伊朗伊斯兰共和国对外广播电台华语台网站上颁布的频率目前不正确。 11:50 UTC(北京时间19:50-20:50)实际上使用的频率是 17700 / 17780 / 21470 / 21650千赫。
伊朗伊斯兰共和国对外广播电台华语台网站上颁布的频率目前不正确。 11:50 UTC(北京时间19:50-20:50)实际上使用的频率是 17700 / 17780 / 21470 / 21650千赫。
Tuned in to the BBC World Service last night, on 15,335 kHz (Singapore relay) and on 15,755; 13,725 and 9,410 kHz (all Thailand relay) respectively. Apart from the transmission on 9,410 kHz, all wavelengths were beamed into the direction of China, if Shortwave Info is correct.
If the jamming originates from China, it is still different from the “Firedrake” recorded here. The noise jamming the BBC isn’t a tune, but a blunt row of monotonous sound waves – click the Soundcloud symbol underneath for a recording.
The BBC’s broadcasts from Singapore start with a very traditional interval tune – the bells from St Mary-le-Bow. This interval was recorded in 1926 and has been used by the BBC World Service since the early 1940s, according to Wikipedia. If the signal is still the original from 1926, the bells don’t even exist anymore, as they were destroyed during the German “Blitz”, and replaced by new ones, cast in 1956.
Apart from China, Vietnam, too, is said to jam foreign broadcasters – Radio Free Asia (RFE) is said to be the target in the case recorded here. If it is indeed RFE should be hard to tell, because you don’t hear anything but the jamming signal.
In a statement thirteen months ago, on February 25, 2013, the BBC issued a statement saying that
[t]hough it is not possible at this stage to attribute the source of the jamming definitively, the extensive and co-ordinated efforts are indicative of a well-resourced country such as China. The BBC strongly condemns this action, which is designed to disrupt audiences’ free access to news and information.
Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying (华春莹) referred reporters to relevant departments at the time when asked about the BBC’s accusation on a press conference.
An early-morning try to catch up with some Chinese coverage of the Crimea crisis. Links within blockquotes added during translation.
Xinhua published this communiqué on Thursday morning:
Xinhua, United Nations, March 19. China’s permanent envoy to the United Nations, Liu Jieyi, said on March 19 that in China’s view, a political solution needed to be sought for the Crimean issue, under a lawful and orderly framework. All sides needed to maintain restraint and to avoid action that would exacerbate the contradictions.
The Security Council held a public session that day, concerning the situation in Ukraine. Liu Jieyi said in a speech that China had always paid great attention to the developments in Ukraine. The Security Council had discussed the Ukraine issue several times previously, and China had clearly set forth its principled position concerning the relevant issues. Respecting all countries’ independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity had been China’s consistent position.
He said that China had always upheld a just [or impartial], objective attitude. We will continue efforts to promote peace talks and to play a constructive role in a political solution of the Ukraine crisis. China has made a proposal: to establish, as soon as possible, an international coordination mechanism, formed by all parties involved, to discuss ways for a political solution to the Ukraine crisis, with no side taking action during that phase that could aggravate the situation, with the International Monetary Fund starting discussions and assisting Ukraine in maintaining economic and financial stability.
他说，中国在乌克兰问题上始终秉持 公正、客观的态度。我们将继续劝和促谈，为政治解决乌克兰危机进一步发挥建设性作用。中方已就政治解决乌 克兰危机提出建议：尽快设立由有关各方组成的国际协调机制，探讨政治解决乌克兰危机的途径；各方在此期间均不采取进一步恶化局势的行动；国际金融机构着手 探讨，并协助乌克兰维护经济和金融稳定。
He also said that the international community should make constructive efforts to mitigate the tense situation. China supports Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s good offices [mediation] in Russia and Ukraine, and [China] hopes that the international community will continue to make constructive efforts to mitigate the tense situation.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon left for Russia and Ukraine on the afternoon of March 19, to make diplomatic efforts for a peaceful solution of the current crisis.
