Victoria Nuland: Let’s Put it That Way

Daily news briefing, State Department, May 24

QUESTION: On China, you must have heard the new State Department directive to the Confucius Institute in the U.S. Could you explain to us, what is the purpose of this new directive?

MS. NULAND: Well, first of all, let me say that, as you know, the U.S. greatly values its people-to-people exchange with China. This was one of the centerpieces of the Secretary’s participation in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. She had a separate people-to-people exchange with State Councilor Liu and they got a chance to meet some American students and some Chinese students, and it was a great event.

This is also not about the Confucius Institutes themselves. It is simply about whether the right visa status was applied in these cases. When you have a J-1 education visa, there are two categories. There are J-1 visas if you are in kindergarten through high school, and there is a different category of J-1 visas if you are at university.

And there was some muddling and messing up, so – in these cases – so we’re going to sort these out. Nobody’s going to have to leave the country. It’s all going to get cleared up. But there was some confusion on the front end, so we’re going to fix it.

QUESTION: But in the directive, it said on all the current affected exchange visitors, they have to leave before June 30 this year. Is that the case?

MS. NULAND: My understanding is that we’re going to do our best to fix this without having anybody have to leave.

QUESTION: And finally –

MS. NULAND: That is my understanding.

QUESTION: — are you concerned about the Confucius Institute’s expansion in the U.S. as the –

MS. NULAND: Are we concerned about?

QUESTION: The Confucius Institute’s expansion in the U.S. as the strongest Chinese soft power?

MS. NULAND: No. This is something that we support. It’s part of the people-to-people understanding. We just want to make sure that the visa categories are correct.

Okay.

QUESTION: Can you speak to the timing of why now? Was it – was that in conjunction to this problem being across all of the Confucius Institutes, the J-1 confusion?

MS. NULAND: I can’t speak to why this came up now. I think that we – as I understood it this morning, we became aware that this wasn’t just one case or two cases, that there was a – sort of a mess-up in the processing in general. So we need to fix that.

QUESTION: What was the mess-up?

QUESTION: Can you characterize the mess-up? Yeah.

MS. NULAND: That in fact, folks who are participating and teaching in programs that were K-12 were given university-style J-1s, and the other way around.

QUESTION: So –

QUESTION: And whose problem with that?

MS. NULAND: I can’t speak to how the mess-up occurred, but we’re going to fix it.

QUESTION: Well, who issues the visas? I mean, it’s – the State Department issues visas, right?

MS. NULAND: Right. So whether there was some confusion on the front end with the sponsors as to which programs individual teachers were being brought for, or whether there was some changing after they arrived, I really can’t speak to that. But we’re going to clean it up so that everybody’s in the right visa category.

QUESTION: So you –

QUESTION: You don’t expect anyone to have to leave the country?

MS. NULAND: My understanding was we’re going to do our best to fix this so that nobody has to leave.

QUESTION: And just so we’re clear, you don’t think, then, that the mistake was on the State Department’s end? Do you think it’s possible that it was on the end of the people who applied or the intermediaries?

MS. NULAND: I just can’t speak to that, and I can’t speak to whether this was uniform in any way or whether there were various problems.

QUESTION: And you can’t speak to it because you don’t know –

MS. NULAND: Correct.

QUESTION: — or because you know and you don’t want to say?

MS. NULAND: Because we have to investigate it and figure it out.

Okay.

QUESTION: Can you talk about how many visas were impacted by the problem?

MS. NULAND: I don’t have that either.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: May I ask you for what kind of meetings, when you say that you are working on this issue? I heard that some of the Confucius Institutions have come and had meetings with the assistant secretary already talking about this. So could you tell us more about what kind of works has been doing to avoid – make sure people don’t have to leave the country by the end of June?

MS. NULAND: Yeah. My understanding is that at the current moment, we’re trying to size the problem, we’re trying to figure out how many people are affected, and then we’re going to – and we’re in the process of reissuing instructions that are a little bit clearer and a little bit more easy to manage. Let’s put it that way.

QUESTION: Okay. And may I also say that we know that in the past couple of months, a few members in the Congress expressed their dissatisfaction and question about the operation of Confucius Institutes in the U.S. So I wonder, when you were doing this – before you released this direction about the J-1 visa, did you have any contact with those members in the Congress?

MS. NULAND: Well, I’m sure that, as we always do on all matters, we’re in dialogue with Congress. But this is a matter not about any of that; it’s a matter about whether people are in the right visa category for where they are teaching.

