文化产业现状、发展措施与经验), Review of Economic Research (经济研究参考, published under the Ministry of Finance’s auspices), No. 10, 2004, pp. 19 – 20.

Countries which followed the American example in supporting the cultural industries indirectly had the state act as a facilitator – be it by tax exempts as mentioned by He above, or by special funding, combined with market mechanisms and commercial operations -, thus maintaining the sustainability and creative vitality of cultural development.

Referring back to his guideline 5 – unity in diversity -, He points to the introduction of multi-culturalism as introduced in America, Europe, Canada, Britain and Australia in the 1960s and 1970s, and this pattern’s relevance for China as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural country, in equal development of cultures and educational policies – He’s footnote [30], Wang Jian (王鉴), “Contemporary Western Countries’ Understandings of Multi-Culturalized Culture and Education” (当代西方国家对多元文化教育的几种认识), Foreign Education Research (外国教育研究), No. 2, 1994, p. 6.

Citing America as an example for public diplomacy once again, He writes that

America takes public diplomacy seriously, makes great efforts for cultural education and exchange, applies different strategies when exporting values, depending on the respective recipients, uses cultural carriers for the export of cultural values, and all these are methods to learn from[38].

[38] Li Bailing, “Practice and Measures taken by America to Increase its Cultural Soft Power”, Research Sub-Report, 2009

美国重视公众外交，在文化教育交流方面进行大量投入，区分不同受众实施不同的文化价值观输出战略，以文化产品输出为载体输出文化价值观，这些做法都有可借鉴之处。[38]

[38] 李百玲：《美国提高文化软实力的措施和经验》，研究分报告，2009年。

He Zengke’s article doesn’t only seem relevant as a source of how a Chinese – semi-official or official – academic compares China’s (cultural) soft power and policies to raise the country’s “soft power” vis-à-vis America. His review also includes a number of other countries and their soft-power approaches – France and Germany among them. But that should be material for another (much shorter) blogpost.

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My Footnotes (translation)

¹⁾ I chose “transaction costs” as a translation here, a term which would usually be used in economics. A more plain translation would be “price”, i. e. “at a lower price” in this context.

²⁾ Yu Xintian is a professor at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS).

³⁾ Multi-culturalism may or may not be the best possible translation. In Germany at least, and arguably in other European countries, too, it is now frequently criticized as cultural relativism or as what is seen as a rather inappropriate approach to conflicts explained with gaps between different ethnic populations. If you are aware of a different translation for 多元化, please advise. Not surprisingly, He points out that multi-culturalism and assimilation [as a doctrine - 同化主义] coexist in America, as only within the mainstream, participation and the acquisition of knowledge, attitudes and skills would be possible.

⁴⁾ The May 2010 National Security Report actually appears to be pretty much into American values, too – if not far beyond the 2002 report. Last year’s concept (“Our moral leadership is grounded principally in the power of our example—not through an effort to impose our system on other peoples”) may, however, come across as quite different from the Bush administration’s.
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