Q: The Russian Parliament approved the use of force against Ukraine. Does China offer diplomatic support to Russia? Does China recognize the new Ukrainian government?
A: On your first question, please refer to the remarks I made yesterday. With respect to the Ukrainian issue, we uphold China’s long-standing diplomatic principles and basic norms governing international relations, and also take into account the history and complexity of the issue. It is fair to say that our position, which is objective, fair, just and peaceful, follows both principles and facts.
On the second question, judgement needs to be made based on laws of Ukraine.
Q: Some western leaders believe that what Russia did violates international law. What is China’s comment?
A: Yesterday, I elaborated on China’s view and position on the current situation in Ukraine and you may take a look at that.
I want to point out that we are aware of the historical facts and realistic complexity of the Ukrainian issue. There are reasons for why the situation in Ukraine is what it is today. We hope relevant parties can seek a political resolution of their differences through dialogue and consultation, prevent tensions from growing and jointly maintain regional peace and stability.
Qin Gang, FMPRC spokesman, March 3, 2014
Q: China says that not to interfere in others’ internal affairs is its long-standing position and it also takes into account the historical facts and the realistic complexity of the Ukrainian issue. What do you mean by historical facts? Does China view Russia’s operation in Crimea as interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs?
A:China has made clear of its position on the Ukrainian issue. As for the historical facts of this issue, please review or refer to the history of Ukraine and this region. I believe that you will understand what we mean after learning about relevant history.
On your second question, please have a complete and comprehensive understanding of China’s position. We uphold the principle of non-interference in others’ internal affairs and respect international law and widely recognized norms governing international relations. Meanwhile we take into account the historical facts and realistic complexity of the Ukrainian issue. You may also analyze why the situation in Ukraine is what it is today based on activities and behaviors of relevant parties in the past months.
Q: Chinese and Russian Foreign Ministers had a telephone conversation yesterday. The Russian side says that China backs Russia’s position on the Ukrainian issue. What is China’s comment? Please give us more details and China’s position on the Ukrainian issue.
A: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov had a telephone conversation yesterday. Foreign Minister Lavrov talked about Russia’s position and viewpoint on the current situation in Ukraine and the two sides had an in-depth exchange of views on that. Both believe that a proper settlement of the Ukrainian crisis is of vital importance to regional peace and stability.
We have already issued China’s principle and position on the Ukrainian issue.
Qin Gang, FMPRC spokesman, March 4, 2014
“(The turmoil) doesn’t have a great impact on daily life and on Chinese overseas students studying here in Crimea”, Yu Junwei, a second-grade graduate student at Crimea Comprehensive University’s Faculty of Management tells the “Huanqiu Shibao” reporter[s]. “The most tense two days were those of the stand-off in front of the Crimean parliament building, between pro-Russian forces and anti-Russian factions, when classes were suspended. At all other times, we regularly had classes.” A student from Sichuan who is interviewed together with Yu says: “I’ve been here as a student for five years, and after graduation, I want to stay here to work for some time. After that, I will think about returning home.” She says that Crimea is a good human and natural environment, with a rather high ecducational level, a comfortable pace of work and rather little stress in life which made her “feel at home” [or, possibly meant this way: having such a good time that one forgets to go home]. Yu Junwei has similar feelings: “Apart from studying, I also guide some domestic business delegations and earn some money to reduce my family’s burden, and also gather some social experience.” Yu Junwei says: “After Crimea has joined Russia, it should be easier to come from China to travel here, and adding Chinese peoples’ historic feelings for Yalta in Crimea, its tourism industry should develop faster, which would also somewhat improve my work prospects.”