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Related

» State Department directive, May 24, 2012

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Confucius Institute: State Department Directive “an Untimely End to Chinese Classes”

Main Link: Huanqiu Shibao, May 24, 2012, 03:29.

Translated off the reel, and posted right away. A link to the State-Department directive can be found under footnote 2. Links within blockquote added during translation.
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A notice issued by U.S. State Department officials on May 17, to all Confucius Institutes in America, has caused great controversy. The new notice requires existing Confucius Institutes to apply for American “certification”, to become part of regular courses, and bans Chinese teachers and volunteers to teach in middle and elementary schools. A Hanban responsible, on May 23, expressed “shock” to a Huanqiu Shibao reporter, as no consultations had preceded this notice. Insiders told this reporter that to date, American officials hadn’t explained to whom the Confucius Institutes should turn for certification. U.S. “Higher Education News”¹⁾ wrote on May 21 that the notice would disrupt Confucius Institute teaching activities. “People don’t undersstand the State Department’s sudden notice. Actually, Confucius Institutes have been on American campuses for almost ten years.” An insider told the Global Times reporter on May 23 that currently, Confucius Institutes were highly successful and influential in America, that many Americans learned Chinese, and that America was somewhat worried about this. In addition, it was election year in America, and political consideration could be behind the measures taken.
美国国务院官员签发的一项公告5月17日发往全美孔子学院，引起巨大争议。新公告规定现有孔子学院必须申请美国“认证”，成为正式课程的一部分，且禁止中方教师和志愿者在美国中小学的孔子学堂教学。国家汉办负责人23日向《环球时报》记者表示，对美方在事先没有任何协商的情况下发出这样的公告感到“震惊”。有知情者告诉《环球时报》记者，孔子学院不计学分，不授学位，不具认证的前提，美国官方迄今也从未说明孔子学院应该向谁认证。美国“高等教育新闻”网站21日载文称，国务院这一公告将打乱孔子学院的教学活动。“人们不明白美国国务院为何突然出台此项公告，毕竟，孔子学院在美国校园内已有近十年时间”。一名了解内幕的人士23日向《环球时报》记者介绍，目前孔子学院在美国搞得很成功，影响很大，美国学习汉语的人很多，美方对此有所担心。再加上今年又是美国的大选年，美国出台这些措施可能有政治方面的考量。

The notice was reportedly issued by Robin Lerner, the State Department Deputy Secretary in charge of Educatonal and Cultural Matters and private-sector exchange. The notice says that while Confucius Institutes may be beneficial to promoting cultural exchange, its activities “need to be in accordance with the standards of exchange, and respect the relevant law and regulations”. “Professors, researchers, short-term visiting scholars or institutes, as well as students, were not allowed to teach in primary schools²⁾. [...] The notice also says that “to ensure that the Confucius Institute education corresponds with and maintains suitable regulations and standards, the Institutes must apply for American certification”, “on initial examination, it isn’t clear if the Confucius Institutes will get American certification”. The State Department allows currently teaching Confucius Institute teachers with J-1 visa to continue teaching until the end of the school year in June, but won’t renew their visas. If they wish, they can return to China to apply for appropriate exchange project visas.
据悉，签发这一公告的是美国国务院负责教育和文化事务局私营部门交流的副助理秘书长罗宾•勒纳。公告称，尽管孔子学院可能有益于促进文化交流，但其所从事的活动“必须符合正确的交流规范，遵循相关法规”。“教授、研究学者、短期访问学者或学院、大学学生不允许在公立和私立小、中学教学，否则便与有关交流访问项目法规相违。 [.....] ”公告还称，“为确保孔子学院的教育符合和保持适合的规定标准，孔子学院必须申请美国认证”，“美国国务院的初步审视并不清楚这些孔子学院是否得到美国认证”。美国务院允许目前持有J-1签证的孔子学院教师继续留至2012年6月本学年结束，但不会为他们续签签证。如果他们愿意，可回中国再申办一种合适的交流项目签证。

There are Confucius Institutes at 81 American universities. The notice has caused wide-spread shock, confusion, and incomprehension. Confucius Institutes in all places said that the notice was “surprising” or “unusual”, and there were discussions everywhere as to how to deal [with the situation]. Huanqiu Shibao has learned that J-1 visas are a kind of non-immigration visas, issued to foreigners who participate in “exchange and visitor programs approved by the State Department”. An official survey concerning J-1 visa holders was carried out early this year.
81所美国大学内设有孔子学院。这一公告已引起广泛的震惊、困惑和不解，各地孔子学院均表示此项公告“令人吃惊”、“很不寻常”，都在讨论如何应对。《环球时报》记者了解到，J－1签证是一种非移民签证，签发给来美国参加美国国务院批准的“交流访问者计划”的各类外籍人士。今年年初，美国官方曾对持有J－1签证人员情况进行过调查。