“从生活角度来说，(动乱)对正在克里米亚求学的中国留学生 影响不大。”正在克里米亚综合大学管理系上研究生二年级的余军伟告诉《环球时报》记者：“局势最紧张的两天，也就是亲俄力量与反俄派在国会大厦对峙的时候 学校停课，其他时候我们都正常上课。”和余军伟一起接受采访的一位四川籍女生表示：“我在这里学生生活5年时间了，毕业后也想继续留在这里工作一段时间， 然后再考虑回国。”她表示，克里米亚良好的自然与人文环境，相对较高的教育水平，闲适的工作节奏和相对较小的生活压力让她“乐不思蜀”。余军伟也有同样的 感受：“学习之余，我也带一些从国内来的商务考察团，赚一些钱来减轻家里的负担，同时也能积累更多的社会经验。”余军伟表示：“克里米亚加入俄罗斯之后， 从中国来这里旅游会更加方便，加上中国人对克里米亚的雅尔塔所抱有的历史感情，该地旅游业未来会有更快的发展，我的工作前景也会更好一些。”
Because of rather high educational levels and comparatively low costs of studying abroad, Crimea has been an important place for many Chinese overseas students. [A local, employee at] Crimea Comprehensive University’s foreign affairs office] tells the “Huanqiu Shibao” reporter[s]: “1995 to 1998 were the years when most Chinese overseas students studied here, more than three hundred every year, a peak time.” Yu Junwei says: “Originally, you paid seventy US dollars a year for a bed. Now the price has risen to 500 dollars. All expenses have risen. A Chinese overseas student spends 50,000 to 60,000 Yuan RMB a year, but to study in America or Europe comes at amounts as high as 300,000 to 400,000 Yuan RMB.” However, given much lowerd thresholds in America and Europe, the numbers of Chinese overseas students in Crimea are going down. In 2014, a total number of 28 Chinese overseas students studied at Crimea Comprehensive University, Crimea Medical University and other schools.
因为当地较高的教育水平和相对低廉的留学费用。克里米亚曾经是中国留学生的重要求学地。曾在克里米亚综合大学外事办工作 的当地人吴成克告诉《环球时报》记者：“1995年至1998年间，克里米亚的中国留学生最多，一年多达300人左右，是一个高峰期。”余军伟说：“这里 原来的学校住宿费是一张床一年70美元，现在涨到500美元。所有费用加起来，一个中国留学生一年的开销也就是5万至6万人民币，而在美欧留学一年开销高 达三四十万人民币。”不过，由于美国与欧洲留学门槛近年来降低了许多，现在在克里米亚求学的中国留学生逐年减少。2014年，克里米亚综合大学、克里米亚 医科大学和其他学校的中国留学生总计28人。
After a paragraph about the technicalities of continuing studies with old or new visas in Crimea, the article turns to Kiev, where a Chinese students is quoted as saying that the most tense areas had been confined to Independence Square [Maidan] and the streets around there. The student also has words of approval for the educaton department at the Chinese embassy in Kiev: “The diplomats are OK, just great.”
[The student] says that there are about ten thousand Chinese overseas students in Ukraine, many of them in Kiev. “Costs of studying are much lower here, than in America and Europe, as well, but the educational level is not low. Therefore, the political unrest doesn’t affect the lessons, and most overseas students will continue and complete their studies here.”
Huanqiu Shibao ["Global Times"], March 26, 2014
Russian president Vladimir Putin lives in another world, possibly not in touch with reality, German chancellor Angela Merkel – reportedly – believes.
That may or may not be so. But if Foarp is right, there are people at Russia Today, the newly created propaganda machine into which RIA Novosti and the Voice of Russia have now been blended together by a presidential decree,
lives who live in a world where Germany is a failed state.
It’s an old story (occured in 2011), but one that hasn’t ended since. Nice stuff therefore for a debate about Westerners working for mere state propaganda outlets, and what they may find there. If you want to comment, please comment there.
Order at Kunming Railway Station has basically been restored, Caixin wrote on Sunday evening, March 2, quoting Xinhua newsagency. Apart from the square east of the station which is still cordoned off, everything operates normally, with not-too-long queues in front of the ticketing booths, all of which had been re-opened by 2 p.m..
In the automatic-vending-machines hall no. 2, there are people standing together and chatting.
On March 1 at about 21 hours, a serious, violent terrorist incident occured on the square in front of Kunming Railway Station. People in charge at the station said that the incident not only hampered three arriving trains with more than 3,000 passengers, while trains leaving Kunming Railway Station hadn’t been greatly impeded. From 21:30 to 23:50, a total of nine trains left Kunming. About 59,000 people went on a departing train on March 1, and about 60,000 were expected to do so on March 2.
Kunming Railway Bureau asks all units under its management to contiuously strengthen security management and preventive work along the railroads. Currently, all cadres at Kunming Railway Station are divided into four groups that maintain order, organize overtime work, strengthen broadcasts of guidance and propaganda, enabling all vending machines, opening additional ticketing booths to keep waiting queues as short as possible, and strictly carry out security checks, checking 100 percent of people and goods by hand and machine.
昆 明铁路局要求局属各单位进一步加强沿线治安防范工作。目前，昆明站全体干部分为4个组在人流密集地、行车指挥室等地现场维持秩序，组织职工加班，加强广播 引导宣传；启用全部自动售取设备，增开了临时售票窗口并适时调整窗口功能尽量减少旅客排队时间；严格安检，做到人、物100%手检、过机。
According to Huanqiu Shibao, also in an article published on Sunday evening, the “incident” occured at 21:20 hours, and the account of it is also somewhat more graphic:
In the evening of March 1, at about 21:20 hours, armed thugs stormed into Kunming Railway Station’s square, into the ticketing halls, and chopped at anyone they saw. According to latest news, by six hours today, 29 people had already died, and more than 130 been wounded. After the incident, the Secretary General of the CCP Central Committee, State Chairman, and Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping immediately issued important instructions, requiring to severely punish the terrorist elements in accordance with the law, and to resolutely overcome their arrogant aggression.
The attack was carried out with melon knives, Huanqiu (apparently) quotes China News Service (中 新社). The story centers around the observations the rescue work of a hostel employee or owner who stood at the exits of the railway hall when the attacks began. A police officer saved him and possibly others by distracting the attackers, challenging them to kill him.
Some of the fear and misery of the wounded is also described, plus some stabbing and fighting scenes, with “five people still provokingly waving their knives” (五人仍然胡乱挥舞着手中的刀不断挑衅) after the first warning shots, hence being killed or overwhelmed (one female attacker) respectively.
According to the usual Huanqiu emoticon board, 1476 readers were angry, 102 moved, 57 saddened, 46 shocked, 14 found the story ridiculous, eleven were delighted, four happy, and one was bored.
Also on March 2, the Chinese press carried reports that the 3-01 Kunming serious terrorist incident (昆明3·01严重暴恐事件) had been planned by Xinjiang separatist forces (新疆分裂势力).
Xinhua Net, March 2, 07:28 h.
2014年03月02日 07:28 来源：新华网
Reporters have learned from Kunming city government information office that evidence found at the scene of the Kunming “3-01″ incident indicates that this serious violent incident was jointly planned and organized by Xinjiang separatist forces.
In July 2013, Huanqiu Shibao spelled out five “not-afraids” to fight terrorism. The term “arrogance” (嚣张气焰) was also used in the article, which reacted to unrest in Xinjiang in June 2013. While many countries and areas worldwide were plagued by terrorism, Xinjiang was different, the article asserted.
The terrorists’ capabilities there are small. They hardly have access to military weaponry or powerful explosives. Their main tools to commit their crimes are hacking knives. They can’t shake the foundations of Xinjiang’s stability, the overall situation is under control, the normal economic development is real, and the chances for committing crimes successfully generally remain very small. This reality and phenomenon in Xinjiang is “normal” by global standards. Such things happen in a modern and prosperous society.
35 people had reportedly been killed at the time, in early summer 2013. The scope of the Kunming attacks appears to be similar.
The World Uyghur Congress denied any involvement in the Kunming attack and said there was no justification for attacks on civilians.
I’ve known many of you for a long time and now we’re all showing signs of age. I was 24 years old when our exile began and I’m nearly 79 now. Meanwhile the spirit of our people in Tibet is still strong; they have a strength that has been passed down generation to generation. Wherever we are, we shouldn’t forget that we are Tibetans. Those of us in exile number about 150,000, but what is most important is that the spirit of those in Tibet remains alive, they are the bosses. And it’s because of the hope they have placed in us that we have to keep our cause alive.