A lady who had taught for Confucius Institutes in America told Huanqiu Shibao on May 23 that teachers sent by China to teach abroad were mainly government-sponsored, or volunteers. They all held visitor J-1 visas. She had been a volunteer, and a visa had been rather easy to obtain.
一名曾在美国孔子学院授课的女士23日向《环球时报》记者介绍，中方派驻国外孔子学院的授课老师主要有公派教师和志愿者两种，他们所持的都是访问学者J-1签证。她当时就是作为志愿者授课的，获得签证比较容易。

What people find most incomprehensible is that American officialdom requires Confucius Institutes to carry out so-called “certification”. Huanqiu Shibao has learned that to date, the State Department has not said where Confucius Institutes should turn for certification. By comparison, nothing has been heard of German Goethe Institutes, French Institutes or other cultural exchange bodies in America having received American certification. People in charge at the first Confucius Institutes established in the U.S., University of Maryland Confucius Institute and George Mason University Confucius Institute, express confusion, and say that the “certification” issue is currently being discussed. The person in charge at the George Mason University Confucius Institute hopes that the notification came without political considerations. After all, Obama’s initiative to have 100,000 students study in China was about encouraging American students to study Chinese.
令人最为不解的是美国官方要求对孔子学院进行所谓“认证”。据《环球时报》记者了解，美国官方迄今从未说明孔子学院应该向谁认证。横向比较一下，从未听说德国的歌德学院、法国的法语联盟等在美文化交流机构须得到美国认证。在接受本报记者采访时，美国第一家孔子学院———马里兰大学孔子学院及乔治•梅森大学孔子学院负责人均表示，对这一公告感到困惑，校方均在就“认证”一事进行讨论与沟通。乔治•梅森大学孔子学院负责人说，希望国务院出台的公告没有政治方面的考虑，毕竟奥巴马推动美国10万学生赴华留学项目也是鼓励美国学生学习中文。

According to explanations by a Hanban person in charge, made to Huanqiu Shibao, Hanban has sent a letter to university presidents, to carry out negotiations. The letter says that Confucius Institutes in America were established at American requests, and run in cooperation with Hanban and Chinese institutions of higher education. The Chinese side fully respected the esteemed universities’ powers to make their own decisions (自主权)³⁾, and there had never been special instructions concerning the teaching and cultural-exchange activities carried out by the Institutes. The central office provided help, such as support in that it sent volunteers, as requested by the American side. The letter also says that the Chinese side respects American governmental law and regulations, but that in this process, we do not wish to see that volunteer projects get disrupted, as this would lead to many quickly-developing Chinese-language classes coming to an untimely end, resulting in losses for the schools and students.
据国家汉办负责人23日向《环球时报》记者介绍，该机构已致信下设孔子课堂的美国大学校长，就此事进行交涉。信中表示，美国孔子学院是由美方自愿申请，并与汉办和中方高校合作举办的。中方充分尊重贵校的办学自主权，对孔子学院开设课程和开展文化交流活动及下设孔子课堂，从未有过专门指令。总部向孔子学院提供的包括派遣志愿者在内的所有帮助，均系美方所要求。信中还表示，中方尊重美国政府的法律和规定，但在此过程中，我们不愿意看到因此而造成中断志愿者项目的后果，否则将会导致很多学校蒸蒸日上的中文课程由于教师缺失而被迫夭折，致使这些学校和学生蒙受损失。

The person in charge also said that before volunteers head for America, they get an invitation from the American schools, in accordance with the Sino-American school agreements, and apply for and obtain a visa. From 2005 on, China had developed Chinese language education to help America, and had sent more than 2,100 teachers. The project had always worked smoothly. It had been believed that once teachers received an American invitation, the application would lead to a visa, and that there would be no problems. No consultations had preceded the State Department’s May-17 notice, and this was felt to be very sudden and surprising by those in charge at the Confucius Institutes.
这位负责人还表示，志愿者赴美前，是按照中美双方学校的协议，接受美方学校的邀请，申请并获准签证的。从2005年起，中方为帮助美国发展汉语教学，已派出2100多名教师，项目执行一直很顺利。原以为教师接受美方邀请，申请并获准了赴美签证，就不会产生问题。在事先没有任何协商的情况下，美国国务院5月17日发布公告，作为主管孔子学院的负责人，他感到很突然、很吃惊。

Many presidents [of universities with Confucius Institutes] were disgusted by the State Department notice, and had many objections, as they believed it interfered with their universities’ autonomy³⁾. They currently contacted the State Department and negotiated. Huanqiu Shibao also learned that to address the doubts, a State-Department official was to be sent to Maryland University to have direct talks with people in charge at the university and the Confucius Institute.
美国多所设有孔子学院的大学校长对美国这一公告非常反感，很有意见，认为它干涉了学校的办学自主权，目前正与美国国务院进行联系和交涉。《环球时报》记者还了解到，面对质疑，美国国务院官员23日将赴马里兰大学，与马里兰大学校方、孔子学院负责人一起进行面对面的沟通与交流。

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Notes

¹⁾ This is my translation of 美国“高等教育新闻”网站 – the website’s real name may be different.

²⁾ Quote:

Teaching positions in primary and secondary schools (K-12) are only authorized under the “Teacher” category set forth at 22 CFR 62.24. Teaching primary and secondary school students in public school systems or private schools is not permitted by professors, research scholars, short-term scholars, or college/university students.

(Guidance Directive 2012-06 Exchange Visitor Program – Confucius Institutes)

³⁾ 自主权, which may be translated either as the right to make decisions of one’s own, or autonomy. The term for provincial or territorial autonomy in China, for places like Tibet, would be 自治区 (autonomous regions), and is therefore not exactly the same term.

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Related

» Three Eight-Hundreds, April 19, 2009

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Chen Guangcheng leaves China

Chen Guangcheng, his wife Yuan Weijing, and their two children are on a plane to the United States, reports Die Zeit.

Ma Ying-jeou, Lost in Tradition

Shortly before the beginning of Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou‘s second term in office, his support and satisfaction rates are at new historical lows, between 15 to 22 per cent. More than 60 per cent of the public have no confidence in Ma’s coming four years of administration, reports Singapore’s Morning News (Lianhe Zaobao).

“These opinion polls aren’t like anything during the past four years”, Zaobao quotes the head of Taiwan National University’s Department of Political Science, Wang Yeh-lih (王業立). “Ma Ying-jeou’s biggest problem is that the decision-making circles are too small, that communication between the government and the [KMT] party is poor, and that the relapse in public opinion was underestimated.”

During the past three months since his re-election, efforts to resolve an ongoing beef-imports dispute with the U.S., oil and electricity price hikes and stock exchange taxes, hadn’t been able to please either farmers, nor workers, nor business people, and had left people boiling with resentment (民怨沸腾), writes Zaobao. Hikes in oil and electricity prices had added to living costs, in terms of food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and all kinds of basic necessities, and stealth price increases in all kinds of products.

Ma Ying-jeou’s traditionally wooden communication skills haven’t been helpful during the recent wave of resentment. The Taipei Times people, of course, loves his exchanges with normal people, but not for the reasons Ma thinks they should:

On May 4, during a visit by the president to National Pingtung University of Science and Technology, a student told Ma in reference to a recent increase in retail prices that he does not feel full now after eating one biandang, or lunchbox. The student said typical lunchboxes these days tend to contain less vegetables even though their prices have remained the same. In response, Ma asked: “You don’t feel full? So now you need to eat one more biandang? Or do you endure being hungry?”

To make things worse, the discussion became distorted in that Ma was later quoted as saying that “Just eat another biandang and you’ll be full” (再吃一个便当就饱了), writes Zaobao.

Ma’s idea of a presidency is traditional – he certainly wants to be seen as a leader who understands what is going on in peoples’ daily lives, but his benchmark – former president Chiang Ching-kuo, who certainly was progressive at his times – when compared to his father Chiang Kai-shek -, is outdated. And each of Ma’s attempts to look like a leader of historic scale is happily ridiculed, whenever opportunites arise. They seem to arise often.