» Zhu Weiqun: keep calm, Feb 23, 2013
Main link: » Why the West keeps meddling with Tibet and Xinjiang and finding fault with China / 西方为何在涉藏涉疆问题上与中国过不去
The article was officially first published by “China Tibet Online” (中国西藏网), and republished by Xinhua online, by People’s Daily‘s CCP webpages, by Guangming Daily online (China’s offical dangwai publication), and by Phoenix (Fenghuang, Hong Kong).
The author is Zhu Weiqun (朱维群), chairman of the ethnic and religious affairs committee of the CPPC. His article suggests that the “splittist” concepts of Tibetan independence and East Turkestan islamic state hadn’t emerged on Chinese soil, but had entered China from abroad, in the wake of imperialism’s aggressions against China. Chinese-speaking readers are provided with details about British policies on Tibet from 1888 to 1914, i. e. aggressions during which false ideas of suzerainty and a Tibetan right to independence were entered into the heads of a minority upper class. In competition with Tsarist Russia, Britain had also tried to get the territories south of the Tianshan Mountains into its sphere of control, writes Zhu.
After World War 2, it had been America which encouraged Tibetan independence and supplied Tibetan forces with arms, and to this day, America was the main financer of the “Dalai clique”, constantly creating cracks and driving wedges on Chinese territory. In Xinjiang, too, it had been upper-class minorities who had been influenced in a “counter-CCP” way (not “counter-revolutionary”, interestingly), including a war by Ospan Batyr against the “People’s Liberation Army”. After the 9-11 attacks (2001), America had entered Central Asia under the name of counter-terrorism, and American support for “splittist forces” in Xinjiang had moved from behind the curtain to the fore. A John-Hopkins University project started in 2003 – apparently described by project members themselves here – denied that Xinjiang had “since ancient times been an inseparable part of China”, “violently attacked the benefits that China’s government had brought to all nationalities in Xinjiang”, and even though America understood the links between East Turkestan and al-Kaida, Taliban and the threats they constituted for America, America also still saw forces in them that could be used to put pressure on China.
After a description of the World Uyghur Congress and Rebiya Kadeer as Western (and Japanese) tools, Zhu draws a – preliminary – conclusion: China doesn’t harm the West, but the West shamelessly harms China.
The strange thing is, the perpetrators can make eloquent assertions without any feelings of shame. This can only be explained with some peoples’ view that this kind of perpetration is some kind of political tradition in some countries, a divine right earned from their Christian faith, without a need to care about the interests or feelings of the aggrieved party. The only difference between history and reality is that in history, the West applied armed force right away. These days, [the West] rather relies on its discourse hegemony, dressing its selfish interests up as “universal values”.
[The last sentence is emphasized by Zhu or by the editor.]
In a short account of the U.S.-Chinese recent history of relations, Zhu then writes that during the 1970s, America significantly reduced its support for the “Dalai clique”, so as to win China over against the USSR. The “Dalai clique” had basically turned into pariahs. The “Dalai” was well aware that America wasn’t there to help Tibet, but for the tactical necessities of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, Zhu says, allegedly claiming the Dalai Lama himself.
Likewise, Zhu argues, the March-5 riots in Lhasa in March 1989, and then the “June-4 incident” were a time when the U.S. felt strongly that the “Dalai” was of great value in containing socialist China.
So, in October 1989, as a measure to punish China, the laurel of the Nobel Peace Prize fell on the Dalai’s head, and in 1991, U.S. president Bush senior met with the Dalai, setting the bad precedent of Western heads of state meeting the Dalai. Strongly encouraged, the “Dalai” suggested at the time that Tibet should become an independent state within three years, and made remarks about a collapsing China, according to Zhu.
The article then moves into the present tense, i. e. into the new century: the Beijing Olympics 2008, the 3-14 Lhasa riots, and violent interceptions of the Olympic torch relays.