From the early 1980s on, Ma had worked for Chiang Ching-kuo, in several functions. In an interview which was part of a Chiang Ching-kuo documentary, Ma remembered one of Chiang’s last public appearances. Chiang was wheelchair-bound by then, he attended a Constitution Commemorative Conference in 1987, and as he was scurried off the stage, probably to spare him the spectacle that accompanied his exit, civil-rights advocates and democracy activists were standing – but not out of respect. They shouted, and waved posters with their demands. It appeared to be an unpleasant scene indeed – and next in the documentary’s picture was modern-day Ma, worry lines and disgust in his face, telling how ungrateful the activists had been:

It was as if [Chiang] was saying, “I have made all these efforts to promote Taiwan’s democratic reforms. How can they do this to me?”^*)
好像就聽到，他嘴裡在說，他說我這幾年來，大力推動台灣的民主改革，他們怎麼還會這樣子對我呢？

But to compare Chiang Ching-kuo and Ma would be unjustified for a number of reasons. On the one hand, Ma has never been something like a secret-police director. But on the other, he doesn’t have Chiang’s merits either. What are Ma’s achievements? What should people reciprocate for? Or, in the words in which he reportedly complained to his sister, after getting a lot of stick for his administration’s management after the Morakot typhoon: “good people weren’t rewarded” (好人沒好報).

Nanfang Shuo (南方朔), a moderate critic of Ma Ying-jeou, believes that much of the public’s unease stems from an awareness that Ma is free from pressure as he faces no further elections. Reforms and decisions could therefore be taken arbitrarily (or autocratically – 独断独行).

In fact, even if one only follows Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential fortunes loosely (as JR does), it is easy to see that Ma is rarely in tune with the public in general, or even in individual chats. During the presidential election campaign, his opponent Tsai Ing-wen (herself not necessarily a folksy type of politician either), came across as fairly presidential (an observation by Nanfang Shuo in October last year), and to beat Ma in terms of communication skills was hardly a daunting challenge either.

All the same, Ma was re-elected – and the public now seems to complain that they got exactly the president they had gotten to know during his first term.

It’s not all the president’s fault. Certainly not in a democracy, where people have choices.

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Note

^*) I can’t find the documentary online, but I seem to remember that Ma basically used the same words to describe his impressions there, as in this quote.

Related

» The Lame leading the Blind, June 3, 2011
» No Shanzhai Chiang, May 20, 2009

Long Yongtu and the Smiling Curve: Only a Great Importer is a Great Power

Main Link: Taiwan News / CNA. Links within blockquote added during translation.

CNA reporter Kang Shih-jen (Kang Shih-jen, Ann Chen) in Chongqing, May 17.
Former mainland Chinese former chief negotiator of China’s accession to WTO and deputy foreign trade minister Long Yongtu emphasized today that if the mainland wants to change its international long-term status as a trade-surplus state, it will need to broaden its imports, which will also increase its customs revenues, and meet domestic demand.
（中央社記者康世人重慶17日電）曾任中國大陸入世首席談判代表、外經貿部副部長的龍永圖今天強調，大陸要改變在國際貿易中長期處於順差狀態的形象，就必須擴大進口，且擴大進口還能增加稅收、滿足內需。

Long Yongtu spoke on invitation by the 2012 World Trade Center Association (Chongqing) Development Forum and said that the mainland at a point in time where old concepts needed to change, and imports therefore be expanded.
龍永圖下午應邀在2012世界貿易中心協會（重慶）發展論壇上發表演說，談到大陸到了改變過時守舊觀念的時候，因此必須擴大進口。

He said that in the past, all the talk had been about how to expand exports, but now, Chongqing Development Forum made the topic of expanding imports a topic with new conceptions; at a time when global trade was depressed, every country had a responsibility to explore ways to expand its own imports, as only through that, global trade could be [re]invigorated.
他說，過去談貿易促進時，都談如何擴大出口，但今天重慶的發展論壇以擴大進口作為主題很有新意；在全球貿易處低迷時，每個國家都有責任研究如何擴大自身進口，唯有如此才能使全球貿易活躍。

Long Yongtu stressed that particularly for the mainland’s long-term status as a surplus trader, broadening imports would be beneficial for its image in global trade; by changing the long-term surplus, a positive contribution to global trade could be made.
龍永圖強調，尤其大陸長期處於貿易順差狀態，擴大進口有利改變大陸在全球貿易中的形象；改變長期順差的局面，才能為全球貿易做出積極貢獻。

He believes that to change the mainland’s image, traditional views and conservative, outdated concepts needed to change, and above all, the idea that exports were better than imports.
他認為，要改變大陸形象，得從觀念上改變傳統、守舊過時的看法，首先是改變出口比進口好的傳統觀念。

From the perspective of international theory, Long Yongtu pointed out that importing countries were, from beginning to end, the most benefitting countries: “Whoever controls imports will control the international initiative”.
從國際理論上來說，龍永圖指出，進口國始終是國際貿易中的最大贏家，「誰掌握進口，誰就掌握國際貿易的主動權」。

Long Yongtu said that, based on the example of the mainland and America, that although the mainland was a long-term exporter, its position in international trade wasn’t strong. Why was America “standing out” in international trade? It was because America was the world’s biggest importer. Therefore, if the mainland wanted to move from the position of a big trading nation to a great trading nation, there were only imports, and the need to become the world’s biggest importing country.
龍永圖以大陸和美國為例說，雖然大陸長期出口，但在國際貿易中的地位不強；美國為什麼在全球貿易體制當中「這麼牛」（這麼厲害）？就是因為美國是全球最大進口國，因此如果大陸要「從貿易大國走向貿易強國，只有進口，且必須要成為全球貿易最大進口國」。

Besides, Long Yongtu believes that expanding imports could also promote an increase in mainland industrial upgrading. The mainland exactly needed to switch from dependence on exports to putting domestic demand first, and could, through these means, also meet domestic demand.
此外，龍永圖認為，擴大進口也會促進大陸內部產業升級，大陸正從依靠出口轉向內需為主，也要擴大進口滿足內需。

He pointed out that to strengthen imports could also strengthen fiscal income. By reducing tariffs, imports could be stimulated and broadened, and the entry of products would benefit a broader custom and excise foundation, and increase tariff revenues.
他指出，增加進口還可增加政府財政稅收。由於關稅下降，刺激、擴大進口產品的進入，有利稅基擴大，提高關稅收入。

To expand imports was also the best answer to international trade protectionism. If the mainland expanded imports of European and American products, European and American trade barriers and protectionism would greatly be reduced.
龍永圖說，擴大進口也是解決國際貿易保護主義的最佳、最有效辦法。大陸擴大從歐美進口商品，歐美對大陸貿易障礙和貿易保護就大幅降低。

He also emphasized that processing trade [the term "extended workbench" should apply here - JR] wasn’t like normal trade, and that enterprises, great and small, had striven for the old concept of a level of all-inclusive organizational structures^*), i. e. to increase their shares of self-made modules. [But in fact,] there was a need to master the global division of labor and procurement, to produce the world’s best products from the world’s best components and modules and thus build the most competitive products. Only this would be beneficial to the mainland’s economic development and make it the world’s marketcenter [purchasing center].
他還強調，要改變加工貿易不如一般貿易、企業發展追求「大而全、小而全」及提高零組件自製比例的舊觀念，要透過全球分工和全球採購，把全球最佳零組件集中形成全球最有競爭力的產品，才有利大陸經濟發展，也讓大陸能成為全球採購中心。

Long Yongtu also praised Chongqing for the creation of a new situation in the information processing industry. This had mainly been for the mainland’s customs rates having been lowered to zero when it entered the WTO. This had stimulated component imports, and the result had been research and development in and production of electronic components. In the end, when calculating the entire smiling curve, the entire assembly line had remained in Chongqing. The “Chongqing Model” had therefore deserved to be studied and to be followed [imitated] by mainland China’s [entire] central and western areas.
龍永圖也稱讚重慶打造一個電子資訊產業加工新型態，這主要是當年大陸加入世界貿易組織（WTO）時，決定讓電子零組件關稅降為零，刺激零組件進口，結果成就現在將研發、零組件製造、終端、結算整個微笑曲線流程全都留在重慶的「重慶模式」，這樣的模式值得研究和大陸中西部仿效。

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Note

^*) The 大而全、小而全 slogan is translated, in an online publication of the Central Committee decision of September 1999, as the status of [state-owned, in that context] enterprises that

have an all-inclusive organizational structure, but have failed to establish specialized production and socialized coordination systems and an economy of scale, and lack market competitiveness

- see item IV. there. In short: the share of components bought from suppliers is small, because what would be sub-suppliers’ business elsewhere, is all integrated into a single company’s production under this concept.

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Related

» Low-End Exports, Oct 3, 2011
» More Scientific & Fairer Rules, Sept 19, 2011

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How Long will the Linyi Leaders last in Office?

Not the rule of law, but “social management”, seems to impose this question. Local party and state authority mostly remains faceless in the news, but there are heads who are responsible for the human-rights violations – apparently gross even by Chinese standards – which turned Chen Guangcheng into an activist, and heads who are responsible for more recent scandals which haven’t only rattled some otherwise callous foreign “old China hands”, but, more crucially, Chinese people, too.

There seems to be an exorbitant flush of revenge among the local or regional authorities. But “loss of face” may not be the only reason for the latest travesties of justice that apparently surround Chen’s wider family, and especially his nephew, Chen Kegui. My impression is that there are officials who are fighting for their political survival, or who want to do as much damage as they can before they are finished.