At the same time, Western leaders collectively threatened to boycott the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games, humiliated China, put pressure on the Chinese government to make concessions to the Dalai clique. Only because the situation in Tibet quickly returned to normal, and because Chinese people and overseas Chinese people all over the world raised their voices in support of the Chinese government, strongly opposing the Dalai’s and CNN’s and other Western media incidents to humiliate China, the West no longer dared to move things around.
It’s a long list of Chinese humiliations, Western aggression, Western pragmatism, Western fears (of China changing the global rules) etc., and, of course, of Chinese victories, with the corresponding ups and downs for the “Dalai clique”. Zhu’s article continues with – no specific – accusation that Western countries had seen contradictions within their societies which they suppressed, not least because of economic crisis, and contrasts this with the way the 3-14 Tibet riots (2008) or 7-5 Urumqi incident (2009) were portrayed by Western media (unfavorably for the Chinese government). Tibetan self-immolations, too, get a mention by Zhu.
The Western refusal to address Tibetan pre-CCP history as a history of exploitation and serfdom (27 manors and more than 6000 farmer-slaves owned by the “Dalais”), and a constant “brainwash” of the Western public (Zhu himself puts the brainwash into quotation marks), made it impossible for common Westerners to “correctly understand the justified nature and the necessity of the Chinese government’s struggle against the Dalai clique” (当然也就不能正确了解中国政府对达赖集团斗争的正义性和必要性).
Sooner or later, however, America would understand that double standards like these impaired their own national interests, such as links between their Xinjiang allies and al-Kaida, or extremist elements within the “Arab Spring”.
Zhu also tries to explain European inabilities to “understand China” with European history and the trend to nation-states there during the past one or two centuries. Too much national self-determination, however, would bring instability to Europe, too, he writes, citing Bosnia and the partitions of India (but not that of Czechoslovakia or, possibly, the United Kingdom and Scotland, apparently). In China, this way of ruling was simply not feasible. In short, Zhu describes economic, political, cultural and blood relationships as too intricate to apply self-determination in China. It is here where his article may become clearly more complex than this traanslation – or that’s how I see it -, but he definitely wouldn’t admit that the CCP has kept creating the situation where “self-determination can’t work”.
In many ways, the article is a comprehensive rehash of the propaganda that dominated the Chinese press and “public opinion” in 2008 and after. Nazi Germany, too, is invoked as a co-author of an unrealistic Western picture of Tibet:
Even Nazi Germany tried to find the secret power here [in Tibet] to rule the world, and a Nazi element named Heinrich Harrer was commissioned to go to Tibet and to establish relations with the upper class there. From 1946, this man was the 14th Dalai’s political adviser and English teacher, and he only fled Tibet in 1951. In his book “Seven Years in Tibet” and in related interviews, he describes feudalistic and farmer-slave-system Tibet as “the last piece of pure earth on the globe” – “you can find there, on the roof of the world, what we have lost in the West.” The 1997 Hollywood adaptation of the book not only concealed the author’s Nazi identity, but also, by fabrications, suggested that Tibet wasn’t a historic part of China, distorting peaceful liberation into a “Chinese invasion of Tibet”, thus deliberately misleading the Western public.
甚至纳粹德国也试图从这里找到可以统 治世界的“神秘力量”，一个叫海因里希·哈勒的纳粹分子受命前往西藏与上层建立联系，此人从1946年起给十四世达赖充当政治顾问和英文教师，直到 1951年才逃离西藏。在其《西藏七年》一书和相关采访中，把封建农奴制统治下的西藏描述为“地球上的最后一片净土”、“我们西方人在现实生活中遗失的东 西在这个世界屋脊的城市里都可以找到”。1997年好莱坞把这本书改编为电影，不仅掩盖了作者的纳粹身份，而且捏造情节否认西藏历史上就是中国一部分，把 和平解放歪曲为“中国入侵西藏”，蓄意误导西方公众。
In short: ugly things were made looking beautiful, and things got farcial enough to make a Spanish judge indict Chinese leaders to curry favor with the public (乃至发生西班牙法官借起诉中国领导人讨好“民意”的丑剧), writes Zhu. But with China’s growing global role, those Western countries couldn’t carry on like that, unless they wanted to harm themselves.
While it was important to inform the Western public about Tibet and Xinjiang, the Western elites wouldn’t settle with anything less than a Chinese acknowledgement that the two territories did not belong to China, writes Zhu. Therefore, illusions needed to be abandoned, and Chinese control be safeguarded:
Only when the West sees the inevitability of a strong China, and that separating Tibet and Xinjiang from China is just a “beautiful dream”, that it is in the Western interest to develop and safeguard relations with China rather than the contrary, it may lead the West to change its thinking.
» China angry, U.S. shouldn’t worry, Washington Post blogs, Feb 21, 2014
WordPress offers an annual report for 2013 to each individual blogger, with individual statistics. As the previous summary for 2012, too, the 2013 summary for
JR’s China blog is upbeat. And it handsomely ignores an interesting fact: this blog has seen the second traffic decline in two consecutive years. That’s what my actual WP dashboard tells me, and it’s useful information indeed. It helps me to think about what makes me write, and what makes others read.
Reflecting on the statistics, I understand that my entries haven’t necessarily become less interesting. I’ve posted less frequently, of course. But that’s probably not the only reason fort he decline. The decline in stats began in 2012, and it didn’t come with a decline in blogging activity. A rough estimate, based on my drafts on my computer, suggests that there were 252 new posts in 2011 and 275 new posts in 2012.
There’s a number of factors that, maybe, drove this blog before 2012, and that abated somewhere in the second half of 2011, or the first half of 2012.
One is the general trend. Microblogging has, in many bloggers‘ lives, replaced actual blogging. Facebook may be another alternative to blogging (even if one I’d never consider myself).
My own writing may be a factor, too. To rate the quality of someone’s writing, or the appeal of it to readers, is difficult when it’s actually your own writing. I’m not trying to be my own critic now. But there’s one thing I can easily discern. Before 2012, I wrote about China and human rights, and made fun of the CCP. It was simple argumentative technology, and it was easy reading. From 2012, I turned to a more “researching” or “deliberative” kind of blogging. There’s probably a post to mark the turn: JR turns to science.
It’s never become real science, I guess, but it did become more about translation and analysis. This started in December 2011, the timing of that post basically corresponds with my memory.
The topic that made me change my blogging approach – not completely, but gradually first, and then to quite a degree – was the Zhang Danhong incident in 2008, and the case of four Deutsche Welle employees who were sacked in 2010/2011. My own situation had changed, too. After having lived in China for a number of years, I had returned to Germany – probably for good. I can’t imagine living in China for another number of years. The people and things that matter most to me are now here.
That doesn’t make China less fascinating to me. But my perspective has shifted. It’s where China has an impact on life in Germany, and the other way round, what interests me most.
In a way, that seems to have the potential of a pretty global topic – there are “thousands of miles” where one country, or one civilization, overlaps with another. But these are, seemingly anyway, rather unspectacular seams around the globe. They usually go as unnoticed by the public as does Chinese economic involvement in Africa or Latin America. Jeremy Goldkorn bemoaned the state of the South African media in 2010: even if a foreign country becomes your new number one trading partner, you may not notice it at all.
The challenge for the press would be to start digging on those sites, along those global borders and seams around the globe – in a way that people want to read. The challenge for a blogger may be pretty much the same.
But to react to this (supposed) demand would require much more of my time, and a willingness to become more „public“ on the internet, as a person. And it would be an experiment which still wouldn’t necessarily lead to a bigger impact.
After all, these reflections are only about what I think people would be interested in. Many bloggers – and many news people and entertainers – believe they know what people actually want to see most. And in most cases, their beliefs are probably wrong.
But if I were a press pro (with a generous boss), I’d probably give it a try. And yes, a bit of curiosity remains: how would it work out?