The party cares more about itself than about the state, but the center will have to sacrify some pawn comrades. No evidence – just a gut feeling.

Afterwards, we will hear from people who are “shocked” that those things could happen at all, as if the crimes had started only a week ago, and Huanqiu Shibao and the “Global Times”, its English-language sister paper will, once again, celebrate the “rule of law” in China.

Experts: How to Win Friends Abroad, and to Lose them at Home

Huanqiu Shibao quotes the gist of what ten academics said in a Central Party School discussion on May 5. This post contains translations from four of the quotes, and a few comments from the Huanqiu readership.

Wang Fan (王帆, Professor, Director of the Institute of International Relations, and Assistant President, China Foreign Affairs University):

In terms of power and politics in Asia, the cold-war mentality won’t go away. China should reduce the negative effects of cold-war mentality, manage crises, and take preventive measures against crises. In the framework of the maintained status quo, a consensus with America should be worked out. On the one hand, multilateral security cooperation should be strengthened, on the other, untraditional security cooperation should be strengthened, and the East Asia Kyousei Forum (东亚共生) model be used, to solve issues of balanced development in East Asia.
从亚洲地区权力与政治的现状来看，冷战思维是不可能消除的，中国应减少冷战思维的负面影响，管控危机、预防危机。在维持亚洲现状的情况下与美国达成共识。一方面加强多边安全合作，另一方面加强非传统安全合作，充分利用东亚共生的现象，解决好东亚均衡发展问题。

Zhang Yansheng (张燕生, the Institute for International Economics Research of the National Development and Reform Commission’s academic-commission secretary):

In the next few years, according to the current pace of development, the size of China’s economy will overtake America’s. During this process, there will be competition between China and America, and China  [correction, May 12: America] will do everything in its power to hold China back. This is a critical stage for China as a country. To respond to these unfavorable prospects, China needs to change its development pattern and establish a pattern which lends support to a order and to a legal system. From an export-oriented economy, it must internationalize [in terms of] talent, markets, industry, capital etc., strategically and structurally link China with the international systems, and structural transformation is the core here.
未来几年，按照现有的发展速度，中国的经济规模将会超过美国。在这个进程中，中美会出现竞争，美国会千方百计地阻止中国。因此，对中国来说，这是一个国家发展的关键时期。中国若要应对这一不利前景，必须改变前30年的发展模式，建立一个基于规则和法制的发展模式，由外向型经济转变为人才、市场、产业、资本等的国际化，在体制、战略和结构上与国际制度接轨，其中体制转变是核心。

Shao Feng, (邵峰, CASS Global Economics and Politcs Research Institute’s Strategy Office director):

A country’s overall level of development is the actual embodiment of its soft power. Four international strategic issues urgently need research and solutions:

• the issue of strategic timing, how China should seize its opportunities and solve issues inherited from history
• the issue of China having too few friends internationally, of how to win more friends through the establishment of common values and common benefit
• the issue of raising China’s international image, and
• the issue of building the national economy and society.

国家整体发展水平才是国家软实力的体现。中国国际战略研究急需研究解决以下四个课题：一是战略时机问题，中国应如何抓住时机，解决历史遗留问题；二是中国在世界上朋友太少，如何通过建立共同价值观和共同利益，在国际社会争取更多朋友；三是提升中国国际形象；四是加强国家经济、社会等建设。

Wang Hongxu (王红续, Central Party School International Strategic Research and Chinese Diplomacy Research Office director):

In the definition of international strategies [an international strategy], the domestic environment and the international environment are equally important. China’s current unbalanced development and cultural soft power stays far behind its economic development, and its position in international public opinion and  discourse dominance [also: the right to speak - 话语权] is weak. In view of that, China still needs to practise, on the global stage, the basic strategy defined in the 1980s. Obviously, there need to be adjustments in accordance with new situations and new characteristics. China hasn’t yet achieved an international cultural strategy, and that has to change.
在制定国际战略时，国内环境和国际环境同样重要。中国目前的发展不平衡，文化软实力大大滞后于经济发展，在国际舆论和话语权方面处于弱势地位。鉴于以上情况，中国在上世纪80年代制定的基本战略还需要继续实行。当然，要根据新形势和新特点，进行适当调整。目前，中国还没有成体系的国际文化战略，这一情况需要改变。

-

Comments from the Huanqiu Shibao readership:

It only takes very small numbers of troops to regain ones territories and territorial waters! Why all the pondering? In the War to Resist America and to Aid Korea, and the self-defense strike against Vietnam, it took very few troops! These so-called experts are apparently all women! — There is no masculine disposition here! This becomes especially apparent in the ideological methods. Take these [experts] and put them next to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping to compare their ideological methods would do too much honor [to these experts].
收复自己的领土领海而动用非常少量的军队!用得着这样思前想后的吗?和在抗美援朝战场及对越反自卫击战投入的兵力比 真的只需动用非常少量的军队!这几位所谓的专家应该都是女性!—没有男子汉的气质与胆量!特别是体现在思维方式上更是如如此 当然啦 拿这几位和毛泽东,邓小平去比较思维方式确实是太高看其人了.
– 21 minutes ago

This bunch of traitors is misleading the citizens! Stomp [them]!
这群汉奸又在误导国民。脚踩！！！
– 26 minutes ago

In reply to the previous comment:
Correct. 正确
– 13 minutes ago.

[A rather sophisticated comment - and too sophisticated for JR to grasp its first line (谁想打仗让谁上好了)]:

[...] A bunch of screaming and chattering lunatics. Do you know the cruelty of war?
谁想打仗让谁上好了,－群哇哇乱叫的疯子,知道战争的残酷吗?
– one hour ago

I can’t translate the replies to the latter comment, but neither of them appears to be friendly, but one of the three (possibly all the same person) writes:

In the past, territory was given away in exchange for peace, but in the end, there was still war. Cruelty? I would rather die than live without dignity, sovereignty is fought for, it’s not resistance with each passing day.
你就是一sb，以前用领土换和平还不是最后要打仗，残酷？情愿死也不要无尊严的活着，主权是打来的，不是天天抗议
– one hour ago.

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Related

» First School Lesson: Patriotic Essays, Sept 1, 2009
» Concerning Traitors, Aug 25, 2009
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Update/Related

» Orgasm is Easy, Rectified.Name, May 12, 2012

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Helping Dissidents: When People Die for Wealth, and Birds Die for Food

Main Link: He Qinglian’s BBC article

He Qinglian is a Chinese economist and author who has lived in the U.S. since 2001. In an article published by the BBC‘s Chinese website (last updated on May 9, 2012) [ this account of it based on the May-7 updated version], she argues that in terms of national interest, America is rather selling benefits, than gaining them, to act in accordance with its values. There was no economic benefit to be gained by focusing on human-rights issues in its talks with China. Accusations that America was using human rights issues as a “tool” to serve its national interest, as claimed both by the CCP and by a number of dissidents, too, therefore made no sense.

It’s the case of Chen Guangcheng and his family which prompted her article. But her advice on how to help with human-rights issues goes beyond the current situation.

The efficiency of Metternich-style diplomacy had become very limited, she writes. Global decisions sought by America depended on China’s cooperation, and Europe was busy with its sovereign debt crisis (and was seeking cooperation from China, too). America’s best diplomatic “weapon” now was to apply its “soft power”, to influence China by persuasion (劝说, quànshuō) and by exchange of benefits. Otherwise, the inevitable result of situations like the current one was international humiliation of China – it would either turn a deaf ear to the matter, or fight back.

The idea that America “used human right criticism as a tool to pursue its national interests” had been an educational and propaganda line which had become deeply rooted in China – a country with a popular saying of “peole die for wealth, and birds die for food” (人为财死，鸟为食亡). CCP propaganda which kept using the concept of natonal interest was therefore highly efficient, exactly for the situation as it was at home, within China.

He Qinglian sums up why, she believes, the American-Chinese talks didn’t get derailed while secretary of state Hilary Clinton was in Beijing:

I don’t believe that China could be inspired by American soft power, and I can only guess what China got [from America] so that the good “partnership” continued.

Taking refuge in the American embassy was therefore – probably – no regular approach Chinese dissidents could take, writes He Qinglian. Each of them would have to seek international help in some ways, to different extents, in accordance with their individual situations.

One may agree or disagree with her, but I seem to sense the soulsearching and the trouble she felt when writing her article. One of the commenters underneath, under the pseudonym of Grief and Resentment (哀怨人), commenting from the U.S., suggests that there is a kind of helplessness (一种无奈感) in it.

Basically, if anything, He Qinglian seems to endorse the U.S. State Department’s approach, rather than calls from Capitol Hill, from news comments and elsewhere, to do more than what has been done so far.

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Related

» A Division of Labor that Can’t Work, Febr 23, 2010
» He Qinglian about Deutsche Welle (interview in German), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Nov 11, 2008

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